[Senate Report 105-118]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 231
105th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 105-118
_______________________________________________________________________
CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1997
_______
October 29, 1997.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Hatch, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany S. 53]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the
bill (S. 53) to require the general application of the
antitrust laws to major league baseball, and for other
purposes, having considered the same and amendments thereto,
reports favorably thereon, with an amendment in the nature of a
substitute, and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Purpose..........................................................2
II. Legislative history..............................................3
III. Vote of the Committee............................................5
IV. Section-by-section analysis......................................5
V. Cost estimate....................................................6
VI. Regulatory impact statement......................................8
VII. Minority views of Senators Grassley, Biden, Feinstein, and Durbin9
VIII.Changes in existing law.........................................11
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Curt Flood Act of 1997''.
SEC. 2. PURPOSE.
It is the purpose of this legislation to clarify that major league
baseball players are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that major
league players will have the same rights under the antitrust laws as do
other professional athletes, e.g., football and basketball players),
along with a provision that makes it clear that the passage of this Act
does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any other
context or with respect to any other person or entity.
SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the
end the following new section:
``Sec. 27. (a) The conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
in the business of organized professional major league baseball
relating to or affecting employment to play baseball at the major
league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the same extent such
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the
antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any other professional
sports business affecting interstate commerce; provided, however, that
nothing in this subsection shall be construed as providing the basis
for any negative inference regarding the caselaw concerning the
applicability of the antitrust laws to minor league baseball.
``(b) Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be
deemed to change the application of the antitrust laws to the conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements by, between, or among persons engaging
in, conducting, or participating in the business of organized
professional baseball, except the conduct, acts, practices, or
agreements to which subsection (a) of this section shall apply. More
specifically, but not by way of limitation, this section shall not be
deemed to change the application of the antitrust laws to:
``(1) the organized professional baseball amateur draft, the
reserve clause as applied to minor league players, the
agreement between organized professional major league baseball
teams and the teams of the National Association of Professional
Baseball Leagues, commonly known as the `Professional Baseball
Agreement', the relationship between organized professional
major league baseball and organized professional minor league
baseball, or any other matter relating to professional
organized baseball's minor leagues;
``(2) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
in the business of organized professional baseball relating to
franchise expansion, location or relocation, franchise
ownership issues, including ownership transfers, and the
relationship between the Office of the Commissioner and
franchise owners;
``(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements protected
by Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known
as the `Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961'); or
``(4) the relationship between persons in the business of
organized professional baseball and umpires or other
individuals who are employed in the business of organized
professional baseball by such persons.
``(c) As used in this section, `persons' means any individual,
partnership, corporation, or unincorporated association or any
combination or association thereof.''.
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of S. 53 is to clarify that major league
baseball players and owners have the same legal rights, and are
subject to the same restrictions, under the antitrust laws as
the players and owners in other professional sports leagues. As
the bill expressly provides, it is not intended to affect the
applicability or inapplicability of the antitrust laws in any
other manner or context.
As set forth in the S. Rept. 104-231, accompanying S. 627,
the ``Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995,'' a
bill that was reported out of the Judiciary Committee but not
enacted during the 104th Congress, the unfortunate baseball
strike of 1994-95 reemphasized the need for Congress to clarify
its intent to apply to professional baseball the same rules of
fair and open competition that are followed by all other
unregulated business enterprises in this country, including
other sports leagues. In short, other professional athletes and
similarly situated employees have alternatives to striking
specifically because of the antitrust laws.\1\ It is the
Committee's belief that the applicability of the antitrust laws
to major league baseball player-owner employment relations will
significantly reduce the likelihood of future baseball strikes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ As described in S. Rept. 104-231, the courts have developed a
``nonstatutory'' labor exemption from the antitrust laws. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996). Although courts and
academics have disagreed on the precise extent and scope of this
exemption, it is clear that, at some point, the nonstatutory labor
exemption ends and employees have a right to invoke the antitrust laws.
Like its predecessor S. 627, S. 53 is intended to clarify the
applicability of the antitrust laws in those contexts where the
nonstatutory labor exemption does not apply, and is not intended to
affect the scope or extent of that exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Introduction of S. 53
Many bills have been introduced over the decades addressing
the subject of baseball's antitrust exemption. During the 104th
Congress, this Committee reported out S. 627, a bill intended
to affirm that major league baseball's owners and players were
subject to the Nation's antitrust laws. This bill, however, was
not considered by the full Senate during the 104th Congress.
