[Senate Report 105-15]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                        Calendar No. 42
105th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE

 1st Session                                                     105-15
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                  NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT OF 1997

                                _______
                                

                 April 30, 1997.--Ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


   Mr. Thurmond, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                     ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS

                          [To accompany S. 7]

    The Committee on Armed Services, to which was referred the 
bill (S. 7) having considered the same, reports favorably 
thereon without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.

                          purpose of the bill

    S. 7 would establish a policy for the development and 
deployment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. The 
National Missile Defense Act of 1997 would establish a 
requirement to deploy an NMD system by 2003 to defend all 50 
states against limited ballistic missile threats. The Act 
provides broad guidance regarding the composition of the 
required NMD system, and allows the Secretary of Defense to 
select the specific components of the NMD architecture.
    S. 7 urges the President to enter into negotiations with 
the Russian Federation to amend the ABM Treaty to allow for NMD 
deployments beyond those currently permitted under the Treaty. 
S. 7, however, does not require the deployment of systems that 
would violate the ABM Treaty or any other action that would 
violate the Treaty.
    S. 7 uses the Department of Defense's ``National Ballistic 
Missile Defense Capstone Requirements Document'' to define the 
NMD system's requirements, from which cost estimates are 
derived. The Committee notes that, using these same 
requirements, the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization last year estimated that a limited NMD system 
would cost roughly $10 billion to develop and deploy (this 
estimate assumed a system consisting of 100 ground-based 
interceptors at a single site and a space-based sensor system 
known as the Space and MissileTracking System).

                     scope of the committee review

    The Armed Services Committee has closely followed the 
evolution of the NMD program and has led several efforts in the 
past to develop a legislative charter for NMD. In 1991, the 
committee took the initiative with the Missile Defense Act of 
1991, which, among other things, established in law a goal for 
the United States to ``deploy an anti-ballistic missile system, 
including one or an adequate additional number of anti-
ballistic missile sites and space-based sensors, that is 
capable of providing a highly effective defense of the United 
States against limited attacks of ballistic missiles.'' The 
Missile Defense Act of 1991 directed the Secretary of Defense 
to develop such a system for deployment ``by the earliest date 
allowed by the availability of appropriate technology or by 
fiscal year 1996''.
    During the 104th Congress, the committee considered several 
pieces of legislation related to NMD. The committee carefully 
considered the full range of associated issues during hearings 
and other committee meetings.
    The committee has conducted numerous hearings on ballistic 
missile defense programs and policies, most recently on 
February 27, 1997, to receive testimony from the Director of 
the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.
    The committee is reporting S. 7 to the Senate for the 
following reasons:

Requirement for deploying an NMD system

    As evidenced by its sponsorship of the Missile Defense Act 
of 1991, the committee has long maintained that there is a 
requirement to develop and deploy an NMD system as an urgent 
national priority. S. 7 is consistent with this long-standing 
position. Largely due to the current Administration's 
opposition to a focused deployment effort, however, the 
bipartisan support for an NMD deployment that once existed on 
the committee has deteriorated. The Administration's so-called 
``deployment readiness'' or ``three-plus-three'' NMD program 
differs from the policy contained in S. 7, insofar as it would 
have the United States develop NMD technology but not commit to 
deployment until some unspecified time in the future. The 
majority view on the committee, which is represented by S. 7, 
is that the requirement for an NMD deployment decision is clear 
and compelling.
    First, long-range ballistic missile threats face the United 
States today, if only from unauthorized or accidental launches 
from Russia or China. Moreover, threats are likely to emerge 
within the coming years from other countries, including, in 
particular, North Korea, which currently has an 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) under development. 
Perhaps most troubling, any country that might develop or 
acquire a capability to deploy a satellite in low earth orbit 
could also deliver anuclear warhead at intercontinental 
distances. The technologies and knowledge necessary to develop such 
systems are widely available. Hence, although it is difficult to 
predict the emergence of new threats, the capabilities exist for 
several countries to acquire such capabilities in the near future.
    Second, the lack of a U.S. NMD system may actually invite 
proliferation and the development or acquisition of long-range 
ballistic missiles by rogue states. Deploying an NMD system 
prior to the unambiguous emergence of new missile threats to 
the United States might serve to deter countries that would 
otherwise seek to acquire ICBMs. A vulnerable America presents 
a range of opportunities and incentives for missile 
proliferation, blackmail, and even aggression.
    Third, deployment of an NMD system can help pave the way 
for a more reliable and less adversarial form of strategic 
stability. Mutual vulnerability is clearly not a necessary 
basis for a stable deterrence relationship. Indefinitely 
extending Cold War notions of nuclear deterrence based on 
vulnerability and threats of retaliation is likely to 
perpetuate basic animosities and security concerns, and 
prohibit the development of the more positive relations 
necessary for a genuinely stable U.S.-Russian strategic 
relationship. Arms reductions alone cannot accomplish this 
goal. By easing concerns about possible non-compliance and 
third party ballistic missile threats, national missile 
defenses can help provide the confidence necessary to move 
toward deeper offensive reductions.

