[Senate Executive Report 106-1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





106th Congress                                              Exec. Rept.
  1st Session                    SENATE                        106-1   

=======================================================================



 
                      CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY

                                _______
                                

                 March 24, 1999.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______


          Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,

                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                    [To accompany Treaty Doc. 104-6]

    The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred 
the Convention on Nuclear Safety done at Vienna on September 
20, 1994, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 
with six conditions and two understandings and recomends that 
the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification thereof 
as set forth in this report and the accompanying resolution of 
ratification.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

  I. Implications of the Nuclear Safety Convention...............     1
 II. Committee Action............................................     6
III. Resolution of Ratification..................................    10
 IV. Article-by-Article Analysis.................................    23

            I. Implications of the Nuclear Safety Convention

Background

    Following the 1986 explosion of the nuclear power reactor 
at Chernobyl, Ukraine, more than 50 nations undertook 
negotiation of a multilateral treaty intended to increase the 
safety of civil nuclear power plants. The treaty, the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety, was signed by the Secretary of 
Energy on behalf of the United States in September 1994. The 
treaty was submitted to the Senate in May 1995.
    The Convention is viewed by the Executive Branch as an 
important tool to encourage countries with civilian nuclear 
programs that do not meet Western safety standards (most 
particularly, those possessing Soviet-era nuclear power plants) 
to improve the safety procedures at their installations. The 
Convention seeks to accomplish this objective by urging 
countries to: (1) establish a legislative and regulatory 
framework for nuclear safety; (2) establish procedures to 
ensure that key technical aspects of nuclear safety are 
considered when constructing nuclear power reactors; and (3) 
ensure that priority is given to the establishment and 
maintenance of nuclear safety programs.
    Accordingly, the Executive Branch states that the 
Convention will contribute to raising nuclear safety standards 
worldwide. It will be able to do so, according to 
Administration officials, while protecting the U.S. nuclear 
industry and the domestic regulatory process from undue foreign 
intrusion.
    The Convention has been referred to as an ``incentive'' 
treaty by Executive Branch officials. It contains no 
enforcement mechanisms, and is not designed to punish countries 
for failure to achieve progress in implementing the treaty's 
principles. Rather, it is intended to encourage progress in 
improving nuclear safety systems through a milder form of peer 
review. This approach was deemed preferable by the 
Administration in light of the desire to secure acceptance of 
the Convention by governments with weak safety systems.

Key U.S. Negotiating Objectives Secured in the Convention

    A number of U.S. objectives were secured in the process of 
negotiating the Convention. First, the treaty is limited to 
land-based civilian nuclear power plants intended primarily for 
the generation of electricity or heat (or both) to be 
transmitted for general commercial purposes only. It was judged 
that nuclear power plants designed for commercial electricity 
generation warranted the greatest degree of scrutiny because of 
the magnitude of the inventory of radioactive isotopes, stored 
energy, and weak regulatory regimes in some countries.
    It must be noted that the definition of a civil nuclear 
power plant includes on-site waste storage, handling, and 
treatment facilities. It does not include, however, other 
nuclear facilities such as nuclear power reactors with military 
applications (e.g. the reactors for ballistic missile 
submarines and aircraft carriers), fuel cycle facilities such 
as reprocessing and/or enrichment plants, or research reactors. 
Therefore, while the Convention would not cover the nuclear 
reprocessing facility in Russia which experienced an accident 
in April 1993, neither does the treaty entail any burden on the 
Armed Forces of the United States.
    A second objective accomplished by the United States 
delegation was limitation of the Convention to the articulation 
of fundamental principles for nuclear safety, rather than a 
detailed itemization of standards or rules. Detailed technical 
provisions would, in the view of the Executive Branch, 
``intrude on the responsibility of national governments to 
regulate their nuclear industries and to shape the details of 
their safety regimes.''
    Third, the Convention does not establish a new 
international bureaucracy. Rather, it operates according to a 
process of peer review of national reports issued at periodic 
meetings. Again, as Executive Branch documents have put it: 
``Nuclear safety is ultimately a sovereign responsibility.''