On January 21, 1997, Senators Hatch, Leahy, Thurmond, and
Moynihan introduced S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of 1997, which
was virtually identical to S. 627 from the 104th Congress. On
June 17, 1997, this Committee held a hearing on S. 53. The
witnesses were Donald A. Fehr, executive director of the Major
League Baseball Players Association, and Dan Peltier, a former
minor league baseball player. Mr. Allan H. Selig, chairman of
the Major League Executive Council, and Mr. Stanley Brand, vice
president of the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues, Inc., were also invited to testify at the hearing, but
did not attend.
B. The Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute
1. The Agreement Between Major League Baseball Owners and Players to
Seek Antitrust Legislation
The 1990 collective-bargaining agreement between the major
league baseball players union and major league owners (``Basic
Agreement'') expired in December 1993, subsequent to which the
industry, and the Nation, suffered through the unfortunate
strike that suspended portions of the 1994 and 1995 seasons,
including the 1994 World Series. After protracted negotiations,
a new Basic Agreement was finally signed in March 1997. As part
of this new agreement, the owners and players reached what was
described by both sides as a landmark pact regarding the
applicability of the antitrust laws to major league baseball.
The parties memorialized this agreement in article XXVIII of
the Basic Agreement, which reads in pertinent part as follows:
The Clubs and the Association will jointly request
and cooperate in lobbying the Congress to pass a law
that will clarify that Major League Baseball players
are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e. that Major
League Players have the same rights under the antitrust
laws as do other professional athletes, e.g. football
and basketball players), along with a provision that
makes it clear that passage of that bill does not
change the application of the antitrust laws in any
other context or with respect to any other person or
entity.
2. The Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute
The sponsors of S. 53 continue to support it as introduced.
After introduction, however, the owners and players reached the
above-referenced agreement regarding the applicability of the
antitrust laws to major league baseball. Senators Hatch and
Leahy subsequently made clear their willingness to substitute
language designed to implement the intent of the owners' and
players' agreement, believing that a bill which enjoyed both
the owners' and players' support would be passed expeditiously.
After considerable prodding from Senator Hatch, on June 12,
1997, the owners ratified specific legislative language,
earlier agreed to by representatives of the owners and the
players, intended to clarify that major league baseball players
have the same rights under the antitrust laws as other
professional athletes. This language provided the basis for the
amendment in the nature of a substitute to S. 53, offered by
Senator Hatch at the Committee's Executive Business Meeting on
July 31, 1997.
C. The Minor Leagues and Senator Hatch's Amendment
The Committee has consistently sought not to adversely
affect the legal status of theminor leagues or minor league
players. Thus, S. 53 (much like its predecessor, S. 627) expressly
states that:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect
* * * the applicability or nonapplicability of the
antitrust laws to the amateur draft of professional
baseball, the minor league reserve clause, the
agreement between professional major league baseball
teams and teams of the National Association of
Baseball, commonly known as the ``Professional Baseball
Agreement'', or any other matter relating to the minor
leagues.
Notwithstanding this relatively clear language, Mr. Stanley
Brand indicated to the Committee that he still had concerns. As
a consequence, Mr. Selig stated in a June 16, 1997, letter to
the Chairman that, although the owners' Executive Council had
formally approved the legislative language which ultimately
became the amendment in the nature of a substitute to S. 53,
their ``support was tempered by the fact that our business
partner, the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues (NAPBL) has concern as to whether the proposed
legislation adequately protects their interests.''
Responding to this concern, when the amendment in the
nature of a substitute to S. 53 was marked up at the
Committee's July 31, 1997, Executive Business Meeting, Senator
Hatch offered an amendment intended to clarify even further
that S. 53 would have no impact on the legal status of the
minor leagues. This amendment stated that ``nothing in this
subsection shall be construed as providing the basis for any
negative inference regarding the caselaw concerning the
applicability of the antitrust laws to minor league baseball,''
and was incorporated by voice vote.
