[Senate Report 105-24]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                        Calendar No. 74
105th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE

 1st Session                                                     105-24
_______________________________________________________________________


 
 AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998 FOR THE INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
     AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                _______
                                

                  June 9, 1997.--Ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


 Mr. Shelby, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                         [To accompany S. 858]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered the 
original bill (S. 858), which authorizes appropriations for 
fiscal year 1998 for the intelligence activities and programs 
of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and which accomplishes 
other purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that 
the bill do pass.

                          purpose of the bill

    This bill would:
          (1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for 
        (a) the intelligence activities and programs of the 
        United States Government; (b) the Central Intelligence 
        Agency Retirement and Disability System; and (c) the 
        Community Management Account of the Director of Central 
        Intelligence;
          (2) Authorize the personnel ceilings as of September 
        30, 1998, for the intelligence activities of the United 
        States Government and for the Community Management 
        Account of the Director of Central Intelligence;
          (3) Authorize the Director of Central Intelligence, 
        with Office of Management and Budget approval, to 
        exceed the personnel ceilings by up to two percent;
          (4) Extend for two additional years the President's 
        authority to delay the imposition of proliferation-
        related sanctions when necessary to protect an 
        intelligence source or method or an ongoing criminal 
        investigation;
          (5) Direct the Director of Central Intelligence to 
        conduct a survey of standards for foreign names and 
        places in intelligence reporting and to issue 
        guidelines to ensure community-wide continuity;
          (6) Authorize the head of a department or agency 
        having jurisdiction over an element in the intelligence 
        community or the head of an element of the intelligence 
        community to detail their employees to serve in the 
        Intelligence Community Assignment Program;
          (7) Encourage the disclosure of certain information 
        to Congress by employees of the executive branch and 
        employees of contractors carrying out activities under 
        classified contracts;
          (8) Ensure that the United States Government takes 
        all appropriate actions to make available to victims 
        and families of victims, information regarding violent 
        crimes committed against United States citizens abroad; 
        and
          (9) Authorize the Central Intelligence Agency to 
        enter into multi-year leases subject to the 
        availability of appropriations.

           the classified supplement to the committee report

    The classified nature of United States intelligence 
activities prevents the Committee from disclosing the details 
of its budgetary recommendations in this Report.
    The Committee has prepared a classified supplement to this 
Report, which contains (a) the classified annex to this Report 
and (b) the classified schedule of authorizations which is 
incorporated by reference in the Act and has the same legal 
status as a public law. The classified annex to this report 
explains the full scope and intent of the Committee's actions 
as set forth in the classified schedule of authorizations. The 
classified annex has the same status as any Senate Report, and 
the Committee fully expects the Intelligence Community to 
comply with the limitations, guidelines, directions, and 
recommendations contained therein.
    This classified supplement to the Committee Report is 
available for review by any Member of the Senate, subject to 
the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress.
    The classified supplement is made available to the 
President who shall provide for suitable distribution within 
the Executive Branch.

                       scope of committee review

    The Committee conducted a detailed review of the 
Administration's three major intelligence budget requests for 
fiscal year 1998: the National Foreign Intelligence Program 
(NFIP) of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Joint 
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) of the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense; and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities 
(TIARA) of the Military Services. The Committee's review 
included a series of briefings and hearings with senior 
intelligence officials, numerous staff briefings, review of 
budget justification materials, and numerous written responses 
provided by the Intelligence Community to specific questions 
posed by the Committee.
    In addition to its annual review of the Administration's 
budget request, the Committee performs continuing oversight of 
various intelligence activities and programs, to include the 
conduct of audits and reviews by the Committee's audit staff. 
For example, the Committee has recently concluded audits of the 
CIA Inspector General's Office and a major NRO program. These 
inquiries frequently lead to actions initiated by the Committee 
with respect to the authorities, applicable laws, and the 
budget of the activity or program concerned.
    As a result of a Memorandum of Agreement entered into in 
1996 between the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI) and Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), 
the Committee is including its recommendations on both JMIP and 
TIARA in its public report and classified annex. The SSCI has 
agreed that JMIP and TIARA issues will continue to be 
authorized in the defense authorization bill. The SASC has 
agreed to involve the SSCI staff in staff-level defense 
authorization conference meetings and to provide the Chairman 
and Vice Chairman of the SSCI the opportunity to consult with 
the SASC Chairman and Ranking Member before a JMIP or TIARA 
issue is finally closed out in conference in a manner with 
which they disagree. The Committee looks forward to continuing 
its productive relationship with the SASC on all issues of 
mutual concern.

                       committee recommendations

    Most of the Committee's specific recommendations related to 
the Administration's budget request for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities are classified. This includes 
the amount of the total fiscal year 1998 budget request, as 
well as any comprehensive treatment of program elements. 
However, the Committee is committed, consistent with security 
considerations, to making its concerns and priorities for 
intelligence public to the extent possible. Further 
recommendations, as well as classified details on these 
unclassified recommendations, are provided in the classified 
annex accompanying this bill.

                 national foreign intelligence program

Areas of committee emphasis

    The Committee has continued its bipartisan efforts to 
``right-size'' and ``re-tool'' U.S. Intelligence Community 
programs and activities to reflect the new, post-Cold War era 
threats and challenges to U.S. national security.
    Specifically, the Committee recommends important new 
investments and initiatives in certain high-priority areas. 
These include: aggressive efforts in what the committee 
chairman has called the ``five C's'' (counter-proliferation, 
counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, and 
covert action); bolstering advanced research and development 
across the Intelligence Community to maintain the U.S. 
technological edge; improving the skills and tools of 
clandestine service personnel; developing new and innovative 
approaches to understanding ``hard target'' countries; and 
enhancing analytical capabilities as well as tools for 
conducting information operations.
    The Committee recommends significant funding increases in 
each of the priority areas listed above. At the same time, 
however, the Committee recommends reductions in lower-priority, 
poorly justified, or programs and activities that cannot be 
executed. Details of the Committee's recommendations are 
included in the Classified Annex accompanying this report.

NRO financial management

    The Committee continues to watch closely the financial 
management of the National Reconnaissance Program. In order to 
gain a fuller understanding of the effect of Congressionally-
directed and NRO-directed actions, the Committee conducted an 
audit of the financial management of one large classified 
program within the NRO. While noting that the NRO has made 
significant strides in improving its financial management 
posture, the audit also identified several areas where 
improvements could be made in the financial management of this 
program, as well as other NRO programs. The audit also 
concluded that the added reporting requirements created by the 
new NRO policies and procedures have not created an unnecessary 
or excessive burden upon the classified Program Office.
    The Committee believes the Director, NRO, must continue to 
pursue aggressively better financial management procedures. The 
initial phases of the comprehensive new Financial Management 
System must be in place and operational by October 1, 1997, and 
follow-on system capabilities, such as an integrated budget 
tool, should be added as soon as possible thereafter. The 
National Reconnaissance Program section of the classified annex 
to this report includes recommendations for several actions 
intended to further strengthen NRO financial management.

Report on foreign counterintelligence reform in the FBI

    The Committee is concerned that the Bureau has not 
adequately addressed the recommendations of the Department of 
Justice Inspector General included in ``A Review of the FBI's 
Performance in Uncovering the Espionage Activities of Aldrich 
Hazen Ames.'' The Committee understands that the Bureau has 
incorporated some of the Inspector General's recommendations 
into its operating procedures. The Bureau has not, however, 
assured the Committee that it intends to give serious 
consideration to the remaining recommendations. Therefore, not 
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall 
submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
of Representatives a report on the Department of Justice 
Inspector General's recommendations contained in ``A Review of 
the FBI's Performance in Uncovering the Espionage Activities of 
Aldrich Hazen Ames.'' This report shall provide a thorough 
analysis of each of the recommendations and include the 
Director's position with respect to each recommendation. Should 
the Director disagree with a particular recommendation, the 
reasons for such dissent shall be provided. Further, the report 
shall contain any actions taken by the Director in response to 
each of the Inspector General's recommendations.

Providing intelligence to the warfighter: The Khamisiyah experience

    The Khamisiyah experience revealed the need for the 
Intelligence and Defense Communities to improve the provision, 
handling, and use of intelligence information during a crisis 
situation. The Select Committee on Intelligence has undertaken 
an investigation into Intelligence Community warnings to the 
U.S. Army about chemical warfare agents at Khamisiyah, Iraq, in 
1991 and suspicions that U.S. forces conducting demolition 
activities to the site may have been exposed to Chemical 
Weapons (CW) agents. Our preliminary review indicates 
substantial mismanagement and lack of communication among 
elements of the military and the Intelligence Community 
regarding information and warnings provided on Iraqi CW 
facilities, including Khamisiyah, as well as in the use made of 
this information. Intelligence support associated with 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, particularly in the 
area of information distribution and analysis, was often 
spotty, inconsistent, and slow. In addition, there were 
problems with multiple databases; inconsistent foreign language 
place names; limited sharing of sensitive but vital 
information; and incomplete searches of files in preparing 
lists of known or suspect CW facilities in Iraq. The Committee 
addresses the problem of inconsistent place names in Section 
308 by directing the Director of Central Intelligence to issue 
guidelines to ensure the use of uniform spelling of foreign 
names and places and the uniform use of geographic coordinates. 
This should alleviate the problem of locating geographic places 
when searching intelligence reports, products, and databases in 
the future.
    The Committee directs the Director of Central Intelligence 
to submit to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
Senate Committee on Armed Services, and the Senate Defense 
Subcommittee on Appropriations, no later than March 1, 1998, a 
report that identifies the specific actions that have been 
taken or are being taken to enhance cooperation between 
Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community by 
improving the provision, handling, and use of intelligence 
information in preparation for, during, and after battle. Such 
a report shall include those steps that intelligence agencies 
are undertaking to reconcile information in databases in order 
to eliminate confusion over potential targets (facilities and 
other sites). It shall also include a review of how 
intelligence components handle sensitive information and of 
their procedures for deciding how and what vital information to 
share with others. Further, the report shall contain an 
enumeration of those steps that intelligence agencies are 
undertaking to ensure that information searches are more 
thorough in order to provide military commanders on the ground 
with complete and timely information.