NMD deployment policy

    Although there are a number of controversial issues 
associated with NMD policy, none has generated as much debate 
in recent years as the requirement to deploy an NMD system by a 
date certain. The Administration's opposition to S. 7 is 
primarily based on its opposition to establishing a deployment 
policy at the current time. The committee, however, has long 
favored an NMD approach in which a target date for deployment 
is specified in law. As cited above, in 1991, the committee 
endorsed a goal of 1996 for initial operational capability of a 
limited NMD system as part of the Missile Defense Act of 1991. 
During the committee's markup of the Defense Authorization Bill 
for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, the committee adopted the 
Missile Defense Act of 1991 by a vote of 16 to 4. During the 
Senate's consideration of the FY92-93 Defense Authorization 
Bill, an amendment to strike the 1996 IOC date from the Missile 
Defense Act of 1991 was defeated by the Senate on a roll call 
vote of 64 to 34. During the debate on that amendment, the 
Chairman of the committee, Senator Nunn, stated clearly the 
rationale for setting a specific deployment date:

          In 1961, it was important that President Kennedy 
        declared the goal of landing a man on the moon. But he 
        did not just say people of America, ``I hope one day 
wewill land a man on the moon.'' He set a date. He was not absolutely 
certain we were going to meet that date. He could not tell whether 
every rocket was going to be built on time or whether all the programs 
were going to work. He hoped it would. But having that date made an 
enormous amount of difference in the whole program, and of course it 
turned out the date was met.
          Without having a date, without having a timeframe, it 
        is very unlikely we would have ever gotten to the moon 
        by 1970. We have set a target date in this goal, in the 
        architecture we have set forth here, of 1996, as the 
        Senator observed. That does not guarantee we can meet 
        that timeframe.
          But it is important we have an initial operational 
        capability goal.

    The majority on the committee continue to agree with the 
former Chairman of the committee, Senator Nunn, and believe 
that it is important to specify an initial operational 
capability date for an NMD system in order to provide focus and 
establish a sense of priority and urgency. The Department of 
Defense has continued to underfund the NMD program and has 
failed to establish the organizational arrangements that would 
get the NMD program moving in the right direction at the right 
speed. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
Administration does not even take its own ``three-plus-three'' 
program seriously. Indeed, the Director of the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Organization has testified that the NMD program 
is ``extremely high risk,'' largely due to insufficient funding 
in the budget for robust testing and other risk reduction 
measures.
    The majority does not accept the argument that providing a 
legislative mandate to deploy by a date certain will force DOD 
to prematurely lock the United States into a technological 
solution. The policy specified in S. 7 would not freeze NMD 
technology options any more than the administration's ``three-
plus-three'' NMD program, which is also supposed to preserve 
the option of deployment by 2003. DOD routinely deploys systems 
even though the necessary technologies and components continue 
to evolve. To do otherwise would mean never deploying at all. 
In the area of theater missile defense, the DOD has embraced a 
concept known as ``user operational evaluation system'' or UOES 
to permit fielding of initial capability without hindering the 
evolution of technology or getting into a self-perpetuating 
cycle of waiting for the ``perfect'' solution. With regard to 
NMD, the U.S. is already pursuing a clear development path, but 
with insufficient vigor. Establishing a deployment policy would 
provide necessary focus but would not undermine programmatic 
flexibility or technology options.
    The committee also rejects the argument that a deployment 
decision would force deployment of a system even if it is 
technologically deficient. There are numerous laws and 
regulations to ensure that the United States does not deploy 
asystem that is not ready for deployment. Without a deployment policy, 
however, the chances of attaining a state of readiness which would 
permit deployment are decreased.
    The committee believes that the technology needed to deploy 
an NMD system by 2003 is within reach. The fundamental 
technologies are well understood and virtually in hand. There 
remains, however, a significant engineering and systems 
integration challenge. A robust testing program will be 
necessary to meet the stated date, but this is a matter of 
relative resource allocation priorities rather than basic 
science.

Arms control considerations

    The committee does not review NMD deployments as 
inconsistent with arms control agreements or the maintenance of 
strategic stability. The United States has seen fit to update 
our offensive posture and associated arms control agreements 
repeatedly since 1972 when the first Strategic Arms Limitations 
Talks occurred. During that same time, only one defensive arms 
control agreement has been reached. The committee believes that 
the United States should pursue, with an appropriate sense of 
priority, ways to update our strategic defensive posture and 
associated arms control agreements to allow for expanded 
defensive deployments.
    The majority rejects the argument that deployment of an NMD 
system will undermine offensive arms control or stability. 
Russia has maintained an operational ABM system for many years 
and the United States has not viewed it as a threat to 
deterrence or arms control. During the early 1990s, the 
Russians themselves made clear that they did not view expanded 
deployments of national missile defenses as a threat to arms 
control or deterrence. President Yeltsin even proposed that the 
United States and Russia cooperate in the development of a 
global defense system. Rather than exploring these innovative 
proposals, the current administration, in 1993, opted to 
terminate the ongoing negotiations that were intended to find 
ways to allow for expanded NMD deployments. As long as the 
Administration maintains that NMD is destabilizing and a threat 
to arms control, the Russians will have no incentive to explore 
ways to update the ABM Treaty.
    Nothing in S. 7 requires the United States to undertake any 
action that would violate the ABM Treaty. At the same time, S. 
7 does encourage the President to enter into negotiations with 
the Russian Federation to amend the ABM Treaty to allow for NMD 
deployments that exceed current treaty limitations. The 
committee notes that many of the concepts that the 
Administration is exploring also require such amendments.

Summary

    S. 7 provides a careful balance between competing interests 
regarding NMD policy. It embodies many compromises that have 
been developed over the last several years to deal with 
concerns regarding cost, arms control, and the role of the 
Executive Branch. The committee recommends passage of this 
legislation.

                      departmental recommendations

    By letter dated April 23, 1997, the General Counsel of the 
Department of Defense provided the committee with the 
Administration's position on S. 7. The General Counsel's letter 
is shown below.