Key Issues Regarding the Nuclear Safety Convention

    At the request of the Chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, the General Accounting Office (GAO) completed a 
review of the Nuclear Safety Convention in January 1997. The 
GAO study summarized its key findings as follows:

          The method to review compliance with the Convention 
        on Nuclear Safety has not been finalized. The 
        Convention does not impose sanctions for noncompliance, 
        but seeks to encourage compliance through peer 
        pressure. The Convention relies on each ratifying 
        country to prepare a self-assessment report of its 
        nuclear power program. These reports will, in turn, be 
        reviewed by other member countries at periodic meetings 
        to determine how each country is complying with the 
        Convention. The level of detail to be included in these 
        reports has not been finalized, nor has the process by 
        which countries will critically review these reports 
        been fully determined.

Process for Reviewing Safety Assessments

    Initially the United States favored a review process 
whereby the self-assessments of various countries would be 
reviewed by three specific committees with respective 
responsibilities for examining each country's (1) governmental 
organization; (2) practices for construction of nuclear 
facilities; and (3) practices for operation of civilian nuclear 
power installations. These three categories are the principal 
elements of the Nuclear Safety Convention.
    The U.S. proposal was rejected, however, in favor of a 
``country-grouping'' model which places countries in five 
different groups, in alternating fashion, on the basis of the 
number of nuclear reactors possessed. This assures that each 
group will have a mix of countries with extensive nuclear 
reactor experience and countries with much less experience. The 
problem with this approach is that the United States is 
therefore not likely to be in same review group as either 
Russia or Ukraine, both of which are recipients of large 
amounts of U.S. nuclear safety assistance.
    Because the Convention affords each country the right to 
discuss and seek clarification regarding the reports submitted 
at a review meeting by any other country, the Administration 
states that the United States will be able to review and 
comment on all self-assessments performed. Administration 
officials have assured the Foreign Relations Committee, 
moreover, that the United States would be present in all group 
meetings where a country currently receiving U.S. nuclear 
safety assistance had submitted a paper for comment.

The Content of Self-Assessment Reports

    National reports provided by Contracting Parties to the 
Convention provide the basis for the entire process established 
under the treaty. Therefore, one would want the reports 
submitted to be of the highest technical quality. The 
Convention contains no specific requirements, however, 
regarding the content of national self-assessments. 
Accordingly, administration officials expect the quality of 
such assessments to vary widely.
    The Guidelines Regarding National Reports Under the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety put forth a comprehensive set of 
``suggested'' categories of information to be included in 
national reports. To the extent that countries use these 
guidelines to establish the minimum level of information 
required, the contribution of the Convention to the overall 
discussion of nuclear safety issues will be enhanced. For 
countries that elect to be non-responsive, or that do not have 
the technical expertise or resources to prepare a thorough 
report, it is to be hoped that the United States delegation to 
review meetings will elicit all of the information suggested in 
the Guidelines by exercising the treaty-provided right to issue 
requests for clarification.

Cost to Implement the Convention

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will serve as 
the Convention's secretariat and provide the facilities and 
personnel for each of the various meetings conducted under the 
treaty. As such, the cost for implementation of the Convention 
will be borne through an increase in the amount assessed to 
member countries by the IAEA on an annual basis. In response to 
a request from the Committee for a detailed cost estimate, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission supplied a December 1993, paper 
which provided high, middle, and low estimates for the 
implementation of the Convention. The 1993 estimates of the 
cost for the conduct of a ``meeting of the parties'' (the 
principal activity conducted pursuant to the Convention) varied 
from $10,800 to $10,303,200. The factors which were expected to 
drive the cost of the treaty were interpretation and 
translation requirements.
    According to the Executive Branch, signatories of the 
Convention have worked to minimize the actual costs of 
implementing the Convention. The Convention's Rules of 
Procedure and Financial Rules adopted in April 1997 
significantly limit the use of languages other than English at 
meetings other than plenary sessions of the Review Meeting that 
is held once every three years. Each Party is required to 
provide an English version of its national report and of 
questions and comments on other Parties' reports, or else to 
repay the IAEA for its translation costs. Organizational 
Meetings and General Committee sessions will be conducted in 
English, as will most Country Group discussions.
    As a result of these steps, the IAEA has budgeted $376,000 
for 1999 to cover all Convention functions, including the 
Review Meeting and preparation costs. The IAEA has budgeted 
only $206,000 for the year 2000, when there will not be a 
Review Meeting, and the Executive Branch believes that costs 
for 2001 are likely to be even lower. The United States would 
be assessed a share of these costs--25 percent--in its IAEA 
contribution whether the United States ratifies the Convention 
or not. Whether the U.S. would agree to pay such assessments, 
however, need not be a matter of contention between the 
Congress and the Administration, as the Committee recommends 
that the Senate provide advice and consent to ratification of 
the treaty. Membership in the Convention, of course, will 
enable the United States to work to minimize costs.

