[House Report 106-411]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress Rept. 106-411
1st Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Part 1
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ANTITRUST TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS ACT OF 1999
_______
October 25, 1999.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Hyde, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 1801]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 1801) to make technical corrections to various
antitrust laws and to references to such laws, having
considered the same, reports favorably thereon without
amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary........................................ 1
Background and Need for the Legislation.................... 2
Hearings................................................... 4
Committee Consideration.................................... 5
Vote of the Committee...................................... 5
Committee Oversight Findings............................... 5
Committee on Government Reform Findings.................... 5
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures.................. 5
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate.................. 5
Constitutional Authority Statement......................... 6
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion................. 6
Agency Views............................................... 7
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported...... 9
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 1801, the ``Antitrust Technical Corrections Act of
1999,'' makes four miscellaneous changes to the antitrust laws.
Three of
these changes repeal outdated provisions, and one clarifies a
longstanding ambiguity.
Background and Need for the Legislation
A. Repeal of the Act of March 3, 1913 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 30)
The Act of March 3, 1913 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 30) requires that
all depositions taken in Sherman Act equity cases brought by
the Government be conducted in public. In the early days of the
Sherman Act, the courts conducted such cases by deposition
without any formal trial proceeding. See generally United
States v. Microsoft Corporation, 165 F.3d 952, 957-58 (D.C.
Cir. 1999). In 1912, a district court held that such
depositions must be closed under the Equity Rules in effect at
the time. United States v. United States Shoe Machinery Co.,
198 F. 870 (D. Mass. 1912). In response, Congress passed this
statute requiring that the depositions be open. The rationale
was that because these depositions essentially constituted the
trial, they should be open as a trial would be. For a fuller
description of these events, see Microsoft, 165 F.3d at 957-58,
and the authorities cited therein.
Under the modern practice of broad discovery, depositions
are generally taken in private and then made public if they are
used at trial. Under the modern system, Sec. 30 causes three
problems: (1) it sets up a special rule for a narrow class of
cases when the justification for that rule has disappeared; (2)
it makes it hard for a court to protect proprietary information
that may be at issue in an antitrust case; and (3) it can
create a circus atmosphere in the deposition of a high profile
figure. In the Microsoft case cited above, the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of the District of
Columbia invited Congress to repeal this law. Microsoft, 165
F.3d at 958 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
B. Repeal of the Antitrust Provision in the Panama Canal Act (15 U.S.C.
Sec. 31)
Section 11 of the Panama Canal Act provides that no vessel
owned by someone who is violating the antitrust laws may pass
through the Panama Canal. The committee has not been able to
determine why this provision was added to the Act or whether it
has ever been used. However, with the return of the Canal to
Panamanian sovereignty at the end of 1999, it is appropriate to
repeal this outdated provision. The committee has consulted
informally with the House Committee on Armed Services, which
has jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Act, and that committee
has indicated that it has no objection to this repeal. The
Committee on Armed Services has waived its secondary referral
of H.R. 1801 by the following letter:
Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, October 22, 1999.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
The Speaker,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: In recognition of the desire to expedite
floor consideration of H.R. 1801, the Antitrust Technical
Corrections Act of 1999, the Committee on Armed Services agrees
to waive its right to consider this legislation. H.R. 1801, as
introduced and as ordered reported by the Committee on the
Judiciary on October 13, 1999, contains subject matter that
falls within the legislative jurisdiction of the Committee on
Armed Services pursuant to House Rule X.
The Committee on Armed Services takes this action with the
understanding that the committee's jurisdiction over the
provisions in question is no way diminished or altered, and
that the committee's right to appointment of conferees during
any conference on the bill remains intact.
With warm personal regards, I am
Sincerely,
Floyd D. Spence, Chairman.
cc: The Honorable Ike Skelton
The Honorable Henry Hyde
The Honorable John Conyers
C. Clarification that Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act Applies to the District
and the Territories (15 U.S.C. Sec. 3)
Two of the primary provisions of antitrust law are Sec. 1
and Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1, 2.
Section 1 prohibits conspiracies in restraint of trade, and
Sec. 2 prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and
conspiracies to monopolize. Section 3 of the Sherman Act was
intended to apply these provisions to conduct occurring in the
District of Columbia and the various territories of the United
States. Unfortunately, however, ambiguous drafting in Sec. 3
leaves it unclear whether Sec. 2 applies to conduct occurring
in those areas.
The committee believes that it was Congress's intent for
Sec. 3 to apply both sections to the territories, and that by
passing this amendment, it is only clarifying the matter by
making explicit that which is already implicit in Sec. 3.
