[House Report 105-828]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                 Union Calendar No. 470

105th Congress, 2d Session  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - House Report 105-828

 
 INVESTIGATION OF THE CONVERSION OF THE $1.7 MILLION CENTRALIZED WHITE 
 HOUSE COMPUTER SYSTEM, KNOWN AS THE WHITE HOUSE DATABASE, AND RELATED 
                                MATTERS

                               ----------                              

                              FIFTH REPORT

                                 by the

                        COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
                          REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

                             together with

                    MINORITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS





October 30, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed



                                                 Union Calendar No. 470

105th Congress, 2d Session  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - House Report 105-828

 INVESTIGATION OF THE CONVERSION OF THE $1.7 MILLION CENTRALIZED WHITE 
 HOUSE COMPUTER SYSTEM, KNOWN AS THE WHITE HOUSE DATABASE, AND RELATED 
                                MATTERS

                               __________

                              FIFTH REPORT

                                 by the

                        COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT

                          REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

                             together with

                    MINORITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS





October 30, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed



 INVESTIGATION OF THE CONVERSION OF THE $1.7 MILLION CENTRALIZED WHITE 
 HOUSE COMPUTER SYSTEM, KNOWN AS THE WHITE HOUSE DATABASE, AND RELATED 
                                 MATTERS



              COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

                     DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois          TOM LANTOS, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland       ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
CHRISTOPHER COX, California          EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             GARY A. CONDIT, California
STEPHEN HORN, California             CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida                THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia            ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, 
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana               DC
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana              CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida             ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona             DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South     DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    Carolina                         JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire        JIM TURNER, Texas
PETE SESSIONS, Texas                 THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey           HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas                         ------
BOB BARR, Georgia                    BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 
DAN MILLER, Florida                      (Independent)
RON LEWIS, Kentucky
                      Kevin Binger, Staff Director
                 Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
           David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
                 Lisa Smith Arafune, Deputy Chief Clerk
                 Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director

   Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and 
                           Regulatory Affairs

                  DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana, Chairman
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire        JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois          BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida             HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona             PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           GARY A. CONDIT, California
VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas             DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia                    ------ ------
PETE SESSIONS, Texas

                               Ex Officio

DAN BURTON, Indiana                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
                   Mildred J. Webber, Staff Director
                    J. Keith Ausbrook, Chief Counsel
                     Jay Apperson, Special Counsel
                Chip Griffin, Professional Staff Member
                        R. Andrew Wilder, Clerk
                 Kristin L. Amerling, Minority Counsel
                 Elizabeth Mundinger, Minority Counsel


                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                  House of Representatives,
                                  Washington, DC, October 30, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, I submit herewith the 
committee's fifth report to the 105th Congress. The committee's 
report is based on a study conducted by its Subcommittee on 
National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory 
Affairs.
                                                Dan Burton,
                                                          Chairman.


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
  I. Summary and Overview.............................................1
 II. Perjury and Obstruction..........................................6
III. Unlawful Distribution of White House Data and Conversion of White 
     House Resources for Political Purposes..........................14
 IV. The President and First Lady Knew of the Conversion of Government 
     Resources to Benefit the DNC and the Campaign...................49
  V. Conclusions.....................................................57
 VI. Rules Requirements..............................................57
Endnotes.........................................................    59
Index of supporting documents....................................    74

                                 VIEWS

Minority views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon. 
  Robert E. Wise, Jr., Hon. Major R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns, 
  Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, Hon. Gary A. Condit, Hon. Bernard 
  Sanders, Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, 
  Hon. Chaka Fattah, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Hon. Dennis J. 
  Kucinich, Hon. Rod R. Blagojevich, Hon. Danny K. Davis, Hon. 
  Thomas H. Allen, and Hon. Harold E. Ford, Jr...................   556
Supplemental views of Hon. David M. McIntosh.....................   664


                                                 Union Calendar No. 470
105th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 2d Session                                                     105-828
_______________________________________________________________________


 INVESTIGATION OF THE CONVERSION OF THE $1.7 MILLION CENTRALIZED WHITE 
 HOUSE COMPUTER SYSTEM, KNOWN AS THE WHITE HOUSE DATABASE, AND RELATED 
                                MATTERS

                                _______
                                

October 30, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


  Mr. Burton of Indiana, from the Committee on Government Reform and 
                   Oversight, submitted the following

                           FIFTH R E P O R T

                             together with

                    MINORITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS

    On October 9, 1998, the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight approved and adopted a report entitled, 
``Investigation of the Conversion of the $1.7 Million 
Centralized White House Computer System, Known as the White 
House Database, and Related Matters.'' The chairman was 
directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

                        I. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW

    The story of the White House Database is one about a White 
House that disregarded the difference between the official 
business of the U.S. Government and the political business of 
reelecting the President. Because the line between official 
business and campaigning was obliterated, this President and 
his White House subordinates proceeded to spend at least $1.7 
million of government funds on a complex, centralized computer 
system known as the White House Database or ``WhoDB.'' It was 
used not just for official purposes; senior White House staff 
planned and, in fact, used it to advance the campaign 
fundraising objectives of the Democratic National Committee 
[DNC]. This conversion of government property to the use of the 
DNC constitutes a theft of government property under 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 641.
    Similarly, White House staff, at the President's direction, 
used other White House resources to translate their new 
expertise in database development, acquired at government 
expense, to plan the development and use of databases for the 
DNC and other political committees in violation of the Hatch 
Act, 5 U.S.C Sec. 7324, which restricts government employee use 
of government property for political activities. This, too, 
represents a theft of government property.
    The conversion of the White House Database and other 
government resources to benefit the DNC and the President's 
campaign in this way was an integral part of the conversion of 
the Nation's White House into the political fundraising tool of 
the President and the DNC. With respect to the Database alone, 
the conversion of that resource was simply a continuation of 
the obliteration of any distinction between the official 
functions of the White House and the campaign to reelect the 
President.
    Prior to the deployment of the White House Database, lists 
generated by White House computers for invitations or 
attendance at social events, meetings, and other White House 
functions were routinely provided to the DNC and the Clinton/
Gore '96 campaign. These lists included, for example, the 1993 
and 1994 Holiday Card lists, among others, that were assembled 
through White House computers, merged with DNC lists and 
campaign lists, and then left in the possession of the DNC and 
the Clinton/Gore campaign for their use. The names and 
addresses of the people to whom the President and First Lady 
send holiday cards are a very valuable asset to those entities. 
They are also the property of the U.S. Government.
    The President's involvement in the plan to convert 
government property to the DNC and the ultimate accomplishment 
of that plan (represented by the transfer of these lists and 
data to the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign) motivated the 
White House to mount an extraordinary effort to delay and 
impede the investigation. Incriminating documents were withheld 
until after the 1996 election--in one case, for more than a 
year. The White House refused to respond for months to repeated 
requests for documents and information. Most significantly, 
when called before the committee to explain the withholding of 
documents, Deputy Counsel to the President Cheryl Mills chose 
to give demonstrably false testimony. This matter has been 
referred to the Department of Justice for investigation of 
possible perjury and obstruction of the investigation.
    Finally, there is evidence that the President and First 
Lady were responsible for the development of the Database and 
were informed of the theft of this and other government 
property for political purposes. The unlawful conversion of 
government property to the use of the DNC or a political 
campaign represents not only the crime of theft of government 
property. It also represents an abuse of power by the 
President, who used his high office and the Nation's White 
House to achieve his and his political party's fundraising 
objectives. The committee issues this report to expose the 
evidence of the President's possible involvement in the theft 
of government property and his abuse of power.

 A. Deputy Counsel to the President Cheryl Mills Lied to the Committee 
       and Obstructed the Investigation by Withholding Documents

    The committee found substantial evidence that Deputy White 
House Counsel Cheryl Mills perjured herself in testimony before 
the committee about her decision, made in concert with White 
House Counsel Jack Quinn, to withhold important documents 
responsive to the committee's requests. The withheld documents 
included: (1) the handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, an 
assistant to then-Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine 
Bowles,1 expressing the President's desire to 
integrate the White House Database with the DNC database; and 
(2) a June 28, 1994 memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold 
Ickes, Bruce Lindsey, and the First Lady,2 showing 
that the First Lady was informed of Marsha Scott's interest in 
using the Database for political purposes and employing White 
House staff to create political databases. To these proposals, 
the First Lady later wrote to Harold Ickes, ``This sounds 
promising. Please advise.'' 3
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Footnotes at end of report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While these documents were discovered at the White House in 
September 1996, they were both withheld until well after the 
1996 election. Marsha Scott's memorandum was produced to the 
committee in February 1997, after it was found by other members 
of the Counsel's Office in an independent search. Bailey's 
notes were not produced until October 1997, when they were 
discovered by other members of the Counsel's Office who were 
reviewing, apparently for the first time, files created by 
Cheryl Mills to contain withheld documents.
    Ms. Mills testified that she and Mr. Quinn had determined 
that the documents were not responsive, and that the Database 
referenced in one of them was not the White House Database, but 
was another database on which the author of the document, 
Marsha Scott, was working at the time. Subsequent deposition 
testimony establishes that there was no other database to which 
the document could have referred. Accordingly, not only is Ms. 
Mills's statement that she thought at the time that it was 
another database not credible, but so is her claim that she and 
Mr. Quinn determined that the documents were not responsive.
    The committee believes that Ms. Mills, in fact, determined 
that the documents were responsive, would expose unlawful 
activity, and would be politically damaging, if released 
shortly before the 1996 election. The withholding of these 
documents illegally obstructed the committee's investigation, 
delayed the discovery of important relevant evidence, and 
raised further questions about the truthfulness of the White 
House's representations to the committee throughout the 
investigation.

B. White House Personnel Took Government Data and Transferred it to the 
    Democratic National Committee to Assist in Campaign Fundraising

    The committee uncovered substantial evidence of plans to 
transfer, and the actual transfer of, official government data 
from the White House Database and other sources to entities 
outside of the Federal Government for use in campaign 
fundraising. Additionally, White House personnel converted 
official resources, such as White House computers, 
photocopiers, stationery, office equipment, and possibly even 
the time of career staff for activities expressly related to 
the President's reelection campaign. The knowing transfer of 
government data for an unofficial use and the use of government 
resources for campaign purposes constitute the theft of 
government property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
    The documents withheld by Cheryl Mills make clear that (1) 
the President himself wanted to integrate the Database with the 
DNC database and (2) the First Lady was interested in using the 
design of the Database and White House personnel for the 
development of political databases outside of the White House. 
Many documents also suggest that Senior White House officials, 
such as then-Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes and Deputy 
Counsel to the President Bruce Lindsey, were frequently 
informed of plans for the political use of the Database and 
plans to manage outside data using White House resources. 
Testimony from numerous White House and DNC witnesses 
establishes that DNC fundraising staff, in concert with Social 
Office and Office of Political Affairs staff, mined the White 
House Database for valuable information to enable the DNC to 
accomplish its fundraising goals.
    Other data was also transferred to the Clinton/Gore 
campaign or the DNC. The committee has obtained evidence that 
the 1993 White House Holiday Card list was transmitted to and 
retained by the Clinton/Gore campaign and is still in their 
possession. The 1994 White House Holiday Card list was 
transmitted to the DNC and remains in its possession. Also, the 
committee obtained documents that show that the President 
routinely transferred names and addresses obtained through the 
official White House mail to his campaign database.

  1. Data from the White House Database and other Government Databases

    The committee has obtained substantial credible evidence 
that data from the White House Database was systematically made 
available to the DNC to assist in its fundraising efforts. 
Documentary evidence and sworn testimony establish that members 
of the DNC Finance Department contacted the White House on a 
routine basis to ask for information on who had attended 
previous White House social events. This information was then 
used by the DNC Finance staff to determine who would be 
recommended to the White House by the DNC Finance staff for 
invitations to future White House events.
    DNC Finance staff testified to this process in depositions, 
as did White House Political Affairs staff. In addition, White 
House Social Office staff testified to giving out such 
information from the Database to White House Political Affairs 
staff who then passed it on to DNC fundraisers. One document 
produced by the White House states that the DNC obtained direct 
access to Social Office Information by sending a staff person 
to the White House Social Office to research event attendance.
    The committee obtained evidence that the distribution of 
this data to the DNC was authorized by Erskine Bowles (at that 
time, Deputy Chief of Staff) in a meeting in March 1995 with 
Truman Arnold (at that time, DNC Finance Chairman) and Ann 
Stock, the White House Social Secretary. Truman Arnold 
testified that he met with Erskine Bowles and Ann Stock to seek 
better access to Social Office information. Erskine Bowles and 
Ann Stock testified that they had no recollection of that 
meeting. Erskine Bowles was unable to produce a calendar from 
that time to verify whether such a meeting took place.
    The committee finds this to be part of a recurring pattern 
in which witnesses who had regular contact with the President 
develop faulty memories about key meetings and events that 
implicate the President and White House staff in wrongdoing. 
Nevertheless, these same witnesses can remember in striking 
detail those events that exculpate the President and his staff.
    The committee also discovered, in the possession of the 
DNC, lists generated by the White House Database and other 
White House data systems, including (1) a list of Asian Pacific 
Americans prepared by the White House Office of Public Liaison, 
(2) the White House calligrapher's list prepared by the Social 
Office for the President's ``Yale Dinner'' and White House 
holiday parties, and (3) lists prepared by the Social Office of 
those invited to the White House Arts and Humanities Dinner in 
October 1995. While the White House permitted the DNC to have 
some of these lists without redacting personal information, 
such as home addresses, the committee was denied this 
information in the copy of the Database produced to the 
committee on the ground that it was too personal.

            2. 1993 and 1994 White House Holiday Card Lists

    Although the 1993 and 1994 White House Holiday Card lists 
were prepared in a government database that predated the White 
House Database, they constitute government property of 
substantial value. The transfer of data through the 1993 and 
1994 Holiday Card project came to light as the committee 
investigated the data used to populate the White House 
Database, which included the 1994 Holiday Card list. The 
knowing delivery of these lists to others outside of the 
government would also constitute the theft of government 
property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
     The committee's evidence shows that the 1994 list was 
deliberately transmitted to the DNC and not returned, 
notwithstanding a February 1997 letter to the committee from 
White House Counsel Charles Ruff stating that the list was 
inadvertently sent to the DNC and returned immediately upon the 
White House's discovery that it was in the possession of the 
DNC. Documents and deposition testimony show that White House 
staff was fully aware that the DNC had the list in November 
1994 and that there was no documentation that the White House 
had imposed any restrictions on its use. Moreover, while the 
DNC returned one copy to the White House, it retained a copy 
for itself.
    The transmission of the 1994 Holiday Card list from the 
White House to the DNC did not differ significantly from the 
handling of the 1993 Holiday Card list. The 1993 Holiday Card 
list was delivered to W.P. Malone, Inc. (Malone), a contractor 
to the Clinton/Gore campaign in Arkadelphia, AR, which 
maintained the campaign supporter lists in a database known as 
PeopleBase. The 1993 list from the White House was combined 
with the holiday card lists from the campaign and the DNC into 
one computer at Malone. This list was retained in that computer 
in Arkadelphia until the computer was shipped to the Clinton/
Gore campaign offices in Washington, DC, in 1995, where it 
still resides.

 C. The President and First Lady Directed the Development of the White 
 House Database and Were Informed of and Involved in Plans for the Use 
of Government Resources to Advance the President's Re-election Campaign

    As Marsha Scott, the architect of the White House Database 
and of at least one plan for integrating the White House with 
the campaign by converting the Database to campaign uses, noted 
regarding that plan: ``This is the President's idea and it's a 
good one.'' 4 Numerous documents make clear that the 
President and First Lady directed the development of the White 
House Database and were aware of and kept informed of its 
potential uses. The First Lady actually received a 
demonstration of the Database. The President approved a job 
description for Marsha Scott that specifically referenced her 
access to the Database. Also, contrary to the written opinion 
of the White House Counsel's Office, the President routinely 
continued to build PeopleBase with the names and addresses of 
individuals who communicated with him through the official 
White House mail. The pattern of evidence obtained by the 
committee implicates the President and the First Lady in the 
possible theft of government property.

                 D. Summary of Findings and Conclusions

    Senior officials in the White House sought to obstruct the 
committee's investigation of the systematic transfer of data 
from the White House to campaign entities and the President's 
and First Lady's knowledge and involvement in the conversion of 
the White House Database and other official resources to the 
use of the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign. This obstruction 
culminated in the perjury of Cheryl Mills, Deputy Counsel to 
the President. Despite the efforts of White House officials to 
obstruct the investigation, the committee found substantial 
evidence that White House officials, including possibly the 
President and the First Lady, knowingly and willfully planned 
to convert, and did in fact convert, valuable government 
property, including data from the White House Database, to the 
DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 641. Such conduct by the President represents not only a 
theft of government property; it represents an abuse of power 
by the President.

                      II. PERJURY AND OBSTRUCTION

    On June 27, 1996, pursuant to the direction of the Chairman 
of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, 
Representative William J. Clinger, Representative David M. 
McIntosh, Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Economic 
Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, first wrote 
to then-Chief of Staff to the President Leon Panetta requesting 
information on the White House Database, known inside the White 
House as ``WhoDB.'' 5 Since the committee's very 
first efforts to discover the facts about the Database, 
including its planned and actual use, and its costs, the 
committee encountered unprecedented efforts by the White House 
to withhold documents and information and to mislead the 
committee with materially false statements as to its use.
    Through its investigation, the committee has uncovered 
substantial disturbing evidence of repeated false or misleading 
statements emanating from the highest levels of the White 
House, including the White House Counsel's Office and the 
Office of the Press Secretary, concerning how the Database was 
planned and used. The investigation has uncovered evidence 
which reveals that persons in the White House Counsel's Office, 
which was charged with responding to the committee's inquiry, 
were themselves central figures in the scheme to put the 
Database to prohibited uses. Those same persons, with ample 
motivation to protect at least themselves, actively sought to 
provide misleading explanations and conceal and alter 
documents.
    These actions severely hampered the committee in the 
exercise of its proper oversight role and needlessly prolonged 
the investigation at taxpayer expense. More importantly, 
despite the best efforts to find the facts and to present them 
to the American people, the committee may never know many of 
the facts which would be revealed by the production of 
contemporaneous documents which the committee has specifically 
sought, but which the White House reports ``cannot be found.'' 
In addition, responsive documents that (1) the White House did 
locate and (2) are evidence of the President's and First Lady's 
involvement in plans to convert the Database and other White 
House resources to campaign uses were deliberately withheld 
from the committee just before the 1996 election and not 
produced until February 1997 in one instance, and for more than 
a year in another case.
    To consider adequately the White House's efforts to 
obstruct the committee's investigation, it is important to 
recognize the fundamental legal principle applicable to data in 
the White House Database and other government data 
repositories. That principle is that once data is entered into 
an official government, taxpayer-funded database, distribution 
to any outside entity, including partisan political entities, 
is prohibited. As Cheryl Mills, then-Associate Counsel to the 
President, wrote with respect to this issue on January 17, 1994 
in an internal White House memorandum:

          Once White House employees integrate information 
        provided by any source into the database system, it 
        becomes government property in the form that it is 
        stored in the database system. Therefore, data from the 
        database system may be provided to a source outside the 
        federal government only for authorized purposes. 5 CFR 
        Sec. 2635.704. Authorized purposes are those specified 
        by law or regulation or those purposes for which 
        Government property is made available to the public. 
        Id.6

David Watkins, Assistant to the President for Administration, 
expressed the same view of the government's ownership of the 
data in the White House Database.

          [T]he White House Database will be government 
        property and cannot be given to or used by a campaign 
        entity (unless made public and thus available to any 
        campaign entity).7

    During the course of the committee's investigation, White 
House officials, and in particular the White House Counsel's 
Office, repeatedly misled the committee as to whether anyone in 
the White House planned to transfer, or in fact transferred, 
data from the White House Database. Very early in the 
investigation, on June 28, 1996, Jack Quinn, then Counsel to 
the President, told the committee:

          The database is for White House use only; we prohibit 
        distribution to outside entities or political 
        organizations--including the Democratic National 
        Committee or the Clinton-Gore '96 
        Committee.8

    Despite such steadfast denials by the White House, the 
investigation has revealed the systematic distribution of data 
from the White House Database and other official sources to the 
DNC, including the ongoing distribution of such data to the DNC 
Finance Department which the DNC Finance Director stated in his 
deposition ``should properly be called the fundraising 
division.'' 9 In addition, there is substantial 
evidence that contrary to specific written advice from the 
White House Counsel's Office, other official resources, such as 
computer time, stationery, photocopying equipment, and other 
office equipment and supplies, were converted to help manage 
the DNC's and the Clinton/Gore campaign's data.