                             General Counsel of the
                                     Department of Defense,
                                    Washington, DC, April 23, 1997.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your request for 
the views of the Department of Defense on S. 7, 105th Congress, 
a bill ``To establish a United States policy for a national 
missile defense system, and for other purposes.''
    The Department of Defense objects to this legislation 
because it would commit the United States to a deployment 
decision today of a national missile defense (NMD) system. We 
consider that a better use of defense dollars is our current 
plan--to develop a system over the next three years, and deploy 
it (or an improved variant) when and if a threat emerges. If we 
do otherwise, it will divert resources that our military needs 
for other priorities, and result in a less effective defense 
when and if a threat does emerge. The Department has the 
correct and prudent overall ballistic missile defense program: 
one that positions us to deploy a defense of the United States 
when a threat emerges and that gives priority to deploying 
theater missile defenses against a threat that is here and now.
    The Department agrees with the bill's premise that the 
United States must be prepared to defend against potential 
rogue missile threats. Furthermore, the Department's ``3-plus-
3'' Deployment Readiness Program positions us to deploy a 
national missile defense by 2003, just as S. 7 would. Our 
program develops national missile defense technology for three 
years--the minimum time needed to develop a workable defense--
after which the United States can make a decision to deploy a 
system by 2003 if warranted by the threat. The crucial 
difference is the timing of the deployment decision. Mandating 
an NMD deployment decision now would divert vital defense funds 
from other more pressing needs, including Service modernization 
requirements that the Chairman and the other members of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff have highlighted as priorities to meet 
today's threats.
    If we determine that deployment of an NMD system requires 
modifications to the ABM Treaty, it is our intention to engage 
Russia and seek agreement on them. However, by mandating 
deployment and a one-year deadline in which to achieve 
negotiated changes to the ABM Treaty, S. 7 could be interpreted 
by the Russians as putting the United States on a path toward 
abrogating the ABM Treaty, thus putting at risk continued 
Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian 
ratification of START II. These two treaties together will 
reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear 
warheads by two-thirds from Cold War levels, significantly 
lowering the threat to U.S. national security. It would be 
imprudent to jeopardize these reductions by making a decision 
today to deploy an NMD system when not warranted by the threat.
    The Intelligence Community has concluded that a long-range 
ballistic missile threat to the United States from a rogue 
nation is unlikely to emerge within the next 14 years, but 
could be accelerated if those nations acquired this capability 
from beyond their borders. However, the Department is not 
complacent about this assessment. That is why the NMD program 
the Department is pursuing is designed to field as early as 
2003--well ahead of the intelligence community estimates--a 
system able to deal with such threats. By mandating an NMD 
deployment decision now, the bill would force the Department to 
commit prematurely to a technological option that may be 
outdated when the threat emerges.
    Finally, the Department notes that it currently is 
considering our ballistic missile defense program in the 
Quadrennial Defense Review. It is possible that the results of 
the review could change in some manner our approach to National 
Missile Defense. We will promptly notify you if there are any 
changes to the foregoing positions.
    The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the 
standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no 
objection to the presentation of this report for the 
consideration of the committee.
            Sincerely,
                                                  Judith A. Miller.

                            committee action

    In accordance with the Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1946, as amended by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 
there is set forth below the committee vote to report the 
National Missile Defense Act of 1997 (S. 7).
    In favor: Senators Thurmond, Warner, McCain, Coats, Smith, 
Kempthorne, Inhofe, Santorum, Snowe, and Roberts.
    Opposed: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Glenn, Byrd, 
Robb, Lieberman, and Cleland.
    The other roll call votes on amendments to the bill which 
were considered during the course of the mark-up have been made 
public and are available at the committee.

               congressional budget office cost estimate

    By letter dated April 24, 1997, the Congressional Budget 
Office stated that it cannot provide a cost estimate for S. 7 
because that estimate would have to be classified. The letter 
from the Congressional Budget Office is shown below.

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                    Washington, DC, April 24, 1997.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office cannot 
provide a cost estimate for S. 7, the National Missile Defense 
Act of 1997, as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services on April 24, 1997, because that estimate would 
have to be classified. Section 7 of the bill would define a 
limited ballistic missile attack by reference to a classified 
document issued by the United States Space Command. A CBO cost 
estimate would likely provide enough information to reveal how 
that document defines such an attack, a definition that we must 
presume is classified. Preparing a classified estimate would be 
inconsistent with CBO's procedures for the review and 
distribution of its products.
    If you have any questions on this matter, we will be 
pleased to answer them. The CBO staff contact is Michael A. 
Miller.
            Sincerely,
                                         June E. O'Neill, Director.

                           regulatory impact

    Paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate requires that a report on the regulatory impact of a 
bill be included in the report on the bill. The committee finds 
that there is no regulatory impact in the cost of S. 7.

                        changes in existing law

    S. 7 does not include any changes in existing law.
MINORITY VIEWS OF MESSRS. LEVIN, KENNEDY, BINGAMAN, GLENN, BYRD, ROBB, 
                         LIEBERMAN, AND CLELAND

    We cannot support S. 7, the National Missile Defense Act of 
1997, as it has been reported to the Senate by the Armed 
Services Committee. In our view, this legislation commits the 
United States to deploy a national missile defense system by 
2003 before we know the cost of such a system; before we know 
whether the system would work effectively; and before we know 
whether deployment of such a system would jeopardize our 
current and future nuclear arms reductions, or what the nature 
of the threat will be at the time of deployment.
    The Department of Defense shares our view that S. 7 
represents an unwise approach to national missile defense. As 
outlined in this letter of April 23 to the Committee, the 
Defense Department's opposition to S. 7 is based on several 
considerations. By mandating now a national missile defense 
deployment in 2003, S. 7 would result in a very limited and 
possibly outdated capacity if and when deployment is warranted, 
or indeed, could lead to deployment of a system that is not 
operationally effective, and would in the meantime divert 
resources from more pressing modernization priorities for our 
military forces. In DOD's view, S. 7 also could jeopardize 
historic nuclear weapons reductions that enhance our security 
by threatening unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty.
    The Defense Department letter states its case clearly:

          The Department of Defense objects to this legislation 
        because it would commit the United States to a 
        deployment decision today of a national missile defense 
        (NMD) system. We consider that a better use of defense 
        dollars is our current plan--to develop a system over 
        the next three years, and deploy it (or an improved 
        variant) when and if a threat emerges. If we do 
        otherwise, it will divert resources that our military 
        needs for other priorities, and result in a less 
        effective defense when and if a threat does emerge.

               resource diversion from higher priorities

    We agree with the Defense Department's view that the 
deployment commitment required by S. 7 would harm the 
modernization programs that our military believes are the 
highest priority: ``Mandating an NMD deployment decision now 
would divert vital defense funds from other more pressing 
needs, including service modernization requirements that the 
Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have 
highlighted as priorities to meet today's threats.'' Given the 
strong congressional consensus that modernization of our 
military forces is a top priority, diverting funds from 
modernization would be inconsistent with the need for continued 
modernization.

                 System Effectiveness and Schedule Risk

    We support continued development of a national missile 
defense system. By mandating in law today the deployment of a 
national missile defense system by 2003, however, we run the 
risk of procuring or deploying a system that would not work, 
and that might end up as an acquisition nightmare. We believe 
that when it comes to systems as important as missile defense, 
we have to follow the practice of ``fly before we buy.''
    Gen. Howell Estes, Commander in Chief of North American 
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) who is responsible for 
defending the U.S. against ballistic missile attack, testified 
to the Committee on March 13, 1997: ``From my perspective as 
CINCNORAD, it is vitally important that any ballistic missile 
defense system we ultimately deploy must be effective. * * * 
Finally, let me reemphasize that the Administration 3+3 program 
will enable us to deploy an NMD system in time to field a 
missile defense system before the threat places our citizens at 
risk.''
    Last year, Lieutenant General Malcolm O'Neill, then-
Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 
responded to a question for the record about the need to deploy 
a system only when the technology proved ready:

          Question. Would you advocate deploying a missile 
        defense system to meet an arbitrary deadline if the 
        technology is not mature or ready, and the system would 
        not work well?
          Answer. No. Clearly I would not advocate deploying a 
        missile defense system to meet an arbitrary deadline if 
        the technology was not mature resulting in a system 
        with poor or no performance. The NMD Deployment 
        Readiness Program is specifically tailored to prevent 
        this approach. The deployment decision is keyed to the 
        detection of a threat to the United States and not to 
        an arbitrary deadline. * * * If the threat did not 
        warrant deployment or if an acceptable level of 
        performance is not achievable, additional development 
        would be performed.

    In the course of the Committee's hearings this year, senior 
defense civilian and military witnesses have made clear that 
the current ``3+3'' NMD Deployment Readiness program has a high 
risk schedule, and that additional time for development will 
provide additional capability when the threat emerges.
    In his testimony before the Committee on February 12, 
Defense Secretary Cohen stated that the Department's ballistic 
missile defense (BMD) program ``is proceeding as rapidly as is 
technologically sound.''
    In a March 28 report to the Committee on the establishment 
of the new NMD Joint Program Office, Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition and Technology) Paul Kaminski commented that the 
``3 plus 3'' program has an ``extremely aggressive time 
constraint. * * * Mostexperts familiar with the program judged 
this schedule as extremely high risk.''
    General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, testified to the Committee earlier this year: ``The NMD 
Deployment Readiness Program optimizes the potential for an 
effective National Missile Defense system. If the decision is 
made to deploy an NMD system in the near-term, then the system 
fielded would provide a very limited capability. If deploying a 
system in the near-term can be avoided, DOD can continue to 
enhance the technology base and the commensurate capability of 
the NMD program system that could be fielded on a later 
deployment schedule. The objective here is to be in a position 
to be three years away from deployment, so America can respond 
to the emergence of a threat. This approach fields the most 
effective capability that is available at the time the threat 
emerges.''
    Lieutenant General Lester Lyles, Director of the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) which is responsible for 
managing all BMD programs, including national missile defense, 
testified before the Committee: ``I would characterize the ``3 
plus 3'' NMD as very high risk.'' * * * I want to reemphasize 
that I fully support the ``3 plus 3'' NMD strategy--it makes 
sense. The schedule, however, is very tough * * *'' He further 
stated that ``While the `3 plus 3' program approach remains an 
absolutely valid strategy, recent events have highlighted the 
fragility of the program schedule,'' and acknowledged the 
``very high level of schedule risk associated with the NMD 
program.''

