[Senate Executive Report 106-1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress Exec. Rept.
1st Session SENATE 106-1
=======================================================================
CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
_______
March 24, 1999.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany Treaty Doc. 104-6]
The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred
the Convention on Nuclear Safety done at Vienna on September
20, 1994, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon
with six conditions and two understandings and recomends that
the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification thereof
as set forth in this report and the accompanying resolution of
ratification.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Implications of the Nuclear Safety Convention............... 1
II. Committee Action............................................ 6
III. Resolution of Ratification.................................. 10
IV. Article-by-Article Analysis................................. 23
I. Implications of the Nuclear Safety Convention
Background
Following the 1986 explosion of the nuclear power reactor
at Chernobyl, Ukraine, more than 50 nations undertook
negotiation of a multilateral treaty intended to increase the
safety of civil nuclear power plants. The treaty, the
Convention on Nuclear Safety, was signed by the Secretary of
Energy on behalf of the United States in September 1994. The
treaty was submitted to the Senate in May 1995.
The Convention is viewed by the Executive Branch as an
important tool to encourage countries with civilian nuclear
programs that do not meet Western safety standards (most
particularly, those possessing Soviet-era nuclear power plants)
to improve the safety procedures at their installations. The
Convention seeks to accomplish this objective by urging
countries to: (1) establish a legislative and regulatory
framework for nuclear safety; (2) establish procedures to
ensure that key technical aspects of nuclear safety are
considered when constructing nuclear power reactors; and (3)
ensure that priority is given to the establishment and
maintenance of nuclear safety programs.
Accordingly, the Executive Branch states that the
Convention will contribute to raising nuclear safety standards
worldwide. It will be able to do so, according to
Administration officials, while protecting the U.S. nuclear
industry and the domestic regulatory process from undue foreign
intrusion.
The Convention has been referred to as an ``incentive''
treaty by Executive Branch officials. It contains no
enforcement mechanisms, and is not designed to punish countries
for failure to achieve progress in implementing the treaty's
principles. Rather, it is intended to encourage progress in
improving nuclear safety systems through a milder form of peer
review. This approach was deemed preferable by the
Administration in light of the desire to secure acceptance of
the Convention by governments with weak safety systems.
Key U.S. Negotiating Objectives Secured in the Convention
A number of U.S. objectives were secured in the process of
negotiating the Convention. First, the treaty is limited to
land-based civilian nuclear power plants intended primarily for
the generation of electricity or heat (or both) to be
transmitted for general commercial purposes only. It was judged
that nuclear power plants designed for commercial electricity
generation warranted the greatest degree of scrutiny because of
the magnitude of the inventory of radioactive isotopes, stored
energy, and weak regulatory regimes in some countries.
It must be noted that the definition of a civil nuclear
power plant includes on-site waste storage, handling, and
treatment facilities. It does not include, however, other
nuclear facilities such as nuclear power reactors with military
applications (e.g. the reactors for ballistic missile
submarines and aircraft carriers), fuel cycle facilities such
as reprocessing and/or enrichment plants, or research reactors.
Therefore, while the Convention would not cover the nuclear
reprocessing facility in Russia which experienced an accident
in April 1993, neither does the treaty entail any burden on the
Armed Forces of the United States.
A second objective accomplished by the United States
delegation was limitation of the Convention to the articulation
of fundamental principles for nuclear safety, rather than a
detailed itemization of standards or rules. Detailed technical
provisions would, in the view of the Executive Branch,
``intrude on the responsibility of national governments to
regulate their nuclear industries and to shape the details of
their safety regimes.''
Third, the Convention does not establish a new
international bureaucracy. Rather, it operates according to a
process of peer review of national reports issued at periodic
meetings. Again, as Executive Branch documents have put it:
``Nuclear safety is ultimately a sovereign responsibility.''