III. VOTE OF THE COMMITTEE
On July 31, 1997, with a quorum present, the Committee on
the Judiciary ordered S. 53 favorably reported by a vote of 11
yeas to 6 nays, with Senator Kohl having recused himself. In
compliance with paragraph 7 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules
of the Senate, the members of the Committee voted as follows on
S. 53:
YEAS NAYS
Hatch Grassley
Thurmond Sessions
Specter (proxy) Biden
Thompson (proxy) Feinstein
Kyl (proxy) Durbin
DeWine Torricelli
Ashcroft (proxy)
Abraham
Leahy
Kennedy
Feingold
Senator Hatch, together with Senator Leahy, offered a
substitute amendment to reflect the agreement that had been
reached between major league baseball owners and players. This
amendment was agreed to by unanimous consent.
Senator Hatch offered an amendment to the substitute, to
further clarify that this bill shall not be construed to affect
the applicability of the antitrust laws to minor league
baseball. The amendment was agreed to by voice vote, with
Senators Biden and Feinstein noted as having voted nay.
IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 1 states the bill's short title, the ``Curt Flood
Act of 1997.''
Section 2 states that the bill's purpose is to clarify that
major league professional baseball players have the same rights
under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes.
Section 3 amends the Clayton Act to add a new section 27.
New subsection 27(a) states that the antitrust laws apply to
actions relating to professional baseball players' employment
to play baseball at the major league level. Reflecting the
Committee's interest in reporting a bill enjoying the support
of both the owners and players, subsection 27(a) implements the
owners' and players' agreement that major league baseball
players have the same rights under the antitrust laws as, for
example, do professional football and basketball players. The
phrase ``the antitrust laws shall apply'' is intended to
incorporate the entire jurisprudence of the antitrust laws, as
it now exists and as it may develop. Subsection 27(a) also
specifies that nothing within the subsection provides a basis
for any negative inference regarding the caselaw concerning the
applicability of the antitrust laws to minor league baseball.
S. 53 was specifically drafted so that it would not
implicate issues or actions other than those specified in
subsection 27(a). Thus, subsection 27(b) makes explicit the
Committee's intent that the passage of this bill does not
affect the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust
laws in any other context beyond that specified in subsection
27(a). With regard to contexts, actions or issues outside the
scope of subsection 27(a) (that is, not constituting ``conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of
organized professional major league baseball relating to or
affecting employment to play baseball at the major league
level''), the law as it exists today is not changed by this
bill. The specific areas listed in the four subparts of new
subsection 27(b) are intended to be merely illustrative of the
areas and/or issues as to which the law remains unchanged by
this bill. The specific reference to the minor leagues in
subsection 27(a) is only intended to clarify that the passage
of the bill will have no impact on the law, or the future
development of the law, governing the applicability of the
antitrust laws to the minor leagues. This reference is not
intended to provide any inference or limitation regarding the
scope of other issues and/or areas as to which the law remains
unchanged by this bill.
V. COST ESTIMATE
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, September 23, 1997.
Hon. Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 53, the Curt Flood
Act of 1997.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
please to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Susanne S.
Mehlman (for federal costs) and Matt Eyles (for the private-
sector impact).
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neill, Director.
Enclosure.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
S. 53--Curt Flood Act of 1997; As ordered reported by the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary on July 31, 1997
S. 53 would remove major league baseball's current
exemption from antitrust laws, except that it would retain the
antitrust exemption for minor league baseball and for decisions
regarding league expansion, franchise location, the amateur
draft and broadcast rights, and employment relations with
nonplayers, such as umpires. By removing the antitrust
exemption under these limited circumstances, S. 53 would allow
the players to challenge in federal court certain conduct by
the team owners. Therefore, enacting S. 53 would impose
additional costs on the U.S. court system to the extent that
additional antitrust cases are filed. However, CBO does not
expect any resulting increase in case load or court costs to be
significant.
Because enactment of S. 53 would not affect direct spending
or receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply to the
bill. S. 53 contains no intergovernment mandates as defined in
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) and would
impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
S. 53 would impose a new private-sector mandate as defined
in UMRA by applying the antitrust laws to the conduct of owners
of major league baseball teams in employment relations with
major league players. As a result, the owners would be
prohibited from engaging in anticompetitive employment-related
activities that are now permissible under their judicially-
created exemption from the antitrust laws. Thus, if enacted, S.
53 would place owners of major league baseball teams in the
same position as owners in the other major professional sports
leagues by making their actions subject to judicial review. In
most lawsuits alleging an antitrust violation, federal courts
would review the conduct of owners under the ``rule of reason''
standard and examine the economic consequences of the action
for its procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. Some
conduct, such as collusion, would be per se violations of
antitrust law. Owners found to be in violation would be subject
to treble monetary damages.