                           threat assessment

    One of the key issues regarding any NMD deployment decision 
is an assessment of the threat to be countered by such an NMD 
system. If there is not a threat sufficient to warrant early 
deployment of an NMD system before its technology is fully 
developed, the U.S. can continue to develop the NMD technology 
so that the capability of the system continues to improve. This 
is the current DOD plan, which we believe makes sense.
    On a general level, the issue of ballistic missile threat 
should be placed in a broader context of other threats to our 
security, and measured both in terms of likelihood and severity 
of the consequences. Only in that context can Congress make 
judgments about the allocation of limited resources to counter 
the most likely threats. For example, if the threat of 
terrorism, including the terrorist use of weapons of mass 
destruction, is more likely than a ballistic missile attack 
against the U.S., then logically we should devote greater 
resources to countering terrorism. This framework is missing 
from the current NMD debate.
    There are currently two concerns related to ballistic 
missile attacks against the U.S. The first is from accidental 
or unauthorized launches of Russian or Chinese ballistic 
missiles. As the Committee has heard in testimony over the past 
few years, the intelligence community assesses such a threat to 
be ``remote.'' Additionally, the U.S. and Russia have 
``detargeted'' their long-range nuclear ballistic missiles, so 
that even if there were an accidental launch, themissile would 
not strike each other's territory.
    Furthermore, General Eugene Habiger, Commander in Chief of 
the U.S. Strategic Command, testified before the Committee this 
year that, after carefully reviewing Russian nuclear force 
command and control procedures with his Russian counterparts, 
he is very confident in Russia's ability to prevent either 
accidental or unauthorized launches. In comparing U.S. and 
Russian command and control of nuclear forces, Gen. Habiger 
stated ``I have the same, if not a greater, comfort factor with 
the command and control procedures in place in Russia.'' He 
told the Committee that he finds it hard even to imagine a 
circumstance which could lead to an unauthorized launch.
    The second concern relates to so-called ``rogue'' nations 
acquiring a long-range nuclear ballistic missile capability 
against the U.S. This would be very serious because some 
nations are believed to be willing to use such weapons, even in 
the face of prompt, certain and utterly devastating retaliation 
by the U.S. The intelligence community testified to the 
Committee this year that the only nation actually trying to 
develop such a capability is North Korea. However, the economic 
crisis in that state leads the Defense Intelligence Agency to 
conclude that North Korea is ``probably terminal'' as a nation, 
thus casting doubt on its ability to develop a missile capable 
of striking any part of the U.S. in the near term.
    In its April 23 letter, the Department discussed its view 
of the relationship between threat and NMD deployment:

          The Intelligence Community has concluded that a long-
        range ballistic missile threat to the United States 
        from a rogue nation is unlikely to emerge within the 
        next 14 years, but could be accelerated if those 
        nations acquired this capability from beyond their 
        borders. However, the Department is not complacent 
        about this assessment. That is why the NMD program the 
        Department is pursuing is designed to field as early as 
        2003--well ahead of the Intelligence Community 
        estimates--a system able to deal with such threats. By 
        mandating an NMD deployment decision now, the bill 
        would force the Department to commit prematurely to a 
        technological option that may be outdated when the 
        threat emerges.

    It is important that prior to any decision to deploy an NMD 
system, Congress and the administration assess whether there is 
a threat that warrants deployment of available technology. If 
not, it would be wiser to continue developing the capability 
for more effective defense technology for possible future 
deployment if and when a threat does emerge.

                         Arms Control Concerns

    S. 7 suggests the strong possibility that the system to be 
deployed might violate or conflict with the ABM Treaty, but 
commits us to deployment regardless. The Department's letter on 
S. 7 states that ``by mandating deployment and a one-year 
deadline in which toachieve negotiated changes to the ABM 
Treaty, S. 7 could be interpreted by the Russians as putting the United 
States on a path toward abrogating the ABM Treaty, thus putting at risk 
continued Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian 
ratification of START I Treaty and Russian ratification of START II. 
These two treaties together will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian 
strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds from Cold War levels, 
significantly lowering the threat to U.S. national security. It would 
be imprudent to jeopardize these reductions by making a deployment 
decision today to deploy an NMD system when not warranted by the 
threat.''
    It was very clear from the Helsinki summit meeting between 
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, where the U.S. and Russia 
agreed to a framework for further reductions in nuclear 
arsenals below the START II levels, that both the United States 
and Russia believe that continued adherence to the ABM Treaty 
is a cornerstone of strategic stability, and permits continued 
and further nuclear weapons reductions that serve our strongest 
national interests. The first paragraph of their Helsinki joint 
statement on the ABM Treaty reads as follows:

          President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing 
        their commitment to strengthening strategic stability 
        and international security, emphasizing the importance 
        of further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and 
        recognizing the fundamental significance of the Anti-
        Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for these objectives as 
        well as the necessity for effective theater missile 
        defense (TMD) systems, consider it their common task to 
        preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, 
        and enhance its viability.

    S. 7 acknowledges that it is important to maintain 
strategic stability. All of us would strongly agree with that 
goal. But S. 7 also contains provisions which would well 
undermine this very stability and jeopardize the continuing and 
planned reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. As 
General Shalikashvili wrote in a letter to Senator Nunn last 
May: ``The current National Missile Defense Deployment 
Readiness Program (NDRP), which is consistent with the ABM 
Treaty, will help provide stability in our strategic 
relationship with Russia as well as reducing future risks from 
rogue countries.''
    S. 7 requires the Secretary of Defense to report on the 
point at which any activity required by the bill would conflict 
with the terms of the ABM Treaty. It urges the President to 
negotiate, ``if necessary'' an agreement to amend the ABM 
Treaty to ``allow deployment'' of the NMD system called for in 
the bill. Then, notwithstanding the ``if necessary'' caveat, S. 
7 requires that, if there is no agreement with Russia within 
one year on amending the ABM Treaty, the President shall 
consult with Congress and consider withdrawing from the ABM 
Treaty.
    S. 7 commits the U.S. now to deploy an NMD system in 2003 
without first determining whether such a deployment would be in 
conflict with the ABM Treaty, and regardless of whether there 
is a conflict. This bill sends a signal that the U.S. is on a 
collision course with the ABM Treaty--hardly the signal we 
should send if we want to maintain the strategic stability 
advocated in S. 7 and continue reductions of Russian and U.S. 
nuclear weapons.