Key Issues Regarding the Nuclear Safety Convention
At the request of the Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, the General Accounting Office (GAO) completed a
review of the Nuclear Safety Convention in January 1997. The
GAO study summarized its key findings as follows:
The method to review compliance with the Convention
on Nuclear Safety has not been finalized. The
Convention does not impose sanctions for noncompliance,
but seeks to encourage compliance through peer
pressure. The Convention relies on each ratifying
country to prepare a self-assessment report of its
nuclear power program. These reports will, in turn, be
reviewed by other member countries at periodic meetings
to determine how each country is complying with the
Convention. The level of detail to be included in these
reports has not been finalized, nor has the process by
which countries will critically review these reports
been fully determined.
Process for Reviewing Safety Assessments
Initially the United States favored a review process
whereby the self-assessments of various countries would be
reviewed by three specific committees with respective
responsibilities for examining each country's (1) governmental
organization; (2) practices for construction of nuclear
facilities; and (3) practices for operation of civilian nuclear
power installations. These three categories are the principal
elements of the Nuclear Safety Convention.
The U.S. proposal was rejected, however, in favor of a
``country-grouping'' model which places countries in five
different groups, in alternating fashion, on the basis of the
number of nuclear reactors possessed. This assures that each
group will have a mix of countries with extensive nuclear
reactor experience and countries with much less experience. The
problem with this approach is that the United States is
therefore not likely to be in same review group as either
Russia or Ukraine, both of which are recipients of large
amounts of U.S. nuclear safety assistance.
Because the Convention affords each country the right to
discuss and seek clarification regarding the reports submitted
at a review meeting by any other country, the Administration
states that the United States will be able to review and
comment on all self-assessments performed. Administration
officials have assured the Foreign Relations Committee,
moreover, that the United States would be present in all group
meetings where a country currently receiving U.S. nuclear
safety assistance had submitted a paper for comment.
The Content of Self-Assessment Reports
National reports provided by Contracting Parties to the
Convention provide the basis for the entire process established
under the treaty. Therefore, one would want the reports
submitted to be of the highest technical quality. The
Convention contains no specific requirements, however,
regarding the content of national self-assessments.
Accordingly, administration officials expect the quality of
such assessments to vary widely.
The Guidelines Regarding National Reports Under the
Convention on Nuclear Safety put forth a comprehensive set of
``suggested'' categories of information to be included in
national reports. To the extent that countries use these
guidelines to establish the minimum level of information
required, the contribution of the Convention to the overall
discussion of nuclear safety issues will be enhanced. For
countries that elect to be non-responsive, or that do not have
the technical expertise or resources to prepare a thorough
report, it is to be hoped that the United States delegation to
review meetings will elicit all of the information suggested in
the Guidelines by exercising the treaty-provided right to issue
requests for clarification.
Cost to Implement the Convention
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will serve as
the Convention's secretariat and provide the facilities and
personnel for each of the various meetings conducted under the
treaty. As such, the cost for implementation of the Convention
will be borne through an increase in the amount assessed to
member countries by the IAEA on an annual basis. In response to
a request from the Committee for a detailed cost estimate, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission supplied a December 1993, paper
which provided high, middle, and low estimates for the
implementation of the Convention. The 1993 estimates of the
cost for the conduct of a ``meeting of the parties'' (the
principal activity conducted pursuant to the Convention) varied
from $10,800 to $10,303,200. The factors which were expected to
drive the cost of the treaty were interpretation and
translation requirements.
According to the Executive Branch, signatories of the
Convention have worked to minimize the actual costs of
implementing the Convention. The Convention's Rules of
Procedure and Financial Rules adopted in April 1997
significantly limit the use of languages other than English at
meetings other than plenary sessions of the Review Meeting that
is held once every three years. Each Party is required to
provide an English version of its national report and of
questions and comments on other Parties' reports, or else to
repay the IAEA for its translation costs. Organizational
Meetings and General Committee sessions will be conducted in
English, as will most Country Group discussions.
As a result of these steps, the IAEA has budgeted $376,000
for 1999 to cover all Convention functions, including the
Review Meeting and preparation costs. The IAEA has budgeted
only $206,000 for the year 2000, when there will not be a
Review Meeting, and the Executive Branch believes that costs
for 2001 are likely to be even lower. The United States would
be assessed a share of these costs--25 percent--in its IAEA
contribution whether the United States ratifies the Convention
or not. Whether the U.S. would agree to pay such assessments,
however, need not be a matter of contention between the
Congress and the Administration, as the Committee recommends
that the Senate provide advice and consent to ratification of
the treaty. Membership in the Convention, of course, will
enable the United States to work to minimize costs.
