[House Report 106-39]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress Rept. 106-39
1st Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________
DECLARATION OF POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING NATIONAL MISSILE
DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT
__________
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON
H.R. 4
together with
ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
March 2, 1999.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
-----------------------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-006 WASHINGTON : 1999
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Sixth Congress
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman
BOB STUMP, Arizona IKE SKELTON, Missouri
DUNCAN HUNTER, California NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia
JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia Carolina
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania OWEN PICKETT, Virginia
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado LANE EVANS, Illinois
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
STEVE BUYER, Indiana NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
California VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma JIM TURNER, Texas
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
Carolina ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JIM RYUN, Kansas ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
BOB RILEY, Alabama BARON P. HILL, Indiana
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada MIKE THOMPSON, California
MARY BONO, California JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
STEVEN T. KUYKENDALL, California
DON SHERWOOD, Pennsylvania
Andrew K. Ellis, Staff Director
Heather Hescheles, Research Assistant
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Purpose and Background........................................... 1
Legislative History.............................................. 3
Committee Position............................................... 3
Fiscal Data...................................................... 4
Congressional Budget Office Estimate........................... 4
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate...................... 4
Committee Cost Estimate........................................ 4
Oversight Findings............................................... 5
Constitutional Authority Statement............................... 5
Statement of Federal Mandates.................................... 5
Roll Call Vote................................................... 5
Additional views of Congressman Bob Stump........................ 7
Additional views of Congressman John Spratt...................... 8
Additional views of Congressman Silvestre Reyes.................. 11
Dissenting views of Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney............... 12
106th Congress Rept. 106-39
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________
DECLARATION OF POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING NATIONAL MISSILE
DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT
_______
March 2, 1999.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Spence, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 4]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 4) to declare it to be the policy of the United
States to deploy a national missile defense, having considered
the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and
recommend that the bill do pass.
PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND
H.R. 4 would commit the United States to the deployment of
a national missile defense (NMD) system as a matter of policy.
The bill reflects the committee's belief that the American
people must be protected against the threat of a limited
ballistic missile attack.
The Administration's current policy commits the United
States to the development--but not deployment--of a national
missile defense system, and is predicated on the belief that
the United States will have adequate warning time during which
to deploy NMD in response to emerging ballistic missile
threats. Although the Administration has proposed additional
funding to support a national missile defense deployment in its
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), it does not plan to make a
deployment decision until June 2000 at the earliest.
The committee notes there is an increasing body of evidence
to suggest that the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the
weapons of mass destruction they can carry poses a growing
threat to the United States, and that missile threats from
rogue states such as North Korea or Iran may emerge sooner than
anticipated by the intelligence community. In this connection,
the committee notes the establishment in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201) of
an independent and bipartisan Commission to Assess the
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. That
commission--chaired by former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and commonly known as the ``Rumsfeld Commission''--
unanimously concluded in July 1998 that the threat posed to the
United States by nations seeking to acquire ballistic missiles
and weapons of mass destruction ``is broader, more mature and
evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and
reports by the intelligence community.'' Consequently, the
commission emphasized that the United States might have
``little or no warning'' before a ballistic missile threat
materializes. This possibility, the commission observed, would
result from the expanding access to detailed open source
technical information; the availability of foreign assistance,
primarily from Russia and China, to rogue states seeking to
develop their own ballistic missiles; and the use of deception
and denial techniques intended to thwart U.S. efforts to
accurately assess the nature and pace of other nations'
ballistic missile programs.
Several recent events have underscored the Rumsfeld
Commission's findings. On July 24, 1998, Iran conducted the
first flight-test of its Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic
missile. Only months before, the intelligence community had
forecast that the missile's initial flight-test would not occur
for at least another year. Iran's accelerated development
effort was facilitated by foreign assistance from Russia and
North Korea. With additional assistance from these countries,
Iran is also developing an intermediate-range ballistic
missile--the Shahab-4--and, according to the Rumsfeld
Commission, will be able ``to demonstrate an
[intercontinental]-range ballistic missile * * * within five
years of a decision to proceed. * * *''
On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a variant of its
Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile in an attempt to place a
satellite into orbit. The missile had a third stage, flight
profile, mission, and range that were not anticipated by the
intelligence community. With a third stage, the intelligence
community estimates that the missile could strike portions of
the United States, including Alaska, Hawaii. North Korea also
continues its development of a longer-range Taepo Dong-2
ballistic missile that could travel up to 10,000 kilometers--
sufficient to place much of the continental United States at
risk.