  A. Members of the White House Counsel's Office and Possibly Others 
 Obstructed the Committee's Investigation to Prevent Disclosure of the 
   Theft of Government Property and the Possible Involvement of the 
                        President and First Lady

    The principle that the distribution of government data to 
campaign entities is prohibited provides ample motive for the 
White House to obstruct the committee's investigation. In one 
specific instance, that obstruction, followed by material false 
statements by Deputy Counsel to the President Cheryl Mills 
during an open hearing before the committee, was especially 
significant because it marked the most obvious effort to 
conceal the clearest evidence that the President and the First 
Lady were involved in the distribution of such data and 
conversions of other government resources to serve the 
interests of political campaign entities.
    The committee believes that there is substantial evidence 
that in September 1996 then-Associate (now-Deputy) Counsel to 
the President Cheryl Mills, with the knowledge and concurrence 
of then-White House Counsel Jack Quinn, knowingly and wilfully 
obstructed the investigative authority of this committee by 
withholding documents that were plainly responsive to the 
committee requests for documents and information. Moreover, 
when this obstruction was brought to light in a hearing before 
the committee, Ms. Mills lied under oath about the documents 
and the circumstances surrounding their nonproduction.
    Ms. Mills's actions, withholding responsive documents from 
the committee, delayed the committee for more than a year from 
obtaining important evidence that the President wanted to 
``integrate'' the White House Database with the DNC database 
and delayed until after the 1996 election the disclosure of the 
use of White House personnel and office equipment to assist the 
DNC in its efforts to develop a new database. Consequently, not 
only did the American public not have relevant information 
regarding the conversion of official resources prior to the 
1996 election, the committee's ongoing investigation was 
impeded by the delay in producing those important documents.
    Moreover, the failure to produce these documents when they 
were discovered in September 1996 had the effect of delaying 
the committee's investigation long enough to allow memories of 
relevant witnesses to fade for more than a year until they 
could plausibly testify that they could no longer remember the 
meetings or conversations reflected in the documents. The 
committee believes that Ms. Mills was fully aware of these 
potential effects and deliberately engaged in the withholding 
of documents for that purpose. In the second term, she was 
promoted from Associate Counsel to the President to Deputy 
Counsel to the President.
    On October 28, 1997, White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff 
produced to the committee a document containing the handwritten 
notes of Brian Bailey, an assistant to then-Deputy Chief of 
Staff Erskine Bowles, that read:

          HAROLD [ICKES] AND DEBORAH DELEE WANT TO MAKE SURE 
        WHODB IS INTEGRATED W/DNC DATABASE--SO WE CAN SHARE--
        EVIDENTLY, POTUS WANTS THIS TO[O]! (MAKES SENSE) 
        10

    A letter from Mr. Ruff and a production log accompanied the 
document and other documents produced to the committee that 
day.11 The letter was intended to apprise the 
committee of ``some new information and to correct certain 
statements regarding two earlier aspects of [the White House] 
document production.'' 12
    Mr. Ruff's letter and the production log raised as many 
questions as it purported to answer. With respect to the 
handwritten notes, Mr. Ruff explained that these notes, along 
with other documents, had been found in September 1996, more 
than a year earlier, and set aside in folders.13 Mr. 
Ruff's letter also sought to obscure whether the previously 
withheld notes were responsive to the committee's request, 
saying: ``Although certain of these documents [including the 
notes] are arguably not responsive, we are erring on the side 
of production.'' 14
    While Mr. Ruff's explanation for the nonproduction of the 
notes sought to avoid the admission that they were responsive 
and had been withheld, he was unable to make such a claim with 
respect to a June 28, 1994 memorandum 15 from White 
House Office of Political Affairs staff member Marsha Scott to 
Harold Ickes, Bruce Lindsey, and the First Lady that was also 
found in September 1996. That document included evidence 
suggesting that the White House Database would be useful for 
the campaign and urging that Marsha Scott and her database 
development team of government employees be allowed to continue 
to work with the DNC and others to develop databases outside of 
the White House.
    This document had already been produced in February 1997 by 
Mr. Ruff, who at that time apparently was unaware that Ms. 
Mills had discovered the document in September 1996 and 
withheld it as nonresponsive. When Mr. Ruff produced it, he 
included it in a production of documents that he represented in 
his February 27, 1997 transmittal letter as ``responsive'' 
16 to the committee's request and also admitted in 
open hearings before the committee that he had determined that 
it was responsive.17
    The complete sequence of events relating to Ms. Mills's 
withholding of the document and her testimony before the 
committee is as follows:

August 2, 1996

    The Majority Members of the Subcommittee on National 
Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs 
write to President Clinton requesting, among other things, 
``All communications related to the WhoDB'' which ``includes 
all documents and materials that memorialize conversations, 
meetings, or other communication.'' 18

September 18, 1996

    Deputy Counsel to the President Cheryl Mills discovers (1) 
handwritten notes reflecting the President's desire to 
integrate the White House Database with the DNC database 
19 and (2) a June 28, 1994 memorandum 20 
from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey (with a 
copy to the First Lady) regarding the White House Database and 
the development of the DNC and other databases outside of the 
White House using government resources.

September 19-24, 1996

    Despite Cheryl Mills's discovery, the thousands of pages of 
documents produced by Ms. Mills and White House Counsel Jack 
Quinn during this time do not include either document.

February 26, 1997

    Apparently unaware that Cheryl Mills had previously 
discovered the June 28, 1994 memorandum, White House Counsel 
Chuck Ruff produces it to the committee and another copy of it 
that includes the First Lady's note to Harold Ickes that ``This 
sounds promising.'' 21

March 6, 1997

    Mr. Ruff inaccurately represents that the memorandum was 
discovered ``over the last few months as part of the ongoing 
review of files . . . .'' 22

October 28, 1997

    White House Counsel Charles Ruff produces a copy of the 
handwritten notes, and discloses that the notes and the 
memorandum had been discovered in September 1996.23

November 6-7, 1997

    Cheryl Mills testifies under oath that:
         (1) she determined that notes reflecting the 
        President's interest in integrating the White House 
        Database with the DNC database ``were not responsive to 
        the seven enumerated items'' requested by the 
        committee; 24
         (2) ``the particular [database referenced in the 
        second paragraph of the June 28, 1994 memorandum], at 
        the time [she] had knowledge of, was not related to the 
        WhoDB;'' 25
         (3) her ``impression at the time'' of production of a 
        January 17, 1994 memorandum 26 was that the 
        database in that memorandum was not the White House 
        Database; 27 and
         (4) ``[u]ltimately, they ended up using WhoDB, which 
        is not modeled on PeopleBase.'' 28
    Each and every one of these statements is a material false 
statement, and the evidence obtained by the committee shows 
that Ms. Mills knew they were false at the time that she made 
them.

B. The Evidence Before the Committee Establishes That The Testimony of 
 Cheryl Mills Before the Committee Was False and That She Knew it Was 
                                 False

    The evidence obtained by the committee contradicts Ms. 
Mills's testimony in every respect. The sworn deposition 
testimony of five other witnesses makes clear that at the time 
the documents were withheld, Ms. Mills could not have believed 
that they were not responsive, deliberately withheld them, and 
lied to the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 
about withholding them.

  1. Ms. Mills's Testimony regarding the Notes Was Demonstrably False

    Not only are the notes on their face responsive to the 
committee's request. But the author of the notes, Brian Bailey 
(an assistant to then-Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles), 
testified that the notes did indeed memorialize a 
``communication,'' 29 which falls clearly within the 
scope of the committee's August 2, 1996 request.

  2. Ms. Mills's Testimony Regarding the June 28, 1994 Memorandum Was 
                           Demonstrably False

    Like the notes, the memorandum on its face was responsive 
to the committee's request. The second paragraph states: 
``Currently in the White House we are preparing, as you know, 
to implement a new database system starting August 1.'' There 
is no other database system to which that sentence and the 
ensuing paragraph could have referred. Not only is that true 
from the face of the document, but that fact was confirmed by 
the testimony of four other witnesses whose testimony is 
consistent with the testimony of each other and who had no 
reason to lie.
    Moreover, when that document was discovered by White House 
Counsel Charles Ruff, independent of Ms. Mills's discovery, he 
immediately produced it as a document responsive to the 
committee's request. He did not, at the time of production, 
qualify its responsiveness in any way. Mr. Ruff also expressly 
testified that the memorandum was responsive to the committee's 
request.30
            a. Marsha Scott's testimony contradicts Cheryl Mills's 
                    testimony
    Marsha Scott, who developed the White House Database, 
contradicted Ms. Mills's testimony, stating under oath that the 
database referenced in the June 1994 memorandum was indeed the 
White House Database and that the description, including that 
the WhoDB was modeled after PeopleBase, accurately described 
the White House Database.31
    The White House has been mysteriously unable to produce the 
January 11, 1994 memorandum from Marsha Scott or the January 
13, 1994 memorandum from Erich Vaden, one of Marsha Scott's 
principal assistants on the White House Database project, 
requesting the advice provided in Ms. Mills's January 17, 1994 
memorandum. Having those documents would assist in determining 
whether the January 17, 1994 memorandum was intended to be 
responsive to a request for advice regarding the White House 
Database or some other database as Cheryl Mills claimed.
    Notwithstanding these missing documents, counsel for Marsha 
Scott insisted in Ms. Scott's deposition that a December 16, 
1993 memorandum to Cheryl Mills with the subject heading of 
``White House Database'' 32 ``track[ed]'' the advice 
in Cheryl Mills's January 17, 1994 memorandum.33 Ms. 
Scott also confirmed in her testimony that Ms. Mills's 
memorandum addressed some of the same issues raised in her 
December 16, 1993 memorandum seeking advice on the White House 
Database,34 which contradicts Ms. Mills's claims 
that her January 17, 1994 memorandum referenced some other 
database.
            b. Erich Vaden's testimony contradicted Cheryl Mills's 
                    testimony
    Erich Vaden, Marsha Scott's principal assistant who was 
largely responsible for the technical development of the 
Database and who became the Database Administrator, 
contradicted Ms. Mills when he testified that:
          (1) the database referred to in the second paragraph 
        of the June 28, 1994 memorandum could be no database 
        other than the White House Database; 35
          (2) nothing in that paragraph suggested to him that 
        the referenced database was not the White House 
        Database; 36
          (3) Marsha Scott was not involved in the development 
        of databases in the White House other than the White 
        House Database at that time; 37 and
          (4) he had specifically and expressly discussed with 
        Cheryl Mills in January 1994 that the database 
        referenced in her January 17, 1994 memorandum was the 
        White House Database, not some other Correspondence 
        Department database, which she acknowledged at that 
        time.38
            c. Laura Tayman's testimony contradicts Cheryl Mills's 
                    testimony
    Laura Tayman, who also worked with Marsha Scott and Erich 
Vaden on the development of the White House Database, 
contradicted Ms. Mills's testimony when she confirmed that:
          (1) there were no other databases in the White House 
        to which the June 1994 memorandum could be referring; 
        39
          (2) the database referenced in the January 17, 1994 
        memorandum was, and could only have been, the White 
        House Database; 40 and
          (3) the White House Database was designed to include 
        features from PeopleBase.41
            d. Miscellaneous other testimony regarding the use of 
                    PeopleBase as a model for the White House Database 
                    contradicts Cheryl Mills's testimony
    That the White House Database was, in fact, modeled after 
PeopleBase (contrary to Ms. Mills's testimony) is also 
confirmed by the testimony of Erich Vaden 42 and 
Mark Bartholomew, a career White House technical staff member 
who worked on the White House Database project.43

C. Cheryl Mills Could Not Have Believed That Her Testimony Was Truthful

    The testimony of these five witnesses contradicts Cheryl 
Mills's testimony and establishes that she did not believe, and 
indeed could not have believed, that her statements before the 
committee were true, namely that (1) the handwritten notes were 
not responsive to the committee's request; (2) the database 
referenced in the second paragraph of the June 28, 1994 
memorandum was not the White House Database; and (3) the 
database in the January 17, 1994 memorandum was not the White 
House Database.

 D. Ms. Mills's False Testimony Before the Committee is Evidence That 
 She and Possibly White House Counsel Jack Quinn and Others Obstructed 
 the Committee's Investigation by Withholding Documents Responsive to 
                        the Committee's Inquiry

    Ms. Mills's false testimony to Congress is also evidence of 
unlawful obstruction of the committee's investigation. The 
evidence contradicting Ms. Mills shows that instead of 
determining that the withheld documents were not responsive, 
she determined that the documents were responsive.
    Consequently, she, White House Counsel Jack Quinn, and 
possibly others deliberately determined without legitimate 
justification to withhold documents that were the subject of 
the committee's request. Mr. Ruff's October 28, 1997 letter 
admits that the documents had been found in September 
1996.44 Ms. Mills admitted that she and White House 
Counsel Jack Quinn reviewed the handwritten notes in September 
1996.45 She also admitted that she placed both the 
handwritten notes and the June 28, 1994 memorandum in separate 
folders in the Counsel's Office in September 1996.46
    Finally, Ms. Mills testified that she and Mr. Quinn made 
the decision jointly to withhold the documents as 
nonresponsive.47 The withholding of these documents 
without justification did, in fact, impede the committee's 
investigation and constitutes unlawful obstruction under 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 1505.

 E. Ms. Mills Prevented the American People From Learning Just Before 
the 1996 Presidential Election That the President of the United States 
 and the First Lady Were Involved in the Theft of Government Data and 
    Other Government Resources to Benefit Their Political Campaigns

    The act of withholding the documents themselves and then 
lying to cover up the obstruction is significant evidence of 
Ms. Mills's consciousness that the contents of the documents 
reflected involvement of the President and the First Lady in 
various efforts to convert government property for unauthorized 
purposes. Significantly, the documents were withheld only 6 
weeks before the 1996 Presidential election. There can be no 
doubt that Ms. Mills knew that the release of the withheld 
documents would have been, at the very least, politically 
damaging if the documents had been released shortly before the 
1996 Presidential election. Indeed, the documents attracted 
substantial media attention when they were released in 
1997.48
    Since the production of the documents, the committee has 
also obtained other corroborating evidence of the theft of 
government property, i.e., that data was transferred to the DNC 
and that other White House resources were converted. However, 
Ms. Mills's failure to produce the documents at the time when 
they were discovered was detrimental to the committee's 
investigation and delayed the discovery of both the documents 
withheld and other important evidence.
    The committee considers giving false testimony before it to 
be a very serious matter that may subject a witness to serious 
penalties for perjury, making false statements in a 
congressional investigation, and obstruction under the criminal 
code of the United States. Consequently, the committee 
acknowledges that Chairman McIntosh has already referred 
evidence obtained relating to this matter to the Justice 
Department for further investigation and appropriate 
prosecution.

III. UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF WHITE HOUSE DATA AND CONVERSION OF WHITE 
                 HOUSE RESOURCES FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES

     The documents ultimately produced by the White House and 
the testimony of numerous witnesses reveals that the theft of 
data from the White House Database for political purposes was 
an integral part of an illegal scheme to convert government 
data and other resources that was planned and executed to aid 
the DNC fundraising effort and the Clinton/Gore campaign. On 
May 22, 1997, Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, told 
the committee that ``there is no evidence . . . that WhoDB was 
planned to be used for political purposes . . . .'' 
49 Notwithstanding this denial, the handwritten 
notes of Brian Bailey that were withheld by Cheryl Mills and 
produced 5 months after Mr. Ruff's letter reflect that the 
President of the United States wanted to integrate the White 
House Database and the DNC database to share data in violation 
of 18 U.S.C Sec. 641.
    In addition to the Federal criminal code's prohibition 
against converting government property, the White House also 
had a clear policy that government resources could not be used 
for political purposes, even if White House staff could engage 
in political activity under the Hatch Act. Cheryl Mills had 
prepared, with former White House Counsels Bernard Nussbaum, 
Lloyd Cutler, and Abner Mikva, memoranda to White House staff, 
essentially advising that they could engage in political 
activity provided they did not use White House resources to 
support it.50 Mills testified before the committee 
when asked why, as reflected in the June 28, 1994 memorandum, 
government employees were working on the DNC's database:

          As you are probably aware, White House officials and 
        others are allowed to engage in political activity and 
        they are allowed to use their time in that way when 
        they volunteer to provide political activity, so to the 
        extent that Ms. Scott wanted to provide or make herself 
        available to engage in those activities, provided she 
        did not use Government resources, that would be 
        consistent with the Hatch Act.51

Congressman Shadegg further inquired regarding the use of 
government resources:

          Government resources seems to be a good question. 
        This is on stationery which says the White House, 
        Washington. I presume that would be a Government 
        resource, wouldn't it? 52

Ms. Mills responded to that question by admitting twice that 
the stationery was, in fact, a government 
resource.53
     For a similar use of government resources, including 
merely government photocopying paper, the Clinton 
administration prosecuted Peter Collins for the theft of 
government property. United States v. Peter Collins, 56 F.3d 
1416 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In that case, the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the conviction of Mr. 
Collins for using office supplies, including paper for making 
photocopies, to support the U.S. Amateur Ballroom Dancing 
Association. Id. at 1421. The court also expressly acknowledged 
that the theft of computer time and storage could also 
constitute the theft of government property under 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 641. Id. at 1420. The court also noted that intangible 
property, including the mere content of a writing, is a thing 
of value that can be converted to an unofficial use in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641. Id. (citing United States v. 
Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 
(1979)).
    The committee found evidence, beyond the withholding of 
incriminating documents, of both the systematic transfer of 
data from the White House Database and other data systems to 
political entities and the systematic use of other government 
resources to advise and assist those entities in the 
development and management of their data systems. These 
conversions of government property, according to the Deputy 
Counsel to the President and the rationale of United States v. 
Collins, are inconsistent with the Hatch Act and constitute the 
theft of government property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.

  A. Marsha Scott Developed a Plan for the President To Use the White 
             House Database for Partisan Political Purposes

    The committee has unearthed abundant evidence that the 
planned uses for the WhoDB included partisan political ones for 
the 1996 reelection effort. Multiple documents expressly 
identify using the WhoDB as critical to election year efforts 
to energize the President's friends and supporters. The 
withheld June 28, 1994 memorandum includes a timeframe for 
development and deployment that is directed at the 1996 
campaign. The memorandum states:

          By the first of the year [1995] we should have any 
        flaws identified and corrected and the majority of the 
        White House using the system. We will then have a year 
        [until 1996] to fully train and familiarize our folks 
        to its many possibilities and uses.

Although the timeframes in the memorandum plainly are aimed at 
making certain that the White House Database was fully 
operational by 1996, Marsha Scott denied that the dates had 
anything to do with the campaign.\54\
    A draft of another memorandum written by Marsha Scott for 
White House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty reveals a plan to: 
``reach[] out to [the President's] friends and supporters . . 
.; identify and contact the key early supporters in all fifty 
states . . .; put in WhoDB the names and relevant information 
about those early supporters . . .; [and] add to this base 
group by early 1995, those folks we will be working with in 
1996.'' \55\
    The draft further outlines the plan to use the White House 
Database to ``recreate the Primary campaign structure . . .; 
establish a database to hold and work these names. (WhoDB will 
be fully functional by January [1995]) . . .; recreate the 
General campaign structure using the same method we employed 
for recreating the Primary . . . [,] add[ing] the DNC and 
campaign records . . .; identify by early 1995, key financial 
and political folks in each state who can work with us'' with 
the expectation that ``[t]hrough consistent dialogue and 
follow-up, leaders will emerge'' to allow ``[c]o-ordinat[ion] 
with DNC and DLC about what they are doing for these folks.'' 
\56\ With respect to this plan, Scott states directly, ``This 
is the President's idea and it's a good one.'' \57\
    The final memorandum prepared and actually sent to Deputy 
Chiefs of Staff Erskine Bowles and Harold Ickes 58 
tracks the draft in key, although not all, respects. In 
producing this final memorandum, the White House first produced 
it without the most damaging information. The concealed text 
included all references to using the data, and people 
identified in the database, for the 1996 reelection campaign, 
as well as the fact that the planned use was personally 
approved by--indeed originated with--the President.\59\ 
Although the draft memorandum itself, not just the final 
version that was withheld, was responsive to the committee's 
original August 2, 1996 request, it was not produced until May 
13, 1997. When Marsha Scott was questioned about the contents 
of this memorandum, she acknowledged that this plan involved 
using the White House Database to identify leaders for the 1996 
campaign.\60\

  B. The White House Social and Political Affairs Offices Shared Data 
           From the White House Database With DNC Fundraisers

    The transfer of data from the White House Database was a 
significant tool in the conversion of White House resources to 
the use of the DNC to exchange White House invitations and 
other perks for campaign contributions. Individuals in the 
White House Social Office and Political Affairs Office were the 
points of contact through which White House data was converted 
to the use of DNC fundraisers.
    The transfer of data was so significant that first, Jack 
Quinn denied that such transfers happened. Then, confronted 
with newspaper reports that such transfers did occur, the White 
House Press Office staff acknowledged the reports, while at the 
same time the Counsel's Office staff and the Press Secretary 
himself were secretly helping to draft a misleading press 
release for DNC Finance Chairman Truman Arnold. When new White 
House Counsel Chuck Ruff was confronted with the press reports 
and the Press Office statements, he sought to qualify and 
minimize the use of the data, claiming that it happened only 
occasionally. However, the committee uncovered that DNC Finance 
Chairman Truman Arnold and Erskine Bowles agreed to a plan to 
allow DNC fundraisers to obtain regular access to data from the 
White House Database to select donors for attendance at White 
House events.
    The committee uncovered a scheme to use data from the White 
House Database to enhance DNC fundraising efforts. This scheme 
involved the White House staff using the White House Database 
to identify for the DNC individuals who had attended White 
House social events. The DNC would then use that information to 
determine whom to recommend for invitations to upcoming White 
House social events. In this way the DNC ensured that it was 
able to reward its donors appropriately with White House 
invitations.

