[Senate Report 105-72]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
105th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 105-72
_______________________________________________________________________
BIENNIAL BUDGETING AND APPROPRIATIONS ACT
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
TO ACCOMPANY
S. 261
TO PROVIDE FOR BIENNIAL BUDGET PROCESS AND A BIENNIAL APPROPRIATIONS
PROCESS AND TO ENHANCE OVERSIGHT AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
September 4 1997.--Ordered to be printed
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee, Chairman
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine JOHN GLENN, Ohio
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas CARL LEVIN, Michigan
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire MAX CLELAND, Georgia
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
Hannah S. Sistare, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Susanne T. Marshall, Professional Staff
Leonard Weiss, Minority Staff Director
Michal Sue Prosser, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
I. Purpose.........................................................1
II. Summary.........................................................1
III. Need for Legislation............................................2
IV. Legislative History of Biennial Budgeting......................16
V. Legislative History of S. 261..................................18
VI. Committee Action...............................................20
VII. Section-by-Section Analysis....................................21
VIII. Regulatory Impact Statement....................................24
IX. Cost Estimate..................................................25
X. Minority Views of Senator Durbin...............................28
XI. Changes in Existing Law........................................30
105th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 105-72
_______________________________________________________________________
BIENNIAL BUDGETING AND APPROPRIATIONS ACT
_______
September 4, 1997.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Thompson, from the Committee on Governmental Affairs, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany S. 261]
The Committee on Governmental Affairs, to which was
referred the bill (S. 261) to provide for a two-year Federal
budget cycle, and for other purposes, having considered the
same, reports favorably on the bill as amended in the nature of
a substitute and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
I. Purpose
The purpose of S. 261, the Biennial Budget and
Appropriations Act, is to increase Congressional control of the
budget process by reducing the amount of time spent on budget
matters while improving the quality of those deliberations by
providing time for long-term planning and careful oversight and
to provide stability and coherence in the collection and
disbursement of Federal funds by establishing a two-year
Federal budget cycle.
II. Summary of S. 261
S. 261 converts the annual budget, appropriations, and
authorization process to a biennial or two-year cycle. Under
the bill, the timetable for the two years is as follows:
First year: Budget and appropriations
Requires the President to submit a two-year budget at the
beginning of the first session of Congress. The President's
budget would cover each year in the biennium and planning
levels for the four out-years. Converts the ``Mid-session
Review'' into a ``Mid-biennium Review.'' The President would
submit his ``Mid-biennium Review'' at the beginning of the
second year.
Requires Congress to adopt a two-year budget resolution and
a two-year reconciliation bill (if necessary). Instead of
enforcing the first fiscal year and the sum of the five years
set out in the budget resolution, the bill provides that the
budget resolution establish binding levels for each year in the
biennium and the sum of the six-year period. The bill modifies
the time frames in the Senate ten-year pay-as-you-go point of
order to provide that legislation could not increase the
deficit for the biennium, the sum of the first six years, and
the sum of the last 4 years.
Requires Congress to enact a two-year appropriations bill
during the first session of each Congress. The bill provides a
new majority point of order against appropriations bills that
fail to cover two years. This point of order would not apply to
supplemental appropriations bills to fund unanticipated needs
such as emergencies.
Makes budgeting and appropriating the priority for the
first session of a Congress. The bill provides a majority point
of order against consideration of authorization and revenue
legislation until the completion of the biennial budget
resolution, reconciliation legislation (if necessary) and the
thirteen biennial appropriations bills. An exception is made
for certain ``must do'' measures.
Second year: Authorization legislation and enhanced oversight
Devotes the second session of a Congress to consideration
of biennial or multi-year authorization bills and oversight of
federal programs. The bill provides a majority point of order
against authorization and revenue legislation that cover less
than two years except those measures limited to temporary
programs or activities lasting less than two years.
Modifies the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)
to fit the government performance planning and reporting
process into the two-year budget cycle to enhance oversight of
federal programs.
III. Need for Legislation
The current congressional budget process is rooted in the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
(Public Law 93-344, Title 2 of U.S. Code). While the 1974
reforms have enabled the Congress to participate more fully in
the development of fiscal policy, the design of the current
process has led to a situation in which repetitive votes on the
budget consume a large percentage of the Congress' time. This
has had two negative results: a decrease in the time available
for systematic oversight of federal programs and delays in
legislation necessary to fund the government. Since 1974, the
Congress has consistently failed to complete action on the
Federal budget before the start of the fiscal year. The failure
to enact regular appropriation bills prior to the beginning of
the fiscal year results in the need for the Congress and the
President to agree on a continuing resolution to fund the
Federal government's operations.
TABLE l.--APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1974-97
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regular
appropriation Continuing
bills enacted resolution
by the start enacted for
of the fiscal the fiscal
year year
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year:
1974................................ 3 2
1975................................ 7 4
1976................................ 2 3
1977................................ 1 13 2
1978................................ 9 3
1979................................ 5 1
1980................................ 3 2
1981................................ 1 2
1982................................ 0 5
1983................................ 1 2
1984................................ 4 4
1985................................ 4 4
1986................................ 0 5
1987................................ 0 5
1988................................ 0 5
1989................................ 2 13 0
1990................................ 1 3
1991................................ 0 5
1992................................ 3 4
1993................................ 1 1
1994................................ 2 3
1995................................ 13 0
1996................................ 0 5
1997................................ 1 13 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 While 13 bills were enacted, certain health programs were not funded
and required a continuing resolution.
2 Six bills were enacted on October 1.
3 Six bills were enacted as one Omnibus bill on September 30. In effect,
this omnibus bill served as a Continuing Resolution.
Sources.--Congressional Research Service (Reports 96-224 GOV and 94-799
GOV).
As Table 1 illustrates, only two times since the enactment
of the Budget Act in 1974 has the Congress completed action on
all 13 regular appropriations bills to fully fund the
government by the beginning of the fiscal year. In addition,
the Committee believes that the success in 1989 strengthens the
case for a shift to biennial budgeting because it can be
attributed in large part to the foundation laid by the Budget
Summit Agreement between the Congressional leadership and the
President which covered two years.
While policy disagreements between Congress and the
Executive Branch have contributed to the budgetary delays
evidenced in Table 1, the complexity of the congressional
budget process is also a contributing factor. The Committee
believes that a biennial budget cycle will greatly improve the
budget process by reducing multiple decisions on individual
budget items. This, in turn, would greatly increase the
likelihood that deadlines will be met and provide stability to
Federal activities. Providing agencies with this increased
predictability is especially important at a time when Congress
and the taxpayers are demanding that agencies provide strategic
and annual performance plans and more systematically link
resources to results. Additionally, for agencies which are
downsizing, multi-year planning increases the probability that
downsizing will be well managed and reduces the negative impact
on the quality of those programs remaining.
The repetitive nature of budget votes and the amount of
time consumed by them has also served to reduce the time
available for members to spend on systematic oversight of the
design and implementation of federal programs. Such oversight
has always been important, but a number of Members have
suggested that the requirements of the Government Performance
and Results Act and the pressure placed on resources by the
need to achieve a balanced budget make oversight even more
critical. Further, the kind of oversight needed requires the
investment of Members' time to look below the surface and see
what is really happening. Members need to consider whether and
what legislative changes might be required to improve the
functioning of federal programs or, when warranted, to
discontinue them. This kind of time is in increasingly short
supply.
In reporting S. 261, it is the Committee's view that while
biennial budgeting will not solve all of the problems which
have developed relating to the budget process, it will
substantially improve the process, and will create a greater
presumption in favor of carefully considered, timely decisions
and of careful, systematic program oversight.
the budget act of 1974
Currently, Congress completes at least four separate budget
processes annually following Presidential submission of the
Administration's budget: (1) the concurrent budget resolution,
(2) program authorizations, (3) budget reconciliation, and (4)
consideration of 13 individual appropriation bills. This multi-
layered approach to budgeting is further complicated by the
addition of the Budget Enforcement Act.
S. 261 would not eliminate any of these processes, but it
would require their consideration biennially instead of
annually. S. 261 would divide the process into two separate
stages over a two year Congress: (1) consideration of the
concurrent budget resolution, reconciliation and all 13
individual two-year appropriation bills in the first year; and
(2) consideration of multi-year authorizing legislation and
program oversight in the second year.
As such, S. 261 builds upon the Budget Act of 1974. That
Act completely overhauled the Congressional budget process,
asserting the legislative branch's participation in the fiscal
policy of the nation. Battles with President Nixon over the
impoundment of funds in the early 1970's, combined with the
lack of an institutional system for developing budget policy,
prompted the Congress to enact these reforms.
The Budget Act established budget committees in the House
and in the Senate, created the Congressional Budget Office to
provide independent budget information and analysis to the
Congress, and established a timetable for the consideration of
the Federal budget and procedures for consideration of
presidential rescissions and impoundments.
The 1974 reforms also established the concurrent budget
resolution which serves as a blueprint for spending and tax
policy for the next fiscal year--a statement of the Congress'
fiscal policy and priorities. Prior to the Budget Act, Members
of Congress expressed great frustration with congressional
inability to determine the impact of individual appropriation
bills within the framework of the entire Federal budget. The
budget resolution satisfies this concern by providing a means
for Congress to formulate a fiscal blueprint, which is then
used as a tool for measuring the impact of individual spending
bills on the overall Federal budget.
The former Chairman and Ranking Republican member of the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Senator William Roth,
summarized the benefits and detriments of the Budget Act in
testimony before the Committee on June 7, 1988:
There's no question that the Budget Act of 1974 was a
major improvement over what had been virtually
uncontrollable and haphazard process. The 1974 Act
provided the Congress with a mechanism to formulate and
evaluate an overall fiscal strategy. It helped put
individual appropriations bills into perspective
regarding the entire budget. Yet, while it strengthened
the Congress' hand in making budget decisions, it has
weakened the ability of the Congress to get its work
done efficiently and effectively.
While the 1974 reforms greatly enhanced the role of the
Congress in forming national fiscal policy, the complexity of
the budget process has contributed to missed deadlines and
inefficient decision making. This problem has grown as the
complexity of the process has grown. For example, in the
original budget act reconciliation was not envisioned as a
major part of the process. Then in 1980, Congress first used
reconciliation to make major changes in the Federal budget. The
reconciliation process directs the authorizing committees of
the Congress to change existing entitlement and revenue laws
for deficit reduction purposes, and is initiated through
instructions in the budget resolution. Reconciliation has now
become a regular part of the process: the Congress has
considered a reconciliation measure eleven times over the
sixteen years from 1981-1997.
Rapidly escalating Federal budget deficits in the mid-
1980's led Congress to add a fifth step to the budget process.
In 1985, the Congress passed the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act, and in 1987, the Congress passed the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Reduction Reaffirmation
Act of 1987. These laws sought to establish procedures for
enforcing maximum deficit amounts for fiscal years 1988 through
1993. In 1987, the Congress and the President added another,
albeit non-statutory, layer of budget procedure--the summit.
The Congress and the administration agreed to a two-year Budget
Summit Agreement, which set enforceable spending and tax
guidelines for fiscal year 1988 and 1989. The Budget Summit
approach was also adopted during the start of the 101st
Congress, but produced spending and tax guidelines for only one
fiscal year.
In 1990 it was clear that achieving the fiscal year 1991
deficit targets would be nearly impossible. Again the President
and the Congress turned to a Budget Summit. Out of this summit
came both a deficit reduction package and a process for
enforcing budget agreements--The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
(BEA). The Budget Enforcement Act represented a shift from
regulating the only effect of governmental actions to
regulating the actions themselves. It contained real
expenditure limits: a series of limits on annual appropriated
spending enforceable by sequesters. Direct spending (i.e.
spending not regulated by the appropriations process) was
governed by new pay-as-you-go rules. These required that the
total of all new spending or taxlegislation from authorizing
committees could not increase the deficit. The Budget Enforcement Act
also extended the time horizon of the budget process: coverage of the
budget resolution was lengthened from 3 to 5 years and the basis of
several enforcement points of order was expanded from one year to 5
fiscal years.
The original BEA set discretionary spending limits through
1995. These limits were extended in 1993 to go through 1998.
The 1997 Bipartisan Budget agreement would further extend the
limits to 2002.
BENEFITS OF BIENNIAL BUDGETING--REDUCING REPETITION
Although each step of the budget process was designed to
make the allocation of Federal resources more efficient and
effective, the combined result has been frequently missed
budget deadlines and repetitive roll call votes on budget
issues. The congressional response to the increasingly complex
process has been to budget year round. Furthermore, these
repetitive votes are extremely confusing to the public which
seeks to understand the actions of their elected
representatives.
While budget delays are frequently the consequence of
policy differences between the Executive branch and Congress or
between two Parties within the Congress, the ability of the
Congress to execute a fiscal plan is unnecessarily slowed by
the existing process. It is the Committee's view that two-year
budgeting can be a successful tool to assist both the Congress
and the Executive branch in more efficiently managing the
budget.
At the June 7, 1988 Committee hearing, Comptroller General
Charles Bowsher said:
I do not think we can devise new procedures that will
completely overcome the delays and inefficiencies of
the current budget process. To a large extent, the
difficulties our elected officials experience in
reaching consensus on budget matters reflects
underlying divisions and uncertainties in the American
public about policy choices and priorities.
Nevertheless, I think that there are changes that could
help. To the extent that we can make the budget process
and documents less complex and more understandable, we
will have taken a step forward.