                          minority amendments

    We offered two amendments in Committee that would address 
some of these concerns. The first amendment would have allowed 
for continued robust development of an NMD system but would 
have removed the requirement for a mandated deployment by the 
year 2003. It would also have required Congressional review, 
prior to any decision to deploy, of the threat to be countered, 
the cost and operational effectiveness of the system, and the 
impact on nuclear weapons reductions. This is the same 
provision that was at the core of the bipartisan compromise 
that was negotiated by Senators Nunn, Levin, Warner and Cohen 
two years ago during the debate on the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996. The Senate voted for 
that compromise by a large bipartisan margin of 85-13.
    The second amendment would have required that the NMD 
system developed under this bill would be managed as a major 
defense acquisition program, and would have established a ``fly 
before you buy'' policy for the NMD system mandated by S. 7. We 
should be sure the system works before we deploy it, especially 
given the numerous comments by senior defense and military 
officials about the very high risk of the current NMD program 
schedule.
    Unfortunately, both these amendments failed on votes of 10-
8.

                            no cost estimate

    Finally, we are concerned there is no cost estimate 
accompanying S. 7. In an April 24 letter to the Committee, the 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) explained 
that CBO cannot provide a cost estimate to S. 7 because the 
bill defines a limited ballistic missile attach by reference to 
a classified document issued by the United States Space 
Command: ``The Congressional Budget Office cannot provide a 
cost estimate for S. 7, the National Missile Defense Act of 
1997, as ordered reported by the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on April 24, 1997, because that estimate would have 
to be classified. * * * Preparing a classified estimate would 
be inconsistent with CBO's procedures for the review and 
distribution of its products.''
    This is an unacceptable situation. It is essential that the 
Senate have a clear understanding of the cost of the system 
required in S. 7 prior to considering this legislation. Last 
year, the cost of a proposed national missile defense system 
required by S. 1635, the ``Defense America Act of 1996'', was 
estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to be as high as 
$175 billion, including acquisition and operating costs over 
the life of the system. This very high cost was one reason the 
bill was not considered by Congress.
    The cost of implementing S. 7 would surely be greater than 
the cost of the current funding plan for the Administration's 
``3+3'' National Missiles Defense Deployment Readiness Program. 
The Department makes clear in their April 23 letter that S. 7 
would require diverting resources from other, higher priority 
modernization programs. But we do not know how much additional 
funding would be required for S. 7. Clearly, the Senate cannot 
adequately consider this bill without a thorough understanding 
of the cost to deploy the national missile defense system 
mandated by this legislation.
    For all these reasons, we cannot support S. 7, and we 
recommend that the full Senate not support it either. As our 
senior defense and military leaders have clearly stated, the 
current ``3 plus 3'' program is a prudent course to address the 
problem of emerging ballistic missile threats to the U.S.
    The issue of national missile defense has been very 
controversial in recent years. We anticipate that there will be 
a thorough and vigorous debate when S. 7 is brought to the 
floor of the Senate. We stand ready to work towards the same 
kind of bipartisan compromise on this issue that received 
overwhelming endorsement in the Senate just two years ago.

                                   Carl Levin.
                                   Jeff Bingaman.
                                   Robert C. Byrd.
                                   J. Lieberman.
                                   Ted Kennedy.
                                   John Glenn.
                                   Chuck Robb.
                                   Max Cleland.
              ADDITIONAL MINORITY VIEWS OF SEN. JOHN GLENN