Will Participation in the Nuclear Safety Convention Render Other U.S.
Government Activities Duplicative?
The United States currently participates in, and expends
funds on a number of organizations dealing with nuclear safety
issues, including the VVER Owner's Regulatory Group, the
International Atomic Energy Agency's Senior Regulators
Meetings, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development's Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) Heads of
Regulatory Agency Meeting and the OECD's Committee on Nuclear
Regulatory Activities, the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear
Installations, the International Nuclear Regulators
Association, and the proposed Forum of the Spanish-American
Regulatory Agencies. Additionally, the Administration wishes to
create, and participate in, an Asian Regulators Group. Because
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is generally the primary
representative of the U.S. Government in these various fora,
the U.S. domestic nuclear power industry winds up footing the
bill (assessed through the NRC's fee structure) for U.S.
participation.
Review of the terms of reference/mandates of these various
groups, and of the subject matters considered by them in recent
years, reveals that all of these organizations duplicate--at
least in part--the stated objectives of the Nuclear Safety
Convention, as expressed in Article 1 of that treaty.
One group--the International Nuclear Regulators Association
(INRA)--replicates the object and purpose of the Nuclear Safety
Convention in entirety. According to NRC documents, in May
1997, the members of INRA agreed to ``endeavor to identify a
set of fundamental elements in nuclear safety regulation which
are common to the various regulatory systems of nuclear
countries.'' The group further agreed that the key elements of
nuclear safety regulation would need to be ``consistent with
existing agreed provisions on nuclear regulations, specifically
those in the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS).'' Further,
Article 2 of the terms of reference for INRA states that the
Association's fundamental purpose is to ``influence and enhance
nuclear safety, from the regulatory perspective, among its
members as well as worldwide.'' This differs little in
substance from the primary objective of the Nuclear Safety
Convention, which is ``to achieve and maintain a high level of
nuclear safety worldwide through the enhancement of national
measures and international cooperation including, where
appropriate, safety-related technical cooperation.''
The Executive Branch cites several reasons for having so
many nuclear safety organizations. Some are more technically-
oriented (e.g., the VVER Owner's Regulatory Group, the IAEA
Senior Regulators Meeting, and the OECD/NEA Committee on
Nuclear Regulatory Activities, which has highly technical
subgroups), while others (e.g., the OECD/NEA Heads of
Regulatory Agency Meeting and INRA) exist for discussion of
broad regulatory policy. Also, some organizations are limited
to the most advanced countries in the field, while others are
universal or regional in their application.
In providing advice and consent to U.S. participation in
the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Senate has the
opportunity to eliminate unnecessarily duplicative U.S.
activities in other, non-binding fora for which the Senate's
advice and consent was not obtained.
The Convention Does Not Solve the RBMK Problem
The Convention is regarded by many as a positive step
toward the strengthening of international nuclear safety
standards. It is purely advisory, however, and does not provide
a solution to the matter of existing problem reactors--most
notably the Chernobyl-type RBMK reactor, of which several still
are in operation on the territory of the former Soviet Union.
OECD efforts and Western financial assistance are argued by the
Administration to be the means by which countries that depend
on such reactors can replace them.
II. Committee Action
The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted at Vienna on
September 20, 1994. It was submitted to the Senate on May 11,
1995, and referred on the same day to the Committee on Foreign
Relations.
The Committee held a hearing on the Convention on March 17,
1999, and heard from the following witnesses:
Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Nonproliferation Affairs;
Marvin Fertel, Senior Vice President for Nuclear
Infrastructure, Support and International Programs of
the Nuclear Energy Institute, and
Gary Jones, Associate Director for Energy, Resources
and Science Issues in the Resources, Community and
Economic Development Division of the General Accounting
Office.
On March 23, 1999, the Committee unanimously approved, by
voice vote, a resolution of ratification of the Convention
including 6 conditions and 2 understandings.