The committee is aware of at least one instance in which
the Department of Justice declined to bring an otherwise
meritorious Sec. 2 claim in a Virgin Islands case because of
this ambiguity. United States v. Topa Equities (V.I..), Ltd.,
Civil No. 1994-179 (D.V.I. 1994). In that case, the Department
was able to bring other claims under Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act
which led to a settlement. All five of the congressional
representatives of the District and the Territories are
cosponsors of the bill.
D. Repeal of Redundant Antitrust Jurisdictional Provision in Sec. 77 of
the Wilson Tariff Act
In 1955, Congress modernized the jurisdictional and venue
provisions relating to antitrust suits by amending Sec. 4 of
the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 15). 69 Stat. 282. At that
time, it repealed what was then Sec. 7 of the Sherman Act, a
jurisdiction and venue provision that was redundant of the one
in Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act. However, it did not repeal the
similarly redundant jurisdiction and venue provision contained
in Sec. 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act. Id. It appears that this
was an oversight because Sec. 77 was never codified and has
rarely been used.
Repealing Sec. 77 will not diminish any jurisdictional or
venue rights because Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act provides any
potential plaintiff with broader rights of jurisdiction and
venue than does Sec. 77. Rather, the repeal simply rids the law
of a confusing, redundant, and little used provision.
E. Application of Amendments to Pending Cases
After ordering H.R. 1801 favorably reported, the committee
realized that it might be helpful to clarify the application to
pending cases of the amendments made by the bill. Accordingly,
the committee anticipates that a managers' amendment will be
added during floor consideration that will address these
matters in the following manner.
With respect to Sec. 2(a) (public depositions), the change
does not affect any substantive rights of the litigants, and
for that reason, the managers' amendment will apply the change
to pending cases.
With respect to Sec. 2(b) (Panama Canal), the committee
believes that this provision has never been used and that there
are no pending cases that will be affected. In the unlikely
event that there is such a case, the amendment should not apply
because it would affect substantive rights. Thus, the committee
anticipates that the managers' amendment will not apply
Sec. 2(b) to pending cases.
With respect to Sec. 2(c) (application of Sherman Act
Sec. 2 to the District of Columbia and the territories), the
committee believes that there could be pending cases that would
be affected. In our judgment, the amendment only makes explicit
that which is already implicit in Sec. 3. However, a court
might interpret the existing Sec. 3 differently. To avoid
changing the rules in the middle of litigation, the committee's
intent is that any litigant in a pending case filed before
enactment of this amendment ought to be treated as if this
amendment had not passed. In such a case, a court should
interpret Sec. 3 as it would have in the absence of this
amendment. Thus, the committee anticipates that the managers'
amendment will not apply Sec. 2(c) to pending cases.
Finally, with respect to Sec. 2(d) (Sec. 77 of the Wilson
Tariff Act), the committee believes that there could be pending
cases that would be affected. The committee understands that
Sec. 77 has rarely, if ever, been used. However, if there is a
pending case in which a litigant has relied on it, he or she
should not have the rules changed in the middle of the case.
For that reason, the committee anticipates that the managers'
amendment will not apply Sec. 2(d) to pending cases.
Hearings
Because H.R. 1801 contains only noncontroversial technical
corrections to the antitrust laws, the committee held no
hearings on it.
Committee Consideration
After its referral to the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R.
1801 was held at the full committee. Thus, it received no
subcommittee consideration. On October 13, 1999, the full
Committee on the Judiciary met in open session and ordered
favorably reported the bill H.R. 1801 unamended, by a voice
vote, a quorum being present.
Vote of the Committee
During its consideration of H.R. 1801, the committee took
no rollcall votes.
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the committee reports that the
findings and recommendations of the committee, based on
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report. See Agency Views Section,
below.
Committee on Government Reform Findings
No findings or recommendations of the Committee on
Government Reform were received as referred to in clause
3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or
increased tax expenditures.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the committee sets forth, with
respect to the bill, H.R. 1801, the following estimate and
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, October 18, 1999.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1801, Antitrust
Technical Corrections Act of 1999.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Lanette J.
Keith, who can be reached at 226-2860.
Sincerely,
Dan L. Crippen, Director.
H.R. 1801--Antitrust Technical Corrections Act of 1999.
CBO estimates that implementing this bill would have no
significant impact on the federal budget. Because the bill
could affect direct spending and receipts, pay-as-you-go
procedures would apply. CBO estimates, however, that any impact
on direct spending and receipts would not be significant. H.R.
