[House Report 106-488]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                 Union Calendar No. 273
106th Congress, 1st Session -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - House Report 106-488


 
THE FALN AND MACHETEROS CLEMENCY: MISLEADING EXPLANATIONS, A RECKLESS 
                     DECISION, A DANGEROUS MESSAGE

                               __________

                              THIRD REPORT

                                 by the

                     COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                             together with

                    DISSENTING AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                                     


                                     

     Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/reform

 December 10, 1999.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on 
            the State of the Union and ordered to be printed


                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
60-619                     WASHINGTON : 1999


                     COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                     DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland       TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California             PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia            CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana           ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, 
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana                  DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida             CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South     DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    Carolina                         ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia                    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida                  JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas             JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska                  THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois               HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon                  JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California                             ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin                 BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho              (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana


                      Kevin Binger, Staff Director
                     James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
                  Kristi L. Remington, Senior Counsel
                    Lisa Smith Arafune, Chief Clerk
                 Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                  House of Representatives,
                                 Washington, DC, December 10, 1999.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on 
Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee's third 
report to the 106th Congress.
                                                Dan Burton,
                                                          Chairman.

                                 (iii)

                                     
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Findings of the Committee on Government Reform...................     1
 I. Why the Committee investigated the offer of clemency to the 16 
    terrorists........................................................5
II. Factual background...............................................11
    A. The capture and conviction of the individuals offered 
        clemency.................................................    12
        1. History of the FALN's reign of terror in Chicago and 
            New York.............................................    13
        2. The capture of the ``Chicago 11''.....................    16
            a. The investigation.................................    17
            b. The trials........................................    18
                i. Ten individuals tried in Chicago..............    19
                ii. Maria Haydee Torres..........................    20
                iii. Oscar Lopez Rivera..........................    21
        3. 1985 Chicago FALN group...............................    22
            a. The safe houses...................................    22
            b. Plans for prison breaks...........................    23
            c. Plans to rob the Chicago Transit Authority........    24
            d. The plan to assist FALN fugitive William Morales..    24
            e. Plans for bombings................................    25
            f. The trial.........................................    25
        4. The Macheteros' activities in Puerto Rico.............    26
        5. The Wells Fargo robbery and Macheteros convictions....    29
            a. The robbery.......................................    29
            b. The investigation and indictments.................    30
            c. The trials and convictions........................    32
    B. The sentences of the 16 offered clemency..................    34
        1. Elizam Escobar........................................    35
        2. Ricardo Jimenez.......................................    35
        3. Adolfo Matos..........................................    36
        4. Dylcia Noemi Pagan....................................    37
        5. Alicia Rodriguez......................................    37
        6. Ida Luz Rodriguez.....................................    38
        7. Luis Rosa.............................................    38
        8. Carmen Valentin.......................................    39
        9. Alberto Rodriguez.....................................    39
        10. Alejandrina Torres...................................    40
        11. Edwin Cortes.........................................    40
        12. Oscar Lopez..........................................    41
        13. Juan Enrique Segarra-Palmer III......................    42
        14. Antonio Camacho-Negron...............................    42
        15. Roberto Maldonado-Rivera.............................    43
        16. Norman Ramirez-Talavera..............................    43
III.The clemency process and decision................................44

    A. How the clemency process works............................    44
        1. Procedures for commutation............................    44
        2. Standards for considering commutation.................    46
    B. The FALN/Macheteros clemency process......................    47
        1. The application process...............................    47
        2. The campaign for release..............................    48
        3. Justice Department action on the clemency.............    49
        4. Opposition to the clemency............................    52
            a. Offices of the U.S. Attorneys.....................    52
            b. The Federal Bureau of Investigation...............    53
            c. The Bureau of Prisons.............................    54
            d. The victims of the FALN and Macheteros' violence..    54
        5. Two Justice Department reports on clemency............    57
        6. The White House's role in the clemency process........    60
IV. The sentences were fair..........................................68
 V. The FALN and Macheteros terrorists are strange candidates for 
    clemency.........................................................72
    A. Criteria for clemency.....................................    73
    B. The violent nature of those offered clemency..............    74
        1. Present day threats...................................    74
        2. Violent escapes planned by the FALN prisoners.........    75
            a. Escape plan of Oscar Lopez Rivera.................    75
            b. Escape plans of Ricardo Jimenez...................    78
    C. The FALN and Macheteros members offered clemency expressed 
        no remorse, nor did they exhibit any signs of 
        rehabilitation...........................................    79
        1. Statements of Oscar Lopez.............................    81
        2. Statements of Edwin Cortes............................    81
        3. Statements of Adolfo Matos............................    82
        4. Statements of Antonio Camacho-Negron..................    83
        5. Statements of Ricardo Jimenez.........................    83
        6. The exception: Alberto Rodriguez......................    84
    D. No cooperation was requested or offered from the FALN and 
        Macheteros members.......................................    85
VI. The clemency decision and the U.S. commitment to fighting terrori85
    A. The international message.................................    86
    B. An inconsistent policy on dealing with terrorists.........    88
    C. Repatriation of an FALN sympathizer to Italy..............    89
VII. The Justice Department's decision to prevent the FBI from 
     submitting an opening statement.................................90
Conclusion.......................................................    91

                               APPENDICES

Appendix I.--The FALN and Macheteros in their own words..........   429
Appendix II.--Letter from Chairman Burton to Attorney General 
  Reno dated October 19, 1999....................................   493
Appendix III.--Repatriation of an FALN sympathizer to Italy......   495

                                 VIEWS

Dissenting views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon. 
  Major R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, 
  Hon. Patsy T. Mink, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Hon. Chaka 
  Fattah, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich, Hon. 
  Danny K. Davis, Hon. John F. Tierney, Hon. Thomas H. Allen, 
  Hon. Harold E. Ford, Jr., and Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky........   526
Additional views of Hon. Dan Burton..............................   578

                                                 Union Calendar No. 273
106th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                    106-488

======================================================================




 THE FALN AND MACHETEROS CLEMENCY: MISLEADING EXPLANATIONS, A RECKLESS 
                     DECISION, A DANGEROUS MESSAGE

                                _______
                                

 December 10, 1999.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on 
            the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Burton, from the Committee on Government Reform submitted the 
                               following

                              THIRD REPORT

    On November 10, 1999, the Committee on Government Reform 
approved and adopted a report entitled ``The FALN and 
Macheteros Clemency: Misleading Explanations, A Reckless 
Decision, A Dangerous Message.'' The chairman was directed to 
transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

             FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

    The Committee on Government Reform has conducted an 
investigation of the President's decision to offer clemency to 
16 FALN and Macheteros terrorists. Subpoenas were issued to the 
White House for documents, a public hearing was held on 
September 21, 1999, and this report has been issued. The 
Committee has reached the following conclusions as a result of 
its investigation:
     Some Within the White House Saw Political Benefit 
in the Release of These Terrorists. One of the key White House 
staff members during the clemency process wrote that the 
release of the 16 terrorists would ``have a positive impact 
among strategic Puerto Rican communities in the U.S. (read, 
voters).'' Other notes produced to the Committee indicate that 
White House personnel believed that certain Congressmen would 
not vote with the President unless he committed to releasing 
the terrorists. Jeffrey Farrow, a key Presidential adviser on 
this issue, wrote in an e-mail:

          We should think about a meeting soon with Reps. 
        Gutierrez, Velazquez, and Serrano on the Puerto Rico


                                  (1)

        independence crimes prisoners issue. They have 
        requested one with the POTUS but the options include 
        the VP and John as well. The issue should be resolved 
        soon--the petitions have been before us for a long 
        time. The VP's Puerto Rican position would be helped: 
        The issue is Gutierrez's [sic] top priority as well as 
        of high constituent importance to Serrano and 
        Velazquez.

     The Sentences Imposed Upon the FALN and Macheteros 
Prisoners Were Fair. The President and his spokesmen 
represented that the 16 offered clemency had served sentences 
in excess of what they would now receive under the sentencing 
guidelines. This is not true. According to the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, which analyzed this matter specifically, ``the 
federal sentencing guidelines generally would call for 
sentences as long as or longer than those actually imposed, if 
the defendants had been sentenced under current law.'' 
Furthermore, less than 9 months before the President and his 
spokesman made these statements, a senior Justice Department 
official informed a Member of Congress, in writing, ``[t]he 
sentences are in line with sentences imposed in other cases for 
similar terrorist activity.'' Given the President's divergence 
from the Sentencing Commission and his own Justice Department, 
the Committee believes he should waive executive privilege and 
release the information he relied upon to make his public 
representations.
     The President and His Spokesman Misrepresented 
Facts Concerning the Terrorists. The President communicated 
that the 16 terrorists offered clemency were being held in 
prison ``in effect by guilt by association.'' In fact, they 
were incarcerated because they had committed serious crimes and 
had been sentenced for those crimes. The individuals in 
question were not the non-violent wing of the FALN or 
Macheteros. They built bombs, were engaged in a wide-ranging 
conspiracy, and committed crimes that justified lengthy prison 
terms. There has been no suggestion that there were errors in 
the sentencing process.
     Those Offered Clemency Were Violent Offenders. In 
the days after the clemency offers were made, the President 
made an effort, through his surrogates, to convince the 
American people that those offered clemency were non-violent 
offenders. For example, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, 
appearing on national television at a time when this issue was 
headline news (and therefore likely to be the subject of 
contemporaneous briefings), said ``[t]hey're not individuals 
who personally were involved in violence.'' Below are some 
examples of the ``non-violent'' offenders offered clemency by 
the President:
          Oscar Lopez: An individual so ``non-violent'' that he 
        wouldn't renounce violence to get out of prison. In 
        addition to crimes committed in furtherance of FALN 
        goals, he plotted two escapes from Federal prison. One 
        was from Leavenworth Penitentiary and, according to a 
        Victim Impact Statement, he ``planned to blow up Fort 
        Leavenworth with the most powerful plastic explosives 
        known to the military, riddle guard towers with rounds 
        from automatic weapons, and throw grenades in the path 
        of those who pursued them. To achieve their goals, 
        Lopez and Brown considered killing the inmates who 
        threatened Richard Cobb, killing George Lebosky after 
        they became suspicious of him, and killing firearms 
        dealer Michael Neece to gain his weapons.'' He set in 
        motion plans to obtain the following for his escape 
        attempt: fragmentation grenades, smoke grenades, 
        phosphorus grenades, 8 M-16 rifles, 2 silencers, 50 
        pounds of plastic C-4 explosives, 8 bulletproof vests, 
        10 blasting caps to use with plastic explosives, 100 
        30-shot clips to use with automatic weapons. In Lopez' 
        probation officer's assessment, ``[Lopez'] level of 
        remorse, rehabilitation and positive regard for this 
        court's process is minimal, if not nonexistent. He 
        demonstrates a sustained consistent commitment to the 
        use of violence and weapons. He will use any means to 
        gain freedom for the purpose of undermining the 
        principles of the United States government. He has 
        already determined that human life is expendable for 
        this purpose.''
          Juan Segarra-Palmer: In 1987, the U.S. Court of 
        Appeals for the Second Circuit found that: ``The 
        [Federal] district judge also found that [Juan] 
        Segarra-Palmer had organized and taken part in the 
        attack in Puerto Rico on a United States Navy bus 
        taking sailors to a radar station, on December 3, 1979, 
        in which two sailors were killed and nine wounded.''
          Edwin Cortes: While planning Oscar Lopez' escape from 
        Federal prison, the following statement by Cortes was 
        recorded by the FBI: ``[y]es, but she [Alejandrina 
        Torres--another recently freed terrorist] has to have 
        it loaded and cocked further back. If they have to 
        shoot, they can shoot.''
          Finally, the seditious conspiracy counts in the 
        indictments of 14 of the individuals offered clemency 
        included the construction and planting of explosive and 
        incendiary devices (bombs) at 28 separate locations.
     Those Offered Clemency Were Very Unlikely 
Candidates for Clemency. Prior to the offer of clemency to the 
16 FALN and Macheteros terrorists, President Clinton had 
received 3,229 requests for clemency. He had acted favorably on 
only 3 of these requests. The 16 terrorists appear to be most 
unlikely candidates. They did not personally request clemency. 
They did not admit to wrongdoing and they had not renounced 
violence before such a renunciation had been made a quid pro 
quo for their release. They expressed no contrition for their 
crimes, and were at times openly belligerent about their 
actions. Some had been involved in escape attempts from Federal 
prison. One committed parole violations and was re-
incarcerated. Some violated prison regulations, including 
possessing a weapon and a key capable of opening handcuffs.
     The White House Seemed to Want Clemency More Than 
the Terrorists. Notwithstanding the fact that the 16 did not 
express enough personal interest in the clemency process to 
file their own applications, the White House appeared eager to 
assist throughout the process. Meetings were held with 
supporters, and some senior staff even suggested ways to 
improve the likelihood of the President granting the clemency. 
Overall, the White House appears to have exercised more 
initiative than the terrorists themselves. For example, it was 
a White House working group that suggested President Carter be 
approached and that a letter be requested. In another peculiar 
turn of events, a senior adviser on this issue appeared to 
coordinate a meeting with supporters inside the White House 
with a demonstration outside the White House. In addition, 
notes obtained by the Committee indicate that White House aides 
planned to identify ``liberal supporters in key media outlets'' 
in an effort to drum up more support for clemency. At the 
Department of Justice, the Deputy Attorney General at one point 
tasked the Pardon Attorney with calling a congressional office 
to ``see where we stood on getting'' a statement addressing 
repentance. It is highly inappropriate that members of the 
President's Working Group and the Justice Department would 
either organize outside support for the clemency or reach out 
to prod proponents of clemency to do things that made it easier 
for the President to find in their favor.
     Some White House Employees Thought the 16 
Terrorists Were Political Prisoners. At least one White House 
employee consistently referred to the 16 as ``political 
prisoners.'' Given the crimes committed by the 16 terrorists, 
it is disturbing that anyone, let alone a White House aide 
whose salary is paid by the American people, would deem these 
individuals to be ``political prisoners.'' In addition, the 
Deputy Attorney General repeatedly described the 16 individuals 
offered clemency as ``nationalists,'' rather than terrorists.
     The Department of Justice Appears to Have Changed 
its Recommendation to the White House in Order to Help the 
White House. The first Justice Department recommendation to the 
White House appears to have taken an unambiguous stand against 
clemency. Later, in June 1997, the White House recognized that 
the Justice Department still opposed clemency. In July 1999, 
however, according to a publicly reported leak from the Justice 
Department, a second report was sent by the Department of 
Justice to the President and no official recommendation was 
made. Instead, according to the Justice Department source, the 
report ``contained what law-enforcement officials said was a 
more carefully worded analysis that presented the President 
with multiple options for each prisoner, from unconditional 
release to no leniency whatsoever.'' If this is true, the 
Committee is concerned that the Justice Department side-stepped 
giving an unambiguous recommendation.
     Law Enforcement Organizations Were Not Adequately 
Consulted Prior to the President's Decision. The FBI was not 
aware that the President was seriously entertaining the 
petitions for clemency. In addition, the Bureau of Prisons was 
not consulted. Had the White House asked for a review of the 
prisoners' recent telephone conversations, it would have found 
that several prisoners made remarks advocating violence.
     The Victims Were Ignored. Victims were unable to 
get meetings with the White House or Department of Justice. 
Some had tried to schedule meetings; they were simply rebuffed. 
Activists seeking clemency did get such meetings. Furthermore, 
while clemency supporters were updated regularly on the 
progress of the petition, victims were not even informed of the 
clemency decisions.
     The President's Clemency Offer Worked Against 
Solving Numerous Crimes. Generally speaking, violent criminals 
offered clemency have cooperated with law enforcement prior to 
their being offered clemency. In this case, the President did 
not even make cooperation with law enforcement a precondition 
for an offer of clemency. It remains a mystery why the 
President would not use every tool at his disposal to solve 
murders, robberies and bombings. Furthermore, by removing any 
incentive to cooperate, it is now very unlikely that any of the 
terrorists will ever provide any assistance to law enforcement.
     The Clemency Decision Undermines the U.S.' 
Position in the International Fight Against Terrorism. The 
decision to grant clemency to the FALN and Macheteros 
terrorists sends a clear message that our demands for severe 
punishment, and our willingness to mete out severe punishment 
for terrorism, can be hollow. Of greater significance, it sends 
a message of encouragement to terrorists themselves.
     The President Has Set a Different Standard for 
Terrorists Who Are U.S. Citizens. The FALN and Macheteros 
terrorists are U.S. citizens. While they have served lengthy 
prison terms, the President has supported even more stringent 
penalties for members of foreign terrorist organizations. For 
example, he directed missiles to be fired on the camp of Osama 
bin Laden and an alleged chemical plant in the Sudan. 
Furthermore, he has been more inclined to strike at foreign 
terrorist organizations, regardless of the fact that the 
members have not been convicted of violent crimes under the 
protections of the U.S. Constitution and criminal justice 
system. From the perspective of the Committee, it undermines 
our international war on terrorism if we set a standard for 
U.S. terrorists that appears to be different than that set for 
foreign born terrorists. If sympathetic lobbyists can win the 
early release of terrorists in this country, our position is 
undercut when we ask other countries to take a hard line on 
terrorists of their own nationalities.
     The Clemency Decision Empowered Two Dangerous 
Terrorist Organizations. As the FBI made clear in a written 
statement prepared for the Committee's September 21, 1999, 
hearing: ``The FALN and Macheteros terrorist groups continue to 
pose a danger to the U.S. Government and to the American 
people, here and in Puerto Rico. . . . The challenge before us 
is the potential that the release of these individuals will 
psychologically and operationally enhance the ongoing violent 
and criminal activities of terrorist groups, not only in Puerto 
Rico, but throughout the world.''
     The President Should Waive His Claim of Executive 
Privilege. While he may be entitled to do so, the President 
should not continue to hide behind executive privilege. As many 
have done before him, the President should waive executive 
privilege and allow all citizens to gain a full understanding 
of what information he considered when he decided to release 
violent terrorists from prison.

   I. Why the Committee Investigated the Offer of Clemency to the 16 
                               Terrorists

    On August 11, 1999, President Clinton extended offers of 
clemency to 16 terrorists incarcerated in Federal prison. Prior 
to these offers, he had offered clemency to only three Federal 
prisoners.\1\ Thus, offers of clemency to so many members of a 
terrorist organization came as a great surprise. In an attempt 
to understand the justification for the offers of clemency, 
this Committee subpoenaed documents from the White House and 
the Department of Justice. The President responded by claiming 
executive privilege over critical documents relating to his 
decision.\2\ In claiming executive privilege, the President 
refused to provide this Committee with material that would 
allow Congress an opportunity to see what recommendations were 
made to the President prior to his decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Department of Justice production 000734-000755, at 000747. 
(Exhibit 1--This exhibit contains historical information related to 
grants of clemency).
    \2\ Letter from Cheryl Mills, Deputy Counsel to the President, to 
the Honorable Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 
(Sept. 16, 1999) (Exhibit 2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Granting clemency to violent terrorists is a matter of 
national significance. When the lives of American citizens are 
endangered and the victims of violent crime are treated with 
contempt, the oversight function of Congress is never more 
important. This is particularly true when the President of the 
United States not only withholds information from the people, 
but also uses the immense power of his office to mislead. This, 
in essence, is what occurred in the aftermath of the recent 
offer of clemency to the 16 terrorists. In such a situation, 
Congress is obligated to exercise its oversight authority.
    The White House would have the American people believe 
otherwise. On September 16, 1999, Presidential spokesman Joe 
Lockhart said: ``I think anyone who looks at the Constitution 
and understands what it means knows that Congress doesn't have 
an oversight role in this case.'' \3\ Mr. Lockhart is wrong, 
and one can only wonder what prompted him to make such a 
statement. As Mr. Waxman, the ranking minority member of this 
Committee, stated at our September 21, 1999, hearing: ``the 
President's decision was, as he said, on each one individually. 
Whether he is right or wrong, we will have to try to get as 
much information as we can to make a judgment.'' \4\ 
Notwithstanding the President's claim of executive privilege, 
this has been what the Committee has tried to do.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Joe Lockhart, White House Press Secretary, daily White House 
press briefing (Sept. 16, 1999). Later, in the same interview, Mr. 
Lockhart said: ``as far as I can tell there is no legitimate oversight 
role here.'' Id.
    \4\ Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 21, 
1999) (remarks of Representative Henry Waxman).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prior to the President's offer to the 16 FALN and 
Macheteros terrorists, he had received 3,229 requests for 
clemency. He had awarded early release to only three of these 
federal prisoners. This represents the lowest percentage 
granted by any President since 1900, the date the Federal 
Government began keeping relevant statistics.\5\ Thus, it came 
as a surprise that President Clinton would make 16 offers at 
the same time, that he appeared to ignore all or most of the 
traditional criteria for exercise of the clemency power, and 
that he acted to benefit not just one or two individuals, but 
an entire terrorist organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Department of Justice production 000734-000755. (Exhibit 1). 
See also Stuart Taylor, Jr., All the President's Pardons: The Real 
Scandal, National Journal, Oct. 30, 1999, at 3116. Taylor states that 
President Clinton had also ``pardoned 108 federal convicts who had 
finished serving their time.'' Id. The percentage of clemency 
applications granted by some recent Presidents is as follows: President 
Kennedy--40.9 percent; President Ford--31.2 percent; President Carter--
21.6 percent; President Reagan--12.6 percent; President Bush--4.2 
percent; and President Clinton--3.4 percent. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee's interest in this issue was triggered by two 
concerns. First, the explanations that have been provided by 
the President and his spokesmen have not been accurate. For 
example, on September 9, 1999, the President told the American 
people that those offered clemency ``had all served sentences 
that were considerably longer than they would serve under the 
sentencing guidelines which control federal sentencing now.'' 
\6\ Two days earlier, the President's spokesman stated: ``if 
you look at even the mandatory sentencing guidelines right now, 
most of these people have served longer terms than they would 
have served if they were sentenced now.'' \7\ Ten days later, 
Mr. Lockhart reiterated this view when he said ``their 
sentences were in excess of what would be given now for those 
crimes under the mandatory minimum sentences.'' \8\ Driving 
this point home, he continued: ``[t]hey had already served 
sentences that exceeded what they'd be sentenced for now under 
the minimum sentencing guidelines which all parties agree are 
tougher than they were 20 or 30 years ago.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ President William J. Clinton, press conference (Sept. 9, 1999).
    \7\ Joe Lockhart, White House Press Secretary, daily White House 
press briefing (Sept. 7, 1999).
    \8\ Joe Lockhart, White House Press Secretary, daily White House 
press briefing (Sept. 17, 1999).
    \9\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The position taken by the President and his spokesman, 
however, does not appear to be true. According to the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, the Federal Sentencing Guideline range 
for the convictions of the 16 offered clemency would require a 
sentence of ``at least 360 months to life.'' \10\ Thus, the 
Sentencing Commission indicates a minimum sentence of 30 years, 
which would be served without the possibility of parole. This 
contradicts the President and his spokesman. Furthermore, a 
senior Justice Department official made the following statement 
on December 21, 1998: ``the sentences imposed in these cases 
were within the sole discretion of the federal judges who 
presided over them. The sentences are in line with sentences 
imposed in other cases for similar terrorist activity.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Letter from Timothy B. McGrath, interim Staff Director, U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, to Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform (Oct. 26, 1999), at 2. (Exhibit 3).
    \11\ Letter from Dennis K. Burke, Acting Assistant Attorney 
General, to the Honorable James P. McGovern, U.S. House of 
Representatives (Dec. 21, 1998). Department of Justice production 
1040475-1040476. (Exhibit 4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A number of questions are therefore inevitable. What 
analysis did the President rely on? What were he and his 
spokesman referring to? Why won't the President release the 
analysis that supports the position he has taken? These are the 
types of questions that suggest congressional oversight. If 
factual representations are being made, and it is not apparent 
where the facts come from, there is significant cause for 
concern.
    Another major area of concern is the President's statement 
that: ``I did not believe they should be held in incarceration 
in effect by guilt by association.'' \12\ This point attempts 
to steer people away from the fact that those offered clemency 
were convicted of actual crimes and sentenced accordingly. The 
President's spokesman, Mr. Lockhart, also supported the 
President's argument when he said ``the point we have tried to 
make is we--our justice system is based on you serve time for 
the crime you're convicted of, not the crime people believe 
you're guilty of.'' \13\ Earlier, Mr. Lockhart had made that 
point with even more emphasis:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ President William J. Clinton, press conference (Sept. 9, 
1999).
    \13\ Joe Lockhart, White House Press Secretary, daily White House 
press briefing (Sept. 17, 1999).

          You know, we have a system of justice here. You know 
        very well--you may not want to tell your listeners what 
        these people were convicted of, but the justice system 
        knows. The President's decision was based on looking at 
        the sentencings, the average sentence for crimes, 
        looking at the mandatory minimum sentences that have 
        come in subsequent to the incarceration of these 
        people[.] \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Joe Lockhart, White House Press Secretary, daily White House 
press briefing (Sept. 8, 1999).

These statements appear to be an effort to steer people away 
from the facts. To date, there has been no suggestion that 
there was any error in the sentencing of the 16 individuals 
offered clemency. They were not imprisoned because they 
associated with criminals. They were not given lengthy 
sentences because they were close to people who had committed 
worse crimes than they had. In fact, with a few exceptions, the 
16 were the backbone of organizations that killed a number of 
people and planted over 130 bombs. But for their code of 
silence, a function of their complicity in numerous serious 
crimes, all FALN and Macheteros cases would probably have been 
solved by now. By freeing these individuals--and thereby 
removing all incentive for cooperation--the President has 
worked to guarantee that a number of murders will not be 
solved. Furthermore, the President has made no attempt to have 
Congress re-evaluate the statutory bases of the convictions. If 
the President genuinely believed the statutes resulting in 
convictions were unfair, it follows that he would ask Congress 
to change the law.
    The attempt to depict those offered clemency as a group who 
were less culpable than other FALN or Macheteros members 
ignores clear evidence, including videotape footage of some of 
those offered clemency making bombs. It ignores the fact that 
one of the individuals offered clemency planned two escapes 
from prison, planned to disable a guard tower with 
fragmentation grenades and gunfire, and approved a plan to 
murder a gun dealer. It ignores the fact that another 
individual offered clemency kept in close contact with the one 
FALN member who succeeded in escaping from Federal prison. It 
also ignores a Federal court opinion which states: ``[t]he 
district judge also found that [Juan] Segarra-Palmer had 
organized and taken part in the attack in Puerto Rico on a 
United States Navy bus taking sailors to a radar station, on 
December 3, 1979, in which two sailors were killed and nine 
wounded.'' \15\ Indeed, the effort to portray those who were 
offered clemency as unfairly tarred by association with other 
more violent criminals appears to be a calculated effort to 
mislead people. In short, those offered clemency committed 
crimes, which resulted in appropriate sentences to lengthy 
terms of incarceration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ U.S. v. Melendez-Carrion, 820 F.2d 56, 58 (2nd Cir. 1987) 
(emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Apart from basic misrepresentations about factual matters, 
it also appears that the President failed to take into account 
all sides of this issue. In fact, the President seemingly 
failed to take into account certain basic types of information 
that would normally be significant factors in the clemency 
process. For example, victims were ignored. The Federal Bureau 
of Prisons was not asked to review tapes of telephone calls to 
and from prison to determine whether individuals were 
remorseful for their crimes or might be future threats to the 
community.\16\ Even some of the alleged supporters of clemency 
turned out to be less than enthusiastic in their support. For 
example, Mr. Lockhart stated that ``this is an issue that the 
Council of Churches, Cardinal O'Connor, Desmond Tutu and former 
President Carter have all urged the President to take action 
on.'' \17\ The implication of this statement is that those 
cited asked for clemency to be granted. This, however, is what 
Cardinal O'Connor recently said: ``I did not ask for the 
release of the Puerto Rican federal prisoners called FALN.'' 
\18\ Similarly, Bishop Tutu did not call for the release of the 
16 terrorists. Rather, he wrote the President ``I appeal to 
your office on behalf of my brother Bishop [of Puerto Rico] to 
consider clemency for these prisoners.'' \19\ This contrasts 
with what the President himself said about Bishop Tutu's 
position: ``Bishop Tutu and Coretta Scott King also wrote to 
seek clemency for the petitioners, since they had received 
`virtual life sentences' and `have spent over a decade in 
prison, while their children have grown up without them.' '' 
\20\ Bishop Tutu did not make these comments, nor did he do 
what the President said he did. The misleading use of respected 
individuals to justify the clemency decision is another cause 
of great concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ This is particularly important because the public record made 
by the 16 prisoners indicated no contrition and a propensity to 
continue their terrorist activities. While the government might not 
normally need to go to such lengths, those considered for clemency are 
not normally unrepentant terrorists. In a situation where there is 
concern about the message sent by the grant of clemency, and the 
potential danger to the community, it appears that, at a minimum, the 
President would have wanted to know whether the prisoners' own words 
would discourage a grant of clemency.
    \17\ Joe Lockhart, White House Press Secretary, daily White House 
press briefing (Sept. 7, 1999).
    \18\ Cardinal John J. O'Connor, FALN: Clarifying the Record, 
Catholic New York, Sept. 16, 1999, at 5. (Exhibit 5).
    \19\ Letter from the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, the Most 
Reverend Desmond M. Tutu, D.D., F.K.C., to President W. Clinton (Aug. 
28, 1995) (emphasis added). (Exhibit 6). It is also of some interest 
that Archbishop Tutu did not even ask that the President consider 
clemency for 2 of the 16 ultimately offered clemency--Roberto 
Maldonado-Rivera and Norman Ramirez-Talavera.
    \20\ Letter from Bill Clinton, to Honorable Henry Waxman (Sept. 21, 
1999) at 2. (Exhibit 7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President also said he ``refused to commute the 
sentence of Carlos Alberto Torres, who had been indicted by a 
federal grand jury in 1977 on explosive charges, was identified 
as the leader of the group, and had made statements that he was 
involved in a revolution against the United States and that his 
actions had been legitimate.'' \21\ If this was the standard 
used for not commuting sentences, it was certainly not applied 
in a consistent fashion. Others who were offered clemency do 
not survive the standard articulated by the President--they 
were indicted on explosives charges, some were described as 
leaders of the organizations, and they spoke in favor of 
revolution against the United States and threatened violence 
against those involved in the judicial process. Oscar Lopez not 
only satisfied all the criteria for no clemency, he had planned 
a violent escape from Leavenworth Penitentiary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Id. at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President also stated unambiguously that ``political 
considerations played no role in the process.'' \22\ Documents 
received from the White House indicate that this is not true. 
Although the President might maintain that politics played no 
role in the process from his perspective, it is abundantly 
clear that other White House personnel who were intimately 
involved in advising the President were well aware of political 
considerations and saw the political benefit of offering 
clemency to the terrorists. For example, Mayra Martinez-
Fernandez, Special Assistant to the co-chair of the Interagency 
Working Group on Puerto Rico, thought that the release of the 
terrorists would ``have a positive impact among strategic 
Puerto Rican communities in the U.S. (read voters).'' \23\ 
Other notes produced to this Committee show that the 
Interagency Working Group on Puerto Rico understood that the 
clemency issue had a significant domestic political importance. 
One set of notes makes the following point: ``[Congressmen and 
Congresswoman] Velazquez, Gutierrez and Serrano not voting with 
President on some important legislation unless he commits to 
release prisoners right after 1996 elections.'' \24\ Thus, it 
appears that the President's statement that politics played no 
part in the clemency process is, at best, misleading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Id. at 4.
    \23\ Memorandum from Mayra Martinez-Fernandez, to Jeffrey Farrow 
(Oct. 24, 1994). White House production CL 15537-15538. (Exhibit 8).
    \24\ Handwritten notes of Mayra Martinez-Fernandez, Special 
Assistant to the Co-Chair of the Working Group, undated. White House 
production CL 15554-15558. (Exhibit 9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, it is of some concern to the Committee that the 
President's staff--and the President--appear to have arrived at 
the decision to offer clemency before relevant information had 
been received. The facts received to date make it appear that 
the decision to offer clemency was made regardless of facts, 
and that efforts were made once the decision was reached to 
help the terrorists in spite of their prior refusals to help 
themselves.
    Presented with misleading rationales for the clemency 
offers, this Committee has made an effort to provide the public 
with a full explanation of the factual background of this 
issue. The Committee has subpoenaed documents from the White 
House and the Justice Department, held public hearings 
involving interested parties and government officials, and 
prepared this report. The Committee also reviewed testimony 
presented to other congressional committees. While the 
Committee recognizes that the Constitution confers on the 
President an absolute power to grant clemency to those 
convicted in Federal court of crimes,\25\ the Constitution most 
assuredly does not prohibit Congress from exploring the facts 
of the clemency process and inquiring into the rationale for 
its exercise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ The U.S. Constitution provides that the President ``shall have 
power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United 
States, except in matters of impeachment.'' U.S. Const., Art. II, Sec. 
2. The term ``clemency'' refers to all official acts of leniency toward 
criminal offenders, including pardons, reprieves, amnesty, remissions 
of fines, and commutations. See Kobil, Daniel T., The Quality of Mercy 
Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 
569, 575-78 (1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given the misrepresentations made in this matter, the 
Committee believes the President should rescind his claim of 
executive privilege, and make all documents previously withheld 
available to Congress and the American people. While he may be 
permitted to do so, the President should not continue to hide 
behind executive privilege. As many have done before him, the 
President should waive executive privilege and allow all 
citizens to gain a full understanding of what he took into 
account when he decided to release violent terrorists from 
prison.

                         II. Factual Background

    On August 11, 1999, President Clinton offered a grant of 
clemency to 16 individuals convicted and incarcerated for their 
activities while members of clandestine terrorist organizations 
promoting the independence of Puerto Rico through violent 
means.\26\ The groups involved were the Armed Forces of Puerto 
Rican National Liberation (``FALN'' or in Spanish, Fuerzas 
Armadas Liberacion Nacional Puertoriquena) and the Popular 
Boricua Army (Ejercito Popular Boricua), commonly known as the 
Macheteros.\27\ Throughout the late 1970's and mid-1980's these 
groups claimed responsibility for numerous bombings and 
robberies, causing a reign of terror in both the United States 
and Puerto Rico.\28\ The FALN operated in the continental 
United States, while the Macheteros were active mostly in 
Puerto Rico.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Executive grant of clemency to Elizam Escobar, Ricardo 
Jimenez, Adolfo Matos, Dylcia Noemi Pagan, Alicia Rodriguez, Ida Luz 
Rodriguez, Luis Rosa, Carmen Valentin, Edwin Cortes, Alberto Rodriguez, 
Alejandrina Torres, Oscar Lopez Rivera, Juan Enrique Segarra-Palmer, 
Antonio Camacho-Negron, Roberto Maldonado-Rivera, and Norman Ramirez-
Talavera, Aug. 11, 1999. (Exhibit 10).
    \27\ See U.S. v. Torres, 83 CR 494 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Indictment) 
(Exhibit 11); U.S. v. Torres, 77 CR 886 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (Indictment) 
(Exhibit 12).
    \28\ Oversight on the Operations of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and 
Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 63 (1982); FALN Communiques dated Oct. 26, 1974 (Exhibit 13), 
Dec. 11, 1974 (Exhibit 14), Jan. 24, 1975 (Exhibit 15), and Apr. 2, 
1975 (Exhibit 16); see also Appendix I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The 16 individuals granted clemency were arrested and later 
convicted in three separate groups. The first group consisted 
of FALN members Elizam Escobar, Ricardo Jimenez, Oscar Lopez 
Rivera, Adolfo Matos, Dylcia Pagan, Alicia Rodriguez, Ida Luz 
Rodriguez, Luis Rosa, and Carmen Valentin.\29\ This group was 
tried in the Northern District of Illinois, in Chicago, and was 
found guilty in February 1981. The second group of individuals 
also was FALN members and was tried in the same district in 
Chicago in 1985. The three members were Alejandrina Torres, 
Edwin Cortes, and Alberto Rodriguez.\30\ The last group of 
individuals was connected to the Macheteros and was tried in 
1989 in Connecticut: Juan Enrique Segarra-Palmer, Antonio 
Camacho Negron, Norman Ramirez Talavera and Roberto Maldonado 
Rivera.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Exhibit 12--Indictment.
    \30\ Jose Rodriguez also was indicted and convicted with the other 
three. However, he chose to defend himself and was represented by an 
attorney. In addition, he denied membership in the FALN. He is no 
longer in prison and was not part of the clemency. Exhibit 11--
Indictment.
    \31\ Exhibit 11--Indictment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    United States law enforcement first learned of the 
existence of the FALN on October 26, 1974, the date the group 
issued a communique taking credit for five bombings in New 
York.\32\ The communique stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Exhibit 13--FALN communique (Oct. 26, 1974).

          Today, commando units of FALN attacked mayor [sic] 
        Yanki [sic] corporations in New York City . . . These 
        actions, along with bombing of major department stores, 
        for three consecutive days in late spring, and the 
        dynamite blasts at Newark Police Headquarters and City 
        Hall, demonstrate what we have said since 1969: that 
        the Puerto Rican people organizing and arming in order 
        to form a Peoples Revolutionary Army which will rid 
        Puerto Rico of yanki [sic] colonialism [sic]. We have 
        opened two fronts, one in Puerto Rico the other in the 
        United States, both nourished by the Puerto Rican 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        people and allies within Northamerica [sic].