Will Participation in the Nuclear Safety Convention Render Other U.S. 
        Government Activities Duplicative?

    The United States currently participates in, and expends 
funds on a number of organizations dealing with nuclear safety 
issues, including the VVER Owner's Regulatory Group, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency's Senior Regulators 
Meetings, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development's Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) Heads of 
Regulatory Agency Meeting and the OECD's Committee on Nuclear 
Regulatory Activities, the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear 
Installations, the International Nuclear Regulators 
Association, and the proposed Forum of the Spanish-American 
Regulatory Agencies. Additionally, the Administration wishes to 
create, and participate in, an Asian Regulators Group. Because 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is generally the primary 
representative of the U.S. Government in these various fora, 
the U.S. domestic nuclear power industry winds up footing the 
bill (assessed through the NRC's fee structure) for U.S. 
participation.
    Review of the terms of reference/mandates of these various 
groups, and of the subject matters considered by them in recent 
years, reveals that all of these organizations duplicate--at 
least in part--the stated objectives of the Nuclear Safety 
Convention, as expressed in Article 1 of that treaty.
    One group--the International Nuclear Regulators Association 
(INRA)--replicates the object and purpose of the Nuclear Safety 
Convention in entirety. According to NRC documents, in May 
1997, the members of INRA agreed to ``endeavor to identify a 
set of fundamental elements in nuclear safety regulation which 
are common to the various regulatory systems of nuclear 
countries.'' The group further agreed that the key elements of 
nuclear safety regulation would need to be ``consistent with 
existing agreed provisions on nuclear regulations, specifically 
those in the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS).'' Further, 
Article 2 of the terms of reference for INRA states that the 
Association's fundamental purpose is to ``influence and enhance 
nuclear safety, from the regulatory perspective, among its 
members as well as worldwide.'' This differs little in 
substance from the primary objective of the Nuclear Safety 
Convention, which is ``to achieve and maintain a high level of 
nuclear safety worldwide through the enhancement of national 
measures and international cooperation including, where 
appropriate, safety-related technical cooperation.''
    The Executive Branch cites several reasons for having so 
many nuclear safety organizations. Some are more technically-
oriented (e.g., the VVER Owner's Regulatory Group, the IAEA 
Senior Regulators Meeting, and the OECD/NEA Committee on 
Nuclear Regulatory Activities, which has highly technical 
subgroups), while others (e.g., the OECD/NEA Heads of 
Regulatory Agency Meeting and INRA) exist for discussion of 
broad regulatory policy. Also, some organizations are limited 
to the most advanced countries in the field, while others are 
universal or regional in their application.
    In providing advice and consent to U.S. participation in 
the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Senate has the 
opportunity to eliminate unnecessarily duplicative U.S. 
activities in other, non-binding fora for which the Senate's 
advice and consent was not obtained.

The Convention Does Not Solve the RBMK Problem

    The Convention is regarded by many as a positive step 
toward the strengthening of international nuclear safety 
standards. It is purely advisory, however, and does not provide 
a solution to the matter of existing problem reactors--most 
notably the Chernobyl-type RBMK reactor, of which several still 
are in operation on the territory of the former Soviet Union. 
OECD efforts and Western financial assistance are argued by the 
Administration to be the means by which countries that depend 
on such reactors can replace them.

                          II. Committee Action

    The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted at Vienna on 
September 20, 1994. It was submitted to the Senate on May 11, 
1995, and referred on the same day to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations.
    The Committee held a hearing on the Convention on March 17, 
1999, and heard from the following witnesses:

          Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
        for Nonproliferation Affairs;
          Marvin Fertel, Senior Vice President for Nuclear 
        Infrastructure, Support and International Programs of 
        the Nuclear Energy Institute, and
          Gary Jones, Associate Director for Energy, Resources 
        and Science Issues in the Resources, Community and 
        Economic Development Division of the General Accounting 
        Office.

    On March 23, 1999, the Committee unanimously approved, by 
voice vote, a resolution of ratification of the Convention 
including 6 conditions and 2 understandings.