1801 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates
as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would impose
no costs on State, local, or tribal governments.
H.R. 1801 would make several technical changes to current
antitrust law and clarify that certain provisions of antitrust
laws apply in territories of the United States and the District
of Columbia. The bill also would repeal legislation requiring
that all depositions in antitrust cases brought by the
government be conducted in public and would repeal a redundant
law that establishes jurisdiction in such cases.
Because those convicted under the antitrust amendments that
would be made by enacting H.R. 1801 could be subject to
criminal fines, the federal government might collect additional
fines if the bill is enacted. Collections of such fines are
recorded in the budget as governmental receipts (revenues),
which are deposited in the Crime Victims fund and spent in
subsequent years. Information from the Department of Justice
indicates that it would be unlikely to prosecute additional
criminal cases under H.R. 1801; therefore, CBO expects that any
additional receipts would be negligible.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Lanette J.
Keith, who can be reached at 226-2860. This estimate was
approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for
Budget Analysis.
Constitutional Authority Statement
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee finds the authority for
this legislation in Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion
Sec. 1. Short Title. Section 1 provides that the short
title of the bill is the ``Antitrust Technical Corrections Act
of 1999.''
Sec. 2. Amendments. Subsection 2(a) repeals the Act of
March 3, 1913, requiring that depositions in Sherman Act equity
cases brought by the Government be held in public, as described
above.
Subsection 2(b) repeals the paragraph in Section 11 of
Panama Canal Act, prohibiting ships owned by persons who are
violating the antitrust laws from passing through the Canal, as
described above.
Subsection 2(c) adds a new Sec. 3(b) to Sec. 3 of the
Sherman Act to clarify that Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act applies
to the District of Columbia and the territories. This new
Sec. 3(b) in Sec. 3 closely tracks the language of Sec. 2 of
the Sherman Act with language applying it to the District and
the territories.
Subsection 2(d) repeals Sec. 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act
and also eliminates several cross-references to Sec. 77 in five
other statutes (the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission
Act, the Packers and Stockyards Act, the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, and the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act). These
cross-references occur in definitions of the term ``antitrust
laws'' in the other statutes and do not change the substance of
those statutes.
Agency Views
The committee has not received any formal agency views on
H.R. 1801. However, the committee has consulted informally with
both of the antitrust agencies, the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and the Bureau of Competition of the
Federal Trade Commission. Both agencies have indicated
informally that they have no objection to the passage of the
bill.
In addition, the impetus for the provisions of subsections
2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) came from answers to questions to the
Antitrust Division after the committee's general oversight
hearing on both of the agencies on November 5, 1997. The
Antitrust Enforcement Agencies: The Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and the Bureau of Competition of the
Federal Trade Commission: Hearing Before the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 105th Congress 250 (1997). The relevant text is
set forth below:
Congress of the United States,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC, December 16, 1997.
Hon. Joel Klein,
Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
Dear Assistant Attorney General Klein: I appreciate your
appearing before the Committee on the Judiciary to testify at
the oversight hearing on ``The Antitrust Enforcement Agencies:
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and The
Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission'' on
Wednesday, November 5, 1997.
Members of the Committee have asked that you answer
additional written questions for the record. I have attached a
copy of the questions. I would appreciate your answering the
questions in writing and returning your answers to the
Committee for inclusion in the hearing record at your earliest
convenience.
If the Committee can provide you with any additional
information, please do not hesitate to have your staff contact
Joseph Gibson by phone at (202) 225-3951 or by fax at (202)
225-7682. I appreciate your participation in our hearing.
Sincerely,
Henry J. Hyde, Chairman.
cc: Hon. John Conyers, Jr.
Questions for assistant attorney general klein
Questions from Chairman Hyde
* * * * * * *
6. Does the Antitrust Division currently seek any changes
to the antitrust laws, the procedural mechanisms available to
it, or to any of its organizational statutes? If so, please
enumerate these changes and provide a brief explanation.
7. Does the Antitrust Division believe that there are any
provisions of the antitrust laws, the procedural mechanisms
available to it, or to any of its organizational statutes that
are anachronistic or that should otherwise be eliminated from
the statute books? If so, please enumerate these changes and
provide a brief explanation.
* * * * * * *
U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Legislative Affairs,
Washington, DC, March 17, 1998.
Hon. Henry Hyde, Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for giving Assistant Attorney
General Joel Klein the opportunity to testify at the oversight
hearing on ``The Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice and the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade
Commission'' on November 5, 1997.