At the time of the first attacks, law enforcement had no leads 
on who was involved with the FALN. Ultimately, over the next 
decade, FALN activities resulted in 72 actual bombings, 40 
incendiary attacks, 8 attempted bombings and 10 bomb threats, 
resulting in 5 deaths, 83 injuries, and over $3 million in 
property damage.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Letter from Jon P. Jennings, Acting Assistant Attorney 
General, to Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Sept. 
23, 1999) (forwarding redacted FBI written opening statement on FALN 
clemency as attachment) (unnumbered) (Exhibit 17).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similar to the FALN, the existence of the Macheteros became 
publicly known when the group sent a communique to the United 
Press International in which they claimed credit for the death 
of a Puerto Rican police officer on August 24, 1978.\34\ The 
goals of the Macheteros were complete autonomy and sovereignty 
for Puerto Rico. In order to achieve their goals, the 
Macheteros conducted an armed struggle against the U.S. 
Government, mainly represented through attacks on military and 
police, in several cases causing the death of U.S. servicemen. 
In a January 1981 attack, Macheteros commandos infiltrated a 
Puerto Rican Air National Guard base and blew up 11 planes, 
causing approximately $45 million in damages.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Luis Feldstein Soto, Puerto Rican Terrorists Taunt FBI, but 
Agency Is Closing in, Houston Chron., Sept. 15, 1985, at A7.
    \35\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The capture and conviction of the individual members of the 
FALN and Macheteros brought an end to the reign of terror in 
Puerto Rico and the United States. Although a few random 
assaults may have occurred, mostly in Puerto Rico, the 
continual assaults on New York, Chicago, and law enforcement 
and Naval officers in Puerto Rico virtually came to a halt with 
the capture of the individuals to whom the President has 
offered clemency. Every major law enforcement group has opposed 
the commutation of the prison sentences being served by these 
members of the FALN or Macheteros.


   a. the capture and conviction of the individuals offered clemency


    After the first FALN communique, law enforcement agents 
worked diligently to identify who was involved with the FALN. 
The FBI formed a team of investigators that operated in the 
Puerto Rican neighborhoods in both New York and Chicago. 
However, it was not until December 1976, that they made any 
significant advances. Chicago police located an FALN ``bomb 
factory'' which led to the identification of several FALN 
members, including Ida Luz Rodriguez and Oscar Lopez 
Rivera.\36\ All of those identified immediately went 
underground, leaving their previous lives behind. Although they 
were terrorists, planting bombs and conducting armed robberies, 
the FALN members also blended into the community as school 
teachers and government workers. They were difficult to 
identify because they literally led double lives. They had jobs 
and children and never told anyone, not even their closest 
family members and friends, that they were members of the 
FALN.\37\ One former FALN member, Freddie Mendez, explained 
that, ``he and his codefendants and other members did not 
socialize with one another. He said that they came together 
only for official FALN activities and then separated. When 
apart they occupied themselves with work, school and socialized 
with friends who were not aware that they were in the FALN.'' 
\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ Memorandum from U.S. Attorney's Office to Probation Office, 
re: Alejandrina Torres, Edwin Cortes, Alberto Rodriguez, and Jose 
Rodriguez (Aug. 30, 1985). Department of Justice production 090047-
090059. (Exhibit 18).
    \37\ Gary Marx, Terrorism on Trial: Justice and the FALN, Chicago 
Tribune, Oct. 22, 1995, at Magazine 22.
    \38\ Presentence report of Oscar Lopez-Rivera, Department of 
Justice production 120031-120044, at 120040.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. History of the FALN's reign of terror in Chicago and New York
    Although the FALN's initial bombings may have been symbolic 
in nature, that soon changed.\39\ On December 11, 1974, the 
FALN called the New York City Police Department to report a 
dead body.\40\ When a policeman arrived at the abandoned 
tenement building to investigate, he walked into a booby-
trapped explosive device. The explosion left him maimed and 
permanently disabled. The FALN issued a communique taking 
credit for the bombing, which they described as an ``explosive 
attack against members of the police.'' \41\ The communique 
explained that the attack was in response to the death of a 
fellow Puerto Rican independentista, Martin Perez, in a Florida 
prison. Although the FALN characterized Perez' death as an 
assassination, authorities found that he committed suicide by 
hanging himself in his cell. The communique warned: ``[t]o make 
it clear, for every repressive action taken against our 
communities or against FALN independentistas, we will respond 
with revolutionary violence.'' \42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Authorities compiled a list of FALN bombings from 1974 through 
1980. Department of Justice production 1041690-1041692. (Exhibit 19).
    \40\ Presentence report for Ricardo Jimenez, Department of Justice 
production 020045-020057, at 020048.
    \41\ Exhibit 14--FALN communique dated Dec. 11, 1974.
    \42\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Several weeks later, the FALN struck again in what they 
described as a retaliatory attack for a bombing in Puerto Rico. 
The FALN communique calls attention to their belief that the 
CIA had plotted the incident.\43\ Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the January 24, 1975, FALN bombing can be meant only to 
have caused death, destruction and injury, as they planted a 
timed explosive device to detonate during the busy lunch hour 
at New York City's historic Fraunces Tavern. The blast killed 4 
people, injured over 60 and caused extensive property 
damage.\44\ In the communique, the FALN stated, ``[w]e, FALN, 
the Armed Forces of the Puerto Rican Nation take full 
responsibility for the especially detornated [sic] bomb that 
exploded today at Fraunces Tavern with reactionary corporate 
executives inside.'' \45\ The communique ended with the 
warning, ``[y]ou have unleashed a storm from which you 
comfortable Yankis [sic] cannot escape.'' \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ Exhibit 15--FALN communique dated Jan. 24, 1975.
    \44\ Presentence report for Ricardo Jimenez at 020048.
    \45\ Exhibit 15--FALN communique dated Jan. 24, 1975.
    \46\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FALN continued its attacks on what it considered 
``Yanki [sic] imperialism'' with the bombing of four New York 
City buildings on April 2, 1975. The communique explained:

          The bombing of the Anglers Club: an exclusive 
        millionaires [sic] club that boasts of members like the 
        Rockefellers, was a retalitory [sic] attack against 
        that sector of the North American ruling-class which is 
        directly responsible for the actions of the C.I.A. and 
        for the wave of repression which is being murderously 
        implemented in Puerto Rico. . . . Our attack on January 
        24, 1975 was not in anyway directed against working-
        class people or innocent North Americans. The targets 
        of our attack were bankers, stock brokers, and 
        important corporate executives of monopolies and multi-
        national corporations. These are not friends of the 
        working people. But the enemies of humanity everywhere 
        [sic].\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Exhibit 16--FALN communique dated Apr. 2, 1975.

    Shortly after the April bombings, in June 1975, the FALN 
carried out its first bombings in the Chicago area. They 
claimed credit for two bombs that exploded downtown. Another 
fatal attack occurred on August 3, 1977, in New York. The FALN 
placed a bomb inside the Mobil Oil employment office, and set 
it to detonate during the early morning rush hour. The blast 
killed one man and wounded several others.\48\ In addition to 
their bombings, the FALN, operating mainly in New York and 
Chicago, also began to set off incendiary devices in numerous 
busy downtown department stores.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Presentence report of Ricardo Jimenez at 020049.
    \49\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 12, 1978, a powerful explosion occurred in a 
residential building in New York City. The subsequent 
investigation revealed that the apartment was an FALN ``bomb 
factory.'' \50\ Police discovered that the resident of the 
apartment, FALN member William Morales, was constructing a pipe 
bomb when the explosion occurred.\51\ Morales was seriously 
injured, losing portions of both hands and his eyesight in one 
eye.\52\ Examination of the apartment turned up materials 
linked to the FALN members who had gone into hiding in 1976: 
Oscar Lopez-Rivera, Ida Luz Rodriguez, Maria Haydee Torres, and 
Carlos Alberto Torres.\53\ Even as police were clearing out the 
New York apartment, incendiary devices that the FALN previously 
had planted ignited in several department stores.\54\ In 
addition to other evidence, the police found an FALN manual in 
the apartment.\55\ The handbook states, ``The introduction of 
this set of rules and regulations is done in the interest of 
preventing errors which traditionally have allowed the enemy to 
strike death blows to revolutionary organizations.'' \56\ Among 
other suggestions, the handbook states that a guerrilla group 
``should start out with an operational army of no less than 50 
strictly clandestine guerrilla fighters.'' \57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ Id. at 020050.
    \51\ Id.
    \52\ Id.
    \53\ Id.
    \54\ Presentence report of Ricardo Jimenez at 020050.
    \55\ Murray Weiss, Leader's Chilling Textbook of Terror, N.Y. Post, 
Aug. 31, 1999, at 12.
    \56\ Id.
    \57\ Id.
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    Morales, who was injured in the July 12, 1978, explosion, 
was tried and convicted in 1979 and sentenced to 99 years in 
prison on State and Federal weapons and explosives charges.\58\ 
Several months after his conviction, Morales made an incredible 
escape from a third-floor prison room at Bellevue Hospital in 
New York. Morales had been transferred to Bellevue to be fitted 
with artificial hands. Prior to the surgery, Morales somehow 
used bolt cutters to tear open the steel security screen of the 
cell window and then shimmied down the three story, 40-foot 
drop.\59\ Federal prosecutors say that members of the Black 
Liberation Army and one of his attorneys assisted him in making 
his getaway.\60\ Morales escaped to Mexico, where he was later 
convicted of murdering a Mexican police officer. Mexico 
rebuffed the United States' requests for extradition of Morales 
while he was serving out his sentence in a Mexican prison. 
Later, Mexican authorities allowed him to flee to Cuba, where 
he was given political asylum.\61\ He has never served the 99-
year U.S. sentence. Morales remains in Cuba, and has petitioned 
the President to allow him to return to the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ Douglas Montero, I Defend My Homeland: William Morales Talks 
to the Post, N.Y. Post, Sept. 12, 1999, at 5.
    \59\ Former FALN member Alfredo Mendez told government 
investigators that Morales' attorney, Susan Tipograph, smuggled the 
bolt cutters into the hospital for Morales. He said that she ``strapped 
a pair of bolt cutters to her leg and smuggled them in to Morales.'' 
Tipograph denied the allegations. Douglas Montero, Cop Who Busted 
Bomber Fears for His Life, N.Y. Post, Sept. 18, 1999, at 6; Stanley 
Penn, Spreading Fear: New Terrorist Groups Are Appearing in U.S., 
Resembling Old Ones, Wall St. J., July 26, 1984; Cerisse Anderson, 
United Press Int'l, June 9, 1983.
    \60\ Stanley Penn, Spreading Fear: New Terrorist Groups Are 
Appearing in U.S., Resembling Old Ones, Wall St. J., July 26, 1984.
    \61\ Roberto Santiago, Terrorism American Style: The Guillermo 
Morales Story, the Plain Dealer, Aug. 1, 1993, at 8; Alex Devine, 
Fugitive Left Trail of Blood and Broken Lives, N.Y. Post, Sept. 12, 
1999, at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the incident at the New York bomb factory, the FALN 
took some time to regroup. Law enforcement developed evidence 
that during that relatively quiet period, the FALN members had 
been active in other areas, including the invasion of the Oak 
Creek, WI Armory in January 1979, in order to steal 
weapons.\62\ During the operation, which ultimately was 
unsuccessful, FALN members held Armory employees hostage. It 
was not until October 1979 that they resumed their bombing 
operations. On October 17, 1979, the FALN took credit for 
simultaneous bombings in New York, Chicago, and Puerto Rico, 
where the FALN previously had not been active.\63\ They 
followed up with several bombings in the Chicago area about a 
month later.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ Presentence report of Ricardo Jimenez at 020051.
    \63\ Id.
    \64\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In mid-March 1980, FALN members took over the Carter/
Mondale presidential campaign headquarters in Chicago, and the 
George Bush campaign office in New York.\65\ They were armed, 
and held several employees of the Carter/Mondale campaign 
hostage.\66\ The FALN members held guns to the heads of the 
employees, forced them to lie down, and then tied them up.\67\ 
They then ransacked the headquarters, stole files, and spray 
painted FALN slogans on the walls.\68\ Days after the invasion, 
the FALN sent threatening letters to approximately 200 Carter/
Mondale supporters and Democratic National Convention delegates 
in Illinois.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ Id. at 020050.
    \66\ Presentence Report of Elizam Escobar. Department of Justice 
production 010036-010049, at 010043.
    \67\ Id. at 010043.
    \68\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The capture of the ``Chicago 11''
    Shortly after the campaign break-ins, on April 4, 1980, 11 
members of the FALN were arrested: Elizam Escobar, Ricardo 
Jimenez, Dylcia Noemi Pagan, Carmen Valentin, Adolfo Matos, 
Alfredo Mendez, Alicia Rodriguez, Luis Rosa, Maria Haydee 
Torres, Carlos Torres, and Ida Luz Rodriguez.\69\ The arrests 
occurred in two separate incidents on the same day. At 
approximately 1:30 p.m., two armed men stole a truck from 
Budget Rent-a-Car in Evanston, IL.\70\ Luis Rosa was later 
identified as the main gunman at the Budget Rent-a-Car 
office.\71\ ``At gunpoint, he ordered the personnel at the 
Budget office to lay on the ground and crawl, or be killed.'' 
\72\ The truck was seen in a parking lot at Northwestern 
University an hour after the robbery, and police waited for 
someone to approach.\73\ Soon thereafter, a man and a woman 
drove up to the stolen truck in separate vehicles, Luis Rosa 
and Alicia Rodriguez.\74\ As police officers approached the 
two, Rosa attempted to draw the loaded gun he was carrying. 
However, he was overpowered by the police.\75\ Police then 
apprehended FALN members Alicia Rodriguez and Luis Rosa, both 
of whom were armed.\76\ In addition, police discovered that the 
vehicles that the two were driving had been stolen at an 
earlier time.\77\ Police later determined that Adolfo Matos had 
driven the stolen truck to the Northwestern parking lot and 
left it there to be picked up by Rodriguez and Rosa.\78\ Matos 
and 10 other members of the FALN were apprehended later that 
same afternoon in a residential neighborhood also in Evanston, 
IL.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ Maria Haydee Torres and Carlos Alberto Torres were not granted 
clemency.
    \70\ Evanston Police Department Website, www.evanstonpolice.com/
captured.htm.
    \71\ Presentence report of Luis Rosa, Department of Justice 
production 010554-010565, at 010561
    \72\ Id. at 010561.
    \73\ Evanston Police Department Website, www.evanstonpolice.com/
captured.htm.
    \74\ Id.
    \75\ Presentence report of Luis Rosa at 010561.
    \76\ Id.; presentence report of Ida Luz Rodriguez, Department of 
Justice production 060034-060046, at 060042.
    \77\ Evanston Police Department Website, www.evanstonpolice.com/
captured.htm.
    \78\ Presentence report of Adolfo Matos, Department of Justice 
production 030038-030050, at 030046.
    \79\ Id. at 030046.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At approximately 3:15 p.m., a resident of an Evanston 
neighborhood called the police to report some suspicious 
activity on her street.\80\ She had seen joggers around a van, 
but had seen at least one of the joggers smoking.\81\ At 3:30 
p.m., the responding officers approached the van and spoke with 
Carlos Alberto Torres, who was then on the FBI's ``most wanted 
list.'' \82\ The officer did not recognize him, and explained 
that a neighbor had called complaining of ``kids partying in a 
van.'' \83\ After some discussion the police officers were 
still not sure about the situation, and ordered everyone to get 
out of the van.\84\ One of the officers looked inside the van, 
but did not notice anything suspicious.\85\ The FALN members 
might have been permitted to go free if Alfredo Mendez' false 
mustache had not begun to slip from his lip.\86\ The officers 
immediately realized there was a problem and ordered the three 
FALN women to drop their bags. As that occurred, a group of 
backup police officers rushed to the scene with their weapons 
drawn.\87\ The nine arrested with the van were: Dylcia Noemi 
Pagan, Elizam Escobar, Ida Luz Rodriguez, Carmen Valentin, 
Carlos Alberto Torres, Maria Haydee Torres, Ricardo Jimenez, 
Adolfo Matos, and Alfredo Mendez.\88\ Found in the van were 13 
weapons, including a sawed off shotgun and several pistols with 
the serial numbers obliterated.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ Evanston Police Department Website, www.evanstonpolice.com/
captured.htm.
    \81\ Id.
    \82\ Gary Marx, Terrorism on Trial: Justice and the FALN, Chicago 
Tribune, Oct. 22, 1995, at Magazine 22.
    \83\ Id.
    \84\ Id.
    \85\ Id.
    \86\ Id.; Evanston Police Department Website, 
www.evanstonpolice.com/captured.htm.
    \87\ Gary Marx, Terrorism on Trial: Justice and the FALN, Chicago 
Tribune, Oct. 22, 1995, at Magazine 22.
    \88\ Presentence report of Ricardo Jimenez, at 020050.
    \89\ U.S. v. Torres, 77 CR 886, (N.D. Ill. 1980).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            a. The investigation
    Law enforcement officials have two theories relating to the 
intentions of the FALN members that day. Some believed that the 
FALN was planning to kidnap wealthy industrialist Henry Crown 
or a member of his family, as the Crown residence was 
nearby.\90\ To support this theory, investigators found an 
intelligence dossier on Henry Crown in a New Jersey safe house 
used by the FALN.\91\ The other explanation for their presence 
in Evanston that day is that they were planning on robbing an 
armored car. At the time of their arrests, there was an armored 
truck carrying $200,000 in cash parked at Northwestern 
University's loading dock.\92\ The authorities could never be 
sure as the 11 FALN members arrested refused to cooperate in 
any way with the authorities. They even refused to identify 
themselves and claimed to be ``prisoners of war.'' \93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \90\Presentence report of Adolfo Matos, at 030046.
    \91\ Id. at 030046.
    \92\ Gary Marx, Terrorism on Trial: Justice and the FALN, Chicago 
Tribune, Oct. 22, 1995, at Magazine 22.
    \93\ Presentence report of Ricardo Jimenez, at 020051.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the law enforcement officials continued the 
investigation, they discovered that the FALN had developed an 
intricate underground operation.\94\ The FALN had set up safe 
houses in Milwaukee, WI; Newark, NJ; New York City; and, 
Chicago, IL.\95\ Upon searching the various safe houses, 
investigators found, among other evidence, sets of false 
identification, fingerprints of the individuals arrested, and a 
list of the automobiles that had been stolen over the prior 
year.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \94\Id.
    \95\Id.
    \96\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A search of the New Jersey safe house revealed a number of 
intelligence files on private individuals, including one on 
Henry Crown.\97\ The fingerprints of Carmen Valentin, Adolfo 
Matos, Elizam Escobar, Carlos and Maria Haydee Torres were 
found in the New Jersey safe house.\98\ Authorities also 
located a car stolen by the FALN near the house, although most 
of the documentation on the car was found in the safe house in 
Milwaukee, where the car was stolen.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \97\ Presentence report of Adolfo Matos at 030046.
    \98\ Presentence report of Carmen Valentin at 080050-080051.
    \99\ Id. at 080050-080051.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Authorities searched Adolfo Matos' home in New York. There 
they found, ``a pamphlet containing a chronology of acts of 
violence perpetrated by the FALN and other groups of the armed 
clandestine movement, as well as reproductions of the FALN 
communiques which had been released claiming credit for 
bombings up to the date of publication.'' \100\ Identity papers 
for Ida Luz Rodriguez were found in Matos' home as well.\101\ 
In Elizam Escobar's home in New York, police found extensive 
lists containing the names and home addresses of various New 
York City police officers.\102\ Law enforcement officials also 
found a surveillance photo of an FBI agent.\103\ In addition, 
Escobar had maintained a personal calendar in code that 
included numerous FALN activities such as, ``the escape of 
William Morales, certain bombings, the armed robbery of a 
Purolator truck in Milwaukee, and most interestingly, a 
reference to `little presents for the Republicans.' '' \104\ 
The reference to Republicans coincides with FALN bombings of 
Republican campaign offices in New York and Chicago.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ Presentence report of Adolfo Matos at 030046.
    \101\ Presentence report of Ida Luz Rodriguez at 060042.
    \102\ Presentence report of Elizam Escobar at 010044.
    \103\ Id.
    \104\ Id.
    \105\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Milwaukee safe house was leased in one of the false 
names used by Ida Luz Rodriguez.\106\ Law enforcement 
fingerprinting showed that, at a minimum, the safe house had 
been used by Ida Luz Rodriguez, Dylcia Pagan, Maria Haydee 
Torres, Carmen Valentin, Luis Rosa, Elizam Escobar, Oscar Lopez 
Rivera, and Carlos Torres.\107\ The Milwaukee safe house 
contained a soundproofed firing range in the basement.\108\ A 
search of the house uncovered, ``a plethora of FALN-related 
evidence, including proceeds of various Wisconsin armed 
robberies, FALN literature, disguises, proceeds of armed 
takeover of the Chicago Carter-Mondale reelection headquarters, 
and the original stencil of a threat letter sent to more than a 
hundred Carter-Mondale delegates[.]'' \109\ In addition, 
investigators found a military manual that discussed weapons, 
explosives, terrorist tactics and past Puerto Rican acts of 
violence.\110\ Enclosed in that manual was a six page document 
which appeared to be some type of justification for what was 
called the ``military action'' taken at Fraunces Tavern in New 
York.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ Presentence report of Ida Luz Rodriguez at 060042.
    \107\ Presentence report of Carmen Valentin at 080051; presentence 
report of Dylcia Pagan at 040044; presentence report of Ida Luz 
Rodriguez, at 060042; presentence report of Elizam Escobar at 010044; 
presentence report of Luis Rosa at 010561.
    \108\ Presentence report of Carmen Valentin at 080051.
    \109\ Presentence report of Luis Rosa at 010564.
    \110\ Presentence report of Dylcia Pagan at 040044.
    \111\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. The trials
    There were 11 FALN members apprehended in Evanston, IL on 
April 4, 1980. One of those individuals, Maria Haydee Torres, 
was transferred to the Federal district court in New York to 
stand trial. She had been implicated in the bombing of the 
Mobil Oil Building which caused the death of 26 year old 
Charles Steinberg.\112\ All 10 of the others apprehended were 
indicted in Federal district court in the Northern District of 
Illinois.\113\ In addition, law enforcement officials were 
still searching for Oscar Lopez Rivera, who also had been named 
in the indictment as part of the conspiracy, and was considered 
a fugitive.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \112\ Presentence report of Maria Haydee Beltran Torres, Department 
of Justice production 1041480-1041486 at 1041482.
    \113\ Exhibit 12--Indictment.
    \114\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    i. Ten Individuals Tried in Chicago.--According to a 
document containing instructions for FALN members found in the 
New Jersey safe house, members were advised to, ``make no 
statement if arrested and to declare themselves `prisoners of 
war' and to demand a transfer to military jurisdiction.'' \115\ 
In each of their presentence reports the following description 
of the defendants' conduct occurs:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \115\ Presentence report of Maria Haydee Beltran Torres at 1041483.

          Each of these defendants, orally and in writing, 
        since the time of their arrest on April 4, 1980, has 
        claimed membership in a clandestine army and has 
        claimed to be at war with the United States. Each has 
        claimed to have been captured by the enemy while 
        engaged in an armed action taking place in their war 
        for independence from the United States. They chant 
        revolutionary slogans, many of which are on court 
        records ranging from, ``Long live the armed clandestine 
        movement'' to ``Long live the FALN.'' In short, they do 
        not deny doing the things for which they have been 
        charged and convicted. They do, however, feel that as 
        captured soldiers in a revolutionary struggle, they are 
        entitled to be treated as prisoners of war and tried by 
        international or military tribunal, or not tried at 
        all. Based on this position, they have steadfastly 
        refused representation to date, both in Chicago and New 
        York, and they have witnessed their trials via 
        loudspeaker and closed-circuit TV from their detention 
        cells. They have made clear that they do not mind the 
        imposition of lengthy prison terms because each 
        believes that successful escape efforts will be 
        arranged with the cooperation of the remaining members 
        of their armed clandestine movement.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \116\ Presentence report of Luis Rosa at 010562; presentence report 
of Dylcia Pagan at 040045; presentence report of Elizam Escobar at 
010045; presentence report of Carmen Valentin at 080052; presentence 
report of Ida Luz Rodriguez at 060043; presentence report of Adolfo 
Matos at 030047; presentence report of Carlos Alberto Torres at 
1041327. (Emphasis added.)

As the defendants refused to take part in their own trials, the 
judge entered pleas of innocent for all of them at the 
arraignment.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \117\ United Press Int'l, Dec. 16, 1980.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As part of the indictment, the grand jury charged the 10 
defendants with constructing and placing explosive and 
incendiary devices at numerous locations, specifically listing 
28 sites, including: six banks, six department stores, the 
Chicago Police Department Headquarters, the Chicago Main Branch 
of the U.S. Post Office, the National Guard Armory, two County 
Buildings, the Republican Party Office, the Great Lakes Naval 
Base, two U.S. Military Recruiting Offices, and the Illinois 
Naval Militia Building.\118\ The prosecution presented 30 
witnesses and 65 boxes of evidence to the jury in the course of 
the FALN trial. In the end, the jurors deliberated only 2 hours 
before convicting all of the defendants of conspiring to 
overthrow the U.S. Government, as well as other charges.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \118\ Exhibit 12--Indictment.
    \119\ United Press Int'l, Feb. 12, 1981.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the end of their trials, the defendants were brought 
before the judge for sentencing. The courtroom turned into a 
political demonstration; as the judge handed down the 
sentences, the defendants sang, shouted, and called him a 
``puppet'' and a ``clown.'' \120\ As she was being sentenced by 
the judge, Carmen Valentin shouted, ``[y]ou are lucky that we 
cannot take you right now. Our people will continue to use 
righteous violence. Revolutionary justice can be fierce, mark 
my words.'' \121\ Ricardo Jimenez shouted at the judge, 
``[w]e're going to fight . . . revolutionary justice will take 
care of you and everybody else.'' \122\ Dylcia Pagan warned the 
judge and courtroom, ``[a]ll of you, I would advise you to 
watch your backs.'' \123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \120\ The Associated Press, Feb. 19, 1981.
    \121\ Id.
    \122\ Id.
    \123\ United Press Int'l, Feb. 19, 1981.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ii. Maria Haydee Torres.--Maria Haydee Torres, wife of FALN 
member Carlos Alberto Torres, was extradited to the Southern 
District of New York to stand trial for the bombing of the 
Mobil Oil Building in New York City which caused the death of 
Charles Steinberg.\124\ The New York prosecutors could place 
Mrs. Torres at the scene and link her to the bomb through 
fingerprint evidence, holding her responsible for one of the 
deaths caused by an FALN bomb. The Mobil Oil bombing occurred 
on August 3, 1977. Investigators were able to determine that a 
bomb consisting of two to three sticks of dynamite had been 
concealed in an umbrella placed on a coat rack in the 
employment office.\125\ Prosecutors explained how the bombing 
victim was killed, ``[t]wenty-six year old Charles Steinberg 
was in immediate proximity to the coatrack, and the rear of his 
head was blown off in the explosion, resulting in his immediate 
death.'' \126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \124\ Presentence report of Maria Haydee Beltran Torres at 1041481.
    \125\ Id.
    \126\ Id. at 10411482.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The bomb was set to explode at 10:40 a.m., a busy time of 
the day when many people would be in the office.\127\ Very 
early on that morning, a young woman wearing sunglasses and a 
wide brimmed hat entered the employment office and asked to 
fill out an application.\128\ The woman began filling out the 
application, but inquired as to whether she was allowed to 
finish it at home. The receptionist told her no, and the woman 
left the application at the desk.\129\ Police were able to 
remove two fingerprints from the application and identified 
them as belonging to Maria Haydee Torres.\130\ The FALN later 
issued a communique taking credit for the Mobil Oil 
bombing.\131\ In addition, investigators were able to determine 
that the dynamite used in the Mobil Oil bombing had originally 
been stolen from a construction site in New Mexico. Because 
dynamite is marked with a ``date shift code'' on each stick, 
the agents were able to determine that the Mobil dynamite was 
part of the same batch found in the FALN safe house discovered 
in Chicago in November 1976.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \127\ Id. at 1041481.
    \128\ Id. at 1041482.
    \129\ Id.
    \130\ Id.
    \131\ Id.
    \132\ Id. at 1041483.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similar to the other FALN defendants in Chicago, Maria 
Haydee Torres refused to participate in her trial and declared 
herself a prisoner of war.\133\ The jury found her guilty after 
a 4 day trial, and imposed a sentence of life 
imprisonment.\134\ The group that originally petitioned for 
clemency on behalf of the FALN members, Ofensiva '92, had also 
placed Mrs. Torres on the list. However, because she was 
convicted of an act that involved the death of another person, 
her name was removed from the list soon thereafter. Ofensiva 
'92 indicated that she would petition separately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \133\ Id. at 1041484.
    \134\ Id. at 1041483.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    iii. Oscar Lopez Rivera.--In December 1980, FALN member 
Oscar Lopez Rivera was indicted along with the other 10 FALN 
members in Chicago, IL.\135\ However, he remained a fugitive 
until his capture on May 29, 1981.\136\ Lopez and a companion 
were in a car in Glenview, IL, when a police officer observed 
them driving erratically.\137\ The officer pulled them over and 
asked for identification, whereupon Lopez produced a false 
driver's license from Oregon.\138\ Lopez first told the officer 
that they were looking for a United Parcel Service building, 
then responded that they were looking for a nice spot to eat 
lunch.\139\ When the officer inquired as to where their lunch 
was, they were unable to produce their meal.\140\ A back-up 
police officer stood next to the car and noticed a gun, pliers, 
wire connectors and field glasses in the car, along with a 
large bag.\141\ The officers then arrested Lopez for the 
weapons violations and traffic offense.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \135\ Exhibit 12--Indictment.
    \136\ Presentence report of Oscar Lopez at 120035.
    \137\ Id.
    \138\ Id.
    \139\ Id.
    \140\ Id.
    \141\ Id.
    \142\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Investigators had determined that Oscar Lopez had been one 
of the national leaders of the FALN since its first public acts 
of violence in 1974. In addition, they received information 
about Lopez from former FALN member Freddie Mendez who 
testified about FALN activities, and Oscar Lopez in 
particular.\143\ Lopez' presentence report summarizes the 
evidence against Lopez and Mendez' testimony:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \143\ Id. at 120036.

          Lopez has been personally involved in bombing and 
        incendiary attacks across the country for at least five 
        years prior to Mendez's [sic] involvement and 
        knowledge, has been a prime recruiter for members of 
        the underground terrorist group, and has been a key 
        trainer in bombing, sabotage and other techniques of 
        guerilla warfare. He has set up a series of safehouses 
        and bomb factories across the country, the searches of 
        which have uncovered literally hundreds of pounds of 
        dynamite and other forms of high explosive, blasting 
        caps, timing devices, huge caches of weapons and 
        stockpiles of ammunition, silencers, sawed-off 
        shotguns, disguises, stolen and altered identity 
        documents, and the proceeds of the armed robberies of 
        locations such as a National Guard Armory, Chicago's 
        Carter-Mondale Re-Election headquarters, radio and 
        communications companies, as well as a variety of 
        stolen vehicles.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \144\ Id.

Ultimately, Oscar Lopez-Rivera did not accept the President's 
offer of clemency. He remains incarcerated.
3. 1985 Chicago FALN group
    On June 29, 1983, authorities arrested FALN members 
Alejandrina Torres, Edwin Cortes, Alberto Rodriguez, and Jose 
Rodriguez (the two Rodriguezes are unrelated).\145\ The 
Government was able to locate and identify the group as members 
of the FALN through former FALN member Freddie Mendez' 
cooperation with the government. Mendez previously had 
identified Alejandrina Torres and Edwin Cortes as likely 
members of the FALN.\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \145\ Brief for the United States, U.S. v. Rodriguez, 85-2802, at 1 
(7th Cir.) [hereinafter Rodriguez brief].
    \146\ Alejandrina Torres was the step-mother of Carlos Alberto 
Torres, who was found guilty of seditious conspiracy and other crimes, 
in the first FALN trial. Presentence report of Alejandrina Torres, 
Department of Justice production 100034-100044, at 100037.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Beginning in 1982, officers assigned to the anti-terrorism 
task force conducted surveillance of Cortes, and determined 
that he periodically traveled to an apartment building on the 
opposite end of Chicago from where he lived and worked.\147\ 
They soon discovered that Cortes and Alejandrina Torres were 
meeting in an apartment in the building.\148\ After further 
investigation, agents were able to secure court authorization 
to place a hidden camera and microphone in the apartment in 
order to monitor the activities occurring within the 
apartment.\149\ The apartment was known as the ``Buena safe 
house,'' due to its street location.\150\ Eventually, agents 
discovered another apartment, known as the ``Lunt safe house.'' 
\151\ Court-ordered surveillance was installed in that 
apartment as well. During 8 months of surveillance, law 
enforcement saw and overheard the four FALN members plan and 
commit various criminal acts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \147\ Id.
    \148\ Id.
    \149\ Id.
    \150\ The address was 736 West Buena, in Chicago, IL. Id.
    \151\ The address was 1135 West Lunt, in Chicago, IL. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            a. The safe houses
    Investigators found that FALN member Edwin Cortes rented 
the Buena safe house under a fictitious name, and paid the rent 
by money order. In order to begin their surveillance of the 
apartment, microphones were installed on January 19, 1983, and 
video equipment was installed soon thereafter.\152\ After only 
a month of surveillance, agents observed Alejandrina Torres and 
Edwin Cortes ``cleaning weapons and handling bomb 
paraphernalia.'' \153\ Federal agents secured another warrant 
to search the apartment. They conducted their search in the 
middle of the night on March 9, 1983, and found, ``thousands of 
rounds of ammunition, 24 blasting caps, detonating cord, 
dynamite, four weapons, false identification and wigs.'' \154\ 
In addition, under the floor of a kitchen cabinet, they found a 
map of the Leavenworth prison drainage system.\155\ To allow 
their surveillance to continue, the agents substituted false 
explosives for the real and disabled the weapons found inside 
the apartment.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \152\ Rodriguez brief at 8.
    \153\ Id.
    \154\ Id.
    \155\ Id.
    \156\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Like the Buena apartment, the Lunt safe house was rented 
under a fictitious name, and Alejandrina Torres delivered a 
money order to pay the rent. At the beginning of April 1983, 
the government installed microphones and video equipment. When 
the government searched the Lunt house, agents found bomb 
accessories, revolvers, and other weapons. Authorities 
identified the characteristics of the bomb paraphernalia as the 
signature of the FALN.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \157\ Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. Plans for prison breaks
    At the time the authorities were observing the safe houses, 
they discovered plans to break out of prison two FALN members 
who had been convicted in the 1981 Chicago cases, Oscar Lopez 
and Luis Rosa.\158\ Lopez and Rosa were serving out their 
sentences at Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary in Kansas and 
Pontiac State Prison in Illinois, respectively. The first 
attempt was planned for March 18, 1983, when Oscar Lopez was 
scheduled to have x rays taken at a veterans' hospital near 
Leavenworth.\159\ Once they discovered the plans, agents kept 
constant surveillance on the FALN members. Five days before the 
scheduled transfer of Lopez, Edwin Cortes picked up a stolen 
rental car.\160\ The following evening, Cortes, Torres, and 
another unidentified individual reviewed the layout and 
security of the veterans' hospital and inspected their 
guns.\161\ Edwin Cortes was heard on the surveillance tape, 
``[y]es, but she [Torres] has to have it loaded and cocked 
further back. If they have to shoot, they can shoot.'' \162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \158\ Id.
    \159\ Id.
    \160\ Id.
    \161\ Id.
    \162\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When the authorities learned of the plan, they notified the 
warden at Leavenworth, who canceled Lopez' scheduled 
transfer.\163\ However, Torres and Cortes, along with the 
unidentified accomplice, were unaware of the change in plans. 
On the morning of March 18th, they showed up, in disguises and 
bulletproof vests, and waited at the entrance to the 
hospital.\164\ Dejected, they eventually left and drove to an 
apartment they had rented in Kansas City under a false 
name.\165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \163\ Id.
    \164\ Id.
    \165\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The next day the trio returned to the Buena safe house and 
conspired to break Luis Rosa out of the Pontiac prison.\166\ 
There they studied a copy of the official prison escape 
response plan. In addition, they went to the trouble of renting 
an apartment in the town next to the Pontiac prison.\167\ 
Unfortunately for them, authorities had already notified the 
warden of the plan.\168\ Luis Rosa was transferred to Joliet 
State Prison on March 22nd, the same day the apartment was 
rented.\169\ Surveillance tapes of the Buena safe house made on 
March 23rd captured Torres and Cortes complaining of changes 
made the day before.\170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \166\ Id. at 10.
    \167\ Id.
    \168\ Id.
    \169\ Id.
    \170\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            c. Plans to rob the Chicago Transit Authority
    Shortly after their failed plans to break their former 
comrades out of prison, Edwin Cortes and Alberto Rodriguez met 
several times at the Lunt safe house to discuss a plan to rob a 
Chicago Transit Authority fare collector.\171\ They discussed 
which lines would be best to hit, and explored the security and 
layout of the stops and trains.\172\ At one point, they 
discussed what to do about the guards, and Alberto Rodriguez 
suggested that they, ``hit him upside the head'' or that they 
might have to ``shoot the guard, which makes a noise.'' \173\ 
Surveillance indicated that the group had chosen a train stop. 
Cortes examined the location carefully, and Alberto Rodriguez 
showed up there several nights later to do the same.\174\ 
Intending to scare him, a plainclothes team of agents pulled 
Rodriguez over for questioning.\175\ Indeed, an intercepted 
phone call from Cortes to Torres told authorities that they had 
been effective in stopping the plan. Cortes explained that, 
``the study we were doing on the train had to be canceled when 
the police stopped `the comrade' in front of `the place where 
it was going to be done.' '' \176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \171\ Id.
    \172\ Id.
    \173\ Id. at 11.
    \174\ Id.
    \175\ Id.
    \176\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            d. The plan to assist FALN fugitive William Morales
    Although William Morales had escaped from police custody in 
1979 and fled the United States to Mexico, he remained active 
in the FALN.\177\ According to Morales, he planned the bombings 
in New York City on New Year's Eve 1983.\178\ In the spring of 
1983, Torres and Cortes spoke about the need to find their 
friend ``Jorge'' a place to live, but worried about the 
visibility of his disfigured hands.\179\ Authorities soon 
determined that ``Jorge'' was actually William Morales. By the 
end of April, Cortes and Torres had plans to move ``Jorge'' out 
of the country in June.\180\ They actually placed a call to 
Morales in Mexico, from which authorities were able to trace 
his location.\181\ Morales told Cortes and Torres to call him 
back on May 26, 1983, at the same location.\182\ On the 
designated date, Mexican authorities captured Morales after a 
gunfight that left a police officer and two of Morales' 
companions dead.\183\ The day after Morales was arrested, 
Cortes and Alberto Rodriguez packed up the contents of the 
Buena safe house, and moved everything to the Lunt safe 
house.\184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \177\ Douglas Montero, I Defend My Homeland: William Morales Talks 
to the Post, N.Y. Post, Sept. 12, 1999, at 5.
    \178\ Roberto Santiago, Terrorism American Style: The Guillermo 
Morales Story, the Plain Dealer, Aug. 1, 1993, at A8. Two of the New 
York City detectives responding to the bomb threats--Detectives Richard 
Pastorella and Anthony Senft--testified before the House Committee on 
Government Reform. Detective Pastorella was blinded by the blast and 
lost the fingers of his right hand while attempting to render the FALN 
bomb safe. Detective Senft was blinded in one eye, partially lost his 
hearing, and underwent five reconstructive surgeries on his face. 
Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the Committee 
on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
    \179\ Rodriguez brief at 14.
    \180\ Id.
    \181\ The phone call was made to a coffee shop in Puebla, Mexico, 
on May 19, 1983. Id.
    \182\ Id.
    \183\ Morales explained that at the time he was ``ambushed'' by the 
police, he was waiting for Alejandrina Torres to call from Chicago. 
Torres was calling from Chicago to double-check plans for bombings in 
Chicago, New York, and Mexico. Roberto Santiago, Terrorism American 
Style: The Guillermo Morales Story, the Plain Dealer, Aug. 1, 1993 at 
A8.
    \184\ Rodriguez brief at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            e. Plans for bombings
    In June 1983, the four FALN members made plans to bomb 
military facilities in the Chicago area.\185\ They drove to 
various sites and discussed the layout and suitability of 
different facilities.\186\ On June 1, 1983, as they discussed 
the different military targets, Cortes was teaching Alberto 
Rodriguez how to put together a bomb as they sat around the 
kitchen table in the Lunt safe house. Cortes told Rodriguez, 
``[u]sually we don't show everybody that's in the organization 
the way this is done . . . this technique. We're the only ones 
that use it. Nobody else uses this. You have to be careful who 
we show this.'' \187\ On June 28, 1983, Cortes met individually 
with Torres and Alberto Rodriguez. That day Cortes inventoried 
the bombmaking accessories located at the safe house.\188\ In 
addition, Cortes and Torres drafted a communique which stated, 
``[w]e warn both governments that failures to respect the human 
rights and physical well being will be met with the 
revolutionary violence of our people.'' \189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \185\ Id. at 15.
    \186\ Cortes and Alberto Rodriguez drove to an Army Reserve Center, 
a Marine base, a GSA building, and two military motor pools. Id.
    \187\ Id.
    \188\ Id. at 16.
    \189\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Cortes indicated that all was ready for the bombs to be 
placed. He and Alberto Rodriguez drew maps and diagrams of the 
targets and prepared the blasting caps and explosives.\190\ 
Fortunately, they did not get a chance to place the bombs. On 
June 29, 1983, agents arrested all four FALN members.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \190\ The explosives had been replaced with inert material at the 
time agents first searched the Buena safe house. Id.
    \191\ Id. at 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            f. The trial
    The four FALN members were charged with seditious 
conspiracy, various weapons charges and conspiring to obstruct 
commerce by robbery.\192\ Similar to the earlier FALN trial, 
Torres, Cortes, and Alberto Rodriguez all declared themselves 
``prisoners of war.'' However, unlike the other members, they 
did participate in various phases of their trial and even made 
closing arguments to the jury. The newest recruit to the FALN, 
Jose Rodriguez, put on a defense.\193\ He sat at a table 
separate from the others and denied affiliation with the FALN, 
yet admitted that he supported its tactics and goals.\194\ 
Torres, Cortes, and Alberto Rodriguez openly admitted that, 
``they believed violence was a morally acceptable and 
legitimate tool and the only one available, to free their 
homeland from American dominance.'' \195\ A jury found all four 
guilty of at least some of the charges brought against 
them.\196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \192\ Exhibit 11--Indictment.
    \193\ Paul Galloway, FALN Recipe for Urban Subversion, Chicago 
Trib., Aug. 8, 1985, at Tempo.
    \194\ Id.
    \195\ William B. Crawford, Jr., 3 Get 35 Years in Jail for FALN 
Conspiracy, Chicago Trib., Oct. 5, 1985, at A1, A2.
    \196\ Exhibit 18--Memorandum from U.S. Attorney's Office to 
Probation Office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. The Macheteros' activities in Puerto Rico
    The Macheteros, a terrorist group whose goal is the 
independence of Puerto Rico from the United States, literally 
translates as ``the machete wielders.'' The group generally 
carries out its terrorist activities within Puerto Rico, and 
the name bespeaks the violence for which they are known.\197\ 
In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh discussed threats to 
the United States' security, stating that, ``[t]he EPB-
Macheteros has been the most active and violent of the Puerto 
Rican-based terrorist groups since it emerged in 1978.'' \198\ 
The Macheteros finance their operations through robberies, the 
largest being the September 12, 1983, robbery of Wells 
Fargo.\199\ During that operation, the Macheteros stole $7.2 
million, the largest armored car robbery at the time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \197\ Presentence report of Juan Segarra-Palmer, Justice Department 
production 130052-130100, at 130061.
    \198\ Threats to U.S. National Security. Hearing before the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).
    \199\ The FBI found that the Macheteros used the proceeds of 
several Wells Fargo robberies in Puerto Rico and the Hartford robbery, 
to finance its activities. George Gombossy, `Freedom Fighter' a Cuban-
Trained Terrorist, FBI Says, Houston Chron., Oct. 25, 1987; presentence 
report of Juan Segarra-Palmer at 130059-130060.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Authorities in Connecticut, where the robbery occurred, 
brought indictments against 19 individuals involved in the 
planning and execution of the robbery, as well as the 
transportation of the money after the fact.\200\ Several of the 
individuals involved in the Wells Fargo robbery remain 
fugitives. Of those individuals convicted, President Clinton 
offered commutations or remissions of fines to four: Juan 
Segarra-Palmer, Norman Ramirez-Talavera, Roberto Maldonado-
Rivera, and Antonio Camacho-Negron.\201\ The President commuted 
the sentence of Juan Segarra-Palmer and remitted his fine.\202\ 
Antonio Camacho Negron reached his mandatory release date and 
was released from prison under conditions of parole. He refused 
to abide by those conditions, therefore his parole was 
revoked.\203\ Because of these circumstances, the President 
offered only to remit the fine of Antonio Camacho-Negron. 
Camacho-Negron refused the offer, and remains in prison. The 
President remitted the fines of the remaining two individuals 
convicted for their involvement in the Wells Fargo robbery, 
Norman Ramirez-Talavera and Roberto Maldonado-Rivera.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \200\ Id. at 130054-130057.
    \201\ Exhibit 10--President's grant of clemency.
    \202\ Id.
    \203\ Notice of Action on Appeal, Department of Justice production 
003625-003628. (Exhibit 20).
    \204\ Exhibit 10--President's grant of clemency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The first terrorist act for which the Macheteros took 
credit was the murder of a San Juan policeman in August 
1978.\205\ Authorities later determined that the group had 
robbed at least two banks prior to the murder.\206\ Ultimately, 
the Macheteros were responsible for a wave of terror in Puerto 
Rico that left five dead and caused many millions of dollars in 
damages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \205\ Luis Feldstein Soto, Puerto Rican Terrorists Taunt FBI, But 
Agency Is Closing In, Houston Chron., Sept. 15, 1985.
    \206\ Listing of Macheteros actions from January 1977 through June 
1989. Department of Justice production 102000045-102000046. (Exhibit 
21).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Perhaps one of the more violent acts perpetrated by the 
Macheteros, was the December 1979 attack on a United States 
Navy bus near Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico, that left 2 dead and 10 
wounded.\207\ At the time of the attack, the bus was carrying 
18 Navy enlisted personnel to a communications transmitter on 
the eastern end of Puerto Rico. A Macheteros communique 
claiming credit for the attack indicated that it was in 
reprisal for the death of an independentista in a Florida 
prison.\208\ However, authorities ruled the prison death a 
suicide after they found the prisoner had hanged himself in his 
cell. Former Macheteros member Carlos Rodriguez implicated Juan 
Segarra Palmer, who was granted clemency by the President, in 
the attack on the Navy bus.\209\ Rodriguez told authorities 
that he attended a Macheteros meeting in mid-November 1979 at 
which Segarra made an announcement that the Macheteros would 
attack a Navy bus.\210\ The group had discussed attacking other 
military institutions; however, it dismissed those plans in 
favor of the Navy bus.\211\ Segarra planned and instructed 
others on the operation, including the orders to shoot at the 
bus from a moving vehicle, while blocking the bus with another 
vehicle.\212\ The Macheteros met 3 weeks after the attack to 
discuss the operation. During the meeting Segarra evaluated the 
attack, and commented that ``while the operation had resulted 
in two dead, he felt the results should have been more 
severe.'' \213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \207\ Luis Feldstein Soto, Puerto Rican Terrorists Taunt FBI, But 
Agency Is Closing In, Houston Chron., Sept. 15, 1985.
    \208\ Id.
    \209\ Presentence report of Juan Segarra-Palmer at 130079.
    \210\ Id.
    \211\ Segarra initially wanted to attack the military installation 
at Sabana Seca, but determined that the fence around the base was too 
high. Another plan considered was to attack FBI agents, but that too 
was rejected as ``too hot.'' The group also discussed attacking Fort 
Buchanan military personnel. That plan was rejected as ``ineffective.'' 
Id. at 130080.
    \212\ The former Machetero, Carlos Rodriguez, indicated that 
Segarra was supposed to be driving a white van during the attack, yet 
he did not see Segarra on the scene that day. Id. at 81.
    \213\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Macheteros continued to use the ambush effectively. In 
March 1980, the Macheteros attacked and wounded three United 
States Army officers on their way to the University of Puerto 
Rico, Rio Pedras Campus, to participate in ROTC 
activities.\214\ In January 1981, the Macheteros claimed 
responsibility for the bombing of 11 Air National Guard planes, 
causing $45 million in damages.\215\ Segarra, who was granted 
clemency by the President, implicated himself in the bombing 
during a conversation with Macheteros leader Filiberto Ojeda 
Rios:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \214\ Luckily, the three officers escaped with only slight 
injuries. Exhibit 21--Listing of Macheteros actions; Luis Feldstein 
Soto, Puerto Rican Terrorists Taunt FBI, But Agency Is Closing In, 
Houston Chron., Sept. 15, 1985.
    \215\ A Machete and a Macheteros flag were left behind at the 
scene. In addition, the attackers left a videotape of themselves 
preparing for the bombing--putting on military fatigues and boots. 
Exhibit 21--Listing of Macheteros actions; Luis Feldstein Soto, Puerto 
Rican Terrorists Taunt FBI, But Agency Is Closing In, Houston Chron., 
Sept. 15, 1985.