    I am concerned that this Committee, on the grounds of a 
badly divided, partisan vote, some dubious assumptions of 
technological sufficiency, and an erroneous claim about my own 
voting record on missile defense, is now endorsing a measure to 
force the President to deploy a National Missile Defense by the 
year 2003, willy nilly.
    First, on a matter of such significance for the nation--
both for its defense and its treasury--I would have hoped that 
there would have been a good faith attempt to reach a 
constructive compromise on language concerning the future NMD 
program. Instead, the measure was summarily dispatched in a 
series of straight party votes. If the amendments offered by my 
colleagues Senators Levin and Bingaman were in some measure 
objectionable, the option of at least entertaining some 
alternative wording might have been considered. The measured 
and prudent language of those amendments was peremptorily 
dismissed without even a brief attempt at reaching some 
compromise language, not to mention engaging in a reasonable 
debate.
    Second, I have serious concerns that the Majority appears 
to be proceeding on the basis of the twin assumptions that all 
of the key technological challenges have been resolved in 
dealing with these various missile defense systems and that all 
that remains to be done is to iron out a few engineering and 
software problems. I strongly believe that the subcommittee is 
turning a blind eye to the high level of risk associated with 
the obligation to deploy NMD by 2003, a risk that arises in no 
small measure from persisting technological uncertainties. The 
Committee's approach effectively amounts to just throwing money 
at the problem, while imposing an unrealistic and controversial 
deadline that will only invite a presidential veto, a veto 
which I would regard as well justified.
    Since the Committee's hearing, I reviewed some recent open 
testimony by key BMD program officials. Here is what they have 
testified:
    ``I think it is equally important that we recognize the 
challenges we still face in developing and fielding ballistic 
missile defenses--in many cases this really is `rocket science' 
.''--Lt. Gen. Lester L. Lyles, Director, BMDO, testimony before 
House Appropriations Committee on FY 98 National Security 
Appropriations, 4/16/97.
    ``While the `3 plus 3' program approach remains an 
absolutely valid strategy, recent events have highlighted the 
very high risk associated with the program schedule * * * The 
most significant risk to the program is the recent failure of 
the EKV seeker flight test where BMDO and the Army attempted 
the first test of the GBI EKV sensor * * * The problem has been 
traced to a human procedural error and corrective procedures 
have been implemented * * * This simple human procedural error 
clearly highlights the very high level of schedule risk 
associated with the NMBD program. * * * It is also important to 
note that since we have not yet demonstrated EKV seeker 
performance, we still have high technical risk associated with 
the EKV seekers.''--Lt. Gen. Lester L. Lyles, Director, BMDO, 
testimony before House Appropriations Committee on FY 98 
National Security Appropriations, 4/16/97.
    ``The Department has accelerated the schedule for an EMD 
phase of SBIRS-Low (SMTS), which results in a first launch in 
Fiscal Year 2004.''--Lt. Gen. Lester L. Lyles, Director, BMDO, 
testimony before House Appropriations Committee on FY 98 
National Security Appropriations, 4/16/97.
    ``My twenty eight years of research, development and 
acquisition experience tells me that we have our challenges and 
some aspects of the program are relatively high-risk, but I am 
reminded that nothing worthwhile is ever easy.''--Lt. Gen. 
Lester L. Lyles, Director, BMDO, testimony before House 
Appropriations Committee on FY 98 National Security 
Appropriations, 4/16/97.
    ``Our inability to establish the management team, embark on 
our acquisition strategy by establishing a primecontractor, and 
most significantly the recent failure of the EKV seeker flight test 
together have left us well `behind the power curve' in executing the 
program.''--Lt. Gen. Lester L. Lyles, Director, BMDO, testimony before 
Senate Appropriations Committee, 3/12/97.
    ``These risk-reduction satellites will serve as a `bridge' 
to a fully operational SBIRS-Low (SMTS) early in the next 
decade. The Department has accelerated the schedule for an EMD 
phase of SBIRS-Low (SMTS), which results in a first launch in 
Fiscal Year 2004.''--Lt. Gen. Lester L. Lyles, Director, BMDO, 
testimony before Senate Appropriations Committee, 3/12/97.
    ``THAAD is the most mature upper-tier system * * * Recent 
testing difficulties have led to the slip of this [THAAD UOES 
(User Operational Evaluation System)] capability from the 
fourth quarter of FY 1998 to the second quarter of FY 1999. We 
still have a significant system engineering challenge. The fact 
that recent THAAD flights have not met all their objectives, 
stretching out testing and delaying the start of EMD by over 
fifteen months, illustrates the difficulty of this task. If the 
seventh THAAD test, scheduled for early March, is not 
successful, it will be necessary to reevaluate the program's 
schedule and content.''--Paul Kaminski, testimony before House 
National Security Committee, 3/6/97.
    ``The Navy Theater Wide system is less mature than the 
THAAD system. We restructured this program in 1996 and made it 
a pre-MDAP program and decided to proceed with concept 
definition and a technical demonstration. We have reevaluated 
this program and have added about $220 million to it over the 
FY 1998 FYDP. This will lower the risk for the flight 
demonstration and accelerate the initial intercept test to 
first quarter fiscal year 2000 * * * This program responds to 
the need to proceed at the fastest prudent pace as the threat 
emerges, the lack of maturity of the technology, and the need 
to further develop the system concept to enhance robustness. 
There is also the opportunity to apply technology being 
developed for national missile defense to the NTW system. 
Likely areas of technology synergy include advanced sensors, 
guidance, and propulsion. Like other TBMD programs at this 
stage, the program faces significant technology as well as 
engineering challenges. In particular, since the LEAP kinetic 
kill vehicle is not yet mature, we need to better understand 
alternatives before committing to full-scale development.''--
Paul Kaminski, testimony before House National Security 
Committee, 3/6/97.
    ``It does not make sense to make a deployment decision in 
advance of the threat, because we would be making investments 
prematurely, resulting in a system that would be less capable 
when it is really needed. In the absence of a threat, it is 
more sensible to continue to enhance the capability of the 
system that could be deployed when it is needed. This approach 
fields the most cost effective capability that is available at 
the time the threat emerges.''--Paul Kaminski, testimony before 
House National Security Committee, 3/6/97.
    ``Air Force is funding development of the Space Based 
Infrared System (SBIRS) low earth orbit (SBIRS-Low) * * * have 
added $509 million to the FY 1998 FYDP to accelerate the 
schedule for an EMD phase of the program, with a first launch 
in FY04. This will bring the initial operating capability (IOC) 
for a mixed high/low SBIRS program on-line two years earlier 
than previously planned, in approximately FY06. This plan is 
supported by both the Defense Science Board and the GAO, which 
found the FY04 initial launch date for the SBIRs-Low 
`technically prudent' ''--Paul Kaminski, testimony before House 
National Security Committee, 3/6/97.
    ``With respect to the impact of the ABM Treaty on our 
national missile defense (NMD) program, DoD is considering 
various proposals for systems that would provide a limited 
defense of the entire United States against intercontinental 
range, or strategic, ballistic missiles. Systems to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles are considered ABM systems, and 
thus various provisions of the ABM Treaty would have to be 