Threats to the United States--Estimate

    The Committee is concerned that there exists no recent, 
comprehensive Intelligence Community estimate on the present 
and emerging threat of terrorist or other ``non-traditional'' 
attacks against North America using weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). The Committee also notes that the November 1995 National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on missile threats to North America 
is based on information and analysis that is now two years old. 
The Committee believes that a new and updated analysis is 
required. Given the critical importance of the subject matter, 
and the rapid pace of technological change, the Committee 
believes, further, that these analyses should be updated on an 
annual basis.
    In his unclassified confirmation testimony before the 
Committee, the Acting DCI committed to prepare annual National 
Intelligence Estimates or comparable reports on (1) the 
ballistic and cruise missile threats to the United States, and 
(2) the threat to the United States of ``non-traditional'' 
attacks using chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons 
delivered by means other than by ballistic or cruise missiles. 
The Committee welcomes the ADCI's commitment in this regard, 
and looks forward to reviewing these products. These estimates 
should be provided to the congressional Intelligence Committees 
annually, on or before February 15, with the first report to be 
submitted on or before February 15, 1998.
    The annual estimate on the ``non-traditional'' WMD threat 
to the United States shall include, at a minimum:
          (1) The current threat of an attack against the 
        United States using a weapon of mass destruction, 
        including the ability of terrorist groups or hostile 
        governments to produce and deliver to the United States 
        a WMD, or the components thereof;
          (2) The degree to which the threat will increase by 
        the year 2010;
          (3) The sources of the threat;
          (4) The potential delivery means of carrying out a 
        WMD attack against the United States;
          (5) The relative feasibility of different means of 
        delivery and the probability that such an attack 
        against the United States would use ballistic missiles, 
        cruise missiles or any other means of delivery; and
          (6) The vulnerability of the United States to such an 
        attack, including, but not limited to, the ability of 
        terrorist groups or hostile governments to 
        clandestinely transport into the United States a WMD or 
        the components necessary to construct a WMD, and the 
        capability of the United States to detect and intercept 
        the importation of such a weapon.
    Not later than March 15, 1998, the President shall submit 
to the congressional Intelligence Committees a report that 
identifies the funds appropriated in Fiscal Year 1998 and 
requested in the Fiscal Year 1999 budget to defend the United 
States against a nuclear, biological or chemical weapons attack 
using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or any other means of 
delivery.

                  joint military intelligence program

National Imagery and Mapping Agency

    The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) was 
established in law in the Department of Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1997 and is jointly funded within the Joint 
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and the National Foreign 
Intelligence Program (NFIP).
    In creating NIMA, the Congress recognized the primary need 
to create a single agency to ensure that timely, relevant, and 
accurate imagery, imagery intelligence and geospatial 
information was provided to support our national security 
objectives, policy decisions, and mapping requirements.
    There are two areas that remain of consistent concern to 
the Committee. The first is related to the dissemination of 
satellite and airborne imagery below the Joint TaskForce level. 
One of the most important lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm 
was the need to rapidly disseminate imagery to the lowest levels 
required. It has been six years since the allied victory in the Gulf, 
and little progress has been made to correct this problem. A 
significant component of the imagery dissemination shortfall, however, 
is the lack of upgraded communications capabilities through which 
imagery and other intelligence related information can be transmitted 
to the users. The collection and production of imagery products is only 
valuable if it can be transmitted to those who need it the most.
    The second area of concern is the use of commercial, civil 
and foreign (CCF) imagery to meet many of our needs. The 
Committee's interest in the use of CCF imagery dates back to 
1993. Over the ensuing four years, the Department of Defense 
and CIA have been urged to more aggressively pursue the use of 
CCF imagery, with little or no result. The Committee notes that 
the Defense Science board 1996 summer Study, ``Achieving an 
Innovative Support Structure for 21st Century Military 
Superiority,'' made a strong recommendation to rely more on 
commercial imagery. In spite of this recommendation and 
prodding by the Congress, we are only acquiring a very small 
amount of CCF imagery per year, which is far below industry 
capacity to support our needs.
    The Committee has received a report from NIMA indicating 
that a Commercial Imagery Implementation Team will report to 
the Director of NIMA in June of 1997 regarding a strategy for 
increased utilization of CCF imagery. It is the Committee's 
intent to review this implementation plan in detail prior to 
making final recommendations on funding for NIMA for fiscal 
year 1998.

Tactical unmanned aerial vehicle

    Providing a reliable tactical unmanned aerial vehicle 
(TUAV) to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 
acquisition in support of maneuver battalion and brigade 
commanders and naval commanders remains a Congressional 
priority. Unfortunately, the Committee received testimony on 
the Outrider TUAV program indicating serious difficulty in the 
current Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) 
program. As a result, it has become apparent that the current 
schedule cannot be maintained.
    Therefore, the Committee recommends a reduction of $75.0 
million in the fiscal year 1998 RDT&E request for Outrider. 
More than $34.0 million in fiscal year 1997 funds remain 
unobligated at this time. The fiscal year 1997 balances 
combined with a reduced fiscal year 1998 authorization should 
be sufficient to maintain an ACTD of reduced scope. Also, the 
Committee has learned that existing unmanned aerial vehicles in 
production may meet most, if not all, of the requirements of 
maneuver battalion and brigade commanders. The Committee 
recommends that the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office 
(DARO) explore an existing UAV as an alternative to Outrider.

Joint airborne SIGINT architecture

    The Advanced Sensors project under JASA calls for $52.6 
million in fiscal year 1998 to continue A-kit development for 
Joint SIGINT Avionics Family (JSAF) integration and testing. 
The A-kit modifications include wiring, antennas, and 
infrastructure within an aircraft.
    The Committee questions the amount requested. The EP-3 is 
the prototype for JSAF as is scheduled for delivery in fiscal 
year 1997. Therefore, the A-kit development for EP-3 should be 
largely completed. Additionally, Global Hawk is an unmanned 
aerial vehicle that is not scheduled to make its initial test 
flight until late fiscal year 1997 or fiscal year 1998. 
Approving $9.6 million for A-kit development on an air vehicle 
that has yet to fly seems premature at this time. As a result 
of these concerns, the Committee believes that this request can 
be reduced by $10.0 million.

Joint SIGINT avionics family enhancements

    The Joint SIGINT Avionics Family (JSAF) was structured as 
an evolutionary development program. The steps in the evolution 
were defined primarily by three factors: available funds, 
technology, and total development risk. The committee feels 
that the program, as presently structured, is resource 
constrained rather than limited by technological shortcomings 
or developmental risk. The capabilities selected initially were 
those that met high priority operational needs for which the 
current systems have limited or no capability. The Committee 
has learned that certain capabilities were omitted from the 
initial increment even though the technologies are mature. One 
such example is the complete family of PROFORMA signals.
    Another area of concern to the Committee is the significant 
number of platforms that are not programmed to receive any JSAF 
upgrades. The JSAF was designed as a modern interoperable 
family of SIGINT suites that could be scaled to support a 
variety of Service collection platforms. The proven operational 
benefits of commonality and interoperability would suggest that 
all DOD collection platforms should adopt a common architecture 
where possible. Funding for the initial studies for a JSAF 
compliant Senior Scout system has been addressed in Air Force 
TIARA, and the Committee recommends that $4.0 million be 
provided to undertake the necessary studies for other 
platforms.
    The Committee has also learned that the schedule for 
delivery of JSAF configured platforms can be accelerated 
substantially with a modest increase in funds. Specifically, 
the delivery schedule completion of the current planned JSAF 
configured platforms could be moved up from fiscal year 2007 to 
fiscal year 2005. The Committee believesthat an accelerated 
schedule should be adopted and that potential savings can be obtained 
by such an alteration in the delivery schedule.
    During the initial planning for the Joint Airborne SIGINT 
Architecture, it was unclear as to whether or not a digital 
approach to ELINT was viable. Recent developments at Wright 
Laboratories have demonstrated the viability of this approach. 
The Committee recommends $5.0 million be provided to commence a 
risk reduction effort to create a digital capability in the 
High Band Subsystem (HBSS) and the remaining $36.0 million be 
applied to schedule acceleration of the initial platforms 
programmed for JSAF configuration.

RC-135 engine replacement

    Replacing the engines in the KC-135 fleet with more 
efficient CFM-56 engines has long been supported by the 
Congress. In FY96, however, the Congress provided the first 
funds to re-engine RC-135 aircraft. After careful review of the 
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the RC-135 fleet, the Committee 
believes that the priority should be shifted to the RC-135 
fleet. At the present time, the RC-135 fleet consists of 21 
aircraft and will grow to 23 aircraft with the delivery of 
Rivet Joint 15 and 16.
    The OPTEMPO requirements for the RC-135 fleet in support of 
the unified combatant commands has resulted in use rates of 
more than three times those of the KC-135 fleet. The Air Force 
estimates that the annual savings in operations and maintenance 
costs from replacing the engines on the RC-135 fleet would pay 
for the cost of replacing the engines on the 23 aircraft in 
less than seven years. Accordingly, the Committee recommends 
$100.0 million in FY1998 to re-engine four RC-135 aircraft.

Rivet Joint cabin equipment air temperature environment

    Adequate air conditioning necessary to cool Rivet Joint 
mission equipment and provide for crew comfort has long been 
difficult to maintain. This results from two factors. The first 
is related to the amount of onboard equipment carried on Rivet 
Joint required to perform its primary mission. This equipment 
relies primarily on copper wiring which is a source of much of 
the heat generated by the equipment. The second factor is 
related to the outdated engines currently in use on Rivet 
Joint. As mission requirements have changed and expanded over 
the years, more equipment has been added to the aircraft, which 
has added significantly to the heat load. In turn, the majority 
of conditioned air, by necessity, must be dedicated to cooling 
the equipment. The result is wide fluctuations in the 
temperature range within the crew compartment.
    In addition to the planned installation of a new family of 
SIGINT equipment on Rivet Joint, there are two solutions to the 
problem. The first is the CFM-56 engine upgrade which has been 
addressed elsewhere in this report. The second solution 
requires the installation of additional skin heat exchangers. 
The Rivet Joint program office has developed a new skin heat 
exchanger that is significantly more efficient than those 
currently installed on the aircraft. Installing two of these 
heat exchangers on a Rivet Joint adds the equivalent of about 
three tons of conditioned air per hour.
    The Committee has learned that these kits can be installed 
in the field at low cost to the immediate benefit of the crews. 
Therefore, the Committee recommends an additional $6.0 which 
will fund new heat exchangers for the entire Rivet Joint fleet.