Condition 1: Certification on the Elimination of Duplicative Activities

    Condition (1) requires the President to certify, within 45 
days of the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the 
Convention, that the United States Government will not 
unnecessarily duplicate (in other multinational fora) 
activities to be undertaken in conjunction with the Convention. 
This condition also bars the United States from participation 
in the Convention, beyond the act of depositing the instrument 
of ratification, until the requisite certification is made.
    The Committee became concerned, during the course of its 
review of the Convention, regarding the large number of 
international nuclear safety-related groups in which the United 
States participates. One benefit of the Nuclear Safety 
Convention may be an opportunity to consolidate some such 
activities under the auspices of Convention-related meetings. 
It also is hoped that the Administration will eliminate 
activities which unnecessarily duplicate those to be performed 
under the Nuclear Safety Convention. Certainly, the Committee 
expects the Executive Branch to ensure that nuclear safety-
related activities that are conducted in accordance with a 
legally-binding treaty take precedence over similar activities 
conducted only under executive agreements.
    The Committee understands that there are several reasons 
for continued U.S. participation in nuclear safety 
organizations that operate outside of the treaty framework. In 
particular, there will continue to be a need for groups that 
are highly specialized and technically-oriented (e.g., the VVER 
Owner's Regulatory Group). However, the Executive Branch should 
seriously consider limiting U.S. participation in non-treaty 
organizations which exist largely for discussion of broad 
regulatory policy. While Condition (1) identifies no particular 
group or organization as being ``unnecessarily'' duplicative, 
questioning in the Committee's hearing on the Nuclear Safety 
Convention focused on whether the International Nuclear 
Regulators Association (INRA) should be eliminated pursuant to 
the certification required under Condition (1).

Condition 2: Commitment to Review Reports

    Condition (2) requires the President to assure the Congress 
that the United States will review and comment upon the safety 
reports prepared by any country receiving U.S. assistance 
relating to nuclear safety. During the course of its 
consideration of the Convention, the Committee became concerned 
that the United States might not be a formal member of the same 
review group as either Russia or Ukraine, both of which are 
recipients of large amounts of U.S. nuclear safety assistance. 
This is due to the manner by which review groups are 
established under the Convention.
    However, because the Convention affords the United States 
the right to discuss and seek clarification regarding reports 
submitted for review, the Administration contends that the 
United States will be able to review and comment on all self-
assessments performed. Administration officials assured the 
Committee that the United States would be present in all review 
meetings where a country currently receiving U.S. nuclear 
safety assistance had submitted a paper for comment. Condition 
(2) formalizes this commitment.

Condition 3: Limitation on the Cost of Implementation

    This provision addresses the fact that the United States is 
scheduled to pay for implementation of the Convention in its 
annual assessed contribution to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. Pursuant to this provision, the United States shall not 
pay more than $1 million per year (adjusted for inflation) for 
the implementation of the Convention, unless the President 
first certifies that more funds are required and Congress 
enacts a joint resolution approving the President's 
certification.

Condition 4: Complete Review of Information by the Legislative Branch 
        of Government

    Condition 4 makes clear that the Executive Branch may not 
cite any provision of the Convention as justification for 
denying the Legislative Branch access to information relating 
to the operation of the Convention, including information 
deemed ``confidential'' or ``protected'' by foreign nations. 
This provision further requires the President to agree that the 
Comptroller General of the United States, who is frequently 
tasked by the Committee to perform assessments of nuclear 
safety-related issues, is to be given full and complete access 
to certain specific categories of information. Finally, the 
condition requires the Executive Branch to prepare a detailed 
report on Convention-related issues, upon request by the 
Chairman of either of the appropriate Committees of Congress.

Condition 5: Amendments to the Convention

    Condition (5) renders binding upon the Executive Branch of 
Government the obligation to be present at all relevant 
meetings and Conferences, and to cast a vote--either positive 
or negative--on all proposed amendments. That, in turn, will 
ensure that the President shall submit to the Senate for its 
advice and consent to ratification all amendments to the 
Convention. Given the wording of Article 32 of the Convention, 
if the Senate were not to adopt this provision, it would be 
possible for an amendment to be adopted without being submitted 
to the Senate for advice and consent, or, indeed, over the 
objection of the Senate.