          You know, if, if I had to choose the, the three or 
        four people that are really responsible for the Gaviota 
        happening and, and happening the way it happened, 
        right? Successful and making it happen, I would pick 
        four people. I would say, Frank, okay? I would say you, 
        Jumbo and I.\216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \216\ ``La Gaviota,'' which literally translates as seagull, was 
the codeword for the Macheteros attack at the Air National Guard base. 
Macheteros literature describes the attack as the ``most overwhelming 
blow given to the Yankees in `North American territory' since Pearl 
Harbor and outside its territory since the TET offensive in Vietnam.'' 
Jumbo, the code name for one of the other individuals referred to by 
Segarra, was later identified as Orlando Gonzalez Claudio. Frank was 
the code name for Isaac Camacho Negron. Presentence report of Juan 
Segarra-Palmer at 130082-130083; Harry Turner, FBI Agent Identifies 3 
as Bombers of Air Base, San Juan Star, Sept. 21, 1985, at 3.

In addition, a surveillance tape at the Muniz Air Base captured 
Segarra and two others on the base the night of the 
bombing.\217\ In 1985, the Macheteros took responsibility for 
the ambush attack on Army Major Michael Snyder as he was riding 
to work the morning of November 6, 1985.\218\ Major Snyder was 
riding his motor scooter to the base when two men on 
motorcycles pulled along side him.\219\ One of the men pulled 
out a gun and shot him twice, seriously wounding Snyder.\220\ 
In claiming responsibility, the Macheteros explained that the 
attack was a reprisal for FBI Director William Webster's visit 
to Puerto Rico 2 days earlier.\221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \217\ An FBI agent identified the trio, which included Orlando 
Gonzalez Claudio and Isaac Camacho Negron, from the surveillance tape. 
Gonzalez and Camacho were also involved in the attack on the Navy bus. 
Harry Turner, FBI Agent Identifies 3 as Bombers of Air Base, San Juan 
Star, Sept. 21, 1985, at 3.
    \218\ Harold Lidin, U.S. Army Officer Wounded in Ambush in Puerto 
Rico, the Washington Post, Nov. 7, 1985, at A17.
    \219\ Id.
    \220\ Id.
    \221\ Webster was in Puerto Rico to speak at a judicial conference. 
``Picketers at the conference protested alleged FBI brutality in an 
Aug. 30 roundup of `Los Macheteros' members.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Macheteros have engaged in numerous other violent acts, 
including more recent attacks. Some of the more violent acts 
which they carried out were: the ambush of four U.S. Navy 
personnel in retaliation for an exercise performed by the Navy 
in 1982, in which one member of the Navy was killed; a 1983 
robbery of a Wells Fargo truck in Villa Fontana in which one 
civilian was killed, and; a 1983 robbery of a Wells Fargo truck 
at San Roberto, Rio Pedras, Puerto Rico, in which the driver of 
the Wells Fargo truck was killed.\222\ The Macheteros have also 
been active recently. On March 31, 1998, they claimed 
responsibility for the bombing of the superaqueduct at Arecibo, 
Puerto Rico.\223\ According to a statement by the Macheteros, 
the attack was in retaliation for ``environmental aggression,'' 
and was ``only the beginning of what from now on will 
constitute a line of action in defense of our country.'' \224\ 
The Macheteros also took responsibility for the June 9, 1998, 
attacks on two branches of the Banco Popular.\225\ The 
Macheteros set off a bomb at the first branch while they 
conducted a drive-by shooting of the second branch.\226\ The 
Macheteros claimed that the attacks were to show support for 
the telephone company strike.\227\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \222\ Exhibit 21--List of Macheteros actions.
    \223\ Recent Macheteros statements/actions. Produced by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, unnumbered. (Exhibit 22).
    \224\ On Apr. 21, 1998, Macheteros fugitive Filiberto Ojeda Rios 
confirmed that the Macheteros were responsible for the bombing on 
environmental grounds. Id.
    \225\ Id.
    \226\ Id.
    \227\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. The Wells Fargo robbery and Macheteros convictions
    On August 30, 1985, FBI agents in Puerto Rico arrested 12 
people in Puerto Rico and 2 people in the continental United 
States in connection with the Macheteros 1983 robbery of $7.2 
million from a Wells Fargo armored car in Connecticut.\228\ 
Over 200 agents served 30 search warrants that day in the 
investigation of the Macheteros, who earlier had claimed credit 
for the robbery.\229\ The FBI indicated that their 
investigation spanned over 20 months and involved numerous 
``wiretaps on suspects [sic] homes, cars, phones, nearby pay 
phones, and a motor home.'' \230\ Ultimately, indictments were 
brought in Connecticut against 19 individuals associated with 
the Macheteros for their respective roles in the conspiracy to 
rob the armored car and later transport the funds.\231\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \228\ 14 Held in $7 Million Wells Fargo Robbery, Houston Chron., 
Aug. 31, 1985, at 1.
    \229\ Ron Howell, FBI Roundup Brings Anger in Puerto Rico, Newsday, 
Dec. 2, 1985.
    \230\ Luis Feldstein Soto, Puerto Rican Terrorists Taunt FBI, But 
Agency Is Closing In, Houston Chron., Sept. 15, 1985 at 1.
    \231\ Presentence report of Juan Segarra-Palmer at 130053-130055.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            a. The robbery
    Prosecutors described the circumstances under which the 
Wells Fargo robbery in Connecticut took place:

          On September 12, 1983, between 9:30 and 11:00 p.m., 
        Wells Fargo guard and co-defendant Victor Manuel 
        Gerena, returned to the Wells Fargo depot in West 
        Hartford, Connecticut after completing his days work, 
        removed a revolver from his co-worker's holster, placed 
        it to his head and tied him up. He then subdued a 
        second employee, hog-tied him, injected both co-workers 
        with a sleep-inducing substance, and fled with more 
        than seven million dollars.\232\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \232\ Id. at 130059-130060.

It was not until October 19, 1984, that the Macheteros took 
credit for the robbery.\233\ The group waited to issue its 
communique until all of the money was safely out of the United 
States and in the Macheteros' possession, ``in a state of 
maximum security.'' \234\ The communique described the robbery 
as a ``military-economic operative'' to earn money for the 
``revolutionary movement[].'' \235\ It further explained, ``in 
the same manner in which we have seized seven million dollars 
from the very bowels of American imperialism, the organized 
force of the Puerto Rican people will know how, in its own time 
to seize the liberty which will allow us to choose our destiny 
as a people.'' \236\ According to the communique, the actual 
planning and execution of the Wells Fargo robbery took 1\1/2\ 
years to complete.\237\ Integral in that planning was Juan 
Segarra-Palmer. Segarra was known as the Macheteros' ``Harvard 
educated thinker,'' who was responsible for much of the 
planning involved in Macheteros' actions.\238\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \233\ Id. at 130060.
    \234\ Quote from the Macheteros communique taking credit for the 
robbery. Id.
    \235\ Id.
    \236\ The communique also notes that their, ``comrade Victor 
Gerena'' had done an outstanding job and that he was in good health and 
integrated into the struggle for Puerto Rican independence. Gerena 
remains a fugitive. Id.
    \237\ Id.
    \238\ Segarra's mother described him as exceptionally intelligent 
from a young age. As a young boy, Segarra approached his parents about 
attending prep school in Andover, MA, which he did. Segarra later 
attended Harvard University. He graduated from Harvard in 1972. Id. at 
130085, 130092-130093.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During its lengthy investigation, the FBI was able to 
untangle the connections and roles of all the individuals 
involved. They began with information they found in a search 
while investigating a separate Macheteros offense.\239\ In a 
Macheteros safehouse they found a cache of weapons along with 
organizational materials describing the manner in which the 
group was organized, ``safe'' meeting places, storage 
facilities, training grounds, and workshops.\240\ The documents 
disclosed that the Macheteros were formed in 1976 with their 
leader Filiberto Ojeda Rios, and that the group operated 
through a system of complicated cells.\241\ Armed with that 
information, the FBI was able to secure wiretaps on the homes 
of Filiberto Ojeda Rios, his car, three public telephones 
across the street from Ojeda's residence, the residence of Juan 
Segarra-Palmer, and the public telephones outside Segarra-
Palmer's residence.\242\ Through these sources, authorities 
learned that Ojeda and Segarra were leaders of the Macheteros 
and had planned not only the Connecticut Wells Fargo robbery, 
but numerous other attacks as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \239\ The FBI was investigating the 1983 light anti-tank weapon 
rocket attack on the United States Courthouse and Federal Building in 
Hato Rey Puerto Rico. Id. at 130061-130063.
    \240\ Id. at 130062.
    \241\ ``The Macheteros use a system of codenames for individuals, 
meeting places, meeting times and projects. The Macheteros utilize a 
system of cells which compartmentalize information so that one cell is 
not aware of the identities of individuals and projects in other 
cells.'' Id.
    \242\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. The investigation and indictments
    After developing its evidence, the government was able to 
secure the cooperation of several witnesses who had been close 
to Segarra and other Macheteros members. Notably, an associate 
of Segarra's, Kenneth Cox, testified that Segarra told him that 
he committed the Wells Fargo robbery.\243\ According to 
Segarra's account to Cox, on the night of the robbery Victor 
Gerena was taken on a motorcycle from Hartford, CT to 
Springfield, MA.\244\ Shortly thereafter, Gerena was moved to 
Boston and ultimately to Mexico while hidden in a secret 
compartment in a motor home.\245\ The money, which in total 
weighed 1,150 pounds, was transported in cars to 
Springfield.\246\ The FBI was able to tie Segarra both to the 
transfer of Gerena and the money.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \243\ Id. at 130064.
    \244\ Id. at 130065.
    \245\ Id.
    \246\ Id.; George Gombossy, `Freedom Fighter' a Cuban Trained 
Terrorist, FBI Says, Houston Chron., Oct. 25, 1987, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A woman who was identified as Segarra's ex-lover, Anne 
Gassin, also cooperated with the government in its case against 
the Macheteros.\247\ Gassin stated that Segarra told her, ``his 
role in the robbery was to time the different escape routes 
away from the Wells Fargo depot.'' \248\ His primary role 
thereafter was to get the money out of the United States. 
Segarra and Ojeda purchased a motor home that they customized 
with secret compartments to house Victor Gerena and a 
substantial amount of the stolen money while crossing the 
border into Mexico.\249\ After his first trip, Segarra made a 
second trip to Mexico in March 1984. He drove the motor home 
across the border to Mexico, transporting $2,024,000 of the 
stolen cash.\250\ In September 1984, Segarra bought a new motor 
home. He and Antonio Camacho-Negron, who was also offered a 
grant of clemency by the President,\251\ worked to customize it 
in order to hide cash.\252\ On September 21, 1983, Segarra, 
Camacho, and a woman from Puerto Rico drove the motor home to 
Mexico.\253\ On October 19, 1984, with the money safely outside 
of the United States, the Macheteros claimed responsibility for 
the robbery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \247\ Gassin had originally been arrested as part of the conspiracy 
on Aug. 30, 1985. Id.
    \248\ Id.
    \249\ Id. at 130067-130068.
    \250\ Macheteros documents reflected Segarra's movement of this 
money. In addition, in an intercept of Filiberto Ojeda Rios' 
conversation with Segarra, Segarra stated that $2,024,000 was taken the 
last time, meaning March 1984. Id. at 130068.
    \251\ The President offered to remit Camacho's fine of $100,000. 
Camacho refused the offer.
    \252\ Segarra had made an earlier attempt to move the rest of the 
money across the border to Mexico. He had devised a plan to have a non-
hispanic couple drive a truck and trailer across the border, and 
recruited Anne Gassin and another friend, Paul Weinberg, to drive. En 
route to the Mexican border from Massachusetts, the truck and trailer 
overturned on the Interstate in Pennsylvania. As a result of the 
accident, the money had spilled out of the secret compartments. Segarra 
occupied the Pennsylvania State Police who showed up on the scene of 
the accident while his colleagues gathered up the money in plastic 
bags. Id. at 130071-130072; presentence report of Antonio Camacho-
Negron, Department of Justice production 140056-140081, at 140064.
    \253\ Segarra applied for and received a passport in the name of 
Ronald Paul Princiotta for the trip. He used the birth certificate of 
an infant who had died shortly after its birth in 1947. Segarra 
explained to Anne Gassin that he had used the name in the past. 
Presentence report of Juan Segarra-Palmer at 130071-130072.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Antonio Camacho Negron's role in the conspiracy was to 
``help Segarra conceal the money inside the vehicle.'' \254\ 
Camacho did, in fact, assist Segarra in building the special 
panels to hide the money inside the motor home. In addition, 
Segarra told Anne Gassin that, ``Camacho had done this sort of 
thing before and was skilled in that type of work.'' \255\ In 
fact, FBI agents first discovered Camacho and his role in the 
Macheteros when he was seen at a safe house used by Filiberto 
Ojeda Rios.\256\ At the time, he was driving a vehicle known as 
a Macheteros ``safe vehicle.'' \257\ After his identification, 
FBI agents were able to trace his membership in the Macheteros 
to July 1984.\258\ Documents seized from the Macheteros 
bookkeeper provided further information into Camacho's 
activities. The documents show that ``Roco,'' Camacho's 
codename, was a full-time member of the Macheteros in December 
1984 and was paid a monthly salary of $600.\259\ In addition, 
minutes of Macheteros meetings show that ``Roco'' was present 
when problems during the Wells Fargo robbery were discussed, 
and actively participated in the conversation.\260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \254\ Camacho's Macheteros codename was ``Roco,'' and that is how 
he is referred to in most documents or surveillance recordings. 
Presentence report of Antonio Camacho-Negron at 140064.
    \255\ Id. at 140066.
    \256\ Id. at 140067-40068.
    \257\ Camacho was pulled over while driving the vehicle. Although 
Camacho told police that a friend owned it, the vehicle was registered 
to a woman who told law enforcement that she had never owned the 
vehicle. In addition, several other known members of the Macheteros had 
driven the vehicle. Id. at 140068.
    \258\ Camacho was photographed on that date exiting the residence 
of Filiberto Ojeda Rios, along with a co-defendant in the Wells Fargo 
robbery, Orlando Gonzalez Claudio. Id. at 140069.
    \259\ ``Roco'' was also entrusted with large sums of Macheteros 
money for ``zone 4,'' of which Camacho was a member. Id. at 140072.
    \260\ Id. at 140073.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Roberto Maldonado Rivera also participated in the 
transportation of the Wells Fargo money across the border from 
the United States to Mexico.\261\ Maldonado was responsible for 
driving the back-up vehicle as Segarra drove the motor home 
across the border into Mexico on September 22, 1984.\262\ 
Macheteros documents showed that Maldonado, whose ``codenames'' 
were ``Joaquin,'' ``Jan,'' or ``Jean,'' had been affiliated 
with Filiberto Ojeda Rios and other members of the Macheteros 
since 1970.\263\ ``A letter sent from the members of `Zone 1' 
of Los Macheteros to `comrades,' dated April 13, 1985, stated 
that `Jean' joined the organization in 1977, was expelled in 
1978, and rejoined in 1984 giving him a total of two to three 
years as a member.'' \264\ After rejoining the Macheteros, 
Maldonado took on significant responsibilities, including 
membership in the Central Committee, which established 
Macheteros policies, and the Directive Committee, which 
implemented those policies.\265\ In 1985, similar to Camacho, 
Maldonado was a salaried member of the Macheteros, paid $500 
per month.\266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \261\ Presentence report of Roberto Maldonado Rivera, Department of 
Justice production 150024-150047, at 150043.
    \262\ Segarra had Orlando Gonzalez Claudio drive the back-up 
vehicle the first time Segarra crossed the border in March 1984. Id. at 
150043-150044.
    \263\ Id. at 150044.
    \264\ Id.
    \265\ Id. at 150045.
    \266\ Maldonado was the leader of Zone 3. In that capacity he was 
entrusted to handle large sums of Macheteros money. Id. at 150045-
150047.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Norman Ramirez Talavera was an active member of the 
Macheteros as well. After the robbery, the Macheteros used a 
small portion of the stolen money to buy toys for Three Kings 
Day.\267\ Ramirez participated in the toy giveaway funded 
through the stolen Wells Fargo money.\268\ Ramirez actually 
purchased about $5,600 in toys from a ``Toys 'R Us'' in 
Connecticut, using the Wells Fargo funds.\269\ He also dressed 
up as a ``King'' to distribute the toys and $20 bills in 
Hartford.\270\ Ramirez first came to the attention of the FBI 
when he was observed traveling frequently with Segarra's 
wife.\271\ Macheteros documents showed that Ramirez was a 
salaried member of the Macheteros since June 1980.\272\ 
However, other records show that Ramirez was a general member 
in 1978, and was listed under ``Approved Comrades for Military 
Action'' since July 1979.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \267\ Presentence report of Norman Ramirez Talavera, Department of 
Justice production 160021-160035, at 160027.
    \268\ Id.
    \269\ Id.
    \270\ Id.
    \271\ Segarra's wife, Luz Berrios Berrios, pleaded guilty to 
charges relating to her role in the Wells Fargo Robbery. Id. at 160025.
    \272\ Depending on the amount of money available, Ramirez earned 
between $268 and $500 per month. Id. at 160025-160026.
    \273\ Id. at 160025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            c. The trials and convictions
    After he was found guilty by a jury, Juan Segarra-Palmer 
submitted a statement regarding his actions in the Wells Fargo 
robbery:

          I planned and organized the receipt and 
        transportation of the money after it was taken from the 
        Wells Fargo depot and the subsequent toy giveaways in 
        Hartford and Puerto Rico on January 6, 1985. I consider 
        my acts part of the struggle against colonialism and 
        for the self-determination of Puerto Rico and therefore 
        political offenses, not crimes. . . .\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \274\ Presentence report of Juan Segarra-Palmer at 130090.

Segarra did not acknowledge that he had prior knowledge, and in 
fact planned the Wells Fargo robbery. The judge and jury found 
differently, and Segarra was sentenced to 65 years in prison 
and given a $500,000 fine. President Clinton offered both to 
commute his sentence and remit his fine. Segarra accepted the 
President's offer, although under the conditions of clemency, 
he continues to serve some portion of his sentence.
    Antonio Camacho-Negron, represented by court appointed 
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges leveled in the 
Connecticut indictment.\275\ During his trial, Camacho was 
asked about the violent activities associated with the 
Macheteros, in particular the attack on the U.S. Navy bus. 
Camacho responded, ``[c]an anyone condemn David for hitting 
Goliath with a stone?'' \276\ Camacho refused to cooperate with 
the Probation Office, indicating that it was a representative 
of the Government.\277\ The Probation Office provided an 
assessment of Camacho:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \275\ Presentence report of Antonio Camacho-Negron at 140076.
    \276\ Id. at 140074.
    \277\ Id. at 140077.

          First and foremost, it is this officer's opinion that 
        Mr. Camacho-Negron exhibits the most fanatical demeanor 
        of all of the codefendants [sic] interviewed by this 
        officer to date. He indulges in florid rhetoric and 
        enjoys hearing himself talk. He appears downright 
        obsessive about his present circumstances and is 
        probably extremely hostile and aggressive under his 
        superficial courteous demeanor.\278\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \278\ Id. at 140081.

    After serving out his sentence until the mandatory release 
date, Camacho was released on parole in February 1998.\279\ He 
was subject to the same terms of release as all other prisoners 
in his situation would be. However, Camacho returned to Puerto 
Rico and purposefully violated the terms of his parole. 
Attorneys for Camacho wrote to the Probation office to let the 
office know that Camacho was ``not available at the moment.'' 
\280\ His attorneys attempted to make the argument that he 
should not be subject to the same rules as all other prisoners 
on mandatory release:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \279\ Sentence monitoring computation data for Antonio Camacho-
Negron, Department of Justice production 140037.
    \280\ Letter from Luis Nieves Falcon, Comite Pro Derechos Humanos 
en Puerto Rico, to Eustaquio Babilonia, United States Probation Office, 
Deputy Chief (Feb. 19, 1998). (Exhibit 23).

          Because of his sincere and strongly held political 
        beliefs, he feels he cannot comply with to [sic] 
        onerous supervision conditions imposed upon him after 
        10 years of incarceration. To require him to comply 
        with those conditions is an interference with his 
        rights to political and personal freedom in violation 
        of prevailing human rights [sic]. If he has to choose 
        between his political beliefs and his personal dignity 
        or complying with your conditions he chooses the first 
        and rather reenter prison [sic].\281\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \281\ Id.

Camacho-Negron did re-enter prison after his mandatory release 
was revoked for failure to comply with the terms and conditions 
of parole.\282\ Camacho was not offered a commutation of 
sentence by President Clinton, rather he was granted a 
remission of fine, which he refused. Camacho is free to gain 
release from prison at any time if he is willing to comply with 
parole conditions.\283\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \282\ Notice of action on appeal for Antonio Camacho-Negron, 
Department of Justice production 015482. (Exhibit 24).
    \283\ Id.

    Roberto Maldonado Rivera, an attorney, represented himself 
during his trial. After he was found guilty of the conspiracy, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
he submitted a written statement to the Probation Office:

          My theory of the case rests on the knowledge that I 
        believe I am being persecuted by the government of the 
        United States for my work in human and civil rights for 
        the past two decades in Puerto Rico. I had nothing to 
        do with the Wells Fargo robbery and I believe there is 
        no evidence linking me in any way to a conspiracy in 
        said case.\284\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \284\ Presentence report of Roberto Maldonado-Rivera at 150029.

Maldonado steadfastly maintained his innocence both before and 
after the trial. However, he did state that he was an ``ardent 
independist'' and that ``he viewed the conflict between Puerto 
Rico and the United States in a similar fashion as a 
revolutionary war between the original thirteen colonies and 
their mother country, England.'' \285\ In addition, he stated 
that he ``does not condemn any violent actions in the pursuit 
of independence.'' \286\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \285\ Id. at 150029-150030.
    \286\ Id. at 150030.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ramirez was arrested in Puerto Rico, along with 15 other 
members of the Macheteros, on August 30, 1985. Prior to his 
arrest he was overheard in a conversation stating that he 
``would never be arrested. Have I told you?'' He added that he 
would not permit anyone to ``take him abroad [to the mainland 
United States] . . . they will have to take me dead. I won't be 
caught alive. I couldn't stand being out there.'' \287\ 
Ramirez, represented by an attorney, pleaded not guilty to the 
charges brought against him. However, he refused to provide any 
statement or information to the Probation Office.\288\ He was 
sentenced to 5 years in prison and released on parole in April 
1994.\289\ President Clinton offered to remit the balance of 
his fine, which Ramirez accepted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \287\ Presentence report of Norman Ramirez Talavera at 160027.
    \288\ Id. at 160028-160029.
    \289\ Certificate of Parole for Norman Ramirez Talavera, Department 
of Justice production 006073.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