RC-135 Rivet Joint theater airborne warning system

    The ability to detect and track theater ballistic missile 
launches, provide accurate launch site data for counter-attack, 
and provide impact point data is critical to the warfighter. 
Last year, the Committee received a proposal to transfer medium 
wave infrared (MWIR) sensor technology from Cobra Ball to the 
RC-135 Rivet Joint fleet as a way of providing the theater 
commander with a low cost fused and space-based airborne 
infrared capability.
    As a result of Congressional interest, the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Office (BMDO) conducted a review of 
requirements for theater ballistic missile launch detection and 
tracking capabilities and evaluated three candidate 
technologies. The candidate technologies were placing MWIR on 
Rivet Joint, the Extended Airborne Global Launch Evaluator 
(EAGLE) on AWACS aircraft, and the Airborne Laser Sensor.
    The BMDO recommended termination of MWIR and EAGLE as 
candidates and pursuit of the Airborne Laser Sensor option. The 
Committee notes, however, that the Airborne Laser Sensor will 
not be deployed until well after the turn of the century. Also, 
the Senate Armed Services Committee received testimony from the 
Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Space Command in support of theater 
airborne warning systems as an interim capability until more 
capable airborne and space based systems can be fielded. To 
meet these interim requirements, the Committee recommends an 
additional $20.0 million to fund nonrecurring engineering costs 
and to equip two Rivet Joint aircraft with MWIR sensors.

Airborne reconnaissance recapitalization

    The Committee remains concerned about the lack of 
modernization for airborne reconnaissance aircraft. These 
assets all have high utilization rates requiring large 
sustainment costs on an annual basis. The high cost of 
sustainment of these platforms limits the investment in 
upgrades that will improve capabilities and readiness, while 
potentially reducing the cost of ownership. For example, as the 
Committee has noted previously, the Air Force estimates that 
replacing the engines on the RC-135 fleet withCFM-56 engines 
would reduce operations and maintenance (O&M) costs to such a degree 
that the annual savings in O&M funds would pay for the cost of 
replacing the engines in less than seven years.
    The Committee believes that a long-term airborne 
reconnaissance recapitalization plan is required to provide 
funds for needed upgrades to Rivet Joint, U-2, and EP-3 and 
recommends that the Director Defense Airborne Reconnaissance 
Office and the military services develop such a plan. Expanded 
use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items, streamlined 
management arrangements, optimized maintenance schedules, and 
reductions in contractor field service representatives should 
help reduce the cost of ownership. These savings could then be 
applied to systems upgrades.

Interferometric synthetic aperture radar

    A radar imaging system that merges radar images of a target 
from difference angles is capable of producing highly accurate 
three-dimensional images. Maps that display target areas in 
altitude, latitude and longitude are invaluable to pilots who 
must fly low level missions in unfamiliar terrain. This form of 
mapping can also improve the accuracy of precision guided 
munitions. The technique is known as interferometrics and was 
jointly tested in Bosnia in support of U.S. ground forces by 
the Army and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA).
    The Committee finds this technology promising and believes 
that further development in fiscal year 1998 is warranted. To 
this end, the Committee recommends that $6.0 million be 
provided to begin development of IFSAR capabilities for the U-2 
and High Altitude Endurance UAV's

Common Automatic Recovery System

    The Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1997 provided funds to purchase the Common Automatic Recovery 
System (CARS) for the Predator UAV. Funds provided last year 
were sufficient to acquire seven of the twelve systems. The 
Committee recommends $3.5 million to purchase five more CARS 
and $4.5 million for initial logistics support for Predator.
    While these funds are not sufficient to fully fund the 
costs of fielding Predator, the Committee expects the 
Administration's budget request for fiscal year 1999 to contain 
funds to continue procurement of initial logistics support, pay 
retrofit costs, and acquire Predator system introduction 
requirements such as training and technical manuals.

Global Hawk production gap

    Global Hawk is a Department of Defense Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program designed to rapidly 
develop a conventional High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (HAE-UAV). The program was begun in October 1994 when 
the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency awarded design 
contracts to five teams with the intent to award two fly-off 
contracts. A single team was selected in May 1995 due to a lack 
of funds.
    The contractor and the Department of Defense are currently 
restructuring the program to include both Global Hawk and Dark 
Star in the Phase III demonstration program. The current 
budget, however, was developed prior the restructuring of the 
program. The Department of Defense estimates that the Global 
Hawk program is underfunded by $25.0 million in fiscal year 
1998. This in turn will delay the program by one year, or 
longer. In an effort to maintain the projected schedule, the 
Committee recommends an additional $25.0 million for Global 
Hawk for fiscal year 1998.

Dark Star High Altitude Endurance UAV

    Dark Star is the Low Observable High Altitude Endurance 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HAE-UAV) portion of the Advanced 
Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) for HAE-UAV's. It 
should be noted that the Dark Star program, because of its 
design as a Low Observable platform, entails a much higher 
level of technological risk than a platform based on 
conventional aircraft design, such as Global Hawk. The 
Department of Defense's long struggle with the development of a 
successful tactical unmanned aerial vehicle causes concern when 
stealth technologies must supplant conventional aircraft 
designs, and the Dark Star program has proven those concerns 
valid. While the Committee strongly supports UAV technology, 
the crash of a test vehicle, reports that Dark Star's actual 
radar cross section may be understated, and contractor 
proposals to substantially restructure the program, indicate 
that the Congress should reevaluate the program.
    Funds requested for fiscal year 1998 will complete air 
vehicles number three and four. Initial fabrication of air 
vehicles five and six would also be undertaken with fiscal year 
1998 funds. The Committee supports completion of air vehicles 
three and four, but construction of additional air vehicles 
prior to further flight testing is premature. Therefore, the 
Committee recommends a reduction of $20.0 million in the Dark 
Star program and a prohibition against acquisition of air 
vehicles five and six in fiscal year 1998.

Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office

    The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) was 
created in November 1993 as the primary Department of Defense 
(DOD) management oversight office for all joint military 
department and defense-wide manned and unmanned 
reconnaissancecapabilities. These capabilities include platforms, 
sensors, data links, data relays, and ground stations. The DARO was 
placed under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology to bring attention, order, and efficiency to 
the development and acquisition of the airborne reconnaissance 
capabilities.
    Created less than four years ago, the DARO has demonstrated 
effective management of resources and programs. One of the 
hallmarks of effective business practices in centralized 
decision making coupled with decentralized execution. This has 
been a DARO trademark. One of the most important issues in 
defense programming is interoperability. Failures in this area 
are too numerous to list here. The DARO, however, has ensured 
that interoperability and commonality are designed into new 
capabilities rather than considered after the fact.
    For example, the Common Imagery Ground/Surface System 
(CIGSS) was established by the DARO to supplant the Joint 
Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS) program. Due to 
diverging Service requirements, JSIPS was experiencing 
substantial cost increases. The DARO restructured the program 
to CIGSS which provides for the migration of all airborne 
imagery ground systems to a common interoperable baseline 
necessary to meet joint warfighting requirements. The CIGSS was 
the first airborne reconnaissance ground system to be approved 
by both the JROC and the CIO. The CIGSS is a prime example of 
the level of interoperability the Department of Defense should 
strive for across the board.
    There are numerous other examples, from the Joint SIGINT 
Avionics Family to Common Data Link, that demonstrate DARO's 
effective stewardship of limited resources. The Committee 
recommends that the Secretary of Defense and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology consider 
transferring more, if not all, remaining reconnaissance assets 
to the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program.

              Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities

Joint tactical terminal

    In October of 1995, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Command Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD C3I) 
issued guidance requiring that tactical intelligence 
dissemination systems of the military services conform with 
Department of Defense Integrated Broadcast interoperability and 
commonality objectives. The Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT) meets 
this requirement for all services by providing commanders a 
secure, dedicated path for tactical intelligence dissemination 
networks and broadcasts. Within the Army, JTT replaces the 
Commanders' Tactical Terminal (CTT).
    The procurement of JTT is strongly supported by the 
Congress. As a result of a prolonged contract dispute, however, 
the delivery schedule for JTT has slipped indefinitely. To meet 
urgent interim requirements, the Army needs to procure a 
limited number of the Commanders' Tactical Terminal 3 (CTT3). 
Funds authorized and appropriated for fiscal year 1997 are 
sufficient to meet the interim requirements for CTT3. The 
Committee recommends the acquisition of CTT3 using fiscal year 
1997 funds.

CI/HUMINT automated tool set

    Formerly known as Theater Rapid Response Intelligence 
Package (TRRIP), the Army has an unfunded requirement of $4.5 
million to complete the inventory objective for CI/HUMINT 
Automated Tool Sets (CHATS). The Committee recommends a 
reduction of $5.7 million in fiscal year 1998 Operations and 
Maintenance Army (OMA) funds as an offset to pay for CHATS. The 
OMA funds originally designated for Contractor Logistics 
Support associated with the potential fielding of the Hunter 
UAV are no longer needed based upon the decision not to field 
Hunter.

GUARDRAIL common sensor

    The Committee recommends a reduction to the GUARDRAIL 
Common Sensor (GRCS) fiscal year 1998 OMA funds of $6.7 
million. The funds are not required in fiscal year 1998 as a 
result of changes in GRCS fielding. The Committee recommends 
that these funds be transferred to Aircraft Procurement Army 
(APA) to complete fielding of the GRCS program embedded 
training requirement.

Ground based common sensor

    The Committee has learned that $26.8 million in Other 
Procurement Army funds for Ground Based Common Sensor (GBCS) in 
the President's budget request for FY 1998 will not be 
necessary due to a decision to reschedule the IOT&E or FY 1998. 
The Committee recommends a decrement in Other Procurement Army 
in the amount of $26.8 million and that $6.5 million be 
transferred to the Aircraft Procurement Army line to procure 
Ground Based Common Sensor/Advanced Quick Fix (GBCS/AQF) 
institutional training devices. There are two training devices 
needed for GBCS/AQF, one for the system operators and one for 
maintenance training.