The Committee believes S. 261 could help achieve this. By
dedicating an entire year to the authorization and oversight
process, the Congress will have much more time to consider
underlying authorizations carefully. Members should be free
from congressional action on the budget, except for action on
supplemental appropriation bills or revised concurrent
resolutions, during the second session of each Congress,
enabling them to focus on the work of the authorizing
committees. On June 24, 1988, Senator Wendell Ford addressed
this issue on the Senate floor:
A two-year budget, with one session reserved
specifically for oversight and authorizations, will
give Congress the time to enact responsible spending
proposals before the adoption of a budget resolution
and appropriation bills. A two year cycle will give the
executive branch and State and local governments two
years to plan for the most efficient use of Federal
dollars. * * * Congress simply needs more time to
review existing spending programs to determine whether
they should be modified, expanded, or replaced.
In 1993 both the House and Senate members of the Joint
Committee on the Organization of Congress made similar
arguments in recommending a shift to biennial budgeting. The
report of the House members said, ``The move to biennial
budgeting will reduce the number of redundant budget-related
votes during each Congress * * *.'' The report of the Senate
members was as forceful:
With biennial budgeting, the budget process should be
less complicated, less repetitious, and instead be more
understandable and meaningful. The Congress is now
dominated by budget activity. But for all the time
spent on the budget, Members complain that their votes
are redundant and meaningless. And, it is a process the
public cannot readily comprehend.
The Committee views as a principal benefit of biennial
budgeting the reduction in the repetitive nature of the current
budget process. Each year the Congress considers the budget
resolution, annual authorizations, reconciliation, and
appropriations. Lastly, the need to extend the public debt
limit usually attracts other legislative and budget items.
Former Representative and ranking Republican member of the
House Committee on the Budget James Rhodes testified at the
June 7, 1988 Committee hearing that two year budgeting would
reduce the repetitive nature of the current budget process:
There is no reason to revisit each and every decision
necessary to run a trillion dollar enterprise each and
every year. Biennial budgets and biennial
appropriations would provide a longer and more certain
planning horizon. They should lead to increased
efficiency in government. They certainly would help
rationalize congressional decision-making. They should
provide a better basis for evaluation of the
effectiveness of Government services and programs. * *
* (It) could improve substantially the quality of
congressional oversight and might once again lead to a
meaningful authorization process.
As Table 2 indicates, during the 1980's the percentage of
budget related votes in the United States Senate increased
dramatically over levels between 1955-1980. This increase can
be tied to the increase in the number of layers in the budget
process.
TABLE 2.--BUDGET RELATED ROLLCALL VOTES IN THE SENATE, 1955-96
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget related
Budget related Total rollcall votes as a
rollcall votes votes percent of
total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year:
1955........................................................ 33 87 38
1960........................................................ 86 207 42
1965........................................................ 108 258 42
1970........................................................ 189 418 45
1975........................................................ 254 602 42
1980........................................................ 280 531 53
1981........................................................ 335 483 69
1982........................................................ 286 465 62
1983........................................................ 244 371 66
1984........................................................ 164 275 60
1985........................................................ 230 381 60
1986........................................................ 189 354 53
1987........................................................ 185 420 44
1988........................................................ 124 379 33
1989........................................................ 148 312 47
1990........................................................ 123 326 38
1991........................................................ 134 280 48
1992........................................................ 162 270 60
1993........................................................ 252 395 64
1994........................................................ 165 329 50
1995........................................................ 328 613 54
1996........................................................ 222 306 73
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source.--Congressional Quarterly Almanacs, 1955-1996, and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, 1987 and 1996.
In 1988, the Congress debated the level of defense spending
five different times during consideration of the budget
resolution, the defense authorization bill, defense
appropriations, the revision in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
sequestration procedures, and the Budget Summit Agreement.
Splitting the process over a two year period could reduce this
repetition. S. 261 does not eliminate any of the processes as
each serves a significant role in the Congress' deliberations.
However, by making decisions once every two years instead of
twice, the burden should be reduced.
Providing this extra time will also promote a smoother
appropriations process, one which is more accountable to the
American people. At the October 18, 1989 joint Governmental
Affairs and Budget Committees hearing, Senator Roth testified:
A two year budget would create an orderly,
predictable process for consideration of spending
decisions responsive to policy priorities and improve
congressional control over the Federal budget. Equally
important, it would allow sufficient time for the
fulfillment by the Congress of its legislative and
oversight responsibilities.
benefits of biennial budgeting--improved oversight
The Committee views one of the major benefits of reducing
the number of repetitious budget-related votes will be the
freeing up of time for systematic program oversight.
Senator Fred Thompson in his opening statement at the July
24, 1996, hearing commented:
What a biennial budget can do is give us time for the
important tasks that often get short shrift these days,
such as conducting oversight and long-range planning,
and spending more time at home. * * *
Program oversight was one of the benefits cited by both the
House and Senate members of the Joint Committee on the
Organization of the Congress in 1993. The report of the Senate
members proposed that ``In even-numbered years, Congress should
consider substantive legislative proposals, conduct meaningful
oversight, monitor and evaluate legislation. * * *'' They noted
further that ``although a great deal of time is spent on the
budget, little time is spent in long-term planning, overseeing
programs, and finding waste and abuse. In short, the Congress
spends too much time on budgetary issues that do not matter and
not enough time on those that do.'' A 2-year cycle, they argued
could permit Members to ``spend more time overseeing programs
to make certain that taxpayer money is spent wisely.''
The House report linked the biennial cycle to its
recommendation for a formal oversight schedule and plan by each
committee.
Members of the Committee noted that they--and their
colleagues--feel there is inadequate time available for serious
examination of how federal programs function and how policy is
implemented. Congress and the President have put in place a
legislative framework--the Government Performance and Results
Act--requiring strategic plans and annual performance plans and
reports. Congress must have the time to be involved actively in
the development of strategic plans and in oversight of the
plans for this Act to offer the American people the kind of
government they deserve.
BENEFITS OF BIENNIAL BUDGETING--GREATER STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY IN
FEDERAL FUNDING
The Committee believes that by providing funds for a two
year period, recipients of these funds will be better able to
plan and administer their funds. Senator Pete Domenici, as
Chairman of the Budget Committee, stated in a December 8, 1996,
Washington Post editorial:
By moving to a two-year budget and appropriations
cycle, Congress can inject stability in a sometimes
chaotic system, strengthen congressional oversight and
watchdog functions, improve the efficiency of
government agencies and--finally, it is hoped--increase
the public's confidence that the achievement of a
balanced budget has been done intelligently,
deliberatively and fairly.
Mr. Richard Helm, then the Comptroller of the Department of
Defense, testified at the June 7, 1988 Committee hearing on the
Defense Department's experience with biennial budgeting. Mr.
Helm highlighted the management benefits of biennial budgeting,
especially for procurement, ``for being able to give program
managers their funding up front so that they can pursue, in the
most efficient fashion, the best type of defense procurement
management that we should all expect for taxpayers money.'' The
annual process, Mr. Helm testified, is inefficient from the
managers' perspective because of the delays in obligating
funds.
The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute and The Center
for Strategic and International Studies completed a joint study
in 1989 entitled, ``Making Defense Reform Work,'' which
strongly endorsed the concept of two year budgeting. This study
highlighted the notion that a two-year process would not only
improve management of the nation's defense spending, but
efficiencies would apply to all aspects of Federal spending:
The substantive arguments for two-year budgets are
compelling. The longer term focus could help to force
hard choices; it is too easy to defer difficult choices
when the field of view is limited to a single year. One
year budgets contribute to the excessive focus in both
the Pentagon and the Congress on the near term. With
every program up for review every year, it is little
wonder that few people in either branch take long term
planning seriously. A biennial budget also would impart
greater stability to the defense program; there simply
is too much turmoil in government programs when every
item in the budget can be adjusted every year. And the
burden of annual budgets on both branches of government
is too great, for domestic programs as well as defense
programs. An annual budget process leaves too little
time in either branch for serious policy planning and
evaluation, and defending each year's budget.
The study suggests that the Federal budget process be
structured along the lines set forth in S. 261, with budget
activity concentrated in the first session of each Congress and
oversight activities in the second session. The Committee
believes that oversight and authorization activities should be
viewed as a continuum across sessions of Congress in order to
promote the most efficient use of Federal spending.
Senator Wendell Ford testified at the October 18, 1989
hearing that two year budgeting ``is a management tool for
Congress to use to make our work on the deficit and federal
budget more efficient and effective.'' The Committee notes the
Senate Committee on Rules successful experiment with two year
budgeting for Senate Committees. Senator Ford, the Chairman of
the Committee on Rules when this reform was first implemented,
expressed his continued enthusiasm for the shift in Senate
Committee budget authorizations from an annual to biennial
basis during the October 18 hearing.
The report of the Senate members of the Joint Committee on
the Organization of Congress noted this point in their support
for biennial budgeting:
Two-year cycles will also permit executive branch
agencies to plan for the longer term, a failure of the
current system. * * * The 2-year funding cycle gives
agencies degree of certainty in policy planning that
they have never had, and will minimize the constant
budget planning process that has accompanied the 2-year
appropriations cycle.
Senator Collins, who heard testimony at the April 23, 1997
Committee on S. 261, stated:
A Federal Biennial Budget would eliminate much of the
procedural repetition and give the executive branch
more time to manage and Congress more time to conduct
effective oversight of Federal agencies.
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
Franklin D. Raines, testified at that hearing regarding the
many potential benefits of S. 261. He noted that:
Biennial budgeting also makes it possible for the
Executive Branch and Congress to better utilize time
and resources. * * * Even if biennial budgeting
generated a greater need for supplementals, the total
expenditure of time and resources on budgeting probably
still would decline. * * * By concentrating budget
decisions in the first year of each biennium, biennial
budgeting also could free up time for more
congressional oversight and agency management
activities. * * * I would expect that a biennial cycle
would free up some time in the second year for program
managers to increase their efforts on management and
long-range planning.
Two-year appropriations bills offer those depending on
federal funds--both federal agencies and, increasingly,
activities run by state and local governments--a longer
planning horizon. If agencies know their funding for two years
rather than for a single year, they can plan better; and they
can make more efficient use of resources. For an agency that is
downsizing, a two-year time period can reduce the disruption to
both personnel and taxpayers who deal with that agency. For a
state or local government seeking to create well-designed
programs, even a two-year time period may seem too short; but
it is infinitely preferable to a single year. Indeed, for both
federal agencies and other levels of government the improvement
could be even greater since the Committee belies the
appropriate comparison is between a one-year appropriation
enacted late and biennial appropriations enacted timely.
As Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
Franklin Raines, said before the Committee on April 23, 1997:
One of the more compelling advantages of biennial
appropriations is that it could provide greater
stability and predictability for those served and
involved in Federal Government programs, such as
individuals receiving Federal benefits or State and
non-profits receiving Federal grants.
1987 BUDGET SUMMIT AGREEMENT PROVIDED TEST OF TWO YEAR BUDGETING
The two year Budget Summit Agreement between President
Reagan and the Congressional leadership on November 20, 1987
provides the compelling evidence that substantial improvements
are possible in the budget process. The Budget Summit Agreement
set forth the spending and tax guidelines for a two year
period. This included funding levels for defense and domestic
discretionary categories and international affairs programs.
These overall totals helped the Congress move briskly with
enactment of individual appropriation bills for fiscal year
1989. The House of Representatives completed initial action on
all thirteen appropriations bills by June 30. This was the
first time since 1960 that the House finished this stage of the
process prior to June 30, and in 1960 the fiscal year started
July 1. The Senate followed this action and all thirteen
individual appropriation bills were enacted by the start of
fiscal year 1989--for the first time in more than a decade.
During the June 7, 1988 Committee hearing, Senators Ford,
Roth, Nickles, and Domenici all noted the value of the Budget
Summit Agreement for laying the foundation of a multi-year
budget and helping expedite fiscal year 1989 appropriation
bills. Senator Nickles said:
It was the Budget Summit Agreement last year (1987)
that technically gave us our first two year budget. We
now find ourselves nearly on schedule with the budget
process. This is due to the fact that we arrived at set
spending levels a year in advance.
In response to a question from former Chairman Glenn during
the June 7, 1988 Committee hearing, then Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) Director James Miller III responded that the
experience of the Budget Summit Agreement demonstrated that the
Federal government and Congress are capable of ``putting
together a two-year budget and carry through reasonably on it.
I think this is something we should emulate.''
The former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, Senator Sam Nunn, and the former ranking Republican
member, Senator John Warner, praised the Budget Summit
Agreement in the transmittal of their Committee's views and
estimates to the Committee on the Budget for the Fiscal Year
1989 Concurrent Resolution on the Budget, ``* * * we would like
to note that last fall's Deficit Reduction Agreement is an
excellent example of the benefits of a two year budget cycle.
Because of this Agreement, we start this year with a consensus
on the overall level of National Defense spending for the next
fiscal year. This agreement will allow the authorization and
appropriations processes to proceed in a more orderly and
timely fashion this year.
SUPPORT FOR THE BIENNIAL BUDGET PROPOSAL
The Committee believes that a biennial budget would create
greater opportunities for careful consideration of
authorizations underlying appropriations bills and would help
Congress operate more effectively. At the June 7, 1988
Committee hearing, Senator Ford testified:
Biennial budgeting is not a panacea for our Federal
budgetary problems. But it is a tool which can make the
Federal government operate more efficiently and allow
Congress the time to make considered and informed
budgetary decisions. Biennial budgeting will provide
greater funding stability and certainty for our elected
counterparts in state and local governments and for the
numerous beneficiaries of Federal funds.