              b. the sentences of the 16 offered clemency


    The following section reviews the counts, crimes, maximum 
penalties, and sentences of the 16 members of the FALN offered 
clemency by President Clinton on August 11, 1999. A variety of 
documents produced to the Committee by the Department of 
Justice in response to the Committee's September 1, 1999, 
subpoena were sources of information for this summary. 
Documents include the August 11, 1999, executive grant of 
clemency, judgment and commitment orders prepared by the 
courts, presentence reports prepared by probation officers, and 
progress reports prepared by the Bureau of Prisons. The U.S. 
Code sections listed for each criminal count are as listed in 
President Clinton's August 11, 1999, executive grant of 
clemency.
1. Elizam Escobar
    Elizam Escobar was convicted of seven criminal counts on 
February 11, 1981, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was 
a $50,000 fine and/or a maximum of 80 years in prison. Escobar 
was sentenced to a 60-year term of imprisonment on February 18, 
1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Seditious Conspiracy.............  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2384...         20
2--Interference with Interstate       18 U.S.C. Sec.  1951            20
 Commerce by Threats or Violence.      and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
3--Possession of an Unregistered      26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(d)         10
 Firearm.                              and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
4--Carrying Firearms During the       18 U.S.C. Sec.                  10
 Commission of Seditious Conspiracy    924(c)(2).
 and Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
9--Interstate Transportation of       18 U.S.C. Sec.  924(b)          10
 Firearms with Intent to Commit        and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
 Seditious Conspiracy and
 Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
10--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
13--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The total effective 60-year sentence was determined by 
consecutive and/or concurrent sentences for the individual 
counts. Counts 1, 2, 10, and 13 were to run consecutively. 
Counts 3, 4, and 9 were to run concurrently with each other and 
consecutively to all other counts.
    On August 26, 1980, Escobar began serving an Illinois State 
sentence for conspiracy to commit armed robbery (3 years), 
unlawful use of a shotgun (5 years consecutive), and unlawful 
use of a loaded handgun (364 days concurrent). He was confined 
at the Illinois State Penitentiary until he was remanded into 
Federal custody on January 31, 1981. Escobar's Federal sentence 
was to run consecutively to the 8-year sentence imposed in the 
Illinois State Court.
2. Ricardo Jimenez
    Ricardo Jimenez was convicted of nine criminal counts on 
February 11, 1981, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was 
a $60,000 fine and/or a maximum of 90 years in prison. Jimenez 
was sentenced to a 90-year term of imprisonment on February 18, 
1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Seditious Conspiracy.............  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2384...         20
2--Interference with Interstate       18 U.S.C. Sec.  1951            20
 Commerce by Threats or Violence.      and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
3--Possession of an Unregistered      26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(d)         10
 Firearm.                              and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
4--Carrying Firearms During the       18 U.S.C. Sec.                  10
 Commission of Seditious Conspiracy    924(c)(2).
 and Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
9--Interstate Transportation of       18 U.S.C. Sec.  924(b)          10
 Firearms with Intent to Commit        and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
 Seditious Conspiracy and
 Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
10--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
11--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
12--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
13--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All counts of the total effective 90-year sentence were to 
run consecutively.
    On August 26, 1980, Jimenez began serving an Illinois State 
sentence for conspiracy to commit armed robbery (3 years), 
unlawful use of a shotgun (5 years consecutive), and unlawful 
use of a loaded handgun (364 days concurrent). He was confined 
at the Illinois State Penitentiary until he was remanded into 
Federal custody on January 31, 1981. Jimenez' Federal sentence 
was to run consecutively to the 8-year sentence imposed in the 
Illinois State Court.
3. Adolfo Matos
    Adolfo Matos was convicted of nine criminal counts on 
February 11, 1981, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was 
a $60,000 fine and/or a maximum of 90 years in prison. Matos 
was sentenced to a 70-year term of imprisonment on February 18, 
1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Seditious Conspiracy.............  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2384...         20
2--Interference with Interstate       18 U.S.C. Sec.  1951            20
 Commerce by Threats or Violence.      and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
3--Possession of an Unregistered      26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(d)         10
 Firearm.                              and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
4--Carrying Firearms During the       18 U.S.C. Sec.                  10
 Commission of Seditious Conspiracy    924(c)(2).
 and Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
9--Interstate Transportation of       18 U.S.C. Sec.  924(b)          10
 Firearms with Intent to Commit        and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
 Seditious Conspiracy and
 Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
10--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
11--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
12--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
13--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The total effective 70-year sentence was determined by 
consecutive and/or concurrent sentences for the individual 
counts. Counts 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, and 13 were to run 
consecutively. Counts 3, 4, and 9 were to run concurrently with 
each other and consecutively to all other counts.
    On August 26, 1980, Matos began serving an Illinois State 
sentence for conspiracy to commit armed robbery (3 years), 
unlawful use of a shotgun (5 years consecutive), and unlawful 
use of a loaded handgun (364 days concurrent). He was confined 
at the Illinois State Penitentiary until he was remanded into 
Federal custody on January 31, 1981. Matos' Federal sentence 
was to run consecutively to the 8-year sentence imposed in the 
Illinois State Court.
4. Dylcia Noemi Pagan
    Dylcia Noemi Pagan was convicted of nine criminal counts on 
February 11, 1981, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was 
a $60,000 fine and/or a maximum of 90 years in prison. Pagan 
was sentenced to a 55-year term of imprisonment on February 18, 
1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Seditious Conspiracy.............  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2384...         20
2--Interference with Interstate       18 U.S.C. Sec.  1951            20
 Commerce by Threats or Violence.      and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
3--Possession of an Unregistered      26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(d)         10
 Firearm.                              and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
4--Carrying Firearms During the       18 U.S.C. Sec.                  10
 Commission of Seditious Conspiracy    924(c)(2).
 and Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
9--Interstate Transportation of       18 U.S.C. Sec.  924(b)          10
 Firearms with Intent to Commit        and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
 Seditious Conspiracy and
 Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
10--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
11--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
12--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
13--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The total effective 55-year sentence was determined by 
consecutive and/or concurrent sentences for the individual 
counts. Counts 1 and 2 were to run consecutively. Counts 3, 4, 
and 9 were to run concurrently with each other and 
consecutively to all other counts. Counts 10, 11, 12, and 13 
were to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to 
all other counts.
    On August 26, 1980, Pagan began serving an Illinois State 
sentence for conspiracy to commit armed robbery (3 years), 
unlawful use of a shotgun (5 years consecutive), and unlawful 
use of a loaded handgun (364 days concurrent). She was confined 
at the Illinois State Penitentiary until she was remanded into 
Federal custody on January 31, 1981. Pagan's Federal sentence 
was to run consecutively to the 8-year sentence imposed in the 
Illinois State Court.
5. Alicia Rodriguez
    Alicia Rodriguez was convicted of nine criminal counts on 
February 11, 1981, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois. Rodriguez was sentenced to a 55-year term 
of imprisonment on February 18, 1981. The specific criminal 
counts are as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Seditious Conspiracy.............  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2384...         20
2--Interference with Interstate       18 U.S.C. Sec.  1951            20
 Commerce by Threats or Violence.      and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
3--Possession of an Unregistered      26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(d)         10
 Firearm.                              and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
6--Carrying Firearms During the       18 U.S.C. Sec.                  10
 Commission of Seditious Conspiracy    924(c)(2).
 and Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
9--Interstate Transportation of       18 U.S.C. Sec.  924(b)          10
 Firearms with Intent to Commit        and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
 Seditious Conspiracy and
 Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
10--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
11--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
12--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
13--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The total effective 55-year sentence was determined by 
consecutive and/or concurrent sentences for the individual 
counts. Counts 1 and 2 were to run consecutively. Counts 3, 6, 
and 9 were to run concurrently with each other and 
consecutively to all other counts. Counts 10, 11, 12, and 13 
were to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to 
all other counts.
6. Ida Luz Rodriguez
    Ida Luz Rodriguez was convicted of nine criminal counts on 
February 11, 1981, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was 
a $60,000 fine and/or a maximum of 90 years in prison. 
Rodriguez was sentenced to a 75-year term of imprisonment on 
February 18, 1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Seditious Conspiracy.............  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2384...         20
2--Interference with Interstate       18 U.S.C. Sec.  1951            20
 Commerce by Threats or Violence.      and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
3--Possession of an Unregistered      26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(d)         10
 Firearm.                              and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
7--Carrying Firearms During the       18 U.S.C. Sec.                  10
 Commission of Seditious Conspiracy    924(c)(2).
 and Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
9--Interstate Transportation of       18 U.S.C. Sec.  924(b)          10
 Firearms with Intent to Commit        and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
 Seditious Conspiracy and
 Interference with Interstate
 Commerce By Violence.
10--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
11--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312...          5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.
12--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312...          5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.
13--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312...          5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The total effective 75-year sentence was determined by 
consecutive and/or concurrent sentences for the individual 
counts. Counts 1, 2, 3, 7, and 9 were to run consecutively. 
Counts 10, 11, 12, and 13 were to run concurrently with each 
other and consecutively to the other counts.
    On August 26, 1980, Rodriguez began serving an Illinois 
State sentence for conspiracy to commit armed robbery (3 
years), unlawful use of a shotgun (5 years consecutive), and 
unlawful use of a loaded handgun (364 days concurrent). She was 
confined at the Illinois State Penitentiary until she was 
remanded into Federal custody on January 31, 1981. Rodriguez' 
Federal sentence was to run consecutively to the 8-year 
sentence imposed in the Illinois State Court.
7. Luis Rosa
    Luis Rosa was convicted of nine criminal counts on February 
11, 1981, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois. Rosa was sentenced to a 75-year term of 
imprisonment on February 18, 1981. The specific criminal counts 
are as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Seditious Conspiracy.............  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2384...         20
2--Interference with Interstate       18 U.S.C. Sec.  1951            20
 Commerce by Threats or Violence.      and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
3--Possession of an Unregistered      26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(d)         10
 Firearm.                              and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
5--Carrying Firearms During the       18 U.S.C. Sec.                  10
 Commission of Seditious Conspiracy    924(c)(2).
 and Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
9--Interstate Transportation of       18 U.S.C. Sec.  924(b)          10
 Firearms with Intent to Commit        and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
 Seditious Conspiracy and
 Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
10--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
11--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
12--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
13--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The total effective 75-year sentence was determined by 
consecutive and/or concurrent sentences for the individual 
counts. Counts 1, 2, 3, 5, and 9 were to run consecutively. 
Counts 10, 11, 12, and 13 were to run concurrently with each 
other and consecutively to all other counts.
8. Carmen Valentin
    Carmen Valentin was convicted of nine criminal counts on 
February 11, 1981, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was 
a $60,000 fine and/or a maximum of 90 years in prison. Valentin 
was sentenced to a 90-year term of imprisonment on February 18, 
1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Seditious Conspiracy.............  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2384...         20
2--Interference with Interstate       18 U.S.C. Sec.  1951            20
 Commerce by Threats or Violence.      and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
3--Possession of an Unregistered      26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(d)         10
 Firearm.                              and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
8--Carrying Firearms During the       18 U.S.C. Sec.                  10
 Commission of Seditious Conspiracy    924(c)(2).
 and Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
9--Interstate Transportation of       18 U.S.C. Sec.  924(b)          10
 Firearms with Intent to Commit        and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
 Seditious Conspiracy and
 Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
10--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
11--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
12--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
13--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Motor Vehicles.                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All counts of the total effective 90-year sentence were to 
run consecutively.
    On August 26, 1980, Valentin began serving an Illinois 
State sentence for conspiracy to commit armed robbery (3 
years), unlawful use of a shotgun (5 years consecutive), and 
unlawful use of a loaded handgun (364 days concurrent). She was 
confined at the Illinois State Penitentiary until she was 
remanded into Federal custody on January 31, 1981. Valentin's 
Federal sentence was to run consecutively to the 8 year 
sentence imposed in the Illinois State Court.
9. Alberto Rodriguez
    Alberto Rodriguez was convicted of five criminal counts on 
August 5, 1985, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was 
a $60,000 fine and/or a maximum of 65 years in prison. On 
October 4, 1985, Rodriguez was sentenced to a 35-year term of 
imprisonment followed by 5 years of probation. The specific 
criminal counts are as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Seditious Conspiracy.............  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2384...         20
4--Conspiracy to Make Destructive     18 U.S.C. Sec.  371....          5
 Devices.
6--Possession of an Unregistered      26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(d)         10
 Firearm.
7--Possession of a Firearm without a  26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(i)         10
 Serial Number.
8--Conspiracy to Obstruct Interstate  18 U.S.C. Sec.  1951...         20
 Commerce by Robbery.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The total effective 35-year sentence followed by 5 years of 
probation was determined by consecutive and/or suspended 
sentences for the individual counts. Counts 1, 4, and 6 were to 
run consecutively. Counts 7 and 8 were suspended. Five years of 
probation were to follow Rodriguez' release from custody.
10. Alejandrina Torres
    Alejandrina Torres was convicted of seven criminal counts 
on August 5, 1985, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was 
a $66,000 fine and/or a maximum of 61 years in prison. On 
October 4, 1985, Torres was sentenced to a 35-year term of 
imprisonment followed by 5 years of probation. The specific 
criminal counts are as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Seditious Conspiracy.............  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2384...         20
2--Possession of an Unregistered      26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(d)         10
 Firearm.
3--Unlawful Storage of Explosives...  18 U.S.C. Sec.  842(j).          1
4--Conspiracy to Make Destructive     18 U.S.C. Sec.  371....          5
 Devices.
5--Interstate Transportation of a     18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312...          5
 Stolen Vehicle.
6--Possession of an Unregistered      26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(d)         10
 Firearm.
7--Possession of a Firearm without a  26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(i)         10
 Serial Number.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The total effective 35-year sentence followed by 5 years of 
probation was determined by consecutive, concurrent, and/or 
suspended sentences for the individual counts. Counts 1 and 4 
were to run consecutively. Counts 2, 6, and 7 were to run 
concurrently with each other and consecutively to all other 
counts. Counts 3 and 5 were suspended. Five years of probation 
were to follow Torres' release from custody.
11. Edwin Cortes
    Edwin Cortes was convicted of eight criminal counts on 
August 5, 1985, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was 
a $76,000 fine and/or a maximum of 81 years in prison. On 
October 4, 1985, Cortes was sentenced to a 35-year term of 
imprisonment followed by 5 years of probation. The specific 
criminal counts are as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Seditious Conspiracy.............  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2384...         20
2--Possession of an Unregistered      26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(d)         10
 Firearm.
3--Unlawful Storage of Explosives...  18 U.S.C. Sec.  842(j).          1
4--Conspiracy to Make Destructive     18 U.S.C. Sec.  371....          5
 Devices.
5--Interstate Transportation of a     18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312...          5
 Stolen Vehicle.
6--Possession of an Unregistered      26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(d)         10
 Firearm.
7--Possession of a Firearm without a  26 U.S.C. Sec.  5861(i)         10
 Serial Number.
8--Conspiracy to Obstruct Interstate  18 U.S.C. Sec.  1951...         20
 Commerce by Robbery.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The total effective 35-year sentence followed by 5 years of 
probation was determined by consecutive, concurrent, and/or 
suspended sentences for the individual counts. Counts 1 and 4 
were to run consecutively. Counts 2 and 6 were to run 
concurrently with each other and consecutively to the other 
counts. Counts 3, 5, 7, and 8 were suspended. Five years of 
probation were to follow Cortes' release from custody.
12. Oscar Lopez
    Oscar Lopez was initially convicted of seven criminal 
counts on July 24, 1981, in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these 
crimes was a $50,000 fine and/or a maximum of 70 years in 
prison. Lopez was sentenced to a 55-year term of imprisonment 
on August 11, 1981. The specific criminal counts are as 
follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Seditious Conspiracy.............  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2384...         20
2--Interference with Interstate       18 U.S.C. Sec.  1951            20
 Commerce by Threats or Violence.      and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
9--Carrying Firearms During the       18 U.S.C. Sec.  924(b)          10
 Commission of Seditious Conspiracy    and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
 and Interference with Interstate
 Commerce by Violence.
10--Interstate Transportation of a    18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Vehicle.                       and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
11--Interstate Transportation of a    18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Vehicle.                       and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
12--Interstate Transportation of a    18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Vehicle.                       and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
13--Interstate Transportation of a    18 U.S.C. Sec.  2312             5
 Stolen Vehicle.                       and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 55-year sentence was determined by consecutive and/or 
concurrent sentences for the individual counts. Counts 1, 2, 
and 9 were to run consecutively. Counts 10, 11, 12, and 13 were 
to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to the 
other counts.
    While serving the 55-year sentence, Oscar Lopez 
participated in a conspiracy to escape from the U.S. 
Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas where he was incarcerated. 
Mr. Lopez was convicted of five criminal counts on December 31, 
1987, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was a $500,000 
fine and/or a maximum of 25 years in prison. Lopez was 
sentenced to a 15-year term of imprisonment on February 26, 
1988. The specific criminal counts are as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Conspiracy to Escape.............  18 U.S.C. Sec.  371....          5
2--Transport of Explosives..........  18 U.S.C. Sec.                   5
                                       1952(a)(3) and 18
                                       U.S.C. Sec.  2.
3--Transport of Explosives..........  18 U.S.C. Sec.                   5
                                       1952(a)(3) and 18
                                       U.S.C. Sec.  2.
7--Transport of Explosives..........  18 U.S.C. Sec.                   5
                                       1952(a)(3) and 18
                                       U.S.C. Sec.  2.
8--Transport of Explosives..........  18 U.S.C. Sec.                   5
                                       1952(a)(3) and 18
                                       U.S.C. Sec.  2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The specific crimes surrounding counts 2, 3, 7, and 8 
include the transportation of explosives with intent to kill 
and injure people, and to destroy government buildings and 
property; aiding and abetting travel in interstate commerce to 
carry on arson; and using a telephone to carry on arson. This 
15-year sentence was determined by consecutive and/or 
concurrent sentences for the individual counts. Count 1 was to 
run consecutively to all other counts. Counts 2 and 3 were to 
run concurrently with each other and consecutively to all other 
counts. Counts 7 and 8 were to run concurrently with each other 
and consecutively to all other counts.
    The entire 15-year sentence was to run consecutively to the 
55-year sentence previously imposed on August 11, 1981, 
resulting in a total effective sentence of a 70-year term of 
imprisonment.
13. Juan Enrique Segarra-Palmer III
    Juan Enrique Segarra-Palmer was initially convicted of 11 
criminal counts on April 4, 1989, in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Connecticut. The maximum penalty for these 
crimes was a $565,000 fine and/or a maximum of 165 years in 
prison. On June 15, 1989, Segarra-Palmer was sentenced to a 65-
year term of imprisonment and ordered to pay a $500,000 fine. 
The specific criminal counts are as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Robbery of Federally Insured Bank  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2113(a)         20
 Funds.
3--Robbery of Federally Insured Bank  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2113(a)         20
 Funds.
5--Robbery of Federally Insured Bank  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2113(a)         20
 Funds.
7--Robbery of Federally Insured Bank  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2113(a)         20
 Funds.
9--Theft from Interstate Shipment...  18 U.S.C. Sec.  659....         10
10--Interstate Transportation of      18 U.S.C. Sec.  2314...         10
 Stolen Money.
12--Foreign Transportation of Stolen  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2314...         10
 Money.
13--Foreign Transportation of Stolen  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2314...         10
 Money.
14--Conspiracy to Interfere with      18 U.S.C. Sec.  1951...         20
 Commerce by Robbery.                                           $250,000
15--Conspiracy to Interfere with      18 U.S.C. Sec.  1951...         20
 Commerce by Robbery.
16--Conspiracy to Rob Federally       18 U.S.C. Sec.  371....          5
 Insured Bank Funds, to Commit a                                $250,000
 Theft from Interstate Shipment, and
 to Transport Stolen Money in
 Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The total effective 65-year sentence was determined by 
consecutive, concurrent, and/or suspended sentences for the 
individual counts. Counts 1, 3, 5, and 7 were to run 
concurrently with each other and consecutively to all counts. 
Counts 9 and 16 were to run consecutively to all counts. Counts 
10, 12, and 13 were to run concurrently with each other and 
consecutively to all counts. Counts 14 and 15 were to run 
concurrently with each other and consecutively to all counts. 
Additionally, counts 14 and 16 each carried a $250,000 fine.
    On March 15, 1990, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that 
Segarra-Palmer's conviction under count 9, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 659, 
was similar to his conviction under count 12, 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1951. United States v. Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 982 (2d Cir. 
1990). Because both of these ``counts of theft from interstate 
commerce focus on precisely the same conduct . . . [they] are 
multiplicious.'' Id. Therefore, the court ordered that count 9 
of the above sentence be vacated. With this modification, 
Segarra-Palmer's total effective sentence was reduced to a 55-
year term of imprisonment, while the original $500,000 fine 
remained imposed as previously ordered.
14. Antonio Camacho-Negron
    Antonio Camacho-Negron was convicted of two criminal counts 
on April 10, 1989, in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Connecticut. The maximum penalty for these crimes was a 
$260,000 fine and/or a maximum of 15 years in prison. Camacho-
Negron was sentenced to a 15-year term of imprisonment and 
fined $100,000 on June 8, 1989. The specific criminal counts 
are as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
13--Foreign Transportation of Stolen  18 U.S.C. Sec.  2314            10
 Money.                                and 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2.
16--Conspiracy to Rob Federally       18 U.S.C. Sec.  371, 18          5
 Insured Bank Funds, Commit a Theft    U.S.C. Sec.  2314, and   $100,000
 from Interstate Shipment, and         18 U.S.C. Sec.  659.
 Transport Stolen Money in
 Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The terms of counts 13 and 16 were to run consecutive for a 
total effective sentence of a 15-year term of imprisonment and 
a $100,000 fine.
    Following his February 13, 1998, mandatory release on 
parole, Camacho-Negron failed to report for supervision as 
required under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4164. The U.S. Department of 
Justice's Parole Commission (the Commission) found that 
Camacho-Negron's unwillingness to comply with this parole 
requirement, a decision that generated considerable publicity, 
was based on ideological grounds. As a result, on April 14, 
1999, the National Appeals Board upheld the Commission's 
decision to revoke Camacho-Negron's mandatory release and 
return him to prison. Until the Commission receives reasonable 
indication that Camacho-Negron is willing to comply with 
conditions of parole, he is unable to gain release from prison. 
Additionally, because time spent on mandatory release will not 
be credited toward time served, Camacho-Negron's full jail term 
expires on May 21, 2004.
15. Roberto Maldonado-Rivera
    Roberto Maldonado-Rivera was convicted of one criminal 
count on April 10, 1989, in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Connecticut. The maximum penalty for this crime was 
a $250,000 fine and/or a maximum of 5 years in prison. 
Maldonado-Rivera was sentenced to a 5-year term of imprisonment 
and fined $100,000 on June 8, 1989. The specific criminal count 
is as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
16--Conspiracy to Rob Federally       18 U.S.C. Sec.  371, 18          5
 Insured Bank Funds, Commit a Theft    U.S.C. Sec.  2314, and   $100,000
 from Interstate Shipment, and         18 U.S.C. Sec.  659.
 Transport Stolen Money in
 Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

16. Norman Ramirez-Talavera
    Norman Ramirez-Talavera was convicted of one criminal count 
on April 10, 1989, in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Connecticut. The maximum penalty for this crime was a 
$250,000 fine and/or a maximum of 5 years in prison. Ramirez-
Talavera was sentenced to a 5-year term of imprisonment and 
fined $50,000 on June 8, 1989. The specific criminal count is 
as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
           Count and crime                    Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
16--Conspiracy to Rob Federally       18 U.S.C. Sec.  371, 18          5
 Insured Bank Funds, Commit a Theft    U.S.C. Sec.  2314, and    $50,000
 from Interstate Shipment, and         18 U.S.C. Sec.  659.
 Transport Stolen Money in
 Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 III. The Clemency Process and Decision

    On August 11, 1999, the President granted clemency to 16 
individuals who were members of the Puerto Rican terrorist 
groups the FALN and the Macheteros. Thirteen of these 
individuals were offered commutations of their sentences, while 
four were offered remissions of their fines.\290\ The decision 
to grant clemency to these individuals convicted of terrorist 
acts took over 6 years to make. Although the clemency process 
is normally lengthy, the process for these individuals not only 
was drawn out, but also was handled in a manner different than 
the average petition. This suggests that the decision was 
subject to numerous political considerations. However, because 
President Clinton claimed executive privilege over all 
documents that might shed light on the reasons for the 
clemency, the public does not know all of the facts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \290\ Juan Segarra-Palmer was offered both a commutation of 
sentence and remission of fine. Exhibit 10--President's grant of 
executive clemency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


                   a. how the clemency process works


    Since his election in 1993, President Clinton has received 
over 1,300 requests for pardon and over 3,000 requests for 
commutation.\291\ In order to process the requests, the 
Department of Justice established the Office of the Pardon 
Attorney (``OPA''), under the direction of the Deputy Attorney 
General.\292\ The major functions of the Office of the Pardon 
Attorney are to:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \291\ Presidential Clemency Actions by Administration: 1945 to 
Present. Produced by the Office of the Pardon Attorney, Department of 
Justice (unnumbered) (Exhibit 25).
    \292\ The Office of the Pardon Attorney dates back to an Executive 
order of Mar. 3, 1865. U.S. Attorneys Manual (Revised 1996), Department 
of Justice production 1040125-1040131. (Exhibit 26).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Receive and review all petitions for executive 
        clemency, conduct the necessary investigations and 
        prepare recommendations to the President for action.
         Provide policy guidance for the conduct of 
        clemency proceedings and the standards for decision.
         Confer with individual clemency applicants, 
        their representatives, public groups, Members of 
        Congress, various Federal, State, and local officials 
        and others in connection with the disposition of 
        clemency proceedings.
         Participate in training and other conferences 
        related to the field of criminal justice, corrections 
        and clemency, and maintain the contacts required of OPA 
        with Department of Justice officials, the Counsel to 
        the President, and other Government officials.\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \293\ Department of Justice Organization, Mission and Functions 
Manual. Department of Justice production 1040578.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In carrying out its mandate, OPA has developed rules and 
regulations for the application and review of clemency 
requests.
1. Procedures for commutation
    The rules governing petitions for executive clemency are 
published in the Code of Federal Regulations.\294\ The first 
rule states, ``[a] person seeking executive clemency by pardon, 
reprieve, commutation of sentence or remission of fine shall 
execute a formal petition.'' \295\ The rule requires that the 
person seeking the remedy personally request such remedy. This 
rule is to ensure that the individual requesting clemency 
actually wants such relief and that the individual would accept 
such relief.\296\ Petitioners address the request to the 
President, the only person who is able to deliver the remedy, 
but submit it to OPA. The Pardon Attorney then initiates and 
conducts the investigations relating to clemency petitions, and 
ultimately prepares a report and recommendation for submission 
to the President.\297\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \294\ The rules are also published in a form that any layperson 
would understand and are available at Federal correctional institutions 
and penitentiaries. 28 C.F.R. Sec. 1.1 et. seq. (Exhibit 27--Code of 
Federal Regulations); (Exhibit 28--Information and Instructions on 
Pardons).
    \295\ 28 C.F.R. Sec. 1.1.
    \296\ Memorandum from Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney, to 
Philip B. Heymann, Deputy Attorney General, July 29, 1993. Department 
of Justice production 1041252-1041253.
    \297\ Exhibit 26--U.S. Attorneys Manual.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the case of a commutation of sentence, the Pardon 
Attorney gathers information and opinions from parties who have 
knowledge of the petitioner's crimes and convictions, as well 
as the petitioner's behavior or status since incarceration in 
order to prepare his report.\298\ Generally, OPA requests 
several items from the Bureau of Prisons, including: a 
presentence report, sentence computation record, sentence data 
summary, and progress report.\299\ A presentence report is 
prepared for the judge in anticipation of sentencing.\300\ It 
is especially useful because it is a contemporaneous account of 
the conviction and the petitioner's conduct leading to the 
conviction. In contrast, a progress report is an internal 
Bureau of Prisons report that is prepared periodically and 
outlines the prisoner's conduct while incarcerated.\301\ 
Although the Bureau of Prisons provides this information to 
OPA, it does not generally give an opinion on whether clemency 
should be granted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \298\ Chart on processing a commutation petition produced by Office 
of the Pardon Attorney. (Exhibit 29).
    \299\ Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, U.S. Department 
of Justice (Sept. 18, 1999).
    \300\ Id.
    \301\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In certain cases, OPA also will request information from 
the Office of the U.S. Attorney that prosecuted the case.\302\ 
Unlike the Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Attorney is asked for 
his recommendation. According to the U.S. Attorneys Manual:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \302\ Exhibit 26--U.S. Attorneys Manual.

          The U.S. Attorney can contribute significantly to the 
        clemency process by providing factual information and 
        perspectives about the offense of conviction that may 
        not be reflected in the presentence or background 
        investigation reports or other sources, e.g., the 
        extent of the petitioner's wrongdoing and the attendant 
        circumstances, the amount of money involved or losses 
        sustained, the petitioner's involvement in other 
        criminal activity, the petitioner's reputation in the 
        community and, when appropriate, the victim impact of 
        the petitioner's crime.\303\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \303\ Id.

The U.S. Attorney may ``support, oppose or take no position on 
a pardon request.'' \304\ In addition, the U.S. Attorney is 
asked to contact the sentencing judge in order to solicit his 
recommendation on the clemency petition. Once collected, the 
two recommendations are sent to OPA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \304\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the Pardon Attorney has gathered all of the relevant 
information relating to the petitioner, he drafts a proposed 
recommendation for action, which is sent to the Deputy Attorney 
General for review, and action.\305\ Such a recommendation is 
supposed to reflect the views of the Department of 
Justice.\306\ If the Deputy Attorney General concurs with the 
Pardon Attorney's recommendation, he will sign the 
recommendation and return it to OPA for transmittal to the 
Counsel to the President. Should the Deputy Attorney General 
disagree with the recommendation, he may send it back to OPA to 
change the proposed recommendation.\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \305\ Exhibit 29--Commutation process chart.
    \306\ The Executive Clemency Process, Department of Justice 
production 1040586-1040591, at 1040586.
    \307\ Id. at 1040588.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Once the Deputy Attorney General has approved the 
recommendation, it is transmitted to the Counsel to the 
President. Ostensibly, the Counsel to the President uses the 
Department of Justice's report as the basis for his 
recommendation to the President. It is then solely the 
President's decision on whether or not to grant clemency.
2. Standards for considering commutation
    Rather than forgiving the underlying offense, a commutation 
reduces the period of incarceration. ``A commutation of 
sentence is an extraordinary remedy that is rarely granted.'' 
\308\ The following factors have traditionally been considered 
appropriate grounds for considering commutation: ``disparity or 
undue severity of sentence, critical illness or old age, and 
meritorious service rendered to the government by the 
petitioner, e.g., cooperation with investigative or prosecutive 
efforts that has not been adequately rewarded by other official 
action.'' \309\ In addition, OPA takes into account the 
``amount of time served and the availability of other 
remedies,'' such as parole, in making its determination.\310\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \308\ Exhibit 26--U.S. Attorneys Manual at 1040131; see also the 
executive clemency process at 1040590 (making a nearly identical 
statement).
    \309\ Exhibit 26--U.S. Attorneys Manual at 1040131.
    \310\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If the decision to grant a commutation of sentence is made, 
the President has several options as to how to effect the 
commutation. He may commute the sentence to time served, which 
would cause the prisoner to be released immediately.\311\ The 
President also is able to reduce a sentence, resulting in two 
possibilities. First, a reduced sentence could advance a 
prisoner's parole eligibility or mandatory release date, 
effecting an immediate release.\312\ However, the prisoner 
would remain subject to conditions of parole or mandatory 
release under that scenario. A reduced sentence could also mean 
exactly what it says, specifying release after the prisoner 
continues to serve a certain period of time.\313\ In the end, 
it is the President's responsibility to determine what remedy, 
if any, is in the interest of justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \311\ Id.
    \312\ Id.
    \313\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


                b. the faln/macheteros clemency process


1. The application process
    On November 9, 1993, Ofensiva '92 filed a petition for 
executive clemency on behalf of 18 members of the FALN and 
Macheteros organizations convicted of Federal offenses.\314\ 
The 18 were: Dylcia Pagan, Elizam Escobar, Ida Luz Rodriguez, 
Adolfo Matos, Maria Haydee Torres, Carmen Valentin, Carlos 
Alberto Torres, Ricardo Jimenez, Alicia Rodriguez, Luis Rosa, 
Oscar Lopez-Rivera, Alejandrina Torres, Edwin Cortes, Alberto 
Rodriguez, Antonio Camacho-Negron, Juan Segarra-Palmer, Roberto 
Jose Maldonado, and Norman Ramirez-Talavera.\315\ Dr. Nieves 
Falcon of Ofensiva '92 earlier had written to the Pardon 
Attorney urging the release of the 18 prisoners.\316\ The 
Pardon Attorney had informed Dr. Nieves Falcon that Department 
of Justice rules required that prisoners file their own 
petitions.\317\ The rationale for the rule is ``to ensure that 
[petitioners] actually desire this relief and that [the 
petitioners] will accept it if it is granted.'' \318\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \314\ Ofensiva '92 characterizes itself as a human rights 
organization and is based in Puerto Rico. Their petition on behalf of 
the prisoners is signed by Dr. Luis Nieves Falcon, Dr. Margarita Mergal 
and Jan Susler, an attorney for the FALN prisoners. Petition from 
Ofensiva '92 to Margaret Colgate Love, U.S. Pardon Attorney (Nov. 9, 
1993) Department of Justice production 000260-000272 (Exhibit 30). In 
the spring of 1994, Dr. Nieves Falcon requested that Haydee Beltran's 
name be taken off the petition. Letter from Margaret Colgate Love, 
Pardon Attorney, to Dr. Luis Nieves Falcon (May 18, 1994) Department of 
Justice production 000718 (Exhibit 31).
    \315\ Id.
    \316\ Memorandum from Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney, to 
Philip B. Heymann, Deputy Attorney General (July 29, 1993) (regarding a 
request for release of the Puerto Rican prisoners by Dr. Luis Nieves 
Falcon with draft response) Department of Justice production 1041252-
1041253. (Exhibit 32).
    \317\ Memorandum from Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney, to 
Philip B. Heymann, Deputy Attorney General (July 28, 1992) (Exhibit 
33).
    \318\ The Pardon Attorney used the example of the Puerto Rican 
nationalists granted clemency by President Carter. OPA allowed the 
attorneys for those prisoners to file the applications, and one of the 
prisoners refused to accept President Carter's grant of clemency. 
Exhibit 32 at 1041253.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite its own regulations, the Justice Department 
accepted the petition filed by Ofensiva '92 on behalf of the 
prisoners.\319\ The petition makes clear that the prisoners 
considered themselves ``political prisoners,'' and similar to 
their trials, they refused to take part in any process that 
would legitimize the government's actions against them, 
therefore they refused to file their own petitions.\320\ The 
Ofensiva '92 petition went on to explain that in considering 
the clemency request, OPA must take into account ``the 
political nature of the entire matter, beginning with the 
colonial nature of the relationship between the United States 
and Puerto Rico.'' \321\ In addition, the petition argued that 
the OPA should compare the prisoners to the forefathers of the 
United States who fought against their colonial status with 
Britain, thereby exculpating the prisoners from any acts they 
may have committed.\322\ However, these were the same failed 
arguments that the petitioner's raised at the time of the jury 
trial when they declared themselves prisoners of war. 
Nevertheless, OPA began the process of reviewing the clemency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \319\ The Pardon Attorney noted that the regulations were not 
mandatory, but that OPA normally required petitioners to file on their 
own behalf. Id. at 1041253.
    \320\ Exhibit 30--Petition.
    \321\ Id. at 000261.
    \322\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After accepting the petition, OPA began the normal 
investigation process, requesting background documents such as 
the presentence and progress reports, as well as judgment and 
conviction orders.\323\ OPA also contacted the U.S. Attorneys' 
offices in Connecticut and Illinois in 1994 for their 
recommendations on clemency. Due to the terrorist acts involved 
in the underlying crimes, OPA contacted the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation as well.\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \323\ Memorandum from Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney, to 
warden, U.S. Penitentiary Atlanta, GA (Dec. 23, 1993) (requesting 
information on Juan Enrique Segarra-Palmer) (Exhibit 34).
    \324\ Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) 
(Statement of Neil Gallagher, Assistant Director for National Security, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The campaign for release
    The individuals working to secure release of the prisoners 
mounted a campaign to show support for clemency. Early in the 
process they involved numerous other groups to lobby for 
clemency, including Members of Congress and the religious 
community.\325\ Most active in the campaign for release were 
Congressmen Luis Gutierrez and Jose Serrano, along with 
Congresswoman Nydia Velazquez.\326\ Supporters made the same 
arguments that had been made in the petition for clemency, 
namely that these were political prisoners and their sentences 
were disproportionately long. They also focused on the benefits 
the release would bring to United States and Puerto Rico 
relations. Many of the supporters were granted meetings with 
the Pardon Attorney, as well as high-ranking officials in the 
Department of Justice and the White House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \325\ Letter from Jose Serrano, Nydia Velazquez, and Luis 
Gutierrez, Members of Congress, to Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General 
(Nov. 22, 1993) (requesting meeting with the Attorney General regarding 
political sentences) Department of Justice production 001723 (Exhibit 
35); letter from Jose Serrano, Nydia Velazquez, and Luis Gutierrez, 
Members of Congress, to President Bill Clinton (Mar. 29, 1995) 
(requesting a meeting with the President and Attorney General regarding 
clemency for Puerto Rican prisoners) Department of Justice production 
001721-001722 (Exhibit 36); letter from Ronald V. Dellums, Member of 
Congress, to President Bill Clinton (Jan. 12, 1996) Department of 
Justice production 001724 (Exhibit 37); letter from Rev. Nozomi Ikuta, 
United Church of Christ, to Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney 
(July 11, 1995) (requesting meeting, along with phone message) 
Department of Justice production 10140035-10140036. (Exhibit 38).
    \326\ See Exhibits 35 and 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the ordinary course of its review, OPA met with 
representatives of the prisoners.\327\ When meeting with 
outside parties interested in the clemency, OPA does not 
disclose information about the investigative steps being taken 
in the case, nor does the office disclose at what point in the 
process the petition is.\328\ Meetings with supporters were 
described as generally for the purpose of ``their learning how 
the clemency process works, in general terms, and providing any 
additional information supporters care to provide about the 
case.'' \329\ The Office of Pardon Attorney further explained 
that it ``do[es] not engage in a dialogue about the merits of 
any case, nor do[es] [it] answer factual or opinion questions 
about the merits of the case, the chances for success, or the 
thoughts of anyone, including members of [OPA], about the 
case.'' \330\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \327\ Letter from Jan Susler, attorney for prisoners, to Margaret 
Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney (July 11, 1994) (confirming meeting on 
July 19, 1994) Department of Justice production 000726 (Exhibit 39).
    \328\ Memorandum from Susan M. Kuzma, Office of the Pardon 
Attorney, to John Trasvina, Office of Legislative Affairs (July 20, 
1995) (describing information OPA releases during clemency meetings) 
Department of Justice production 102000030 (Exhibit 40).
    \329\ Id.
    \330\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Justice Department action on the clemency
    The Pardon Attorney had her first meeting with the 
attorneys and advocates of the FALN and Macheteros prisoners on 
July 19, 1994. Attending were Jan Susler and Michael Deutsch, 
the attorneys for some of the prisoners, Drs. Nieves Falcon and 
Margarita Mergal of Ofensiva '92, Congressman Gutierrez, and 
the mother of two of the prisoners, Josefina Rodriguez.\331\ 
Although OPA agreed to meet with other groups of individuals, 
and even the same individuals again, the office warned that no 
new information would be provided to meeting participants, and 
that expectations should not be raised in that regard.\332\ 
Aside from their meetings with OPA, supporters of clemency also 
met with Counsel to the President Jack Quinn in October 1996, 
and later meetings were held with Deputy Attorney General 
Holder, Attorney General Reno, and White House Counsels Quinn 
and Ruff.\333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \331\ Exhibit 39--Letter from Jan Susler to Margaret Colgate Love 
(July 11, 1994); letter from Jan Susler, Attorney for prisoners, to 
Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney (July 22, 1994) (thanking Pardon 
Attorney for meeting on July 19, 1994) Department of Justice production 
000728 (Exhibit 41); Memorandum from Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon 
Attorney, to Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General (July 19, 1994) 
(reporting on July 19, 1994, meeting with supporters of Puerto Rican 
nationalists) Department of Justice production 10140028 (Exhibit 42).
    \332\ Exhibit 40--Memorandum from Susan M. Kuzma to John Trasvina 
(July 20, 1995).
    \333\ Letter from Jan Susler, attorney for the prisoners, to 
Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney (December 1996) Department of 
Justice production 001116-001117 (Exhibit 43).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As part of the clemency process, the Pardon Attorney 
reported regularly to the Attorney General's office on status 
of the clemency for the FALN and Macheteros members and on any 
new information in the case.\334\ By December 1996, the Pardon 
Attorney made a recommendation against clemency and that 
recommendation was forwarded to the White House.\335\ 
Nevertheless, OPA continued to meet with or respond to requests 
from the supporters of the FALN and Macheteros clemency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \334\ Memorandum from Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney, to 
Donna Templeton, Assistant to the Attorney General, with attachments 
(Nov. 28, 1994) (responding to a request for information on the 
clemency) Department of Justice production 10140025-10140027 (Exhibit 
44).
    \335\ Letter from Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney, to 
Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President (July 25, 1997) (forwarding 
a letter from former President Carter) Department of Justice production 
1041964 (Exhibit 45).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By fall of 1997, the clemency remained pending, even though 
the White House had received the Pardon Attorney's 
recommendation in December 1996. From a September 1997 
memorandum from the Pardon Attorney, it appears that the 
Justice Department had been getting inquiries about the FALN 
and Macheteros from both the White House and outside 
parties.\336\ In November 1997, Deputy Attorney General Eric 
Holder met with clemency supporters Congressmen Jose Serrano, 
Luis Gutierrez, and Nydia Velazquez.\337\ The Members of 
Congress argued for commutation of the prisoners' sentences and 
asked Deputy Attorney General Holder that he ``render to us the 
ability to be here [in Congress] when these people are 
released.'' \338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \336\ Memorandum from Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon Attorney, to 
Roger Adams (Sept. 23, 1997) (discussing OPA's policy on responding to 
clemency inquiries) Department of Justice production 10140020-10140021 
(Exhibit 46).
    \337\ Notes of Deputy Attorney General Holder's meeting (Nov. 5, 
1997) Department of Justice production 1041804 (Exhibit 47).
    \338\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Deputy Attorney General Holder mentioned to the 
Representatives that the prisoners had not petitioned for 
clemency on their own, and asked whether that made them 
unrepentant.\339\ Congressman Gutierrez replied that the fact 
that the prisoners did not apply ``reinforce[d] the political 
nature of who they are.'' \340\ However, the Congressman said 
that the prisoners would provide a written statement answering 
the question of why they did not apply.\341\ Mr. Holder pressed 
the question on how the prisoners had changed since they 
committed the crimes, and Congressman Gutierrez said that the 
prisoners would reflect on that question also and respond in 
writing.\342\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \339\ Id. at 1041805.
    \340\ Id.
    \341\ Id.
    \342\ Id. at 1041806.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    No decisions had been made on the clemency by the spring of 
1998. On April 8, 1998, Deputy Attorney General Holder again 
agreed to meet with a group of supporters, this one from the 
religious community.\343\ During that meeting, the supporters 
of the prisoners finally delivered the prisoners' statements 
promised during the meeting with Congressman Gutierrez in 
November 1997.\344\ According to notes of the meeting, the 
Deputy Attorney General discussed whether the prisoners would 
renounce violence if offered clemency. Reverend Paul Sherry 
responded that they ``would not change their beliefs.'' \345\ 
The Department of Justice participants interpreted that 
statement to mean that ``they would not change their beliefs 
about the desirability of Puerto Rican independence, although 
[Reverend Sherry] gave a carefully phrased answer that did not 
make it entirely clear that they had renounced the use of 
violence.'' \346\ The Justice Department asked the supporters 
additional questions about the prisoners, such as why some of 
the prisoners had not sought parole when they were eligible. 
The supporters responded that ``their principles would not 
allow them to.'' \347\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \343\ At least one member of the group, the Reverend Nozomi Ikuta, 
had already met with the previous Pardon Attorney, Margaret Colgate 
Love. Letter from Paul H. Sherry, president, United Church of Christ, 
to Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney General (Mar. 26, 1998) (listing 
meeting participants and attachments) Department of Justice production 
001718-001720 (Exhibit 48).
    \344\ Facsimile from Roger Adams, Department of Justice, to Dawn 
Chirwa, Associate Counsel to the President (Apr. 21, 1998) (``notes 
from the meeting, and copy of statement from the prisoners, submitted 
by Jan Susler on April 10. A copy was also provided by Paul Sherry'') 
Department of Justice production 1041847-1041853 (Exhibit 49).
    \345\ Id. at 1041849.
    \346\ Id.
    \347\ Id. at 1041850.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the meeting, Roger Adams, the Pardon Attorney,\348\ 
again explained the clemency process to the supporters. He also 
acknowledged that OPA was preparing a report on the clemency 
petition for the Deputy Attorney General.\349\ He did not 
mention the OPA report that was prepared in December 1996 and 
forwarded to the White House on the same clemency request. In 
addition, in response to questions from the supporters as to 
the timing of the report, the Deputy Attorney General told them 
that ``it would likely be fairly quickly'' and added that they 
``had delayed its final preparation until after [that] 
meeting.'' \350\ Between the first meetings and the meeting on 
April 8, 1998, it is unclear whether OPA revised its guidelines 
to allow for the sharing of information with clemency 
supporters. In fact, the representation that a decision would 
be made soon, was later used by the attorneys for the prisoners 
as a basis for complaining about their treatment.\351\ After 
referencing the clemency petition, the attorney even accused 
the warden at the U.S. Penitentiary at Lewisburg of 
``undermin[ing] the positive records all three of [the 
prisoners] have accumulated, so as to prejudice this 
effort[.]'' \352\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \348\ Roger Adams was appointed Pardon Attorney after Margaret 
Colgate Love resigned the position.
    \349\ Id. at 1041850.
    \350\ Id.
    \351\ Letter from Dr. Luis Nieves Falcon, coordinator of the Comite 
Pro-Derechos Humanos en Puerto Rico, to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy 
Attorney General (June 3, 1998) (concerning the transfers of Alberto 
Rodriguez and Ricardo Jimenez to a new prison location, with 
attachment) Department of Justice production 000882-000886 (Exhibit 
50).
    \352\ Id. at 000886.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The unsigned document entitled, ``Statement from the Puerto 
Rican Political Prisoners,'' produced at the meeting, purports 
to show how the prisoners had changed since the time of their 
incarceration. However, they continued to blame the government 
for their own illegal actions, namely bombings and violence, 
and allege that they were forced into such acts because the 
government did not allow for ``other avenues for exercising 
self-determination.'' \353\ In what one could hardly interpret 
as a sign of change, the prisoners acknowledge:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \353\ Exhibit 49--Facsimile from Roger Adams to Dawn Chirwa (Apr. 
21, 1998) at 1041852.

          At this juncture, we want to express our disposition 
        to participate in reaching a just and dignified 
        political solution to our colonial problem. If the U.S. 
        Congress and the executive branch of the U.S. 
        government desire to reach a political solution through 
        a truly democratic process, we are disposed to 
        participate in that process, a process which is 
        necessary for reconciliation to take place, for healing 
        one hundred years of wounds to begin . . .
          Invoking the right under international law to use all 
        means available does not mean we used them with no 
        respect for human life. . . . Our actions, for the most 
        part symbolic, have had the objective of focusing the 
        attention of the U.S. government on the colonial 
        conditions of Puerto Rico, and not of causing terror to 
        the citizens of the U.S. or Puerto Rico. However, that 
        is not to deny that in all liberation processes, there 
        are always innocent victims on all sides.\354\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \354\ Id. at 1041852-1041853.