Focused intelligence support for USFK

    Focused Intelligence provides the commander the capability 
to exploit real-time information allowing him to focus assets 
in time and space to defeat an adaptive threat. The enabling 
technologies that provide Focused Intelligence can be divided 
into three functional areas: (1) Shared Battlefield Awareness; 
(2) Information Management; and (3) Predictive Analysis. an 
architecture that integrates these functions into a 
collaborative environment provides a commander with Information 
Dominance and allows him to operate within and disrupt the 
decision and operating cycles of the adversary.
    In USFK, Command Post Tango is the location where Focused 
Intelligence is required to support the CINC. Unfortunately, 
USFK operates with an antiquated system using ``post it'' notes 
and grease pencils rather than current generation hardware and 
software. At the present time, some information from 
subordinate elements is delivered to CP Tango by hand in hard 
copy, which then has to be manually added to a display board.
    Modernization of CP Tango will provide the Commander-in-
Chief USFK with a capability comparable to that of the NATO 
commander in Vicenza, Italy, known as the Combined Air 
Operations Center (CAOC). The architecture will be 
interoperable with follow-on technologies and will allow more 
rapid integration of these technologies as they become 
available. The outdated infrastructure at CP Tango today 
prevents USFK from exploiting existing information technologies 
much less evolving technologies.
    The Committee notes that the Air Force completed the 
upgrades at the CAOC in 1996 for around $10.0 million. Due to 
the increased threat situation in Korea, the Committee believes 
that upgrades to CP Tango should be a high priority for the 
Army and the Commander-in-Chief USFK in fiscal year 1998. 
Therefore, the Committee recommends $10.0 million to provide 
Focused Intelligence in CP Tango.

ASAS remote work stations

    The All Source Analysis System (ASAS) Remote Work Station 
(RWS) is the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) 
component of the Army Tactical Command and Control System 
(ATCCS) and the tactical commander's primary intelligence 
processor and graphics display system. It provides a collateral 
common intelligence picture tailored from the ASAS all source 
data base and is capable of interfacing with Army area 
communications systems as well as IEW special purpose 
communications.
    If approved, the Committee's recommendation will provide 
ASAS RWS for the Army Force Package One, which is comprised of 
early deploying units and the training base necessary to 
support fielding the system. The Defense Science Board Task 
Force on ``Improved Application Of Intelligence To The 
Battlefield'' emphasized the importance of maximizing the 
dissemination of intelligence down to the battalion level. The 
Committee's recommendation $26.5 million will field ASAS RWS 
down to the battalion level.

Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar Systems

    Joint STARS is a modified Boeing 707 airframe outfitted 
with a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) for surveillance of 
stationary targets and a Wide Area Surveillance radar to 
detect, locate, classify, track and monitor moving targets. 
Although the Air Force plans had sought an inventory of 19 
JSTARS aircraft, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) has 
recommended that the inventory objective be reduced to 13 
aircraft.
    The President's budget also requested $119.0 million for 
RDT&E for JSTARS. Given the recommended reduction in scope of 
the program, the Committee believes that the RDT&E effort for 
JSTARS should be refocused for emphasis on follow-on platforms 
and upgraded capabilities to the existing JSTARS aircraft. 
Upgrades to JSTARS are addressed elsewhere in this report. 
Therefore, the Committee recommends a reduction of $20.0 
million in RDT&E associated with JSTARS.

                  GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

MASINT IR discrimination

    The Committee continues to believe that measures and 
signature intelligence (MASINT) is an underdeveloped discipline 
that can provide valuable and unique intelligence--especially 
in priority areas such as chemical, biological, nuclear and 
missile proliferation and counternarcotics. The Committee notes 
that the majority of the NFIP MASINT funds requested for FY1998 
are located in the GDIP--home of MASINT management--and is 
disappointed that the GDIP Program Manager has decreased 
funding from last year's level-of-effort. The Committee also 
notes that GDIP's advanced R&D funds, the majority of which is 
related to MASINT, was drastically cut from last year's 
appropriated amount. The Committee urges the reversal of this 
trend line. In this regard, the Committee directs the 
investment of $10.0 million to evaluate infrared (IR) 
discrimination technology. The Committee notes that preliminary 
findingsin this area suggest that this capability may enhance 
detectability, selectivity, and/or discrimination of targets from 
surrounding clutter. In essence, these advanced research and 
development efforts in passive polarimetric sensors show promise of 
enhancing the value of data collected by IR sensors.
    Conventional thermal sensors, such as forward looking 
infrared devices (FLIRs), in widespread use by DoD and the 
Intelligence Community, measures the intensity of energy from 
objects, while this new sensor technology concept measures 
intensity and direction of polarization thereby adding 
significant information content on targets of interest. Test 
results have demonstrated that a whole new set of discriminants 
can be extracted from thermal polarization signals to improve 
target detection, identification, and characterization. 
Inherent sensor characteristics include improved signal-to-
noise performance and natural countermeasure rejection 
capability.
    The Committee directs the Central MASINT Office to develop 
a plan to demonstrate the utility of passive IR polarization 
sensors in reconnaissance applications. The plan should 
include: (1) development of a polarization sensor; (2) 
collection of polarization data on specific targets; (3) 
development of computer simulations describing the sensors 
utility; (4) development of automatic target recognition 
algorithms; and (5) an analysis of the costs and benefits of 
continuing the development of this technology versus other 
promising MASINT collection initiatives. The Committee also 
directs that a cost-benefit analysis be conducted to assess the 
value of either incorporating this technology into existing 
systems through a product improvement program or inserting the 
technology into new systems. The Program Manager is directed to 
provide the Committee detailed spending and contract 
competition plans prior to the Fiscal Year 1998 Intelligence 
Authorization Conference.

SURF EAGLE--MASINT

    The FY1998 request does not sustain the Congressional 
FY1997 add for project SURF EAGLE. In addition, the Program 
Manager (PM) proposes to transfer this capability to the Joint 
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP).
    With previous Congressional plus-up funds of $11.4 million, 
the Navy's Meteorologic and Oceanographic Command's Warfighting 
Support Center is now capable of fusing data derived from 
national technical means (NTM) with publicly available and open 
source data (maritime, LANDSAT, French SPOT, ACINT, 
meteorologic, and oceanographic). This capability allows 
analysts to better characterize littoral ocean areas and 
satisfy special operation and Naval/expeditionary warfare 
requirements. This effort, known as SURF EAGLE, enables the 
digital receipt, exploitation, archival, fusion, and 
dissemination of this processed data. Retaining this capability 
within GDIP is appropriate because at least two of SURF EAGLE's 
primary customers are GDIP units--Marine Corps Intelligence 
Activity and SOCOM'S Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). Both 
units rely heavily on SURF EAGLE-processed MASINT to produce 
tailored material for the warfighter.
    The Committee understands that an out year commitment to 
support and maintain the capital expenditures already made for 
SURF EAGLE has been programmed at $1.5 million per year. To be 
determined is the appropriate level of personnel required to 
carry out the intelligence-related functions of requesting and 
processing NTM information, an adjunct to funded oceanographic 
personnel already in place. The Committee understands that an 
estimate in the 20-40 person range has been discussed, but not 
fully analyzed. The Committee requests that the DNI in 
consultation with Commander, Naval Meteorology, and 
Oceanography Command provide an analysis of the level of GDIP-
funded personnel to carry out the intelligence related 
functions of SURF EAGLE by January 10, 1998.
    Only $0.2 million of the necessary $3.5 million is 
identified in the FY 1998 budget submission. The FY 1998 
request under funds the SURF EAGLE requirement by $3.3 million. 
The Committee supports a $3.5 million sustainment level of 
effort for SURF EAGLE and adds $1.0 million for digitization. 
In addition, the Committee denies the transfer of funds to JMIP 
and directs this capability remain in the GDIP.

Project 2000

    The budget request includes $10.0 million to address the 
``Year 2000'' date problem for GDIP units and activities. In 
response to a Congressional question-for-the-record, the 
Program Manager indicated that an overall program plan for 
addressing the ``Year 2000'' problem has yet to be developed. 
The Committee believes it would be inappropriate to permit 
expenditure of these funds in the absence of such a detailed 
plan and therefore directs that none of these funds be 
obligated or expended pending receipt by the Congressional 
Intelligence Committees of a detailed spending plan.

Air Force replacement ADP

    The GDIP Air Force National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) 
replacement ADP effort has been significantly reduced as a 
result of the DCI-mandated $50.0 million in over budget 
guidance reinvestment initiatives for facility upgrades. 
Specifically, NAICs' FY1998 budget submission leaves the Center 
without an acceptable recapitalization program to sustain its 
core mission computing needs. A recent staff visit found that 
NAIC's ``resource baseline is currently inadequate to support * 
* * common use ADP suite'' and that the Center ``will suffer 
significant mission degradation starting around 2000.'' In 
addition, the NAIC commander noted that ``[w]ithout 
recapitalization, current base mission analysis and processing 
will not be possible'' and added that, because of funding 
shortfalls, the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture 
``cannot be implemented at NAIC.'' In a response to a 
Congressional question-for-the-record, the GDIP Program Manager 
indicated that if additional funds were made available, he 
would ``accelerate current plans to recapitalize automation 
equipment.'' Therefore, the Committee adds $3.1 million to 
restore GDIP replacement ADP funds to the FY 1998 requested 
level.

Infrastructure base funds

    The FY 1998 GDIP budget request includes an infrastructure 
growth of $9.2 million, or 212% expansion above the FY1996 
actual funding level, for a ``base'' Operations and Maintenance 
appropriation category titled ``Other Expenses.'' As defined by 
DoD Procedural Guidance, the ``base'' budget category consists 
of programs or activities whose funds do not expand upon an 
existing capability. The category titled ``Other Expenses'' is 
defined as capital investments in land and structures, grants, 
subscriptions, automotive fuel, and minor repairs costing less 
than $50,000. Adequate CBJB justification for this increase of 
funds has not been provided. The budget submission also 
reflects a ``base'' growth of $3.4 million or 160% increase 
above the FY1996 actual level for a GDIP-DIA Emergency and 
Extraordinary Expense (E&E) budget line. GDIP E&E expenses are 
defined as special funds for emergent requirements to include 
Official Representation Funds and Confidential Military Purpose 
Funds. Again, adequate CBJB justification for this increase of 
funds has not been provided. In light of the current budget 
environment and poor justification, the Committee recommends 
sustaining these efforts at well above the FY1996 actual level 
but deletes a total of $7.6 million from these two line items.

Base ``other management'' funds

    The FY1998 budget request includes an infrastructure spike 
of $7.7 million, or 145% increase above the FY1996 actual 
funding level of $17.1, for a GDIP ``base'' category titled 
``Other Management.'' As noted earlier, the ``base'' budget 
category is defined as programs or activities whose funds do 
not expand upon an existing capability. The CBJB does not 
justify this one-year ``base'' increase. Fiscal constraints 
necessitate that the Committee maintain this ``Other 
Management'' funding line closer to the FY1996 actual level, 
thereby reducing the request by $3.85 million.