Condition 1: Certification on the Elimination of Duplicative Activities
Condition (1) requires the President to certify, within 45
days of the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the
Convention, that the United States Government will not
unnecessarily duplicate (in other multinational fora)
activities to be undertaken in conjunction with the Convention.
This condition also bars the United States from participation
in the Convention, beyond the act of depositing the instrument
of ratification, until the requisite certification is made.
The Committee became concerned, during the course of its
review of the Convention, regarding the large number of
international nuclear safety-related groups in which the United
States participates. One benefit of the Nuclear Safety
Convention may be an opportunity to consolidate some such
activities under the auspices of Convention-related meetings.
It also is hoped that the Administration will eliminate
activities which unnecessarily duplicate those to be performed
under the Nuclear Safety Convention. Certainly, the Committee
expects the Executive Branch to ensure that nuclear safety-
related activities that are conducted in accordance with a
legally-binding treaty take precedence over similar activities
conducted only under executive agreements.
The Committee understands that there are several reasons
for continued U.S. participation in nuclear safety
organizations that operate outside of the treaty framework. In
particular, there will continue to be a need for groups that
are highly specialized and technically-oriented (e.g., the VVER
Owner's Regulatory Group). However, the Executive Branch should
seriously consider limiting U.S. participation in non-treaty
organizations which exist largely for discussion of broad
regulatory policy. While Condition (1) identifies no particular
group or organization as being ``unnecessarily'' duplicative,
questioning in the Committee's hearing on the Nuclear Safety
Convention focused on whether the International Nuclear
Regulators Association (INRA) should be eliminated pursuant to
the certification required under Condition (1).
Condition 2: Commitment to Review Reports
Condition (2) requires the President to assure the Congress
that the United States will review and comment upon the safety
reports prepared by any country receiving U.S. assistance
relating to nuclear safety. During the course of its
consideration of the Convention, the Committee became concerned
that the United States might not be a formal member of the same
review group as either Russia or Ukraine, both of which are
recipients of large amounts of U.S. nuclear safety assistance.
This is due to the manner by which review groups are
established under the Convention.
However, because the Convention affords the United States
the right to discuss and seek clarification regarding reports
submitted for review, the Administration contends that the
United States will be able to review and comment on all self-
assessments performed. Administration officials assured the
Committee that the United States would be present in all review
meetings where a country currently receiving U.S. nuclear
safety assistance had submitted a paper for comment. Condition
(2) formalizes this commitment.
Condition 3: Limitation on the Cost of Implementation
This provision addresses the fact that the United States is
scheduled to pay for implementation of the Convention in its
annual assessed contribution to the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Pursuant to this provision, the United States shall not
pay more than $1 million per year (adjusted for inflation) for
the implementation of the Convention, unless the President
first certifies that more funds are required and Congress
enacts a joint resolution approving the President's
certification.
Condition 4: Complete Review of Information by the Legislative Branch
of Government
Condition 4 makes clear that the Executive Branch may not
cite any provision of the Convention as justification for
denying the Legislative Branch access to information relating
to the operation of the Convention, including information
deemed ``confidential'' or ``protected'' by foreign nations.
This provision further requires the President to agree that the
Comptroller General of the United States, who is frequently
tasked by the Committee to perform assessments of nuclear
safety-related issues, is to be given full and complete access
to certain specific categories of information. Finally, the
condition requires the Executive Branch to prepare a detailed
report on Convention-related issues, upon request by the
Chairman of either of the appropriate Committees of Congress.
Condition 5: Amendments to the Convention
Condition (5) renders binding upon the Executive Branch of
Government the obligation to be present at all relevant
meetings and Conferences, and to cast a vote--either positive
or negative--on all proposed amendments. That, in turn, will
ensure that the President shall submit to the Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification all amendments to the
Convention. Given the wording of Article 32 of the Convention,
if the Senate were not to adopt this provision, it would be
possible for an amendment to be adopted without being submitted
to the Senate for advice and consent, or, indeed, over the
objection of the Senate.