When one compares the self-serving nature of this statement 
with the many communiques found at Appendix I, it is clear that 
the 16 terrorists have no qualms about lying. This is 
disturbing to the Committee, particularly given the President's 
reliance on the promised renunciation of violence. The 
President is relying on their promises to refrain from violence 
when the actions of the individuals over a period of nearly 
three decades sends a very different message.
    The President announced his offer of clemency to the 
members of FALN and Macheteros on August 11, 1999. On August 
23, 1999, Pardon Attorney Adams sent an electronic mail message 
to Jamie Orenstein in the Deputy Attorney General's office 
regarding the FALN terrorists. Adams stated, ``[a]lthough noe 
[sic] of the 13 were actually convicted of a bombing, the group 
with which most of them are associated--the FALN--certainly was 
responsible for over 100 bombings about 20 years ago.'' \355\ 
This statement by the Pardon Attorney is misleading. The 12 
FALN members all were indicted and convicted of the seditious 
conspiracy alleged in count 1 of their indictments.\356\ That 
meant that a jury found that they participated in a conspiracy, 
the result of which was the placement and detonation of 28 
bombs at specific locations.\357\ All 12 were convicted of this 
count.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \355\ Electronic mail from Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, to Jamie 
Orenstein, Office of the Deputy Attorney General (Aug. 23, 1999) 
Department of Justice production 1041803. (Exhibit 51).
    \356\ Exhibit 12--Indictment; Exhibit 11--Indictment.
    \357\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After meeting with numerous supporters of clemency and 
reviewing materials produced on behalf of the prisoners, the 
Department of Justice transmitted its second report on the 
prisoners to the White House on July 8, 1999.\358\ As mentioned 
earlier, after meeting with supporters and requesting all of 
the background materials, OPA produced the original report by 
December 1996. Leading up to the 1996 report, the Department of 
Justice appeared to be following the normal process in 
reviewing the petition filed on behalf of the FALN and 
Macheteros members. However, it is apparent that between 
December 1996 and the fall of 1997, the Department began to 
write another report and recommendation to the President. This 
is particularly odd because the Justice Department report is 
only a recommendation that the President need not follow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \358\ ``Log of Documents Subject to Executive Privilege'' (Oct. 14, 
1999) White House production (unnumbered).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Opposition to the clemency
    As part of the clemency process, OPA requested the 
recommendations of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices that tried the 
cases involving the FALN and Macheteros members. Although the 
President has claimed privilege over the actual 
recommendations, it became clear through documents and 
testimony that the U.S. Attorneys, sentencing judges, and FBI 
all opposed a grant of clemency to the proposed individuals.
            a. Offices of the U.S. Attorneys
    As early as 1994, the U.S. Attorneys from Connecticut and 
the Northern District of Illinois informed OPA of their 
opposition to clemency for the FALN and Macheteros 
members.\359\ However, the President has claimed executive 
privilege over those letters. Through other documents produced 
by the Justice Department, it became clear that the U.S. 
Attorneys offices opposed clemency. After the decision on 
clemency was made, Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder prepared 
to make courtesy calls to the U.S. Attorneys for the districts 
in which the 16 clemency grantees were convicted. Talking 
points prepared for Mr. Holder in anticipation of the telephone 
call to U.S. Attorney Scott Lassar state that, ``[t]he United 
States Attorney for the N.D. Illinois recommended strongly 
against commutation of sentence. Also, one of the sentencing 
judges in the N.D. Illinois was quoted in the print media as 
opposing clemency.'' \360\ Similarly, talking points prepared 
for the telephone conversation with U.S. Attorney for the 
District of Connecticut, Stephen Robinson state, ``[t]he United 
States Attorney strongly opposed clemency in these cases. The 
sentencing judge also expressed the view that the sentences 
should stand.'' \361\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \359\ The White House Privilege log lists two memoranda regarding 
the clemency request for Puerto Rican Nationalist prisoners from 
Christopher F. Droney, U.S. Attorney, District of Connecticut, to 
Margaret C. Love, Pardon Attorney (Aug. 26, 1994 and Oct. 19, 1994). It 
also lists two memoranda regarding clemency request for Puerto Rican 
Nationalist prisoners from James B. Burns, U.S. Attorney, Northern 
District of Illinois, to Margaret C. Love, Pardon Attorney (Aug. 26, 
1994 and Dec. 15, 1994). ``Log of Department of Justice Documents 
Subject to President's Assertion of Executive Privilege'' (Oct. 18, 
1999) Department of Justice production (unnumbered).
    \360\ DAG call to Scott Lassar, U.S. Attorney for the N.D. 
Illinois, Department of Justice production 10180007 (Exhibit 52).
    \361\ DAG call to Stephen Robinson, U.S. Attorney for the District 
of Connecticut, Department of Justice production 10180008 (Exhibit 53).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
    The Department of Justice also asked the FBI for its 
opinion regarding a commutation of sentence for the FALN and 
Macheteros members. The FBI conducted most of the original 
investigations of the two groups, as it is responsible for 
counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts in the United 
States and its territories.\362\ In testimony prepared in 
anticipation of testifying before Congress, the FBI stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \362\ Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) 
(Statement of Neil Gallagher, Assistant Director for National Security, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation). Copies of audio tapes of Oscar Lopez-
Rivera's telephone conversations should have been produced to the 
Committee under the Committee's subpoena to the Department of Justice. 
However, as of Nov. 4, 1999, the Justice Department has not produced 
such tapes to the Committee.

          In June of 1999 the FBI was asked by [the] Department 
        of Justice for the FBI's input on the granting of a 
        pardon and/or clemency for the incarcerated Puerto 
        Rican terrorists. The FBI has consistently advised the 
        Department of Justice that the FBI was opposed to any 
        such pardon and/or commutation of sentences for these 
        individuals. As the request for pardon has been pending 
        since 1994, the FBI was unaware that any such 
        commutation of sentences was actually being 
        contemplated or imminent.\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \363\ The testimony of Assistant Director Gallagher was submitted 
to the Justice Department over a week prior to the Committee's hearing. 
Nevertheless, the Justice Department waited until the evening before 
the hearing to notify the FBI that it could not present the written 
testimony because of executive privilege issues. The Committee was 
forced to subpoena the Justice Department for the redacted written 
statement. Letter from Jon P. Jennings, Acting Assistant Attorney 
General, to Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Sept. 
23, 1999) (forwarding redacted FBI written opening statement on FALN 
clemency as attachment) (unnumbered) (Exhibit 17).

    The FBI was concerned about the release for several 
reasons. In a draft letter responding to a congressional 
inquiry on the FBI position, Director Freeh noted that although 
the President had conditioned release upon the renunciation of 
violence, ``the FBI had previously advised DOJ that `few of the 
current prisoners have expressed remorse for their crimes or 
for their victims; rather, most remained committed to violence 
as a means to achieve Puerto Rican independence.' '' \364\ An 
additional concern for the FBI was the message that clemency 
would send to other terrorists. The FBI advised the Department 
of Justice that it ``had reason to expect the release of these 
individuals would `psychologically and operationally enhance' 
the ongoing violent and criminal activities of Puerto Rican 
terrorist groups.'' \365\ Director Freeh added that, ``any such 
pardon of the `currently incarcerated terrorists would likely 
return committed, experienced, sophisticated and hardened 
terrorists to the clandestine movement.' '' \366\ In case there 
was any misunderstanding of the FBI's opinion, Director Freeh 
noted at the end of his letter that, ``[i]t is evident from the 
foregoing that the FBI was unequivocally opposed to the release 
of these terrorists under any circumstances and had so advised 
DOJ.'' \367\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \364\ The letter has a cover sheet on it from the Justice 
Department explaining that the letter should not be sent because it 
could be subject to executive privilege. The Department of Justice 
informed the Committee that the draft letter and cover had 
inadvertently been produced to the Committee, and it considered the 
letter to be under executive privilege. Draft letter from Louis J. 
Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Henry J. Hyde, 
chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary (undated) (explaining FBI 
position on release of FALN and Macheteros terrorists) Department of 
Justice production 001950-001952 (Exhibit 54).
    \365\ Id. at 001951.
    \366\ Id.
    \367\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            c. The Bureau of Prisons
    While testifying before the Committee, the Assistant 
Director for Correctional Programs at the Bureau of Prisons, 
Michael B. Cooksey, stated that the Bureau of Prisons was not 
asked for its recommendation as to whether the prisoners should 
be granted clemency.\368\ However, according to OPA, the Bureau 
of Prisons is not typically consulted for its opinion, rather 
it is only asked to provide documents relating to the 
petitioner.\369\ Had either the Justice Department or White 
House asked the Bureau of Prisons for additional information on 
the prisoners, they would have found that at least two of the 
prisoners recently had made statements about furthering the 
goals of the FALN.\370\ After the announcement of the grant of 
clemency, the Bureau of Prisons had read media accounts of 
alleged statements of at least one prisoner on its tapes of 
inmates conversations.\371\ In response, the Bureau of Prisons 
conducted its own investigation to determine whether such 
statements actually existed.\372\ After discovering the two 
phone conversations, the Bureau of Prisons forwarded the 
information to the Department of Justice on September 7, 
1999.\373\ Testifying on behalf of the Justice Department, 
Acting Assistant Attorney General Jon Jennings was asked 
whether such information would have been material to the 
Justice Department recommendation on the clemency matter, and 
he replied that it would have been relevant information.\374\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \368\ Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) 
(Testimony of Michael B. Cooksey, Assistant Director for Correctional 
Programs, Bureau of Prisons).
    \369\ Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney (Sept. 18, 1999).
    \370\ Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) 
(Testimony of Michael B. Cooksey, Assistant Director for Correctional 
Programs, Bureau of Prisons).
    \371\ Id.
    \372\ Id.
    \373\ Id.
    \374\ Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) 
(Testimony of Jon P. Jennings, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 
Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            d. The victims of the FALN and Macheteros' violence
    President Clinton's public statements regarding the rights 
of crime victims have been unambiguous. As he signed the Victim 
Rights Clarification Act of 1997 on March 19, 1997, President 
Clinton stated that ``when someone is a victim, he or she 
should be at the center of the criminal justice process, not on 
the outside looking in.'' \375\ On April 20, 1998, in his 
proclamation declaring National Crime Victims' Rights Week, 
President Clinton characterized as ``fundamental'' the right of 
crime victims ``to be notified of a convicted criminal's 
release from incarceration.'' \376\ Despite these strong 
statements, it appears that none of the FALN's victims were 
contacted, much less consulted, during the clemency review 
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \375\ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, press release 
dated Mar. 20, 1997 (viewed Nov. 2, 1999),  (Exhibit 55).
    \376\ President William J. Clinton, Proclamation 7084, ``National 
Crime Victims' Rights Week, 1998,'' 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 679 
(Apr. 27, 1998). (Exhibit 56).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The experience of Thomas Connor, whose father Frank Connor 
was killed in the FALN's Fraunces Tavern bombing on January 24, 
1975, is representative. Mr. Connor informed this Committee 
that he received no official notice of the clemency, stating 
that his family ``found out by reading the newspaper,'' \377\ 
and that his family was ``never contacted by Janet Reno or 
anyone at the Justice Department or anyone at the White House 
regarding our views on clemency.'' \378\ Connor also stated 
that ``[b]ecause no notice was given, had the terrorists 
renounced violence and accepted clemency right away, they may 
actually have been out of jail before we ever learned of the 
offer.'' \379\ The administration certainly did not take into 
account the experiences of those that have been directly 
affected by the FALN or Macheteros, as Connor explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \377\ Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 21, 
1999) (remarks of Thomas Connor).
    \378\ Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 21, 
1999) (written statement for the record of Thomas Connor).
    \379\ Id.

          The next indiscriminate bombing in this country will 
        probably not kill me or anyone else in my family, but 
        it may harm someone that you all know or love. And 
        whenever that happens and whoever is the bomb-maker, I, 
        unlike the President, will feel the pain of the 
        victims, and he will be partially responsible for 
        it.\380\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \380\ Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 21, 
1999) (remarks of Thomas Connor).

    Further, those victims who were aware that clemency for the 
FALN terrorists was under consideration were rebuffed in their 
efforts to involve themselves in the review process. Anthony 
Senft, a New York City Police Department bomb squad detective 
who was maimed by an FALN bomb on December 31, 1982, learned 
that FALN supporters were encouraging the President to grant 
clemency. Detective Senft stated before this Committee that 
``[s]ince 1997, my wife and I have been writing letters to our 
President. We've written four letters to Janet Reno. We have 
never received a response.'' \381\ Detective Senft also told 
the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \381\ Id. (remarks of Detective Anthony Senft).

          . . . I was severely injured by one of five bombs 
        placed by the FALN while my partner and I attempted to 
        render it safe. On that day I received a lifelong 
        sentence without the opportunity for parole, time off 
        for good behavior, and no chance of clemency. My 
        sentence includes five reconstructive operations on my 
        face, the loss of my right eye--my left eye is 
        deteriorating as we speak--and a 60 percent hearing 
        loss in both ears, a fractured hip, severe vertigo, and 
        the hell of a post-traumatic stress disorder. My only 
        solace was the fact that 16 members of the FALN were 
        serving prison sentences for crimes committed against 
        American citizens.\382\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \382\ Id.

It is shocking that any number of clemency supporters were able 
to get meetings with the Pardon Attorney, Deputy Attorney 
General, Attorney General, and White House staff, while this 
former detective, who was wounded in the line of duty, could 
not even get one of his letters answered.
    Detective Senft's partner, Richard Pastorella, was also 
wounded in the same FALN bombing. Also like his partner, the 
Justice Department never contacted Detective Pastorella 
regarding the clemency. Detective Pastorella was completely 
blinded by the FALN bomb, and lost the fingers of his right 
hand.\383\ Perhaps he could have shared his experience with the 
Justice Department or White House, as he had shared it with the 
Committee. He testified before the Committee in order ``to give 
a human face to what terrorism truly is.'' \384\ He told the 
Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \383\ Id. (remarks of Detective Richard Pastorella).
    \384\ Id.

          When my granddaughters present me with crayon 
        drawings and are pleased to show them to me, I have to 
        pretend that I can see them and enjoy their effort. 
        [And] when they ask me to go outside and play ball with 
        them, I cannot. I don't have the fingers to hold the 
        ball. I can't even see it coming. I have sacrificed my 
        pride, my dignity, and will never be free. Yet these 
        terrorists are free to roam our streets here in 
        America.\385\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \385\ Id.

    Diana Berger Ettenson, widow of Alejandro Berger, who was 
killed in the January 24, 1975, Fraunces Tavern bombing, 
related a similar lack of cooperation from the administration: 
``I asked the White House for copies of letters from those who 
petitioned for clemency. To date, I have not received them.'' 
\386\ Similar to the other victims of the FALN, Mrs. Berger 
Ettenson was not advised before their release. She explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \386\ Id. (remarks of Diana Berger Ettenson).

          On the day of the bombing, I was driving to New York 
        to meet Alex and his parents. I heard the news of the 
        blast on my car radio. The news reported that a group 
        known as the FALN had claimed responsibility for the 
        bombing. I had never heard of this group before. 
        However, this group has haunted me to this day. I had 
        to tell Cecelia and Joseph Berger that their only child 
        had been murdered. I do not think I have to tell you in 
        detail what this act of terror did to my family and 
        friends.\387\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \387\ Id.

    Although these victims of FALN violence could not get their 
letters or requests answered, the Justice Department and White 
House were happy to accommodate the supporters of clemency. At 
the same time, Attorney General Reno apparently was meeting 
with pro-clemency activists personally. For example, Detective 
Senft testified before this Committee that a pro-clemency 
activist named Alice Cordova boasted of her ``sit-down 
interview'' with Attorney General Reno regarding clemency for 
the FALN terrorists.\388\ The Clinton administration ignored 
the FALN's many victims when it failed to consult with, or even 
notify, them prior to offering the terrorists clemency. In 
doing so, the administration left those victims on the outside 
of the clemency process, looking in.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \388\ Id. (remarks of Anthony Senft).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Two Justice Department reports on clemency
    According to privilege logs produced by both the White 
House and Department of Justice, the Department transmitted two 
reports on clemency to the Counsel to the President.\389\ The 
first report was transmitted in December 1996.\390\ The 
privilege log reflects that the second report was transmitted 
to the White House on July 8, 1999.\391\ Because the President 
claimed executive privilege over any documents or 
correspondence relating to the reports, it is impossible to 
determine why two reports were created. Through the privilege 
logs, one is able to get an idea of the timing of the reports 
and other correspondence between the White House and Justice 
Department at the time the clemency was being considered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \389\ A privilege log is a list of documents over which the 
President has claimed executive privilege. These documents are 
identified by control number, author, addressee, date, and description. 
However, the documents are not produced to the Committee. ``Log of 
Documents Subject to Executive Privilege'' (Oct. 14, 1999) White House 
production (unnumbered) (Exhibit 57); ``Log of Department of Justice 
Documents Subject to President's Assertion of Executive Privilege'' 
(Oct. 18, 1999) Department of Justice production (unnumbered) (Exhibit 
58).
    \390\ Exhibit 45--Margaret Colgate Love letter to Charles F.C. Ruff 
(July 25, 1997).
    \391\ Exhibit 57--White House privilege log at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The first mention of a report to the White House occurs on 
December 5, 1996, when Pardon Attorney Margaret Colgate Love 
sent a 35-page document to Associate Counsel to the President 
Dawn Chirwa, which was described as a ``cover memorandum with 
attached draft document to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, from Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General, 
regarding clemency matter.'' \392\ The Justice Department's log 
does not list such a report until December 16, 1996, when 
Dennis M. Corrigan, Executive Assistant and Counsel, Office of 
the Deputy Attorney General transmits the December 4, 1996, 
report to Counsel to the President Jack Quinn. There is no 
further activity until May 1997.\393\ These documents are the 
original recommendations of the Justice Department. From the 
names on the transmittal, it would appear that this first 
report was approved by the Deputy Attorney General, and would 
be considered the official position of the Department of 
Justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \392\ Id. at 6.
    \393\ Id. at 5; Exhibit 58--Department of Justice privilege log at 
20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Soon after the FALN and Macheteros clemency report was 
transmitted, Chirwa sent a two-page memorandum to Roger Adams, 
who was then Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General, concerning 
``information relating to clemency request for Puerto Rican 
Nationalist prisoners.'' Two days later, on May 16, 1997, 
Chirwa sent another two-page memorandum to Pardon Attorney 
Love. Although the Committee does not have the memoranda, one 
could assume that there were questions about the clemency 
recommendation. Several days after Chirwa contacted the Justice 
Department, Pardon Attorney Love contacted the General Counsel 
at the U.S. Parole Commission regarding the clemency 
matter.\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \394\ Exhibit 58--Department of Justice privilege log at 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is another break in the Justice Department and White 
House privileged communications until July 23, 1997, when Love 
sent Chirwa a seven-page memorandum ``concerning information 
relating to clemency request for Puerto Rican Nationalist 
prisoners, with handwritten note attached.'' \395\ Two days 
later, Love forwarded to Counsel to the President Ruff a letter 
from former President Jimmy Carter, and referenced the December 
16, 1996, report.\396\ Although the White House listed the 
document on its privilege log, the Department of Justice 
produced the actual transmittal letter referencing its 
recommendation against clemency.\397\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \395\ Id. at 18; Exhibit 57--White House privilege log at 5.
    \396\ Exhibit 45--Letter from Margaret Colgate Love to Charles F.C. 
Ruff (July 25, 1997).
    \397\ Exhibit 57--White House privilege log at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As of June 1997, the White House internally acknowledged 
that the Department of Justice was not in favor of the 
clemency. The June 10, 1997, briefing materials for Vice 
President Gore's meeting with the congressional Hispanic Caucus 
discuss the clemency:

          Reps. Serrano, Gutierrez, or Velazquez may privately 
        urge you to support granting clemency to 15 citizens of 
        States of Puerto Rican origin incarcerated for crimes 
        committed in connection with efforts to encourage the 
        granting of independence to Puerto Rico. A campaign is 
        under way. The campaign has broad Puerto Rican support 
        but Rep. Romero-Barcelo is opposed and Justice is 
        disinclined.\398\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \398\ White House production CL 16760-16772, at 16765 (emphasis 
added).

    Toward the end of 1997, Pardon Attorney Margaret Love was 
preparing to leave the Department of Justice. In September 
1997, she wrote a 36-page memorandum to Roger Adams in the 
Deputy Attorney General's Office, ``reflecting status and 
nature of clemency deliberations concerning Puerto Rican 
Nationalists, with series of 9/12/97-9/19/97 electronic 
communications between Margaret Colgate Love and Roger C. Adams 
concerning same . . .'' \399\ That memorandum was the final 
internal Department of Justice document received or written by 
Love reflected on the privilege log.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \399\ Exhibit 58--Department of Justice privilege log at 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Throughout the closing months of 1997 it appears that 
Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder was active in the issue. 
The privilege log reflects at least two notes regarding his 
questions on the clemency or his thoughts on the matter.\400\ 
Meanwhile, Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General Roger Adams 
was appointed Pardon Attorney. It appears from the privilege 
log that Adams began working on the clemency matter for OPA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \400\ Id. at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The issue of clemency for the FALN and Macheteros prisoners 
picked up again in the summer of 1998. On May 19, 1998, Pardon 
Attorney Adams sent Deputy Attorney General Holder a 48-page 
draft memorandum to the President, ``concerning clemency for 
Puerto Rican Nationalist prisoners.'' \401\ Several months 
later, the Attorney General was informed of the new activity 
concerning the clemency. On August 7, 1998, the Pardon Attorney 
prepared a two-page memorandum regarding the history of the 
clemency request, which was forwarded to Attorney General Reno 
on the following day.\402\ By the end of August, the Pardon 
Attorney and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General were 
again working on drafts of the clemency report.\403\ On 
September 1, 1998, Pardon Attorney Adams discussed the draft 
memorandum with Associate Counsel to the President Chirwa, 
again bringing the White House into the picture.\404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \401\ Id.
    \402\ Id. at 15.
    \403\ This is the same time period in which they were meeting with 
supporters of clemency as well. Id.
    \404\ Id. at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It was not until the spring of 1999 when the privilege log 
shows more activity on the clemency report. Between April and 
July 1999, there were numerous drafts of the report and 
discussions between OPA and the Office of the Deputy Attorney 
General.\405\ In addition, OPA was consulting with the Chief of 
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, and other attorneys in 
the Criminal Division at the Department of Justice. However, in 
March 1999, according to White House documents, the Justice 
Department continued to oppose the clemency. In an e-mail to 
Counsel to the President Charles Ruff, Deputy Chief of Staff 
Maria Echaveste wrote, ``[m]y recollection of the last status 
is that there was some movement towards a conclusion that 
commutation might be ok for some of the prisoners but not all--
but DOJ concluded no go then--is that about right?'' \406\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \405\ Id. at 7-14.
    \406\ White House production CL 16653 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 8, 1999, Deputy Attorney General Holder sent to the 
President a ``memorandum regarding clemency matter.'' \407\ 
This was the second report sent to the White House regarding 
clemency for the members of the terrorist groups FALN and Los 
Macheteros. At the end of July 1999, Counsel to the President 
Ruff personally spoke with an attorney in the office of the 
Deputy Attorney General regarding the clemency.\408\ On August 
9, 1999, OPA and the Deputy Attorney General's office held a 
meeting about the clemency.\409\ The President announced the 
clemency 2 days later on August 11, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \407\ Exhibit 57--White House privilege log at 1 (emphasis added).
    \408\ Exhibit 58--Department of Justice privilege log at 7.
    \409\ Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although it is impossible for the Committee to know what 
was in the Department of Justice's report, an article in the 
New York Times claimed to have an official source with 
knowledge of information in the report.\410\ The article stated 
that although the opposition of the U.S. Attorneys and FBI was 
mentioned in the report, the Justice Department made no 
specific recommendation. Rather, the report ``contained what 
law-enforcement officials said was a more carefully worded 
analysis that presented the President with multiple options for 
each prisoner, from unconditional release to no leniency 
whatsoever.'' \411\ This is a matter of some concern to the 
Committee because it appears that the Justice Department has 
bent and even changed its rules to accommodate this politically 
charged clemency. By refraining from giving a clear 
recommendation, it is almost as if the Justice Department is 
doing the best that it can to bolster a decision that had 
already been made.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \410\ David Johnston, Federal Agencies Opposed Leniency for 16 
Militants, N.Y. Times at A1 (Aug. 27, 1999).
    \411\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. The White House's role in the clemency process
    The White House was involved in the clemency process from 
nearly the beginning. The President's Interagency Working Group 
on Puerto Rico took an interest in the petition filed on behalf 
of the members of the FALN and Los Macheteros terrorist 
organizations. Thereafter it became involved in the clemency 
process, working with clemency supporters to bring the issue 
more support and attention. Although the White House staff 
worked regularly with clemency supporters, they never met with 
the victims of FALN and Macheteros violence or any groups that 
opposed the clemency. Most groups in opposition did not know 
the clemency was being considered, or never believed that it 
would be seriously considered due to the nature of the crimes 
committed. It appears that the White House was aware of the 
opposition of the Department of Justice and law-enforcement, 
and was searching for a way in which its decision would not be 
in direct contradiction to the Department of Justice 
recommendation.
    The White House first became involved in the clemency 
through the Interagency Working Group on Puerto Rico (``Working 
Group''), co-chaired by Marcia Hale and Jeffrey Farrow. On 
October 24, 1994, the Special Assistant to Jeffrey Farrow, 
Mayra Martinez-Fernandez, wrote a memo to Farrow on the 
``Puerto Rico Political Prisoners.'' \412\ It is obvious even 
from the title of her memorandum that she believed that the 
FALN members were imprisoned for their political beliefs rather 
than the terrorist acts for which they were convicted. In fact, 
in the very first paragraph of the memorandum Martinez-
Fernandez states, ``[t]hey have been persecuted because of 
their commitment and activism in support of Puerto Rican 
independence.'' \413\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \412\ Memorandum from Mayra Martinez-Fernandez, to Jeffrey Farrow 
(Oct. 24, 1994). White House production CL 15537-15538. (Exhibit 59).
    \413\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee finds it troubling that a White House aide 
would show such disregard for the victims of FALN and 
Macheteros violence and the laws of the United States. The 
Martinez-Fernandez memorandum continues to argue against the 
long sentences being served by the FALN members: ``[t]hese 
sentences and the time already served are far longer than the 
average time served in the U.S. for the most heinous offenses 
against society, and far longer than the average time served by 
political prisoners in other countries!'' \414\ Again, this 
position is inconsistent with the statutes leading to the FALN 
and Macheteros' sentences, and there appears to be no 
accompanying enthusiasm to change the law. In effect, the early 
White House position appears to be more tied to support for the 
politics of these prisoners than concern for the laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \414\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even more disturbing, the memorandum not only discusses the 
deserving and good nature of the prisoners, it also discusses 
the benefits to the Clinton administration:

          The release of these Puerto Rican men and women would 
        be welcomed as a show of good faith and a gesture to 
        demonstrate that reconciliation, peace-making and human 
        rights (as well as the resolution of the situation in 
        Puerto Rico) are among Clinton's priorities. This could 
        be a tangible accomplishment of the Working Group that 
        not only enjoys wide support in the U.S., Puerto Rico, 
        and internationally, but that is fairly easy to 
        accomplish and will have a positive impact among 
        strategic Puerto Rican communities in the U.S. (read, 
        voters).\415\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \415\ Id.

It is clear from the memorandum that Martinez-Fernandez had no 
idea what was involved in a grant of clemency, much less 
commuting a prisoner's sentence. However, it appears her memo 
was acted upon; the ``Working Group'' was behind the clemency 
and continued to work with advocacy groups until the 
commutations were finally granted. As a final addition to the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
memorandum, Martinez-Fernandez wrote:

          The release of these 15 Puerto Ricans is of special 
        significance to me. I know most of these people's 
        families. I know of their hard work and contributions 
        to Chicago's Puerto Rican community. They are truly 
        good people who are where they are for wanting their 
        country to be free. That is not a crime. The history of 
        the birth of this country clearly demonstrates the 
        burning desire of a people to be free from colonial 
        control. As a Puerto Rican, I feel I own [sic] them for 
        their sacrifice. As people who love and value democracy 
        and liberty, I feel that this Administration should 
        take a stand for what they believe in, and set an 
        example for other countries to follow by setting free 
        15 of their own political prisoners.\416\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \416\ Id.

    As a further example, Martinez-Fernandez wrote a June 7, 
1995, memorandum to Jeffrey Farrow, updating him on the 
``Puerto Rican Prisoners.'' \417\ In the memorandum, she 
mentioned seven different groups that were working on behalf of 
the prisoners. Perhaps one of the most interesting was Gerry 
Adams of the Irish Republican Army. Martinez-Fernandez wrote of 
Adams, ``[h]e made a commitment to bring up the issue of the 
Puerto Rican political prisoners in the negotiations which 
involve the White House and the Government of Great Britain 
concerning peace in Northern Ireland.'' \418\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \417\ Memorandum from Mayra Martinez-Fernandez to Jeff Farrow (June 
7, 1995). White House Document production CL 15534. (Exhibit 60).
    \418\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In her memoranda, Martinez-Fernandez consistently refers to 
the FALN and Macheteros members as ``political prisoners.'' 
Indeed, the prisoners themselves argue that they have been 
incarcerated for political reasons. However, the only elected 
Federal representative from Puerto Rico, Resident Commissioner 
Carlos Romero-Barcelo disputed the characterization. He wrote 
that:

          [T]he terrorists aimed to legitimize their actions by 
        seeking protection as political prisoners or prisoners 
        of conscience through Amnesty International, the 
        leading human rights organization in the world. 
        According to an editorial in the San Juan Star, the 
        principal English language newspaper in Puerto Rico, 
        Amnesty International rejected their request, 
        clarifying that because ``the crimes the 15 committed 
        were violent in nature . . . disqualified them as 
        political prisoners in describing their status.'' \419\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \419\ Letter from Carlos Romero-Barcelo, Resident Commissioner for 
Puerto Rico, to Dan Burton, chairman, House Government Reform Committee 
(Sept. 14, 1999) (Exhibit 61).

If one believes that the White House should be impartial when 
reviewing and handling clemency matters, Martinez-Fernandez 
should have had no role in the petition for clemency on behalf 
of the FALN and Macheteros members. Nevertheless, she and the 
Working Group played a major role, working to recruit 
supporters and organize the campaign for release.
    The White House Counsel's Office is historically and 
typically the liaison with OPA on the issue of clemency.\420\ 
The Counsel's Office first became involved in the FALN and 
Macheteros clemency in early June 1995.\421\ Associate Counsel 
Cheryl Mills \422\ handled clemency issues for the Counsel's 
Office.\423\ On June 5, 1995, the Working Group asked to meet 
with Associate Counsel Mills to discuss the clemency for the 
FALN and Macheteros members.\424\ The meeting was described to 
Mills:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \420\ DOJ Organization, Mission and Functions Manual, Office of the 
Pardon Attorney at 51 (July 1999).
    \421\ Electronic mail from Vicki J. Divoll to Cheryl D. Mills, 
Associate White House Counsel (June 5, 1995). White House production CL 
16383 (Exhibit 62).
    \422\ Mills was subsequently promoted to Deputy Counsel to the 
President.
    \423\ Id.
    \424\ Electronic mail from Vicki J. Divoll to Cheryl D. Mills, 
Associate White House Counsel (June 5, 1995). White House production CL 
16382 (Exhibit 63).

          The people involved in this potential meeting are not 
        outsiders seeking to influence the White House 
        regarding these prisoners. They are all White House, 
        DOJ, and Commerce Dept. officials who are members of 
        the Inter-Agency Working Group on Puerto Rico who want 
        to discuss how to respond to expected pressures and 
        requests for meetings with the President and others 
        about these prisoners.\425\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \425\ Electronic mail from Vicki J. Divoll to Cheryl D. Mills, 
Associate White House Counsel (June 7, 1995). White House production CL 
16384 (Exhibit 64).

The Working Group did hold a meeting on June 21, 1995, however 
it is not clear whether Associate Counsel Mills attended.\426\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \426\ The White House inadvertently produced handwritten notes of 
Mayra Martinez-Fernandez, Special Assistant to the Co-Chair of the 
Working Group, taken during the meeting. The notes do not reflect who 
was in attendance. Letter from Dimitri J. Nionakis, Associate Counsel 
to the President, to Kristi L. Remington, senior counsel, House 
Government Reform Committee (Oct. 14, 1999). (Exhibit 65).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Notes of the June 21, 1995, Working Group meeting reflect 
that several issues arose, including, ``how should we respond 
to this political request.'' \427\ The notes made clear that 
the White House was hearing from Puerto Rico on the clemency 
issue, however, ``the effort [was] led by P[uerto] R[icans] in 
the U.S.'' The Working Group also acknowledged that OPA had to 
resolve the issue of the petition for clemency. They recognized 
that it was a problem that the prisoners would not file their 
own petitions.\428\ During the meeting, the Working Group 
discussed the general process of clemency. The notes indicated 
that the last step would be the transmittal of the Department 
of Justice recommendation to the Counsel's Office, and that it 
``pretty much follows [the] recommendation by [the] Pardon 
Attorney.'' \429\ The notes further explained, ``[I]f parole is 
a possibility, they use it rather than a commutation. They 
could also enable the process to make them parole eligible. 
Most of them don't want to apply for parole--which is another 
political statement on their part.'' It was true that the 
prisoners should have faced a major obstacle to their clemency 
in that all of them would be eligible for parole after serving 
a certain portion of their sentences. However, most of the FALN 
and Macheteros members refused even to apply for parole because 
it would recognize the Unites States Government and its 
authority over them. Those that did apply for parole had been 
rejected as poor candidates. Finally, the participants in the 
meeting noted that this was a ``high priority P[uerto] R[ican] 
issue.'' \430\ This indicates a level of political calculation 
that is troubling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \427\ Handwritten notes of Mayra Martinez-Fernandez, Special 
Assistant to the Co-Chair of the Working Group, June 21, 1995. White 
House production CL 15550-15553. (Exhibit 66).
    \428\ Id.
    \429\ Id. at 15551.
    \430\ Id. at 15553.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The White House produced notes taken by Mayra Martinez-
Fernandez from two other Working Group ``strategy meetings'' on 
the clemency matter. In the first set of notes, the Working 
Group discusses the actions congressional groups would take on 
the clemency.\431\ Congressmen Gutierrez, Serrano, and 
Congresswoman Velazquez were taking the lead on all efforts 
supporting clemency. They noted that, ``Velazquez, Gutierrez 
and Serrano not voting with President on some important 
legislation unless he commits to release prisoners right after 
1996 elections.'' \432\ Under a separate heading of 
``Meetings,'' the Working Group listed individuals who should 
request meetings with Pardon Attorney Margaret Colgate 
Love.\433\ They added, ``[s]ome of these people should meet 
with President Carter and request a letter to the President.'' 
\434\ President Carter did ultimately write a letter to 
Attorney General Reno supporting the clemency for the FALN and 
Macheteros members. However, it appears odd that members of the 
President's Working Group would organize outside support for 
the clemency. From the Committee's perspective, an impartial 
position would be more appropriate. In fact, the notes indicate 
that they planned to identify ``liberal reporters in key media 
outlets,'' in an effort to create more support.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \431\ Handwritten notes of Mayra Martinez-Fernandez, Special 
Assistant to the Co-Chair of the Working Group, undated. White House 
production CL 15554-15558. (Exhibit 9).
    \432\ Id. at 15554 [emphasis added].
    \433\ Id. at 15556.
    \434\ Id. 
    \435\ Id. at 15557.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 7, 1995, the Working Group held another ``strategy 
meeting.'' \436\ The first item on the agenda was to ``continue 
letter campaign from U.S. as Democratic voters. Personalize 
them.'' \437\ The notes go on to list numerous individuals who 
should write letters to the President and request meetings with 
officials in Illinois and Chicago who might oppose the 
clemency.\438\ Most of the prisoners were convicted in 
Illinois, therefore they proposed meetings with the Illinois 
Governor and Attorney General, as well as the mayor of 
Chicago.\439\ Again, these are actions that it would appear 
inappropriate for the White House to be organizing. To use U.S. 
taxpayer dollars to promote something of this nature for 
political benefit is deeply disturbing. Because the Committee 
is unable to discuss the clemency issue with anyone in the 
White House, it is left to speculate that the purpose of these 
activities was to be able to point to outside support for 
clemency when announcing its decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \436\ Handwritten notes of Mayra Martinez-Fernandez, Special 
Assistant to the Co-Chair of the Working Group, July 7, 1995. White 
House production CL 15559-155562. (Exhibit 67).
    \437\ Id. at 15559.
    \438\ Id.
    \439\ Id. at 15559-15560.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Few documents were received from the White House during the 
time between the July 1995, meeting and mid-1998, when the 
clemency issues moved to the forefront. However, internal White 
House documents do indicate that White House Counsel Jack Quinn 
met with Representatives Serrano, Gutierrez, and Velazquez on 
December 16, 1996.\440\ The meeting was held on the same day 
that the Justice Department transmitted its recommendation 
against clemency for the FALN and Macheteros clemency. It is 
not until a year later that Jeffrey Farrow, the Co-Chair of the 
Working Group, asked for a meeting with Associate Counsel Dawn 
Chirwa about the clemency issue.\441\ Farrow wrote in an 
electronic mail message, ``[d]id Maria Echaveste ask if you 
could come to her office tomorrow at 2 re[:] Puerto Rican 
political prisoners? She's sympathetic and wanted to discuss 
the issue.'' \442\ Again, it is troubling that a senior White 
House staff member would refer to the terrorists as ``political 
prisoners.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \440\ Electronic mail from Janet Murguia, Deputy Assistant to the 
President for Legislative Affairs (House), to Stacey L. Rubin, Special 
Assistant to the Deputy Director for Legislative Affairs (Dec. 16, 
1996). White House production CL 16385. (Exhibit 68).
    \441\ Electronic mail from Jeffrey Farrow, Co-Chair Interagency 
Working Group on Puerto Rico, to Dawn Chirwa, Associate Counsel to the 
President (Dec. 16, 1997). White House production CL 16412. (Exhibit 
69).
    \442\ Maria Echaveste is now the Deputy Chief of Staff at the White 
House. Id. (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1998, the White House was more active on the FALN and 
Macheteros clemency. On March 26, 1998, an organization 
supporting the release of the prisoners sought to deliver 
petitions for the prisoners' release to the White House.\443\ 
On the same day, a representative of the Carter Center, 
Ambassador Harry Barnes, requested to meet with the Co-Chair of 
the Working Group, Jeffrey Farrow. Farrow noted in an 
electronic mail message regarding the two requests:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \443\ Electronic mail from Jeffrey Farrow, Co-Chair Interagency 
Working Group on Puerto Rico, to Dawn Chirwa, Associate Counsel to the 
President and Fred Duval (Mar. 11, 1998). White House production CL 
16428. (Exhibit 70).

          Fred and I plan to be in Puerto Rico on the 26th, but 
        I think it would help on the issue--since it will not 
        be resolved soon--to have these people received. This 
        is the type of meeting that we discussed having at our 
        meeting in Maria's office. We (Dawn [Chirwa], Janet, 
        Suzanna Valdez, and I) symbolically received petitions 
        on the issue before. (Reps. Serrano, Velazquez [sic], 
        and Gutierrez were part of that presentation. They are 
        not making this request but we may want to see if at 
        least the NY Members want to be here if there's a brief 
        meeting.) \444\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \444\ Id. 