Condition 6: Treaty Interpretation

    The Committee condition on Treaty Interpretation affirms 
that the constitutionally-based principles of treaty 
interpretation, set forth in Condition (1) of the Senate's 
resolution of ratification of the INF Treaty (May 27, 1988) and 
Condition (8) of the resolution of ratification of the CFE 
Flank Document (May 14, 1997) apply to all treaties. These 
principles apply regardless of whether the Senate chooses to 
say so in its consideration of any particular treaty.

Understanding 1: Dismantlement of the Juragua Nuclear Reactor

    This provision establishes the formal understanding of the 
United States Government that Cuba will not be considered to 
have satisfied its treaty obligations under Article 6 of the 
Convention unless it has agreed not to complete the Juragua 
nuclear installation. Article 6 of the Convention binds 
Contracting Parties either to upgrade the safety of their 
nuclear installations ``as a matter of urgency'' or, if 
upgrading cannot be achieved, to implement plans to shut down 
the installation ``as soon as practically possible.''
    The Committee judges that the Government of Cuba has not 
taken the necessary steps to ensure that the nuclear reactor 
site under construction at Cienfuegos, Cuba, will meet 
acceptable safety standards. In particular, the Committee 
judges that the Government of Cuba has not satisfactorily 
engaged in the types of activities stipulated under Articles 
17, 18, and 19 of the Convention (relating to the siting, 
design and construction, and proposed operation of a nuclear 
facility). Because of the Cuban Government's lack of 
appropriate safety precautions, the Committee believes that the 
Juragua nuclear reactor, if completed, would pose a serious 
environmental and health hazard. Just as the accident at 
Chernobyl affected people living well beyond the borders of 
Ukraine, so too would an accident at Juragua threaten the lives 
and health not only of the Cuban people, but of U.S. citizens 
as well. The Committee deems the risk posed by this planned 
reactor to be unacceptable, and recommends adoption of 
Understanding (1).

Understanding 2: IAEA Technical Assistance

    Understanding (2) establishes the sense of the Senate that 
the United States should withhold certain funds from the 
International Atomic Energy Agency every year in an effort to 
induce that organization not to provide funds to nuclear-
related projects in Iran and Cuba. (The withheld funds would be 
the U.S. proportionate share of IAEA's technical cooperation 
fund projects in Iran and Cuba.) The Committee is concerned 
that the IAEA continues to provide resources to Cuba for work 
relating to the partially-completed nuclear reactor at 
Cienfuegos. Moreover, the IAEA continues to provide technical 
assistance relating to Iran's Bushehr nuclear installation. As 
is made clear by Understanding (1), the Committee is deeply 
concerned with the environmental and health implications of the 
Cienfuegos facility.
    The Committee is concerned with the Bushehr reactor in Iran 
for different reasons. Specifically, the Committee shares the 
Executive Branch's concern that Iran continues to pursue a 
nuclear weapons capability, and that the facility at Bushehr 
will be used both to train Iranian nationals who may 
subsequently work in the weapons program and as a cover for the 
program itself.