considered. DoD will make formal ABM Treaty compliance 
assessments of the proposed systems as necessary once 
theirdesigns have matured to a point where this is possible.''--Paul 
Kaminski, testimony before House National Security Committee, 3/6/97.
    ``As you all know, we are building highly sophisticated 
sensor and interceptor systems that utilize state-of-the-art 
technologies. In most cases, we are the program pushing the 
envelope of those technologies.''--Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, 
Director of BMDO, testimony before Senate Armed Services 
Committee, 2/27/97.
    ``I would characterize the `3 plus 3' NMD program as very 
high risk * * * The schedule * * * is very tough and I will 
rely on industry, the Services and my staff to identify and 
assess the program's technical and schedule risks.''--Lt. Gen. 
Lester Lyles, Director BMDO, testimony before Senate Armed 
Services Committee, 2/27/97.
    ``We made a conscious decision to keep the UOES [User 
Operational Evaluation System] portion of the program on track, 
but we restructured the rest of the program for the objective 
THAAD system. During the review, we confirmed it was not 
likely, due to the extent of system engineering risk in the 
program, that we could achieve a THAAD first unit equipped 
until fiscal year 2003 or 2002 at the very earliest * * * The 
UOES+ program will militarize the UOPS design and upgrade 
certain components, such as the infrared seeker, the radar, and 
the BM/C3. Our current schedule for this program is to begin 
LRIP [Low-Rate Initial Production] in fiscal year 2003, with a 
FUE [First Unit Equipped] in fiscal year 2006. However, we are 
currently considering whether we might be able to afford some 
recovery of the FUE date, perhaps to 2004. We still have a 
significant system engineering challenge; the fact that recent 
THAAD flights did not meet all of their objectives, stretching 
out testing and delaying the start of EMD [engineering and 
manufacturing development] by four months, illustrates the 
difficulty of this task.''--Paul Kaminski, testimony before 
House National Security Committee, 9/27/96.
    ``The Navy Theater Wide system is less mature than the 
THAAD system. Prior to the review, we were proposing funding 
this program in our fiscal year 1996 and 1997 budgets at a low 
level ($30 million per year) to mature the key enabling 
technologies. We have restructured this program to begin 
technology demonstration and concept definition this fiscal 
year, adding about $570 million through the FYDP * * * This 
structured program responds to the need to proceed at a prudent 
pace as the threat emerges, the lack of maturity and the 
technology, and the need to further develop the system concept 
to enhance robustness * * * The program faces significant 
technology as well as engineering challenges. In particular, 
since the lead kinetic kill vehicle is not yet mature, we need 
to better understand kill vehicle alternatives before 
committing to full-scale development. A Lethality Improvement 
Program has been initiated to evolve the kill vehicle to a 
robust capability.''--Paul Kiminski, testimony before House 
National Security Committee, 9/27/96.
    ``If the decision is made to deploy an NMD system in the 
near term, then the system we could field in 2003 would provide 
a very limited capability. If we can avoid deploying a system 
in the near term, we will continue to enhance the technology 
base and the commensurate capability of the NMD system that 
could be fielded on a later deployment schedule.''--Paul 
Kiminski, testimony before House National Security Committee, 
9/27/96.
    If comments such as those above fail to resonate in the 
Committee or to be reflected in moderation of the relevant 
legislation, I can only wonder why we bother even having 
hearings at all on this subject.
    At the risk of overdoing my quotes, I would like to commend 
to the Committee's attention a passage from a recent report 
from the General Accounting Office identifying our government's 
key ``high-risk'' programs. I think GAO's concerns are quite 
germane to the deliberations of this Committee on missile 
defense issues:
    ``We noted [in 1992 and 1995] that one common 
characteristic of high-risk strategies is the acquisition of 
weapons based on optimistic assumptions about the maturity and 
availability of enabling technologies. * * * We also reported 
in 1992 and 1995 on the high-risk practice of beginning 
production of a weapon system before development, testing, and 
evaluation are complete. When a highly concurrent strategy is 
used, critical decisions are made without adequate information 
about a weapon's demonstrated operational effectiveness, 
reliability, logistic supportability, and readiness for 
production. Also, rushing into production before critical tests 
have been successfully completed has resulted in the purchase 
of systems that do not perform as intended * * * Nevertheless, 
DOD still begins production of many major and nonmajor weapons 
without first ensuring that the systems will meet critical 
performance requirements. * * * [for example] The Army plans to 
commit funds for producing 40 early prototype interceptors of 
the Theater High Altitude Area Defense System well before 
testing provides assurance of the system's capabilities, even 
though the program has already experienced significant cost, 
schedule, and technical performance problems.''--GAO, High-Risk 
Series: Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition, GAO/HR-97-6, 
February 1997, p. 21, 24.
    My third concern arises from a claim made by a member of 
the Majority that I voted in favor of Committee proposal in 
1991 to require the deployment of NMD by 1996. I presume my 
colleague was referring to the relevant NMD deployment language 
in the Senate bill (S. 1507) for the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. My staff 
reviewed the Committee's roll call vote for that specific 
measure and found that I voted (along with Senators Gore, 
Levin, and Kennedy) in opposition to that 1996 deployment 
proposal. The vote was 16-4 in favor.
    It is also noteworthy that the enacted law (PL 102-190) did 
not contain any unconditional obligation to deploy an NMD by 
1996. The law required that ``The Secretary of Defense shall 
develop for deployment by the earliest date allowed by the 
availability of appropriate technology or by fiscal year 1996 a 
cost-effective, operationally-effective, and ABM Treaty-
compliant anti-ballistic missile system at a single site as the 
initial step toward deployment of an anti-ballistic missile 
system * * * designed to protect the United States against 
limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental or 
unauthorized launches or Third World attacks.'' The law clearly 
called for development, but tied actual deployment of NMD both 
to the availability of the technology and to the satisfaction 
of several other additional conditions.
    Furthermore, sec. 240 had another interesting provision: 
``Nothing in this part may be construed to imply--(1) 
congressional authorization for development, testing, 
deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems in violation of 
the ABM Treaty, including any protocol or amendment to the 
treaty; or (2) final congressional authorization for deployment 
of anti-ballistic missile systems in compliance with the ABM 
Treaty.''
    I am less concerned about the error made in placing me in 
favor of a mandatory deployment date than I am about the 
omission of all of this other language from the current bill--
specifically the language about complying with (as opposed to 
explicit threats of withdrawing from) the ABM Treaty, and the 
caveats about the ``availability of appropriate technology'', 
cost effectiveness, and operational effectiveness. Perhaps if 
these specific legislative provisions had been incorporated 
into the current bill, S. 7 might well have obtained some 
greater support among the minority. Indeed, if this language 
had been inserted into S. 7 in place of the mandatory 
deployment date, there would have been no need or the Levin or 
Bingaman amendments.

                                
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