The message represents another example of the White House 
organizing support for the clemency. It is not clear why they 
put so much effort into the appearance of things, when the 
President could grant clemency at any time. Nevertheless, the 
meetings with supporters continued.
    In June 1998, Working Group Co-Chair Jeffrey Farrow was 
organizing a high level meeting for the family of the 
prisoners. He consulted with Deputy Chief of Staff Maria 
Echaveste, Deputy Director for Legislative Affairs Janet 
Murguia, Associate Counsel Dawn Chirwa, and Director of 
Intergovernmental Affairs Mickey Ibarra.\445\ Farrow wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \445\ Electronic mail from Jeffrey L. Farrow, Co-Chair Interagency 
Working Group on Puerto Rico, to Maria Echaveste, Deputy Chief of 
Staff; Janet Murguia, Deputy Director for Legislative Affairs; Dawn 
Chirwa, Associate Counsel to the President (June 11, 1998). White House 
production CL 16430. (Exhibit 71).

          Mickey and I want to make sure you agree on the 
        advisability of meeting with family members of the 
        Puerto Rico independence crimes prisoners. He and I 
        discussed the issue after his e-mail copied to you. He 
        now has more background on what we have been doing on 
        this matter, feels more comfortable, and will be if you 
        are. Are you? Additionally, my sense from the families' 
        counsel is that they plan a low-key visit aimed at 
        adding to the human dimension on the issue (following, 
        in particular, the religious leaders' presentations to 
        Chuck Ruff and Jack Quinn.) \446\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \446\ Id.

A month later, Farrow prepared talking points for the Vice 
President's meeting with the Hispanic Caucus and included the 
``Puerto Rican Political Prisoners.'' \447\ He noted that, 
``Justice is expected to make a recommendation on the cases 
soon.'' \448\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \447\ Electronic mail from Jeffrey L. Farrow, Co-Chair Interagency 
Working Group on Puerto Rico, to Ricardo Gonzalez, Office of the Vice 
President (July 16, 1998). White House production CL 16415-16416. 
(Exhibit 72).
    \448\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On June 4, 1998, Farrow was quoted in the San Juan Star 
regarding the clemency for the FALN and Macheteros 
members.\449\ He indicated to the reporter that the decision 
may be near, ``We expect that the Department of Justice will 
complete its review and submit its recommendations in a few 
months[.]'' Although the Justice Department allegedly had a 
clear policy on the discussion of the status of clemency 
petitions, it is not clear whether the White House had such a 
policy. It appears that Farrow spoke regularly with reporters 
on the issue. In an internal OPA electronic mail message, staff 
informs Pardon Attorney Adams that, ``[t]he White House contact 
who has told reporters that they are expecting a recommendation 
in about a month regarding the Puerto Ricans' pardons is 
Jeffrey Farrow. He is apparently the `Puerto Rican contact' at 
the White House.'' \450\ In fact, some at the White House 
referred to him as the ``guru on the issue.'' \451\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \449\ Farrow: Pardon Decision for 15 P.R. Inmates May Be Near, San 
Juan Star, June 4, 1998, at A7.
    \450\ Electronic mail from Chris J. Watney, Office of the Pardon 
Attorney, to Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney (Dec. 4, 1998). Department of 
Justice production 1040931. (Exhibit 73).
    \451\ Electronic mail from Maritza Rivera to Maureen Shea (Oct. 28, 
1998). White House production CL 16501. (Exhibit 74).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In early 1999, Farrow appeared to be pushing for a 
resolution of the clemency issue. He writes in an electronic 
mail message:

          We should think about a meeting soon with Reps. 
        Gutierrez, Velazquez, and Serrano on the Puerto Rico 
        independence crimes prisoners issue. They have 
        requested one with the POTUS but the options include 
        the VP and John as well. The issue should be resolved 
        soon--the petitions have been before us for a long 
        time. The VP's Puerto Rican position would be helped: 
        The issue is Gutierrez's [sic] top priority as well as 
        of high constituent importance to Serrano and 
        Velazquez.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \452\ POTUS is the President of the United States. Electronic mail 
from Jeffrey L. Farrow, Co-Chair Interagency Working Group on Puerto 
Rico, to Fred Duval, Mickey Ibarra, Maria Echaveste, and Janet Murguia 
(Mar. 6, 1999). White House production CL 16653 (emphasis added). 
(Exhibit 75).

The following day, Deputy Chief of Staff Maria Echaveste 
forwards the electronic mail message to Counsel to the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President, Charles F.C. Ruff, urging a meeting:

          Chuck--Jeff's right about this--very hot issue. I 
        would suggest that Chuck and I meet with these members 
        once we have the latest update from Chuck, unless John 
        [Podesta] feels like taking the time on this difficult 
        issue. My recollection of the last status is that there 
        was some movement towards a conclusion that commutation 
        might be ok for some of the prisoners but not all--but 
        that doj [Department of Justice] concluded no go then--
        is that about right? \453\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \453\ Exhibit 75--Electronic mail from Maria Echaveste, Deputy 
Chief of Staff, to Charles F. Ruff, Counsel to the President. White 
House production CL 16653. (Mar. 7, 1999).

In fact, Ruff did meet with the Representatives on April 21, 
1999, to discuss the clemency issue.\454\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \454\ Also attending the meeting were Jeffrey Farrow and Dawn 
Chirwa. Electronic mail from Jeffrey Farrow to Fred Duval, Maria 
Echaveste, Maritza Rivera, Mickey Ibarra, and Janet Murguia (Apr. 19, 
1999). White House production CL 16496. (Exhibit 76).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By July 8, 1999, the Department of Justice transmitted its 
second clemency report on the petition of the FALN and 
Macheteros members to the White House. However, the President 
had not yet made his decision public. A background memo and 
talking points prepared by Jeffrey Farrow for the White House 
Press Secretary in July 1999 discuss a demonstration at the 
White House:

          A demonstration in front of the White House July 23rd 
        is planned to include a refusal to move at 1 pm. At the 
        same time, representatives of the demonstrators are to 
        meet with inside [sic] on the matter (Associate Counsel 
        to the President Meredith Cabe and Jeffrey Farrow, Co-
        Chair of the President's Interagency Group on Puerto 
        Rico).

From the electronic mail message, it appears as though Farrow 
had coordinated with the demonstrators in order to produce the 
greatest effect from the event.
    On August 11, 1999, the President announced his decision 
and offered the grants of clemency. He explained that, ``[he] 
commuted the sentences of eight of these prisoners to between 
23 and 26 years thereby making them eligible for parole 
pursuant to the mandatory release standards applicable to all 
prisoners.'' \455\ The eight prisoners were: Elizam Escobar, 
Ricardo Jimenez, Adolfo Matos, Dylcia Pagan, Alicia Rodriguez, 
Ida Luz Rodriguez, Luis Rosa, and Carmen Valentin.\456\ The 
President commuted the sentences of three other prisoners, 
Edwin Cortes, Alberto Rodriguez, and Alejandrina Torres, to 26 
years, also making them eligible for parole.\457\ Oscar Lopez 
was treated differently because he also had a separate 15-year 
sentence for attempted escape.\458\ The President proposed 
commuting his original sentence to 29 years, but would not have 
commuted the time for the escape attempt.\459\ The last four 
prisoners were members of the Macheteros. Two of the 
individuals were already out of prison, but had not paid their 
fines. Roberto Maldonado-Rivera and Norman Ramirez-Talavera 
were granted remissions of their fines. The other two 
individuals, Juan Segarra-Palmer and Antonio Camacho-Negron 
were still imprisoned and still had fines. Antonio Camacho-
Negron was already eligible for parole, but had violated his 
conditions of release. Therefore the President only offered him 
a remission of fine.\460\ The President commuted the sentence 
of Juan Segarra-Palmer so that he would be eligible for parole 
after serving 19 years in prison, which the President explained 
was consistent with the time served by the other prisoners with 
similar sentences.\461\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \455\ Exhibit 7--Letter from President Clinton to Representative 
Waxman.
    \456\ Exhibit 10--Executive order of clemency.
    \457\ Id.; Exhibit 7--Letter from President Clinton to 
Representative Waxman.
    \458\ Exhibit 7--Letter from President Clinton to Representative 
Waxman.
    \459\ Id.
    \460\ Id.
    \461\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The clemency was conditioned upon the prisoner's renouncing 
violence and agreeing to the standard terms of parole. Those 
terms included reporting to a probation officer, as well as 
restrictions on travel and association.\462\ The prisoners and 
their attorneys responded that the conditions were ``unfair'' 
and would impose too many restrictions on the prisoners once 
released.\463\ Jan Susler, attorney for the FALN prisoners, 
stated, ``[i]t's conditioned upon them complying with terms 
that would limit their ability to integrate themselves into the 
political process to shape the future of their country, because 
it restricts their travel and association.'' \464\ The 
attorneys also complained that the prisoners were worried about 
the officials who would supervise their parole as most law 
enforcement agencies opposed the release of the FALN 
members.\465\ The fact that the prisoners would complain about 
being subject to the same rules as all other parolees when 
their sentences were reduced by dozens of years is incredible. 
Their statements show that they still do not appreciate the 
criminality of their acts, and still believe that they were 
persecuted solely for their political beliefs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \462\ ``Conditions of Release'' Department of Justice production 
002003. (Exhibit 77).
    \463\ Lawyers for Puerto Rican Prisoners Call Clinton's Offer 
Unfair, Associated Press (Sept. 3, 1999).
    \463\ Id.
    \464\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The month-long deliberations on accepting clemency brought 
to light one of the original issues with the request for 
clemency, that the prisoners refused to submit their own 
petitions. According to the Pardon Attorney, the rule that 
prisoners submit their own petitions was to be sure that they 
desired the relief. As a consequence of allowing Ofensiva '92 
to submit the petitions, the White House could not be sure that 
the prisoners would accept the grants of clemency. The lengthy 
deliberation on the offer forced the President to demand that 
the prisoners accept the offer by a date certain, September 10, 
1999, or forfeit the grant altogether.\466\ In addition, the 
prisoners were required to sign what amounted to requests for 
clemency, even though they were after the fact.\467\ 
Ultimately, two of the prisoners did not accept the grants of 
clemency, Oscar Lopez Rivera and Juan Segarra-Palmer. The other 
prisoners waited until September 7, 1999, to accept the 
President's offer.\468\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \466\ Letter from Dawn Chirwa, Associate Counsel to the President, 
to Jan Susler, attorney for clemency grantees (Sept. 3, 1999). White 
House production CL 15896-15897. (Exhibit 78).
    \467\ Id.
    \468\ Department of Justice production 001974-001990. (Exhibit 79).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Once the prisoners accepted the commutations, their 
attorney, Jan Susler, stated, ``[w]e think this is an 
unprecedented, historic moment that the President of the United 
States could recognize that men and women who have dedicated 
their lives to the freedom of their country deserve to be free 
. . . to participate in the political, legal process to shape 
the future of their country.'' \469\ Through the act of 
commutation the President erased the facts of their convictions 
and transformed these terrorists into honorable freedom 
fighters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \469\ 12 Puerto Rican Nationalists Agree to `Unprecedented' 
Clemency Condition, CNN.com, Sept. 8, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      IV. The Sentences Were Fair

    Supporters of clemency for the 16 Puerto Rican terrorists 
have argued that their sentences were disproportionately long. 
While the President may grant clemency for any reason, it 
appears that this, the most substantive publicly-advanced 
justification for granting clemency, was flawed. The President, 
in a letter dated September 21, 1999, to Representative Henry 
Waxman, ranking minority member of this Committee, stated that 
``. . . the prisoners were serving extremely lengthy 
sentences--in some cases 90 years--which were out of proportion 
to their crimes.'' \470\ The President has also stated that the 
terrorists ``had all served sentences that were considerably 
longer than they would serve under the sentencing guidelines 
which control federal sentencing now.'' \471\ These arguments, 
however, do not appear to be true.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \470\ Exhibit 7--Letter from President Clinton to Representative 
Waxman at 2.
    \471\ President William J. Clinton, press conference (Sept. 9, 
1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As Timothy McGrath, the interim Staff Director of the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission recently informed this Committee: ``[W]e 
estimate that the federal sentencing guidelines generally would 
call for sentences as long as or longer than those actually 
imposed, if the defendants had been sentenced under current 
law.'' \472\ According to the Commission, applying the 
sentencing guidelines to offenses analogous to those committed 
\473\ would result in sentences of 30 years to life for the 
nine Puerto Rican terrorists convicted of seditious conspiracy 
in the Northern District of Illinois, and in sentences which 
would be 30 years up to the functional equivalent of life for 
the remaining terrorists who were in prison at the time of the 
clemency offer.\474\ Addressing this point, the Commission 
found:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \472\ Exhibit 3--Letter from Timothy B. McGrath to Chairman Dan 
Burton at 9.
    \473\ There is no Federal sentencing guideline for the offense of 
seditious conspiracy.
    \474\ Id. at 1-2. Terrorists Antonio Camacho-Negron, Roberto 
Maldonado-Rivera, and Norman Ramirez-Talavera were not included in the 
Sentencing Commission's analysis, as each had completed their prison 
terms when President Clinton offered clemency. Id. at fn. 1.

          In considering applicability of the current Federal 
        Sentencing Guidelines to the 12 defendants sentenced in 
        the Northern District of Illinois, we thought it most 
        likely that a court would use one of two approaches to 
        guideline application. Both of these approaches would 
        result in a guideline range of at least 360 months to 
        life (and, in the case of the approach described below 
        using the Treason guideline, Sec. 2M1.1, a guideline 
        sentence of life imprisonment) that would permit a 
        judge to impose a life sentence for those nine 
        defendants convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
        Sec. 924(c).\475\ The other three defendants not 
        convicted of a section 924(c) violation could have 
        received a sentence amounting to the functional 
        equivalent of life imprisonment, and would have been 
        required to receive a sentence of at least thirty years 
        under the guidelines, in our estimation. In estimating 
        the guideline sentence for defendant Palmer sentenced 
        in the district of Connecticut, we applied the Robbery 
        sentencing guideline with applicable enhancements and 
        concluded that the defendant would have been subject to 
        a guideline sentence of life imprisonment. However, 
        because none of the counts of conviction permit an 
        actual life sentence, the guidelines would direct the 
        court to impose the statutory maximum term of 
        imprisonment on each count and run the sentences 
        consecutively, in order to achieve the functional 
        equivalent of a life sentence.\476\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \475\ ``The following defendants were convicted of violations of 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 924(c) and, accordingly, could receive sentences of life 
imprisonment under the current version of that statute: Elizam Escobar, 
Ricardo Jimenez, Oscar Lopez-Rivera, Adolfo Matos, Dylcia Noemi Pagan, 
Alicia Rodriguez, Ida Luz Rodriguez, Luis Rosa, and Carmen Valentin.'' 
Id. at fn. 2.
    \476\ Id. at 1-2.

 Applying the sentencing guideline for the crime of 
treason,\477\ the guidelines would require that life sentences 
be imposed on all 13 terrorists, with statutory maximum 
sentences for all other counts running consecutively with each 
other and with the life sentences. The Commission stated that 
applying the sentencing guidelines for treason would be 
appropriate based on the facts of the case:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \477\ In his letter, McGrath stated that ``[i]t is our opinion that 
a court reasonably could conclude that the Treason guideline, USSG 
Sec. 2M1.1(a)(1), is sufficiently analogous to the offense of 
conviction of seditious conspiracy charged in these cases. We find 
strong support for this conclusion based on the fact that, in a 
factually and legally analogous case involving the bombing of the World 
Trade Center, the district court for the Southern District of New York 
made a similar determination, and this decision was recently affirmed 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.'' Id. at 2-3 
(citing United States v. Rahman, 1999 WL 626631 (2d Cir., Aug. 16, 
1999)).

          Because the object of the FALN conspiracy, and the 
        conduct alleged as part of the conspiracy, amounted to 
        an avowed intent by the members of the conspiracy to 
        wage war against the United States, a court could 
        appropriately find that the most analogous guideline is 
        USSG Sec. 2M1.1(a), Treason. Applying that guideline 
        based on the court determination that the underlying 
        conduct amounts to waging war against the United 
        States, a base offense level of 43 is mandated under 
        USSG Sec. 2M1.1(a)(1). See United States v. Rahman, --
        -- F. 3d ----, 1999 WL 626631, at *55 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 
        1999) (concluding that treason by waging war is 
        appropriately analogous to offense of seditious 
        conspiracy by levying war; conviction for seditious 
        conspiracy was based on planned bombing of tunnels in 
        New York).\478\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \478\ Id. at 3.

    The Commission also found that no mitigating adjustments 
would be appropriate. With respect to mitigating adjustments 
based on the role of the offender in the conspiracy (USSG 
Sec. 3B1.2), the Commission found that ``a court could not 
grant a downward adjustment for mitigating role unless the 
particular defendant met his or her burden of proving that he 
or she was `substantially less culpable than the average 
participant.' '' \479\ Since the defendants chose not to 
participate in their trial, the applicability of this 
mitigating adjustment is doubtful. Likewise, with respect to a 
mitigating adjustment based on remorse (USSG Sec. 3E1.1), the 
Commission stated that ``[b]ecause the defendants went to trial 
and did not express remorse, we are aware of no basis for 
granting this reduction.'' \480\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \479\ Id. at 4.
    \480\ Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Clemency supporters who testified at this Committee's 
September 21, 1999, hearing compared the sentences of the 16 
Puerto Rican terrorists with sentences imposed for other crimes 
thought to be more serious than seditious conspiracy. The 
Reverend Thomas E. Dipko, testifying on behalf of the General 
Synod of the United Church of Christ, stated:

          We agree with President Clinton, Amnesty 
        International, and numerous voices of conscience at 
        home and abroad, who note that in comparison with the 
        seven to twenty year sentences generally served by 
        people actually convicted of murder in our nation, the 
        more than 1,000 years of incarceration imposed on these 
        men and women, averaging over 65 years in prison for 
        each, constitutes excessive punishment disproportionate 
        to the crimes of which they were found guilty.

Also, Harry Barnes, director of the Conflict Resolution Program 
at the Carter Center, in a letter to Chairman Burton of this 
Committee dated October 15, 1999, compared the sentences of the 
16 terrorists to: (1) the ``average maximum sentence for 
murder'' in Federal courts in 1980 (approximately 10 years); 
(2) the ``average maximum sentence for murder'' in Federal 
courts in 1997 (approximately 12 years); and (3) the ``average 
maximum sentence for murder'' in State courts in 1997 
(approximately 22 years).\481\ 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \481\ Letter from Harry Barnes, director, Conflict Resolution 
Program, the Carter Center, to Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on 
Government Reform (Oct. 15, 1999). (Exhibit 80).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Seditious conspiracy and murder, however, are not 
equivalent crimes. McGrath, in his October 26, 1999, letter 
addressed the Carter Center's comparison:

          The completed criminal conduct of the FALN defendants 
        may not have resulted in murder, but the additional 
        planned conduct certainly threatened the lives of many 
        persons and, more generally, sought to oppose the 
        United States government by force and violence. Thus, 
        from a just punishment perspective, it is not at all 
        clear that the FALN sentences were disproportionate to 
        the seriousness of the crimes.\482\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \482\ Exhibit 3--Letter from Timothy B. McGrath to Chairman Dan 
Burton at 8-9.

The implication that the sentences of up to 90 years imposed on 
the FALN terrorists were unusually long as compared with other 
Federal sentences is further belied by Bureau of Justice 
Statistics sentencing data. At the end of fiscal year 1998, 
there were 74 offenders in Federal prison who had been 
sentenced to determinate sentences greater than 100 years prior 
to enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and 578 
offenders who had been sentenced to life imprisonment under the 
old law. Overall, at the end of fiscal year 1998, there were 
115 offenders in Federal prison serving determinate sentences 
greater than 100 years, 2,040 offenders serving Federal life 
sentences, and 7 offenders on Federal death row.\483\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \483\ Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center, ``Dataset: 
Population of offenders in Federal Prison at fiscal year-end, 1998,'' 
(viewed Oct. 26, 1999). .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In his letter to Representative Waxman, the President also 
contrasted the sentences of the prisoners in question with that 
of Jose Solis Jordan, another Puerto Rican terrorist who was 
sentenced on July 7, 1999, to 51 months in prison for the 
attempted bombing of a Marine recruiting center in 
Chicago.\484\ Unlike the 16 Puerto Rican terrorists, who were 
convicted on multiple charges related to the FALN's terrorist 
campaign in the early 1980's, Solis Jordan was tried on charges 
related to a single attempted bombing.\485\ Solis Jordan was 
ultimately convicted on four counts: \486\ (I) conspiracy to 
destroy Federal property by fire or explosive; \487\ (II and 
III) attempted destruction of Federal property by fire or 
explosive; \488\ and (IV) illegal possession of 
explosives.\489\ The fact that Solis Jordan was not prosecuted 
for seditious conspiracy, and not sentenced under the guideline 
for terrorism,\490\ does not suggest that the sentences imposed 
on his predecessors in terror were in any respect unjust.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \484\ Exhibit 7--Letter from President Clinton to Representative 
Waxman at 2.
    \485\ Neil Gallagher, Assistant Director of the National Security 
Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified at this 
Committee's Sept. 21, 1999 hearing that the 1992 bombing for which 
Solis Jordan was convicted was designed to gauge the response of the 
Puerto Rican people to the resumption of pro-independence terrorism. 
Solis Jordan was not charged with seditious conspiracy.
    \486\ U.S. v. Solis Jordan, Docket No. 97-CR-814, (N.D. Ill., 
1999). Amended Judgment and Commitment Order, issued Sept. 3, 1999
    \487\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371.
    \488\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(f).
    \489\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5861(d).
    \490\ U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1998 Guidelines Manual, Sec. 
3A1.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   V. The Faln and Macheteros Terrorists Are Strange Candidates for 
                                Clemency

    As the Justice Department itself noted, commutations of 
sentence are very rarely granted; it is an extraordinary 
remedy.\491\ Since President Clinton took office, he had 
granted only 3 commutations of sentence out of 3,042 
requests.\492\ In each of those three instances, the length of 
the sentence commuted did not compare to the sentences being 
served by the FALN and Macheteros terrorists. The first 
commutation, in 1994, was of a hog farmer in Nebraska who had 
been convicted of perjury in bankruptcy proceedings.\493\ The 
farmer was sentenced to 5 months prison, 3 years supervised 
release, and 5 months home confinement.\494\ The President 
commuted his 5 month sentence after the farmer had served 4 
months and 25 days, and removed the home detention 
requirement.\495\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \491\ ``The Executive Clemency Process'' Department of Justice 
production 1040586-1040591, at 590.
    \492\ Exhibit 25--Chart, ``Presidential Clemency Actions by 
Administration.'' Figures include the first 6 months of fiscal year 
1999.
    \493\ Exhibit 1 at 000735.
    \494\ Id.
    \495\ Id. at 000750.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    President Clinton later commuted the sentence of a woman 
who was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and 
sentenced to 2 years and 9 months.\496\ She was scheduled to be 
released on May 27, 1995, when Clinton commuted her sentence to 
time served on April 17, 1995, sparing her a little less than a 
month longer in prison.\497\ The Pardon Attorney explained that 
the woman had withdrawn from drug activity prior to her trial 
and the President felt that she had served enough time.\498\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \496\ Id. at 000739.
    \497\ Id. at 000751.
    \498\ Committee Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Sept. 
18, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The third sentence commuted by President Clinton was that 
of a man convicted of marijuana charges. The Pardon Attorney 
explained that the man had cooperated with the U.S. Attorneys 
Office prosecuting the case, and in turn was supposed to get a 
favorable recommendation on sentencing.\499\ Due to an error on 
the part of the U.S. Attorneys Office, the recommendation was 
not filed on time. The man commenced his sentence of 5 years 
and 11 months on December 3, 1991 and was scheduled for release 
on November 1, 1996.\500\ The President commuted his sentence 
to time served on August 21, 1995, releasing him 1 year and 2 
months early.\501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \499\ Id.
    \500\ Exhibit 1 at 000752.
    \501\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In comparison, the FALN and Macheteros terrorists were 
released after serving 19 years on their sentences ranging from 
35 to 90 years.\502\ The initial commutations were of a 
completely different nature than the FALN and Macheteros 
commutations, and the presence of remorse and cooperation 
provided a justification for the grant of clemency. The members 
of the FALN and Macheteros terrorist groups who were granted 
clemency showed none of those virtues. Some of them may well 
have been exemplary prisoners.\503\ However, they never took 
responsibility for what they did and, in fact, most of them 
still call themselves ``political prisoners'' and blame the 
government for what they did. Furthermore, the President 
granted them clemency as a group. It is troubling to the 
Committee that some might read President Clinton's grant of 
clemency as validating the actions of the FALN and Macheteros 
terrorist groups, or at the least being lenient toward them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \502\ Exhibit 7--Letter from President Clinton to Representative 
Henry Waxman. Juan Segarra-Palmer's sentence was commuted so that he 
would not be released until he served 19 years. He was originally 
sentenced to 55 years in prison.
    \503\ There is evidence in the record of good conduct during their 
period of incarceration (in addition to evidence, in some of their 
cases, of bad or illegal conduct).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


                        a. criteria for clemency


    Generally, when considering commutations, the Justice 
Department looks at several factors: ``disparity or undue 
severity of sentence, critical illness or old age, and 
meritorious service rendered to the government by the 
petitioner, e.g., cooperation with investigative or prosecutive 
efforts that has not been adequately rewarded by other official 
action.'' \504\ In addition, whether the petitioner is eligible 
for parole is taken into account, which would be another remedy 
available.\505\ Other factors that one would look into when 
considering clemency would be the type of offense and whether 
the petitioner accepted responsibility and showed remorse for 
his actions.\506\ When looking at remissions of fines, ``the 
ability to pay and any good faith efforts to discharge the 
obligation are important considerations,'' along with 
``satisfactory post-conviction conduct.'' \507\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \504\ Exhibit 26--U.S. Attorneys Manual.
    \505\ Id.
    \506\ Id.
    \507\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the case of the FALN and Macheteros clemency, all of the 
prisoners granted commutations by the President either were 
already eligible for parole, or soon would be. The majority of 
them refused even to apply for parole.\508\ The prisoners do 
not appear to meet any of the other criteria that the 
authorities are supposed to examine to determine eligibility. 
Using today's sentencing guidelines, the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission determined that the sentences imposed on the FALN 
and Macheteros terrorists were not disparate or unduly 
severe.\509\ According to the prisoners' records provided by 
the Department of Justice, none of the prisoners suffered from 
a critical illness or old age. In addition, the FBI testified 
before the Committee that none of the prisoners had cooperated 
with law enforcement.\510\ After reviewing the information 
available on the prisoners and speaking with the relevant 
authorities, the Committee was left puzzled about the grant of 
clemency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \508\ Oscar Lopez Rivera, Ricardo Jimenez, Alejandrina Torres, 
Elizam Escobar, Carmen Valentin, Adolfo Matos, Edwin Cortes, and Ida 
Luz Rodriguez all refused to apply for parole. Sentence monitoring 
computation data. Department of Justice production at 120015, 020022, 
100011, 010019, 080010, 030026, and 110013.
    \509\ See discussion supra part V.
    \510\ Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) 
(testimony of Neil Gallagher, Assistant Director for National Security, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


            b. the violent nature of those offered clemency


    In discussing the grant of clemency to the FALN and 
Macheteros members, the White House made an effort to portray 
those who were offered clemency as non-violent offenders. The 
mantra repeated by the White House was that the individuals 
offered clemency were not convicted of bombings that directly 
caused the death of any person. This suggested that they were 
unfairly categorized as violent through guilt by association. 
This is not the case. The individuals granted clemency were 
violent people committed to the use of violence to win 
independence for Puerto Rico.
    When considering a commutation of sentence, one would hope 
that the Department of Justice and the President would look to 
whether it was safe to put an individual back into society; of 
foremost concern should be public safety. Generally, in making 
a determination, the Justice Department should look at the 
individual's conduct in prison, statements the prisoners have 
made, and whether law enforcement agencies have concerns. In 
the case of the FALN and Macheteros prisoners, it appears that 
their violent histories were ignored.
1. Present day threats
    In September 1999, the Attorney General released a ``Five-
Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan.'' 
\511\ The plan was released the same month as the FALN and 
Macheteros terrorists were released from prison. In a section 
of the Attorney General's report discussing the threat posed 
from domestic terrorists, she writes:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \511\ Five Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime 
Plan, September 1999. Department of Justice production 10140039-
10140136.

          Puerto Rican terrorist groups, such as the Fuertas 
        [sic] Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquena 
        [sic] (FALNP) and the Ejercito Popular Boricua 
        Macheteros (EPB-Macheteros), are an exception and 
        represent an on-going threat. They have previously used 
        violence in an attempt to achieve independence for 
        Puerto Rico. In an eleven-year span, Puerto Rican 
        terrorists were responsible for more than 100 bombings 
        and arsons, in both Puerto Rico and on the U.S. 
        mainland. Factors which increase the present threat 
        from these groups include renewed activity by a small 
        minority advocating Puerto Rican statehood, the 100-
        year anniversary of the U.S. presence in Puerto Rico, 
        and the impending release from prison of members of 
        these groups jailed for prior violence.\512\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \512\ Id. at 10140050 (emphasis added).

Even as the prisoners were being released, the Justice 
Department acknowledged that such release increased the threat 
of violence from the FALN and Macheteros.
    In testimony before the Committee, Neil Gallagher, FBI 
Assistant Director for National Security testified that the FBI 
believed that the release of the prisoners would provide a 
``psychological or operational'' benefit to the two terrorist 
organizations.\513\ Gallagher explained that the FALN and 
Macheteros continue as terrorist organizations and to place one 
of their imprisoned ``comrades'' back into their midst, would 
give the organization a boost.\514\ Gallagher used the example 
of the Macheteros' fugitive leader Filiberto Ojeda Rios, who, 
on September 13, 1999, issued a communique warning the U.S. 
Navy not to resume the use of a range on the island of Vieques, 
Puerto Rico.\515\ The communique warned that the Macheteros 
``would not remain with their arms crossed.'' \516\ Gallagher 
made clear that the FBI had given the Justice Department its 
warnings and opinion on the release of the FALN and Macheteros 
prisoners on numerous occasions.\517\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \513\ Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) 
(testimony of Neil Gallagher, Assistant Director for National Security, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation).
    \514\ Id.
    \515\ Id.; see also Appendix II, letter from Dan Burton, chairman, 
Government Reform Committee, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (Oct. 19, 
1999) (letter discusses the danger to civilians protesting on the 
island of Vieques).
    \516\ Id.
    \517\ Id. The FBI also noted in a draft, unsent letter to House 
Judiciary Committee chairman, Henry Hyde, that, ``[a]s the request for 
pardons had been pending since 1994, the FBI was unaware that any such 
commutation of sentences was actually being contemplated or imminent.'' 
Exhibit 54--Letter from Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI, to Henry Hyde, 
chairman, House Judiciary Committee (undated).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Violent escapes planned by the FALN prisoners
            a. Escape plan of Oscar Lopez Rivera
    Between mid-1983 and May 1986 several FALN members, a group 
of prisoners, and former prisoners from Leavenworth conspired 
to escape from Leavenworth. The mastermind of the plan was 
Oscar Lopez Rivera, who declined President Clinton's offer of 
clemency. At the time of the conspiracy, Lopez was incarcerated 
in Leavenworth Penitentiary. The government learned of the 
conspiracy through an inmate at Leavenworth and soon began 
monitoring the efforts of Lopez Rivera and his co-conspirators 
both inside and outside of prison.
    While in prison, Lopez boasted that he was the Chicago 
leader of the FALN in a discussion with other inmates.\518\ 
Lopez said that, ``he believed the only way he could win 
independence for Puerto Rico was by engaging in violent acts 
against private businesses and against U.S. government 
installations.'' \519\ He explained that ``his people'' lived 
in Chicago, and that he communicated with them through visits, 
legal mail and coded telephone calls.\520\ In the same 
conversation, he urged the other inmates to begin their own 
campaign of armed struggle.\521\ This discussion led the 
participants to conclude that it would be difficult to conduct 
an armed struggle while still in prison, thus the participants 
began to formulate an escape plan.\522\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \518\ Brief for the United States, U.S. v. Delgado, Nos. 88-1434, 
88-1450, and 88-1476, at 5 (7th Cir.).
    \519\ Id. (emphasis added).
    \520\ Id.
    \521\ Id. at 6.
    \522\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Several weeks after the first meeting, Lopez met with one 
of the participants and informed him that the FALN had given 
him permission to participate in an escape plan and would 
provide a helicopter, pilot, and some of the materials 
needed.\523\ The plan was contingent upon one of the 
Leavenworth participants being released from prison, which was 
scheduled within a year.\524\ In the meantime, between late 
1984 and mid 1985, the participants met on a daily basis to 
discuss their plan. The final plan called for a helicopter to 
be flown into the Leavenworth prison yard.\525\ Guards would be 
held off with gunfire, and the helicopters at nearby Fort 
Leavenworth were to be disabled with explosive devices.\526\ 
Once out of prison, the participants would accumulate funds 
through robbery or counterfeiting.\527\ With the funding, they 
``intended to buy various explosives and firearms to use to 
blow up buildings and kill people.'' \528\ Lopez promised to 
bring FALN members to help train the men in their ``armed 
struggle.'' \529\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \523\ Id.
    \524\ Id.
    \525\ Id. at 7.
    \526\ Id.
    \527\ Id.
    \528\ Id. (emphasis added).
    \529\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Several months later, Lopez learned that a leading figure 
in the ``armed struggle'' had been arrested, and therefore the 
FALN would not be able to provide the weapons and 
explosives.\530\ The co-conspirators then went to another 
inmate with a list of weapons they would need to get out: 
``fragmentation grenades, smoke grenades, phosphorous grenades, 
eight M-16 rifles, two silencers, 50 pounds of plastic C-4 
explosives, eight bulletproof vests, ten blasting caps to use 
with plastic explosives, and 100 30-shot clips for use with 
automatic weapons.'' \531\ The smoke grenades were to be used 
in the yard to obstruct the guards' vision, while the 
fragmentation grenades ``were going to be used to throw against 
the guard tower.'' \532\ Ostensibly, there would be guards in 
the guard tower who would either be killed or seriously wounded 
by a weapon such as a fragmentation grenade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \530\ Id. at 7-8.
    \531\ Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
    \532\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After some time, Lopez' contacts outside of the prison made 
arrangements to make an initial purchase of some of the C-4 
explosives.\533\ Because there was an informant working within 
the co-conspirators, the FBI became involved and an agent posed 
as a weapons dealer.\534\ The FBI agent sold $5,000 worth, or 
30 sticks, of C-4 to the outside contact of the FALN.\535\ In 
mid-May 1985, Lopez was given details of the weapons 
purchased.\536\ Lopez told his co-conspirators that he thought 
the ``weapons dealer'' was giving them a bad deal, but that 
``his people'' would ``take care of'' the weapons dealer if he 
had set them up.\537\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \533\ Id. at 11.
    \534\ Id.
    \535\ Id. at 15-16.
    \536\ The ``weapons dealer'' was actually an undercover FBI agent. 
Id. at 16.
    \537\ Id. (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As time passed, numerous FALN members across the country 
were captured. Lopez was getting and sending information 
through his attorneys and other visitors who would communicate 
through written notes taken from the prison by Lopez' attorneys 
or paralegals.\538\ Lopez had to change his escape plans 
several times and informed his co-conspirators on the outside, 
through a letter smuggled out by his attorney, that the FALN 
would not be able to provide the weapons or helicopter 
training.\539\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \538\ Id. at 17.
    \539\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In May 1986, Lopez sent a letter to a co-conspirator (at 
that time the co-conspirator was cooperating with the 
government), giving him the name of a new weapons dealer.\540\ 
The co-conspirators, including Lopez, agreed that if the 
weapons dealer did not meet their price, he should be killed 
and the weapons stolen.\541\ At the end of May, Lopez was 
visited by an FALN contact, and the two, communicating through 
writing, discussed the escape attempt.\542\ After the visit, 
the government seized the communications and foiled the 
plot.\543\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \540\ Id. at 26.
    \541\ Id.
    \542\ Id. at 27.
    \543\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Lopez and his co-conspirators were charged with:
           Committing a multi-goal conspiracy to effect 
        the escape of several inmates from the Leavenworth 
        Federal Penitentiary.
           Committing a multi-goal conspiracy to 
        transport explosives with the intent to kill and injure 
        people.
           Committing a multi-goal conspiracy to use 
        explosives to destroy government buildings and 
        property.
    Lopez' probation officer's assessment of him was:

          His level of remorse, rehabilitation and positive 
        regard for this court's process is minimal, if not 
        nonexistent. He demonstrates a sustained, consistent 
        commitment to the use of violence and weapons. He will 
        use any means to gain freedom for the purpose of 
        undermining the principles of the United States 
        government. He has already determined that human life 
        is expendable for this purpose. He will not be an 
        inactive influence on the FALN while incarcerated.\544\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \544\ Presentence report of Oscar Lopez at 120042.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Government stated in its sentencing recommendation:

          Oscar Lopez is beyond rehabilitation. He has shown 
        nothing but contempt for the judicial system and the 
        lives of his fellow citizens. He has adopted a 
        philosophy to rationalize and justify every act of 
        violence and criminality he commits. In this regard, he 
        is a particularly dangerous individual whose commitment 
        to his cause guarantees a continued and real threat to 
        the lives and well being of all persons who find 
        themselves in his way.\545\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \545\ Id. at 120054.

    In February 1986, Lopez was interviewed regarding his 
participation in the ``struggle'' for Puerto Rico's 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
independence:

          I would consider myself a freedom fighter. Ah, it 
        could be argued that somebody's terrorist is somebody 
        else's freedom fighter. Our struggle is a just 
        struggle, and because it's a just struggle, we have the 
        right to wage it by any . . . ah . . . means necessary, 
        including armed struggle. . . . We can anticipate more 
        violence. People are not going to sit idle and, ah, 
        wait for the oppression to continue. Ah, as long as the 
        conditions do not improve ah, yes there is that, ah, 
        outlet for violence. A bombing or any type of armed 
        action is worth study. It's not something that, ah, is, 
        is spontaneous. Ah, all the factors, human lives are 
        taken into consideration.\546\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \546\ Id. at 120064.