JIVA enhancement

    The Committee notes that the Program Manager sustained the 
FY1997 increase for the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture 
(JIVA). JIVA connects the Washington-hub to tactical forces 
through the theater commands. JIVA focuses on commercial 
software to provide collaborative and cognitive tools for data 
mining, white boarding, improved use of multimedia, video-
teleconferencing, and office automation. Correspondingly, the 
JIVA capability integrates modern techniques for data 
warehousing to handle vast amounts of information made 
available by the collaborative environment. JIVA also focuses 
on enhancements that include upgrading site-internal 
communications bandwidth to accommodate the needs arising from 
multimedia and desktop video usage.
    The budget request includes $26.3 million in FY1998 and 
$57.2 programmed for FY1999. However, no JIVA funding was 
reflected in the FY1998 budget for U.S. Space Command, Special 
Operations Command, Transportation Command or U.S. Central 
Command. In response to a Congressional Directed Action and to 
a question-for-the-record, the Program Manager indicated that 
``[f]unding for FY1998 may need to be realigned within the 
program to ensure that investment is focused on the most 
profitable technologies,'' and that JIVA funding anomalies in 
the CBJB were a result of budget cutbacks incurred during the 
Community Management Staff's budget review. The Committee 
acknowledges the increased emphasis that the GDIP has placed on 
JIVA and therefore provides an additional $24.75 million to 
accelerate this project.

Base Navy administration and facility

    The request includes an infrastructure ``base'' increase of 
$2.1 million or 10% growth above the FY1997 appropriated 
funding level for a category title ``Navy Intelligence 
Administration and Facility.'' The DoD Procedural Guidance 
manual defines the budget category of ``base'' as programs or 
activities whose funds do not expand upon an existing 
capability. The CBJB indicates that this increase is due to 
higher cost of ADP and furniture. Of note, the facility is only 
three years old with personnel numbers reduced by 19%. Fiscal 
concerns necessitate that the Committee sustain this funding 
effort at its FY1997 appropriated level and thus reduces the 
request by $2.1 million.

DIA's high performance computer replacement

    In response to a question-for-the-record, the GDIP program 
manager indicated that his highest priority unfunded project is 
to recapitalize ADP. According to the commander of DIA's 
Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), MSIC's mission-
essential High Performance Computer (HPC) will be obsolete by 
the year 2000. While the Center has requested out year life 
cycle replacement funds, the request is not reflected in the 
DoD or NFIP budget submissions. Of note, the Army's Strategic 
and Space Defense Command is co-located on the same 
installation and houses one of 13 DoD HPC distribution centers. 
The Committee is disappointed that the Program Manager has 
shown little effort to date in fully investigating linking the 
GDIP computer needs to the $2 billion DoD HPC Modernization 
Program, nor has the Program Manager aggressively investigated 
the use of NSA's supercomputing systems.
    The Committee directs the Program Manager to conduct a 
study of the following possible options: (1) use of DoD's HPC 
Modernization funds; (2) use of DoD's HPC Modernization 
capability; (3) leasing capability elsewhere; (4) procuring the 
use of NSA's supercomputing systems; or (5) procuring a new HPC 
for MSIC. The Committee requests that the report be submitted 
prior to the meeting of the Intelligence Authorization 
Conference. The Committee also recommends an additional $4.0 
million for MSIC's HPC replacement capability.

Open source analysis

    The Committee acknowledges the increased emphasis that the 
GDIP Program Manager has placed on open-source collection, 
analysis, and production in recent years. However, the 
constrained fiscal environment has forced a 50% reduction in 
FY1998 to open-source processing and dissemination from the 
FY1997 appropriated level. Thevalue of open-source is noted in 
this line from the CBJB--``[t]he use of open-source information to 
support deployed forces in Bosnia clearly attests to its status as an 
essential, cost-effective complement to classified intelligence 
disciplines.'' The Committee acknowledges the value of open-source 
analysis and adds $1.6 million to expand the collection, flow, and 
usefulness of it throughout GDIP analytical production activities.
    As active duty military and full-time civilian personnel 
are drawn down, utilization of open-source information has 
increased in recent years with DoD reservists playing a much 
greater role. In response to a question-for-the-record, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense indicated that the Joint 
Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP) provides augmented support 
to specific theaters' war plans and, if adequately funded, 
could better harness readily available open-source information 
on transnational topics. The response also suggested that 
efficiency could be enhanced by connecting the Open Source 
Information System (OSIS) data to JRIP units and work-at-home/
Individual Ready reservist. DoD proposed a concept centered 
around the development of a hub of already qualified full-time 
personnel such as that currently available at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, which is currently managing the World Basic Information 
Library Program. The OSD response further suggested that 
through a functional realignment of Reservists to newly 
designed, developed and activated JRIP transnational hubs, 
significant analytical improvements would be gained by the 
Intelligence Community.
    The Committee also recommends an additional $0.8 million to 
activate a prototype Open-source Reserve Cell to experiment 
with a transnational OSIS-connected reserve unit.

Joint collection management tools/JCMT

    In early 1994, the Military Intelligence Board directed the 
implementation of a single DoD, automated all-source collection 
requirements management system to be approved by the 
Intelligence Systems Board. Army was designated as the DoD 
Intelligence Information System's executive agent to develop 
JCMT as the migration system with over $24.0 million requested 
over five years. In October 1996, the Program Manager asked for 
a review of JCMT as a result of concerns raised by the Services 
and Commands. As of late May 1997 significant Intelligence 
Community concerns continue to surface over the development and 
fielding of JCMT to include unevaluated customer requirements. 
The Committee understands that a report is being prepared for 
the Military Intelligence Board. Consequently, the Committee 
believes it would be inappropriate to permit expenditure of 
these funds before the results of this report are known to the 
Committee.

GDIP DIA's civilian leadership

    The Committee is concerned that the Program Manager has 
assigned one out of four Defense Intelligence Senior Executive 
Service (DISES) civilian positions to external matters. For 
example, the Program Manager has assigned external DISES 
positions to such outpost as London, Ottawa or Canberra Liaison 
Offices. The Committee questions the return on the investment 
to the Intelligence Community of these senior civilian billets. 
Therefore, Committee directs the Program Manager to conduct a 
review of senior-level internal (core mission areas especially) 
and external billets. The review shall consider the rationale 
for the high number of external billets given the fiscally 
constrained GDIP resources pool. The results of the review 
shall be provided to the Congressional Intelligence Committees 
not later than January 31, 1998.

       improving intelligence community management and operation

    Last year, the Congress adopted provisions in the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 aimed at 
improving the ability of the Intelligence Community to meet the 
challenges of the Post-Cold War world and enhance 
accountability in the wake of the Ames scandal and other 
intelligence and management failures. The Committee views this 
reform effort, however, as an ongoing process and continues to 
examine ways to bring greater efficiency and effectiveness to 
the Intelligence Community.
    One of the themes of last year's efforts, for example, was 
the importance of encouraging intelligence professionals to 
serve in more than one office or element within the national 
security field. This not only enhances the professional 
satisfaction of the employee, it also improves the 
effectiveness of the entire national security community. Thus, 
the Committee has included in this bill expanded authority for 
intelligence employees to be detailed on a reimbursable or 
nonreimbursable basis as part of the Intelligence Community 
Assignment Program recently established by the Acting DCI and 
the Secretary of Defense.

Multi-year leasing authority

    The Committee is providing authority for the Agency to 
enter into multi-year leases in a timely fashion in order to 
realize the savings to the government that come with such 
leases. The Committee notes that agencies within the 
Intelligence Community are currently required to give the 
intelligence oversight committees at least two weeks' notice 
prior to entering into any lease that has an expected full-
service cost for items provided by the landlord in excess of 
$500,000 in any given year, or that involves more than 20,000 
square feet of building space. This requirement will apply to 
multi-year leases entered into pursuant to the authority 
granted in this provision.
    The Committee understands that in addition to the overt 
multi-year leases authorized by this provision, the CIA has 
entered into leases for operational purposes in which the role 
of the CIA remains covert. These covert leases, many of them 
for Agency proprietaries requiring limited space, are covered 
by the existing reporting requirement but rarely meet the 
reporting threshold; the Committee therefore receives no 
notification. In order to improve its understanding of covert 
leasing, the Committee requests an annual report from the DCI 
listing all of the Intelligence Community's covert leases. Such 
a list shall include a listing of each lease, its cost, 
duration and location, the purpose for the lease, and the 
controlling directorate or office.

Report on management reform within the Directorate of Administration

    The CIA has also proposed a new way of doing business in 
its Directorate of Administration. This would include the 
establishment of a working capital fund to allow the CIA's 
Directorate of Administration to manage some of its services in 
a manner that encourages greater efficiency by requiring them 
to compete for ``customers'' in much the same way private 
industry does. It also forces elements within the Agency which 
utilize those services to more accurately assess their value by 
directly purchasing the services with funds from their office 
budgets. The Committee applauds the kind of creative thinking 
reflected in this proposal and generally supports the 
objectives underlying this initiative. However, it is essential 
that this fund and the management reforms accompanying it be 
carefully structured so as to maximize the prospects for 
success and minimize the risk of unintended consequences. While 
working capital funds are not new to the executive branch, CIA 
is proposing several significant variations from the way in 
which existing funds operate at other agencies. The Committee, 
therefore, is requesting a report on the Working Capital Fund 
proposal prior to conference on this bill. This report should 
include:
          Projected amounts of funds needed for the Working 
        Capital Fund (WCF) in fiscal years 1998 and 1999;
          Policies for management of the WCF, including the 
        criteria for release of funds to individual 
        ``businesses'' within the Directorate of Administration 
        and how the WCF will be apportioned for each business;
          The criteria that will be employed to select 
        businesses to be included in the WCF and a description 
        of the business plan that will be required of each;
          List of businesses to be included in the Working 
        Capital Fund (WCF) in FY 1998 and FY 1999 and the 
        amounts reflected in the CIA budget and projections as 
        of May 1, 1997, for those businesses for FY 1998 and FY 
        1999, notwithstanding the WCF;
          Procedures for establishing and monitoring prices set 
        by the WCF businesses;
          Procedures for initial-year distribution of funds to 
        components throughout the CIA to be used to purchase 
        goods and services from the businesses participating in 
        the WCF and procedures for determining component 
        budgets for those purchases in subsequent years;
          Training or other preparation undertaken to ensure 
        these component managers are prepared to manage their 
        budgets and make purchase decisions in light of the WCF 
        and the consequent new business practices;
          Policies or guidance regarding what managers can do 
        with funds distributed for making purchases from the 
        participating businesses, particularly distributed 
        funds not used for such purposes during the fiscal 
        year;
          Procedures for monitoring expenditures by managers of 
        customer elements, including plans to standardize 
        record keeping by managers: and
          Guidelines for evaluating the success of the WCF and 
        of individual businesses.