 1. the white house counsel and the white house press office concealed 
   the regular and continuous transfer of data from the white house 
                          database to the DNC

    The White House Counsel consistently denied or sought to 
minimize the transfer of any data stored in White House 
databases to the DNC or other partisan political entities, 
including specific denials of dissemination of data from White 
House computers in the specific context of generating 
invitations to White House events. In a June 28, 1996 letter to 
the committee, White House Counsel Jack Quinn stated:

          The database maintained by the White House is a list 
        of names, addresses and other pertinent information for 
        generating invitations to White House events. . . . The 
        database is for WhiteHouse use only; we prohibit 
distribution to outside entities or political organizations--including 
the Democratic National Committee or the Clinton-Gore '96 
Committee.61

    This denial was untrue. On January 30, 1997, the Los 
Angeles Times reported that White House staff frequently 
retrieved data on large contributors and turned it over to the 
DNC to help raise money for the President's reelection. The 
L.A. Times story by investigative reporter Glenn F. Bunting, 
reported that former DNC National Finance Chairman, Truman 
Arnold told him that:

[the DNC finance] staff routinely used WhoDB to identify likely 
candidates for increased donations. . . . [T]he staff found out 
how many White House invitations certain donors were receiving, 
so they could arrange more events for prospective contributors. 
. . . I started checking back with the White House just as a 
routine matter. . . . It didn't seem very privileged to me. It 
was open to a lot of people.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [P]eople familiar with the system said that during the last 
two years DNC workers routinely used the database as a fund-
raising tool to recruit prospective donors and to solicit large 
contributions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Arnold said he focused on reconnecting the party with 
contributors who had given in 1992 but who had ``fallen from 
the fold.'' To do this, Arnold said, party staff members tapped 
the White House computer base, usually calling for the 
information. . . . ``It was most helpful to us because we were 
looking to the disaffected,'' Arnold said. ``The database 
helped us to see who had been invited to what.'' 62

    That day's White House Press Briefing was largely dominated 
by questions stemming from the story. With no mention of the 
White House Counsel's prior denial that any such data had been 
disseminated to the DNC, the White House Deputy Press Secretary 
Barry Toiv after talking with the White House Counsel, 
responded repeatedly that giving such White House data to the 
DNC was appropriate:

          If the DNC, in the context of putting together a list 
        of people that they might want to ask to be invited to 
        an event here, asked the question, was this particular 
        person invited to previous events, or did this person 
        previously attend events at the White House, it would 
        be entirely appropriate for the Social Office to answer 
        that question. . . . If they didn't know [the answer], 
        the place where that information was kept was in the 
        database.63

    This statement is wholly inconsistent with Mr. Quinn's 
assertion 6 months earlier that the White House prohibits the 
distribution of such data to the DNC. The White House now 
admitted that what was prohibited 64 was, in fact, 
``entirely appropriate.'' In addition, the White House had 
refused to provide this very information to the committee for 
over 3 months. On October 3, 1996 the committee had 
specifically asked the White House to acknowledge whether ``the 
White House ever provided any data from the WhoDB to an outside 
organization or individual.'' 65
    The committee requested an answer by October 9, 1996. The 
White House failed to answer by that date, was asked again to 
respond by October 29, 1996,66 again failed to 
answer, was again asked to respond by November 18, 
1996,67 again failed to answer, was again asked to 
do so by January 14, 1997,68 and again did not 
respond.69 Indeed, the answer to this question was 
never provided during the tenure of Jack Quinn as Counsel to 
the President.
    Even after Mr. Ruff's arrival as Counsel to the President, 
and after the press briefing admission of the data transfer to 
the DNC, the White House still failed to answer the committee's 
questions with respect to that very matter. The committee once 
again, requested answers to these questions by February 26, 
1997.70 The White House once more failed to answer 
and was asked again to do so by February 28, 1997.71 
Not until February 28, 1997, almost 5 months after first being 
asked, well after the 1996 Presidential election, and well 
after the previously denied facts had been exposed by the LA 
Times, did the White House finally admit to the committee that 
data from the White House Database had been funneled to the 
DNC.72
    In addition to the White House Counsel repeatedly refusing 
to answer the committee's questions, the President's Press 
Secretary Mike McCurry also concealed his own role in the story 
at a White House press briefing. Although Mr. McCurry had 
assisted Mr. Arnold in drafting a statement regarding the use 
of the Database, he turned the briefing over to his assistant 
Barry Toiv. When Toiv was asked if anyone in the White House 
had spoken with Truman Arnold, he responded, ``I don't know.'' 
73 Mike McCurry, although still present, said 
nothing. Four questions later, when reporters pressed the 
issue, asking ``[D]on't you think you might want to ask 
[Arnold] about that? [] Given all the reports you all haven't 
talked to [Arnold] yet[,]'' McCurry interjected to tell Toiv 
``Barry, the Counsel's Office has. . . .'' 74 To 
this, Toiv admitted, ``That's true. The Counsel's Office has 
contacted him. . . .'' 75
    At no time did McCurry reveal the fact that he had talked 
to Arnold the previous night. The committee had asked who in 
the White House had contacted Arnold.76 In response, 
theWhite House revealed that McCurry had indeed talked to 
Arnold about these matters on the evening of January 29, 1997:

          Later that evening [January 29, 1997], Mr. McCurry 
        returned Mr. Arnold's call. * * * Mr. Arnold said that 
        he trusted Mr. McCurry's opinion and wanted some 
        guidance as to how to respond to a number of press 
        inquiries related to the WhoDB * * *.77

    Not only was McCurry silent about his own conversation with 
Arnold on the night before the briefing, neither he nor Toiv 
revealed the White House Counsel's role in conveying a 
misleading denial for the DNC to issue. On the very day of the 
press briefing, [January 30, 1997] Sally Paxton, Associate 
Counsel to the President, after Arnold read her a prepared 
written statement denying aspects of data transfer matters 
attributed to him by the L.A. Times, secretly received and 
thereafter transmitted to the DNC, Arnold's written 
denial.78
    The following day Arnold was ``unavailable'' and instead 
issued a statement under his name claiming he had never heard 
of WhoDB.79 Presumably, this was the statement which 
had previously been read to Paxton, received at the White 
House, and faxed to the DNC. Of course, the committee's 
investigation has established that many aspects of the data 
transfer described by Truman Arnold to the L.A. Times were, in 
fact, true.

  2. Sworn Testimony Indicates That The DNC Obtained Data Exactly as 
                 Arnold Had Revealed to the L.A. Times

    The committee's investigation confirmed that Mr. Arnold had 
set up a scheme with Erskine Bowles and Ann Stock in March 1995 
to allow DNC fundraisers to contact the White House Social 
Office to obtain the valuable information contained in the 
White House Database regarding who had attended events at the 
White House. Prior to this confirmation by the committee's 
investigation, the White House sought to downplay the extent 
and frequency of the data flow to the DNC. In his February 28, 
1997 letter to the committee, Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the 
President, stated that

        the DNC occasionally called the White House to inquire 
        whether specific individuals had been to prior events, 
        such as state dinners. [White House] [s]taff sometimes 
        would consult WhoDB to answer a specific 
        question.80

This attempt to minimize the conduct was contrary to what 
Truman Arnold had revealed to the L.A. Times. Arnold is 
reported to have admitted: ``I started checking back with the 
White House just as a routine matter.'' 81 The L.A. 
Times also reported:

        people familiar with the system said that during the 
        last two years DNC workers routinely used the database 
        as a fund-raising tool to recruit prospective donors 
        and to solicit large contributions.82

    More importantly, as set forth infra, the evidence 
uncovered by the committee's investigation, including the sworn 
testimony of numerous witnesses, both at the White House and 
the DNC, revealed that such conduct was not at all occasional, 
but was a significant, regular, and ongoing practice which 
allowed the DNC access to the prohibited White House data. This 
evidence included Truman Arnold's testimony in a committee 
deposition in which he stood by his publicly reported statement 
that the DNC ``started checking back with the White House just 
as a routine matter.'' 83
    Indeed from documents and testimony obtained as part of the 
investigation, both from the White House and the DNC, as well 
as the testimony of participants in the data flow scheme both 
at the White House and the DNC, a clear picture emerges of the 
regular and ongoing practice of supplying the DNC with 
government-owned proprietary data. Further, the investigation 
reveals that this data was indeed used in a sophisticated 
scheme to directly further the fundraising goals of the DNC.

 3. Obtaining the data on social event attendance was directly tied to 
                          fundraising efforts

    Obtaining invitations to White House events and other perks 
was part of a direct coordinated scheme between the White House 
and the DNC to convert the White House into nothing more than a 
fundraising machine. As recently as May 25, 1998, the 
Washington Post starkly revealed not only the tremendous value 
of White House event attendance, but the very effective use of 
such attendance in assuring a huge flow of money to the 
DNC.84
    Bernard Schwartz, described as ``the party's largest single 
individual donor,'' 85 was reported to have been 
``twice invited to stay in the Lincoln Bedroom but couldn't 
make it. He attended state dinners for the Emperor of Japan and 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and was toasted at a White 
House dinner two years ago on his 70th Birthday.'' 
86 Schwartz was quoted as saying, ``It's awesome to 
go to the White House, an extraordinary privilege.'' 
87 Indeed, the article quotes a former DNC official: 
``He was really sort of your perfect donor--just wanted to 
attend events and never asked for anything.'' 88
            a. The DNC planned to use White House event invitations as 
                    a fundraising tool
    Documents found within the White House show that the DNC in 
concert with the White House staff used access to events as a 
tool to achieve fundraising goals. A May 5, 1994 DNC memorandum 
written by DNC staffer Martha Phipps sets forth the plan to use 
event invitations to meet DNC fundraising goals. The memorandum 
identifies as essential to reaching a goal of $40 million 
offering invitations to specific events, including ``[s]ix 
seats at all White House Private dinners * * * [s]ix to eight 
spots at all White House events * * * White House residence 
visits and overnight stays * * * [t]wo places per week at the 
Presidential CEO lunches * * * [and] [t]en places per month at 
White House film showings.'' 89
    This memorandum was discovered in the Office of the White 
House Chief of Staff (Leon Panetta at the time the memorandum 
was written) in a file marked ``Democratic National Committee, 
FINANCE SUPPORTERS, Revised 5/4/94.'' 90 Also 
contained in the file was another page which appears to be from 
a larger document. In addition to its location in a DNC file, 
the content of this page, and its wording, gives every 
appearance that it was written by someone at the DNC. It 
significantly states:

    The White House Social Office has been relatively 
inaccessible to the DNC. * * * We are on the same team and 
would like to share information in a legal and ethical manner. 
If we can break down the territorial nature of the Social 
office, we will accomplish a great deal more for the President 
and the party.


                                problems


Events
    At this time we do not have access to calendars or advance 
notice of events and dates. We frequently face the embarrassing 
situation of being notified of upcoming events by the 
contributors. Additionally, we can match the most appropriate 
people and events, given some advance notice.
Follow Up
    The DNC is not aware of who has been taken care of to date. 
Only recently have we been allowed to send a staffer to the 
Social office to look up Trustee involvement for the past year. 
Having this information in a timely fashion is important to our 
fundraising efforts.
Cooperation
    The nature of fundraising is very last minute. Contributors 
often come in at the last minute for a specific event. * * * We 
need flexibility to make changes where appropriate.
Fundraising Interference
    DNC solicitation is subverted due to major donors being 
invited to high level White House events regardless of the date 
or amount of contribution. This is a disincentive especially 
for the Trustee level contributor.
Understanding the contributor
    The Trustee consist [sic] of many of the nation's 
wealthiest and most influencial profiles. Some White House 
staffers fully understand the profiles of these contributors. 
We avoid events with huge crowds that may make the donors feel 
unimportant.91

    Yet another page contained in the file contains handwritten 
notes reflecting that 30 percent of the DNC Managing Trustees 
(DNC Trustees raised or donated $100,000 or more to the DNC) 
92 had not been to the White House. The notes 
further reflect the need for a ``list of who has been [to the 
White House].'' 93
    These documents found inside the White House parallel other 
documents discovered inside the DNC complaining of the 
inability to gain access to internal White House information. 
These documents include internal DNC memorandum prepared by DNC 
Fundraising staff. This fact cannot be over-emphasized. DNC 
Finance Director Richard Sullivan testified in depositions both 
before the Senate and House that the Finance Division at the 
DNC ought to have been named ``the fundraising division.'' 
94 Sullivan described his duties:

          The finance director reported to the Finance 
        Chairman. Essentially, the finance director had the 
        day-to-day interaction with the fundraising staff, and 
        worked with the fund-raising chairman in working 
        towards the goals of how much money was to be raised 
        and in what way.95

    Significantly, Sullivan testified that he had no other 
duties at the DNC other than fundraising.96 In 1995 
one of Sullivan's top fundraising assistants, Ari Swiller, 
served as Director of ``major supporter fund-raising,'' whose 
duties including ``work[ing] in raising money from our top tier 
of donors.'' 97 Indeed, Swiller headed the DNC 
Trustee program which Swiller described as ``a group of major 
donors and contributors to the Democratic Party as well as 
major fundraisers.'' 98 He described duties in 
heading the program as ``speaking with donors, following up 
with them, working on events and soliciting contributions from 
new donors.'' 99
            b. The plan involved the transfer of prior attendance 
                    information by the White House Social Office to the 
                    DNC
    The committee found evidence that the White House staff and 
the DNC planned to facilitate DNC fundraising by providing the 
proprietary prior event attendance information to DNC 
fundraisers. While witnesses sought to assert that providing 
this information was part of an ``official'' invitation 
process, much of it was, in fact, nothing more than a scheme to 
allow DNC fundraisers to have better information on the 
susceptibility of prospective donors to solicitations. By 
obtaining information from White House computers on previous 
event attendance, DNC fundraisers could decide who had already 
been rewarded, who needed to be rewarded, and who needed to be 
inspired through a White House invitation to raise and give 
money to the DNC.
    It is clear that within the White House the guest lists 
detailing who has been invited, who has accepted, and who has 
attended White House social events is jealously guarded. This 
information was maintained in the White House Database with 
respect to events such as official State dinners with foreign 
Heads of State, State arrival ceremonies for visiting Heads of 
State, receptions, and other official events. It is equally 
clear from the evidence that the DNC wanted this information, 
and complained when they could not get it.
    In March 1995, the DNC fundraising staff's complaints about 
access to the White House Social Office reached the new DNC 
Finance Chairman Truman Arnold in a memorandum from Richard 
Sullivan.100 The memorandum included complaints that 
mid-level White House staff compiled the event invitation lists 
and recommended who should be included in White House 
functions--``When we follow up, our requests are often second 
guessed, questioned and scrutinized by this tier of staff.'' 
101 It descibed the ``need to sell and represent our 
donors as supporters that represent more than contributions,'' 
102 and proposed, under the heading 
``COORDINATION,'' that ``[e]ach agency and WH department should 
have a list of supporters and a staff person identified and 
devoted to handle matters related to reaching out to our 
donors.'' 103
    Significantly, the memorandum recommends:

    [W]e might be able to work out a situation with the Social 
Office for us to get a copy of invited guests after WH affairs 
have occurred.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    If there's a problem sending it to [DNC] finance then 
perhaps it could be sent to the Chairman's office and then 
routed to finance.104

    Ari Swiller, DNC Deputy Finance Director under Richard 
Sullivan, testified that many of the ideas in the memorandum 
represented the perception of those persons, including himself, 
in the DNC finance division.105 Swiller testified 
that he formed his perception based upon his own experience of 
having made calls to the White House Social Secretary's Office 
and having his ``requests for information about upcoming events 
[]not responded to, because persons in the White House [he] 
dealt with felt that there shouldn't be preferential treatment 
given to the finance division.'' 106
    Swiller testified that there was a time when the DNC could 
not get information from the White House staff reflecting who 
had been invited to or attended White House 
events,107 and that both he and others in the DNC 
Finance Division desired to obtain White House Social Secretary 
lists of persons who had attended events at the White 
House.108 Indeed, this information was extremely 
valuable to the DNC Finance Division because whether or not a 
person had attended a prior event at the White House was a 
factor used by the DNC fundraising division in determining who 
it would recommend for invitations to upcoming 
events.109
    DNC Finance Chairman 110 Truman Arnold, was very 
candid in his deposition with respect to how prior attendance 
information was used as part of the DNC fundraising effort. 
Arnold testified that the reason the DNC obtained the prior 
attendance information was:

          Because in trying to reactivate the people who had 
        stopped contributing . . . 111
          There were people in Washington, inside Washington 
        who know how to work the system to get to a lot of 
        events that don't ever give a dime, or work, . . . 
        112
          So it was our way of bringing equity to the system . 
        . . to make sure that the DNC was not being abused, and 
        that the President wouldn't be abused.113

Arnold admitted that the system of making sure people got 
invited to the White House was designed to ``energize'' them to 
raise and give money.114 He went on to compare the 
DNC fundraising operation in this regard to people who attend 
church being expected to tithe:

          . . . [I]f you attend church, you are supposed to be 
        a tither. So if I can hopefully give a little 
        explanation, short philosophical approach to what I was 
        doing that may clarify some other questions, I am not a 
        hard s[ell]. I have been in sales all of my life, but 
        my whole philosophy is to include and to involve people 
        in the process, and if they like it and embrace it, 
        they will do their part without being asked. And if 
        they don't like it they won't.
          Whether it be charity drives that I have had for my 
        hospitals, for my church, for civic endeavors in the 
        community, mine is one of doing my part, stepping up, 
        including and involving and engaging. They become 
        energized, take part, take a role, and the balance 
        follows. This was my approach to this. This is what I 
        was attempting to do.115

    Indeed, Ari Swiller, also admitted that there were 
discussions with respect to people being invited over and over 
again to the White House even though they had not contributed 
recently.116
    Truman Arnold admitted that the White House attendance 
information was used in the preparation of DNC lists:

    [W]e had the list--how many times they had attended White 
House social events.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [T]he list would have already been prioritized, and there 
were references who they were and the nature of their business 
and how they had come to be contributors.117

    Another internal DNC memorandum to DNC Deputy Finance 
Director David Mercer, revealed that ``The only way [the DNC] 
can get the things we need to have done is through the [White 
House Chief of Staff's] office. This person is critical to our 
abilities.118 Indeed, it was the Chief of Staff's 
Office 119 to whom the DNC Finance Chairman, Truman 
Arnold, turned to break the logjam and permit the information 
flow. As set out below, Arnold went to the White House to 
obtain an agreement that the White House would provide the DNC 
with the information it sought.120
    In March 1995, shortly after taking over the helm as DNC 
Finance Chairman, and after the fundraising staff voiced to him 
their complaints about the inability to get proprietary White 
House attendance data,121 Arnold went to the White 
House and met with Erskine Bowles, Deputy Chief of Staff, and 
Ann Stock, White House Social Secretary. Although Arnold 
testified that the data flow arrangement had been in place 
before he arrived at the DNC,122 he explained that 
the meeting was arranged ``because there was a lot of confusion 
on how the system worked and what the responsibility was. I 
wanted to find the responsibility of the DNC and how it 
interfaced with the White House Social Office.'' 123
    It was at this meeting that Arnold learned of the Social 
Office event data which the White House would make available to 
the DNC:

          So I met with [Ann Stock] and * * * Erskine Bowles 
        and we had a discussion about the protocol and how the 
        system worked. And as a result of that, I knew that 
        they had an internal record of everyone and the number 
        that had attended a social event, and what that event 
        was, and how many times they had attended as part of 
        the Social Office.
          So, from that, the understanding that I had with the 
        Social Office is that we would check [for prior 
        attendance].124

    While Mr. Arnold's testimony was refreshingly candid with 
respect to most matters, one troubling aspect of his testimony 
on this crucial meeting was Arnold's seeming attempt to suggest 
that the DNC was permitted to obtain proprietary White House 
data in an effort to ``screen'' inappropriate persons from 
attending events.125 The record as a whole, however, 
makes clear that obtaining event attendance information had 
nothing to do with screening for inappropriate persons, as 
Arnold himself made clear. Arnold elsewhere repeatedly 
testified that non-familiar DNC names were already screened by 
the DNC before the DNC called the White House for attendance 
data. He said:
          [W]hen we had our list screened, our nominees 
        screened, we would call over to rate them and 
        prioritize them to see what the record was, because we 
        knew how many that the DNC had invited them to, but 
        they could have come from a lot of different directions 
        to other events.126
          The only thing we called for was to see the number of 
        times that this list, that we had already screened, the 
        number of times that they had attended functions 
        because we did not have that information. * * * the 
        only thing we used it for was to prioritize the 
        attendees.127
          [I told the fundraising staff] [t]hat we had the 
        responsibility to screen. In our recommendations, we 
        would assume major responsibility for screening of IDs 
        to the White House, and the procedure we would use is 
        to do the best we could with the tools we had to work 
        with and then we would call the White House to see, 
        after we screened them, how many times they had 
        attended, as part of prioritizing. * * * 128