                    III. Resolution of Ratification




                    IV. Article by Article Analysis

    The Preamble describes the concerns underlying the 
Convention. The Contracting Parties wish to promote a high 
level of nuclear safety worldwide, recognizing the importance 
to the international community of ensuring that the use of 
nuclear energy is safe, well regulated and environmentally 
sound and also recognizing that accidents at ``nuclear 
installations'' (defined in Article 2) potentially have trans-
border impacts. The Preamble also states that the Convention 
entails a commitment to the application of fundamental safety 
principles for nuclear installations rather than of detailed 
safety standards, and affirms the importance of international 
cooperation for the enhancement of nuclear safety.
    Article 1 sets forth the objectives of the Convention, 
which are to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear 
safety worldwide through the enhancement of national measures 
and international cooperation, to establish and maintain 
effective defenses in nuclear installations against potential 
radiological hazards, and to prevent accidents with 
radiological consequences and mitigate such consequences if 
they occur.
    Article 2 contains definitions for the Convention. 
``Nuclear installation'' is defined as any land-based civil 
nuclear power plant under the jurisdiction of a Contracting 
Party, including storage, handling and treatment facilities for 
radioactive materials that are on the same site and are 
directly related to the operation of the nuclear power plant. A 
``regulators body'' for each Contracting Party means any body 
or bodies given the legal authority by that Contracting Party 
to grant licenses and regulate the siting, design, 
construction, commissioning, operation or decommissioning of 
nuclear installations. ``License'' means any authorization 
granted by the regulatory body to the applicant to have the 
responsibility for the siting, design, construction, 
commissioning, operation or decommissioning of a nuclear 
installation.
    Article 3 specifies that the Convention shall apply to the 
safety of nuclear installations.
    Article 4 requires each Contacting Party to take, within 
the framework of its national law, the legislative, regulatory 
and administrative measures and other steps necessary to 
implement its obligations under the Convention.
    Article 5 provides that each Contracting Party shall submit 
for review, prior to each review meeting provided for in 
Article 20, a report on the measures it has taken to implement 
its obligations under the Convention. Review meetings must be 
held no less fre quently than every three years (see Article 
21), so national reports must be submitted at least that 
frequently. This reporting requirement, combined with the 
review process provided for in Article 20, is the central 
implementing mechanism of the Convention.
    Article 6 directs each Contracting Party to take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of nuclear 
installations existing at the time the Convention enters into 
force for that Contracting Party is reviewed as soon as 
possible, and to ensure that all reasonably practicable 
improvements are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the 
safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be 
achieved by a Contracting Party, it must implement plans to 
shut down the nuclear installation as soon as practically 
possible, taking into account the whole energy context and 
possible alternatives, as well as the social, environmental and 
economic impact.
    Article 7 requires each party to establish and maintain a 
legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of 
nuclear installations. The framework must provide for the 
establishment of applicable national safety requirements and 
regulations, a system of licensing with regard to nuclear 
installations and the prohibition of the operation of a nuclear 
installation without a license, a system of regulatory 
inspection and assessment of nuclear installations to ascertain 
compliance with applicable regulations and the terms of 
licenses, and the enforcement of applicable regulations and of 
the terms of licenses, including suspension, modification or 
revocation.
    Article 8 requires each Contracting Party to establish or 
designate a regulatory body entrusted with the implementation 
of the legislative and regulatory framework created under 
Article 7. Each such regulatory body must be given adequate 
authority, competence and resources to fulfill its assigned 
responsibilities. Contracting Parties must also ensure that the 
functions of these regulatory bodies are effectively separated 
from those of any other body concerned with the promotion or 
utilization of nuclear energy.
    Under Article 9, each Contracting Party is obligated to 
ensure that the prime responsibility for the safety of a 
nuclear installation rests with the holder of the relevant 
license and to take steps to ensure that each such license 
holder meets its responsibility.
    Article 10 obligates each Contracting Party to take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that all organizations engaged in 
activities directly related to nuclear installations establish 
policies giving due priority to nuclear safety.
    Article 11 requires a Contracting Party to take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that there are adequate financial 
resources available to support the safety of each nuclear 
installation throughout its life, and that there are sufficient 
numbers of qualified and ap propriately trained and retrained 
staff available for all safety-related activities for each 
nuclear installation throughout its life.
    Article 12 requires each Contracting Party to take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that the capabilities and 
limitations of human performance are taken into account 
throughout the life of a nuclear installation.
    Under Article 13, each Contracting Party must take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that quality assurance programs are 
established and implemented with a view to providing confidence 
that specified requirements for all activities important to 
nuclear safety are satisfied throughout the life of a nuclear 