Condition 6: Treaty Interpretation
The Committee condition on Treaty Interpretation affirms
that the constitutionally-based principles of treaty
interpretation, set forth in Condition (1) of the Senate's
resolution of ratification of the INF Treaty (May 27, 1988) and
Condition (8) of the resolution of ratification of the CFE
Flank Document (May 14, 1997) apply to all treaties. These
principles apply regardless of whether the Senate chooses to
say so in its consideration of any particular treaty.
Understanding 1: Dismantlement of the Juragua Nuclear Reactor
This provision establishes the formal understanding of the
United States Government that Cuba will not be considered to
have satisfied its treaty obligations under Article 6 of the
Convention unless it has agreed not to complete the Juragua
nuclear installation. Article 6 of the Convention binds
Contracting Parties either to upgrade the safety of their
nuclear installations ``as a matter of urgency'' or, if
upgrading cannot be achieved, to implement plans to shut down
the installation ``as soon as practically possible.''
The Committee judges that the Government of Cuba has not
taken the necessary steps to ensure that the nuclear reactor
site under construction at Cienfuegos, Cuba, will meet
acceptable safety standards. In particular, the Committee
judges that the Government of Cuba has not satisfactorily
engaged in the types of activities stipulated under Articles
17, 18, and 19 of the Convention (relating to the siting,
design and construction, and proposed operation of a nuclear
facility). Because of the Cuban Government's lack of
appropriate safety precautions, the Committee believes that the
Juragua nuclear reactor, if completed, would pose a serious
environmental and health hazard. Just as the accident at
Chernobyl affected people living well beyond the borders of
Ukraine, so too would an accident at Juragua threaten the lives
and health not only of the Cuban people, but of U.S. citizens
as well. The Committee deems the risk posed by this planned
reactor to be unacceptable, and recommends adoption of
Understanding (1).
Understanding 2: IAEA Technical Assistance
Understanding (2) establishes the sense of the Senate that
the United States should withhold certain funds from the
International Atomic Energy Agency every year in an effort to
induce that organization not to provide funds to nuclear-
related projects in Iran and Cuba. (The withheld funds would be
the U.S. proportionate share of IAEA's technical cooperation
fund projects in Iran and Cuba.) The Committee is concerned
that the IAEA continues to provide resources to Cuba for work
relating to the partially-completed nuclear reactor at
Cienfuegos. Moreover, the IAEA continues to provide technical
assistance relating to Iran's Bushehr nuclear installation. As
is made clear by Understanding (1), the Committee is deeply
concerned with the environmental and health implications of the
Cienfuegos facility.
The Committee is concerned with the Bushehr reactor in Iran
for different reasons. Specifically, the Committee shares the
Executive Branch's concern that Iran continues to pursue a
nuclear weapons capability, and that the facility at Bushehr
will be used both to train Iranian nationals who may
subsequently work in the weapons program and as a cover for the
program itself.
III. Resolution of Ratification
IV. Article by Article Analysis
The Preamble describes the concerns underlying the
Convention. The Contracting Parties wish to promote a high
level of nuclear safety worldwide, recognizing the importance
to the international community of ensuring that the use of
nuclear energy is safe, well regulated and environmentally
sound and also recognizing that accidents at ``nuclear
installations'' (defined in Article 2) potentially have trans-
border impacts. The Preamble also states that the Convention
entails a commitment to the application of fundamental safety
principles for nuclear installations rather than of detailed
safety standards, and affirms the importance of international
cooperation for the enhancement of nuclear safety.
Article 1 sets forth the objectives of the Convention,
which are to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear
safety worldwide through the enhancement of national measures
and international cooperation, to establish and maintain
effective defenses in nuclear installations against potential
radiological hazards, and to prevent accidents with
radiological consequences and mitigate such consequences if
they occur.
Article 2 contains definitions for the Convention.
``Nuclear installation'' is defined as any land-based civil
nuclear power plant under the jurisdiction of a Contracting
Party, including storage, handling and treatment facilities for
radioactive materials that are on the same site and are
directly related to the operation of the nuclear power plant. A
``regulators body'' for each Contracting Party means any body
or bodies given the legal authority by that Contracting Party
to grant licenses and regulate the siting, design,
construction, commissioning, operation or decommissioning of
nuclear installations. ``License'' means any authorization
granted by the regulatory body to the applicant to have the
responsibility for the siting, design, construction,
commissioning, operation or decommissioning of a nuclear
installation.