The first biennial budgeting bill was introduced in 1977 by
then-Congressman Leon Panetta. When Mr. Panetta became OMB
Director in 1993 he retained his support for biennial
budgeting.
President Bush, in the fiscal year 1991 Budget also
recommended biennial budgeting as a reform of the budget
process. ``If the budget process could cover two years instead
of one, there would be large saving of congressional time and
better opportunities for improved program management in the
executive branch.'' While the President's budget endorsed two
year appropriations, it suggested that a reform that stopped
short of biennial appropriations could still be useful.
As noted above, biennial budgeting was again recommended in
1993 by both the House and Senate members of the Joint
Committee on the Organization of Congress and by the Vice
President's National Performance Review.
Senator Domenici urging the shift to biennial budgeting in
his 1996 Washington Post article, ``Make It A Two-Year
Budget,'' stated:
We should begin by abandoning the outmoded and
disorderly annual budget and appropriations process and
move to biennial budgeting and appropriating to
stabilize our budget decisions. This is the most
important reform we can adopt to improve the process,
provide for oversight and careful deliberation, and
make us more accountable to the American people.
In addition to the congressional and executive branch
support, numerous state officials have urged the federal
government to shift to a biennial budget cycle.
STATE EXPERIENCE WITH BIENNIAL BUDGETING
Although there are significant differences between State
budgets and that of the Federal government, the Committee still
believes that an examination of state experiences could prove
useful.
In her opening statement on the April 23, 1997 Committee
hearing on S. 261, Senator Collins addressed the States use of
biennial budgeting by stating:
Many State Governments, including my own State of
Maine, use a 2-year budget very successfully. As a
former cabinet member in Maine, I speak from direct
experience in working in a 2-year budget cycle. It is
far more efficient, far more cost effective than our
current Federal budget process.
On July 15, 1987 the General Accounting Office published a
survey of biennial budgeting trends, practices, and experiences
in the 50 states. The data were updated in later GAO testimony
in 1996 and 1997. Eight states have biennial legislatures and
hence of necessity biennial appropriations cycles. Of the 42
states with annual legislative cycles, 12 have biennial budget
cycles and 27 have annual ones. Three states describe their
budget cycles as ``mixed'' in which the budget is divided into
two categories: that for which budgeting is annual and that for
which it is biennial. These states placed agencies with
relatively predictable needs on a biennial cycle and those with
more volatility on an annual cycle. The Committee believes that
a major contributor to volatility perceived by the states is
the federal government's annual cycle.
In the last three decades, 11 states switched from biennial
to annual and three from annual to biennial. One state switched
from biennial to annual and back to biennial. Then-Comptroller
General Bowsher testified at the June 7, 1990 Committee hearing
that one of the factors contributing to the states' shift to
annual budgeting was the annual Federal process.
Senator Richard Finan, President Pro Tem of the Ohio
Senate, testified biennial budgeting has worked well: budgets
are completed on time; staff and members have time to do other
things; and ``agencies are in a better position to plan.'' In
addition, Senator Finan noted that shifting the Federal
government to a biennial budget cycle would be helpful to the
states. As he explained, ``As you know, Congress is very
involved in our spending in our State programs and when you
take things like Medicaid and AFDC which can get to 40 percent
of our budget, just imagine, after we have done a biennial
budget, if you vary 1 percent or 2 percent on those kinds of
numbers, you can be a disaster to us in that second year of the
budgeting process. It would be extremely helpful to us to have
a biennial budget here in Washington, D.C.''
John Keel, Director of the Texas Legislative Budget Board,
echoed Senator Finan's statements. He noted that a two-year
budget cycle increases planning stability and certainty not
only for state agencies but also for other governmental
jurisdictions. In addition, he felt that it permitted the state
to ``more effectively monitor * * * expenditures and * * * more
effectively assess the performance of agencies and programs.''
ADDITIONAL ISSUES
A number of issues with regard to biennial budgeting have
been raised during the Committee's consideration. These issues
include: (1) whether biennial budgeting would lead to greater
use of supplemental spending; (2) whether the uncertainty of
economic projections would make it very difficult to budget two
years in advance; (3) how the Congress would respond to new
national needs or emergencies; (4) the timing of authorizations
in a biennial budget; and (5) the transition to biennial
budgeting.
First, concern was expressed about the impact of biennial
budgeting in creating an incentive for more supplemental
appropriations. In particular, some noted that the stability
and predictability of funding cited as a major benefit of
biennial appropriations would be lessened if major adjustments
became routine in the ``off years.'' As Table 3 indicates, the
Congress already enacts at least one supplemental each fiscal
year. In 1978, the Congress enacted nine supplemental
appropriations. In 1989, the Congress enacted three.
TABLE 3.--SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1974-96
[Dollar amounts in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Amount of
supplemental budget
bills authority
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year:
1974................................ 5 $14,796
1975................................ 7 27,587
1976................................ 5 24,636
1977................................ 5 49,482
1978................................ 8 8,219
1979................................ 2 13,784
1980................................ 5 19,575
1981................................ 3 12,461
1982................................ 4 21,020
1983................................ 2 22,654
1984................................ 4 16,357
1985................................ 3 14,804
1986................................ 3 8,191
1987................................ 2 9,370
1988................................ 2 1,310
1989................................ 1 3,295
1990................................ 2 2,039
1991................................ 3 19,786
1992................................ 1 2,806
1993................................ 3 9,848
1994................................ 2 7,822
1995................................ 2 -9,847
1996................................ 0 ..............
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source.--U.S. Congress, Senate, Appropriations, Budget Estimates, Etc.,
S Doc., 94th Cong., 2nd sess.--103rd Cong., 1st sess., prepared by
Senate and House Appropriations Committees, (Washington: GPO, 1976-
1993); House Appropriations Committee data, 1994-1996.
The Committee believes that it would be easier to consider
several supplementals annually than to go through the entire
budget process as the Congress does currently. By retaining the
enforcement mechanisms set forth in the Budget Enforcement Act
as amended (commonly referred to as BEA), the Congress can
assure that supplementals do not break budget discipline. The
Committee believes that supplementals should and can continue
to be seen as exceptions considered when changes in condition
warrant a change in spending decisions. While it is possible
that in the early years some agencies may seek changes in the
funding provided in the biennial appropriation bill, the
Committee believes that the attitude of the OMB and the
Congress can prevent such attempts from becoming routine. In
addition, all decisions would still have to comply with the
spending limits established in the BEA.
Second, concern was expressed about the uncertainty of
economic assumptions which would be required for two years in
advance instead of one. Several witnesses noted the problems in
forecasting economic performance, and the dependence of the
current process on accurate assumptions.
However, the Committee noted that the Congressional Budget
Office and the Office of Management and Budget currently
project economic assumptions for the budget year and the
following five years. Further, the Committee notes that nothing
in this legislation prevents consideration of a revised budget
resolution if the changes in the underlying economic
assumptions are great enough to demand it. The budget process
will be neither more nor less dependent on accurate forecasting
under biennial budgeting. This is especially the case since the
enactment of binding discretionary spending limits for a multi-
year period already binds the appropriations process.
Third, concern was also expressed regarding the need for
congressional flexibility to react to emergencies like
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the 1997 floods in North Dakota or
to the rise of new issues. The Committee believes that S. 261
should have no impact on the ability of the Congress to deal
with emergencies--which, even under the current annual cycle
require mid-cycle adjustments. Although the Committee believes
that the benefits of a biennial cycle will be the greatest if
mid-cycle adjustments are the exception rather than the rule,
S. 261 does not limit the Congress' ability either to respond
to emergencies or to make adjustments were Congress believes a
new issue demands a mid-cycle reallocation of funds.
Fourth, concern was expressed about the timing of
authorizations and appropriations in a two year budget process.
Some experts have suggested that authorizations should be in
the first session of the Congress, with the budget resolution
and appropriation bills in the second session of each Congress.
At the June 7, 1988 Committee hearing, Senator Ford testified
that this approach would ``have meant that a newly elected
Congress and a newly elected President would have to wait a
full year before they could start to work their will on the
budget.'' The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress
accepted this argument--also made by other observers including
the General Accounting Office--and recommended that each
Congress appropriate in its first year. Even though building
that kind of learning period into the process has its desirable
aspects, we concluded, that it was unrealistic and opted for
budgeting in the first session.
Fifth, concern was expressed about effective date of the
legislation, and the transition to biennial budgeting. Under
the provisions of S. 261, biennial budgeting will be phased in.
Effective October 1, 1998 authorizations would have to cover at
least two years. The first two-year budget resolution and
appropriations bills would cover the biennium with Fiscal Year
2000--beginning October 1, 1999. The Committee notes that in
recent fiscal years, excluding the Department of Defense, less
than five percent of all Federal spending has been authorized
on an annual basis. Including the Department of Defense,
roughly 20 to 25 percent of all Federal spending has been
authorized on an annual basis. However, considering the
Committee on Armed Services willingness to move to a two year
authorization under certain conditions, the Committee notes
that Congress has the capacity to authorize most programs on a
multi-year basis. Since a large percentage of Federal spending
is already authorized on other than an annual basis, the
Committee concludes that the transition to multi-year
authorizations for the entire government would not constitute
an undue burden on either Congress or the Executive.
IV. Legislative History of Biennial Budgeting
1974 (93rd Congress).--The Congressional Budget Act of 1974
required the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to issue a
report on the ``feasibility and advisability'' of budgeting and
appropriating a full year in advance.
1977 (95th Congress).--In response to 1974 directive, CBO
issued ``Advance Budgeting: A Report to Congress.'' This
included a study of two-year appropriations, and concluded that
if ``committees did not have to spend so much time each year on
routine `budgetary' matters, they would in fact have more time
for their oversight work * * *''.
A parallel report made in 1977 by the Office of Management
and Budget, entitled ``A Study of the Advisability of
Submitting the President's Budget and Enacting Budget Authority
in Advance of the Current Timetable,'' also advocated the
concept of multi-year budgeting, on the grounds that, ``Both
the President and Congress will reap significantly greater
benefits from multiyear budgeting * * *.''
Also in 1977, Representative Panetta introduced the first
legislation to establish a biennial budget process. Panetta's
legislation, the Biennial Budget Act, sought to create a two-
year budget process devoted in the first year to oversight of
Executive branch agencies.
1979 (96th Congress).--Representative Panetta again
introduced a biennial budget bill. In the Senate, Senator
Bumpers introduced a resolution directing a study of the
feasibility of a biennial budget. No action was taken on either
bill.
1981-82 (97th Congress).--Four bills (Ford, Roth, Cochran,
and Quayle) to establish a biennial budget process were
introduced in the Senate. Representative Panetta again
sponsored a House bill. In 1981, biennial budgeting was
discussed during Governmental Affairs Committee hearings on the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974. Separate
hearings on Senator Roth's biennial budget bill also were held
by the Committee.
1983-84 (98th Congress).--Several biennial budget bills
were again introduced. Governmental Affairs held hearings on
Senator Roth's bill.
1984.--The Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate
Committee System recommended that a select committee be
established to study the feasibility of biennial budgeting. No
committee was formed.
1985-86 (99th Congress).--The FY 1986 Defense Authorization
bill included an amendment proposed by Senator Nunn to, among
other things, require the President to submit two-year budget
proposals for the Defense Department. The provision was
maintained, and the conferees for the bill expressed their
belief that a biennial budget would ``substantially improve DOD
management and congressional oversight.'' They further
indicated that it was preferable for all Federal spending to be
under a two-year system. While DOD submits a two-year budget,
Congress continues to with the annual cycle--so the long-term
planning benefit is still not realized.
1987-88 (100th Congress).--President Reagan and
congressional leadership approved the Budget Summit Agreement,
setting specific funding totals for domestic, international,
and defense discretionary spending for FY 1988 and FY 1989.
Longstanding supporters of biennial budgeting note that the
``biennial character'' of the summit agreement demonstrates
that the time had come to move to a two-year budget cycle. The
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1987
directed the appropriate congressional committees to develop a
plan to experiment with multi-year authorization and
appropriations.
1989-90 (101st Congress).--As Chairman of the Governmental
Affairs Committee, Senator John Glenn held hearings and ordered
favorably reported S. 29 (sponsored by Senators Ford, Roth and
Domenici) providing for a two-year budget resolution and
appropriations. The bill was not taken up by the full Senate.
1993-94 (103rd Congress).--Senators Boren and Domenici in
1994 introduced S. 1824 to implement the recommendations of the
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, which included
a provision to shift to a biennial budget cycle. The bill
reported by the Rules Committee as an outgrowth of the Joint
Committee's included the provision for biennial budget and
appropriations. Senator Domenici offered the Joint Committee's
legislative recommendations as an amendment to the District of
Columbia Appropriations bill. Senator Byrd raised a point of
order under section 306 of the Budget Act, and the Senate voted
58-41 in favor of the motion to waive the Budget Act with
respect to consideration of the amendment. Since the motion did
not gain the 60 votes necessary, the amendment failed.
1995-96 (104th Congress).--Four bills providing for a
biennial cycle were introduced. In July 1996, Senator Fred
Thompson, Chairman of the Financial Management and
Accountability Subcommittee of the Governmental Affairs
Committee, held a hearing on biennial budgeting. In September
1996, Senator Thompson introduced a biennial budget bill (S.
2049), emphasizing the need to provide Members of Congress with
time for increased legislative oversight and time at home.