    As with his fleeting and seemingly half-hearted suggestion 
concerning a ``non-fundraising'' screening function, Arnold 
also sought to defend the appropriateness of receiving the 
information by suggesting that:

          I never discussed financial terms in any form or 
        fashion with the Social Office. They never knew in the 
        list how much had been contributed, why they were being 
        submitted, what kind of workers they were. There was a 
        Chinese wall between the Social Office and the 
        Financial Office.129

    While it may very well be true that the DNC Finance 
Division did not discuss contributions with the Social Office, 
that is beside the point. There was no need to discuss 
contributions with the Social Office because the DNC Finance 
Division already had the financial and contributor information 
about every donor and potential donor. What they lacked was the 
proprietary White House data about past event attendance.
    Far from keeping that valuable data from the DNC--the White 
House agreed to provide it, and indeed thereafter did so on a 
regular and ongoing basis. It cannot be overstated that the 
White House agreed to provide the information that Arnold 
sought directly to the DNC Finance Division, the very entity 
which was charged with raising money.
    Neither Erskine Bowles nor Ann Stock recall the meeting at 
all. Stock testified that she had no recollection of a meeting 
with Arnold and Erskine Bowles. She recalled a meeting in her 
office in the White House with Arnold and his wife, where they 
discussed the logistics of the Arnolds' move to Washington, DC, 
but has no recollection of any discussions with Truman Arnold 
concerning the DNC and White House event 
attendance.130 Significantly, Stock testified--
directly contrary to Truman Arnold with respect to White House 
authorization for DNC staff to call and obtain information from 
the White House databases. Stock pointedly stated that Arnold 
``may have had the desire [to obtain such information] but he 
didn't have the ability to do that.'' 131
    Similarly, Erskine Bowles testified that he had no 
recollection of any such meeting. He testified that he did not 
remember a meeting with Arnold and Stock at any time, and 
recalled no meeting with Arnold in March 1995.132 
Prior to his deposition, committee staff had specifically 
requested Mr. Bowles to bring his calendar for 1995 for use 
during the questioning. Bowles neither brought his calendar, 
nor reviewed it. He testified ``I don't know where it is.'' 
133 Bowles did recall meeting with Arnold at some 
time during Bowles's tenure as Deputy Chief of Staff and 
recalled Arnold complaining about problems of getting people 
invited to White House events.134 Bowles testified 
that he was unaware of any White House event attendance data 
which was ever provided to Arnold.135
    It is difficult to reconcile the testimony of Truman Arnold 
and the testimony of Erskine Bowles and Ann Stock without 
concluding that the meeting to discuss the arrangement took 
place. Arnold has a clear memory of it; the others do not.
    Moreover, it is during this period that Brian Bailey worked 
for Erskine Bowles and created the handwritten notes reflecting 
that the President agreed that the WhoDB and the DNC database 
should be integrated.136 These notes are evidence 
that the President signed off on a plan to give DNC Finance 
Chairman Truman Arnold the very data that he sought in his 
meeting with Erskine Bowles and Ann Stock.
    The inescapable conclusion is that Truman Arnold and 
Erskine Bowles agreed that the DNC would receive the 
proprietary White House information to--in Truman Arnold's 
words--``reactivate the people who had stopped contributing'' 
137 and with the ``hope'' that they would be 
``energized'' to raise money.138 The best evidence 
that individuals at the highest levels in the White House 
agreed to provide the data is the fact that the data was 
thereafter regularly provided.
            c. Richard Sullivan, Ari Swiller, and others obtained data 
                    from the White House Social Office and the Office 
                    of Political Affairs
    Apparently in response to DNC complaints about not knowing 
about White House events for which they might submit names for 
invitations, at least while Erskine Bowles served as Deputy 
Chief of Staff, a group operated within the White House which 
held regular weekly ``list creation meetings.'' This group 
permitted the notification of upcoming official White House 
events to coordinate component entities to be able to submit 
names for invitations.139 Remarkably, the DNC as 
well as the the Clinton-Gore reelection campaign, and the 
Democratic Leadership Council [DLC] were regular participants. 
The DNC representative to the group, Brooke Stroud, admitted 
that the DNC was ``just like any other department within the 
White House.'' 140
    Following the weekly list creation meetings at the White 
House, DNC personnnel armed with the knowledge of upcoming 
events, informed the respective DNC offices of those events and 
invited all offices to submit names to the DNC ``Office of 
Constituent Services.'' According to testimony received by the 
committee it was this entity, the Office of Constituent 
Services, within the DNC which was the official entity to 
collect DNC names, prioritize them, and send them to the White 
House as part of the invitation process.141 The 
number of events for which DNC submitted names was 
approximately 20 a month.142
    This system itself provided a mechanism which allowed for a 
significant flow of proprietary White House information to the 
DNC (and presumably to the DLC and to the Clinton-Gore 
reelection campaign). This data included otherwise jealously 
guarded (even within the White House) information revealing 
which individuals had been selected for invitations to upcoming 
official White House events,143 and who had been 
invited to past events.144 The information 
concerning who had been invited to upcoming White House events 
was widely sought by persons both within and outside of the 
White House. However, this information was kept highly 
confidential by the Social Office. As Ann Stock, the White 
House Social Secretary testified:

          [Persons in the White House] could possibly call and 
        ask [who had been invited to an upcoming event from 
        their recommended list] but that wasn't really a 
        regular occurrence, because we had a policy of not 
        releasing lists, because we wanted invitations to come 
        from President and Mrs. Clinton, not from people who 
        had suggested names. So we had a policy of not 
        releasing the lists [either inside or outside of the 
        White House].145
          We chose not to submit [the invitation] list and 
        circulate it through the White House so that the 
        President and First Lady would have the opportunity to 
        invite people . . . rather than somebody decide that 
        they wanted to call up and say, I put you on the list. 
        That is why it was kept very 
        confidential.146
          We usually didn't give them the information, which 
        was a source of contention, because we maintained [the 
        invitee list] until the people came to the White House, 
        the list was under the purview of President and Mrs. 
        Clinton, how and why they had been invited, and we 
        didn't circulate the list.147

The value of this information was expressed most pointedly by 
Stock when she testified:

          People want to claim credit for getting someone 
        invited to the White House. That is why we did not 
        circulate those lists. . . . 148
          People like to have the information.149

    Beyond the list creation meetings, specific staff members 
of the DNC called specific individuals in the Social Office and 
Office of Political Affairs to obtain lists and information 
about prior attendance at White House events. Richard Sullivan, 
the DNC Finance Director himself testified that he obtained 
lists of attendance at White House CEO lunches and the White 
House Economic Conference and that he used those lists to raise 
money.150 Karen Hancox, the Deputy Director of the 
Office of Political Affairs testified that Sullivan called her 
and asked for information about prior event attendance, that 
she called the Social Office staff for such information, which 
was given to her, and that she, in turn, gave it to 
Sullivan.151
    Ari Swiller, the Director of the DNC's major donor program, 
similarly testified that he and two other DNC staff members 
called for such information from the staff in the Social 
Office.152 He also testified that it was his 
impression that Donald Dunn in the White House Office of 
Political Affairs was looking up data on a computer when he 
provided such data toSwiller.153 Donald Dunn, whom 
DNC Director of Constituent Services Brooke Stroud called ``Information 
Central,'' 154 confirmed that Swiller contacted him and that 
he used the White House Database to provide him with 
data.155 Swiller also testified that he received lists from 
the White House when he had inquired about prior 
attendance.156
    Consistent with Arnold's and Bowles's plan, it plainly 
became a routine matter for DNC staff to contact the White 
House staff to obtain this information. Moreover, the 
President's objective of integrating the White House Database 
was effectively achieved. DNC fundraisers had obtained access 
to the crucial and valuable data in the White House Database.
            d. The White House Database was used to supply data to the 
                    DNC for planning DNC events at the White House
    After Arnold exposed the practice of the White House 
providing the DNC with proprietary White House information in 
connection with official White House events, the White House 
Press Office sought to transform what Jack Quinn had said was 
prohibited 157 into something fully appropriate, 
claiming that the DNC by obtaining proprietary information was 
somehow performing an offical governmental 
function.158 During the January 30, 1997 press 
briefing Deputy White House Press Secretary Barry Toiv also 
suggested that the data flow to the DNC was limited only to 
``official'' White House functions:

    The only contact that we're aware of that the DNC would 
have had would have been when the Social Office was putting 
together lists of people to invite to official events here . . 
. .

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [T]hose [DNC events at the White House such as coffees] are 
not the events I'm talking about.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    It would not have been appropriate to use the database to 
determine who ought to come to a DNC event. And--well, that's 
the answer.159

    Although Toiv was correct that it would not be appropriate 
to use the White House Database ``to determine who ought to 
come to a DNC event,'' he failed to answer the question of 
whether the Database had, in fact, been used to determine who 
ought to come to a DNC event. The committee's investigation 
revealed that the DNC did obtain data from the Database in the 
planning of DNC events at the White House.
    Richard Sullivan testified that the DNC finance staff 
``probably'' contacted the White House and obtained prior event 
attendance information with respect to putting together 
invitees to DNC sponsored dinners, lunches, and receptions held 
both at the White House and outside the White 
House.160 Similarly, Truman Arnold testified that 
his DNC staff did indeed obtain for use by DNC fundraisers 
prior White House attendance in preparing lists for DNC 
events.161 Ari Swiller, who was very active in 
seeking and obtaining White House information, made no 
distinction between official events and DNC sponsored events at 
the White House.162 Swiller testified:

          Often we would submit a list of names to be included 
        at an event at the White House, and when we did that, 
        we wanted to see if people we were submitting had been 
        invited to previous events and attended or regretted, 
        or been invited at all.163

He added that this happened without distinction between 
official or DNC events.164
    Furthermore, it is clear that with respect to DNC events at 
the White House the DNC got more information from White House 
databases in the form of actual lists and printouts both for 
upcoming events at the White House and for previous events at 
the White House. In addition, the committee has exposed the 
establishment of an entire infrastructure, including government 
manpower, computer time and resources, fax transmissions, and 
telephone reports paid for by government funds, which were 
converted to the DNC fundraising efforts.
            e. The White House infrastructure was dedicated to helping 
                    the DNC raise money through White House invitations
    The resources dedicated to these events represent the 
conversion of the taxpayer-funded White House infrastructure to 
help the DNC raise money. That infrastructure included the 
preparation and mailing of invitations to DNC 
events.165 White House computer systems, including 
the White House Database, were utilized for inputting the DNC 
names into a list for each DNC event at the White 
House.166 Once the list was inputted, it was then 
printed from the White House Database (and, previously, its 
predecessor system) and sent to the White House Calligrapher's 
Office where the written invitations were prepared for mailing 
from the White House.167
    Thereafter, the White House Social Office received 
responses from those invited, and tracked whether they accepted 
or declined the invitation. White House personnel received the 
responses of those accepting or regretting and entered that 
respones and for those accepting, their date of birth and 
Social Security number into the White House 
Database,168 or its DOS predecessor database 
system.169
    All of this information, including the updated accept/
regret responses was able to be printed out in hard copy 
updates from both the White House Database and its DOS 
predecessor system.170 When the White House Database 
was installed, it permitted White House staff to view an entire 
list on the computer screen without the need to print out a 
report.171
    After handling invitations at government 
expense,172 the White House faxed to the DNC updated 
guest status lists from government computer systems for 
upcoming DNC events at the White House. These lists provided 
up-to-date information from the White House computer systems 
reflecting who had been invited, and who had accepted, who had 
declined an invitation.173
    Both prior to and after the installation of the White House 
Database, these White House-generated and updated lists were 
regularly sent by persons in the White House to the DNC to 
facilitate event attendance.174 While the DNC 
actually solicited the contributions, the White House 
infrastructure handled all of the arrangements for the events 
to which the contributions were attributed.
    Having the lists prepared by White House staff on White 
House computers permitted the DNC to ``work the phones,'' 
targeting calls to those who had not responded to the White 
House to check on their intentions.175 Remarkably, 
this appeared to be the exception. The usual practice was for 
government employees to make these calls in follow-up to 
invitations.176 The use of the White House staff to 
generate attendance cloaked the DNC's involvement, concealing 
the role that contribtions played in obtaining the invitations. 
This process effectively integrated the White House 
infrastructure with the DNC staff for the purpose of raising 
money through White House invitations.

  4. the transfer of data from the white house database as part of a 
scheme to convert the white house infrastructure to the benefit of the 
          dnc may constitute the theft of government property

    18 U.S.C. Sec. 641 provides:

          Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly 
        converts to his use or the use of another, or without 
        authority, sells, conveys, or disposes of any record, 
        voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States 
        or of any department or agency thereof, or any property 
        made or being made under contract for the United States 
        or any department or agency thereof; or
          Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with 
        intent to convert it to his own use or gain, knowing it 
        to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined, or 
        converted--
          Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
        more than ten years or both; but if the value of such 
        property does not exceed the sum of $10,000, he shall 
        be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 1 
        year, or both.

    The evidence obtained by the committee shows that 
individuals in the White House may have violated this section 
of the Federal criminal code by converting to the use of the 
DNC a thing of value, namely data from the White House 
Database. The information was plainly a thing of value in the 
scheme to use White House invitations to reward and energize 
donors.
    There can be no suggestion that they did not transfer this 
data knowingly and without authority. White House Counsel Jack 
Quinn plainly recognized that such transfers were prohibited, 
and memoranda from the Counsel's Office to all White House 
staff advised that the use of White House property was not 
permitted under the provisions of the Hatch Act that otherwise 
permit political activity by White House staff.
    Erskine Bowles and Truman Arnold knowingly and willfully 
planned the transfer of data to support the conversion of the 
White House infrastructure to an effective fundraising machine. 
The DNC fundraisers knowingly and willfully carried out that 
scheme to obtain the data and to convert the White House 
infrastructure to the use of the DNC for fundraising. And White 
House staff knowingly and willfully cooperated in that scheme 
by giving out the data and by allowing the White House to 
become a fundraising tool of the DNC.
    Obtaining the data itself was a critical element in 
advancing the scheme to use the White House for fundraising to 
meet DNC fundraising objectives. Without the information from 
the White House Database, the DNC would have wasted precious 
fundraising resources--White House invitations--on at least 
those who had already been rewarded for their generosity. 
Obtaining the data allowed the DNC to integrate their 
fundraising with the White House Social Office.

C. White House Staff Transferred Other Data to the DNC and the Clinton/
     Gore Campaign Before the White House Database Was Operational

    The sharing of White House data did not begin with the 
White House Database. Prior to the development of the Database, 
White House staff apparently distributed White House lists to 
the DNC. The committee found numerous White House lists in the 
hands of the DNC and the campaign that pre-dated the White 
House Database.
    These lists included calligraphers' lists with hundreds of 
names and addresses from White House holiday receptions in 1994 
and the President's Yale Dinner in December of the same year, 
which were produced to the commiteee by the DNC.177 
The Yale Dinner list, although available to DNC fundraisers, 
was withheld from the committee by the White 
House.178 They also included the 1993 and 1994 
Holiday Card lists that were transferred to the campaign and 
theDNC, respectively.179 The list of those invited 
to attend the White House Economic Conference in 1994 was also produced 
by the DNC.180 A White House Office of Public Liaison list 
of Asian Pacific American leaders was given, according to the White 
House Counsel, possibly to John Huang while he was employed by the 
DNC.181 The transfer of the lists, which are things of 
value, and the knowing conversion of them to the use of the DNC is a 
theft of government property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641, which punishes 
the knowing conversion of government property.
    Finally, although Cheryl Mills had prepared a memorandum 
specifically advising that names and addresses from the 
official mails could not be sent to the DNC (in the context of 
the 1993 Holiday Card project), the President routinely 
directed that names and addresses from official correspondence 
that had not been entered in the WhoDB be included in 
PeopleBase. This, too, could constitute theft of government 
property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641. It is hardly surprising that 
with this history of sharing data that the White House 
Database, when it became operational, was used as a vehicle to 
transfer similar valuable data to outside entities.

     1. White House Staff Knew that the 1994 Holiday Card List was 
                         Transferred to the DNC

    The committee discovered that the Holiday Card project, at 
least in 1994, served as a vehicle to funnel massive amounts of 
proprietary government data, at least 76,000 names and 
addresses,182 from White House computers (prior to 
the creation of the White House Database) to the DNC. The 
Holiday Card projects undertaken during previous 
administrations are appropriate and legal joint undertakings by 
the White House, the national political party of the President, 
and his campaign entity, if any.
     While the national party traditionally pays for the 
production and mailing of the White House holiday cards, 
government data is prohibited from being provided to the 
national party by the White House. In order to ensure that the 
law is not violated, the White House, the political party, and 
the campaign often transmit their respective lists to a third-
party professional outside vendor to merge the lists and mail 
the cards.183 The purpose of this process is to 
ensure that the political party does not receive the White 
House list, which is government property.
    Despite these legal restrictions, the committee dislodged 
evidence that persons within the Clinton White House sought to 
use the Holiday Card project to unlawfully transmit government 
data to the DNC. Contemporaneous notes made by Erich Vaden 
reveal that Marsha Scott suggested that the Holiday Card 
project could be used as a vehicle to transmit the data to the 
DNC.184 These notes suggest a criminal conspiracy to 
circumvent the prohibition on transferring data to the DNC.
    According to Vaden's testimony, in response to Scott's 
suggestion that the White House names might be sent to DNC, 
Vaden felt it necessary to contact Cheryl Mills in the White 
House Counsel's Office to learn whether this was unlawful. 
``Marsha was saying, `Hey, well, we are sending this to the 
public.' It is public knowledge. You know, we are not hiding 
who we send the Christmas card to. De facto, people find out. 
So it is then public? Is that a public record then?'' 
185 Vaden testified that: ``to the extent possible 
that we could, we were looking for vehicles, you know, as ways 
to share that information with people.'' 186
    This statement is not the only instance of the expressed 
desire to accomplish what the law prohibited. In her reply to a 
June 17, 1994 memorandum from Brooke Stroud [DNC] to Tara Burns 
(White House), Burns suggested that the DNC bring over their 
list to the White House ``for a cross check''--``since we 
legally can't give it to you, I think it'd be helpful if you 
all could come over some time.'' 187
    Despite knowing the prohibition on transferring White House 
data to the DNC, and even suggesting during her deposition that 
she thought it was illegal,188 Brooke Stroud, Deputy 
Director of Membership Services at the DNC, who was in charge 
of the 1994 Holiday Card project for the DNC, oversaw the 
delivery of the merged list (including the White House lists) 
to the DNC in November 1994 from the Saturn Corp., a third-
party contractor used for the production of the 
list.189 There, it was entered into the DNC 
computer.190 Further, a hard copy printout was made 
which reached 5 feet in height,191 which has not 
been located.192 This is troubling indeed, for as 
Richard Sullivan testified with respect to other White House 
lists:

          We assembled tens of lists to work off of, and I 
        don't rule out that those lists may have been 
        assimilated into this assimilation of tens of hundreds 
        of lists that were floating around in the fund-raising 
        division. * * * [I]t * * * would have accumulated with 
        other lists that I had and others. * * * Generally when 
        we were working on our big Washington galas, we would 
        try to put together thousands of names for prospect 
        mailings or for prospect list callings. So that we 
        would ask everyone to produce whatever list they had. * 
        * * 193

    The knowing transmission of this list to the DNC is a 
violation of White House policy and a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 641, which prohibits the theft of government property. The 
mere possession of the list by the DNC is evidence of a theft 
of the property. But in addition to the possession of the list, 
there is other evidence that White House and DNC staff knew 
that they had no authority to transfer or receive and retain 
the list. Nevertheless, the list was transferred to the DNC not 
just once, but multiple times and retained in several forms. 
The multiple transfers are part of a pattern of evidence that 
White House staff provided and the DNC staff retained valuable 
government property. It is clear that these lists should not 
have been been sent to the DNC even once, much less the many 
times they were sent.
    The list was transferred to DNC computers multiple times. 
The data in the merged file from which duplicates were removed 
(called ``deduping'') at the DNC over the 1994 Veterans Day 
weekend itself remained as uploaded data in a file in the DNC 
computer. There were in factnumerous other tapes and computer 
files containing this government data which were impermissibly 
transferred to the DNC.
            a. At the direction of the DNC, Saturn delivered a sample 
                    printout of the merged tape to the DNC
    After the DNC and White House lists had been combined or 
merged by the Saturn Corp., the DNC instructed Saturn to 
produce and deliver to the DNC for review a ``sampling'' of the 
lists (including the White House data).194 Stroud 
has no recollection as to what happened to the ``sample'' list 
which included White House data.195
            b. At the direction of the DNC and with the knowledge and 
                    cooperation of White House staff, Saturn delivered 
                    the merged computer file tape to the DNC
    Prior to the Veterans Day weekend in 1994 Brooke Stroud 
(with the full knowledge of White House personnel) directed 
Saturn to deliver the merged Holiday Card list including the 
White House data to the DNC headquarters. There, Stroud had 
arranged for the data to be entered into the DNC computer and 
to be further de-duped by White House volunteers under the 
direction of a government employee, Sharon Lewis. Saturn made 
deliveries of the merged data to the DNC in multiple 
installments on November 8, 9, and 11, 1994.196 The 
component parts making up the merged list were entered into the 
DNC computer where it was worked on and further de-
duped.197 As Brooke Stroud testified:

    A. All the lists, PeopleBase, White House, DNC, all the 
lists were sent to a merge/purge house who did the de-duping. 
They did not--they didn't do a great job. So we brought the 
list in.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Q. All right. That list came back to the DNC?
    A. Right.198

    DNC personnel and White House volunteers worked on the data 
in the DNC computer at least during the Veterans Day weekend 
and thereafter. The two computer personnel at DNC testified 
that they had no recollection of these events involving 
volunteers or weekend work. Though, clearly someone beyond the 
technical level of Stroud would have been needed to enter the 
data and set up the terminal access for a dozen persons. Bryan 
Daines, the Director of Information services at the DNC, 
testified that only two DNC employees were technically capable 
of uploading data into the DNC system from a magnetic tape--he 
and Al Hurst, a DNC computer programmer.199 However, 
neither Daines 200 nor Hurst 201 had any 
recollection of performing such a task.
    It is likely they would have remembered this incident, 
given the unusual circumstances of the situation including the 
use of White House volunteers on a weekend.202 This 
suggests that someone other than these two entered the data 
into the DNC computer. The committee has been unable to 
discover in what file name or other identifying information it 
was entered, what, if any access limitations were built in, and 
who thereafter had access to the information thus entered is 
unknown to the committee.
    The committee requested all sign-in/sign-out logs and 
records for the time period covering the Veterans Day weekend 
which would reveal the names of those persons present in the 
DNC. The DNC did not produce those records, and refused to 
state what records they had produced and why they were 
produced. Finally, testimony revealed that these records had 
been destroyed.203
    On or about November 30, 1994, the DNC produced tapes from 
the DNC computer containing the de-duped, or cleaned-up, 
information. However, at least one set of tapes containing the 
merged data was returned to Saturn Corp. to be placed in postal 
presort format and then transferred to the laser house (``The 
Last Word'') for final mailing.204 The information 
transferred to the tape, of course also, as far as is known 
remained in the file within the DNC computer. No evidence 
exists that the data was deleted from the computer system after 
the tapes were made to be returned to Saturn.
            c. A so-called problem tape was delivered to the DNC and 
                    retained
    The committee's investigation revealed that the prohibited 
data went to the DNC and into its computer system, yet again, 
this time, under the guise of a problem tape. After receiving 
the DNC de-duped tapes back from the DNC on or about November 
30, 1994, Saturn placed the data in a postal presort format. On 
or about December 2, 1994 Saturn delivered the data to the 
laser house for addressing and mailing.205
    However, the Last Word discovered what was perceived to be 
a problem with the tape provided by Saturn. The Last Word 
returned tapes to Saturn Corp. which Saturn received on 
December 14, 1994.206 Two days later, on Friday, 
December 16, 1994, Saturn representatives arrived at DNC with 
the problem tape. Two letters from Saturn, one dated December 
20, 1994 to Brooke Stroud,207 and one dated December 
22, 1994 to Eric Sildon,208 confirm the meeting of 
Saturn personnel at the DNC on that date concerning the problem 
tape.
    With respect to these events, Al Hurst, the computer 
programmer at the DNC, recalled that his only contact with 
Saturn personnel occurred at the time of the ``the problem 
tape.'' 209 He testified that when Saturn brought 
the ``problem tape'' to the DNC, ``we uploaded it to a secure 
place on the AS400 [the DNC computer database system].'' 
210 Beyond his recollection that he once viewed the 
problem tape on the computer screen with Brooke 
Stroud,211 Hurst has norecollection as to what 
happened to the tape itself, which Saturn brought to the DNC on 
December 16, 1994 and which Hurst uploaded into the 
computer.212
    With respect to the data from the tape which had been 
uploaded into the DNC computer system, the record establishes 
that it remained in the computer for an extended period of 
time. At some time after 1994, at Brooke Stroud's request, 
Hurst made yet another tape containing this data.213 
He gave the tape to Brooke Stroud, but has no idea what she did 
with that copy.214 In addition to this copy of the 
data on yet another tape, the data also remained in the DNC 
computer system thereafter.215
    In fact, this data remained in the specified file in the 
DNC computer system for a total of over a year, until in 
approximately January 1996, Hurst testified he deleted the file 
from the DNC system.216 However, before deleting the 
data, Hurst made yet another tape which contained the 
data.217 This copy was placed on a tape rack in the 
unsecured DNC computer room.218
    Hurst's testimony regarding the deletion of the data from 
the DNC computer system is unusual. Hurst is a computer 
programmer. He described his duties as being ``to keep the 
computer running, to train people how to use the computer, and 
to make enhancements and changes to the programs that are on 
the computer.'' 219
    Yet Hurst, seemingly out of the blue and of his own 
volition, made the independent judgment to delete the file from 
the system--a file which contained data that he produced in the 
form of a tape for Brooke Stroud. Hurst testified that he did 
not ask anyone else whether the file should be 
deleted.220 He stated that he made the determination 
because ``it was taking up a lot of space on the system.'' 
221 Despite specific recollections of having deleted 
this particular file, the name he gave to the file, and when he 
deleted it, Hurst was unable to recall the volume of the data 
in this file.222
    In addition, despite his earlier testimony that the other 
criteria he used in determining whether to delete a file was 
how often it was used, he admitted that he consulted no one 
about this file's use.223 and that he did not check 
the computer program data which would have revealed its 
``use.'' 224 He could not explain why he did not 
check that information before deleting the file.225 
Nor could Hurst provide any explanation as to why he copied the 
data onto a copy tape prior to deleting the file in January 
1996.226
    In sum, this data (from the supposed ``problem tape'') was 
purposefully and deliberately entered into the DNC computer 
system where it remained for at least a year. Further, numerous 
copy tapes were produced from downloading that data, some of 
which, at least, remained unsecured in the possession of the 
DNC for years. At least one such copy remains in the possession 
of the the DNC at this very moment. And the original Saturn 
tape from which the data was originally uploaded remains 
unaccounted for, last seen at the DNC when uploaded.
            d. After the mailing, the final merged tape was returned to 
                    the DNC, not the White House
    Following the lasering and the mailing of the 1994 holiday 
cards, the final tape containing White House data was returned 
not to the White House, but to the DNC. Al Hurst understood it 
had come from Saturn in as much as it had a Saturn label on the 
tape.227 However he received it and placed it on the 
tape rack in the unsecured computer room at the 
DNC.228 Hurst did not recall uploading this tape 
into the computer, or whether anyone else may have in March 
1997. This tape was subsequently retrieved by Hurst in March 
1997 from the tape rack for a copy to be made at DNC counsel's 
request.229

 2. The White House Counsel Sought to Evade the Committee's Questions 
 about the 1994 Holiday Card Tape because the Staff Knew that the Tape 
               Had Been Transmitted to the DNC Illegally

    The White House has sought to conceal many of these facts 
and to mislead investigators concerning the unlawful access. 
These efforts to mislead are evidenced by the convoluted 
language in the attachment to White House Counsel Charles F.C. 
Ruff's letter of February 28, 1997.
    One of the most glaring examples is the White House's 
assertion that it had only ``recently become aware'' of the DNC 
receipt of the White House list.230 In fact, Maggie 
Williams, Chief of Staff to the First Lady, Alice Pushkar, 
Director of the Office of the First Lady's Correspondence, Jim 
Dorskind, Director of White House Correspondence, Sharon Lewis, 
who directed the White House volunteers, and perhaps Cheryl 
Mills, then-Associate Counsel to the President, were all fully 
aware in November 1994 that the White House data was unlawfully 
transferred to the DNC.
    The White House certainly knew as early as August 1995 that 
the final list was unlawfully at the DNC. Alice Pushkar 
testified that she knew it by that date, and prior to that had 
always ``assumed'' that the DNC and not the White House had 
received the final list after the 1994 mailing.231 
However, in August 1995, Pushkar told Cheryl Mills, Deputy 
Counsel to the President, in a written memorandum that the DNC 
had the tape.232 Indeed, Mills responded that the 
DNC could not legally have the list.233
    While Erich Vaden testified that to his knowledge the 
Holiday Card list was not shared with the DNC,234 
the evidence clearly reveals that, at least in 1994, it was. 
More importantly, the elaborate efforts taken by the White 
House to conceal the facts and to misrepresent the 
circumstances of the delivery of the data has not only 
obstructed the committee's investigation, but suggests a 
consciousness of criminal guilt surrounding the delivery.
    At least by October 1996, the committee's investigation had 
identified the possible improper use of official data under the 
guise of the traditional joint White House/DNC Holiday Card 
projects. On October 3, 1996, the committee requested answers 
to specific questions surrounding the Holiday Card projects.
    While many of the questions focused on the 1995 and 1996 
Holiday Card projects, the final question asked the White House 
to ``identify any and all outside contractors who assist or 
have assisted in the preparation and/or mailing of the White 
House holiday cards.'' 235 The committee requested 
answers by October 9, 1996. The White House failed to answer by 
that date and was asked again to respond by October 29, 
1996.236 White House Counsel Jack Quinn again failed 
to answer and was asked to respond by November 18, 
1996.237 He again failed to answer, was again asked 
to do so, this time by January 14, 1997,238 and 
again, he did not respond.239 Indeed, answers to 
these questions concerning the Holiday Card project were never 
provided during the tenure of Jack Quinn as White House 
Counsel, despite representations that such answers would be 
forthcoming.
    After Mr. Ruff's arrival, the White House had still failed 
to answer the holiday card questions. The committee, once 
again, requested answers to these questions by February 26, 
1997.240 The White House once more failed to answer, 
was asked again to do so by February 28, 1997.241 
Not until February 28, 1997, almost 5 months after first being 
asked, and well after the 1996 Presidential election, did the 
White House Counsel's Office respond--only then revealing for 
the first time the illegal transfer of massive amounts of data 
from the White House to the DNC in the guise of the 1994 
Holiday Card project.
    At a White House press briefing on January 30, 1997, White 
House spokesman Barry Toiv stated categorically that at no time 
did the DNC ever get to see any list from White House computers 
for the Holiday Card project. He further emphasized that ``the 
entire [merged list] was then brought back [to the White 
House],'' that only the printer would see the whole list, and 
that ``The DNC would not see the White House list.'' 
242
     In a February 28, 1997 letter, the White House Counsel 
told the committee that in 1994 the arrangements for the 
preparation and mailing of holiday cards was ``similar'' to 
that in 1995 and 1996. The White House suggested that in 1994 
(as in 1995 and 1996):

          The White House, [and] the DNC [] independently 
        submitted their respective lists directly to an outside 
        vendor. The vendor then compiled the lists into a 
        single list, attempted to eliminate duplicates and 
        mailed the same White House card to everyone on the 
        list.243

    Mr. Ruff's letter further stated that ``there was a clear 
understanding that, after the various lists had been merged and 
the duplicates eliminated, the final list was to be returned to 
the White House only.'' 244 In fact, this was simply 
not true. The White House was unable to produce any documentary 
evidence reflecting that the vendor understood that it was to 
return the deduped lists only to the White House. Indeed, no 
documents produced by Saturn included anyinstruction that the 
final list was to be returned only to the White House. The person in 
charge of the project at the White House similarly testified that she 
could not recall any discussions about the requirement of either the 
original White House tape or the merged tape being returned to the 
White House,245 and that with respect to the final merged 
tape, she ``assumed it would go back to [the DNC].'' 246
    The evidence uncovered by the committee revealed Saturn was 
instructed to send the merged lists not to the White House but 
to the DNC. Prior to the final mailing, the merged lists were 
delivered to the DNC where the list was entered into the DNC AS 
400 computer system.247
    The White House Counsel's Office further characterized the 
delivery of the merged tape to the DNC as a ``mistake'' and a 
``mix-up.'' 248 In fact it was not a mistake or a 
mix-up at all, but was intentionally sent to the DNC to be 
entered into its computer and cleaned up or ``deduped'' by 
White House volunteers directed by White House employees. Not 
only had Saturn Corp. done exactly what the DNC asked it to 
do--deliver the merged tape to the DNC--it did so with the full 
knowlege of White House officials in charge of the 1994 Holiday 
Card project. In memoranda dated November 9, 1994 
249 and again on November 15, 1994,250 
Brooke Stroud at the DNC, informed Maggie Williams and Alice 
Pushkar at the White House that White House lists were at the 
DNC for ``manual de-duplication,'' having been delivered from 
Saturn to the DNC.
    Further, White House employee Sharon Lewis was fully aware 
that White House lists had been entered into the DNC computer, 
because she coordinated White House volunteers to dedupe the 
merged lists at the DNC headquarters on the Veterans Day 
weekend in 1994.251 Jim Dorskind, Assistant to the 
President and Director of White House Correspondence, was also 
fully and specifically aware of the fact and directed Lewis to 
direct White House volunteers to the DNC for the 
project.252
    In addition, it is quite possible that Cheryl Mills had 
specific knowlege of the unlawful transfer of data to the DNC. 
Brooke Stroud testified that ``Cheryl Mills might have [had 
knowledge of the project and the use of White House volunteers 
to dedupe the list at DNC], but I don't remember.'' 
253 Stroud stated, that while she had no distinct 
memory of Mills having such knowlege, Mills ``was on the 
telephone for most of our meetings, or most of the holiday card 
group meetings.'' 254
    Additional evidence, suggesting that other White House 
staff, including Mills, had actual knowledge of the prohibited 
transfer of data at the time of the transfer, is Mills's later 
attempts at damage control in her 1995 memoranda. For example, 
in her memorandum to Alice Pushkar of August 14, 1995, Mills 
retreated from her earlier categorical response to Alice 
Pushkar that the DNC ``shouldn't have [the] tape'' 
255 to her more expedient advice that 
``[n]evertheless, the DNC is, as you know, prohibited from 
using the official Holiday Card list for any purposes other 
than the Holiday Card project.'' 256
    Pushkar testified that she had no idea what Mills meant by 
``use restrictions'' and that she (Pushkar) wasn't concerned 
about use restrictions at the DNC.257 Mills's 
memorandum further suggests that not only was the DNC 
prohibited from using the list for any purpose other than the 
Holiday Card project, but also that such ``use restrictions'' 
had been imposed on the DNC by the White House.258 
Mills's memorandum clearly states that prior to 1995 the White 
House had ``entered into use agreements to protect the use of 
the White House list against any other use than the holiday 
[card] project.'' 259
    The committee sought from the White House copies of all 
such ``use agreements,'' both by letter request,260 
and later subpoena.261 Such agreements between the 
White House and the DNC would, of course, clearly establish 
that the White House staff knew very well that the DNC had 
obtained the prohibited data. Despite the compelled production 
of these critical documents, the White House has never produced 
these records, claiming that they are missing. On November 19, 
1997, the White House Counsel's Office responded to the 
committee that:

         We have been unable to locate any use agreements for 
        any years between any holiday card vendors or the DNC 
        and the White House. * * * 262

    The White House Counsel's staff provided no further 
explanation concerning these suddenly missing documents, 
casually suggesting that ``should we subsequently locate 
responsive material, it will be provided promptly.'' 
263 Thereafter, at the committee's request a 
subpoena was issued compelling production of this material. 
Further, in an attempt to discover why the White House was 
``unable to locate'' these records, the subpoena compelled all 
records reflecting efforts made by the White House Counsel's 
Office to locate them.264 No documents have been 
produced in response to this subpoena.
    It is reasonable to conclude in light of this record that 
the list was delivered to the DNC without any use restrictions. 
Mills's memo suggests that she believed either that the DNC had 
the list or that it was better to lie about the existence of 
such use restrictions than to admit that the DNC had the list 
without them.
    There is ample reason to prepare a memorandum after the 
fact, saying that use restrictions were imposed when they were 
not. Preparation of such a memorandum would conceal the fact 
that the lists were delivered to the DNC without restrictions. 
The memorandum would lead the reader to believe that even if 
the DNC had the tape, it could not and would not use it for 
fundraising purposes. The inability of the White House to 
produce any agreements or any evidence of agreements, other 
than Mills's self-serving memorandum, leads the committee to 
conclude that White House staff knowingly allowed the list to 
be delivered to the DNC without restriction in violation of 
law, and in direct contradiction to the White House's later 
statements to the committee that the lists were sent to the DNC 
inadvertently.

 3. The Clinton/Gore Campaign Impermissibly Received the 1993 Holiday 
                               Card List.

    The committee has exposed the fact that White House staff 
not only impermissibly transferred the 1994 White House Holiday 
Card list to the DNC, but also that the White House portion of 
the 1993 Holiday Card list was transferred into the Clinton/
Gore computer system. The documentary evidence discloses that 
the Clinton/Gore campaign acquired between 33,000 
265 to 43,000 266 names and addresses 
from the White House, which were entered and still reside in a 
Clinton/Gore campaign computer.
    In 1993, the entity selected to merge the Holiday Card list 
was W.P. Malone, Inc. (Malone), an Arkadelphia, AR firm which 
was also the entity which had maintained the Clinton PeopleBase 
campaign database.267 Documents obtained by the 
committee reveal that the White House list went to Malone on or 
about November 8, 1993.268
    As a result of interviews with Malone employees conducted 
by committee staff in Arkadelphia on April 29, 1998, a Malone 
staff member supplied a sworn affidavit to the committee that 
(1) the White House portion of the 1993 Holiday Card list was 
received in disk or tape form and was merged with both DNC and 
PeopleBase lists to create a master database for the card 
mailing; (2) this separate database was entered into the 
Clinton/Gore ICL DRS 6000 computer which was later moved to the 
offices of the Clinton/Gore '96 campaign in 1995; and (3) he 
has no recollection that he was asked to return these disks to 
the White House, or to return the master merged lists 
containing the White House submissions to the White 
House.269
    This retention of the final merged list by Malone was no 
mistake or inadvertent oversight. Indeed, the retention by 
Malone of the merged list, including the White House data, was 
fully known by persons in the White House, including Marsha 
Scott and Dan Burkhardt. In January 1994, for example, 
Burkhardt had asked Malone--not for the return of the final 
master list--but for a copy of it for White House clean 
up.270
    Not only was the original list retained by the Clinton/Gore 
campaign following the 1993 Holiday Card mailing, but also, 
corrections to the list made by White House employees on White 
House stationery and at government expense were transmitted to 
the Clinton campaign to be used to clean up the campaign 
database.271 The best evidence suggests that the 
number of returned envelopes totaled approximately 
8,000.272 The White House sent the directive to 
Malone, with instructions to use the information gleaned from 
the mailing to clean up the database, with specific instruction 
to drop listings from the database where the envelopes 
reflected insufficient addresses, and where new address 
information had been provided, the new listings ``can be 
updated on the database.'' 273
    That the 1993 information was intentionally used to clean 
the campaign database was known at the highest levels of the 
Clinton-Gore campaign and the White House. Documents attached 
to a March 9, 1998 memorandum from Lyn Utrecht, counsel to the 
Clinton/Gore campaign, to Bruce Lindsey and recovered from 
White House files, make clear that the 1993 White House Holiday 
Card mailing was used to correct addresses in the campaign 
database.274
    There were, in fact, elaborate efforts made in 1993 to get 
the 1993 White House holiday card data not only to the Clinton-
Gore campaign, but to the DNC. There is evidence that plans 
were underway to send White House lists directly to the DNC. 
The data sought to be transfered under the guise of holiday 
card lists had been compiled by White House employees based 
upon official lists including ``correspondence, event 
attendance lists, outreach lists and other sources. * * *'' 
275 The DNC transfer plan was apparently set forth 
in a September 15, 1993 memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Maggie 
Williams, entitled ``Holiday Greeting Cards.'' 276 
Yet this crucial document is inexplicably missing. The White 
House Counsel informed the committee that it has ``not 
located'' a copy of this document.277
    Thereafter, persons in the White House sought to implement 
complex schemes to transfer both campaign lists and White House 
lists to the DNC. Evidence suggests that the first scheme was 
designed to funnel campaign lists (presumably from PeopleBase) 
through the White House and then to the DNC. This scheme would 
have hidden evidence of a direct transfer of campaign data to 
the DNC. While providing such lists may be legal under certain 
circumstances, providing them also triggers reporting 
requirements as well as in-kind contribution limits which could 
have been avoided by sending the data through the White House.
    Whatever the reason, it appears that Cheryl Mills took the 
position that such a transfer scheme was ``impermissible.'' 
278 The White House has been unable to ``locate[] a 
written memorialization of the `explanation of the 
impermissibility of a list from campaign to [White House] to 
DNC[,]' '' 279 which presumably would elucidate both 
the details of the scheme and the reasons for opposing it.
    Another effort was made to use an outside entity to funnel 
the data to the DNC. It is not clear whether these efforts were 
designed to funnel the campaign data to the DNC, similar to the 
first scheme, or to funnel the White House data to the DNC, or 
both. In an October 20, 1998 e-mail message from Matthew Moore 
to Cheryl Mills, Moore informed Mills that:

          Dan Burkhardt, in light of your explanation of the 
        impermissibility of a list from campaign to WH to DNC, 
        inquired as to the permissibility of sending our 
        created list to a third party, having the campaign and/
        or transition send similar lists to the same third 
        party (for elimination of duplicates on the list and 
        creation of a master list), who would then send the 
        resultant list to the DNC.
          Again: Campaign/Transition to Joakum Doe to DNC 
        parallel to: WH to Joakum Doe to DNC. With all 
        resulting list being sent to the DNC.
          Please advise.280

    The committee's efforts to fully understand the specific 
details of this proposal has also been prevented by missing 
records. In response to the committee's request for the 
memorialization of Daniel Burkhardt's inquiry as to the 
permissibility of sending a list to the DNC through third 
parties,281 the White House Counsel's Office 
responded that it has ``not located [such] a written 
memorialization.'' 282 In response to the 
committee's request for Mills's response to the e-mail 
proposal,283 the White House Counsel stated, ``[w]e 
have not located a memorialization of a response to the October 
20, 1993 e-mail from Matthew Moore to Cheryl Mills.'' 
284
    However, by October 28, 1993, Cheryl Mills had provided a 
remarkable attempt at ``legal cover'' in the form of a 
memorandum, allowing the transfer of White House data to any 
outside entity, including the DNC. Despite clear pronouncement 
elsewhere that once data is entered into databases in the White 
House, it cannot thereafter be transfered to outside sources, 
here, Mills states:

          Because the White House did not use mailing lists 
        created from the official government mail from members 
        of the public who wrote to the President (or the First 
        Lady or any other White House entity), but rather 
        created a list of supporters of the Administration 
        based upon personal knowledge of staff members, this 
        list properly can be provided to a non-federal entity, 
        including the DNC or a non-governmental 
        individual.285

    This analysis of what data may be used for the holiday card 
lists sent to the DNC makes no sense. It is simply not credible 
that a list of approximately 43,000 names, with their 
accompanying addresses was ``created * * * based on personal 
knowlege of staff members.'' Indeed, the names are gathered by 
White House personnel in performance of their official duties 
at the White House, and included: 2,500 names of military 
personnel including ``all military assigned to the White 
House;'' 286 the internal White House and taxpayer-
funded Presidential contact [PCON] database list; 
287 lists of invitees to the White House, the 
diplomatic corps, and the Secret Service.288 It also 
included State Department lists which were provided by ``a 
career person who has background or who has received lists in 
the past.'' 289 Further, Mills herself describes the 
source of this White House data in the very same memo--not as 
coming from the memories of individuals--but from White House 
staff who ``reviewed their correspondence, event attendance 
lists, outreach lists and other sources * * *.'' 290
    In addition, only as recently as August 11, 1993, Cheryl 
Mills had concluded that the very same White House Holiday Card 
list ``was created from the official mail of the President. . . 
.'' 291 Indeed, Mills had been specifically told on 
August 6, 1993 that the White House Holiday Card list ``will 
come from databases within the White House.'' 292 
Yet, less than 3 months later, she authored a memorandum 
purporting to reach the exact opposite conclusion and 
concocting an argument to allow the flow of prohibited data to 
the DNC, and key documents which would reveal the circumstances 
of this remarkable turnaround are inexplicably missing.
    The committee uncovered that the White House staff, under 
the guidance of Cheryl Mills, assembled the 1993 Holiday Card 
list and forwarded it to the operator of PeopleBase, the 
Clinton/Gore campaign database operator, where it was merged 
with the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign lists, cleaned up 
based on the returns after the mailing, and has been retained 
in the Clinton/Gore computer to this day.
    Indeed, the Clinton/Gore campaign is well aware that it has 
this list and has yet to notify the committee of its return to 
the rightful owner, which is the White House, or its 
destruction. As recently as August 21, 1998, Carl Mecum 
analyzed the file, presumably under the direction and with the 
permission of the Clinton/Gore campaign, to prepare the 
affidavit for the record of this investigation. Despite this 
notice of its possession of the lists, as far as the committee 
knows, no steps have been taken to return the government's 
property.
    While the original transfer may constitute a theft of 
government property, the retention of the list knowing it to be 
stolen also constitutes theft under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641. The 
Clinton/Gore campaign, because of the committee's 
investigation, is on notice that the data belongs to the 
government. Accordingly, the continued retention of the list 
constitutes a theft independent of the original theft.

4. The Names and Addresses from the Official Mail Sent to the President 
                     were Transferred to PeopleBase

    While Cheryl Mills's October 28, 1993 memorandum could not 
have been clearer--that data from the official mail could not 
be transmitted to the DNC--the names and addresses of people 
who contacted the President through the official mails or 
through the White House switchboard were routinely referred for 
entry into PeopleBase. Such transfers of official government 
data to the President's campaign database could constitute the 
theft of government property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
    According to an October 17, 1994 memorandum prepared by 
White House staff, ``Quite frequently, the President will ask 
that certain names and addresses be added to the `supporter 
file'. * * * Attached is a list of supporter file information. 
Please make sure all this information is added to the Data Base 
System. Also, can you send this information to Arkansas or do 
you need me to? '' 293
    While the nature and extent of this practice was not fully 
explored, the committee obtained several specific examples of 
lists that were forwarded to PeopleBase from the White House, 
including a January 1996 White House phone log with notations 
in the margin in unidentified handwriting ``PB'' and 
``WhoDB'',294 and a July 1993 list of addresses with 
a cover note to Monica Breadlove who operated PeopleBase, to 
add the names and addresses on the list to 
PeopleBase.295 It is not clear whether the President 
asked for these lists to be forwarded to PeopleBase or what the 
criteria for directing these particular addresses to PeopleBase 
was. If the the names and addresses were, indeed, from the 
official mails or derived from other official sources, the 
transfer of the data to PeopleBase could be considered a theft.

  D. Marsha Scott Converted Other Government Resources To Benefit the 
             Democratic National Committee and the Campaign

    The committee has uncovered information that government 
personnel and resources were converted to directly benefit 
outside political campaigns. Marsha Scott, in memorandum after 
memorandum, appeared to be advising and/or managing the 
campaign database and/or DNC databases, as well as other DNC 
operations. The knowing use of government computers, paper, and 
other office supplies and resources for the benefit of the DNC 
or the Clinton/Gore campaign constitutes the theft of 
government property. See United States v. Peter Collins, 56 
F.3d 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
    Even if Ms. Scott was permitted to engage in political 
activity on her own time, it is clear that she knowingly and 
wilfully used her White House computer and other office 
equipment and supplies to translate her new-found expertise in 
database development and data management to the benefit of the 
DNC or the President's campaign. This activity is contrary to 
Cheryl Mills's advice and testimony discussed earlier in this 
report that White House staff are prohibited from using White 
House resources to engage in political activity.296
    Marsha Scott's June 28, 1994 memorandum makes clear that 
she was seeking to do just that. As Mr. Shadegg and Ms. Mills 
agreed at the committee hearing on November 7, 1997, Ms. Scott 
used government resources to prepare her memorandum to Harold 
Ickes, Bruce Lindsey, and the First Lady regarding her 
involvement in developing the DNC and other outside databases. 
That in itself is a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
    Both White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff and Ms. Scott in 
her deposition acknowledged that the memorandum dealt with 
working on outside databases.297 Indeed, in Mr. 
Ruff's case, his insistence that these were outside databases 
was intended to clarify that the memorandum was not discussing 
the use of the White House Database to populate other outside 
databases. Thus, to defend Ms. Scott from a charge that she was 
using the White House Database improperly, Mr. Ruff was willing 
to admit, as was she, that she was using other government 
resources to make plans for the DNC and other political 
databases, a violation as well.
    Indeed elsewhere, in Marsha Scott's June 28, 1994 
memorandum to Harold Ickes, Bruce Lindsey and the First Lady, 
Marsha Scott reported having used government resources and 
personnel to work with the DNC on the development of their 
database. She also sought Ickes's, Lindsey's, and Mrs. 
Clinton's intervention to direct the DNC to allow her team of 
government personnel to work with the DNC on its database to 
ensure compatibility with future political databases outside of 
the White House.

    My team and I are also engaged in conversations with the 
DNC about the new system they are proposing. We have asked that 
their system be modeled after whatever system we decide to use 
outside the White House. I need you to make very clear to them 
that their system must be technologically compatible, if not 
the same, as whatever system we decide to use for political 
purposes later on. These discussions are currently in progress 
and a clear direction from you to the DNC will eliminate much 
unnecessary wrangling.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    * * * [L]et my team work with the DNC to help them design a 
system that will meet our needs and technical specifications. 
We can show them what to do and then clone another system for 
our specific uses later on. Any information stored in 
PeopleBase could then be dumped into the new system and made 
available * * * for political purposes.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    * * * I am proceeding as if this is the plan.298

    The ``team'' to which Scott referred was composed of White 
House personnel, including career personnel who thought they 
were performing only official government services with respect 
to all aspects of their database work with Marsha 
Scott.299
    Indeed, career employees were sent to the DNC by White 
House officials. One career employee testified that ``[I]t just 
didn't look right for us to go to the DNC. We were Federal 
employees * * * [M]y entire team was questioning us going to 
the DNC when we went, yes * * *,'' until his career supervisors 
put a stop to any further visits.300 He further 
testified that ``[W]hen we visited the DNC there was some 
discussion about being able to swap systems and information and 
things like that; but that was brought to a 
halt''.301
    Other career employees testified that members of the WhoDB 
team had been sent to the DNC for yet another meeting. While at 
the DNC, the team was contacted by beeper, and ordered back to 
the White House.302 A career employee who was sent 
and then ordered back explained ``The sense was that it wasn't 
appropriate for Federal employees to have direct contact with 
DNC''.303
    The White House Counsel's Office would later make 
extraordinary and elaborate attempts to cloak the diversion of 
official personnel and resources to political activity as being 
permitted by the Hatch Act. There is no doubt, but that certain 
White House officials may, in appropriate circumstances, engage 
in partisan political activities on their own time. However, 
while individuals are free to voluntarily engage in certain 
partisan political activities, the law does not sanction White 
House employers directing individuals to perform political work 
without their knowledge or consent. That is a diversion of 
official government resources, which is unlawful.
    In addition, the committee uncovered the fact that much of 
the work on database development, which the White House later 
sought to characterize as work on campaign databases, had 
involved government resources, including White House 
stationery, fax machines, et cetera, for which, as far as we 
have been able to determine, there has been no reimbursement 
from any campaign or party entity. The record is unmistakable 
that in the Clinton White House, the lines between official and 
partisan political acts were so blurred as to be non-existent. 
This led White House staff to involve themselves in political 
activity using government resources in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 641.
    Beyond that, the efforts to label certain database work as 
campaign-related, was an after-the-fact attempt to justify the 
nonproduction of records related to the official White House 
Database. Those records make clear that persons at the highest 
levels of the White House, including the First Lady, knew of 
the use of official government resources for partisan campaign 
activities 304 in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
    The crucial June 28, 1994 memorandum from Marsha Scott to 
Harold Ickes, Bruce Lindsey, and the First Lady, was itself 
written on official White House stationery and prepared on 
government-owned word processor equipment and systems. It 
conveyed and update not only on the White House Database 
project, but a report of the White House Database team, (whom 
Scott referred to as ``my staff'') and its trip to Arkadelphia 
to review the PeopleBase system. The memorandum further 
provides an update on the implementation of the White House 
Database,

          By the first of the year [1995] we should have any 
        flaws identified and corrected and the majority of the 
        White House using the new system. We will then have a 
        year [until 1996] to fully train and familiarize our 
        folks to its many possibilities and uses.\305\

    After reviewing this memorandum, the First Lady responded: 
``This sounds promising. Please advise. HRC''--and directed the 
memo, along with the notation to Harold Ickes.\306\ This is 
indeed a remarkable memorandum. It reveals that persons at the 
highest levels of the WhiteHouse, including the First Lady, 
knew of, and approved the planned use of the White House Database for 
partisan political purposes, or the use of government personnel and 
resources to work on outside partisan political databases. Either 
scenario is simply unlawful, and represents a planned theft of 
government property for partisan political activities.
    Further, the committee's investigation uncovered the 
significance of Marsha Scott's proposal to use government 
personnel to set up an outside database for future political 
purposes into which ``any information stored with PeopleBase 
could then be dumped.'' The evidence obtained by the committee 
shows that by June 28, 1994 the ``information stored with 
PeopleBase'' included over 40,000 names and accompanying data 
from White House computers.307 The committee found 
that the unlawfully transfered data ended up in the Clinton-
Gore `96 campaign computer.308
    The many other memoranda written by Ms. Scott to her 
superiors regarding her political activity equally reflect a 
diversion of government resources to the benefit of the DNC and 
the campaign. In addition to her June 28, 1994 memorandum, Ms. 
Scott wrote to Harold Ickes regarding ``DATABASE OUTSIDE WHITE 
HOUSE.'' 309 On January 26, 1994, she had written a 
``CONFIDENTIAL'' memorandum to Hillary Rodham Clinton and Bruce 
Lindsey outlining plans to use White House resources and 
personnel to clean up and correct campaign lists for future 
campaign use:
Status of Outside Databases

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Another way we can insure accuracy, is by providing 
corrections to any data sent to us. As long as we are not 
giving ``updated or supplemental information about data the 
entity may have initially provided'', we can correct ``where 
the action is de minimis.'' (See Cheryl's [Mills] memo attached 
for a full explanation.) I will work with Cheryl on a case by 
case basis and am anxious to discuss this with you 
further.310

As with other documents, the White House Counsel sought to 
conceal this very information from the committee by altering 
documents to delete the information reflecting work on outside 
political databases.311 Another draft of notes or an 
agenda for a meeting with the First Lady and Deputy Chiefs of 
Staff Phil Lader and Harold Ickes references ``Systems outside 
White House,'' ``Database for campaign use,'' and ``resources 
available to fund outside databases.312
    It is apparent that these kinds of notes and memos finally 
were enough for Harold Ickes. In a note dated December 5, 1994, 
he was reminded of a scheduled meeting with Marsha Scott in 
which he was ``supposed to be getting her clear on what she 
will be doing and what she will not be doing.'' 313 
The note further exposes exasperation with Marsha Scott's 
communications: ``As you know, until you have this 
conversation, you will continue to get memos from her and 
copies of memos she is sending around to different people * * 
*.'' 314
    Ultimately, in May 1996, the President approved a new job 
description for Marsha Scott, prepared mostly by Deputy Chiefs 
of Staff Evelyn Lieberman and Harold Ickes, expressly 
authorizing Marsha Scott to involve the President's supporters 
in fundraising from her government position and purporting to 
limit her access to the White House Database to uses that were 
``only in connection with her official duties.'' 315 
However, those official duties, according to the same memo, 
included fundraising. The use of the Database for fundraising 
constitutes theft of the data for the DNC's use.
    In his deposition, Harold Ickes described Marsha Scott's 
views of her responsibilities as ``expansive.'' 316 
When asked whether he ever expressed concern to Marsha Scott 
about this view of her responsibilities, he said, ``No. Well, 
the answer is, I didn't worry about it, because I knew that 
this was--if it were going to go anywhere, it would have to 
come back up through me, and I had no problem with her writing 
memos about it.'' 317 Ickes also testified that he 
did not concern himself with Marsha Scott's June 28, 1994 
memorandum regarding plans to develop a new DNC database 
because ``I don't think [the DNC] had the money at that time to 
even think about a new computer system. They were lucky to turn 
on the electricity of the one they had.'' 318 He 
further added: ``I knew what the financial situation of the DNC 
was. They had a database that had been there for years. They 
hardly had the money to turn on the damn database, much less 
establish a new one, so this sort of stuff didn't worry me.'' 
319
    This testimony demonstrates that Harold Ickes knew that 
Marsha Scott was using an ``overexpansive'' view of her 
responsibilities to work on the development of DNC databases at 
a time when the DNC had no money to do it itself. Without DNC 
financial capability, it was even more important that White 
House staff, such as Marsha Scott, conduct as much development 
and planning activity as possible from a position where the DNC 
would not have to pay her. Ickes knowingly continued to allow 
the diversion of government resources to the DNC at a time when 
he also knew that the DNC itself lacked resources. Thus, at the 
taxpayers expense, Marsha Scott was allowed to plan databases 
for the DNC.

 IV. THE PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY KNEW OF THE CONVERSION OF GOVERNMENT 
             RESOURCES TO BENEFIT THE DNC AND THE CAMPAIGN

          ``The President and the First Lady want this done. 
        Translating this into action on the part of others is 
        the rub.'' 320

    This statement, included in a memorandum from Marsha Scott 
to the First Lady and Bruce Lindsey, describes the essence of 
the President's and First Lady's involvement in the White House 
Database project. This and other documents and testimony 
showing that thePresident and the First Lady were informed of 
the use of official resources for unofficial political purposes suggest 
that the President and the First Lady were aware of the conversion of 
government resources to support the DNC and the campaign. See Section 
III.A and III.D (regarding Scott's conversion of government resources 
for political purposes).
    The committee believes that the President's involvement in 
the conversion of the White House into a fundraising tool 
represents an abuse of power. The President is entrusted with 
the conservation of the White House as a national landmark. The 
scheme to transfer data from the White House Database and other 
data sources supported the overall objective of systematically 
using White House invitations to accomplish political 
fundraising goals. The committee has issued this report to 
expose the evidence of this abuse of power.
    The documents plainly show that the President and the First 
Lady jointly directed the use of official resources to create 
the Database, with Marsha Scott in charge. Even after the 
initiation of the project, the President and First Lady 
remained deeply involved in the ongoing development and use of 
the Database. In this regard, the First Lady's actions with 
respect to the Database and the conversion of other official 
resources should be viewed as the President's.
    The evidence suggests that the President and the First Lady 
were involved in the enhancement of the DNC fundraising 
operation through the use of White House staff and resources, 
including the White House Database. See Section III.B 
(regarding the conversion of data from the White House Database 
to the use of DNC fundraisers). While having an official 
purpose, the White House Database was susceptible to being used 
for both official and unofficial purposes. The President and 
the First Lady capitalized on the Database's susceptibility to 
misuse for political purposes. The White House Database 
included financial information, 321 which allowed 
internal decisions on invitations to White House events to be 
determined by the degree of financial support given by 
potential invitees. The President's and First Lady's 
involvement in the details of the Database suggest that they 
knew what a powerful tool the Database would be not only for 
internal data management, but also for working with the DNC and 
the campaign to upgrade their data and data management systems.
    The DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign also benefitted from 
the President's and First Lady's knowledge and approval of the 
use of official resources, in addition to the Database, for 
unofficial purposes. The connection between the conversion of 
the White House Database and the conversion of other resources 
is reflected in the memoranda that address the internal data 
needs of the White House while at the same time seeking to 
address the database needs of the DNC and the campaign. Indeed, 
those sections of documents that addressed the issues of 
management of the DNC were originally withheld from the 
committee to conceal the relationship between the White House 
Database and the other efforts to use official resources for 
political purposes.

A. Evidence Relating to the President's and First Lady's Knowledge of, 
Approval of, and Involvement in the Conversion of Resources, Including 
         the White House Database, to the DNC and the Campaign

    Several documents produced to the committee reflect the 
President's and First Lady's knowledge, approval, and 
involvement in the conversion of government resources, 
including the White House Database, to the DNC and the 
campaign.

1. The President Wanted to ``Integrate'' the White House Database with 
   the DNC Database: Handwritten Notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to 
          Deputy Chief of Staff, Erskine Bowles 322

    The handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to then-
Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles, express most clearly the 
President's involvement in efforts to convert the White House 
Database to the use of the DNC. These notes, written in late 
1994 or 1995,323 expressly say that the President 
wants to ``integrate'' the White House Database with the DNC 
database to ``share'' data.324 Associate Counsel 
Cheryl Mills had opined that once data is entered in an 
official government database, sharing it with anyone for 
political purposes violates the law.325 The 
President's interest in sharing data with the DNC suggests that 
the President was willing to convert the White House Database 
to the use of the DNC in violation of clear White House legal 
advice and in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641, which prohibits 
the theft of government property.
    The withholding of this document by Cheryl Mills herself 
further corroborates that the President was interested in 
illegally integrating the Database. As discussed in Section II, 
there would be no reason to withhold this document, which was 
obviously responsive to the committee's request, unless it 
implicated the President in wrongdoing.