Article 3 specifies that the Convention shall apply to the
safety of nuclear installations.
Article 4 requires each Contacting Party to take, within
the framework of its national law, the legislative, regulatory
and administrative measures and other steps necessary to
implement its obligations under the Convention.
Article 5 provides that each Contracting Party shall submit
for review, prior to each review meeting provided for in
Article 20, a report on the measures it has taken to implement
its obligations under the Convention. Review meetings must be
held no less fre quently than every three years (see Article
21), so national reports must be submitted at least that
frequently. This reporting requirement, combined with the
review process provided for in Article 20, is the central
implementing mechanism of the Convention.
Article 6 directs each Contracting Party to take the
appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of nuclear
installations existing at the time the Convention enters into
force for that Contracting Party is reviewed as soon as
possible, and to ensure that all reasonably practicable
improvements are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the
safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be
achieved by a Contracting Party, it must implement plans to
shut down the nuclear installation as soon as practically
possible, taking into account the whole energy context and
possible alternatives, as well as the social, environmental and
economic impact.
Article 7 requires each party to establish and maintain a
legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of
nuclear installations. The framework must provide for the
establishment of applicable national safety requirements and
regulations, a system of licensing with regard to nuclear
installations and the prohibition of the operation of a nuclear
installation without a license, a system of regulatory
inspection and assessment of nuclear installations to ascertain
compliance with applicable regulations and the terms of
licenses, and the enforcement of applicable regulations and of
the terms of licenses, including suspension, modification or
revocation.
Article 8 requires each Contracting Party to establish or
designate a regulatory body entrusted with the implementation
of the legislative and regulatory framework created under
Article 7. Each such regulatory body must be given adequate
authority, competence and resources to fulfill its assigned
responsibilities. Contracting Parties must also ensure that the
functions of these regulatory bodies are effectively separated
from those of any other body concerned with the promotion or
utilization of nuclear energy.
Under Article 9, each Contracting Party is obligated to
ensure that the prime responsibility for the safety of a
nuclear installation rests with the holder of the relevant
license and to take steps to ensure that each such license
holder meets its responsibility.
Article 10 obligates each Contracting Party to take the
appropriate steps to ensure that all organizations engaged in
activities directly related to nuclear installations establish
policies giving due priority to nuclear safety.
Article 11 requires a Contracting Party to take the
appropriate steps to ensure that there are adequate financial
resources available to support the safety of each nuclear
installation throughout its life, and that there are sufficient
numbers of qualified and ap propriately trained and retrained
staff available for all safety-related activities for each
nuclear installation throughout its life.
Article 12 requires each Contracting Party to take the
appropriate steps to ensure that the capabilities and
limitations of human performance are taken into account
throughout the life of a nuclear installation.
Under Article 13, each Contracting Party must take the
appropriate steps to ensure that quality assurance programs are
established and implemented with a view to providing confidence
that specified requirements for all activities important to
nuclear safety are satisfied throughout the life of a nuclear
installation.
Article 14 obligates each Contracting Party to take the
appropriate steps to ensure that comprehensive and systematic
safety assessments are carried out before the construction and
commissioning of a nuclear installation, as well as throughout
its life. These assessments must be well documented and
subsequently updated in the light of operating experience and
significant new safety information. They also must be reviewed
under the authority of the regulatory body. Article 14 also
requires Contracting States to take the appropriate steps to
ensure that verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and
inspection is carried out to ensure that the physical state and
the operation of a nuclear installation continue to be in
accordance with its design, applicable national safety
requirements, and operational limits and conditions.
Article 15 requires Contracting Parties to take the
appropriate steps to ensure that the radiation exposure to
workers and the public caused by a nuclear installation in all
operational states shall be kept as low as reasonably
achievable, and also that no individual shall be exposed to
radiation doses exceeding prescribed national dose limits.