Committee review of the CIA inspector general (IG)

    Another issue addressed in the Committee's Reform and 
Renewal review during the 104th Congress was the accountability 
of the various Intelligence Community Inspectors General. While 
the Committee's Audit and Program Review Group conducts 
oversight through the review of IG publications such as 
semiannual reports, projected IG plans, numerous IG 
investigative and audit reports, and almost daily contact with 
one or more IG staffs, there had been no documented review of 
overall operations of the IG offices within the Community.
    Thus, the Committee directed that each year one of the 
Intelligence Community IGs be reviewed in detail by the Audit 
and Program Review Group and that they prepare a report 
summarizing the review. The CIA's Office of Inspector General 
was selected for the first such in-depth review. That review 
was recently completed, with an objective of gaining further 
details on how the three CIA IG staffs (Audit, Inspection, and 
Investigation) operate. There was particular emphasis on the 
Investigations Staff because this staff had significantly 
increased in size and responsibility since the IG became 
statutory, and the most recent CIA IG Semiannual Report 
indicated that further changes were to take place. Topics 
covered included the conduct of investigations, recommendations 
concerning accountability and disciplinary action, crimes 
reporting, and the grievance process.
    The review was strongly supported by the CIA IG and 
provided the Committee a much greater understanding of the 
operations of that office. The majority of the information was 
collected through interviews of senior IG personnel. Also, 
members of the recently created CIA IG Management Advisory 
Group were interviewed to gain the perspective of the working 
level members of the staff. Finally, the operational manuals of 
the three staffs were reviewed in detail and other available IG 
policies and procedures were obtained.
    The review found that the Inspector General has taken 
numerous steps to improve the operations of the office since 
this position became statutory. Examples include better 
training, strengthened quality controls, increased staff, and 
the creation of an IG Counsel team. Some additional personnel 
management and operational policy changes are being made in 
response to this review. Based on the results of this review 
and its other oversight activities, the Committee believes CIA 
IG is producing quality products which address the issues at 
hand with the appropriate amount of analysis, criticism, and 
independence. In addition, the office has increased the level 
of trust and respect from within the Agency, the Oversight 
Committees, and the Intelligence Community.

Subpoena authority for the CIA inspector general

    The Committee has included in this bill authority for the 
Inspector General at the CIA to issue subpoenas to obtain 
documentary evidence necessary for the performance of the IG 
mission Congress established it to fulfill. The need for this 
authority was examined during the Committee's CIA IG review 
described above.
    Until now, the IG has conducted investigations and 
inquiries without the subpoena authority routinely employed by 
all other statutory Inspectors General. Congress acknowledged 
at the time it created the CIA IG in 1989 that it was not 
providing a full complement of investigative tools, but 
directed the IG to compile information in each Semiannual 
report to the Director of Central Intelligence regarding any 
instances where the absence of subpoena authority has been an 
impediment.
    In several semi-annual reports provided to the Committee, 
the IG has provided the Committee with examples of cases that 
illustrate the problems created by the lack of subpoena 
authority. One example provided by the IG involved an 
investigation into the theft of CIA credit cards. The IG 
investigators initially were only able to obtain copies of cash 
register and credit card receipts and videotape security 
records through the voluntary cooperation of a number of 
retailers. Similarly, in a series of computer thefts, the IG 
noted that interviews of the primary subjects might have 
produced more positive results if certain sales receipts and 
financial information could have been obtained without alerting 
the interviewees prior to the interviews.
    Perhaps the most overriding impact of not having subpoena 
authority is that the CIA IG is forced to reverse the normal 
order of an investigation. Typically, an investigator will 
interview the target of an investigation last, after carefully 
compiling evidence with which to confront the target, so as to 
maximize the prospect for gettinguseful information during the 
interview. In the absence of authority to subpoena the production of 
relevant documents, the CIA IG must rely on voluntary cooperation. 
Thus, it often is compelled to interview the presumed target early in 
the investigation in an effort to get their cooperation in providing or 
authorizing access to relevant documents.
    The CIA IG can, in criminal investigations, ask the 
Department of Justice to convene a grand jury and obtain grand 
jury subpoenas to acquire necessary records. This ultimately 
was done in the credit card case referenced above. However, 
this option is only available for cases that are deemed worthy 
of a criminal investigation. Other Inspectors General often use 
the information obtained through their subpoena authority to 
help decide if a case should be pursued as a criminal, civil, 
or administrative case. Also, reliance on a grand jury subpoena 
limits the usefulness of the information for other purposes 
because of the rules prohibiting disclosure of grand jury 
information. For example, information obtained through a grand 
jury subpoena cannot be used later for administrative purposes 
without a formal proceeding before a federal judge. Congress 
acknowledged the importance of the CIA IG's mission when it 
adopted legislation providing a statutory basis for this 
function. The CIA IG statute was designed to ensure that the 
CIA IG was sufficiently independent from the Director of 
Central Intelligence to provide effective oversight. During the 
intervening years the mission of the CIA IG has become 
increasingly important, particularly in support of the 
oversight responsibilities of this Committee. Moreover, the 
independence of the CIA IG has been consistently reflected in 
the reports of investigations, audits, and inspections provided 
to the Committee. The Committee is aware that granting subpoena 
authority to the CIA IG may raise some concerns. However, in 
light of the importance of the IG's function, the demonstrated 
need for the authority to fulfill this function, and the proven 
independence of the IG, the Committee believes the CIA IG 
should be granted subpoena authority to the same extent it is 
currently granted to other national security Inspectors 
General.

 ensuring flow of information to congress, policymakers, and the public

    The most effective intelligence capability in the world is 
worthless if the information collected is not provided to the 
people who need it. Consumers of intelligence include not only 
the warfighters and policymakers, but also the Congress and the 
American public. A key issue in this regard is the handling of 
classified information. The Committee is concerned that 
insufficient priority is attached to ensuring a thorough review 
of intelligence so that families concerned about the murder of 
a loved one overseas and the general public receive information 
the disclosure of which no longer threatens national security. 
There is also a risk that over-classification or undue 
restrictions on dissemination of intelligence information 
within the executive branch could prevent information from 
reaching the policymakers who need it to reach informed 
decisions. In addition, the Committee is concerned about the 
impact of classification on Congress' ability to learn from 
federal employees about wrongdoing within executive agencies 
and departments.
    The Committee is reviewing the findings and recommendations 
of the report by the Commission on Protecting and Reducing 
Government Secrecy released in March 1997. The twelve person 
bi-partisan Commission spent two years investigating how the 
U.S. Government classifies and declassifies national security 
information, grants security clearances, and protects 
information on automated systems. The Committee will examine 
the feasibility of implementing the Commission's 
recommendations in the Intelligence Community and intends to 
play an important role in the Senate's consideration of 
legislation regarding this issue.

Providing information to victims and victims' families

    The Committee recently heard from the families of several 
Marines who were murdered in a terrorist attack in Zona Rosa, 
El Salvador, in 1985. A common refrain in their testimony was 
concern about how little information they received from their 
government regarding the attack and its perpetrators. It was 
from network television, for example, that at least one family 
first learned of the attack. Several families learned, years 
later from a television broadcast, that the likely mastermind 
of the attack had been brought into this country through 
official U.S. Government (USG) channels. The Committee has 
pressed the executive branch to provide these families with as 
much information as possible, but eleven years is a long time 
to wait. Similar frustration was expressed when the Committee 
heard during the last Congress from Americans who had lost 
their loved ones to violence in Guatemala. Subsequently, the 
Administration did establish a focal point on the Guatemala 
issues and this proved helpful to the families trying to 
negotiate through the maze of bureaucracies in search of 
relevant information.
    The Committee believes it is in the national interests of 
the United States to provide information regarding the murder 
or kidnaping of U.S. persons abroad to the families of the 
victims. Moreover, given the difficulty inherent in identifying 
all relevant information that might be held by disparate 
elements of the government, and the likely resistance to 
providing information that is currently classified, the 
Committee believes this important responsibility must 
ultimately be vested in a cabinet-level official.Therefore, the 
Committee has adopted a provision requiring the Secretary of State to 
ensure that all appropriate actions are taken within the USG to 
identify promptly all relevant information and to make it available to 
families to the maximum extent possible without seriously jeopardizing 
sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other vital national 
security interests. It is the Committee's expectation that the 
Secretary of State will act as an advocate for the families in the 
inevitable interagency debates regarding how much information can be 
disclosed.
    In order to improve the process for handling classified 
information in such a way that declassification can be 
accommodated efficiently, the Committee is providing additional 
funds to support the CIA's Declassification Factor (CDF). The 
Committee directs the DCI to review the current 
declassification polices and programs within the Intelligence 
Community and recommend measures to consolidate programs, 
evaluate agency performance, prioritize efforts, and provide 
adequate personnel and financial resources. The DCI's findings 
and recommendations should be provided to the intelligence 
oversight committees no later than September 1, 1997.

Standardizing information control systems and markings

    The Committee commends the steps the CIA has taken to 
improve classification management practices, including efforts 
to make classifiers more accountable for their actions. Another 
important aspect of classification policies and procedures is 
information control systems and markings. Efforts to ensure 
that intelligence is appropriately disseminated and that 
information vital to the Nation's security is kept secure and 
all other information is ultimately released to the public will 
be enhanced by standardizing information control systems and 
markings. The Controlled Access Program Oversight Committee 
(CAPOC), as a part of the Community Management Staff, is 
leading an interagency project jointly with the Security Policy 
Board and the Intelligence System Secretariat to standardize 
guidance for the principle Sensitive Compartmented Information 
control systems and related classification and security 
markings. This project should result in improved consistency of 
compartmentation and classification management across 
intelligence disciplines and make an important contribution to 
interoperability among automated information systems in the 
Intelligence Community. The Committee urges the DCI to assign 
resources and priority attention to completion of updated 
classification guides and a unified list of compatible 
markings. In addition, the Committee encourages the DCI to 
incorporate into this effort other CIA collection disciplines. 
The Committee commends the efforts of the CAPOC to keep the 
Committee informed of its activities. The DCI is directed to 
review the activities and recommendations of the CAPOC and 
notify the Congressional Intelligence Committees if legislation 
is necessary to further standardization and enhance oversight 
of these controlled access programs.