As a December 1998 CIA report to Congress noted, Russia and
China have continued to be the primary suppliers to rogue
states and potential U.S. adversaries of key nuclear, chemical,
biological, and ballistic missile technologies. The committee
believes that this kind of technology transfer will increase
the long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States.
The committee welcomes the Administration's recent
acknowledgment that the ballistic missile threat to the United
States is more serious than previously estimated. Secretary of
Defense Cohen stated on January 20, 1999, that the Rumsfeld
Commission had presented a ``sobering'' report demonstrating
that ``there is a growing threat and * * * it will pose a
danger not only to our troops overseas, but also to Americans
here at home.'' The committee also notes the Administration's
recognition that additional budget resources are required to
support deployment of a national missile defense. Nonetheless,
technology development and funding levels proposed over the
FYDP do not support the Administration's original ``3-plus-3''
NMD program, which was predicated on the ability to deploy a
system three years after a decision to do so. Moreover,
Secretary Cohen has acknowledged that, under current
Administration plans, an initial NMD deployment would not occur
before 2005. The committee believes that the pace at which the
ballistic missile threat is evolving suggests that the United
States faces an increasingly dangerous period of vulnerability
to ballistic missile attack. Consequently, the committee
considers it prudent to establish deployment of national
missile defenses as U.S. policy.
The committee notes that H.R. 4 does not address the legal
status or constraints of, or U.S. rights with respect to, the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty signed with the Soviet
Union in 1972. The committee notes that Congress, in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public
Law 105-261), expressed its sense that ``any national missile
defense deployed by the United States must provide effective
defense against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic
missile attack for all 50 States.'' The director of the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization recently stated, and the
committee agrees, that to provide an effective defense of all
50 states an NMD architecture would require revisions to the
ABM Treaty. The Secretary of Defense also stated recently that
he would support modification of the ABM Treaty to allow for
the deployment of an effective, limited national missile
defense. The Secretary correctly noted that if such revisions
cannot be negotiated, the U.S. has the legal right to withdraw
from the ABM Treaty.
The committee believes that the ballistic missile threat to
the United States warrants a categorical commitment to the
deployment of a national missile defense system. H.R. 4
establishes this commitment as a matter of national policy. The
committee believes this to be an important step toward assuring
that all Americans are protected against the threat of limited
ballistic missile attack.
legislative history
On February 4, 1999, H.R. 4, to establish the deployment of
a national missile defense system as the policy of the United
States, was introduced with 59 co-sponsors and referred to the
committees on Armed Services and International Relations. On
February 25, 1999, the Committee on Armed Services held a mark-
up session to consider H.R. 4. The bill was reported favorably
by a record vote of 50-3. The record vote can be found at the
end of this report.
committee position
On February 25, 1999, the Committee on Armed Services, a
quorum being present, approved H.R. 4 by a vote of 50 to 3.
fiscal data
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(2)(A) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the committee attempted to
ascertain annual outlays resulting from the bill during fiscal
year 2000 and the four following fiscal years. The results of
such efforts are reflected in the cost estimate prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402
of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which is included in
this report pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the
Rules of the House.
congressional budget office estimate
In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the cost estimate prepared by
the Congressional Budget Office and submitted pursuant to
section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is as
follows:
February 25, 1999.
Hon. Floyd Spence,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4, a bill to
declare it to be the policy of the United States to deploy a
national missile defense.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Raymond Hall.
Sincerely,
Dan L. Crippen, Director.
congressional budget office cost estimate
H.R. 4 would state that it is U.S. policy to deploy a
national missile defense. CBO estimates that the bill, by
itself, would have no budgetary impact. Because it would not
affect direct spending or receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures
would not apply. Any budgetary impact would stem from separate
implementing legislation or from annual authorization and
appropriation bills. How the costs of implementing the policy
enunciated in H.R. 4 would compare with costs likely to be
incurred under current law would depend on the systems and time
frame required by subsequent legislation.
Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act excludes from
the application of that act any legislative provisions that are
necessary for national security. That exclusion might apply to
the provisions of this bill. In any case, the bill contains no
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Raymond Hall.
This estimate was approved by Paul N.Van de Water, Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
committee cost estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee generally concurs with
the estimate contained in the report of the Congressional
Budget Office.
oversight findings
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, this legislation results from
hearings and other oversight activities conducted by the
committee pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X.
With respect to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives and section 308(a)(1) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not
include any new spending or credit authority, nor does it
provide for any increase or decrease in tax revenues or
expenditures. The fiscal features of this legislation are
addressed in the estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the committee has not received a
report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
pertaining to the subject matter of H.R. 4.
constitutional authority statement
Pursuant to clause 3 (d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the committee finds the authority
for this legislation in Article I, section 8 of the United
States Constitution.
statement of federal mandates
Pursuant to section 423 of Public Law 104-4, this
legislation contains no federal mandates with respect to state,
local, and tribal governments, nor with respect to the private
sector. Similarly, the bill provides no unfunded federal
intergovernmental mandates.
record vote
In accordance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, a record vote was taken with
respect to the committee's consideration of H.R. 4. The record
of this vote can be found on the following page.
The committee ordered H.R. 4 reported to the House with a
favorable recommendation by a vote of 50 to 3, a quorum being
present.
Offset Folios - to 10 here
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CONGRESSMAN BOB STUMP
Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, I could not be in attendance
for the Committee's consideration and markup of this important
legislation. I was chairing a Joint House/Senate Veterans
Affairs Committee hearing to receive the annual legislative
presentation of Military Order of the Purple Heart, Fleet
Reserve Association, The Retired Enlisted Association, Gold
Star Wives of America, and the Air Force Sergeants Association.
Had I been present, I would have voted in support of H.R. 4.
This bipartisan bill before us today sends a clear and
convincing message to the world that the United States will no
longer be vulnerable to foreign attack and will respond
accordingly to defend our nation and its citizens. The growing
threat of a ballistic missile attack on our homeland is a clear
and present danger. Failure to deploy an effective defense
capability soon will most assuredly threaten our interests
worldwide and our security at home.
Bob Stump.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS BY CONGRESSMAN JOHN SPRATT
I introduced this bill last year with my colleague, Curt
Weldon, and I sponsor it again this year, not because I think
we have a National Missile Defense (NMD) system ready to
deploy, but because I think it's worth pursuit. Of course, any
system worth deploying has to work, and by referring to
``limited'' strikes, this bill means that the objective system
will have to take out up to 20 oncoming warheads. We are a long
way from defending against a deliberate attack by a well-armed
adversary, particularly if the oncoming reentry vehicles (RVs)
are mixed with decoys and chaff, requiring target
discrimination; and particularly if the number of RVs exceeds
200. The Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) long ago
concluded that when the number of RVs enters this range, the
radiation, heat, and electro-magnetic effects generated by
taking some of them out will make guidance of the remaining
interceptors precarious, if not impossible. There is legitimate
concern about how Russia may react to this push for NMD
deployment. In truth, the system this bill calls for will not
defend us against a massive attack by a nation with an arsenal
as large and diverse as Russia's, not at least in the near
future. It should defend us against rogue or accidental attacks
and some unauthorized attacks, and Russia should have no
objection to that.
The system we refer to seems to be within our reach, but it
is not yet within our grasp. Secretary Cohen beefed up BMD
recently and gave his backing to NMD, but he warned that the
technology is, in his words, ``highly challenging'' and
``highly risky.'' The Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programs,
the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the
Navy's Upper Tier, are not comparable on a one-to-one basis to
NMD, but when the THAAD interceptor is 0-5 in testing, and
Upper Tier is 0-4, we should be wary of presuming that a
ground-based interceptor can travel thousands of miles into the
exo-atmosphere and hit an RV four feet long.