Lopez was found guilty and sentenced to 15 years, to run 
consecutively with the prison sentence he was already serving.
    When testifying before the Committee, the Assistant 
Director for Correctional Programs at the Bureau of Prisons, 
Michael Cooksey, spoke about Oscar Lopez. Cooksey testified 
that Oscar Lopez' escape plans were indeed violent.\547\ In 
fact, Oscar Lopez was considered one of the most dangerous 
criminals in the Bureau of Prisons system, and was sent to the 
highest security prison in the United States.\548\ During the 
hearing, the FBI, Bureau of Prisons, and Justice Department all 
testified that they had never told the White House that Oscar 
Lopez was not violent.\549\ Nevertheless, the White House 
continued to represent to the public that the individuals 
granted clemency had never been involved in violent acts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \547\ Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) 
(testimony of Michael B. Cooksey, Assistant Director for Correctional 
Programs, Bureau of Prisons).
    \548\ Lopez was incarcerated at both the Marion and Florence, CO 
maximum security facilities. Id.
    \549\ Id. (testimony of Michael B. Cooksey, Assistant Director for 
Correctional Programs, Bureau of Prisons; testimony of Neil Gallagher, 
Assistant Director for National Security, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; testimony of Jon Jennings, Acting Assistant Attorney 
General for Legislative Affairs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. Escape plans of Ricardo Jimenez
    Officers at the Federal Correctional Institution in 
Otisville, NY were conducting a routine ``shakedown'' of the 
prisoners cells on October 11, 1985. When they searched FALN 
member Ricardo Jimenez' cell they found the following:
          Exhibit 1: a plastic architectural drawing 
        (3"5") which depicts the entire Otisville 
        facility as seen from the air; appears to have been 
        produced in UNICOR; found taped to bottom of inmate's 
        desk.
          Exhibit 2: FALN-related material (three newspapers).
          Exhibit 3: two informational fliers concerning 
        individuals of Puerto Rican descent currently 
        incarcerated at various facilities.\550\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \550\ Memorandum from Jerry Brookmole, Captain to Ken Willicki, SIS 
(Oct. 21, 1985). Department of Justice production 10180032-10180035, at 
10180032.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jimenez was present during the search, and when he became aware 
that the officers had found the materials, he attempted to 
flee.\551\ As he was already in prison, he did not get far.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \551\ Id
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Through informants, the officers at Otisville were able to 
determine that the FALN was planning to break into the prison 
to free Jimenez and ``pre-trial Puerto Ricans'' who were being 
held at Otisville at the time.\552\ Jimenez had paid another 
prisoner who was able to leave the prison on furlough to take 
information outside the prison such as ``site plans of the 
institution layout; information about the perimeter security; 
and details of perimeter security vehicle activity.'' \553\ A 
confidential informant supplied officials with the following 
details:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \552\ Id. at 10180033-10180034.
    \553\ Id. at 10180033.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Twenty-five to Thirty (25 to 30) people will be 
        involved, coming from the outside to implement the 
        escape plan. They will approach from the road that 
        leads from the sewage treatment plant. They will be 
        heavily armed with automatic weapons, grenades, and 
        dynamite. Half of the group will come to the front of 
        the parking lot to create a diversion. The other half 
        will come up from the sewage treatment plant area and 
        blow a hole in the fence. The primary target will be to 
        get Jimenez and the Puerto Ricans out of segregation. 
        It will be a total takeover and all other inmates who 
        wish to break for the fence will be permitted to do so.
          Plans of the institution have already been sent to 
        New York where the weapons and individuals are located. 
        The woods leading to the back of Units 1, 2, and 3 have 
        already been staked out three to six weeks ago. The 
        perimeter vehicles will be taken out immediately 
        because they know this is the only fire power we have.
          There is a hit list established identifying 
        particular staff who they will kill on sight if seen. 
        The informant knew of only one staff member on the 
        list, namely, Lt. Asuega.\554\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \554\ Id. at 10180034.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prison authorities confirmed that a guard checking the prison 
perimeter approximately 6 weeks earlier had reported people 
with flashlights in the woods behind the prison.\555\ The 
following day, guards had found footprints in the area.\556\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \555\ Id.
    \556\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is apparent from the description of both the Lopez and 
Jimenez escape attempts that the two remained in contact with 
FALN members outside of prison and were kept abreast of current 
FALN events. Their escape plans were extremely violent and did 
not take into account possible loss of life, and in fact, 
planned on it. Lopez intended to attack the guard tower, and 
Jimenez had a ``hit list'' for guards.


   c. the faln and macheteros members offered clemency expressed no 
       remorse, nor did they exhibit any signs of rehabilitation


    An important aspect of any grant of clemency should be the 
remorse or repentance of the petitioner for the crimes he 
committed. There is no evidence of repentance with the FALN and 
Macheteros terrorists. The Office of the Pardon Attorney even 
worked with supporters of clemency to find remorse on the part 
of the prisoners. During a November 5, 1997, meeting with 
Representatives Gutierrez, Serrano, and Velazquez, Deputy 
Attorney General Holder asked that they get a written statement 
from the prisoners on how they had changed and whether they 
were repentant.\557\ Five months later, OPA had not received 
any statement. Ultimately, Pardon Attorney Adams had to call 
Representative Gutierrez' office and request the 
statement.\558\ Finally, on April 9, 1998, the Pardon Attorney 
spoke with Enrique Fernandez of Representative Gutierrez' 
office.\559\ Fernandez told Pardon Attorney Adams that the 
prisoners would ``send separate, though identical, 
statements.'' \560\ It is clear from the fact that the 
prisoners' statements were identical that the prisoners did not 
truly feel remorse. A group statement tends to defeat the idea 
of personal remorse or repentance. Fernandez also warned that 
the statement would probably not be what the Deputy Attorney 
General had asked for in his meeting:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \557\ Exhibit 47--Notes from Nov. 5, 1997, meeting between Deputy 
Attorney General Holder and Representatives Gutierrez, Serrano, and 
Velazquez.
    \558\ Notes of telephone call from Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, to 
Doug Scoffield, chief of staff to Representative Gutierrez (undated). 
Department of Justice production 1041926. (Exhibit 81).
    \559\ Notes of telephone call from Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, to 
Enrique Fernandez, staff to Representative Gutierrez (Apr. 9, 1999). 
Department of Justice production 1041899. (Exhibit 82).
    \560\ Id.

          It is unlikely to show ``repentance'' as Mr. 
        Fernandez said the persons have said--and this may be 
        the gist of the statement--that they cannot participate 
        in the current political process of the U.S. with 
        respect to its relationship to PR--although they have 
        no quarrel with the U.S. Constitution and laws with 
        respect to matters in the U.S. . . . Anyway, he said 
        that his Congressman is very confident they will not 
        ``do it again, bombs and stuff like that.'' \561\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \561\ Id.

In fact, the statement from the prisoners reflected no remorse, 
repentance or change in beliefs on the part of the FALN 
prisoners.\562\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \562\ Exhibit 49--Facsimile from Roger Adams to Dawn Chirwa, with 
attachment of statement from the prisoners (Apr. 21, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In their statement, the prisoners blamed the U.S. 
Government for their actions. Describing the decades of the 
1970's and 1980's, the statement claimed:

          During those years the criminalization of 
        independence and systemic harassment of supporters of 
        independence and their sympathizers was official 
        government policy, out of which grew COINTELPRO. In 
        Puerto Rico and the United States, the government 
        targeted supporters of independence, including the 
        unconstitutional practice of creating dossiers and 
        conducting surveillance of over 100,000 innocent 
        people, dubbed ``subversives,'' merely because they 
        believed in independence. . . .
          It is within this totality of circumstances, with all 
        other avenues for exercising self-determination 
        foreclosed, that a group of individuals decided to 
        resort to exercise the right of self-determination due 
        all nations, and, concretizing the right accorded by 
        international law to all colonial subjects to use all 
        means at their disposal, waged a struggle against 
        colonialism.\563\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \563\ Id.

The letter acknowledges that the prisoners might now deign to 
participate in the political process to work toward 
independence for Puerto Rico. Yet the prisoners continue to 
refuse to acknowledge their personal participation and 
culpability. Many of the individual prisoners have made 
unofficial statements regarding their participation in the 
``independence movement'' that tend to show that they have no 
remorse, and in fact continue to be proud of their actions.
1. Statements of Oscar Lopez
    In the summer of 1995 Oscar Lopez made a statement for the 
use of ``Libertad!'' which was the publication of a group of 
pro-clemency supporters. Lopez wrote, ``I define myself as a 
Puerto Rican, with a right to struggle for the liberation and 
dignity of my people using any means necessary.'' \564\ Later, 
in May 1998, Lopez was interviewed for the San Juan Star. Lopez 
told the reporter, ``I cannot undo what's done. The whole thing 
of contrition, atonement, I have problems with that.'' \565\ He 
continued, ``I have no regrets for what I've done in the Puerto 
Rico independence movement. The onus is not on us. The crime is 
colonialism.'' \566\ Lopez was asked whether he and his former 
``comrades'' would accept a Puerto Rican plebiscite on the 
issue of Puerto Rican independence or statehood. He responded 
that they would accept a plebiscite, but would react violently 
if they found that it had been ``rigged against them.'' \567\ 
However, Lopez added, ``[i]f annexation [statehood] is the 
answer, I would say there would be a good number of Puerto 
Ricans who would advocate and practice armed struggle.'' 
Finally, if asked whether he would remain an active 
independentista if he were freed from prison, after a long 
pause Lopez responded, ``I cannot stop being a Puerto Rican. I 
cannot be anything but a Puerto Rican.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \564\ Statements of the FALN and Los Macheteros members in 
Libertad!, a publication of the National Committee to Free Puerto Rican 
Prisoners of War and Political Prisoners (summer 1995) http://
www.prisonactivist.org/pubs/libertad/ (emphasis added).
    \565\ Imprisoned FALN Leader Claims No Regrets, San Juan Star, May 
10, 1998.
    \566\ Id.
    \567\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is obvious that Lopez has no remorse for his actions, 
nor does he understand that his acts were wrong, not just 
legally but morally. The group to which he belonged detonated 
bombs around major metropolitan centers to draw attention to 
the group's beliefs. Those bombs caused the deaths of numerous 
people. He deserved to be in prison. However, true to his 
beliefs, Lopez refused to renounce violence or submit to the 
conditions of the President's offer of clemency, and rejected 
the offer.
2. Statements of Edwin Cortes
    FALN member Edwin Cortes also wrote a summer 1995, 
statement for the Libertad! publication. In it he discusses his 
struggle on whether or not to apply for parole:

          I originally considered appearing before the parole 
        board, based in part on my discussions with other POWs 
        and sectors of the independence movement who believe 
        that parole should not be ruled out as a form of 
        struggle in the campaign for our freedom. My intentions 
        were to embrace all political/legal avenues available 
        under international and US laws including Parole, 
        Presidential Amnesty/Pardon/Commutation, the United 
        Nations, OAS, the World Court, etc. [sic] in order to 
        become an active political subject in the campaign to 
        free al [sic] Political Prisoners and Prisoners of War. 
        The organizing work done around the Parole Board could 
        also be part of a multi-prong political/legal strategy 
        to expose the contradictory and politically biased 
        parole process as it relates to political activists. As 
        well as to organize, educate and mobilize our community 
        toward the freedom of Political Prisoners and Prisoners 
        of War.
          I have an inalienable human right to rid my nation of 
        colonialism, and remain committed to being a 
        protagonist in the struggle for national independence 
        and the freedom of all Puerto Rican patriots.\568\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \568\ Statements of the FALN and Los Macheteros members in 
Libertad!, a publication of the National Committee to Free Puerto Rican 
Prisoners of War and Political Prisoners (summer 1995) http://
www.prisonactivist.org/pubs/libertad/.

Again, his statements do not show remorse. Cortes insists that 
he is a ``political prisoner'' or a ``prisoner of war.'' What 
he does not take into account is that there was no war. The 
FALN conducted their own guerrilla actions in the United 
States. The FALN did not and still does not have the support of 
the majority of Puerto Ricans living in Puerto Rico.\569\ He 
and other members of the FALN and Macheteros continue to insist 
that they are not to blame for their own actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \569\ In fact, less than 3% of Puerto Ricans voted for independence 
from the United States in the last plebiscite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Statements of Adolfo Matos
    After the FALN and Macheteros prisoners were granted 
clemency, the Bureau of Prisons began to review prior taped 
conversations of the prisoners. A correctional officer called 
an April 15, 1999, tape of FALN member Adolfo Matos to the 
attention of his supervisors because of the statements he made. 
Matos was speaking to a woman in Puerto Rico named ``Lydia'':

          Matos. To give my life for something I believe in, 
        something that's not for personal gain. I liked helping 
        people, anybody, you know. For the justice of my 
        people. In this manner I get involved. And my desire 
        has gotten stronger, to the point where I want to 
        continue. Continue to fight and get involved with my 
        people, because I love them.
          Lydia. And what about what Carlos said? If the 
        prisoners were to ask for a pardon, it would all be 
        different. Are you willing to ask for a pardon?
          Matos. No. I don't have to ask for forgiveness from 
        anybody. Look it's like the song says . . .
          Lydia. Aren't they recording?
          Matos. No, I don't care, it's like that song by . . .
          Lydia. Don't you feel ashamed of it?
          Matos. No, no, no, my love, I have nothing to be 
        ashamed of, or feel that I have to ask for forgiveness. 
        I don't have to ask for forgiveness because my 
        conscience is at peace with itself. You see, it's a 
        question of rights[.] \570\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \570\ Memorandum from J.M. Guerrero, correctional officer, Lompoc 
Penitentiary, to G. Bondurant, Special Investigative Agent (Sept. 7, 
1999). Department of Justice production 10120001. (Exhibit 83).

It is vividly clear from his statements that Matos feels no 
remorse for his action.
4. Statements of Antonio Camacho-Negron
    Bureau of Prisons officials also reviewed the telephone 
calls of Macheteros member Antonio Camacho-Negron.\571\ After 
reviewing the calls, the officials found that the content of 
the calls were a ``good indication he is persistent with 
supporting his dissident cause.'' \572\ Officials called 
attention to one call in particular, where he had the following 
exchange with FALN attorney Jan Susler:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \571\ Memorandum from Jake Mendez, warden, FCI Allenwood, to David 
M. Rardin, Regional Director, Bureau of Prisons, with attachment (Sept. 
8, 1999). Department of Justice production 10120012-10120013, at 
10120012. (Exhibit 84).
    \572\ Id.

          Susler. During the conference we spoke about 
        renouncing the violence.
          Camacho. The circumstances have changed.
          Susler. They agreed that they weren't going to go 
        back to the armed struggle.
          Camacho. We don't have to accept that in a written 
        form. We cannot (politically) renounce the armed 
        struggle totally.
          Susler. Let's talk more about this when we meet 
        again.\573\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \573\ Id. at 10120013.

In an August 25, 1999, telephone conversation, Camacho 
``mentions the struggle his group is in and it could not 
continue unless the use of arms was employed.'' \574\ In 
earlier telephone calls, Camacho-Negron indicated that he would 
accept the President's offer of clemency if it was given 
without conditions.\575\ Finally, during an August 20, 1999 
telephone conversation Camacho-Negron was discussing the 
$100,000 fine he received when convicted for his activities 
relating to the Wells Fargo robbery. Camacho-Negron indicated 
that, ``he did not acknowledge the fine because of his 
political affiliation, and his stand against the government.'' 
\576\ After reviewing his statements, it is hard to imagine a 
poorer candidate for clemency. President Clinton did not offer 
to commute Camacho-Negron's sentence because he remains 
eligible for mandatory release, should he choose to abide by 
the conditions imposed. However, the President did offer to 
remit the fine, which Camacho-Negron rejected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \574\ ``Investigator's Report Regarding Camacho-Negron.'' 
Department of Justice production 10120016-10120017, at 10120016. 
(Exhibit 85).
    \575\ Id.
    \576\ Id. at 10120017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Statements of Ricardo Jimenez
    FALN member Ricardo Jimenez accepted President Clinton's 
offer of clemency. After he was released from prison, he 
appeared on the political talk show, Meet the Press, on 
September 12, 1999.\577\ The host of the program asked Jimenez 
whether he had any regret or remorse for the crimes of which he 
had been convicted.\578\ Jimenez replied, ``I think basically 
what we have to know, that what we were charged with, if it was 
anybody else, would have served--would have served much, much 
less time. Those sentences would have not been consecutive the 
way they were. . . .'' \579\ When asked whether he had any 
remorse for the bombings, especially those in which people were 
killed or injured, Jimenez responded, ``No. I think all 
precautions were taken--you know, to make sure that all human 
life was preserved. And in the end . . . the measures were not 
taken by the people who owned those establishments.'' \580\ It 
is clear that Jimenez, like the others, has no remorse for the 
FALN actions. What is even more disturbing is that he places 
the blame on the owners of the businesses bombed by the FALN. 
The bomb that exploded in Fraunces Tavern in January 1975 was 
set to detonate during the busy lunch hour, when the restaurant 
was most crowded. It is offensive that he blames the 
restaurant, and his comments show that he was a poor candidate 
for clemency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \577\ Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 12, 1999).
    \578\ Id.
    \579\ Id.
    \580\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. The exception: Alberto Rodriguez
    There is an exception to the lack of remorse on behalf of 
the FALN and Macheteros members. Alberto Rodriguez issued a 
statement in February 1995, renouncing the activities that led 
to his conviction. He stated:

          I now recognize that many of the assumptions that 
        guided my actions over twelve years ago were simply 
        wrong. I sincerely believed that the majority of Puerto 
        Ricans desired independence from the United States, and 
        that the only thing keeping the island from achieving 
        its independence was the power of the United States 
        Government. . . .
          I realize that violence to achieve independence is 
        neither realistic nor right. . . .
          Most specifically, I disregarded the consequences 
        that my conduct would have had on others. I took 
        violence lightly over a decade ago, and regret that. 
        While all of the FALN bombings that were charged as 
        part of the seditious conspiracy took place before I 
        became involved, I take responsibility for my cavalier 
        attitude towards violence and willingness to use 
        it.\581\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \581\ ``Statement of Alberto Rodriguez'' (Feb. 2, 1995). Department 
of Justice production 005507-00512, at 00507-00509.

FALN member Carmen Valentin responded to Rodriguez' 
renunciation, stating, ``only a desperate, crazed person would 
take such steps.'' \582\ She added, ``I apologize for his lack 
of integrity, honesty, vision. This is unacceptable behavior. I 
do not wish to stand near him in this struggle and demand that 
he be dubbed a persona non grata in our movement for liberation 
and in our campaign for amnesty, freedom.'' \583\ It is clear 
from Valentin's statements in the spring of 1995, that she had 
no remorse for the crimes committed by FALN members, and in 
fact, had contempt for those that did express remorse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \582\ Statements of the FALN and Los Macheteros members in 
Libertad!, a publication of the National Committee to Free Puerto Rican 
Prisoners of War and Political Prisoners (spring 1995) http://
www.prisonactivist.org/pubs/libertad/.
    \583\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although it is not clear whether Alberto Rodriguez would 
have been the best candidate for clemency regardless of the 
campaign to grant clemency to the FALN members, at least he 
recognized that his past actions were wrong and expressed 
remorse for his acts. The same certainly cannot be said for his 
fellow FALN members.


d. no cooperation was requested or offered from the faln and macheteros 
                                members


    There are numerous unsolved crimes about which the members 
of the FALN and Macheteros terrorist organizations could have 
provided information. In addition to unsolved bombings that 
occurred in both the United States and Puerto Rico, there were 
numerous robberies that were attributed to the groups, but 
never proven. Just one example is the January 1975 bombing of 
the historic Fraunces Tavern in New York City that killed four 
people. The families of the victims would like to see someone 
punished for the heinous crimes committed. When asked about 
unsolved crimes attributed to the two terrorist groups, FBI 
Assistant Director for National Security, Neil Gallagher, 
mentioned that individuals associated with the Macheteros' $7.2 
million armored car robbery in Connecticut remained fugitives, 
in addition to open investigations of the more recent bombings 
in Puerto Rico.\584\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \584\ Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) 
(testimony of Neil Gallagher, Assistant Director for National Security, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the hearing, Gallagher was asked whether any of the 
conditions of the grant of clemency included cooperating with 
law enforcement. He stated that the FBI was not asked whether 
it wanted to question the prisoners, and therefore never had 
the opportunity. It is of great concern to the Committee that 
there was absolutely no requirement that the prisoners speak to 
law enforcement regarding open investigations for which they 
may have had valuable information. At the very least, they 
could have provided some answers to the questions of the 
victims of FALN and Macheteros crimes. However, as with all of 
the other phases of this particular grant of clemency, the 
victims were never considered.

VI. The Clemency Decision and the U.S. Commitment to Fighting Terrorism

    The decision to offer clemency to the 16 FALN and 
Macheteros terrorists has ramifications that go beyond the 
typical dangers posed by the release of violent criminals back 
into society. First, this is the first time in the history of 
the United States that clemency has been offered to such a 
large number of individuals who are all members of like-minded 
terrorist organizations. The President's failure to require 
cooperation to solve numerous unsolved murders, coupled with 
the failure to require any type of contrition by the 
individuals or the group, sends a message that an organization 
has received preferential treatment. This is troubling because 
terrorist organizations do not necessarily act in a rational 
manner and might indeed be encouraged by a group being singled 
out for preferential treatment. As Neil Gallagher, Assistant 
Director for National Security, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, testified before the Committee on Government 
Reform on September 21, 1999: ``The challenge before us is the 
potential that the release of these individuals will 
psychologically and operationally enhance the ongoing violent 
and criminal activities of terrorist groups, not only in Puerto 
Rico, but throughout the world.'' \585\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \585\ Exhibit 17--Draft FBI statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A related concern is how this decision will impact our 
relations with foreign governments. Eliminating terrorist 
groups and initiatives requires foreign governments to 
cooperate with U.S. law enforcement initiatives. The decision 
to grant clemency to the FALN and Macheteros terrorists sends a 
clear message that our demands for severe punishment, and our 
willingness to mete out severe punishment, can be hollow. Of 
greater significance, it sends a message of encouragement to 
terrorists themselves. Although supporters of the clemency 
decision, and the President himself, often point to President 
Carter's decision to exercise clemency to individuals who 
attempted to assassinate President Truman and Members of 
Congress, this is hardly a good model to follow.\586\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \586\ The rationale for one of President Carter's grants of 
clemency was that the inmate had a terminal illness. There is no 
analogous situation with the 16 terrorists recently offered clemency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another area of concern is the intellectual inconsistency 
inherent in the rationale for the decision. When the United 
States decided to strike at the terrorist organization of Osama 
bin Laden, the President did not target only those proven to 
have committed acts of violence. He struck at the organization 
as a whole, and he presumably did so because all members were 
deemed to be responsible for the atrocities committed against 
others. Similarly, when Terry Nichols, the co-conspirator in 
the Oklahoma City bombing that killed 168 individuals, was 
given a life sentence without the possibility of parole, the 
President did not deplore the sentence. Thus, the White House 
has used a very different standard for the FALN terrorists than 
the standard used in statements or actions that are directed at 
other terrorist organizations.
    Finally, this section draws attention to the very curious 
repatriation of terrorist Silvia Baraldini to Italy. This 
decision was finalized within 2 weeks of the decision to offer 
clemency to the 16 FALN members. This is particularly curious 
because Baraldini herself had been involved with the FALN cause 
and its members.


                      a. the international message


    Simply put, the President's decision to release U.S. 
terrorists has seriously eroded this country's moral authority 
to require other countries to deal firmly with terrorist 
organizations. By offering the 16 FALN and Macheteros 
terrorists a lenient deal, the President has undercut our 
ability to require other countries to crack down on terrorist 
groups that threaten the safety of Americans at home and 
abroad. Once lost, it is difficult to recapture the moral high 
ground.
    The U.S. Government spent approximately $50 million in the 
1970's and 1980's to put an end to FALN and Macheteros 
violence.\587\ Indeed, the convictions of those recently 
offered clemency led to the end of most of the FALN terrorist 
activities in the United States. The recent decision, however, 
sends a different message about terrorist organizations, 
particularly because the clemency appears to be directed more 
at a group than at individuals. As the FBI made clear in a 
written statement prepared for the Committee's September 21, 
1999, hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \587\ Interview with Marlene Hunter, Assistant Special Agent in 
Charge (San Juan, Puerto Rico), Federal Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 
7, 1999).

          The FALN and Macheteros terrorist groups continue to 
        pose a danger to the US. Government and to the American 
        people, here and in Puerto Rico. . . . The challenge 
        before us is the potential that the release of these 
        individuals will psychologically and operationally 
        enhance the ongoing violent and criminal activities of 
        terrorist groups, not only in Puerto Rico, but 
        throughout the world.\588\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \588\ Draft statement of Neil Gallagher. (Exhibit 17).

    In a statement made last year before the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, FBI Director Freeh had this to say 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
about Puerto Rican terrorist groups:

          Although the last terrorist incident involving Puerto 
        Rican terrorist groups was a bombing in Chicago in 
        December, 1992, these groups continue to be of concern. 
        Between 1982 and 1994, approximately 44 percent of the 
        terrorist incidents committed in the United States and 
        its territories are attributed to Puerto Rican 
        terrorist groups. Efforts are continuing to locate 
        fugitives still at large from these incidents.
          Puerto Rican terrorist groups believe the liberation 
        of Puerto Rico from the United States justifies the use 
        of violence to obtain that objective. These groups 
        characterize their terrorism activities as ``acts of 
        war'' against invading forces and, when arrested, they 
        consider themselves to be ``prisoners of war'' who must 
        be treated as such according to the Geneva Convention. 
        Clandestine behavior and security are of utmost 
        importance in these group's activities.\589\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \589\ Threats to National Security. Hearing before the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Jan. 28, 
1998) (testimony of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation).

It is particularly disturbing that the White House has not 
offered a response to this analysis. If the President was privy 
to information that casts doubt on this assessment, it should 
be shared with the public. In the absence of the White House 
addressing the FBI's concerns, however, Congress and the 
American people are left with the impression that the President 
simply ignored this concern.
    Another matter of concern is the seeming confusion within 
the administration about whether the President's actions have 
any international ramifications. The following exchange between 
journalist Tim Russert and National Security Adviser Berger 
illustrates this point: \590\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \590\ Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 19, 1999).

          Russert. The President did not seek your advice on 
        this?
          Berger. This is not--again, I do foreign policy. 
        Puerto Rico is not an issue that comes within the 
        jurisdiction of the NSC.

As is obvious from this exchange, Mr. Berger is attempting to 
convey the impression that the President did not seek his 
advice. Notwithstanding this public representation, in a 
handwritten note just 2 months before this exchange, the 
President asked Berger: ``What about the prisoners[?]'' \591\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \591\ Handwritten note from President William J. Clinton, to Samuel 
Berger, National Security Adviser. (Exhibit 86).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Notwithstanding Mr. Berger's attempt to either avoid the 
question or mislead the audience, Berger himself had stated the 
previous year: ``Terrorism is not just [a] law enforcement or 
domestic issue. It's a national security and foreign policy 
issue.'' \592\ Thus, there appears to be great confusion in the 
administration about whether terrorism within the United States 
has any international ramifications. When the political results 
for this administration are negative, Mr. Berger argues that 
domestic terrorism is not a matter within the jurisdiction of 
the National Security Council. When speaking under different 
circumstances, however, it appears that Mr. Berger's message 
could not be more different, and he clearly states that 
terrorism is a national security issue and it is a foreign 
policy issue. This vacillation sends an unfortunate message to 
terrorist organizations and to the foreign governments that 
must respond to terrorist organizations. It also makes it 
appear that the U.S. Government somehow distinguishes U.S. 
terrorists from other nations' terrorists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \592\ Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 19, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


          b. an inconsistent policy on dealing with terrorists


    At the time that the controversy over the clemency offers 
was at its most pronounced, National Security Adviser Sandy 
Berger appeared on television to defend the President's 
decision. Nowhere is the inconsistency in the administration's 
policy more apparent than in his statements. After pointing out 
that ``these people have served between seventeen and nineteen 
years,'' and after misrepresenting that they were not 
``personally involved in violence,'' Mr. Berger says that he 
finds the President's explanation ``perfectly reasonable.'' Mr. 
Berger then goes on, however, to explain that the 
administration's record against terrorists ``is the strongest 
of any President in history.'' To establish this claim, he 
points to the apprehension of the World Trade Center bombers 
and the fight against those who allegedly destroyed the two 
United States embassies in Africa in 1997. Thus, he seeks 
credit for a strong response against the terrorist 
organizations that have recently committed acts of violence and 
he downplays the need for a harsh response where the FALN is 
concerned.
    This approach to the FALN matter was used by the President 
when he stated that none of the FALN terrorists ``had been 
convicted of doing bodily harm to anyone.'' \593\ Yet this was 
far from the standard used when dealing with the terrorist 
activities of Osama bin Laden or the World Trade Center 
bombers. In the case of the U.S. strike against Osama bin 
Laden, military aircraft dropped bombs specifically to kill 
members of the terrorist organization. There was no 
constitutional due process, nor was there an attempt to target 
only those who had committed violent acts. Rather, the 
President ordered a raid designed to disable the organization 
by killing its members. On the other hand, the FALN and 
Macheteros terrorists did receive due process of U.S. law and 
were sentenced accordingly. There appears to be no reason to 
undercut what the courts did, particularly where the President 
believes that, in other circumstances, U.S. legal due process 
is irrelevant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \593\ President William J. Clinton, press conference (Sept. 9, 
1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the case of the prosecutions and convictions of the 
World Trade Center bombers, some of those given lengthy prison 
sentences did not literally commit acts of violence. For 
Congress, for most Americans, and certainly for international 
observers, it is difficult to understand why FALN terrorists 
should not serve their full sentences, when it is acceptable to 
deploy missiles against the followers of Osama bin Laden or 
seek long sentences for some of the World Trade Center 
conspirators. This is particularly true given the fact that 
none of the 16 terrorists offered clemency showed any 
contrition for their activities, nor did they provide any 
cooperation to solve the numerous crimes that remain unsolved.
    In short, the President appears to be using a standard to 
justify his decision to offer clemency to the 16 terrorists 
that has not been used with other terrorist organizations. 
Leaving aside the mischaracterization as to whether these 
terrorists are actually non-violent, the American people, and 
the international community, is left to ponder why some 
terrorists are given favored treatment. There appears to be, 
given the information that has been made available to date by 
the White House, no rational explanation for this 
inconsistency.


         c. repatriation of an faln sympathizer to italy \594\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


    \594\ A full explanation of this issue can be found at Appendix 
III.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1984, Silvia Baraldini, an Italian national who had 
lived in the United States since 1961, was sentenced to 43 
years in prison and fined $50,000 for terrorist crimes linked 
to radical political groups, including the FALN, ``the Family'' 
and the May 19 Communist party.\595\ Her crimes included 
conspiracy and racketeering connected to armed robberies, as 
well as kidnapping and contempt of court.\596\ The robberies 
were conducted to help finance terrorist activities within the 
United States.\597\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \595\ Baraldini v. Thornburgh, 884 F.2d 615, 616-617 (D.C. Cir. 
1989).
    \596\ Baraldini v. Meese, 691 F. Supp. 432, 433, 436 (D.D.C. 1988).
    \597\ Denise Lavoie, Italian Radical Moved to New York in 
Preparation for Return, the Associated Press, Aug. 19, 1999, PM cycle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The contempt of court conviction was based on Baraldini's 
refusal to testify about her involvement with the FALN before a 
Federal grand jury investigating four Wall Street bombings that 
occurred on February 28, 1982.\598\ Baraldini had the only 
carbon copy of an FALN communique claiming responsibility for 
the bombings and the original communique was found inside a 
telephone booth four blocks from her apartment.\599\ The 
attacks, which occurred at the New York Stock Exchange, the 
American Stock Exchange, the Chase Manhattan Bank, and Merrill 
Lynch,\600\ gravely injured three police officers.\601\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \598\ Thornburgh, 884 F.2d at 617.
    \599\ Regional News, New York, United Press International, Mar. 21, 
1983, AM cycle.
    \600\ Thornburgh, 884 F.2d at 617.
    \601\ Two More Found Guilty for Refusing to Talk in FALN Inquiry, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1984, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On August 24, 1999, the Justice Department announced 
Baraldini's transfer to Italy under the terms of the Strasbourg 
Convention.\602\ This transfer occurred less than 2 weeks after 
President Clinton's August 11, 1999, clemency offer to the 16 
FALN and Macheteros terrorists. Although Baraldini is scheduled 
to serve the remainder of her U.S. prison sentence under 
similar conditions of incarceration in Italy,\603\ there are 
already indications that Italian authorities have been lax in 
enforcing the agreed to terms.\604\ As with the offers of 
clemency to the 16 United States-citizen FALN and Macheteros 
members, the Committee is concerned that this Italian-born FALN 
conspirator has been given lenient treatment. The Committee is 
also concerned that Baraldini was given preferential treatment 
even though she failed to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \602\ See Department of Justice statement regarding the transfer of 
Silvia Baraldini (Aug. 24, 1999) at Appendix III, Exhibit 1.
    \603\ Letter from Oliviero Diliberto, Italian Minister of Justice, 
to Janet Reno, United States Attorney General (July 28, 1999).
    \604\ As part of the transfer, Italy agreed to Baraldini's United 
States' conditions of confinement, including ``that whenever she is 
transported outside the prison, she must be handcuffed with a waist 
chain attached to the handcuffs.'' Letter from Oliviero Diliberto, 
Italian Minister of Justice, to Janet Reno, United States Attorney 
General, (July 28, 1999) (see Appendix III, Exhibit 4); letter from 
James K. Robinson, United States Assistant Attorney General, to Giorgio 
Lattanzi, General Director, Penal Affairs, Italian Ministry of Grace 
and Justice, including Appendices A and B (May 25, 1999) and letter 
from James K. Robinson, United States Assistant Attorney General, to 
Giorgio Lattanzi, General Director, Penal Affairs, Italian Ministry of 
Grace and Justice, including Appendices A and B (revised) (June 4, 
1999) (see Appendix III, Exhibit 5 at 000014). Regardless of these 
conditions, during the Aug. 25, 1999, transfer flight from the United 
States to Italy, which was conducted on the Prime Minister of Italy's 
private jet, Baraldini ``complained that U.S. prison officials had put 
her in chains.'' Prisoner Welcomed Home, Palm Beach Post, Aug. 26, 
1999, at 9A. The Italian guards obviously answered her complaints 
because Baraldini descended from the plane in Italy ``unrestrained'' 
and ``[w]ithout handcuffs.'' Id.; Jorge Pina, Rights-Italy: Baraldini 
Returns After 17 Years in U.S. Jails, Inter Press Service, Aug. 25, 
1999. Although this may be a small point, it does not bode well for 
adherence to the agreement between the United States and Italy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    VII. The Justice Department's Decision To Prevent the FBI From 
                    Submitting an Opening Statement

    On September 21, 1999, the Committee held a hearing 
regarding the President's grant of clemency to members of the 
FALN and Macheteros terrorist groups. In accordance with its 
rules, the Committee asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
to provide a written copy of its opening statement 24 hours 
prior to the hearing. Specifically, the FBI was requested to 
comment on historical activities of the FALN and the 
Macheteros, and to provide an assessment of their current 
terrorist capability.
    The day before the hearing, the Committee learned that the 
Department of Justice had denied the FBI permission to submit 
its written statement. In response to this information, 
Committee Chairman Dan Burton wrote to Attorney General Reno 
that day requesting that the Justice Department not prevent the 
FBI from submitting its written statement. Chairman Burton 
wrote:

          As you know, the President has asserted executive 
        privilege over records relating to his clemency 
        decision. The President's decision has prevented the 
        Committee and the public from determining any of his 
        reasons for granting clemency.
          However, the Committee's hearing will examine 
        important issues relating to the threat posed by the 
        FALN both in the past, and in the present. Accordingly, 
        I expect that most of Assistant Director Gallagher's 
        testimony would not have touched on issues covered by 
        executive privilege.\605\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \605\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Attorney General Janet Reno, (Sept. 20, 1999), at 1. 
(Exhibit 87).

The view of the chairman was confirmed by Neil Gallagher, who 
on September 21, 1999, testified as follows regarding his 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
written statement:

          I had a statement that was prepared for testimony 
        before another committee approximately a week and a 
        half ago. I attempted to cover several different areas 
        with respect to this issue, one of which addressed the 
        FBI's role and response to the clemency process. We 
        sent that statement over to the Department of Justice. 
        A determination was made that that portion of the 
        statement was covered by executive privilege. At first 
        it was held back because it was being resolved, and we 
        were eventually told it was covered by executive 
        privilege.\606\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \606\ Clemency for the FALN: A Flawed Decision? Hearing before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 21, 
1999) (remarks of Neil Gallagher).

Apparently, by the time Assistant Director Gallagher testified 
at this Committee's September 21, 1999, hearing, the Department 
of Justice had already determined which portions of his 
statement were covered by executive privilege, and had informed 
Gallagher of its determination. Nevertheless, the Justice 
Department still failed to provide the Committee with a 
redacted version of the statement. Ultimately, the Committee 
was forced to issue a subpoena to the Justice Department in 
order to get the redacted statement. The statement was 
produced, pursuant to subpoena, on September 23, 1999.\607\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \607\ Exhibit 17--Draft FBI statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Upon reviewing the statement, it was apparent that only a 
very small part of the statement was covered by executive 
privilege. It is disappointing that the Justice Department 
would not work to accommodate a congressional committee in 
anticipation of a hearing. In addition, it is unfortunate that 
the Committee was forced to resort to obtaining a document by 
subpoena which should have been provided voluntarily. 
Furthermore, when this matter was brought to the attention of 
the Attorney General, she made no effort whatsoever to provide 
the statement--even though there were no outstanding issues to 
resolve and it would have been relatively simple for her staff 
to transmit the statement to this Committee.


                               conclusion


    The President of the United States has the power to free 
any Federal prisoner. With this power comes great 
responsibility. The President should not mislead the American 
people as to why he has exercised his power. This is what he 
appears to have done.
    In the case of the clemency offer to the 16 FALN and 
Macheteros terrorists, the President has yet to provide a full 
and accurate explanation of his actions. The many 
inconsistencies between fact and the President's public 
positions create a presumption of impropriety. The President 
purposefully misrepresented facts, or facts were withheld from 
him. Either possibility is unacceptable.
    The Committee believes that the President should withdraw 
his claim of executive privilege. The American people should be 
able to see for themselves what advice was given to the 
President, whether the safety of the American people was taken 
into account, and whether political considerations beyond those 
identified in this report played any part in the ultimate 
decision.
    The Committee also finds that the offer of clemency to 
unrepentant terrorists who have done nothing to discourage 
violence or solve unsolved crimes diminishes our moral 
authority in the fight against international terrorism. The 
appearance that the United States is willing to undercut its 
own legal system in response to political pressure is an 
unfortunate precedent.
    [The documents referred to follow:]
    
    
                          A P P E N D I C E S

                                ------                                


        Appendix I.--The FALN and Macheteros in Their Own Words

    This appendix is a collection of communiques, manifestoes, 
and other documents produced by Puerto Rican pro-independence 
terrorists during the 1970's, 1980's and 1990's, which have 
been provided to this Committee. Included in these documents 
are the following representative statements, published by the 
FALN after its bombings in the 1970's, which show the violent 
and seditious nature of the 16 terrorists to whom President 
Clinton offered clemency:


          [T]he Puerto Rican people are organizing and arming 
        in order to form a People's Revolutionary Army which 
        will rid Puerto Rico of Yanki colonialism. We have 
        opened two fronts, one in Puerto Rico, the other in the 
        United States . . .


          [W]e fully realize that the people will not gain 
        justice by demonstrating and shouting. The only justice 
        that can be handed out to the murderers of our people 
        is revolutionary justice through the implementation of 
        revolutionary violence. . . . For each repressive act 
        taken upon our people and fighters for Puerto Rican 
        independence, the FALN will respond with revolutionary 
        violence.


          We, FALN, the Armed Forces of the Puerto Rican 
        Nation, take full responsibility for the especially-
        detonated bomb that exploded today at Fraunces Tavern 
        with reactionary corporate executives inside. . . . You 
        have unleashed a storm from which you comfortable 
        Yankis cannot escape.


          To the FALN the issue is very clear: at no time can 
        we allow an attack by the enemy upon our people to go 
        unanswered. Fascist terror is met with revolutionary 
        violence.


          These actions demonstrate to the United States 
        Government that the mobile guerrilla units of the FALN 
        can hit anywhere in the United States. . . . We also 
        want to express our solidarity with the victorious 
        people of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Their victory is 
        our victory!


          Only a protracted, organized armed struggle can force 
        the yanki invaders out of Puerto Rico.


          We also wish to communicate our profound sorrow on 
        the death of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, whose teaching has 
        inspired the FALN every step of the way.


          [T]o be truly revolutionary, a party must educate and 
        organize the masses for the seizure of power by way of 
        an organized and disciplined vehicle, a People's 
        Revolutionary Army. . . . The importance of a People's 
        Revolutionary Army is that it arms the masses and 
        produces a cadre to lead the masses to victory and the 
        development of a Marxist-Leninist Party, tried and 
        tested under fire . . .