installation.
    Article 14 obligates each Contracting Party to take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that comprehensive and systematic 
safety assessments are carried out before the construction and 
commissioning of a nuclear installation, as well as throughout 
its life. These assessments must be well documented and 
subsequently updated in the light of operating experience and 
significant new safety information. They also must be reviewed 
under the authority of the regulatory body. Article 14 also 
requires Contracting States to take the appropriate steps to 
ensure that verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and 
inspection is carried out to ensure that the physical state and 
the operation of a nuclear installation continue to be in 
accordance with its design, applicable national safety 
requirements, and operational limits and conditions.
    Article 15 requires Contracting Parties to take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that the radiation exposure to 
workers and the public caused by a nuclear installation in all 
operational states shall be kept as low as reasonably 
achievable, and also that no individual shall be exposed to 
radiation doses exceeding prescribed national dose limits.
    Under Article 16, each Contracting Party must take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that there are on-site and off-site 
emergency plans covering the activities to be carried out in 
the event of an emergency and that such emergency plans are 
routinely tested. Emergency plans must be prepared and tested 
before any new nuclear installation commences operation above a 
low power level agreed to by the regulatory body. Each 
Contracting Party must also take the appropriate steps to 
ensure that its own population and the competent authorities of 
the States in the vicinity of the nuclear installation are 
provided with appropriate information for emergency planning 
and response. Contracting Parties without nuclear installations 
on their territories must take the appropriate steps for the 
preparation and testing of emergency plans for their 
territories, if they are likely to be affected by a 
radiological emergency at a nuclear installation in the 
vicinity.
    Article 17 deals with the siting of nuclear installations. 
Contracting Parties are required to take the appropriate steps 
to ensure that appropriate procedures are established and 
implemented for evaluating all relevant site-related factors 
likely to affect the safety of a nuclear installation for its 
projected lifetime, and for evaluating the likely safety impact 
of a proposed nuclear installation on individuals, society and 
the environment, as well as for re-evaluating as necessary all 
such factors so as to ensure the continued safety acceptability 
of the nuclear installations. Each Contracting Party must also 
take the appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate 
procedures are established and implemented for consulting Con 
tracting Parties in the vicinity of a proposed nuclear 
installation likely to affect them and provide to them, upon 
their request, information necessary for them to evaluate and 
assess the likely safety impact of the nuclear installation on 
their own territory.
    Article 18 sets forth the actions that each Contracting 
Party must take with respect to the design and construction of 
nuclear installations. The article obligates a Contracting 
Party to take appropriate steps to ensure that the design and 
construction of a nuclear installation provides for several 
reliable levels and methods of protection (defense in depth) 
against the release of radioactive materials, to prevent the 
occurrence of accidents and mitigate their radiological 
consequences if they do occur. Each Contracting Party must also 
take appropriate steps to ensure that the technologies 
incorporated in the design and construction of a nuclear 
installation are proven by experience or qualified by testing 
or analysis, and that the design of a nuclear installation 
allows for reliable, stable and easily manageable operation, 
with specific consideration of human factors and the man-
machine interface.
    Addressing the safety of operation of nuclear 
installations, Article 19 requires each Contracting Party to 
take the appropriate steps to ensure that the initial 
authorization to operate a nuclear installation is based upon 
an appropriate safety analysis and a commissioning program 
demonstrating the consistency of the installation as 
constructed with design and safety requirements. Contracting 
Parties must also take appropriate steps to ensure that 
operational limits and conditions derived from the safety 
analysis, tests and operational experience are defined and 
revised as necessary for identifying safe boundaries for 
operation, and that operation, maintenance, inspection and 
testing of nuclear installations are conducted in accordance 
with approved procedures. Under subparagraphs (iv) and (v) of 
Article 19, Contracting Parties must also take appropriate 
steps to ensure that procedures are established for responding 
to anticipated operational occurrences and to accidents, and 
that necessary engineering and technical support in all safety-
related fields is available through the lifetime of a nuclear 
installation. Subparagraph (vi) obligates Contracting Parties 
to take appropriate steps to ensure that incidents significant 
to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the 
relevant license to the regulatory authority. Under 
subparagraph (vii), Contracting Parties must take appropriate 
steps to ensure the establishment of programs to collect and 
analyze operating experience, and must also ensure that the 
conclusions of these analyses are acted upon and that existing 
mechanisms are used to share important experience with 
international bodies and with other operating organizations and 
regulatory bodies. Lastly, Contracting Parties are required 
under subparagraph (viii) of Article 19 to take appro priate 
steps to ensure that the activity and volume of radioactive 
waste resulting from the operation of a nuclear installation is 
kept to the minimum practicable for the process concerned, both 
in activity and in volume, and that any necessary treatment and 