V. Legislative History of S. 261
1997 (105th Congress)
Senator Domenici introduced S. 261 on February 4, 1997. The
bill provides for a two-year budget and appropriations process.
There were 25 original cosponsors.
February 13, 1997.--Budget Committee
Senator Domenici chaired a Budget Committee hearing on the
issue.
Although it was cut short, testimony was received from:
(1) Senators Thomas and Ford, as sponsors and
proponents;
(2) the National Conference of State Legislatures,
addressing the state experience,
(3) the Congressional Research Service, giving an
overview of the institutional impact on the internal
operations of Congress and the relationship between the
executive and legislative branches, and
(4) the Ford Motor Company, which cited the
advantages of multi-year funding for federal research
investments in science and technology.
April 23, 1997.--Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing
The hearing chaired by Senator Thompson on Wednesday, April
23, was designed to focus specifically on S. 261. There were
two panels:
Panel I
Frank Raines, OMB Director, on behalf of the
Administration. The Clinton Administration supports biennial
budgeting which was recommended in the report of the Vice
President's National Performance Review (NPR). The two previous
Clinton OMB Directors, Leon Panetta and Alice Rivlin, both
supported biennial budgeting. During the Carter Administration
then-Congressman Panetta had been the first to introduce
legislation establishing a biennial budget process.
Panel II
The second panel consisted of three witnesses:
(1) Charles Whalen, Cornell University, who had
recently published an article on biennial budgeting and
lessons from the states.
(2) Susan Irving, GAO, who summarized previous
testimony on state experiences and other issues
regarding congressional oversight and the
appropriations process specifically a section of the
original bill dealing with GAO and how S. 261 as
drafted interacts with the Government Performance and
Results Act.
(3) Louis Fisher, CRS, who discussed advantages and
disadvantages for Congress as an institution.
(4) CBO provided a written statement updating its
earlier testimony on biennial budgeting.
(5) The Senior Executives Association submitted a
written statement on behalf of senior and career
federal executives in support of biennial budgeting,
believing it would save both time and money, as well as
provide benefits in long-range planning.
OMB Director Raines supported S. 261, with the exception of
some substantive changes that it would make to the Government
Performance and Results Act (the Results Act). He commended the
bill for making biennial budgeting comprehensive, stating that
for biennial budgeting to work, it must cover each phase of the
budget process--the President's budget, the congressional
budget resolution, and appropriations. He expressed his
beliefthat biennial budgeting gives us some interesting possibilities
for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Federal
government. He indicated that a change to biennial budgeting would
allow OMB to devote more time to budget execution, financial
accounting, and performance reporting.
Dr. Whalen supported S. 261 and cited state experience with
biennial budgeting as indicating that there can be significant
benefits if the practice were adopted at the federal level. In
his view, three advantages would result from a biennial budget
and appropriations cycle--(1) it would streamline the budget
process, (2) enable federal officials to make policies more
effective, and (3) promote economic stability.
Dr. Irving noted that the decision to change the entire
budget process to a biennial one is fundamentally a decision
about the nature of congressional oversight. Biennial
appropriations would be neither the end of congressional
control nor the solution to many budget problems. Whether a
biennial cycle would reduce congressional workload and increase
time for oversight is unclear. Many policy issues present
themselves in a budget context. While pleased to see so much
thought go into the integration of the Government Performance
and Results Act into the process, Dr. Irving did agree with
Director Raines regarding substantive changes to the Results
Act at this time. She also agreed with the Chairman that the
provision in S. 261 regarding GAO assistance with
authorizations and oversight was unnecessary since GAO would
and did provide such assistance under its existing authorities.
Dr. Fisher commented on the bill's likely effect on the
operations of the Congress and the relationship between the
executive and legislative branches. He expressed concern that
it might lead to a further loss of the congressional power of
the purse and a decline in legislative control that would
result by giving the executive branch a longer leash with two
years of money. In his view, biennial budgeting might permit
the Congress to more closely oversee the activities of the
executive branch, but he was concerned regarding the loss of
oversight through annual appropriations. He thought that
biennial budgeting would bring modest workload relief to the
Congress and create a new set of problems. He suggesting
undertaking biennial budgeting on a pilot basis, in carefully
selected areas, before deciding on full-scale implementation.
CBO's written statement for the record noted that most
spending and revenues flow from permanent law or cover multi-
year periods. Thus, biennial budgeting would be more
significant for its effect on the cycle of budget action than
for its effect on the duration of budget laws. The CBO
statement said that the Committee should weigh the potential
gains from more time for planning, program evaluation, and
oversight against a potential loss of budget control and
accountability. It further noted that S. 261's specific
procedures to maintain separate budgetary and nonbudgetary
congressional sessions would make the legislative and budget
process more rigid.
VI. Committee Action
On May 22, 1997 the Committee held a business meeting at
which S. 261, the Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act,
was considered. Chairman Thompson offered an amendment in the
nature of a substitute, which was approved by voice vote.
Senator Durbin offered three amendments to S. 261 as
amended. The first amendment would have retained the annual
appropriations cycle in the budget process. The amendment
failed on a roll call vote of 4 Yeas (Cochran, Akaka, Durbin,
and Cleland) and 11 Nays (Collins, Brownback, Domenici by
proxy, Nickles, Specter, Smith, Bennett, Glenn, Levin,
Lieberman, and Thompson).
Senator Durbin's second amendment would have provided for a
joint resolution on the budget that required the President's
signature, rather than a concurrent resolution. The amendment
failed on a roll call vote of 3 Yeas (Akaka, Durbin, and
Cleland) and 12 Nays (Collins, Brownback, Domenici by proxy,
Cochran, Nickles, Specter, Smith, Bennett, Glenn, Levin,
Lieberman, and Thompson).
Senator Durbin's third amendment would have created a new
point of order precluding final action on the regular
Legislative Branch appropriations bill if all other
appropriations bills for the fiscal year have not already been
enacted into law. After some discussion, Senator Durbin
withdrew the amendment.
With no other amendments being offered, Chairman Thompson
moved adoption of S. 261 as amended. The bill was ordered
favorably reported by a vote of 13 Yeas (Collins, Brownback,
Cochran, Nickles, Specter, Glenn, Levin, Lieberman, Akaka,
Cleland, Thompson, Smith, and Bennett) and 1 Nay (Durbin).
Senator Domenici voted Aye by proxy.
VII. Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1 states the title of the legislation--the
``Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act''.
Section 2 amends section 300 of the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to revise the timetable to
reflect a biennial budget process. In general, the revised
timetable is similar to the current timetable except that most
of the milestones only apply to the first session of a
Congress. The timetable is modified to extend the deadline for
completionof the budget resolution to May 15th and to extend
the deadline for completion of reconciliation legislation to August
1st. The revised timetable contains two milestones in the second
session: a February 15th reporting requirement for the CBO annual
report on the budget and an end-of-session deadline for completion of
action on authorization legislation. This section also amends the
timetable to provide a special schedule in years a new President is
elected. Generally, deadlines are extended by 6 weeks to give a new
President more time to prepare and submit his budget.
Section 3 includes most of the other amendments made to the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act.
Section 3(a) amends section 2 of the Act to make a
conforming change to the statement of the purposes of the Act.
Section 3(b) adds a definition for ``biennium'' and makes a
conforming change to the definition of ``concurrent resolution
on the budget.''
Section 3(c) amends section 301 to require the Congress to
complete action on a biennial budget resolution by May 15th of
each odd-numbered year; to require the budget resolution to
cover the biennium, and each of the ensuing four years; to make
conforming changes regarding requirements for hearings and
reports on budgets; to make other conforming changes to the
section; and, to make conforming changes to the section heading
and the table of contents of the Act.
Section 3(d) amends section 302 of the Budget Act,
regarding committee allocations, to require the joint
explanatory statement accompanying the conference report on a
budget resolution to include for the Senate an allocation of
budget authority and outlays to each committee for each year in
the biennium and the total of the biennium and the four
succeeding fiscal years. This subsection also makes conforming
changes to section 302(f).
Section 3(e) amends section 303 of the Budget Act,
regarding the point of order against spending and revenue
legislation affecting future fiscal years, to make a conforming
change to provide that such legislation cannot be considered
until the budget resolution for a biennium is adopted. This
subsection also drops an exception to this point of order in
the Senate for appropriations measures providing an advance
appropriation for the two fiscal years following the budget
year.
Section 3(f) makes conforming changes to section 304 of the
Budget Act, regarding revisions of budget resolutions.
Maintains current law that allows Congress to revise the budget
resolution at any time.
Section 3(g) amends section 305 to make a conforming change
regarding a reference to the budget resolution.
Section 3 (h) and (i) amend sections 307 and 309 to make
conforming changes regarding the deadlines for completion of
appropriations bills.
Section 3(j) amends section 310 to make conforming changes
regarding reconciliation.
Section 3(k) would conform section 311 of the Act to the
biennial budget process. Section 311 currently makes
legislation subject to a point of order if it would cause total
new budget authority or total budget outlays to exceed levels
agreed to in the most recent budget resolution. As amended,
Section 311 would authorize a point of order if pertinent
budget levels were exceeded in either fiscal year in the
biennium.
Section 3(l) amends section 401(b)(2) to make a conforming
change regarding the referral of certain entitlement
legislation to the Appropriations Committee.
Section 3(m) amends section 603 to make a conforming change
regarding automatic allocations to the House Appropriations
Committee if the budget resolution is not adopted by a certain
date.
Section 4 amends the Senate pay-as-you-go point of order to
conform to a biennial cycle.
Section 5 amends the relevant sections of Title 31 of the
U.S. Code regarding materials the President's budget submission
and related documents.
Section 5(a) amends section 1101 to add a definition of
``biennium.''
Section 5(b) amends section 1105 to require the President
to submit the budget by the first Monday of February for every
odd- numbered year (except when the schedule in section 300(b)
of the Budget Act applies) Section 5(b) also amends a number of
requirements in section 1105 to conform the President's budget
to a biennial budget. Among these changes, the President's
budget would have to propose levels for each fiscal year in the
biennium and projections for the four succeeding years.
Section 5(c) amends section 1105(b), regarding estimated
expenditures and proposed appropriations for the legislative
and judicial branches, to require the submittal of these
proposals to the President before October 16th of even-numbered
years.
Subsections (d) and (e) of section 5 make conforming
changes to section 1105 regarding the President's
recommendations if there is a proposed deficit or surplus and
capital investment analyses.
Section 5(f) amends section 1106 to change the requirements
regarding the President's ``Mid-session Review.'' Current law
requires the President to submit the Mid-session Review before
July 16 of each year. Section 5(f) requires the President to
submit a ``Mid-biennium Review'' before February 15 of each
even-numbered year. With this modification, the President will
submit his biennial budget at the beginning of each odd-
numbered year and provide updated information on the budget at
the beginning of each even-numbered year.
Section 5(g) amends section 1109 to make conforming changes
to require the President to submit current services estimates
for the upcoming biennium and to require the Joint Economic
Committee to submit an economic evaluation to the Budget
Committee as part of its views and estimates report. This
subsection also makes two technical corrections to require the
President to submit the current services information with his
budget submission and to require the Joint Economic Committee
to submit its economic evaluation within 6 weeks of the
President's budget submission.
Section 5(h) makes amendments to section 1110 regarding
year ahead requests on authorization legislation to require the
President to submit requests for authorization legislation by
March 31st of even-numbered years.
Section 6 amends section 105 of Title I of the U.S. Code
regarding the form and style of appropriations Acts to require
that they cover two years.
Section 7 adds a new section 314 to the Budget Act that
establishes two new points of order in the Congress against
authorization legislation. The first point of order prohibits
consideration of authorization legislation that covers less
than 2 years except for temporary activities. The second point
order prohibits consideration of authorization or revenue
legislation until the Congress has completed action on the
biennial budget resolution, biennial appropriations bills, and
all reconciliation bills. These two points of order do not
apply to appropriations measures, reconciliation bills,
privileged matters, or matters considered in Executive Session
such as treaties, or nominations. This point of order can be
waived by a simple majority.
Section 8 amends the Government and Performance and Results
Act of 1993 (GPRA) to incorporate GPRA into the biennial budget
cycle.
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)
requires federal agencies to develop strategic plans,
performance plans, and performance reports. Strategic plans set
out the agencies' missions and general goals. Performance plans
lay out the specific quantifiable goals and measures.
Performance reports compare actual performance with the goals
of past performance plans.
GPRA requires federal agencies to consult with
congressional committees as they develop their strategic plans
and to submit the first strategic plans to the Office of
Management and Budget and to the Congress, by September 30 of
this year; the plans are to cover at least 6 years (i.e., the
current year plus 5 years into the future) and be updated at
least every three years. Annual performance plans delineating
agency goals in objective and measurable form are to cover each
program activity described annually in the agencies' budget
requests, with the first of these plans due in February 1998
with the fiscal year 1999 budget. GPRA also requires the
President to include a performance plan for the entire
government, beginning with the fiscal year 1999 budget.
Finally, the first annual performance report, comparing actual
performance for fiscal year 1999 to the performance goals
stated in the annual plan, are to be submitted by March 2000.
Section 8(a) amends section 306 of title 5 to require
agencies to prepare strategic plans, beginning no later than
September 30, 2000, which cover the year of submission plus six
years, and requires that the plans be updated at least every
four years.
Section 8(b) amends section 1105(a)(28) of title 31 to
require the President's budget to include a biennial government
wide performance plan beginning with fiscal year 2000.