If enacted, S. 53 would represent an explicit reversal by
the Congress of a portion of baseball's 75-year-old exemption
from the antitrust laws created by the Supreme Court's decision
in Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). In that case,
the Court determined that baseball was not a business involved
in interstate commerce and, therefore, was not subject to the
antitrust laws, which prohibit anticompetitive behavior and
unreasonable restraint of trade. In subsequent legal challenges
to the ruling in Federal Baseball, the most noteworthy being
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), the Supreme Court
acknowledged that its 1922 decision was flawed, yet it declined
to overturn baseball's antitrust exemption on the grounds that
this anomaly should be rectified by the Congress. Thus, the
bill would impose a new legislatively-crafted enforceable duty
on the business of baseball, which fits the definition of a
private-sector mandate in UMRA.
CBO estimates that the direct cost, as defined in UMRA, of
the private-sector mandate in S. 53 would not likely exceed the
$100 million statutory threshold. Direct costs would be imposed
on owners to the extent that they would have to employ counsel
to defend their actions against antitrust suits from which they
are now immune. Moreover, baseball operates under a collective
bargaining agreement that runs through the 2000 season, and
players have the option to extend the current agreement through
the 2001 season. Under that agreement players have recourse
against owners who engage in collusion on the terms of player
contracts and can recover treble damages through a process of
binding arbitration. Consequently, S. 53 would probably impose
no direct costs from 1998 through 2000 or 2001 because no
antitrust suits would be initiated while the collective
bargaining agreement is in effect. Costs in subsequent years
are not likely to exceed the $100 million statutory threshold.
CBO does not count possible monetary damages that may be
assessed against owners for antitrust infractions a cost of
complying with a private-sector mandate because CBO assumes
that owners would comply with the law's prohibition against
anticompetitive behavior.
The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Susanne S.
Mehlman (for federal costs) and Matt Eyles (for the private-
sector impact). This estimate was approved by Robert A.
Sunshine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
VI. REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT
In compliance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee concluded that no
significant additional regulatory impact or impact on personal
privacy would be incurred in carrying out the provisions of
this legislation. After due consideration, the Committee
concluded that enactment of the Act would not create any
significant additional paperwork.
VII. MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS GRASSLEY, BIDEN, FEINSTEIN, AND DURBIN
We oppose passage of this legislation for a number of
reasons. We advocate a comprehensive approach, from the fans'
perspective, to examining the problems in professional
baseball. Most of these problems would exist regardless of
antitrust liability. Indeed, in attempting to solve baseball's
labor relations difficulties by modifying the antitrust laws,
we run too great a risk of creating more problems than we
solve.
Unfortunately, as reported by this Committee, S. 53, ``The
Curt Flood Act of 1997,'' takes the potentially
counterproductive step of engaging in a piecemeal approach to
the issues confronting baseball by addressing only the
application of the antitrust laws to major league baseball
labor relations. What is more, it is far from clear that S. 53
even adequately addresses the labor relations issue. Under
current law, major league owners can unilaterally impose new
labor conditions on players following the expiration of a
collective-bargaining agreement. Players then have two choices:
(1) accept the unilateral terms and ``play ball'' or (2) go on
strike. This bill is designed to give the players a third
option. It would allow players to sue the owners under the
antitrust laws for unilaterally imposing collusive and unfair
labor conditions. We support the goal of encouraging the owners
and the players to resolve their differences at the bargaining
table prior to Opening Day. But, it is far from clear that S.
53 will generate the promised benefit of strengthening the
players' hand and reducing the likelihood of future strikes.
For one thing, the bill says nothing about the nonstatutory
labor exemption, which removes union members engaged in
collective bargaining from the reach of applicable antitrust
laws. In other words, if S. 53 became law in its current form,
the players may not be able to sue without decertifying their
union.
We also believe that the ability of the players to sue the
owners is not the only issue in professional sports today.
Other important issues include league expansion and franchise
movement, taxpayer-financed stadiums, revenue sharing, player
salaries, and fan access to television coverage. Despite the
Committee's efforts, we have not addressed these issues, other
than to say that this legislation will not affect the current
system in these areas. This legislation continues to leave fans
vulnerable to major league franchise relocations and
broadcasting decisions. In short, S. 53 in our view attempts a
simple fix to a complex problem and risks further alienating
the fans and irreparably harming the national pastime.