Under Article 16, each Contracting Party must take the
appropriate steps to ensure that there are on-site and off-site
emergency plans covering the activities to be carried out in
the event of an emergency and that such emergency plans are
routinely tested. Emergency plans must be prepared and tested
before any new nuclear installation commences operation above a
low power level agreed to by the regulatory body. Each
Contracting Party must also take the appropriate steps to
ensure that its own population and the competent authorities of
the States in the vicinity of the nuclear installation are
provided with appropriate information for emergency planning
and response. Contracting Parties without nuclear installations
on their territories must take the appropriate steps for the
preparation and testing of emergency plans for their
territories, if they are likely to be affected by a
radiological emergency at a nuclear installation in the
vicinity.
Article 17 deals with the siting of nuclear installations.
Contracting Parties are required to take the appropriate steps
to ensure that appropriate procedures are established and
implemented for evaluating all relevant site-related factors
likely to affect the safety of a nuclear installation for its
projected lifetime, and for evaluating the likely safety impact
of a proposed nuclear installation on individuals, society and
the environment, as well as for re-evaluating as necessary all
such factors so as to ensure the continued safety acceptability
of the nuclear installations. Each Contracting Party must also
take the appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate
procedures are established and implemented for consulting Con
tracting Parties in the vicinity of a proposed nuclear
installation likely to affect them and provide to them, upon
their request, information necessary for them to evaluate and
assess the likely safety impact of the nuclear installation on
their own territory.
Article 18 sets forth the actions that each Contracting
Party must take with respect to the design and construction of
nuclear installations. The article obligates a Contracting
Party to take appropriate steps to ensure that the design and
construction of a nuclear installation provides for several
reliable levels and methods of protection (defense in depth)
against the release of radioactive materials, to prevent the
occurrence of accidents and mitigate their radiological
consequences if they do occur. Each Contracting Party must also
take appropriate steps to ensure that the technologies
incorporated in the design and construction of a nuclear
installation are proven by experience or qualified by testing
or analysis, and that the design of a nuclear installation
allows for reliable, stable and easily manageable operation,
with specific consideration of human factors and the man-
machine interface.
Addressing the safety of operation of nuclear
installations, Article 19 requires each Contracting Party to
take the appropriate steps to ensure that the initial
authorization to operate a nuclear installation is based upon
an appropriate safety analysis and a commissioning program
demonstrating the consistency of the installation as
constructed with design and safety requirements. Contracting
Parties must also take appropriate steps to ensure that
operational limits and conditions derived from the safety
analysis, tests and operational experience are defined and
revised as necessary for identifying safe boundaries for
operation, and that operation, maintenance, inspection and
testing of nuclear installations are conducted in accordance
with approved procedures. Under subparagraphs (iv) and (v) of
Article 19, Contracting Parties must also take appropriate
steps to ensure that procedures are established for responding
to anticipated operational occurrences and to accidents, and
that necessary engineering and technical support in all safety-
related fields is available through the lifetime of a nuclear
installation. Subparagraph (vi) obligates Contracting Parties
to take appropriate steps to ensure that incidents significant
to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the
relevant license to the regulatory authority. Under
subparagraph (vii), Contracting Parties must take appropriate
steps to ensure the establishment of programs to collect and
analyze operating experience, and must also ensure that the
conclusions of these analyses are acted upon and that existing
mechanisms are used to share important experience with
international bodies and with other operating organizations and
regulatory bodies. Lastly, Contracting Parties are required
under subparagraph (viii) of Article 19 to take appro priate
steps to ensure that the activity and volume of radioactive
waste resulting from the operation of a nuclear installation is
kept to the minimum practicable for the process concerned, both
in activity and in volume, and that any necessary treatment and
storage of spent fuel and waste directly related to the
operation and on the same site as that of the nuclear
installation take into consideration conditioning and disposal.
Article 20 provides for review meetings of the Contracting
Parties for the purpose of reviewing the national reports
submitted pursuant to Article 5. At these meetings, each
Contracting Party is to have a reasonable opportunity to
discuss and seek clarification of the review reports submitted
by others. Sub-groups comprised of representatives of
Contracting Parties may also be established as necessary for
the purpose of reviewing specific subjects contained in the
reports.