That's why I said when we introduced this bill that I
support it as much for what it does not say, as for what it
does say. It does not say what will be deployed, when it will
be deployed, or where it will be deployed, and I want to
emphasize those points:
This bill does not mandate a date certain for deployment.
We should not rush technology development, and we should not
settle for a substandard system just to say we have deployed
something. Rather, we should only deploy a system that has
proven itself through rigorous testing. I have opposed NMD
bills in the past that legislated Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) dates and deployment dates. In 1991, the
Senate imposed on us in conference a ``Missile Defense Act''
which made it a national ``goal'' to deploy a missile defense
system by 1996. It is now 1999, and nothing has been deployed,
which shows the folly of legislating a deployment date.
This bill is also silent on the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty. Everyone knows that we are developing a ground-
based system, which can be treaty-compliant. This bill leaves
open the number of interceptors and where they may be deployed,
as it should. We do not want to push NMD so hard that we derail
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II and doom START
III. Unlike past bills, this bill does not dictate terms that
the Administration must negotiate with the Russians, and it
should not. For now, compliance with the ABM Treaty is
important to ratifying START II and negotiating START III. If
we are concerned about the threat of nuclear attack, or about
the risk of unauthorized or accidental attacks, or about the
cost of maintaining our strategic forces at START I levels,
both treaties are important--probably a lot more important to
our near-term security than a limited missile defense. These
treaties are also important for the long run if the warheads
deployed on both sides, in the U.S. and Russia, are to be
lowered to levels where national missile defense can complement
deterrence.
There is another key point I want to make clear. I am not
supporting this bill because I think Congress needs to stiffen
the resolve of this Administration. This Administration has put
a billion dollars each year into developing a ground-based
system, and for the last several years, Congress has generally
acquiesced in that level of spending. This year the President's
budget includes funds for deploying an NMD system, funds that
amount to a plus-up of $6.6 billion for a total of $10.5
billion over FY 1999--FY 2005. That sounds like a system taking
shape to me. In fact, that's one reason I support deployment as
our objective. At this level of spending, we should be thinking
about a deployable system, and not more viewgraphs to go on the
shelf.
One aim of this bill is to focus NMD on attainable
objectives. Since President Reagan's speech on March 23, 1983,
this country has spent nearly $50 billion on ballistic missile
defense, much of it in pursuit of myriad systems, tried and
abandoned. We have explored exo-atmospheric interceptors, endo-
atmospheric interceptors, terminal interceptors, boost phase
interceptors, Brilliant Pebbles, a neutral particle beam, and
at least five types of laser. Our failure to field a missile
defense system is due more to a lack of focus than a lack of
funding.
Finally, I sponsor this bill in the hope that we can put
BMD on a more bipartisan footing. TMD enjoys bipartisan
support; NMD has been a political totem. Now that the
technology is taking shape and showing promise, NMD needs to
stand the test of any weapons system. If we can develop a
system that can prove itself, in rigorous testing, capable of
holding this country harmless against a limited missile attack,
I think we should build it. It would give us a defense against
rogue attacks and a working system to learn from and build
upon. It would allow us to reap a return on the investment of
nearly $50 billion already spent on ballistic missile defense,
and it would complement TMD and exploit the investment in SBIRS
Low and SBIRS High (Space-Based Infrared Sensors) that we will
make anyway for TMD and other missions.
John M. Spratt, Jr.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE SILVESTRE REYES
I want to congratulate my colleagues, Curt Weldon and John
Spratt, for drafting this bi-partisan bill which establishes
that it is the policy of this nation to deploy a national
missile defense (NMD) system. I also want to thank Chairman
Spence and Ranking Member Skelton for bringing the bill before
the House Armed Services Committee for our consideration in an
expedited manner.
I support this bill both for what it says and for what it
does not say. This bill does not say when an NMD system must be
deployed. This bill does not say how an NMD system must be
deployed. This bill does not say where an NMD system must be
deployed. Chairman Weldon and Congressman Spratt have
intelligently left those decisions for the future.