We are particularly concerned about the consequences of
this bill for minor league baseball. The minor leagues
legitimately fear that if S. 53 becomes law without being
modified to protect them, the major league teams will
discontinue their financing of the minor leagues and look for
an alternative to the minors for developing players. Minor
league teams in our home States promote community-based and
affordable events for citizens who for financial or geographic
reasons cannot attend major league games. Destruction of minor
league baseball, the sport for the fans in towns and small
cities across America, cannot be the effect of any bill we
pass.
The proponents of this legislation argue that the current
language adequately protects the minor leagues. The limited
evidence before the Committee does not support their argument.
At a February 15, 1995, Antitrust Subcommittee hearing, the
former Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of
the United States Department of Justice, James F. Rill,
testifying on behalf of the owners, expressed the minor
leagues' fears that removal of the antitrust exemption, even on
a limited basis, threatens to end the major league funding upon
which the minor leagues' viability depends. The reason is
clear: the majors pay 100 percent of the salaries of all minor
league players, managers, coaches, and trainers--and supply
five dozen baseballs per game--in return for the prospect of
major league talent someday down the line. Without the ability
to reserve their players, major league teams will no longer
have assurance that they can realize their investment in minor
league players. Moreover, the current major and minor league
systems are inextricably intertwined. Attempting to address the
major league separately in this bill may lead to extensive
litigation and ultimately prove unworkable.
This Committee needs to understand the relationship between
minor league baseball and major league baseball's antitrust
exemption more fully before we pass this bill. Left unresolved,
this issue may generate more litigation, more lawyers' fees,
and more uncertainty than we already have today. We hope that
future consideration of this issue will explore more fully the
intended and unintended consequences of congressional action in
this area. And, most important, we urge our colleagues to focus
on how repeal of the antitrust exemption for major league
baseball would affect fans of both the minor and the major
leagues.
Chuck Grassley.
Joe Biden.
Dianne Feinstein.
Dick Durbin.
VIII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by
S. 53, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law which
would be omitted is enclosed in bold brackets, new matter is
printed in italic, and existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman type):
UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
TITLE 15--COMMERCE AND TRADE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 1--MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and,
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 12. Definitions; short title
(a) ``Antitrust laws,'' as used herein, includes the Act
entitled ``An Act to protect trade and commerce against
unlawful restraints and monopolies,'' approved July second,
eighteen hundred and ninety; sections seventy-three to seventy-
seven, inclusive, of an Act entitled ``An Act to reduce
taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other
purposes,'' of August twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and
ninety-four; an Act entitled ``An Act to amend sections
seventy-three and seventy-six of the Act of August twenty-
seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled `An Act to
reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for
other purposes,' '' approved February twelfth, nineteen hundred
and thirteen; and also this Act.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 27. (a) The conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of
persons in the business of organized professional major league
baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball
at the major league level are subject to the antitrust laws to
the same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
would be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons
in any other professional sports business affecting interstate
commerce; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection
shall be construed as providing the basis for any negative
inference regarding the caselaw concerning the applicability of
the antitrust laws to minor league baseball.
(b) Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section
shall be deemed to change the application of the antitrust laws
to the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements by, between, or
among persons engaging in, conducting, or participating in the
business of organized professional baseball, except the
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements to which subsection (a)
of this section shall apply. More specifically, but not by way
of limitation, this section shall not be deemed to change the
application of the antitrust laws to:
(1) the organized professional baseball amateur
draft, the reserve clause as applied to minor league
players, the agreement between organized professional
major league baseball teams and the teams of the
National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues,
commonly known as the ``Professional Baseball
Agreement'', the relationship between organized
professional major league baseball and organized
professional minor league baseball, or any other matter
relating to professional organized baseball's minor
leagues;
(2) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of
persons in the business of organized professional
baseball relating to franchise expansion, location or
relocation, franchise ownership issues, including
ownership transfers, and the relationship between the
Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners;
(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
protected by Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.)
(commonly known as the ``Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961''); or
(4) the relationship between persons in the business
of organized professional baseball and umpires or other
individuals who are employed in the business of
organized professional baseball by such persons.
(c) As used in this section, ``persons'' means any
individual, partnership, corporation, or unincorporated
association or any combination or association thereof.