Article 21 establishes timetables for meetings of the
Contracting Parties. A preparatory meeting must be held not
later than six months after the entry into force of the
Convention. At that meeting, Contracting Parties must establish
a date for the first review meeting, to be held no later than
30 months after the date of the Convention's entry into force.
At each review meeting, the Contracting Parties must determine
the date for the succeeding review meeting, at an interval of
no more than three years.
Article 22 concerns the procedures to be followed at the
meetings of the Contracting Parties. Rules of Procedure,
including guidelines regarding the form and structure of the
reports to be submitted under Article 5, a date for submission
of such reports, and the proc ess for reviewing them, and
Financial Rules are to be prepared and adopted-by consensus by
the Contracting Parties at the preparatory meeting.
Article 23 provides for extraordinary meetings of the
Contracting Parties if agreed to by a majority of those present
and voting at the meeting (including abstentions as voting), or
at the written request of a Contracting Party supported by a
majority of the Contracting Parties.
Article 24 provides that each Contracting Party shall
attend meetings of the Contracting Parties and be represented
at such meetings by one delegate, and by alternates, experts
and advisers it deems necessary. Contracting Parties may by
consensus invite intergovernmental organizations competent in
matters relating to the Convention to attend, as observers, any
meetings or specific sessions thereof.
Summary reports addressing the issues discussed and
conclusions reached during a meeting are to be adopted by the
Contracting Parties by consensus and made available to the
public (Article 25).
The languages of meetings of the Contracting Parties are
Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish, unless
otherwise provided in the Rules of Procedure (Article 26).
Reports may be in the national language of the submitting
Contracting Party or in a single designated language agreed
upon in the Rules of Procedure, although in the former case the
Contracting Party must also provide a translation into the
designated language.
Article 27 provides that the Convention does not affect the
rights and obligations of the Contracting Parties under their
own laws to protection information from disclosure. Information
is defined to include, inter alia, personal data, information
protected by intellectual property rights or industrial or
commercial confidentiality, and information relating to
national security or to the physical protection of nuclear
materials or nuclear installations. When a Contracting Party
provides information identified by it as protected, such
information can be used only for the purposes for which it has
been provided and must be kept confidential. Similarly, the
contents of discussions of national reports held at review
meetings must be kept confidential.
The secretariat functions for meetings of the Contracting
Parties under the Convention are to be provided by the IAEA,
which will pay the costs of performing these functions out of
its regular budget (Article 28). The secretariat's duties are
to convene, prepare and service the meetings of the Contracting
Parties, and transmit to the Contracting Parties information
received or prepared under the Convention.
Article 29 concerns dispute resolution. In the event of a
disagreement between Contracting Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of the Convention, the
Contracting Parties shall consult within the framework of a
meeting of the Contracting Parties to try to resolve the
disagreement.
The Convention was opened for signature by all States at
the Headquarters of the IAEA in Vienna on September 20, 1994,
and will remain open for signature until its entry in force
(Article 30). After the Convention has entered into force, it
is to be open for accession by all States. Under Article 30,
regional organizations constituted by sovereign States and with
competence in respect of negotiation, conclusion and
application of international agreements in matters covered by
this Convention may also sign or accede to the Convention. In
matters within their competence, such organizations may
exercise the rights and fulfill the responsibilities of the
Convention on their own behalf, but do not have any vote
additional to those of their Member States.
Article 31 provides that the Convention will enter into
force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit with the
Depositary of the twenty-second instrument of ratification,
acceptance or approval, including the instruments of seventeen
States each of which as at least one nuclear installation which
has achieved criticality in a reactor core. It will enter into
force for each additional adhering State or regional
organization 90 days after the date of deposit with the
Depositary of the appropriate instrument by such State or
organization. Procedures for amendment of the Convention are
included in Article 32.
A Contracting Party may denounce the Convention by written
notice to the Depositary, effective one year following the
Depositary's receipt of the notification or at such later date
as specified in the notification (Article 33). The Depositary
of the Convention is the Director General of the IAEA, who is
charged with the duty of notifying all Contracting Parties of
all significant developments concerning the Convention (Article
34).