What this bill does say is that it is the policy of this
nation to deploy an NMD system. My colleagues and I understand
that the threat from ballistic missiles is here and now. On
August 31, 1998, when the North Koreans tested their Taepo Dong
1, the reality of the threat to this nation became brutally
clear. Even the Secretary of Defense is now admitting that the
threat is real.
I hope that the President will support this bi-partisan
bill. We need to send a message to our citizens, to our troops,
to our allies and especially to our enemies that we are serious
about national missile defense.
I regret that I was unable to participate in the mark-up of
this important bill, but I had pressing business back in my
district. Two years ago, I was appointed to the Transatlantic
Learning Community-Migration Group, an organization of 25
international immigration experts. The TLC-Migration Group
brings together elected officials, journalists and researchers
from Western Europe and North America who meet in each other's
countries to learn about practical policies that facilitate
immigration and integration in local settings and how best
practices can be transferred between Europe and North America.
I am the only Member of Congress to have been selected to
participate in the TLC-Migration Group, and I was hosting them
in El Paso during the mark-up.
If I had been present at the mark-up, I would have voted in
favor of the bill and look forward to supporting it when it is
considered on the floor of the House.
Silvestre Reyes.
DISSENTING VIEWS OF CONGRESSWOMAN CYNTHIA McKINNEY
Ladies and gentleman, I would like to speak in opposition
to the proposal before the Committee.
As a Member of Congress for over 6 years now, I have been
asked to make a number of very difficult decisions.
Fortunately, this is not one of those occasions.
The decision to vote against making it the policy of the
United States--mandating deployment of a system that does not
now work, that may in fact, never work--is quite easy.
Why the rush to mandate deployment before it is
successfully tested? Like all of the members of this committee,
I am concerned about the security of the United States and her
citizens.
Over the past several weeks we have heard testimony from
the heads of all the uniformed services.
They have all given compelling and professional testimony
on real emerging threats to our armed forces, from laser
technology to sophisticated attacks on our Command, Control,
Communication, Computer and Intelligence systems. And every one
of them has spoken of the immediate need to provide adequate
pay and benefits for our most important military asset--our
people in military service.
Yet our first vote in this committee is not to provide a
livable wage for our troops and their families, our priority it
seems, is to pass into law a requirement that the United States
build a ``Maginot Line'' in space.
Why the rush? Earlier this month, General Shelton, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in an Interview with
Sea Power Magazine: ``The Chiefs question putting additional
billions of taxpayers'' dollars into fielding a system now that
does not work or has not proven itself . . .''.
Why the rush ladies and gentlemen. The latest estimate from
the Congressional Budget Offices of the cost of deploying and
operating a National Missile Defense System ranged from $31
billion to $60 billion. The tremendous costs along with the
consistent technical failures prompted one analyst to write:
``The only thing that seems certain is that the missile defense
program will intercept large amounts of taxpayers money.''
The costs come on top of the some $40 billion we've already
spent in the 16 years since President Reagan first announced
his star wars plan.
That's a lot of cash. Particularly when one considers that
any state or ``rogue group'' with the sophistication to build
an intercontinental ballistic missile, can probably figure out
how to drive a truck or a smugglers boat, a far more likely
threat.
I know that much has been made in recent weeks that the
citizens of the United States are defenseless against an attack
of even a single nuclear weapon. But that argument is false.
Our real security lies in continuing the steady progress we
have made under both Republican and Democratic Administrations
to reduce the nuclear threat through arms control agreements.
And it is that very progress that a star wars system is most
likely to shoot down and kill.
Former Senator Dale Bumpers, in a recent editorial in the
Los Angeles Times eloquently outlined that concern. He wrote:
``As presently conceived, the system would be a clear violation
of the U.S.-Russian Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. This
treaty has been the solid foundation of all arms control
efforts for the past 27 years. If we violate it, in spite of
strong Russian objections, we virtually assure not only the end
of arms reduction efforts but we jeopardize the very positive
progress of the U.S.-Russia Cooperative Threat Reduction
program.''
Folks, if we were really concerned about our Armed Forces,
we would RUSH to address the fact that thousands of American
Service men and women have to depend on food stamps to provide
for their families. Star Wars can wait.
Cynthia McKinney.