storage of spent fuel and waste directly related to the 
operation and on the same site as that of the nuclear 
installation take into consideration conditioning and disposal.
    Article 20 provides for review meetings of the Contracting 
Parties for the purpose of reviewing the national reports 
submitted pursuant to Article 5. At these meetings, each 
Contracting Party is to have a reasonable opportunity to 
discuss and seek clarification of the review reports submitted 
by others. Sub-groups comprised of representatives of 
Contracting Parties may also be established as necessary for 
the purpose of reviewing specific subjects contained in the 
reports.
    Article 21 establishes timetables for meetings of the 
Contracting Parties. A preparatory meeting must be held not 
later than six months after the entry into force of the 
Convention. At that meeting, Contracting Parties must establish 
a date for the first review meeting, to be held no later than 
30 months after the date of the Convention's entry into force. 
At each review meeting, the Contracting Parties must determine 
the date for the succeeding review meeting, at an interval of 
no more than three years.
    Article 22 concerns the procedures to be followed at the 
meetings of the Contracting Parties. Rules of Procedure, 
including guidelines regarding the form and structure of the 
reports to be submitted under Article 5, a date for submission 
of such reports, and the proc ess for reviewing them, and 
Financial Rules are to be prepared and adopted-by consensus by 
the Contracting Parties at the preparatory meeting.
    Article 23 provides for extraordinary meetings of the 
Contracting Parties if agreed to by a majority of those present 
and voting at the meeting (including abstentions as voting), or 
at the written request of a Contracting Party supported by a 
majority of the Contracting Parties.
    Article 24 provides that each Contracting Party shall 
attend meetings of the Contracting Parties and be represented 
at such meetings by one delegate, and by alternates, experts 
and advisers it deems necessary. Contracting Parties may by 
consensus invite intergovernmental organizations competent in 
matters relating to the Convention to attend, as observers, any 
meetings or specific sessions thereof.
    Summary reports addressing the issues discussed and 
conclusions reached during a meeting are to be adopted by the 
Contracting Parties by consensus and made available to the 
public (Article 25).
    The languages of meetings of the Contracting Parties are 
Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish, unless 
otherwise provided in the Rules of Procedure (Article 26). 
Reports may be in the national language of the submitting 
Contracting Party or in a single designated language agreed 
upon in the Rules of Procedure, although in the former case the 
Contracting Party must also provide a translation into the 
designated language.
    Article 27 provides that the Convention does not affect the 
rights and obligations of the Contracting Parties under their 
own laws to protection information from disclosure. Information 
is defined to include, inter alia, personal data, information 
protected by intellectual property rights or industrial or 
commercial confidentiality, and information relating to 
national security or to the physical protection of nuclear 
materials or nuclear installations. When a Contracting Party 
provides information identified by it as protected, such 
information can be used only for the purposes for which it has 
been provided and must be kept confidential. Similarly, the 
contents of discussions of national reports held at review 
meetings must be kept confidential.
    The secretariat functions for meetings of the Contracting 
Parties under the Convention are to be provided by the IAEA, 
which will pay the costs of performing these functions out of 
its regular budget (Article 28). The secretariat's duties are 
to convene, prepare and service the meetings of the Contracting 
Parties, and transmit to the Contracting Parties information 
received or prepared under the Convention.
    Article 29 concerns dispute resolution. In the event of a 
disagreement between Contracting Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Convention, the 
Contracting Parties shall consult within the framework of a 
meeting of the Contracting Parties to try to resolve the 
disagreement.
    The Convention was opened for signature by all States at 
the Headquarters of the IAEA in Vienna on September 20, 1994, 
and will remain open for signature until its entry in force 
(Article 30). After the Convention has entered into force, it 
is to be open for accession by all States. Under Article 30, 
regional organizations constituted by sovereign States and with 
competence in respect of negotiation, conclusion and 
application of international agreements in matters covered by 
this Convention may also sign or accede to the Convention. In 
matters within their competence, such organizations may 
exercise the rights and fulfill the responsibilities of the 
Convention on their own behalf, but do not have any vote 
additional to those of their Member States.
    Article 31 provides that the Convention will enter into 
force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit with the 
Depositary of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, 
acceptance or approval, including the instruments of seventeen 
States each of which as at least one nuclear installation which 
has achieved criticality in a reactor core. It will enter into 
force for each additional adhering State or regional 
organization 90 days after the date of deposit with the 
Depositary of the appropriate instrument by such State or 
organization. Procedures for amendment of the Convention are 
included in Article 32.
    A Contracting Party may denounce the Convention by written 
notice to the Depositary, effective one year following the 
Depositary's receipt of the notification or at such later date 
as specified in the notification (Article 33). The Depositary 
of the Convention is the Director General of the IAEA, who is 
charged with the duty of notifying all Contracting Parties of 
all significant developments concerning the Convention (Article 
34).

                                

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