Subsection 8(c) amends section 1115 of title 31, to conform
required performance plans to a biennial period and to require
that the plans cover each program activity of both years of the
biennial budget submission.
Subsection 8(d) amends section 9703 of title 31, regarding
managerial accountability and flexibility waivers, to conform
that section to the biennial budget process. Under this
amendment, waivers of ``procedural requirements or controls''
shall be for a two-year period.
Subsection 8(e) amends section 1119 of title 31, to require
that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
include in his report regarding performance budgeting pilot
projects authorized under GPRA the feasibility of including a
performance budget as part of a biennial budget process.
Subsection 8(f) amends section 2802 of title 39, to require
the Postal Service to prepare strategic plans, beginning no
later than September 30, 2000, which cover the year of
submission plus six years, and requires that the plans be
updated at least every four years. This amendment is comparable
to the amendment made to section 306 of title 5 by section 8(a)
of the bill.
Section 8(g) amends section 2803 of title 39 to require
that the Postal Service prepare performance plans for a
biennial period.
Section 8(h) amends section 301(d) of the Budget Act to
require Congressional committees to review the strategic plans,
performance plans, and performance reports of agencies in their
jurisdiction. Committees may then provide their views on the
plans or reports to the Budget Committee as part of their views
and estimates report.
Section 8(i) provides that the amendments in section 8
shall take effect on March 31, 1998.
Section 9 amends the Budget Act to add a new section 315
that provides a majority point of order against consideration
in any odd-numbered year of a regular appropriations bill that
fails to fund both years of the biennium except for temporary
activities. This point of order does not apply to supplementals
or continuing resolutions.
Section 10 requires OMB to conduct a study within 180 days
of enactment of the feasibility of converting the fiscal year
to a two year period.
Section 11 provides an effective date for the Act and a
transition period. Subsection (a) generally provides that the
Act takes effect on January 1, 1998. Section 11(b) provides a
transition year to the biennial cycle by requiring the
authorizing committees to start consideration of two-year
authorization legislation in 1998.
VIII. Regulatory Impact of Legislation
Paragraph 11(b)(1) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of
the Senate requires that each report accompanying a bill
evaluate ``the regulatory impact which would be incurred in
carrying out this bill.''
The enactment of this legislation will not have significant
regulatory impact.
IX. Cost Estimate of the Legislation
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington DC, June 3, 1997.
Hon. Fred D. Thompson,
Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington,
DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 261, the Biennial
Budgeting and Appropriations Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mary
Maginniss.
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neil, Director.
Enclosure.
congressional budget office cost estimate
S. 261--Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act
Summary: CBO estimates that shifting the federal budgetary
and appropriations process from an annual to a biennial cycle,
as required by S. 261, would not result in any significant cost
or savings to the federal government. Because the bill would
not affect direct spending or receipts, pay-as-you-go
procedures would not apply. S. 261 contains no
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) and would have no
impact on state, local or tribal governments.
Description of the bill's major provisions: Under S. 261,
the Congress and the President would act on budgetary matters
every other year. The first session of each Congress would be
devoted to budgetary actions--the President's budget, the
budget resolution, and appropriation and reconciliation acts--
under a schedule that parallels the current annual timetable.
The second session would generally be reserved for nonbudgetary
activities, including planning, oversight, and authorizing
legislation, and for any needed adjustments in budget laws
enacted in the first session or in earlier years. CBO and the
Office of Management and Budget would be required to prepare
reports of updated budget estimates during this second session.
A biennium composed of two separate fiscal years would
become the standard fiscal period. The fiscal biennium would
begin on October 1 each odd-numbered year, and end on September
30 two years later. The first beinnium would begin October 1,
1999 (the start of fiscal year 2000). Budgets would cover two-
year periods. The President's budget and the Congressional
budget resolution would cover three successive bienniums (a
six-year period), and regular appropriation acts would be
required to provide funds for a full biennium. Various rules
and procedures in the Senate and the House would be established
to enforcethe biennial budget process. S. 261 also would
conform the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 to the two-
year budget cycle.
In many respects, the proposed budget process would not
differ significantly from current practice. The President now
prepares multiyear revenue and spending estimates in his annual
budget. The current budget resolution includes recommended
levels for fiscal years through 2002. Further, most revenue and
spending law is permanent and would not be affected by any
changes that S. 261 would trigger in the annual appropriations
process. Relative to current law and practices, it is the
annual appropriation process--in which lawmakers both act on
and provide funds one year at a time--that biennial budgeting
would affect most significantly.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: Biennial
budgeting has the potential to streamline the budget process,
thereby freeing up time for the Congress to conduct oversight
reviews of programs and for executive branch agencies to focus
more on long-range planning and program management. Over time,
some funds now spent to pay for staff and other resources used
to prepare an annual budget might decrease by moving to a
biennial cycle. Initially, however, S. 261 would likely
increase federal costs. In fiscal year 2000, preparing precise
budget estimates for two years instead of one would probably
necessitate an increase in agency effort. Although the first
year of the biennium would be expected to continue to consume
the larger portion of the workload associated with budget
preparation, costs in the first year of the biennium should
decline somewhat after 2000.
In the second year of the biennium, Congressional and
federal agencies would continue to monitor, and in some cases,
revise budgetary estimates and requests in order to respond to
changes in the economy and to fund emergencies and other
unanticipated events. Based on a recent study analyzing the
experience in states with biennial budgeting, concrete
estimates of time savings in the second year are hard to
substantiate. CBO is unable to quantify the precise budgetary
impact of adopting biennial budgeting at the federal level, but
we expect that any such impact would not be significant.
CBO assumes that enacting S. 261 would not change the
period of availability or the amount of appropriated funds.
Under current law, annual appropriations already include
multiple-year or no-year funding for about two-thirds of the
accounts within the jurisdiction of the appropriations
committees. In some cases, advance appropriations are made
available. If the Congress were to change its procedures to
allow agencies to use funds not spent in the first year of the
biennium in the second year, total spending could increase, and
the timing of outlays could shift. However, we have no basis
for assuming that the Congress would change the period of time
for which funds would be made available to agencies under the
biennial budgeting process. If discretionary spending caps are
extended as assumed in the budget resolution for fiscal year
1998 (currently under consideration by the Congress), such
controls would effectively limit the total of any such
spending, regardless of the year in which the authority was
provided.
Pay-as-you-go considerations: None.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: S. 261
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in UMRA and would have no impact on state, local, or
tribal governments.
Estimate prepared by: Mary Maginniss.
Estimate approved by: Paul N. Van de Water, Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
X. Minority Views of Senator Durbin
To the extent that this bill would replace the present
annual appropriations cycle with a biennial process, I must
respectfully state my objections.
This bill aims to reduce the amount of time spent on the
budget process and provide more time for evaluation and review
of Federal agency program performance. The budget process is
complex and time-consuming, and it is important that we
scrutinize Federal programs to ensure that they are effective
and that Federal funds are being spent properly.
Yet, by limiting the frequency of the appropriations
process, this measure would sacrifice one of the most valuable
oversight mechanisms we have available.
There is no more effective way to focus the attention of
Federal program administrators than to have their budgets at
stake. Requiring agencies to justify and defend their programs
and budgets every year is a critical element of our effort to
evaluate how Federal programs are functioning and how funds are
expended. Under the existing annual structure, if agency
expenditures are inconsistent with Congressional intent,
Congress can address the situation within the year in the next
appropriation. Under biennial appropriations, Congress would
frequently have to do without its strongest tool.
Why would we want to diminish our authority to control
spending? Curtailing the amount and frequency of oversight by
appropriators directly contradicts one of the declared
objectives of this bill--to increase opportunities for agency
oversight.
The ultimate oversight is the power of the purse. To
restrain and weaken that process under the guise of expanding
oversight misapprehends the critical role that appropriations
committees play in oversight. Cutting back on that control of
spending, in my estimation, would be a serious mistake.
Some proponents suggest that a biennial appropriations
process would offer greater flexibility in fund availability.
Congress already has and routinely exercises its authority to
provide multi-year money or advance money where the program
cycle requires or where it is sensible to do so. Use of this
authority is demonstrated in a host of program accounts,
including Title I and other education programs, the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting, the Low Income Home Energy Assistance
Program, State grants for Medicaid, and various defense
procurement programs. The fact that Congress currently
accommodates needs in this way, and could broaden its use of
that authority where appropriate, underscores that it is not
necessary to change the decision cycle in order to change how
long money is available.
Even under an annual appropriations system, making precise
projections about agency needs is difficult. Under the current
annual cycle, the formulation of the President's budget begins
15 to 18 months prior to the beginning of the fiscal year for
which funding decisions will be made. In its Economic and
Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1998-2007, the Congressional
Budget Office compares actual budget totals and the first
budget resolution estimates. The discrepancies between these
figures clearly illustrate how, even on an annual basis,
projections of outlays, revenues, and estimates can miss the
mark.
Since the time lag between initial forecasts and actual
budget execution creates difficulties even in an annual
environment, it is hard to conceive how extending the budget
lead time to 27 or 30 months would enhance the reliability or
quality of the estimates, improve the capacity of the executive
branch to foresee future needs, or eliminate unanticipated
funding requirements. Increased difficulty in forecasting was a
primary reason several States gave for switching from biennial
to annual budget cycles. The federal government is not immune
from this problem.
Advocates suggest that biennial appropriations could
provide agencies with greater stability and certainty about the
level of available resources. However, as OMB Director Franklin
Raines noted in his testimony, the potential for that stability
is dependent on whether second year appropriations remain
unchanged by supplemental bills.
Many proponents of comprehensive biennial budgeting
acknowledge that an increase in supplementals can be expected
under a biennial environment. Given that supplemental spending
bills have already become almost routine under the present
appropriations process, it appears clear that we would
ultimately be engaged in appropriation decisions annually even
if Congress adopted a biennial appropriations process. However,
the supplemental bills would become more elaborate and
comprehensive, and the ``biennial'' nature of the
appropriations cycle would be, for all practical purposes, one
in name only.
I am skeptical that a shift to biennial appropriations
would actually reduce the time and attention Congress would
need to devote to spending decisions. In fact, it is possible
that the appropriations process would become more contentious
and protracted as Congress fought over what programs should be
cut--despite their biennial appropriation--to offset
unanticipated spending increases needed in the so-called ``off-
year.''
Finally, it is not necessary to abandon annual
appropriations in order to invigorate the authorizing
committees and help them engage in more focused and
deliberative oversight. Retaining annual appropriations will
not interfere with more intensive oversight by the authorizing
committees. In fact, the oversight function will be more
effective if the regular annual appropriations process remains
available to accommodate the needs identified through enhanced
oversight by authorizing committees.
Biennial budgeting may have its merits, but those merits do
not extend to the appropriations process. I hope my colleagues
will recognize the distinctions, and leave the annual
appropriations process intact.
Dick Durbin.
XI. Changes in Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law with no change
proposed is shown in roman):
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
short titles; table of contents
Sec. 1(a). * * *
(b) Table of Contents.--
* * * * * * *
Sec. 300. Timetable.
Sec. 301. [Annual] Biennial adoption of concurrent
resolution on the budget.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 314. Authorizations of appropriations.
Sec. 315. Consideration of two year appropriations bills.
* * * * * * *
DECLARATION OF PURPOSES
Sec. 2. The Congress declares that it is essential--
(1) to assure effective congressional control over
the budgetary process;
(2) to provide for the congressional determination
[each year] biennially of the appropriate level of
Federal revenues and expenditures;
* * * * * * *
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 3. In General.--For purposes of this Act--
* * * * * * *
(4) The term ``concurrent resolution on the budget''
means
(A) a concurrent resolution setting forth the
congressional budget for the United States
Government for a [fiscal year] biennium as
provided in section 301; and
(B) any other concurrent resolution revising
the congressional budget for the United States
Government for a [fiscal year] biennium as
described in section 304.
* * * * * * *
(11) The term ``biennium'' means the period of 2
consecutive fiscal years beginning on October 1 of any odd-
numbered year.
* * * * * * *
Title III--Congressional Budget Process
[TIMETABLE
[Sec. 300. The timetable with respect to the congressional
budget process for any fiscal year is as follows:
[On or before: Action to be completed:
[First Monday in February................ President submits his budget.
[February 15............................. Congressional Budget Office
submits report to Budget
Committees.
[February 25............................. Committees submit views and
estimates to Budget
Committees.
[April 1................................. Senate Budget Committee
reports concurrent
resolution on the budget.
[April 15................................ Congress completes action on
concurrent resolution on the
budget.
[May 15.................................. Annual appropriation bills
may be considered in the
House.
[June 10................................. House Appropriations
Committee reports last
annual appropriation bill.
[June 15................................. Congress completes action on
reconciliation legislation.
[June 30................................. House completes action on
annual appropriation bills.
[October 1............................... Fiscal year begins.]
timetable
Sec. 300. (a) In General.--Except as provided by subsection
(b), the timetable with respect to the congressional budget
process for any Congress (beginning with the One Hundred Sixth
Congress) is as follows:
First Session
On or before: Action to be completed:
First Monday in February................. President submits budget
recommendations.
February 15.............................. Congressional Budget Office
submits report to Budget
Committees.
Within 6 weeks after budget submission... Committees submit views and
estimates to Budget
Committees.
April 1.................................. Budget Committees report
concurrent resolution on the
biennial budget.
May 15................................... Congress completes action on
concurrent resolution on the
biennial budget.
May 15................................... Biennial appropriation bills
may be considered in the
House.