    [The documents referred to follow:]
    
    
    
    
                                 (493)


      Appendix III.--Repatriation of an FALN Sympathizer to Italy

    In 1984, Silvia Baraldini, an Italian national who had 
lived in the United States since 1961, was sentenced to 43 
years in prison and fined $50,000 for terrorist crimes linked 
to radical political groups, including the FALN, the May 19 
Communist party, and ``The Family.'' \1\ Her crimes included 
conspiracy and racketeering connected to armed robberies, as 
well as kidnapping and contempt of court.\2\ The robberies were 
conducted to help finance terrorist activities within the 
United States.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Baraldini v. Thornburgh, 884 F.2d 615, 616-617 (D.C. Cir. 
1989); Department of Justice statement regarding the transfer of Silvia 
Baraldini (Aug. 24, 1999) [hereinafter Department of Justice statement] 
(Exhibit 1).
    \2\ Baraldini v. Meese, 691 F. Supp. 432, 433, 436 (D.D.C. 1988); 
Exhibit 1--Department of Justice statement.
    \3\ Denise Lavoie, Italian Radical Moved to New York in Preparation 
for Return, the Associated Press, Aug. 19, 1999, PM cycle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On August 24, 1999, the Department of Justice announced 
Baraldini's transfer to Italy under the terms of the Strasbourg 
Convention.\4\ This transfer occurred less than 2 weeks after 
President Clinton's August 11, 1999, clemency offer to the 16 
FALN and Macheteros terrorists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Exhibit 1--Department of Justice statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As with the offers of clemency to the 16 United States-
citizen FALN and Macheteros terrorists, the Committee is 
concerned that this Italian-born FALN conspirator has been 
given lenient treatment. The Committee is also concerned that 
Baraldini was given preferential treatment even though she 
failed to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement.

                       A. Baraldini's Background

    Baraldini, a 51-year-old Italian national and daughter of a 
diplomat, lived in the United States for 38 years.\5\ She moved 
here in 1961,\6\ graduated from the University of Wisconsin, 
and was involved in the anti-war and civil rights movements.\7\ 
Baraldini worked as a legal assistant \8\ to Susan Tipograph, a 
lawyer who has represented several FALN terrorists.\9\ 
Baraldini also actively participated in radical political 
groups, including the FALN,\10\ the May 19 Communist party,\11\ 
and ``The Family.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Exhibit 1--Department of Justice statement; Larry Neumeister, 
Radical Will Serve out Term in Italian Prison, the Record (Bergen 
County, NJ), Aug. 25, 1999, at A4.
    \6\ Denise Lavoie, Imprisoned Italian to be Released Soon, the 
Associated Press, Aug. 3, 1999, PM cycle.
    \7\ Mark Spencer, Prisoner to Return to Her Native Italy, the 
Hartford Courant, Aug. 8, 1999, at B2.
    \8\ Dan Collins, FBI Agent Shows Up for News Conference by Radical 
Group, United Press International, Nov. 12, 1982, AM cycle.
    \9\ See, e.g., Guerra v. Meese, 614 F. Supp. 1430 (D.D.C. 1985); 
Court Papers Say FALN Leader's Lawyer Aided in Escape, the Associated 
Press, June 2, 1983, AM cycle.
    \10\ Thornburgh, 884 F.2d at 617; United Press International, Jan. 
20, 1984, AM cycle.
    \11\ Meese, 691 F. Supp. at 436. The May 19 Communist party, named 
to commemorate the birth date of Ho Chi Minh and Malcolm X, is an 
organization sympathetic to other radical groups, especially the FALN 
and the New African Freedom Front. Dan Collins, United Press 
International, Nov. 12, 1982, AM cycle. ``Members of [Baraldini's May 
19 group] have participated in numerous armed robberies where police 
officers were wounded or killed.'' Thornburgh, 884 F.2d at 617. 
Baraldini was also the spokeswoman for the May 19 Communist party. Dan 
Collins, United Press International, Nov. 12, 1982, AM cycle.
    \12\ ``The Family'' is ``a revolutionary organization whose members 
advocate the overthrow of the U.S. government through violent means.'' 
Meese, 691 F. Supp. at 436 (citing plaintiff's Exhibit 8). Baraldini 
was a member of ``The Family's secondary team, a group of women that 
facilitated the crimes by arranging for cars, safe houses, and 
reconnaissance.'' U.S. v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 874 (2nd Cir. 1984).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               B. Baraldini's Terrorist and Criminal Acts

    Baraldini committed numerous terrorist and criminal 
acts.\13\ For example, in 1983, Baraldini was held in contempt 
of court for her refusal to testify about her involvement with 
the FALN before a Federal grand jury investigating four Wall 
Street bombings that occurred on February 28, 1982.\14\ 
Baraldini had the only carbon copy of an FALN communique 
claiming responsibility for the bombings.\15\ The original 
communique was found inside a telephone booth four blocks from 
her apartment.\16\ The attacks, which occurred at the New York 
Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, the Chase 
Manhattan Bank, and Merrill Lynch,\17\ gravely injured three 
police officers.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Exhibit 1--Department of Justice statement.
    \14\ Thornburgh, 884 F.2d at 617. See also letter from Janet Reno, 
United States Attorney General, to Giovanni Maria Flick, Italian 
Minister of Grace and Justice (Apr. 14, 1998) (Exhibit 2); United Press 
International, Jan. 20, 1984, AM cycle.
    \15\ United Press International, Jan. 20, 1984, AM cycle.
    \16\ Id.
    \17\ Thornburgh, 884 F.2d at 617.
    \18\ Two More Found Guilty for Refusing to Talk in FALN Inquiry, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1984, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1981, Baraldini attempted a $1.6 million robbery of a 
Brinks armored truck in Rockland County, NY.\19\ A Brinks guard 
and two police officers were killed in the incident.\20\ 
Baraldini was convicted of racketeering and conspiracy.\21\ One 
year earlier, Baraldini participated in the attempted-armed 
robbery of an armored truck in Danbury, CT.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Exhibit 1--Department of Justice statement. See also John 
Pryor, United Press International, Nov. 18, 1982, AM cycle.
    \20\ Exhibit 1--Department of Justice statement. See also Exhibit 
2--Letter from Janet Reno, United States Attorney General, to Giovanni 
Maria Flick, Italian Minister of Grace and Justice (Apr. 14, 1998).
    \21\ Exhibit 2--Letter from Janet Reno, United States Attorney 
General, to Giovanni Maria Flick, Italian Minister of Grace and Justice 
(Apr. 14, 1998). See also Judgment N 40/99, the Court of Appeal of 
Rome, Italy, Criminal Section IV (July 7, 1999) (translation) 
(Continuance of Baraldini's U.S. sentence) and Order, the Court of 
Appeal of Rome, Italy, Criminal Section IV (July 20, 1999) 
(translation) (Making corrections to the July 7, 1999, judgment) 
[hereinafter Italian judgment] (Exhibit 3).
    \22\ Ferguson, 758 F.2d at 854.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1979, Baraldini helped Black Liberation Army leader 
Joanne Chesimard successfully escape from the Clinton State 
Correctional Facility in Clinton, NJ.\23\ During this crime, 
Baraldini kidnapped two prison guards.\24\ Chesimard was 
serving a life sentence for the murder of a New Jersey State 
trooper.\25\ After her escape from New Jersey prison, Chesimard 
fled to Cuba.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Ferguson, 758 F.2d at 854. See also Exhibit 1--Department of 
Justice statement; Salvatore Arena, Italian Sent Home to Jail, Daily 
News (New York), Aug. 25, 1999, AM cycle.
    \24\ Ferguson, 758 F.2d at 854.
    \25\ Exhibit 1--Department of Justice statement.
    \26\ Angela Singer, Torture of Women Prisoners in America--The Land 
of the Free, Universal News Services, May 18, 1990.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                C. Baraldini's Convictions and Sentences

    In 1984, Baraldini was convicted in Federal court in New 
York of, and sentenced for, the following crimes: \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ U.S. v. Baraldini, 803 F.2d 776, 777 (2nd Cir. 1986); Exhibit 
3--Italian judgment.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Sentence
                Crime                         Statute           (years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conspiracy to violate the RICO        18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec.       20 years
 Statute.                              1961, 1962(d).            $25,000
Substantive Violation of RICO         18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec.       20 years
 Statute.                              1961, 1962(c).            $25,000
Contempt of Court...................  18 U.S.C. Sec.  401....    3 years
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The court required that the sentences be served 
consecutively, and recommended that Baraldini receive no 
parole.\28\ Because of accumulated good conduct credits, 
however, Baraldini's mandatory release date is in March 
2008.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Baraldini, 803 F.2d at 777.
    \29\ Exhibit 1--Department of Justice statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             D. Italy's Attempts to Win Baraldini's Freedom

    In 1989, 300 Italian lawmakers, predominately representing 
the left, began a campaign to win Baraldini's freedom.\30\ 
These lawmakers requested that Italy's President, Francesco 
Cossiga, ask for a grant of clemency or, at a minimum, 
deportation to Italy.\31\ Emilio Vesce, a Radical party leader, 
stated Baraldini's release would be a ``humanitarian gesture'' 
and that this matter was not about ``dealing with questions of 
guilt or innocence.'' \32\ Supporters cited a variety of 
reasons to release Baraldini, including claims that she 
received an excessive sentence, ``was not convicted of 
committing violent acts herself,'' and received improper 
medical attention and insufficient exercise while in 
prison.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Clyde Haberman, Italy Lawmakers Seek U.S. Convict's Release, 
the New York Times, Mar. 5, 1989, at A8.
    \31\ Id.
    \32\ Id.
    \33\ Id. In contrast to these claims, however, the Second Circuit 
held that ``Baraldini's sentence was not excessive,'' Ferguson, 758 
F.2d at 856, and the D.C. Circuit held that she ``personally 
participated in the violent and criminal activities,'' Thornburgh, 884 
F.2d at 620. Baraldini also received medical attention, including 
``surgery after developing ovarian cancer,'' while in prison. Angela 
Singer, Torture of Women Prisoners in America--The Land of the Free, 
Universal News Services, May 18, 1990.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This constant pressure by certain Italian lawmakers to 
reverse the United States position on Baraladini's extradition 
continued for the next 10 years. For example, Italian President 
Oscar Luigi Scalfaro ``raised the issue with [President 
Clinton]'' during a 1996 visit.\34\ In April 1998, Italy 
requested for the fifth time that Baraldini be allowed to serve 
out the remainder of her sentence in Italy.\35\ The following 
month, in May 1998, over 200 Italian lawmakers asked Prime 
Minister Romano Prodi to request Baraldini's transfer to 
Italy.\36\ Most of these lawmakers belonged to the ruling 
center-left party.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Deputies Urge Prodi to ask U.S. for Transfer of Italian 
Prisoner, Agence France Presse, May 4, 1998.
    \35\ Id.
    \36\ Id.
    \37\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Through 1998, however, the United States adamantly refused 
every transfer request, five refusals in total,\38\ to allow 
Baraldini to serve the rest of her sentence in Italy. The 
United States based these rejections on a variety of reasons, 
including the United States' tough stance against terrorism and 
crime, the severity of Baraldini's crimes, Baraldini's lack of 
remorse, Baraldini's apparent refusal to cooperate with 
investigators, and the risk Baraldini would not serve her full 
term or that she would receive lenient jail treatment in 
Italy.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Id.; Exhibit 2--Letter from Janet Reno, United States Attorney 
General, to Giovanni Maria Flick, Italian Minister of Grace and Justice 
(Apr. 14, 1998).
    \39\ Exhibit 2--Letter from Janet Reno, United States Attorney 
General, to Giovanni Maria Flick, Italian Minister of Grace and Justice 
(Apr. 14, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    E. The Clinton Administration's Sudden Reversal on Baraldini's 
                         Repatriation to Italy

    On February 3, 1998, a United States military jet severed a 
cable supporting a gondola ascending Mount Cermis near Aviano, 
Italy.\40\ Twenty people were killed in this tragedy.\41\ After 
a United States military aviator was acquitted on 20 counts of 
involuntary manslaughter, it was reported that an outraged 
Italian Prime Minster Massimo D'Alema agreed to tone down 
demands to President Clinton punish those responsible for the 
accident ``if the United States handed over Silvia Baraldini.'' 
\42\ Prime Minister D'Alema denied the charges in March 
1999.\43\ However, on April 10, 1999, media outlets reported 
that anonymous sources said ``[t]he United States is 
considering returning a jailed radical to her native Italy, a 
gesture that could appease anger over acquittal of an American 
military pilot in 20 deaths at an Italian ski resort.'' \44\ 
The reports also stated that Department of Justice officials 
were making plans to meet with their Italian counterparts to 
discuss the transfer.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ D'Alema expects U.S. to Find and Punish Guilty Parties in 
Cable Car Crash, the Associated Press Worldstream, Mar. 9, 1999.
    \41\ Id.
    \42\ Id.
    \43\ Id.
    \44\ Anne Gearnan, U.S. Considers Return of Prisoner to Italy; 
Gesture Eyed in Light of Gondola Deaths, the Boston Globe, at A8. See 
also U.S. Agrees to Allow Jailed Italian Radical to Finish Term at 
Home, Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1999, at 19; U.S. Might Free Italian 
Radical: Move Might Appease Anger Over Gondola Deaths, the Gazette 
(Montreal), Apr. 10, 1999, at A22.
    \45\ Anne Gearnan, U.S. Considers Return of Prisoner to Italy; 
Gesture Eyed in Light of Gondola Deaths, the Boston Globe, at A8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On June 11, 1999, U.S. Ambassador to Italy Thomas Foglietta 
announced Baraldini's transfer to Italy, stating that ``the 
gesture was `important' for the American-Italian partnership.'' 
\46\ Ambassador Foglietta also commented that ``I believe that 
today's agreement will strengthen that partnership.'' \47\ 
Reports also stated that Baraldini's transfer was a ``reward 
for Italy's unwavering support of NATO during the Kosovo 
conflict, as well as a way to ease anger over the acquittal of 
an American military pilot.'' \48\ A Baraldini article in 
Milan, Italy's newspaper, Il Giorno, began with the headline 
``In Exchange for Cermis.'' \49\ However, the Department of 
Justice claims Baraldini's release had nothing to do with the 
Aviano tragedy or Kosovo.\50\ The Committee has not determined 
the administration's underlying motivations for Baraldini's 
return to Italy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ U.S. Agrees to Allow Jailed Italian Radical to Finish Term at 
Home, Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1999, at 19.
    \47\ Id.
    \48\ Id.
    \49\ Ellen Knickmeyer, Italian Convicted in United States Gets 
Hero's Welcome on Transfer to Rome, Associated Press Worldstream, Aug. 
25, 1999.
    \50\ Denise Lavoie, Imprisoned Italian to be Released Soon, the 
Associated Press, Aug. 3, 1999, PM cycle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More than 2 months after Ambassador Foglietta's 
announcement, the Department of Justice first announced details 
about the agreement, stating the transfer was a result of 
``many years of discussion between the United States and 
Italy.'' \51\ Baraldini would be repatriated to Italy pursuant 
to the Strasbourg Convention.\52\ The Department of Justice 
found that ``[a]s negotiated, [Baraldini's] transfer satisfies 
the two goals of prisoner transfer set out in the Strasbourg 
Convention: (1) the ends of justice, in that she will serve out 
her entire United States sentence in a manner comparable to the 
service of the sentence in the United States, and (2) the 
social rehabilitation of the prisoner, in that she will serve 
the remainder of that sentence in Italy close to her family.'' 
\53\ Since the United States had refused Baraldini's transfer 
for 10 years, one must question the sudden reversal in the U.S. 
position, especially when the same goals could not be met for 
the 1998 request for transfer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ Exhibit 1--Department of Justice statement.
    \52\ If certain criteria are met, the Strasbourg Convention 
(formally known as the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons) ``allows a foreign national to transfer to his or 
her home country to serve the remainder of a sentence imposed by the 
country in which the foreign national committed an offense.'' Exhibit 
1--Department of Justice statement. The United States entered 
Strasbourg Agreement into force on July 1, 1985.
    \53\ Exhibit 1--Department of Justice statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First, there is legitimate concern as to whether Baraldini 
will fully serve out her prison sentence in conditions similar 
to those imposed in the United States. Although news reports 
claim that Baraldini's transfer was made possible because 
``[a]n obstacle was removed when an appeals court in Rome 
formally recognized U.S. prison sentences,'' \54\ there is 
still an ever-present concern over Italy's ``notoriously lax 
and leaky prisons.'' \55\ Over the years, the United States has 
had to ``rebuff several Italian governments . . . [for] the 
tradition of granting amnesties to inmates, including convicted 
terrorists.'' \56\ Italy's former Ambassador to Moscow, Sergio 
Romano, believes that the Italian system is a disaster, where 
``the guilty are left free to roam the streets.'' \57\ Noting 
his country's failure to ``guarantee its citizens justice,'' 
Ambassador Romano also warned in 1998 that ``it was clear why 
the Americans have no intention of allowing Silvia Baraldini to 
serve her prison sentence in Italy.'' \58\ Regardless of the 
length remaining of Baraldini's sentence, Italian ``supporters 
say they will now press for her release.'' \59\ Furthermore, 
demonstrating complete disregard for the transfer agreement and 
Baraldini's crimes, Elizabeth Fink, Baraldini's lawyer in New 
York, stated that ``the only right thing for Italy to do is to 
free Baraldini.'' \60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ Larry Neumeister, Radical Will Serve out Term in Italian 
Prison, the Record (Bergen County, NJ), Aug. 25, 1999, at A4.
    \55\ James P. Pinkerton, A Tough, if Convenient, Policy on 
Terrorism, Newsday, Aug. 31, 1999, at A34. For example, ``a Palestinian 
terrorist--found guilty of murdering an American Jewish tourist during 
the hijack of the Achille Lauro cruise liner--[escaped] from an Italian 
prison while on weekend leave.'' Robert Graham, Allies at Odds over 
Extradition, Financial Times, July 8, 1996, at 9.
    \56\ Court Ruling in Rome Clears Way for Italian Woman's Return, 
the Associated Press Worldstream, July 9, 1999.
    \57\ Sergio Romano, Why Italian Justice is a Disaster, the 
European, May 25, 1998, at 28.
    \58\ Id. Additionally, the press has reported that ``there were 
suggestions Italy might choose to free her on medical grounds.'' Ellen 
Knickmeyer, Italian Convicted in United States Gets Hero's Welcome on 
Transfer to Rome, Associated Press Worldstream, Aug. 25, 1999.
    \59\ Ellen Knickmeyer, Italian Convicted in United States Gets 
Hero's Welcome on Transfer to Rome, Associated Press Worldstream, Aug. 
25, 1999.
    \60\ Italy: Jailed Radical's Return Creates Political Storm, 
British Broadcasting Corp., Aug. 26, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Examining the agreement made between the United States and 
Italy pursuant to the Strasbourg Convention, it appears that 
Italy has already been lax regarding security measures. As part 
of the transfer, Italy agreed that Baraldini ``will continue to 
be kept in prison in Italy . . . on the conditions agreed, 
similar to those that exist in the United States[,]'' including 
all conditions of U.S. confinement listed in Appendix B of the 
Department of Justice's June 4, 1999, letter.\61\ Appendix B, 
Section (a) states ``that whenever [Baraldini] is transported 
outside the prison, she must be handcuffed with a waist chain 
attached to the handcuffs.'' \62\ Regardless of these 
conditions, during Baraldini's August 25, 1999, transfer flight 
from the United States to Italy, Baraldini ``complained that 
U.S. prison officials had put her in chains.'' \63\ The Italian 
guards were obviously sympathetic to her complaints because 
Baraldini descended from the plane in Italy ``unrestrained'' 
\64\ and ``[w]ithout handcuffs on her wrists.'' \65\ The 
Committee hopes that Italy will take better steps to ensure 
Baraldini fully and fairly serves out her sentence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ Letter from Oliviero Diliberto, Italian Minister of Justice, 
to Janet Reno, United States Attorney General, (July 28, 1999) (Exhibit 
4); letter from James K. Robinson, United States Assistant Attorney 
General, to Giorgio Lattanzi, General Director, Penal Affairs, Italian 
Ministry of Grace and Justice, including Appendices A and B (May 25, 
1999) and letter from James K. Robinson, United States Assistant 
Attorney General, to Giorgio Lattanzi, General Director, Penal Affairs, 
Italian Ministry of Grace and Justice, including Appendices A and B 
(revised) (June 4, 1999) (hereinafter U.S. Conditions of Confinement) 
(Exhibit 5).
    \62\ Exhibit 5--U.S. Conditions of Confinement at 000014.
    \63\ Prisoner Welcomed Home, Palm Beach Post, Aug. 26, 1999, at 9A.
    \64\ Id.
    \65\ Jorge Pina, Rights-Italy: Baraldini Returns After 17 Years in 
U.S. Jails, Inter Press Service, Aug. 25, 1999. Although this may be a 
small point, it does not bode well for adherence to the agreement 
between the United States and Italy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, the Department of Justice's endorsement of the need 
for Baraldini to be in Italy, close to her family for social 
rehabilitation purposes, is not convincing. As recently as 
1998, the Department of Justice found that Baraldini's 
humanitarian reasons for release ``were outweighed by the 
nature of the offenses for which Ms. Baraldini was convicted.'' 
\66\ Neither the humanitarian reason nor the nature of the 
offenses changed from 1998 to 1999. Although it is legitimate 
for a criminal to want family members to visit them in prison, 
it is well-established that prisoners in the United States have 
``no right to be incarcerated in any specific institution,'' 
and there is no right to be proximate to one's family.\67\ It 
is a concern to the Committee that such a privilege has been 
extended to a foreign terrorist who has committed violent 
crimes in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ Exhibit 2--Letter from Janet Reno, United States Attorney 
General to Giovanni Maria Flick, Italian Minister of Grace and Justice 
(Apr. 14, 1998).
    \67\ Meese, 691 F. Supp. at 448.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   F. Baraldini's Reception in Italy

    The Italian Government provided Baraldini with a grand 
celebration during her August prison transfer. She flew from 
New York to Rome on one of the Prime Minister's jets,\68\ and 
was welcomed by Justice Minister Oliviero Diliberto, as well as 
by a jubilant crowd of 600 throwing flowers and waving hammer-
and-sickle flags.\69\ Diliberto ``called [Baraldini's] return a 
humanitarian victory over a harsh prison system.'' \70\ Several 
Italian city governments, including the Palermo city 
government, even went so far as to call Baraldini ``a symbol of 
injustice,'' and made her an honorary citizen.\71\ She received 
a hug and roses from Armando Cossutta, head of the Italian 
Communist party, inside the prison.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ Italy Jailed Radical's Return Creates Political Storm, British 
Broadcasting Corp., Aug. 26, 1999.
    \69\ Massive Security Greets the Return of Terrorist to Italy; The 
Government Said it Gave No Special Treatment to Silvia Baraldini, Who 
has Served 16 Years in U.S. Jails, the Orlando Sentinel, Aug. 26, 1999, 
at A4.
    \70\ Id.
    \71\ Jorge Pina, Rights-Italy: Baraldini Returns After 17 Years in 
U.S. Jails, Inter Press Service, Aug. 25, 1999; Frances D'Emilio, 
Convicted Terrorist Returns To Rome, the Associated Press Online, Aug. 
25, 1999.
    \72\ Massive Security Greets the Return of Terrorist to Italy; The 
Government Said it Gave No Special Treatment to Silvia Baraldini, Who 
has Served 16 Years in U.S. Jails, the Orlando Sentinel, Aug. 26, 1999, 
at A4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Baraldini's greeting outraged a number of Italian 
politicians, along with some Italian jurists, who saw in the 
welcome an official blessing of her past by the government of 
Prime Minister D'Alema, a former communist.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ Daniel Williams, Hero's Welcome for Felon Jolts Italy Out of 
Doldrums, the Gazette (Montreal), Aug. 29, 1999, at A6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            G. Sending an Inconsistent Message on Terrorism

    President Clinton's decision to transfer Silvia Baraldini 
to Italy before she finished serving her 43-year sentence in 
the United States raises a number of concerns. In addition to 
allowing Italian radicals to glorify a violent anti-American 
terrorist and turn her into a heroine, Baraldini's transfer, 
like the grant of clemency to members of the FALN, sends an 
inconsistent message on terrorism.
    As with the FALN clemency grant, President Clinton failed 
to secure any cooperation from Baraldini in solving unsolved 
crimes. Baraldini also avoided the basic requirement the FALN 
terrorists had to fulfill to gain clemency: the renunciation of 
violence.\74\ During a jailhouse news conference, however, 
Baraldini made it clear just how she felt: ``I have never 
repented for what I have done in the past.'' \75\ Overall, the 
Baraldini decision sends the message that the United States 
will be lenient with terrorists, and that prisoners do not have 
to renounce violence against American citizens before being 
released from American prisons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ Another Clinton Terrorist Outrage, the New York Post, Sept. 8, 
1999, at 30.
    \75\ Daniel Williams, Italy Split as Radical Gets Hero's Welcome; 
Convicted Felon Returns After Years in U.S. Prison, the Washington 
Post, Aug. 28, 1999, at A13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    [The documents referred to follow:]
    
    

 DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, HON. TOM LANTOS, HON. MAJOR 
 R. OWENS, HON. EDOLPHUS TOWNS, HON. PAUL E. KANJORSKI, HON. PATSY T. 
  MINK, HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, HON. CHAKA FATTAH, HON. ELIJAH E. 
 CUMMINGS, HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH, HON. DANNY K. DAVIS, HON. JOHN F. 
   TIERNEY, HON. THOMAS H. ALLEN, HON. HAROLD E. FORD, JR., AND HON. 
                          JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY

    We have differing views about the wisdom of the President's 
August 11, 1999, decision to grant clemency to 16 Puerto Rican 
nationalists. Some of us support the President's decision. Many 
of us oppose the decision and have voted for a resolution 
opposing the decision.\1\ However, we are united in our view 
that the majority's report reaches unsubstantiated conclusions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ On Sept. 9, 1999, the House of Representatives voted 311-41 
(with 72 members voting ``present'') for H. Con. Res. 180 expressing 
the sense of the House that the President should not have granted 
clemency to the 16 individuals in question. On Sept. 14, 1999, the 
Senate voted 95-2 for S.J. Res. 33, similarly disagreeing with the 
President's decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority report errs by transforming legitimate 
differences of opinion into allegations of wrongdoing and 
personal attacks. The majority report finds that the President 
``use[d] the immense power of his office to mislead.'' It 
accuses clemency supporters of engaging in ``a calculated 
effort to mislead people.'' It repeatedly characterizes legal 
and legitimate actions as ``inappropriate.'' These findings and 
allegations are not supported by the record before the 
Committee. We therefore dissent from the majority report.

                  I. The President's Clemency Decision

    The President's power to commute sentences stems from the 
pardon power granted to the President in Article 2, Section 2 
of the Constitution.\2\ That power is exclusive and absolute, 
and not subject to any restrictions from the Congress. The 
Supreme Court has held that the pardon power ``flows from the 
Constitution alone, not from any legislative enhancements, and 
. . . cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished by 
Congress.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ The President ``shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons 
for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of 
Impeachment.''
    \3\ Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On August 11, 1999, President Clinton used this power to 
offer to commute the prison sentences of 16 individuals 
convicted of various criminal offenses relating to their 
involvement in two radical Puerto Rican independence 
organizations. The clemency offers were conditioned on the 
prisoners' willingness to renounce violence and accept certain 
restrictions on their freedom of travel and association.
    In a letter to Representative Waxman on September 21, 1999, 
President Clinton explained the rationale for his decision.\4\ 
He stated that ``the prisoners were serving extremely lengthy 
sentences--in some cases 90 years--which were out of proportion 
to their crimes.'' He explained: ``whatever the conduct of 
other FALN members may have been, these petitioners--while 
convicted of serious crimes--were not convicted of crimes 
involving the killing or maiming of any individuals. For me, 
the question, therefore, was whether the prisoners' sentences 
were unduly severe and whether their continuing incarceration 
served any meaningful purpose.'' The President stated that in 
his view, ``equity and fairness dictated'' that their sentences 
be reduced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Letter from President Clinton to Representative Henry Waxman 
(Sept. 21, 1999). The President's letter is attached to these views as 
Exhibit 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President also stated that he ``rejected'' the argument 
that the prisoners were political prisoners or prisoners of 
conscience. He made clear that ``no form of violence is ever 
justified as a means of political expressions in a democratic 
society based on the rule of law.''
    In addition, the President stated that there had been an 
active and lengthy campaign on behalf of the prisoners. He 
observed that ``various Members of Congress, a number of 
religious organizations, labor organizations, human rights 
groups, and Hispanic civic and community groups supported 
clemency. The petitioners also received widespread support 
across the political spectrum within Puerto Rico.'' \5\ He also 
noted that ``the petitioners received worldwide support on 
humanitarian grounds from numerous quarters'' including such 
prominent figures as former President Jimmy Carter, Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, and Coretta Scott King.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Documents obtained by the Committee indicate that the Members 
of Congress who lobbied for clemency included Representatives Jose 
Serrano, Nydia Velazquez, Luis Gutierrez, Charles Rangel, Danny Davis, 
Eliot Engel, Maxine Waters, Patsy Mink, and Bobby Rush. Letters from 
these Members, as well as other materials from clemency supporters, are 
attached to these views as Exhibit 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, the President disputed accusations that he had not 
taken opposing views into account. He stated that he had 
``sought and considered the views of the Department of 
Justice.'' He also stated: ``Press reports note that certain 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and Justice Department 
officials . . . were opposed to clemency. I did not dismiss 
those concerns, as some have implied. Rather, I carefully 
weighed them.'' He also recognized that ``there are victims of 
FALN-related violence who feel strongly that these individuals 
. . . should serve the full sentences imposed.''

                II. The Merits of the Clemency Decision

    The merits of the President's decision are debatable. Some 
independent observers have supported the decision. For example, 
the editorial board of the Washington Post wrote:

          Whatever the President's motives, the case for 
        clemency is strong. . . . the people in question were 
        charged with and convicted of serious crimes . . . But 
        they were crimes in which nobody was hurt or killed. 
        Their sentences on each count, moreover, were imposed 
        consecutively, meaning that their total sentences range 
        as long as 90 years in prison. This is very difficult 
        to justify, especially when compared with other 
        sentences in similar cases.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Puerto Rican Clemency, Washington Post (Sept. 10, 1999).

    Others have raised serious doubts about the decision. At 
the September 21, 1999, hearing, Representative Henry Waxman, 
the ranking minority member, released a draft letter from the 
FBI Director, Louis J. Freeh, that criticized the decision.\7\ 
According to the draft letter released by Representative 
Waxman: ``the FBI has consistently advised the Department of 
Justice (DOJ), in writing, that the FBI was opposed to any such 
pardon and/or commutation of sentences for any of these 
individuals. . . . DOJ was also advised the FBI had reason to 
expect the release of these individuals would `psychologically 
and operationally enhance' the ongoing criminal activities of 
Puerto Rican terrorist groups. The FBI also pointed out that 
any such pardon of the `currently incarcerated terrorists would 
likely return committed, experienced, sophisticated and 
hardened terrorists to the clandestine movement.' ''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Draft letter from Louis J. Freeh to Representative Henry Hyde, 
Justice Department Document production 001951-001952. The letter 
appears to be a draft response to an inquiry from Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Henry Hyde regarding the clemency decision. It is not signed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ultimately, any decision to grant clemency requires the 
exercise of judgment in weighing the arguments for and against 
clemency. Under the Constitution, that judgment is entrusted to 
the President. While some of us may disagree with the 
President's decision to grant clemency to these 16 individuals, 
we have not seen any evidence that contradicts the view that 
the President's judgment was made in good faith and on the 
merits.

                    III. The Majority's Allegations

    Soon after the clemency offers were made, many Republican 
leaders alleged that the President's decision was intended to 
boost the potential New York Senate campaign of First Lady 
Hillary Clinton. Appearing on NBC's ``Meet the Press,'' 
Chairman Burton stated: ``The President should not be pardoning 
these people under any circumstances, and there's some 
indication it may be for political purposes. . . . [H]is wife 
is running for--may be running for the United States Senate in 
New York, and there's a large Puerto Rican constituency up 
there. And there's a lot of people in Washington that are 
questioning whether or not this is related to that.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ ``Meet the Press,'' NBC News (Aug. 29, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other Republican leaders made similar claims. According to 
Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, ``almost anybody with brains would conclude'' that 
the clemency offers were designed to help the First Lady's 
senatorial campaign.\9\ Senator Phil Gramm, chairman of the 
Senate Banking Committee, said that ``[t]his was an effort by 
the President, by the First Lady, to manipulate politics in New 
York.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ ``Fox News Sunday,'' Fox News (Sept. 19, 1999).
    \10\ ``This Week,'' ABC News (Sept. 5, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the majority's report is voluminous, it does not 
contain evidence linking the President's decision to a desire 
to boost the Senate campaign of the First Lady. As an 
investigative body, this Committee should limit its findings to 
the evidence gathered during the investigation. Based on what 
the Committee has learned to date, the record does not 
substantiate the allegations related to the First Lady's 
possible Senate campaign.
    The majority report also contains numerous other 
unsubstantiated allegations. For example, it alleges that ``the 
President use[d] the immense power of his office to mislead.'' 
It also alleges at various points that the actions taken by 
White House staff in this matter were ``inappropriate,'' 
``troubling,'' and ``disturbing.'' These allegations are not 
supported by the evidence.
    The record before the Committee does not support the 
allegation that the President sought to mislead the public 
about the rationale for his decisions. Instead, to support this 
allegation, the majority report relies on legitimate 
disagreements over the harshness of the sentences received by 
the 16 prisoners and the relative severity of the crimes they 
committed. While these disagreements are intensely argued by 
clemency supporters and opponents, they are not evidence that 
the President used ``the immense power of his office to 
mislead.''
    The majority report also attempts to label various 
legitimate and routine actions as ``inappropriate,'' 
``troubling,'' and ``disturbing.'' For example, the majority 
report notes that participants at a White House meeting on the 
clemency issue described clemency as a ``high priority PR 
[Puerto Rico] issue.'' The majority report suggests that 
``[t]his indicates a level of political calculation that is 
troubling.'' The fact that White House staff were aware that 
the prisoners were a major issue in the Puerto Rican community 
is not ``troubling''--indeed, it would be more troubling if the 
President's staff were ignorant of that fact.
    In another instance, the majority report notes that the 
Deputy Attorney General asked the Pardon Attorney to inquire 
with a congressional supporter of clemency into the status of 
obtaining statements from the prisoners expressing repentance 
for their crimes. It then goes on to characterize this request 
as a ``highly inappropriate.'' Obtaining statements of 
repentance from the prisoners, however, is an entirely 
legitimate request, particularly given the President's decision 
to condition clemency on the prisoners' willingness to renounce 
violence.
    In sum, instead of simply disagreeing with the President's 
decision on the merits, the majority report attempts to 
transform legitimate criticisms of the President's decision 
into unsubstantiated allegations. The majority report concludes 
by asserting that the President's decision should be viewed 
with a ``presumption of impropriety.'' Impropriety, however, 
should be demonstrated, not presumed.

          IV. The President's Assertion of Executive Privilege

    The majority report criticizes the President for invoking 
executive privilege over a small number of documents relating 
to his decision. We disagree with this criticism and believe 
that the President's assertion of executive privilege in this 
case was entirely proper.
    In September 1999, Chairman Burton issued multiple 
subpoenas to the White House and the Department of Justice 
demanding documents relating to the President's decision to 
grant clemency to the 16 Puerto Rican nationalists.\11\ In 
response to these subpoenas, the Executive branch produced 
approximately 10,000 pages of documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Subpoenas from Committee on Government Reform to the Executive 
Office of the President (Sept. 1, 1999) and Department of Justice 
(Sept. 1 and 16, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the request of the President, however, Attorney General 
Janet Reno reviewed a number of other documents relating to 
internal deliberations among staff, recommendations to the 
President, and the President's decisionmaking to determine if 
this material was subject to a proper assertion of executive 
privilege.\12\ The Attorney General concluded that the White 
House could properly assert executive privilege over those 
documents.\13\ This interpretation appears to be supported by 
legal standards and historical precedents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to President Clinton 
(Sept. 16, 1999).
    \13\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The concept of executive privilege was first invoked by 
President George Washington.\14\ More recently, executive 
privilege has been asserted by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush.\15\ The Supreme Court 
explicitly addressed the issue of executive privilege in 1974 
in United States v. Nixon. In recognizing the privilege, the 
unanimous court articulated the reasons and constitutional 
basis behind such a privilege:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Letter from Assistant Attorney General W. Lee Rawls to Senator 
Howard Metzenbaum (July 1, 1991).
    \15\ See letter from Assistant Attorney General W. Lee Rawls to 
Senator Howard Metzenbaum (July 1, 1991).

          [T]he importance of this confidentiality is too plain 
        to require further discussion. Human experience teaches 
        that those who expect public dissemination of their 
        remarks may well temper candor with a concern for 
        appearances and for their own interests to the 
        detriment of the decision making process. Whatever the 
        nature of the privilege of confidentiality of 
        Presidential communications in the exercise of Art. II 
        powers, the privilege can be said to derive from the 
        supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area 
        of constitutional duties. Certain powers and privileges 
        flow from the nature of enumerated powers; the 
        protection of the confidentiality of Presidential 
        communication has similar constitutional 
        underpinnings.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Court went on to state:

          The expectation of a President to the confidentiality 
        of his conversation and correspondence, like the claim 
        of confidentiality in judicial deliberations, for 
        example, has all the values to which we accord 
        deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to 
        those values, is the necessity for protection of the 
        public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or 
        harsh opinions in Presidential decision making. A 
        president and those who assist him must be free to 
        explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies 
        and making decisions and to do so in a way many would 
        be unwilling to express except privately. These are the 
        considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for 
        Presidential communications. The privilege is 
        fundamental to the operation of Government and 
        inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under 
        the Constitution.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Id., at 708.

    In the case of the President's clemency decision, the 
assertion of executive privilege was fully justified. The 
documents being sought by the Committee contained advice and 
recommendations presented to the President and his advisors. 
They involved the pardon power, which the Constitution entrusts 
exclusively to the President. There was no credible evidence of 
illegal conduct by the President or his advisors. As stated by 
the Washington Post, ``if executive privilege does not cover 
the Puerto Rico flap, it does not meaningfully exist.'' \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Executive Privilege--Again, Washington Post (Sept. 19, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             V. Conclusion

    Although many Democrats oppose the President's decision, 
the majority made no attempt to find consensus with the 
Committee's minority members. Instead, the majority report 
appears to be designed to score political points, not reach the 
truth. It is based on unsubstantiated allegations and innuendo, 
not the facts and evidence before the Committee. We therefore 
dissent.

                                   Hon. Henry A. Waxman.
                                   Hon. Tom Lantos.
                                   Hon. Major R. Owens.
                                   Hon. Edolphus Towns.
                                   Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski.
                                   Hon. Patsy T. Mink.
                                   Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton.
                                   Hon. Chaka Fattah.
                                   Hon. Elijah E. Cummings.
                                   Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich.
                                   Hon. Danny K. Davis.
                                   Hon. John F. Tierney.
                                   Hon. Thomas H. Allen.
                                   Hon. Harold E. Ford, Jr.
                                   Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky.

    [The documents referred to follow:]
    
    