Enclosed are the responses to the written questions for the
record that you sent to Mr. Klein on behalf of the Committee
after the hearing.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to
contact me.
Sincerely,
Andrew Fois,
Assistant Attorney General.
Enclosure
questions for assistant attorney general klein
Questions from Chairman Hyde
* * * * * * *
6. Does the Antitrust Division currently seek any changes
to the antitrust laws, the procedural mechanisms available to
it, or to any of its organizational statutes? If so, please
enumerate these changes and provide a brief explanation.
Yes.
* * * * * * *
A second area that this Committee may wish to take a look
at is the application of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to the
District of Columbia and the territories. There does not appear
to be any reason other than historical anomaly for the laws
against monopolization to apply in the 50 states but not the
District of Columbia or the territories, but that appears to be
the current state of the law. I would be happy to work with the
Committee on developing such legislation.
7. Does the Antitrust Division believe that there are any
provisions of the antitrust laws, the procedural mechanisms
available to it, or to any of its organizational statutes that
are anachronistic or that should otherwise be eliminated from
the statute books? If so, please enumerate these changes and
provide a brief explanation.
Yes. The Antitrust Division believes that both 15 U.S.C.
Sec. 30 and 15 U.S.C. Sec. 31 should be eliminated from the
statute books. The first statute requires that in antitrust
cases, as opposed to any other types of civil cases,
depositions of witnesses be open to the public. We do not
believe that different procedures should apply regarding the
openness of depositions in antitrust cases from any other civil
cases. Indeed, such a requirement could raise unnecessary
complications in certain instances. For example, in a high
profile civil litigation, it is possible that a large number of
people may desire to be present at a given deposition. If the
deposition has been scheduled for a normal size conference
room, and large numbers of people show up, the question would
arise whether any of those individuals could be turned away
consistent with the statute. Must the deposition be postponed
until a larger room can be found or could the deposition go
forward and people be excluded? In any event, the Division sees
no need for this type of provision. If the matter goes to
trial, the trial will be public.
The second statute that could be eliminated is entitled
``Panama Canal closed to violators of the antitrust laws,'' 15
U.S.C. Sec. 31. In the 84 years since this statute has been
part of the law, we are aware of no enforcement of the statute.
Moreover, without expressing any Department of Justice legal
opinion on the issue, it may be the case that the Treaty
Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama
Canal (Sept. 7, 1977) impliedly repealed this statute. In any
event, we believe this statute is anachronistic and should be
removed from the statute books.
* * * * * * *
In addition, although they do not constitute formal agency
views, the committee would like to recognize two other
contributions to this bill. The committee appreciates the
contribution of the D.C. Circuit in calling to our attention
the need for the repeal contained in subsection 2(a).
Microsoft, 165 F.3d at 958. We also appreciate the contribution
of the office of the House Legislative Counsel, in calling to
our attention the need for the repeal contained in subsection
2(d).
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change
is proposed is shown in roman):
ACT OF MARCH 3, 1913
CHAP. 114.--An Act Providing for publicity in taking evidence under Act
of July second, eighteen hundred and ninety.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, [That in
the taking of depositions of witnesses for use in any suit in
equity brought by the United States under the Act entitled ``An
Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints
and monopolies,'' approved July second, eighteen hundred and
ninety, and in the hearings before any examiner or special
master appointed to take testimony therein, the proceedings
shall be open to the public as freely as are trials in open
court; and no order excluding the public from attendance on any
such proceedings shall be valid or enforceable.]
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SECTION 11 OF THE PANAMA CANAL ACT
Sec. 11. * * *
* * * * * * *
[No vessel permitted to engage in the coastwise or foreign
trade of the United States shall be permitted to enter or pass
through said canal if such ship is owned, chartered, operated,
or controlled by any person or company which is doing business
in violation of the provisions of the Act of Congress approved
July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, entitled ``An Act to
protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies,'' or the provisions of sections seventy-three to
seventy-seven, both inclusive, of an Act approved August
twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled ``An
Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government,
and for other purposes,'' or the provisions of any other Act of
Congress amending or supplementing the said Act of July second,
eighteen hundred and ninety, commonly known as the Sherman
Antitrust Act, and amendments thereto, or said sections of the
Act of August twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four.
The question of fact may be determined by the judgment of any
court of the United States of competent jurisdiction in any
cause pending before it to which the owners or operators of
such ship are parties. Suit may be brought by any shipper or by
the Attorney General of the United States.]