June 10.................................. House Appropriations
Committee reports last
biennial appropriation bill.
June 30.................................. Congress completes action on
biennial appropriation
bills.
August 1................................. House completes action on
reconciliation legislation.
October 1................................ Biennium begins.
Second Session
On or before: Action to be completed:
February 15.............................. Congressional Budget Office
submits report to Budget
Committees
The last day of the session.............. Congress completes action on
bills and resolutions
authorizing new budget
authority for the succeeding
biennium.
(b) Special Rule.--In the case of any first session of
Congress that begins in any year immediately following a leap
year and during which the term of a President (except a
President who succeeds himself) begins, the following dates
shall supersede those set forth in subsection (a):
First Session
On or before: Action to be completed:
First Monday in April.................... President submits budget
recommendations.
April 20................................. Committees submit views and
estimates to Budget
Committees.
May 15................................... Budget Committees report
concurrent resolution on the
biennial budget.
June 1................................... Congress completes action on
concurrent resolution on the
biennial budget.
July 1................................... Biennial appropriation bills
may be considered in the
House.
July 20.................................. House Appropriations
Committee reports last
biennial appropriation bill.
[ANNUAL] BIENNIAL ADOPTION OF CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET
Sec. 301. (a) Content of Concurrent Resolution on the
Budget.--On or before [April 15 of each year] May 15 of each
odd-numbered year, the Congress shall complete action on a
concurrent resolution on the budget for [the fiscal year
beginning on October 1 of such year] the biennium beginning on
October 1 of such year. The concurrent resolution shall set
forth appropriate levels for [the fiscal year beginning on
October 1 of such year] each fiscal year in such period, [and
planning levels for each of the two ensuing fiscal years] and
the appropriate levels for each of the 4 ensuing fiscal years,
for the following--
(1) totals of new budget authority, budget outlays,
direct loan obligations, and primary loan guarantee
commitments;
(2) total Federal revenues and the amount, if any, by
which the aggregate level of Federal revenues should be
increased or decreased by bills and resolutions to be
reported by the appropriate committees;
(3) the surplus or deficit in the budget;
(4) new budget authority, budget outlays, direct loan
obligations, and primary loan guarantee commitments for
each major functional category, based on allocations of
the total levels set forth pursuant to paragraph (1);
(5) the public debt;
(6) For purposes of Senate enforcement under this
title, outlays of the old-age, survivors, and
disability insurance program established under title II
of the Social Security Act [for the fiscal year] for
each fiscal year in the biennium of the resolution and
for each of the 4 succeeding fiscal years; and
(7) For purposes of Senate enforcement under this
title, revenues of the old-age, survivors, and
disability insurance program established under title II
of the Social Security Act (and the related provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) [for the fiscal
year] for each fiscal year in the biennium of the
resolution and for each of the 4 succeeding fiscal
years.
The concurrent resolution shall not include the outlays and
revenue totals of the old age, survivors, and disability
insurance program established under title II of the Social
Security Act or the related provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 in the surplus or deficit totals required by this
subsection or in any other surplus or deficit totals required
by this title.
(b) Additional Matters in Concurrent Resolution.--The
concurrent resolution on the budget for a biennium may--
(1) set forth, if required by subsection (f), the
calendar year in which, in the opinion of the Congress,
the goals for reducing unemployment set forth in
section 4(b) of the Employment Act of 1946 should be
achieved;
(2) include reconciliation directives described in
section 310;
(3) require a procedure under which all or certain
bills or resolutions providing new budget authority or
new entitlement authority [for such fiscal year] for
either fiscal year in such biennium shall not be
enrolled until the Congress has completed action on any
reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution or
both required by such concurrent resolution to be
reported in accordance with section 310(b);
* * * * * * *
(d) Views and Estimates of Other Committees.--Within 6
weeks after the President submits a budget under section
1105(a) of title 31, United States Code (or, if applicable, as
provided by section 300(b)) each committee of the House of
Representatives having legislative jurisdiction shall submit to
the Committee on the Budget of the House and each committee of
the Senate having legislative jurisdiction shall submit to the
Committee on the Budget of the Senate its views and estimates
(as determined by the committee making such submission) with
respect to all matters set forth in subsections (a) and (b)
which relate to matters within the jurisdiction or functions of
such committee. The Joint Economic Committee shall submit to
the Committees on the Budget of both Houses its recommendations
as to the fiscal policy appropriate to the goals of the
Employment Act of 1946. Any other committee of the House of
Representatives or the Senate may submit to the Committee on
the Budget of its House, and any joint committee of the
Congress may submit to the Committees on the Budget of both
Houses, its views and estimates with respect to all matters set
forth in subsections (a) and (b) which relate to matters within
its jurisdiction or functions. Any Committee of the House of
Representatives or the Senate that anticipates that the
committee will consider any proposed legislation establishing,
amending, or reauthorizing any Federal program likely to have a
significant budgetary impact on any State, local, or tribal
government, or likely to have a significant financial impact on
the private sector, including any legislative proposal
submitted by the executive branch likely to have such a
budgetary or financial impact, shall include its views and
estimates on that proposal to the Committee on the Budget of
the applicable House. Each committee of the Senate or the House
of Representatives shall review the strategic plans,
performance plans, and performance reports, required under
section 306 of title 5, United States Code, and sections 1115
and 1116 of title 31, United States Code, of all agencies under
the jurisdiction of the committee. Each committee may provide
its views on such plans or reports to the Committee on the
budget of the applicable House.
(e) Hearings and Report.--In developing the concurrent
resolution on the budget referred to in subsection (a) for each
[fiscal year] biennium, the Committee on the Budget of each
House shall hold hearings and shall receive testimony from
Members of Congress and such appropriate representatives of
Federal departments and agencies, the general public, and
national organizations as the committee deems desirable. Each
of the recommendations as to short-term and medium-term goal
set forth in the report submitted by the members of the Joint
Economic Committee under subsection (d) may be considered by
the Committee on the Budget of each House as part of its
consideration of such concurrent resolution, and its report may
reflect its views thereon, including its views on how the
estimates of revenues and levels of budget authority and
outlays set forth in such concurrent resolution are designed to
achieve any goals it is recommending. On or before April 1 of
each odd-numbered year (or, if applicable, as provided by
section 300(b)), the Committee on the Budget of each House
shall report to its House the concurrent resolution on the
budget referred to in subsection (a) for the biennium beginning
on October 1 of that year. The report accompanying such
concurrent resolution shall include, but not be limited to--
* * * * * * *
(6) projections (not limited to the following), for
the period of [five fiscal years beginning with such
fiscal year] six fiscal years beginning with the first
fiscal year of such biennium, of the estimated levels
of total budget outlays and total new budget authority,
the estimated revenues to be received, and the
estimated surplus or deficit, if any, for each fiscal
year in such period, and the estimated levels of tax
expenditures (the tax expenditures budget) by major
functional categories;
* * * * * * *
(f) Achievement of Goals for Reducing Unemployment.--
(1) If, pursuant to section 4(c) of the Employment
Act of 1946, the President recommends in the Economic
Report that the goals for reducing unemployment set
forth in section 4(b) of such Act be achieved in a year
after the close of the five-year period prescribed by
such subsection, the concurrent resolution on the
budget for the [fiscal year] biennium beginning after
the date on which such Economic Report is received by
the Congress may set forth the year in which, in the
opinion of the Congress, such goals can be achieved.
(2) After the Congress has expressed its opinion
pursuant to paragraph (1) as to the year in which the
goals for reducing unemployment set forth in section
4(b) of the Employment Act of 1946 can be achieved, if,
pursuant to section 4(e) of such Act, the President
recommends in the Economic Report that such goals be
achieved in a year which is different from the year in
which the Congress has expressed its opinion that such
goals should be achieved, either in its action pursuant
to paragraph (1) or in its most recent action pursuant
to this paragraph, the concurrent resolution on the
budget for the [fiscal year] biennium beginning after
the date on which such Economic Report is received by
the Congress may set forth the year in which, in the
opinion of the Congress, such goals can be achieved.
* * * * * * *
(g) Economic Assumptions.--
(1) It shall not be in order in the Senate to
consider any concurrent resolution on the budget [for a
fiscal year] for a biennium, or any amendment thereto,
or any conference report thereon, that sets forth
amounts and levels that are determined on the basis of
more than one set of economic and technical
assumptions.
* * * * * * *
committee allocations
Sec. 302. (a) Allocation of Totals.--
(1) For the House of Representatives, the joint
explanatory statement accompanying a conference report
on a concurrent resolution on the budget shall include
an estimated allocation, based upon such concurrent
resolution as recommended in such conference report, of
the appropriate levels of total budget outlays, total
new budget authority, and total entitlement authority
among each committee of the House of Representatives
which has jurisdiction over laws, bills and resolutions
providing such new budget authority, or such
entitlement authority. The allocation shall, for each
committee, divide new budget authority, and entitlement
authority between amounts provided or required by law
on the date of such conference report (mandatory or
uncontrollable amounts), and amounts not so provided or
required (discretionary or controllable amounts), and
shall make the same division for estimated outlays that
would result from such new budget authority.
[(2) For the Senate, the joint explanatory statement
accompanying a conference report on a concurrent
resolution on the budget shall include an estimated
allocation, based upon such concurrent resolution as
recommended in such conference report, of the
appropriate levels of social security outlays for the
fiscal year of the resolution and for each of the 4
succeeding fiscal years, total budget outlays and total
new budget authority among each committee of the Senate
which has jurisdiction over bills and resolutions
providing such new budget authority.]
(2)(A) For the Senate, the joint explanatory
statement accompanying a conference report on a
concurrent resolution on the budget shall include an
estimated allocation of the appropriate levels of total
new budget authority, total outlays, and social
security outlays, based upon the concurrent resolution
as recommended in the conference report, to each
committee of the Senate which has jurisdiction over
bills and resolutions providing budget authority.
(B) For all committees except the Committee on
Appropriations, the allocations under subparagraph (A)
shall include the appropriate levels of budget
authority, outlays, and social security outlays for
each fiscal year in the biennium and the total of the
biennium and the 4 succeeding fiscal years.
(C) For the Committee on Appropriations, the
allocation under subparagraph (a) shall include the
appropriate levels of budget authority, outlays, and
social security outlays for each fiscal year in the
biennium.
* * * * * * *
(f) Legislation Subject to Point of Order.--
(1) In the house of representatives.--After the
Congress has completed action on a concurrent
resolution on the budget [for a fiscal year], it shall
not be in order in the House of Representatives to
consider any bill, joint resolution, or amendment
providing new budget authority [for such fiscal year]
or new entitlement authority [effective during such
fiscal year], or any conference report on any such bill
or joint resolution, if--
(A) the enactment of such bill or resolution
as reported;
(B) the adoption and enactment of such
amendment; or
(C) the enactment of such bill or resolution
in the form recommended in such conference
report,
would cause the appropriate allocation made pursuant to
subsection (b) [for such fiscal year] of new
discretionary budget authority or new entitlement
authority to be exceeded.
(2) In the senate.--[At any time after the Congress
has completed action on the concurrent resolution on
the budget required to be reported under section 301(a)
for a fiscal year, it shall not be in order in the
Senate to consider any bill, joint resolution,
amendment, motion, or conference report, that provides
for budget outlays, new budget authority, or new
spending authority (as defined in section 401(c)(2)) in
excess of (A) the appropriate allocation of such
outlays or authority reported under subsection (a), or
(B) the appropriate allocation (if any) of such outlays
or authority reported under subsection (b) in
connection with the most recently agreed to concurrent
resolution on the budget for such fiscal year or
provides for social security outlays in excess of the
appropriate allocation of social security outlays under
subsection (a) for the fiscal year of the resolution or
for the total of that year and the 4 succeeding fiscal
years.] At any time after Congress has completed action
on a concurrent resolution on the budget required to be
reported under section 301(a), it shall not be in order
to consider any bill, joint resolution, amendment,
motion, or conference report, that provides new budget
authority, outlays, new spending authority (as defined
in section 401(c)(2)), or social security outlays in
excess of allocations made pursuant to subsection (a)
and (b). [Subparagraph (A)] The requirement of this
paragraph to comply with allocations made pursuant to
section 302(a) shall not apply to any bill, resolution,
amendment, motion, or conference report that is within
the jurisdiction of the Committee on Appropriations. In
applying this paragraph--
* * * * * * *
concurrent resolution on the budget must be adopted before legislation
providing new budget authority, new spending authority, new credit
authority, or changes in revenues or the public debt limit is
considered
Sec. 303. (a) In General.--It shall not be in order in
either the House of Representatives or the Senate to consider
any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or conference
report as reported to the House or Senate which provides--
(1) new budget authority for a fiscal year;
(2) an increase or decrease in revenues to become
effective during a fiscal year;
(3) an increase or decrease in the public debt limit
to become effective during a fiscal year;
(4) new entitlement authority to become effective
during a fiscal year;
(5) in the Senate only, new spending authority (as
defined in section 401(c)(2)) for a fiscal year; or
(6) in the Senate only, outlays,
until the concurrent resolution on the budget for such [fiscal
year] biennium (or, in the Senate, a concurrent resolution on
the budget covering such fiscal year) has been agreed to
pursuant to section 301.
(b) Exceptions.--[(1)] In the House of Representatives,
subsection (a) does not apply to any bill or resolution--
[(A)] (1) providing new budget authority which first
becomes available in a fiscal year following [the
fiscal year] biennium to which the concurrent
resolution applies; or
[(B)] (2) increasing or decreasing revenues which
first become effective in a fiscal year following [the
fiscal year] biennium to which the concurrent
resolution applies.