Disclosures of classified information to Congress

    The Committee is also concerned that executive branch 
policies on classified information could interfere with its 
ability to learn of wrongdoing within the elements over which 
it has oversight responsibility. The Committee's concern has 
been heightened by its review of executive branch opinions in 
this area, most recently articulated in a December 5, 1996 
letter from the Director of Central Intelligence informing a 
State Department employee who was accused of having revealed 
sensitive classified information to a Member of Congress of the 
decision to deny him access to Sensitive Compartmental 
Information. The letter stated that ``[n]either a security 
clearance, nor access to SCI give an individual the right or 
authority to make unilateral decisions to disclose classified 
information to others, including to cleared Members of 
Congress.'' Without addressing the merits of that particular 
decision or attempting to resolve the factual disputes in that 
case, the Committee noted in a letter to the Acting DCI on 
January 3, 1997, that it was troubled by the reasoning 
underlying the decision because of its potential impact on the 
ability of the intelligence oversight committees to ensure they 
are informed of possible wrongdoing.
    The Committee is particularly concerned that federal 
employees may view the decision or other relevant statements by 
elements of the Executive Branch, including opinions from the 
Department of Justice, to mean that there are no circumstances 
under which they can bring information to Congress that they 
believe evidences wrongdoing if to do so requires disclosure to 
Congress of classified information.
    The Committee fully appreciates the need to carefully 
protect national security information, particularly information 
the disclosure of which might reveal sensitive intelligence 
sources or methods. Indeed, the select committees for oversight 
of intelligence were established in part to balance that need 
for protection with the equally compelling need for Congress to 
have access to information necessary for effective oversight. 
Moreover the Committee has worked closely with the Intelligence 
Community to establish appropriate procedures for the routine 
provision of intelligence information to the committees. 
However, it is essential that where these standard procedures 
fail to get the necessary information to Congress, for example, 
because the wrongdoing involves the very individuals who would 
have to authorize the disclosure or the authorization is not 
forthcoming, then employees must have an alternative.
    The Committee has included in this bill a provision 
designed to ensure that Congress receives information necessary 
to fulfill its constitutional oversight responsibilities. The 
bill directs the President to issue guidance for all executive 
branch employees making it clear that disclosures of classified 
information to appropriate oversight committees or the 
employee's own Congressional representative is not prohibited 
by any law, executive order, regulation, or policy if the 
employee reasonably believes that such information evidences a 
violation of any law, rule, or regulation; a false statement to 
Congress on an issue of material fact; or gross mismanagement, 
a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial 
and specific danger to public health or safety.
    Disclosure to an appropriate oversight committee means 
disclosure to cleared staff or a member of the committee with 
responsibility for the agency involved in the wrongdoing in 
their capacity as staff or committee member. Committee staff or 
members who receive such information from an employee are 
presumed to have received it in their capacity as members or 
staff of the appropriate oversight committee and are 
responsible for ensuring that the information is protected and 
brought to the attention of the leadership of the committee or 
its staff directors.
    Executive branch opinions note that Executive Order 12356 
on classification requires that classified information be 
disclosed only to a person with the appropriate clearance and a 
``need to know.'' Members of Congress are cleared by virtue of 
the election to office. This provision recognizes that, at a 
minimum, the committee with primary oversight jurisdiction over 
the elements allegedly engaged in wrongdoing and the member of 
Congress representing the employee have a need to know the 
information and such disclosure is consistent with the 
Executive Order.

Notification of Congress

    To conduct effective oversight the Committee must also 
receive notification of intelligence activities in a timely and 
complete fashion. Section 502 of the National Security Act of 
1947 requires that the Committees be informed of all 
intelligence activities including any significant anticipated 
intelligence activity as well as any significant intelligence 
failure. In several cases the Committee has received notice 
well after the fact and follow-up requests for further 
information have not been responded to promptly and completely. 
The Committee reaffirms the requirement that notification occur 
in advance of the activity if it is anticipated or foreseeable. 
Where there is not time to provide written notice in advance, 
or where the event was not foreseeable, immediate verbal notice 
will suffice until written notice is provided; written notice 
should be provided within five business days. Follow-up 
requests from the Committee for additional information and/or 
supporting documentation regarding a notification must be 
addressed promptly and completely.

              section-by-section analysis and explanation

Title I--Intelligence activities

    Section 101 lists departments, agencies, and other elements 
of the United States Government for whose intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities the Act authorizes 
appropriations for fiscal year 1998.
    Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities and personnel ceilings for the 
entities listed in section 101 for fiscal year 1998 are 
contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The 
Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the Act by this 
section.
    Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central 
Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office 
of management and Budget, in fiscal year 1998 to exceed the 
personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the 
Intelligence Community under section 102 by an amount not to 
exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings applicable 
under section 102. The Director may exercise this authority 
only when necessary to perform important intelligence functions 
or to maintain of a stable personnel force. The Director must 
report any exercise of this authority to the two intelligence 
committees of the Congress.
    Section 104 provides certain details concerning the amount 
and composition of the Community Management Account (CMA) of 
the Director of Central Intelligence.
    Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$90,580,000 for fiscal year 1998 for the staffing and 
administration of various components under the CMA. Subsection 
(a) also authorizes funds identified for the Advanced Research 
and Development Committee and the Environmental Intelligence 
and Applications Program to remain available for two years.
    Subsection (B) authorizes a total of 278 full-time 
personnel for elements within the CMA for fiscal year 1998 and 
provides that such personnel may be permanent employeesof the 
CMA element or detailed from other elements of the United States 
Government.
    Subsection (c) explicitly authorizes the classified portion 
of the CMA and expressly provides that the classified Schedule 
of Authorizations applies to the CMA.
    Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed on a 
reimbursable basis except for temporary situations.

Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System

            Authorization of Appropriations
    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$196,900,000 for fiscal year 1998 for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

Title III--General Provisions

    Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by the 
conference report for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
    Section 302 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the conference report shall not be deemed to 
constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence 
activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution 
or laws of the United States.
    Section 303 would allow heads of Intelligence Community 
(IC) entities, or officials to whom they have delegated this 
authority, to authorize long-term reimbursable or 
nonreimbursable details within the Intelligence Community 
Assignment Program (ICAP). Nonreimbursable details would be 
capped at three years. The heads of the parent and host 
agencies, however, could extend such details for a period not 
to exceed one year when they determine that an extension is in 
the public interest. The provision also would authorize IC 
elements to pay ICAP participants any benefits, allowances 
(including travel allowances) or incentives otherwise provided 
by their organizations to encourage participation in the ICAP.
    The Acting Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense established the ICAP in order to broaden 
the perspective of Community employees and open an additional 
mechanism by which employees can secure rotational assignments 
within the Community. The Program will develop leaders with a 
broader knowledge and appreciation of the issues facing the IC. 
ICAP assignments will be for two to three years and involve GS-
13 to Senior Executive Service/Senior Intelligence Service 
positions. The Program should address concerns shared by senior 
IC managers, the intelligence oversight committees, and the 
Brown Commission that IC employees develop a broad IC-wide 
perspective. It is expected that the Program will not comprise 
more than 100 people initially and 900 by 2001.
    Current law could impede the effective implementation of 
ICAP in two respects. First, under title 31, United States 
Code, nonreimbursable details are restricted and must either 
involve a matter related to the loaning agency's appropriation 
and aid it in accomplishing the purpose for which the 
appropriations are provided; or have a negligible impact on the 
loaning agency's appropriations (generally viewed as a detail 
of one year or less). This restriction would impede the ability 
to establish the longer-term nonreimbursable rotations 
necessary to provide adequate exposure to a broader range of IC 
activities.
    Second, under existing law, it is questionable whether 
unique benefits, allowances, travel and/or incentives normally 
payable to employees may continue to be paid to those employees 
upon their detail to another IC organization. Employees may 
view loss of such benefits as a penalty for participating in 
ICAP and may be less willing to participate in the program. 
Under this legislation, IC elements will be able to provide 
special relocation bonuses and cost-of-living allowances to 
their employees on detail to other agencies under the ICAP if 
it is determined that the particular incentive is necessary to 
fill the position. This determination will be made on a case-
by-case basis.
    Without this legislation, the implementation of ICAP will 
not be as flexible, and the program may not achieve its goal of 
creating a more efficient and ``corporate'' Intelligence 
Community.
    Section 304 further extends the `delay of sanctions'' 
provision in current law until January 6, 2001. This provision 
was first included in the Fiscal Year 1996 Intelligence 
Authorization Act and was extended until January 6, 1998, in 
the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act. The 
provision amended the National Security Act of 1947 to give the 
President statutory authority to delay imposing a sanction, 
upon determining that proceeding with the sanction could 
compromise an ongoing criminal investigation or an intelligence 
source or method. The President would be required to lift any 
stay of sanction as soon as possible. Also, the provision would 
require the President to report to Congress immediately upon 
imposing any stay and when any stay exceeds 120 days.
    Section 305 amends section 102(e) of the National Security 
Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 403 by reinserting language that 
places the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence in 
the CIA, for administrative purposes. This language was 
inadvertently deleted when Congress enacted amendments to the 
National Security Act in the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-293. Reinsertion of this 
language clarifies that the CIA has the authority to provide 
administrative support to entities within the Office of the 
Director.
    Section 306 directs the President to inform all executive 
branch employees that disclosing classified information to an 
appropriate oversight committee or to their Congressional 
representative is not prohibited by any law, executive order, 
regulation, or policy; provided, that the employee reasonably 
believes that the classified information evidences a violation 
of any law, rule, or regulation; a false statement to Congress 
on an issue of material fact; or gross mismanagement, a gross 
waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and 
specific danger to public health or safety. This provision is 
intended to ensure that Congress receives information necessary 
to fulfill its constitutional oversight responsibilities.
    Disclosure to an appropriate oversight committee means 
disclosure to cleared staff or a member of the committee with 
jurisdiction over the agency involved in the wrongdoing in 
their capacity as staff or a committee member. Members or 
Committee staff who receive such information from an employee 
are presumed to have received it in their capacity as members 
or staff of the appropriate oversight committee. Members and 
staff are responsible for ensuring that the information is 
protected and brought to the attention of the leadership of the 
committee or its staff directors.
    The President, by informing executive branch employees as 
directed in this provision, will make it clear that disclosure 
to the appropriate oversight committee or member is authorized, 
thereby recognizing that these committees and members have a 
``need to know'' the information as required by current 
executive branch restrictions on disclosure of classified 
information.
    Section 307 expresses a sense of Congress that it is in the 
national interest of the United States to provide information 
regarding the murder or kidnaping of United States persons 
abroad to the families of the victims. Moreover, Congress 
believes that the responsibility for providing such information 
is sufficiently important that this provision vests it in a 
cabinet-level official. This provision requires the Secretary 
of State to ensure that the United States Government takes all 
appropriate actions to identify promptly all relevant 
unclassified and classified information in the possession of 
the United States Government. The provision further requires 
the Secretary of State to ensure that all unclassified 
information is made available to the victims' families. With 
respect to classified information, this provision directs the 
Secretary of State to work with the Director of Central 
Intelligence to release all relevant information that would not 
jeopardize intelligence sources or methods, or vital national 
security interests. If the Secretary of State and the Director 
of Central Intelligence determine that intelligence sources or 
methods would not be jeopardized and no vital national security 
interest would be compromised by the release of classified 
information, this provision directs the Secretary to release 
that information to the appropriate recipient. The Committee 
realizes that there will be interagency disagreement about what 
should or should not be released under this provision. When 
such disagreements arise, the Committee expects the Secretary 
of State to act as an advocate for the families.
    Section 308 addresses the Committee's concern that 
intelligence reporting and analysis lacks standards for foreign 
names and places. Recent reporting suggests that U.S. troops 
may have received inadequate intelligence warnings in the Gulf 
War because of inconsistent references to locations in Iraq. 
These inconsistencies may have contributed to the possible 
exposure of U.S. military forces to chemical agents released 
during the destruction of Iraqi weapons caches.
    Intelligence databases maintained by various entities 
within the intelligence community are a critical national 
resource. The Intelligence Community must standardize the names 
and places in each database to allow for effective and 
consistent support for war fighters and national security 
policy makers. This provision calls on the DCI to conduct a 
survey of standards currently in place throughout the 
Intelligence Community and to issue guidelines for community-
wide standards. The DCI is further directed to report the 
results of this survey, no later than 90 days after the 
enactment of this Act, and provide a copy of the guidelines to 
the Intelligence Committes no later than 180 days after the 
enactment of this Act.

Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 401 modifies section 5 of the CIA Act of 1949 to 
provide clear legislative authority for the Central 
Intelligence Agency to enter into multi-year leases of not more 
than 15 years' duration for the purpose of ensuring cost-
efficient acquisition of Agency facilities. This section is not 
intended to modify or supersede authority granted in section 8 
of the CIA Act of 1949. The multi-year least authority in this 
section is subject to appropriations provided in advance for 
either the full cost of the lease or the first 12 months' cost 
plus estimated termination liability. In the latter case, 
leases shall include a clause that conditions the lease upon 
the availability of funds in any fiscal year. Additionally, 
funds made available for termination liability remain available 
until the costs associated with lease termination are paid. 
This provision is similar to and modeled after section 1072 of 
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994. In the 
event a lease is not terminated early, excess termination 
liability funds may be used to satisfy rental obligations in a 
subsequent fiscal year. Lastly, available funds in any fiscal 
year may be used to make lease payments for a maximum of 12 
months beginning any time during the fiscal year. This 
provision is similar to section 1073 of FASA.
    With the end of the Cold War, CIA has been reorganizing to 
meet new intelligence requirements. As part of this effort, CIA 
has been consolidating its facilities in the Washington, D.C. 
area and other locations. This process, as well as future 
consolidation efforts, calls for the acquisition of new leases 
that permit CIA to relocate from outdated facilities with poor 
work space, communications, personal security, and safety. 
Because multiyear leases are desirable to commercial landlords 
and lenders, the ability to enter into multiyear leases during 
this process cold result in savings to the Government, both in 
money and time. Multiyear leasing authority would allow CIA to 
negotiate better terms with a wider array of landlords. The 
CIA's security concerns present it with unique constraints in 
choosing a suitable rental property. Thus, it is often 
difficult to find a replacement if a potential site is lost due 
to delay. This authority will allow the Agency to conduct lease 
negotiations in a more timely manner than is currently 
possible.
    The end of section 5(e) is deleted because the Act it 
cites, section 322 of the Act of June 30, 1932 (47 Stat. 412), 
was repealed by P.L. 100-678 on November 17, 1988.
    Section 402 amends section 17(e) of the CIA Act of 1949, 50 
U.S.C. Sec. 403q(e) to provide the CIA Inspector General (IG) 
with authority to subpoena records and other documentary 
information necessary in the performance of functions assigned 
to the IG. This authority is the same as that provided to 
Inspectors General covered by the Inspector General Act of 
1978. As under the 1978 Act, enforcement of an IG subpoena 
would necessitate the filing by the Department of Justice of a 
request for and an order by a United States district court.
    The section also directs the CIA Inspector General to 
submit a biannual report to the Congressional intelligence 
committees detailing the exercise of the IG's subpoena 
authority during the preceding six months. The Committee 
expects that these reports will include a summary of each 
exercise of the IG's subpoena authority. The reports should 
also include whether the IG needed to request judicial 
enforcement of a subpoena and the results of such a request.
    This section also amends section 17(b)(3) of the CIA Act of 
1949, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 403q(b)(3), by inserting language similar 
to that found in provisions of the Inspector General Act of 
1978, as amended, that pertain to the Inspectors General of the 
Departments of Defense, Justice, and Treasury, and of the 
Postal Service. This new language authorizes the Director of 
Central Intelligence to prohibit the CIA Inspector General from 
issuing any subpoena after the IG has decided to issue such 
subpoena, if the Director determines that such prohibition is 
necessary to protect vital national security interests of the 
United States.

Title V--Department of Defense

    Section 501 would amend Section 2161 of title 10 of the 
United States Code to show that the former Defense Intelligence 
School has been renamed as the Joint Military Intelligence 
College, in order to reflect the nature of the College as a 
joint institution of higher learning. The amendment also 
authorizes the President of the College to confer the 
undergraduate degree of Bachelor of Science in Intelligence 
(BSI) on graduates of the College who have fulfilled the 
requirements for that degree.
    The increasing complexity in the field of intelligence has 
created the need for a highly educated professional work force. 
Although the need to broaden the intelligence knowledge of 
Intelligence Community professionals has been recognized in 
degree programs such as the Master of Science in Strategic 
Intelligence (MSSI), the professional development of the 
Intelligence Community should not be limited to senior-level 
personnel. A substantial portion of the community is composed 
of intelligence personnel in the E-5 through E-9, warrant 
officer, and equivalent civilian grades. The Intelligence 
Community would benefit greatly by the addition of an 
undergraduate degree program designed to educate junior 
intelligence professionals.
    The BSI is a degree completion program developed by the 
Joint Military Intelligence College focusing on intelligence 
collection and analysis, providing an intelligence major for 
those who have completed the first three years of an 
undergraduate program. This is a cost-effective means of 
increasing the professional competence of a key segment of the 
Community. It also serves to underpin a coherent career 
development program which may include the MSSI.
    In his March 1996 Annual Report to the President and the 
Congress, the Secretary of Defense advised that the college was 
taking the steps necessary to acquire this additional degree 
granting authority. The BSI degree program enjoys wide support, 
which includes the Joint Military Intelligence College Board of 
Visitors, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and 
each of the Service intelligence organizations. As stated in 
the Department of Education report on the college's 
application, the program has already received informal support 
from the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, the 
accreditation authority for the Joint Military Intelligence 
College. The program has been fully piloted, reviewed, and 
approved by the U.S. Department of Education.
    Section 502 would extend through the end of FY 1999 the 
authority granted the Army in the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1996 for the rectification of 
infrastructure and quality of life problems at Bad Aibling and 
Menwith Hill Stations. With respect to Bad Aibling Station, 
this authority is requested as an interim measure for 
contingency maintenance pending any final decision on the 
status of the Station.
    The Army became the Executive Agent for Bad Aibling Station 
in FY 1995 and Menwith Hill Station in FY 1996. Without 
congressional action, the Army is prohibited by 31 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1301 from using appropriated funds to support these field 
sites, notwithstanding that the Army is the Executive Agent for 
them. Language in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1996 provided the necessary flexibility to allow the Army 
to transfer or reprogram relatively minor amounts of funds (up 
to $2 million in FY 1996 O&M and $2 million in FY 1997 O&M 
funds) for necessary maintenance at these stations. Sufficient 
funding has not been available, however, to allow the Army to 
meet all of the stations' needs because of financial 
constraints and increasing operational tempo. Consequently, in 
order to continue addressing infrastructure and quality of life 
needs at Menwith Hill Station and to be able to meet 
contingencies on an interim basis at Bad Aibling Station, the 
Army's flexible transfer and reprogramming authority is 
extended through FY 1999.
    Section 503 prohibits any person from publicly using the 
name, initials or seal of the National Reconnaissance Office 
(NRO) for commercial purposes without the joint written 
permission of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of 
Central Intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency and 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency currently have identical 
provisions prohibiting unauthorized use of their names, 
initials, and seals. See Section 13 of the CIA Act, 50 U.S.C. 
Sec. 403m (CIA); 10 U.S.C. Sec. 445 (NIMA).

                            committee action

    On June 4, 1997 the Select Committee on Intelligence 
approved the bill and ordered that it be favorably reported.

                           estimate of costs

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the estimated costs incurred in carrying 
out the provisions of this bill, for fiscal year 1998, are set 
forth in the classified annex to this bill. Estimates of the 
costs incurred in carrying out this bill in the five fiscal 
years thereafter are not available from the Executive branch, 
and therefore, the Committee deems it impractical, pursuant to 
paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate, to include such estimates in this report.

                    evaluation of regulatory impact

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing the 
provisions of this legislation.

                        changes in existing law

    In the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary to 
dispense with the requirements of section 12 of rule XXVI of 
the Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the 
business of the Senate.

                                
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