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SECTION 3 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
* * * * * * *
Sec. 3. (a) Every contract, combination in form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in
any Territory of the United States or of the District of
Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such
Territory and another, or between any such Territory or
Territories and any State or States or the District of
Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of
Columbia, and any State or States or foreign nations, is hereby
declared illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract
or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation,
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
(b) Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the Territories of the United States and the District of
Columbia, or between any of the several States and any
Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a
corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
----------
WILSON TARIFF ACT
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 77. That any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by any other person or corporation by
reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this
Act may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States
in the district in which the defendant resides or is found,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.]
Sec. [78.] 77.Sections 73, 74, 75, [76, and 77] and 76 of
this Act may be cited as the ``Wilson Tariff Act''.
----------
SECTION 1 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a)
``antitrust laws,'' as used herein, includes the Act entitled
``An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful
restraints and monopolies,'' approved July second, eighteen
hundred and ninety; sections seventy-three to [seventy-seven]
seventy-six, inclusive, of an Act entitled ``An Act to reduce
taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other
purposes,'' of August twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and
ninety-four; an Act entitled ``An Act to amend sections
seventy-three and seventy-six of the Act of August twenty-
seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled `An Act to
reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for
other purposes,' '' approved February twelfth, nineteen hundred
and thirteen; and also this Act.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 4 OF THE FEDEAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
Sec. 4. The words defined in this section shall have the
following meaning when found in this Act, to wit:
* * * * * * *
``Antitrust Acts'' means the Act entitled ``An Act to
protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies,'' approved July 2, 1890; also sections 73 to [77]
76, inclusive, of an Act entitled ``An Act to reduce taxation,
to provide revenue for the Government, and for other
purposes,'' approved August 27, 1894; also the Act entitled
``An Act to amend sections 73 and 76 of the Act of August 27,
1894, entitled `An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue
for the Government, and for other purposes,''' approved
February 12, 1913; and also the Act entitled ``An Act to
supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and
monopolies, and for other purposes,'' approved October 15,
1914.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 405 OF THE PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT, 1921
Sec. 405. Nothing contained in this Act, except as
otherwise provided herein, shall be construed--
(a) To prevent or interfere with the enforcement of, or the
procedure under, the provisions of the Act entitled ``An Act to
protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies,'' approved July 2, 1890, the Act entitled ``An Act
to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and
monopolies, and for other purposes,'' approved October 15,
1914, the Interstate Commerce Act as amended, the Act entitled
``An Act to promote export trade, and for other purposes,''
approved April 10, 1918, or sections 73 to [77] 76, inclusive,
of the Act of August 27, 1894, entitled ``An Act to reduce
taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other
purposes,'' as amended by the Act entitled ``An Act to amend
sections seventy-three and seventy-six of the Act of August
twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled `An
Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government,
and for other purposes' '' approved February 12, 1913, or
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 105 OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
Sec. 105. Antitrust Provisions.--
a. Nothing contained in this Act shall relieve any person
from the operation of the following Acts, as amended, ``An Act
to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies'' approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety;
sections seventy-three to [seventy-seven] seventy-six,
inclusive, of an Act entitled ``An Act to reduce taxation,
mission, to define its powers and duties, and for other
purposes'' approved August twenty-seven, eighteen hundred and
ninety-four; ``An Act to supplement existing laws against
unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes''
approved October fifteen, nineteen hundred and fourteen; and
``An Act to create a Federal Trade Commission, to define its
powers and duties, and for other purposes'' approved September
twenty-six, nineteen hundred and fourteen. In the event a
licensee is found by a court of competent jurisdiction, either
in an original action in that court or in a proceeding to
enforce or review the findings or orders of any Government
agency having jurisdiction under the laws in the conduct of the
licensed activity, the Commission may suspend, revoke, or take
such other action as it may deem necessary with respect to any
license issued by the Commission under the provisions of this
Act.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 103 OF THE DEEP SEABED HARD MINERAL RESOURCES ACT
SEC. 103. LICENSE AND PERMIT APPLICATIONS, REVIEW, AND CERTIFICATION.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Antitrust Review.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(7) As used in the subsection, the term ``antitrust laws''
means the Act of July 2, 1890 (commonly known as the Sherman
Act; 15 U.S.C. 1-7); sections 73 through [77] 76 of the Act of
August 27, 1894 (commonly known as the Wilson Tariff Act; 15
U.S.C. 8-11); the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.); the Act
of June 19, 1936 (commonly known as the Robinson-Patman Price
Discrimination Act; 15 U.S.C. 13-13b and 21a); and the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.).
* * * * * * *