After May 15 of [any calendar year] any odd-numbered calendar
year (or, if applicable, as provided by section 300(b)),
subsection (a) does not apply in the House of Representatives
to any general appropriation bill, or amendment thereto, which
provides new budget authority for the fiscal year beginning in
such calendar year.
[(2) In the Senate, subsection (a) does not apply to any
bill or resolution making advance appropriations for the fiscal
year to which the concurrent resolution applies and the two
succeeding fiscal years.]
* * * * * * *
permissible revisions of concurrent resolution on the budget
Sec. 304. (a) In General.--At any time after the concurrent
resolution on the budget for a [fiscal year] biennium has been
agreed to pursuant to section 301, and before the end of such
[fiscal year] biennium, the two Houses may adopt a concurrent
resolution on the budget which revises or reaffirms the
concurrent resolution on the budget [for such fiscal year] most
recently agreed to for such biennium.
* * * * * * *
provisions relating to consideration of concurrent resolution on the
budget
Sec. 305. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) Following the presentation of opening statements
on the concurrent resolution on the budget for a
[fiscal year] biennium by the chairman and ranking
minority member of the Committee on the Budget of the
House, there shall be a period of up to four hours for
debate on economic goals and policies.
* * * * * * *
house committee action on all appropriation bills to be completed by
june 10
Sec. 307. On or before June 10 of each year, the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives shall report
annual appropriation bills providing new budget authority under
the jurisdiction of all of its subcommittees for the [fiscal
year] biennium which begins on October 1 of [that year] each
odd-numbered year.
* * * * * * *
house approval of regular appropriations bills
Sec. 309. It shall not be in order in the House of
Representatives to consider any resolution providing for an
adjournment period of more than three calendar days during the
month of July of any odd-numbered calendar year until the House
of Representatives has approved [annual] biennial appropriation
bills providing new budget authority under the jurisdiction of
all the subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations for
the fiscal year beginning on October 1 of such year. For
purposes of this section, the chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives shall
periodically advise the Speaker as to changes in jurisdiction
among its various subcommittees.
reconciliation
Sec. 310. (a) Inclusion of Reconciliation Directives in
Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget.--A concurrent resolution
on the budget for [any fiscal year] any biennium, to the extent
necessary to effectuate the provisions and requirements of such
resolution, shall--
(1) specify the total amount by which--
(A) new budget authority for [such fiscal
year] any fiscal year covered by such
resolution;
(B) budget authority initially provided for
prior fiscal years;
(C) new entitlement authority which is to
become effective during [such fiscal year] any
fiscal year covered by such resolution; and
(D) credit authority for such fiscal year any
fiscal year covered by such resolution,
contained in laws, bills, and resolutions within the
jurisdiction of a committee is to be changed and direct
that committee to determine and recommend changes to
accomplish a change of such total amount;
* * * * * * *
new budget authority, new spending authority, and revenue legislation
must be within appropriate levels
Sec. 311. (a)(1) Legislation Subject to Point of Order.--
Except as provided by subsection (b), after the Congress has
completed action on a concurrent resolution on the budget [for
a fiscal year] for a biennium, it shall not be in order in
either the House of Representatives or the Senate to consider
any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or conference
report providing new budget authority for [such fiscal year]
either fiscal year in such biennium, providing new entitlement
authority effective [during such fiscal year] during either
fiscal year in such biennium, or reducing [revenues for such
fiscal year] revenues for a fiscal year, if--
(A) the enactment of such bill or resolution as
reported;
(B) the adoption and enactment of such amendment; or
(C) the enactment of such bill or resolution in the
form recommended in such conference report;
would cause the appropriate level of total new budget authority
or total budget outlays set forth in the most recently agreed
to concurrent resolution on the [budget for such fiscal year]
budget for either fiscal year in such biennium to be exceeded,
or would cause revenues to be less than the appropriate level
of total revenues set forth in such concurrent resolution
except in the case that a declaration of war by the Congress is
in effect.
(2)(A) After the Congress has completed action on a
concurrent resolution on the budget, it shall not be in order
in the Senate to consider any bill, resolution, amendment,
motion, or conference report that would cause the appropriate
level of total new budget authority or total budget outlays or
social security outlays set forth [for the first] for either
fiscal year in the most recently agreed to concurrent
resolution on the budget [covering such fiscal year] covering
the biennium to be exceeded, or would cause revenues to be less
than the appropriate level of total revenues (or social
security revenues to be less than the appropriate level of
social security revenues) set forth for [the first fiscal year
covered] either fiscal year in the biennium covered by the
resolution and for the period including [the first fiscal year
plus] the biennium plus the following 4 fiscal years in such
concurrent resolution.
(b) Exception in the House of Representatives.--Subsection
(a) shall not apply in the House of Representatives to any
bill, resolution, or amendment which provides new budget
authority or new entitlement authority effective during such
fiscal year, or to any conference report on any such bill or
resolution, if--
(1) the enactment of such bill or resolution as
reported;
(2) the adoption and enactment of such amendment; or
(3) the enactment of such bill or resolution in the
form recommended in such conference report,
would not cause the appropriate allocation of new discretionary
budget authority or new entitlement authority made pursuant to
section 302(a) for [such fiscal year] either fiscal year in
such biennium, for the committee within whose jurisdiction such
bill, resolution, or amendment falls, to be exceeded.
* * * * * * *
authorizations of appropriations
Sec. 314. (a) Point of Order.--It shall not be in order in
the House of Representatives or the Senate to consider--
(1) any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or
conference report that authorizes appropriations for a
period of less than 2 fiscal years, unless the program,
project, or activity for which the appropriations are
authorized will require no further appropriations and
will be completed or terminated after the
appropriations have been expended; and
(2) in any odd-numbered year, any authorization or
revenue bill or joint resolution until Congress
completes action on the biennial budget resolution, all
regular biennial appropriations bills, and all
reconciliation bills.
(b) Applicability.--In the Senate, subsection (a) shall not
apply to--
(1) any measure that is privileged for consideration
pursuant to a rule or statute;
(2) any matter considered in Executive Session; or
(3) an appropriations measure or reconciliation bill.
consideration of two-year appropriations bills
Sec. 315. It shall not be in order in the House of
Representatives or the Senate in any odd-numbered year to
consider any regular bill providing new budget authority or a
limitation on obligations under the jurisdiction of any of the
subcommittees of the Committees on Appropriations for only the
first fiscal year of a biennium, unless the program, project,
or activity for which the new budget authority or obligation
limitation is provided will require no additional authority
beyond 1 year and will be completed or terminated after the
amount provided has been expended.
Title IV--Additional Provisions To Improve Fiscal Procedures
Sec. 401. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(b)(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(2) If any committee of the House of Representatives or
the Senate reports any bill or resolution which provides new
spending authority described in subsection (c)(2)(C) which is
to become effective during a fiscal year and the amount of new
budget authority which will be required for such fiscal year if
such bill or resolution is enacted as so reported exceeds the
appropriate allocation of new budget authority reported under
section 302(b) in connection with the most recently agreed to
concurrent resolution on the budget [for such fiscal year] for
the biennium in which such fiscal year occurs, such bill or
resolution shall then be referred to the Committee on
Appropriations of that House with instructions to report it,
with the committee's recommendations, within 15 calendar days
(not counting any day on which that House is not in session)
beginning with the day following the day on which it is so
referred. If the Committee on Appropriations of either House
fails to report a bill or resolution referred to it under this
paragraph within such 15-day period, the committee shall
automatically be discharged from further consideration of such
bill or resolution and such bill or resolution shall be placed
on the appropriate calendar.
* * * * * * *
Title VI--Budget Agreement Enforcement Provisions
* * * * * * *
Sec. 603. Consideration of Legislation Before Adoption of Budget
Resolution For That Fiscal Year
Sec. 603. (a) Adjusting Section Allocation of Discretionary
Spending.--If a concurrent resolution on the budget is not
adopted by April 15, (or if section 300(b) applies by June
15th), the chairman of the Committee on the Budget of the House
of Representatives shall submit to the House, as soon as
practicable, a section 602(a) allocation to the Committee on
Appropriations consistent with the discretionary spending
limits contained in the most recent budget submitted by the
President under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States
Code. Such allocation shall include the full allowance
specified under section 251(b)(2)(E)(i) of the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
* * * * * * *
House Concurrent Resolution 67--One Hundred Fourth Congress
* * * * * * *
Sec. 202. Extension of Pay-As-You-Go Point of Order.--(a)
Purpose.--The Senate declares that it is essential to--
(1) ensure continued compliance with the balanced
budget plan set forth in this resolution; and
(2) continue the pay-as-you-go enforcement system.
(b) Point of Order.--
(1) In general.--It shall not be in order in the
Senate to consider any direct spending or revenue
legislation that would increase the deficit for any one
of the three applicable time periods as measured in
paragraphs (5) and (6).
(2) Applicable time periods.--For purposes of this
subsection the term ``applicable time period'' means
any one of the three following periods:
[(A) The first year covered by the most
recently adopted concurrent resolution on the
budget.
[(B) The period of the first five fiscal
years covered by the most recently adopted
concurrent resolution on the budget.
[(C) The period of the five fiscal years
following the first five fiscal years covered
in the most recently adopted concurrent
resolution on the budget.]
(A) The period of the biennium covered by the
most recently adopted concurrent resolution on
the budget.
(B) The period of the first six fiscal years
covered by the most recently adopted concurrent
resolution on the budget.
(C) The period of the four fiscal years
following the first six fiscal years covered by
the most recently adopted concurrent resolution
on the budget.
* * * * * * *
UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 31, MONEY AND FINANCE
Subtitle II--The Budget Process
CHAPTER 11--THE BUDGET AND FISCAL, BUDGET, AND PROGRAM INFORMATION
Sec. 1101. Definitions
In this chapter--
* * * * * * *
(3) ``biennium'' has the meaning given to such term
in paragraph (11) of section 3 of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C.
622(11)).
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1105. Budget contents and submission to Congress
(a) [On or after the first Monday in January but not later
than the first Monday in February of each year, the President
shall submit a budget of the United States Government for the
following fiscal year. Each budget shall include a budget
message and summary and supporting information. The President
shall include in each budget the following:] On or before the
first Monday in February of each odd-numbered year (or, if
applicable, as provided by section 300(b) of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974), beginning with the One Hundred Sixth
Congress, the President shall transmit to the Congress, the
budget for the biennium beginning on October 1 of such calendar
year. The budget transmitted under this subsection shall
include a budget message and summary and supporting
information. The President shall include in each budget the
following:
(1) information on activities and functions of the
Government.
(2) when practicable, information on costs and
achievements of Government programs.
(3) other desirable classifications of information.
(4) a reconciliation of the summary information on
expenditures with proposed appropriations.
(5) except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, estimated expenditures and proposed
appropriations the President decides are necessary to
support the Government in [the fiscal year for which
the budget is submitted and the 4 fiscal years after
that year] each fiscal year in the biennium for which
the budget is submitted and in the succeeding 4 years.
(6) estimated receipts of the Government in [the
fiscal year for which the budget is submitted and the 4
fiscal years after that year] each fiscal year in the
biennium for which the budget is submitted and in the
succeeding 4 years under--
(A) laws in effect when the budget is
submitted; and
(B) proposals in the budget to increase
revenues.
(7) appropriations, expenditures, and receipts of the
Government in the prior fiscal year.
(8) estimated expenditures and receipts, and
appropriations and proposed appropriations, of the
Government for the current fiscal year.
(9) balanced statements of the--
(A) condition of the Treasury at the end of
the prior fiscal year;
(B) estimated condition of the Treasury at
the end of the current fiscal year; and
(C) estimated condition of the Treasury at
the end of [the fiscal year] each fiscal year
in the biennium for which the budget is
submitted if financial proposals in the budget
are adopted.
(10) essential information about the debt of the
Government.
(11) other financial information the President
decides is desirable to explain in practicable detail
the financial condition of the Government.
(12) for each proposal in the budget for legislation
that would establish or expand a Government activity or
function, a table showing--
(A) the amount proposed in the budget for
appropriation and for expenditure because of
the proposal in [the fiscal year] each fiscal
year in the biennium for which the budget is
submitted; and
(B) the estimated appropriation required
because of the proposal for each of the [4
fiscal years after that year] 4 fiscal years
immediately following the second fiscal year in
such biennium that the proposal will be in
effect.
(13) an allowance for additional estimated
expenditures and proposed appropriations for [the
fiscal year] each fiscal year in the biennium for which
the budget is submitted.
(14) an allowance for unanticipated uncontrollable
expenditures for [that year] each fiscal year in the
biennium for which the budget is submitted.
(15) a separate statement on each of the items
referred to in section 301(a) (1)-(5) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 632(a) (1)-
(5)).
(16) the level of tax expenditures under existing law
in the tax expenditures budget (as defined in section
3(a)(3) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2
U.S.C. 622(a)(3)) for [the fiscal year] each fiscal
year in the biennium for which the budget is submitted,
considering projected economic factors and changes in
the existing levels based on proposals in the budget.
(17) information on estimates of appropriations for
[the fiscal year following the fiscal year] each fiscal
year in the biennium following the biennium for which
the budget is submitted for grants, contracts, and
other payments under each program for which there is an
authorization of appropriations for [that following
fiscal year] each such fiscal year when the
appropriations are authorized to be included in an
appropriation law for the [fiscal year before the
fiscal year] biennium before the biennium in which the
appropriation is to be available for obligation.
(18) a comparison of the total amount of budget
outlays for [the prior fiscal year] each of the 2 most
recently completed fiscal years, estimated in the
budget submitted [for that year] with respect to those
fiscal years, for each major program having relatively
uncontrollable outlays with the total amount of outlays
for that program [in that year] in those fiscal years.
(19) a comparison of the total amount of receipts for
[the prior fiscal year] each of the 2 most recently
completed fiscal years, estimated in the budget
submitted [for that year] with respect to those fiscal
years, with receipts received [in that year] in those
fiscal years, and for each major source of receipts, a
comparison of the amount of receipts estimated in that
budget with the amount of receipts from that source in
that year.
(20) an analysis and explanation of the differences
between each amount compared under clauses (18) and
(19) of this subsection.
(21) a horizontal budget showing--
(A) the programs for meteorology and of the
National Climate Program established under
section 5 of the National Climate Program Act
(15 U.S.C. 2904);
(B) specific aspects of the program of, and
appropriations for, each agency; and
(C) estimated goals and financial
requirements.
(22) a statement of budget authority, proposed budget
authority, budget outlays, and proposed budget outlays,
and descriptive information in terms of--
(A) a detailed structure of national needs
that refers to the missions and programs of
agencies (as defined in section 101 of this
title); and
(B) the missions and basic programs.
(23) separate appropriation accounts for
appropriations under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.) and the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (30 U.S.C. 801 et
seq.).
(24) recommendations on the return of Government
capital to the Treasury by a mixed-ownership
corporation (as defined in section 9101(2) of this
title) that the President decides are desirable.
(25) a separate appropriation account for
appropriations for each Office of Inspector General of
an establishment defined under section 11(2) of the
Inspector General Act of 1978.
(26) a separate statement of the amount of
appropriations requested for the Office of National
Drug Control Policy and each program of the National
Drug Control Program.
(27) a separate statement of the amount of
appropriations requested for the Office of Federal
Financial Management.
(28) [beginning with] for fiscal year 1999, a Federal
Government performance plan, and beginning with fiscal
year 2000, a biennial Federal Government performance
plan for the overall budget as provided for under
section 1115.
(29) information about the Violent Crime Reduction
Trust Fund, including a separate statement of amounts
in that Trust Fund.
(30) an analysis displaying, by agency, proposed
reductions in full-time equivalent positions compared
to the current year's level in order to comply with
section 5 of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of
1994.
(b) Estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for
the legislative branch and the judicial branch to be included
in each budget under subsection (a)(5) of this section shall be
submitted to the President before October 16 of [each year]
each even numbered year and included in the budget by the
President without change.
(c) The President shall recommend in the budget appropriate
action to meet an estimated deficiency when the estimated
receipts for the [fiscal year for] biennium for which the
budget is submitted (under laws in effect when the budget is
submitted) and the estimated amounts in the Treasury at the end
of the current fiscal year or current biennium, as the case may
be, available for expenditure in the fiscal year for which the
budget is submitted, are less than the estimated expenditures
for [that year] that period. The President shall make
recommendations required by the public interest when the
estimated receipts and estimated amounts in the Treasury are
more than the estimated expenditures.
(d) When the President submits a budget or supporting
information about a budget, the President shall include a
statement on all changes about the current fiscal year that
were made before the budget or information was submitted.
(e)(1) The President shall submit with materials related to
each budget transmitted under subsection (a) on or after
January 1, 1985, an analysis for the [ensuing fiscal year]
biennium to which such budget relates that shall identify
requested appropriations or new obligational authority and
outlays for each major program that may be classified as a
public civilian capital investment program and for each major
program that may be classified as a military capital investment
program, and shall contain summaries of the total amount of
such appropriations or new obligational authority and outlays
for public civilian capital investment programs and summaries
of the total amount of such appropriations or new obligational
authority and outlays for military capital investment programs.
In addition, the analysis under this paragraph shall contain--
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1106. Supplemental budget estimates and changes
(a) [Before July 16 of each year,] Before February 15 of
each even-numbered year, the President shall submit to Congress
a supplemental summary of the budget for the [fiscal year]
biennium for which the budget is submitted under section
1105(a) of this title. The summary shall include--
(1) for [that fiscal year] each fiscal year in such
biennium--
(A) substantial changes in or reappraisals of
estimates of expenditures and receipts;
(B) substantial obligations imposed on the
budget after its submission;
(C) current information on matters referred
to in sections 1105(a) (8) and (9) (B) and (C)
of this title; and
(D) additional information the President
decides is advisable to provide Congress with
complete and current information about the
budget and current estimates of the functions,
obligations, requirements, and financial
condition of the United States Government[.];
and
(2) for the [4 fiscal years following the fiscal
year] four fiscal years following the biennium for
which the budget is submitted, information on estimated
expenditures for programs authorized to continue in
future years, or that are considered mandatory, under
law[;].
[(3) for future fiscal years, information on
estimated expenditures of balances carried over from
the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted.]
(b) Before [July 16 of each year] February 15 of each even-
numbered year, the President shall submit to Congress a
statement of changes in budget authority requested, estimated
budget outlays, and estimated receipts for [the fiscal year]
each fiscal year in the biennium for which the budget is
submitted (including prior changes proposed for the executive
branch of the Government) that the President decides are
necessary and appropriate based on current information. The
statement shall include the effect of those changes on the
information submitted under section 1105(a) (1)-(14) and (b) of
this title and shall include supporting information as
practicable. The statement submitted before [July 16] February
15 of each even-numbered year may be included in the
information submitted under subsection (a)(1) of this section.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1109. Current programs and activities estimates
(a) [On or before the first Monday after January 3 of each
year (on or before February 5 in 1986)] At the same time the
budget required by section 1105 is submitted for a biennium,
the President shall submit to both Houses of Congress the
estimated budget outlays and proposed budget authority that
would be included in the budget for [the following fiscal year]
each fiscal year of such period if programs and activities of
the United States Government were carried on during that year
at the same level as the current fiscal year without a change
in policy. The President shall state the estimated budget
outlays and proposed budget authority by function and
subfunction under the classifications in the budget summary
table under the heading ``Budget Authority and Outlays by
Function and Agency'', by major programs in each function, and
by agency. The President shall also include a statement of the
economic and program assumptions on which those budget outlays
and budget authority are based, including inflation, real
economic growth, and unemployment rates, program caseloads, and
pay increases.
(b) The Joint Economic Committee shall review the estimated
budget outlays and proposed budget authority and submit an
economic evaluation of the budget outlays and budget authority
to the Committees on the Budget of both Houses [before March 1
of each year] within 6 weeks of the President's budget
submission for each odd-numbered year (or, if applicable, as
provided by section 300(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974.
Sec. 1110. Year-ahead requests for authorizing legislation
A request to enact legislation authorizing new budget
authority to continue a program or activity for a [fiscal year]
biennium (beginning on or after October 1, 1999) shall be
submitted to Congress before [May 16] March 31 of the [year
before the year in which the fiscal year begins] calendar year
preceding the calendar year in which the biennium begins. If a
new program or activity will continue for more than one year,
the request must be submitted for at least the first and 2d
fiscal years.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1115. Performance plans
(a) In carrying out the provisions of [section 1105(a)(29)]
section 1105(a)(28), the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget shall require each agency to prepare [an annual] a
biennial performance plan covering each program activity set
forth in the budget of such agency. Such plan shall--
(1) establish performance goals to define the level
of performance to be achieved by a program activity for
both years 1 and 2 of the biennial plan;
(2) express such goals in an objective, quantifiable,
and measurable form unless authorized to be in an
alternative form under subsection (b);
(3) briefly describe the operational processes,
skills and technology, and the human, capital,
information, or other resources required to meet the
performance goals;
(4) establish performance indicators to be used in
measuring or assessing the relevant outputs, service
levels, and outcomes of each program activity;
(5) provide a basis for comparing actual program
results with the established performance goals; [and]
(6) describe the means to be used to verify and
validate measured values[.]; and
(7) cover a 2-year period beginning with the first
fiscal year of the next biennial budget cycle.
* * * * * * *
(d) An agency may submit with its [annual] biennial
performance plan an appendix covering any portion of the plan
that--
(1) is specifically authorized under criteria
established by an Executive order to be kept secret in
the interest of national defense or foreign policy; and
(2) is properly classified pursuant to such Executive
order.
(e) The functions and activities of this section shall be
considered to be inherently Governmental functions. The
drafting of performance plans under this section shall be
performed only by Federal employees.
(f) For purposes of this section and sections 1116 through
1119, and sections 9703 and 9704 the term--
* * * * * * *
(6) ``program activity'' means a specific activity or
project as listed in the program and financing
schedules of the [annual] biennial budget of the United
States Government; and
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1119. Pilot projects for performance budgeting
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) No later than March 31, 2001, the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget shall transmit a report to the
President and to the Congress on the performance budgeting
pilot projects which shall--
(1) assess the feasibility and advisability of
including a performance budget as part of the [annual]
biennial budget submitted under section 1105;
(2) describe any difficulties encountered by the
pilot agencies in preparing a performance budget;
(3) recommend whether legislation requiring
performance budgets should be proposed and the general
provisions of any legislation; and
(4) set forth any recommended changes in the other
requirements of the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993, section 306 of title 5, sections 1105,
1115, 1116, 1117, and 9703 of this title, and this
section.
(e) After receipt of the report required under subsection
(d), the Congress may specify that a performance budget be
submitted as part of the [annual] biennial budget submitted
under section 1105.
* * * * * * *
UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 31, MONEY AND FINANCE
Subtitle VI--Miscellaneous
CHAPTER 97--MISCELLANEOUS
Sec. 9703. Managerial accountability and flexibility
(a) Beginning with fiscal year 1999, the performance plans
required under section 1115 may include proposals to waive
administrative procedural requirements and controls, including
specification of personnel staffing levels, limitations on
compensation or remuneration, and prohibitions or restrictions
on funding transfers among budget object classification 20 and
subclassifications 11, 12, 31, and 32 of each [annual] budget
submitted under section 1105, in return for specific individual
or organization accountability to achieve a performance goal.
In preparing and submitting the performance plan under [section
1105(a)(29)] section 1105(a)(28), the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget shall review and may approve any proposed
waivers. A waiver shall take effect at the beginning of the
fiscal year for which the waiver is approved.
* * * * * * *
(e) A waiver shall be in effect for [one or] two years as
specified by the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget in approving the waiver. A waiver may be renewed for [a
subsequent year] for a subsequent 2-year period. After a waiver
has been in effect for [three] four consecutive years, the
performance plan prepared under section 1115 may propose that a
waiver, other than a waiver of limitations on compensation or
remuneration, be made permanent.
* * * * * * *
TITLE 39, UNITED STATES CODE
POSTAL SERVICE
CHAPTER 28, STRATEGIC PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2802. Strategic Plans
(a) No later than [September 30, 1997] September 30, 2000
the Postal Service shall submit to the President and the
Congress a strategic plan for its program activities. Such plan
shall contain--
* * * * * * *
(b) The strategic plan shall cover a period of not less
than [five years forward] six years forward from the fiscal
year in which it is submitted, and shall be updated and revised
[at least every three years] at least every 4 years.
(c) The performance plan required under section 2803 shall
be consistent with the Postal Service's strategic plan. A
performance plan may not be submitted for a fiscal year not
covered by a current strategic plan under this section,
including a strategic plan submitted by September 30, 1997
meeting the requirements of subsection (a).
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2303. Performance plans
(a) The Postal Service shall prepare [an annual] a
performance plan covering each program activity set forth in
the Postal Service budget, which shall be included in the
comprehensive statement presented under section 2401(g) of this
title. Such plan shall--
* * * * * * *
TITLE 1, UNITED STATES CODE
CHAPTER 2--ACTS AND RESOLUTIONS; FORMALITIES OF ENACTMENT; REPEALS;
SEALING OF INSTRUMENTS
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 105. Title of appropriations Acts
[The style and title of all Acts making appropriations for
the support of Government shall be as follows: ``An Act making
appropriations (here insert the object) for the year ending
September 30 (here insert the calendar year).'']
Sec. 105. Title and style of appropriations Acts
(a) The style and title of all Acts making appropriations
for the support of the Government shall be as follows: ``An Act
making appropriations (here insert the object) for each fiscal
year in the biennium of fiscal years (here insert the fiscal
years of the biennium).''.
(b) All Acts making regular appropriations for the support
of the Government shall be enacted for a biennium and shall
specify the amount of appropriations provided for each fiscal
year in such period.
(c) For purposes of this section, the term ``biennium'' has
the same meaning as in section 3(11) of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 622(11)).
* * * * * * *
UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 5, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES
PART I--THE AGENCIES GENERALLY
CHAPTER 3--POWERS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 306. Strategic plans
(a) No later than [September 30, 1997] September 30, 2000,
the head of each agency shall submit to the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget and to the Congress a strategic
plan for program activities. Such plan shall contain--
* * * * * * *
(b) The strategic plan shall cover a period of not less
than [five years forward] six years forward from the fiscal
year in which it is submitted, and shall be updated and revised
[at least every three years] at least every 4 years.
(c) The performance plan required by section 1115 of title
31 shall be consistent with the agency's strategic plan. A
performance plan may not be submitted for a fiscal year not
covered by a current strategic plan under this section,
including a strategic plan submitted by September 30, 1997
meeting the requirements of subsection (a).
* * * * * * *