  2. Conversion of White House Resources ``Sounds Promising'' to The 
First Lady: June 28, 1994 Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes 
    and Bruce Lindsey, with a copy to the First Lady 326

    In her June 28, 1994 memorandum, Marsha Scott communicated 
to the First Lady her interest in and efforts to develop 
databases for the DNC or ``other entities we choose to work 
with for political purposes later on.'' 327 The 
First Lady responded to this memo with a handwritten comment at 
the top of the page: ``This sounds promising. Please advise.'' 
328 This memorandum shows that the First Lady was 
informed of this conversion of government staff and other 
resources for political purposes and even found it a 
``promising'' project.
    As with the Bailey handwritten notes, the deliberate 
withholding of a version of this document (which is in itself a 
criminal violation) corroborates its incriminating content. 
This evidence is particularly strong corroboration because the 
document was withheld, again by Cheryl Mills, who had provided 
advice through three separate memos to White House staff that 
such work using government resources was prohibited by law. 
Cheryl Mills knew that this memorandum implicated the First 
Lady in Marsha Scott's conversion of government property and 
withheld it for that reason. See Section II.E.

 3. The President Recreates the Campaign: Draft Memorandum to Chief of 
                Staff on Early Supporters 329

    ``This is the President's idea and it's a good one,'' 
announces a memorandum, which was originally produced to the 
committee in draft and was written by Marsha Scott for White 
House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty.330 This draft 
memo reveals a plan to: ``reach[] out to [the President's] 
friends and supporters * * *; identify and contact the key 
early supporters in all fifty states * * *; put in WhoDB the 
names and relevant information about those early supporters * * 
*; [and] add to this base group by early 1995, those folks we 
will be working with in 1996.'' 331
    The draft further outlines the plan to use the White House 
Database to ``recreate the Primary campaign structure * * *; 
establish a database to hold and work these names. (WhoDB will 
be fully functional by January [1995] * * *; recreate the 
General campaign structure using the same method we employed 
for recreating the Primary * * *[,] add[ing] the DNC and 
campaign records * * *; identify by early 1995, key financial 
and political folks in each state who can work with us'' with 
the expectation that ``[t]hrough consistent dialogue and 
follow-up, leaders will emerge'' to allow ``[c]o-ordinat[ion] 
with DNC and DLC about what they are doing for these folks.'' 
332

      4. The President Approved the White House Database: ``WhoDB 
                  Requirements Report'' 333

    The WhoDB Requirements Report expressly set forth the early 
history of the project. It stated: ``The President and First 
Lady have requested from Marsha Scott that a resource database 
containing relevant information about all White House events 
and contacts be designed and implemented.'' 334 That 
document further stated that the objectives of the Database 
would be to ``[p]rovide the President and the First Lady with a 
database that tracks all contacts with individuals and 
organizations that are important to the Presidency.'' 
335
    The knowledge and involvement of the President and the 
First Lady in directing the creation of the White House 
Database suggests that they had a particular interest in the 
Database project, such as the possible political uses of 
databases, with which they were familiar from their use of the 
campaign database, PeopleBase. Moreover, the potential for 
conversion of the White House Database to political purposes 
was enhanced by choosing Marsha Scott, a long-time friend of 
the President who was involved in other schemes to convert 
government resources for unofficial political purposes. This 
document is also consistent with numerous other memoranda that 
invoke the President's and First Lady's names for the Database 
project.336

  5. WhoDB Was Intended to Support the Fundraising Objectives of the 
  President and the First Lady: October 25, 1994 Draft Memorandum to 
    Erskine Bowles from Paul Antony and Brian Bailey 337

    The draft October 25, 1994 memorandum from Paul Antony and 
Brian Bailey to Erskine Bowles, ``Update on White House 
Database Project,'' confirms that the President and the First 
Lady thought that the Database would be a useful tool to track 
events and contributions. The memo expressly states under the 
heading ``WILL IT MEET THE NEEDS OF POTUS AND THE FIRST LADY?'' 
that those needs include ``keep[ing] accurate records of 
individuals' dealings with the White House (invitations, 
contributions, meetings) * * *'' 338 The answer was 
``YES?'' 339
    Clearly, this memo indicates that the President wanted the 
Database to be able to correlate contributions, invitations to, 
and attendance at events and so-called ``meetings.'' This 
document reflects the contemporaneous communication to Brian 
Bailey (an assistant to then-Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine 
Bowles) by Marsha Scott, regarding what needs the First Lady 
expressed regarding the Database--that is, to track 
``invitations, contributions, and meetings.'' 340 At 
the time Brian Bailey wrote this memorandum, he had been in the 
White House only a few weeks 341 and had no reason 
not to write down what he was told about needs for the 
Database. Although he testified that he consulted with Cheryl 
Mills frequently, he could not remember whether he had spoken 
with her prior to the drafting of this 
memorandum.342
    The final database that was created, in fact, met, the 
President's and the First Lady's needs. It included 
designations of contributors, such as DNC Trustee or DNC 
Managing Trustee,343 which correspond to specific 
dollar contributions. Not only were the designations within the 
Database useful for the President and First Lady to identify 
donors for invitations, the committee now knows that DNC 
fundraisers matched up their contributor information with WhoDB 
attendance information (see Section III.B) to appropriately 
reward donors. The combined efforts of the DNC and the White 
House most effectively and efficiently ensured the maximization 
of fundraising by matching DNC data on donors and White House 
data on attendance. This document indicates that these 
functions were designed to meet a ``need'' of the President to 
have such information.

 6. The First Lady Received a Demonstration of the Database and Asked 
for a Specific List to be Included: March 2, 1995 Memorandum from Erich 
                  Vaden to Marsha Scott 344

    On March 2, 1995, Erich Vaden wrote a memorandum to Marsha 
Scott that reflected that he had given the First Lady a 
demonstration of the Database. From that demonstration, the 
First Lady asked that a specific list, the ``Miles Rubin Rapid 
Response List,'' be included in the Database.345 
This memorandum shows the substantial involvement of the First 
Lady in the details of this Database in that (1) she wanted a 
demonstration and (2) she wanted a particular list added to the 
Database.
    Moreover, at the same time as she was asking for data to be 
put into the Database, others were devising a plan to send data 
to the DNC from the Database. Just a few weeks later, Truman 
Arnold and Erskine Bowles met to devise the plan for the White 
House to share data with the DNC (see III.B.2). This plan set 
forth an illegal scheme to convert official resources (the 
Database and White House personnel) to implement fundraising 
based on meetings and contact with the President through such 
activities as coffees, overnights in the Lincoln Bedroom, and 
invitations to White House events.

 7. The President Regularly Views Data and Places ``High Priority'' on 
 Data Clean-up: March 28, 1995 Memorandum [for multiple distribution] 
   from Erskine Bowles, ``Clean-up and Coding of Database Records'' 
                             346

    Indeed, 4 days after the meeting between Erskine Bowles and 
Truman Arnold, Erskine Bowles wrote a memorandum to various 
White House staff asking them to verify the data in the 
Database.347 The memorandum stated that the new 
Database would ``speed up the list creation process by giving 
us the ability to identify and target individuals.'' 
348 It further represented that ``The President and 
First Lady will view this information on a regular basis.'' 
349 In addition, the memorandum stated: ``This 
clean-up project is one of the highest priorities for the 
President and your office should treat it as such.'' 
350
    The new Database would in fact speed up the list creation 
process because it would allow the DNC to identify more readily 
those donors who were due for invitations to the White House. 
Because of the commitment to supply data to the DNC, it was 
important to clean up the data. It is logical to conclude that 
the President placed a high priority on the data because of the 
enhanced role of White House invitations in the DNC fundraising 
plan.
    Identifying the appropriate people in the Database for 
White House invitations took on new importance at this time. In 
March of 1995, the President was attempting to raise millions 
of dollars from Democrat party supporters to counter the 
Republican electoral gains the previous November. In January, 
he had personally authorized the use of overnight stays to 
raise money, asking for ``names at 100,000 or more, 50,000 or 
more'' and noting in his own handwriting that he was ``ready to 
start the overnights right away.'' 351 Logically, a 
President so personally involved in fundraising (and using 
White House invitations to do it) needed access to the right 
kind of data to make his efforts successful.

 8. The President Signs Off on Official Fundraising Job: The May 1996 
              Marsha Scott Job Description 352

    In May 1996, the President approved a job description for 
Marsha Scott. That description included: ``insur[ing] that the 
President's supporters were involved in fundraising activities 
to the extent possible'' and ``attend[ing] political 
fundraising coffee/events, and certain other events * * *'' 
353 The description also stated that Scott will 
``have appropriate access to the White House database [sic] but 
only in connection with her official duties.'' 354 
According to the documents produced regarding this description, 
the President asked to ``discuss once more'' the description 
with Harold Ickes 355 and approved it only after the 
discussion (``okay, per our discussion'').356
    It is not clear what official function is fulfilled by 
Marsha Scott's efforts to involve supporters in fundraising and 
attending fundraisers. However, the committee regards the 
disclaimer of use of the White House Database ``only in 
connection with her official duties'' to be nothing but boiler 
plate language with little or no meaning in this context. Here, 
the President approved a job description that included as an 
``official duty'' the involvement of others in fundraisers. By 
including that definition within the definition of official 
responsibilities, the President essentially gave a license to 
use the White House Database for Marsha Scott's work involving 
fundraisers.

 9. The First Lady was Aware of Marsha Scott's Transfer of White House 
 Data from the White House Database to the Campaign, the Conversion of 
   Government Resources for the DNC, and The Political Nature of the 
  Database: January 26, 1994 Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary 
            Rodham Clinton and Bruce Lindsey 357

    On January 26, 1994, Marsha Scott prepared a memorandum 
detailing proposals to help clean up data in the campaign 
database and at the DNC. Marsha Scott informed the First Lady 
that she was working to clean up the campaign data from the 
campaign database by ``providing corrections to any data sent 
to us.'' 358 Not only was Marsha Scott's use of 
government resources to work on the outside resources a 
conversion of government property; making corrections to the 
data of others using White House data was also a conversion.
            a. Transfer of data through providing corrections to the 
                    Campaign
    In this memorandum, Marsha Scott communicates to the First 
Lady about her efforts to convert government data to the 
campaign. The memorandum states that the White House staff can 
ensure the accuracy of data ``by providing corrections to any 
data sent to us.'' 359 In her deposition, she 
insisted that this was permissible regardless of the quantity 
of data.360 But the corrections to PeopleBase 
enhanced the value of the list that was ultimately delivered to 
the 1996 Clinton/Gore campaign.361
    The view that address corrections were of ``de minimis'' 
value is preposterous. The entire value of a list of names and 
addresses is derived from its accuracy. To correct a list of 
thousands of names, even if each correction is minor, adds 
significant value to that list. If that correction is taken 
from a White House data source, it is a theft of government 
property. Yet, this memorandum expressly explains to the First 
Lady how government property can be stolen.
            b. Conversion of government resources for the DNC and the 
                    Clinton/Gore campaign
    This memorandum to the First Lady is one of several 
memoranda to the First Lady and others prepared by Marsha Scott 
reflecting her involvement in the conversion of government 
resources to benefit the DNC and the campaign.362 
These memos reflect her systematic use of her time and other 
government resources to improve the data at the DNC and the 
campaign. In her deposition, Scott admitted that, like the June 
28, 1994 memorandum, this memorandum was written on a White 
House computer and on White House stationery.363 As 
discussed in section III.D, this use of government resources to 
benefit the DNC and the Clinton campaign represents a theft of 
government property, even if White House staff are permitted to 
use their time to engage in political activity at the White 
House. There is no evidence that the First Lady, Harold Ickes 
(who was the recipient of most of these memos), or anyone else 
did anything to stop it.
    Further evidence of the incriminating nature of the 
portions of this document dealing with the outside databases 
includes the fact that White House Counsel Jack Quinn, with the 
involvement of Cheryl Mills, originally produced this 
memorandum without any of the information regarding outside 
databases.364 The committee views this as an attempt 
to conceal incriminating information from the committee. Cheryl 
Mills, who had prepared three memoranda on the scope of 
permissible political activity, withheld those portions of the 
documents because she knew that the information withheld would 
expose that the First Lady had been informed of Marsha Scott's 
impermissible political activities.
            c. The Database as a political project
    Marsha Scott communicated in this memorandum to the First 
Lady her view that the White House Database was a political 
project. She identified a career employee on her team as a 
``closet Democrat,'' explained that his work on the Database 
was kept secret, and complained about the other career staff's 
lack of loyalty to the President.365 She wrote that 
she found ``an inherent conflict in having our entire 
information management system developed and supervised by 
people who do not know and may not support the President.'' 
366 She later sent a memorandum to Deputy Chief of 
Staff Phil Lader complaining about the allegiance of the career 
technical staff.367 All of these steps suggest that 
the Database was more than just a White House management tool--
it required political loyalty and secrecy.

        B. The Contemporaneous Documentary Evidence Is Credible

    The contemporaneous documentary evidence, suggesting that 
the President and the First Lady knew of, approved of, and 
continued to be involved in the conversion of White House 
resources to the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign, is very 
credible. These documents represent the best evidence of the 
real thoughts and actions of individuals at the time, and they 
are supported by credible testimony.
    In one case, although Marsha Scott testified that she has 
``no memory of a conversation with the President'' regarding 
the Database other than a passing remark that she made to him 
that she was ``'working on something to get a social system 
up,'' 368 nevertheless, admitting that she had read 
the WhoDB Requirements Report,369 she did not change 
its text about the President and First Lady's involvement. This 
suggests that, at the time, she viewed it as accurate.
    In addition, there is no reason to discount invocations of 
the President's name in these documents. Marsha Scott, who had 
known the President for many years and appears to have frequent 
access to the President, made these invocations. Further, she 
made them to persons at the highest levels of the White House--
persons who would have reason to know if the invocations were 
not accurate, including White House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty 
and Deputy Counsel to the President Bruce Lindsey.
    Moreover, one making false invocations is not likely to do 
so to the very person whose name one is invoking. However, that 
is exactly what Marsha Scott did. In her January 26, 1994 
memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and 
Bruce Lindsey, Scott states ``The President and the First Lady 
want this done. Translating this into action on the part of 
others is the rub.'' 370
    Finally, Jerry Carlsen, a career employee of the Office of 
Administration, and Manager of the Systems Integration and 
Development Branch of the Office of Information Systems and 
Technology who was asked to lead the White House Database 
development team, testified that Marsha Scott told him that the 
Database was a top priority for the President.371 He 
further testified that he had never heard the President's 
authority invoked with respect to another project at the White 
House.372
    The President and the First Lady clearly involved 
themselves more deeply in projects like the White House data 
management systems than other Presidents and First Ladies. Of 
course, they recognized that the Database had a value greater 
than just running an efficient White House, such as the value 
of using the Database for other unofficial political purposes. 
The clear involvement in the development of the Database, the 
President's desire to integrate the White House Database with 
the DNC database, and the circumstances surrounding the 
distribution of data from the Database (see Section III.B) are 
compelling evidence that the President and First Lady planned 
and carried out those plans to develop a database that could 
be, and was, used for unofficial political purposes.
    The President's encouragement of sharing official 
resources, such as the White House Database, to benefit the 
DNC, seconded by his agent, the First Lady, in her support for 
the development of outside databases referenced in the June 28, 
1994 memo, plainly represents the dedication of White House 
resources to unofficial political activity. There is simply no 
evidence that the President or the First Lady, having been 
informed of these activities using White House property, ever 
did anything to stop them.

                             V. CONCLUSIONS

    The committee has obtained evidence that (1) Deputy Counsel 
to the President Cheryl Mills perjured herself and obstructed 
the investigation to prevent Congress and the American public 
from finding out that the President and the First Lady were 
involved in the unlawful conversion of government property; (2) 
the President and the First Lady were involved in the unlawful 
conversion of government property to the use of the DNC and the 
Clinton/Gore campaign; and (3) numerous other individuals, 
including Truman Arnold, Erskine Bowles, and Marsha Scott were 
also involved in the unlawful conversion of government property 
to the use of the DNC and the campaign through the diversion of 
data and resources.

                         VI. RULES REQUIREMENTS

                      A. Committee Action and Vote

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(2) (A) and (B) of House Rule XI, a 
majority of the Committee having been present, the report was 
approved by a vote of 7 ayes to 3 nays.

    B. Statement of Committee Oversight Findings and Recommendations

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of House Rule XI and clause 
2(b)(1) of House Rule X, the findings and recommendations of 
the committee are contained in the foregoing sections of this 
report.

         C. Statement on New Budget Authority and Related Items

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(B) of House Rule XI and Section 
308(a)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the 
committee finds that no new budget authority, new spending 
authority, new credit authority, or an increase or decrease in 
revenues or tax expenditures result from approval of this 
report.

            D. Statement of CBO Cost Estimate and Comparison

    Pursuant to House Rule XI(2)(l)(3)(C) and Section 403(a) of 
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the committee finds that 
a statement of Congressional Budget Office cost estimate is not 
required as this report is not of a public character.

                E. Statement of Constitutional Authority

    Pursuant to House Rule XI(2)(l)(4), the committee finds 
that a statement of constitutional authority to approve the 
report is not required as this report is not of a public 
character.

                       F. Changes in Existing Law

    Pursuant to House Rule XIII(3), the committee finds that a 
statement of changes in existing law is not necessary, as the 
report does not alter existing law.

                G. Statement of Committee Cost Estimate

    Pursuant to House Rule XIII(7)(a), the committee finds that 
a statement of committee cost estimate is not necessary as the 
report is not of a public character.

                    H. Statement of Federal Mandates

    Pursuant to the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and Section 
423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the committee 
finds that a statement of Federal mandates is not necessary as 
this report is not of a public character.

                                ENDNOTES

    1. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to Deputy Chief of 
Staff Erskine Bowles, undated, White House document production Bates 
Stamp No. M 033298. (Hereinafter, document numbers preceded by ``M'' or 
``EOP'' indicate White House documents.)
    2. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and 
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New 
Database,'' June 28, 1994, M 32433-32434.
    3. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and 
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New 
Database,'' June 28, 1994, (copy inscribed with handwritten notes of 
the First Lady) M 32438-32439.
    4. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, undated 
(computer archive date February 11, 1995), M 33054-33057; Memorandum 
from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, M 
32457-32461 (unredacted copy).
    5. The scope of the committee's investigation is set forth in the 
July 17, 1997 referral from the chairman of the House Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, which provides in pertinent part:

          [T]he content of the WhoDB and any other database and 
        comparable information repository; its purposes and uses, both 
        planned and implemented; the planning, creation, design, 
        implementation, management of the same; the sources of 
        information that were used, planned or contemplated to be used 
        to populate the same; the use and dissemination of any 
        information at any time contained in any such repository to any 
        person or entity; the use of government time and resources in 
        any of these matters; the knowledge, direction, encouragement, 
        assistance or acquiescence of any person with respect to any of 
        these matters; and any matter that might reasonably lead to the 
        production of relevant evidence concerning these matters.
          In addition, the Subcommittee should investigate any attempt, 
        plan, scheme, or other action which would impede or prevent a 
        thorough investigation of these matters, including, but not 
        limited to, nonresponsive or misleading answers, evasive acts, 
        attempts at delay, or unsupported claims of privilege.

Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, to David M. McIntosh, chairman, Subcommittee on National 
Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, July 17, 
1997, (Hereinafter, letters to or from the subcommittee chairman shall 
be designated as letters to or from ``Chairman McIntosh.'')
    6. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the 
President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President and 
Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages, Jan. 17, 1994, M 
24918-24920 (citing 5 CFR Sec. 2635.704) (emphasis added). 5 CFR 
Sec. 2635.704 provides, in pertinent part:

          (a) Standard. An employee has a duty to protect and conserve 
        Government property and shall not use such property, or allow 
        its use, for other than authorized purposes.
          (b) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
                  (1) Government property includes any form of real or 
                personal property in which the Government has an 
                ownership . . . or other property interest as well as 
                any right or other intangible interest that is 
                purchased with Government funds, including the services 
                of contractor personnel. The term includes . . . 
                automated data processing capabilities . . . [and] 
                Government records.
                  (2) Authorized purposes are those purposes for which 
                Government property is made available to members of the 
                public or those purposes authorized in accordance with 
                law or regulation.
See also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641, which provides in pertinent part:
          Whoever embezzles, steal, purloins, or knowingly converts to 
        his use or the use of another, or without authority . . . 
        conveys or disposes of any record, . . . or thing of value of 
        the United States or of any department or agency thereof . . .; 
        or
          Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent 
        to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been 
        embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted--
          Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
        ten years, or both. . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
    7. David Watkins, ``Briefing Paper on Databases--Eyes Only,'' Jan. 
31, 1994, M 32467-32472.
    8. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman 
McIntosh, June 28, 1996 (emphasis added).
    9. Committee deposition of Richard Sullivan, Oct. 22, 1997, p. 17.
    10. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, undated, M 033298 (all 
capitals in original).
    11. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, Oct. 28, 1997.
    12. Id.
    13. Id.
    14. Id.
    15. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and 
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), June 28, 1994, M 32433-32434.
    16. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 27, 1997.
    17. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings 
Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th 
Cong., 1st sess., p. 240 (1997) (testimony of Charles F.C. Ruff, 
Counsel to the President).
    18. Letter from the majority members of the Subcommittee on 
National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs to 
President William J. Clinton, Aug. 2, 1996.
    19. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, undated, M 033298.
    20. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and 
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), June 28, 1994, M 32433-32434.
    21. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and 
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), June 28, 1994, M 32438-32439 (copy 
inscribed with handwritten notes of the First Lady).
    22. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, Mar. 6, 1997.
    23. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, Oct. 28, 1997.
    24. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings 
Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th 
Cong., 1st sess., p. 115 (1997) (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy 
Counsel to the President).
    25. Id. p. 241.
    26. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the 
President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President, Jan. 17, 
1994, M 24918-24920.
    27. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings 
Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th 
Cong., 1st sess., p. 241 (1997) (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy 
Counsel to the President).
    28. Id.
    29. Committee deposition of Brian Bailey, Feb. 6, 1998, p. 135.
    30. White House Compliance with Committee Subpoenas: Hearings 
before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th 
Cong., 1st sess., p. 240 (1997) (testimony of Charles F.C. Ruff, 
Counsel to the President).
    31. Committee deposition of Marsha Scott, Feb. 19, 1998, pp. 90-91.
    32. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Cheryl [Mills], Dec. 16, 1993, 
M 25101.
    33. Committee deposition of Marsha Scott, Feb. 18, 1998, p. 84.
    34. Id. p. 89.
    35. Committee deposition of Erich Vaden, Jan. 25, 1998, p. 258.
    36. Id.
    37. Id. p. 260.
    38. Id. pp. 25-27, 34, 81, 98-99.
    39. Committee deposition of Laura Tayman, Mar. 20, 1998, p. 136.
    40. Id. pp. 122-124.
    41. Id. pp. 50-51.
    42. Vaden deposition, pp. 144-145.
    43. Committee deposition of Mark Bartholomew, Aug. 15, 1997, p. 73.
    44. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, Oct. 28, 1997.
    45. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings 
Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th 
Cong., 1st sess., pp. 114-115 (1997) (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy 
Counsel to the President).
    46. Id. p. 133.
    47. Id. pp. 248, 265.
    48. See, e.g., Guy Gugliotta, ``Lawmaker Suggests Obstruction in 
Late Delivery of Memo on White House Database,'' the Washington Post, 
Friday, Oct. 31, 1997, p. A8; Jeanne Cummings, ``White House Retained 
Memo on Database,'' the Wall Street Journal, Friday, Nov. 7, 1997, p. 
A4; Larry Margasak, ``Committee Chairman Warns White House Lawyers on 
Delays,'' Associated Press, Nov. 6, 1997; John Solomon, ``Withheld 
Documents Say President Wanted Database to Share With DNC,'' Associated 
Press, Oct. 30, 1997.
    49. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, May 22, 1997.
    50. Memorandum from Bernard W. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, 
and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to White House 
Staff, July 12, 1993, M 033320-033330; Memorandum from Lloyd Cutler, 
Special Counsel to the President, and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel 
to the President, to Executive Office of the President Staff, Apr. 6, 
1994, M 033331-033342; Memorandum from Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the 
President, and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to 
Executive Office of the President Staff, Oct. 12, 1994, M 033343-
033355.
    51. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings 
Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th 
Cong., 1st sess., p. 241 (1997) (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy 
Counsel to the President) (emphasis added).
    52. Id. (statement of Representative Shadegg).
    53. Id. (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy Counsel to the 
President).
    54. Scott deposition, Feb. 19, 1998, pp. 93-94.
    55. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, undated 
(computer archive date Feb. 11, 1995), M 33054-33057 (emphasis added).
    56. Id.
    57. Id.
    58. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold 
Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, M 32457-32461 (unredacted copy).
    59. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold 
Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, M 25673-25677 (redacted copy).
    60. Scott deposition, Feb. 18, 1998, pp. 144-146.
    61. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman 
McIntosh, June 28, 1996 (emphasis added).
    62. ``Fund-Raisers' Use of White House Database Reported,'' Los 
Angeles Times, Thursday, Jan. 30, 1997, p. A1.
    63. White House Press Briefing by Mike McCurry and Barry Toiv, Jan. 
30, 1997 (12:45 p.m. EST), transcript, p. 9 (emphasis added) 
(hereinafter ``White House Press Briefing'').
    64. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman 
McIntosh, June 28, 1996 (``The database is for White House use only; we 
prohibit distribution to outside entities or political organizations--
including the Democratic National Committee.'') (emphasis added).
    65. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, Oct. 3, 1996, response to question 1(I) (emphasis in 
original).
    66. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, Oct. 28, 1996.
    67. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, Nov. 13, 1996.
    68. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, Jan. 10, 199[7].
    69. On Jan. 17, 1997, Quinn wrote to the Committee that, with 
respect to the Oct. 3, 1996 questions, ``That response is almost 
complete and I expect it will be finished at the end of next week.'' 
Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman McIntosh, 
Jan. 17, 1997.
    70. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to 
the President, Feb. 21, 1997.
    71. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to 
the President, Feb. 27, 1997.
    72. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, response to question 1, Feb. 28, 1997.
    73. White House Press Briefing, transcript p. 8.
    74. Id. pp. 8-9.
    75. Id. p. 9.
    76. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, Jan. 31, 1997.
    77. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman 
McIntosh, Feb. 3, 1997.
    78. Id.
    79. ``DNC Statement on the White House Database,'' Jan. 30, 1997, M 
037428.
    80. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 1 (emphasis 
added).
    81. ``Fund-Raisers' Use of White House Database Reported,'' Los 
Angeles Times, Thursday, Jan. 30, 1997, p. A1 (emphasis added).
    82. Id. (emphasis added).
    83. Committee deposition of Truman Arnold, July 18, 1997, p. 124.
    84. ``Big Donor Calls Favorable Treatment a Coincidence,'' the 
Washington Post, Monday, May 25, 1998, p. A1.
    85. According to the Washington Post, Schwartz contributed $25,000 
in the 1991-92 election cycle; $112,000 in 1993-94; $602,000 in 1995-
96; and $421,000 in 1997-98. Id.
    86. Id.
    87. Id.
    88. Id.
    89. Memorandum from Martha Phipps to Ann Cahill, ``White House 
Activities,'' May 5, 1994, EOP 036287. A previous draft of this 
memorandum which appears to have been prepared for Martha Phipps 
(inside the DNC) appears to have been faxed to the White House from the 
office of the Chairman of the DNC on Apr. 28, 1994. See draft 
memorandum to Martha Phipps, Apr. 28, 1994, EOP 036294. This earlier 
draft encompassed only items 1 through 10 of the later memo. It 
included, however, the following notation: ``NOTE: Any money above and 
beyond the $40 million goal would require two additional Presidential 
events outside of Washington, DC'' Id.
    90. Notes, undated, EOP 036283-036286. See also White House 
Production Log, ``Documents produced to the Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight on June 6, 1997, EOP 32986-36699, Office of the 
Chief of Staff,'' June 6, 1997.
    91. Notes, updated, EOP 036286 (emphasis added).
    92. ``Fund-Raisers' Use of White House Database Reported,'' Los 
Angeles Times, Thursday, Jan. 30, 1997, p. A1.
    93. Handwritten notes, undated, EOP 036285.
    94. Sullivan deposition, Oct. 22, 1997, p. 17.
    95. Id. p. 19 (emphasis added).
    96. Id. p. 17.
    97. Id. p. 20.
    98. Committee deposition of Jacob Aryeh (``Ari'') Swiller, Jan. 6, 
1998, p. 16.
    99. Id. p. 17 (emphasis added).
    100. Memorandum from David Mercer, Fran Wakem, Ari Swiller, 
Jennifer Scully, and Peter O'Keefe to [Truman] Arnold and Richard 
Sullivan, ``Proposed Communications & Marketing Ideas: INTERNAL MEMO--
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION,'' Mar. 14, 1995, DNC 3236734-3236737, at DNC 
3236734.
    101. Id. DNC 3236735.
    102. Id.
    103. Id.
    104. Id.
    105. Swiller deposition, p. 69.
    106. Swiller deposition, p. 70
    107. Id. p. 92.
    108. Id. pp. 79-80.
    109. Id. p. 54 (stating that whether or not someone had been to an 
event at the White House was ``a factor'' in DNC finance prioritization 
of names to recommend for invitations); pp. 57-58 (stating that 
information he received from the White House about prior event 
attendance and prior invitations to attend events was a factor that 
would be considered in the prioritization of recommendations for 
invitations to future White House events).
    110. Arnold had been personally asked to become DNC finance 
chairman by President Clinton after declining the position when asked 
by DNC Chairman Don Fowler. Arnold deposition, pp. 63-64. The 
President's charge to Arnold was ``to raise the money and to make sure 
it was spent frugally.'' Id. p. 64.
    111. Id. p. 122.
    112. Id. p. 116.
    113. Id. p. 116.
    114. Id. pp. 123-124.
    115. Id. p. 124. See also id., p. 77 (``[P]eople . . . contribute 
if they were included and made aware of the need.'').
    116. Swiller deposition, p. 95.
    117. Arnold deposition, pp. 117-118.
    118. Memorandum to David Mercer, ``Finance Needs,'' Mar. 13, 1994, 
DNC 3236707. This memorandum also states that ``[m]ajor contributors or 
raisers should have the opportunity to dine in the White House Mess. We 
have not been able to get this done with any consistency, and I do not 
understand why?'' Id. The memorandum also outlines the importance of 
movies, the White House Tennis Court, and theater tickets. Id.
    119. The very office in which DNC documents reflecting the DNC 
fundraising staff's desire for the information and their complaints 
about getting it. See Production Log, June 6, 1997, EOP 036286.
    120. Arnold deposition, pp. 126, 141, 142.
    121. White House Automated Verification Entry System [WAVES] 
records reflect Arnold's entry for a meeting with Ann Stock on Mar. 24, 
1995. See WAVES records, Mar. 24, 1995, EOP 040404. This was 10 days 
after the Finance Staff memo was prepared which outlined complaints and 
sought DNC-White House coordination for servicing DNC donors. 
Memorandum, Mar. 14, 1995, DNC 3236734-3236737. Ari Swiller testified 
that the topics in the memorandum had been discussed at a fundraising 
staff meeting around Mar. 14, 1995, and that both Richard Sullivan and 
Truman Arnold appeared to be receptive to the ideas expressed at the 
meeting. See Swiller deposition, pp. 63-64 (``[P]art of this discussion 
. . . is [that] there was a concern that on certain occasions we were 
unable to get information about who attended or was invited to White 
House events.''); p. 66 (``[The discussion would] probably [have] 
be[en] about the same time period.''); p. 84 (stating that Mr. Sullivan 
and Mr. Arnold were receptive to the concerns).
    122. Arnold deposition, p. 121 (``[I]t was a procedure in place. It 
seemed to work well . . .''); p. 126 (stating that procedure was in 
place before Arnold arrived).
    123. Arnold deposition, p. 126. Despite the transcript reference on 
this page (p. 126) to his having met with Marsha Scott, the record 
makes clear that his meeting was only with Bowles and Stock (not Marsha 
Scott). See id. pp. 133, 137, 141, 142, 144, 108 (``[I] never met with 
[Marsha Scott] on official business at the White House.'').
    124. Arnold deposition, p. 126 (emphasis added).
    125. See id., pp. 126-127:

          [Bowles and Stock] were concerned about someone inappropriate 
        having access to the White House. So I assumed responsibility 
        for doing the very best that we could with information that was 
        available to bring equity to the system so it wouldn't be 
        overrun with people who knew how to work the system; they would 
        be legitimate people of good reputation. So we shored up our 
        responsibilities. Not only were we raising money, we were 
        making sure that appropriate people were being invited and 
        included.

Id.
    126. Arnold deposition, p. 115 (emphasis added).
    127. Id. pp. 133-134 (emphasis added).
    128. Id. p. 143 (emphasis added).
    129. Id. 122. See also id., p. 137. At the meeting with Bowles and 
Stock, neither told Arnold that there was any information which the 
White House could not provide to the DNC. Id. However, Arnold did 
testify that ``[t]he ground rules were discussed that there would be no 
financial information across those lines. The White House didn't want 
to know it, was not allowed to know it. Whether it was legal or policy, 
I'm not sure.'' id.
    130. Committee deposition of Judith Ann Stock, Feb. 20, 1998, pp. 
126-128.
    131. Id. pp. 127-128.
    132. Committee deposition of Erskine Bowles, May 5, 1998, pp. 53-
54.
    133. Id. p. 58.
    134. Id. p. 54.
    135. Id. pp. 55-56.
    136. Bailey deposition, p. 13 (``[F]rom September 1994 until 
November 1995, I am not sure of the exact day, I worked at the White 
House Chief of Staff's Office.'').
    137. Arnold deposition, pp. 122-124.
    138. Id. p. 123-124.
    139. Stock deposition, pp. 33-34.
    140. Committee deposition of Brooke Stroud, Nov. 4, 1997, p. 47.
    141. Id. pp. 52-55.
    142. Id. p. 93.
    143. Id. p. 70. When DNC offices wanted to know who had ``made the 
cut'' or been included on the invitation list to an upcoming event, 
Stroud called and obtained that information from Kim Widdess. Id. 
Stroud thereafter passed on the information to the DNC requestor. Id. 
See also Id.  p. 71 (``[I]f they were really on the ball, they were 
able to fax over a list that said who was included. But that was 
rare.''); p. 77 (``Sometimes I never--never heard back at all. 
Sometimes somebody would want to know just about one person to make 
sure the one person off the list had been selected. And sometimes an 
actual list would be sent over that said who had been invited.'').
    144. Id. p. 78 (``[I]nconsistently, again, a list may or may not be 
sent over [from the White House to the DNC] afterward . . . But it was 
very rare.''). Such lists were sent to Brooke Stroud and were 
apparently also sent to DNC Finance Director Richard Sullivan. Id. p. 
79. Sullivan nevertheless obtained additional such White House lists, 
for Stroud saw them in Sullivan's office. Id. Stroud could not recall 
how many such lists she received; she testified that she filed them in 
her office. Id. p. 80. When the questioning turned to the location of 
her files, Stroud then said, ``I might have thrown them away, I might 
have kept them. I don't really know.'' Id. p. 81.
    145. Stock deposition, p. 56. She noted that the only instances in 
which White House lists were released were for State Dinners, but only 
for publication in the Washington Post after the dinner took place. Id. 
pp. 56-67.
    146. Id. p. 58 (emphasis added). Stock gave every indication that 
providing the information to anyone was done only with the approval of 
the President or First Lady based upon a demonstrated need by a senior 
White House official of the highest level: ``It went to President and 
Mrs. Clinton, and on occasion if the Chief of Staff asked to see 
something right before the event occurred, like an hour or two before 
it occurred, but we did not circulate lists through the White House . . 
.'' Id.
    147. Id. p. 59 (emphasis added).
    148. Id. (emphasis added).
    149. Id. p. 60.
    150. Committee deposition of Richard Sullivan, Mar. 5, 1998, pp. 
40-41, 81-86.
    151. Committee deposition of Karen Hancox, Dec. 18, 1997, pp. 55-
56.
    152. Swiller deposition, pp. 57, 60.
    153. Id. pp. 99, 104.
    154. Stroud deposition, Nov. 4, 1997, p. 41.
    155. Committee deposition of Donald Dunn, Jan. 27, 1998, pp. 78-80.
    156. Swiller deposition p. 20.
    157. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman 
McIntosh, June 28, 1996.
    158. White House Press Briefing, transcript pp. 6-7.
    159. White House Press Briefing, transcript pp. 6, 9.
    160. Sullivan deposition, Oct. 22, 1997, p. 92. Sullivan, the DNC 
Finance Director, testified that he did not believe this happened with 
respect to any of the DNC ``coffees,'' but that:

          I don't rule out the fact that in putting together the list 
        of recommended invitations for the dinners or receptions or 
        lunches that were held at the White House or DNC-sponsored, 
        that, again Ari [Swiller] might not have made an inquiry to the 
        Social Secretary's office. I don't remember specific instances, 
        but I can't tell you definitely, no, because that could have 
        happened.

Id. p. 93. Sullivan also stated: ``I don't rule out that he may have 
made a call or two or three as they related to the lunches or 
receptions or dinners.'' Id. p. 95. Furthermore: ``I have a very, very 
vague recollection that [Ari Swiller] may have made a call in reference 
to an individual as we put together the list for a [DNC-sponsored] 
dinner or a lunch.'' Id. p. 96.
    161. Arnold deposition, pp. 120-121. Arnold testified as follows:

          Q. Did you use that same process with those kinds of events?
          A. Yes.
          Q. Did you use them for--let me make sure I understand. You 
        used them for all the DNC events that you were involved in?
          A. Right.
          Mr. Ballen. Did he use what?
          Mr. Ausbrook. That process of vetting the list and screening 
        them with the White House.
          The Witness. The number of times in attendance previous. The 
        Social Office would tell us how many times they had been there. 
        The staff did those. It was a procedure in place. It seemed to 
        work well, because during this period of time there were no 
        improprieties of anyone having attended or any problem being 
        made, to my knowledge.

Id.
    162. Swiller deposition, p. 21 (``I don't recall ever drawing a 
distinction [between official White House events as opposed to DNC-
sponsored events at the White House].''). See also Id. p. 23 (``Again, 
you're drawing a distinction I was not familiar with when I was at the 
DNC, of what was a DNC-sponsored and what was official. . . . I didn't 
know of such a distinction at the time. When it would come to 
submitting names, I would review a list . . . [o]r I would submit a 
short list of names [which went to the White House].''); p. 24 (no 
distinction in his mind between official White House events and DNC-
sponsored events).
    163. Id. p. 20 (emphasis added).
    164. Id. p. 36. Swiller participated in sending DNC names for both 
official events and DNC-sponsored events at the White House. See Id. 
pp. 21, 37.
    165. Stock deposition, pp. 30-33. White House staff usually 
prepared and mailed written invitations for DNC-sponsored events taking 
place at the White House. Id. In the case of ``last minute'' 
invitations, White House personnel spent time telephoning from the DNC 
list to extend invitations. Id.
    166. Id. p. 28 (``[W]e would put [the list] into the White House 
Database to create a calligrapher's list so that invitations could be 
addressed. Those invitations were sent out.''). Stock testified that 
the process was the same for both political events, including DNC-
sponsored events, and official events. Id. p. 31. See also Committee 
deposition of Kimberly Widdess, Feb. 24, 1998, p. 28 (``The [White 
House] database is used when we have a list of people that we are going 
to invite. We enter their names and addresses into the database and 
then it--that information is then printed out on a list that the 
calligraphers write the invitations off of. . . .''; p. 29 (``Most 
often, the invitations are sent--we have hard copy invitations and an 
actual card that is sent out to people.'').
    167. Stock deposition, p. 28 (``[W]e would put [the list] into the 
White House Database to create a calligrapher's list so that 
invitations could be addressed. Those invitations were sent out.''). 
Stock testified that the process was the same for both political 
events, including DNC-sponsored events and for official events. Id. p. 
31. See also Widdess deposition, p. 28 (``The [White House] database is 
used when we have a list of people that we are going to invite. We 
enter their names and addresses into the database and then it--that 
information is then printed out on a list that the calligraphers write 
the invitations off of. . . .''). p. 29 (``Most often, the invitations 
are sent--we have hard copy invitations and an actual card that is sent 
out to people.'').
    168. Widdess deposition, p. 28 (``[T]hen responses come to the 
office [of the Social Secretary], people responding to the event. That 
information is entered into the computer with their dates of birth and 
Social Security number.'').
    169. Id. pp. 29-30 (stating that, prior to installation of White 
House Database, a DOS-based computer system performed a similar 
function).
    170. Stock deposition, p. 87 (``WhoDB and the previous [White House 
computer system in the Social Office] generated exactly the same 
reports.''). See also Facsimile from Judy Spangler, White House Office 
of the Social Secretary, to Jennifer Scully, DNC, Apr. 15, 1994, DNC 
3058341-3058351 (print-out from White House Database reflecting status 
of persons invited to an upcoming Apr. 19, 1994 DNC Trustee Reception 
at the White House, as of Apr. 15, 1994 at 1 p.m).
    171. See Widdess deposition, pp. 30-31:

         You can see the entire guest list on the screen so you don't 
        have to waste paper printing names out. It gives you 
        information as to--immediately gives you information as to how 
        many responses you have, how many responses you are waiting on. 
        It is a much better system for us to use in the office for 
        executing events. . . . The only way the old system you could 
        see the guest list is if you printed it out. . . . The WhoDB 
        lets you see the entire guest list and who their guest is and 
        if they have accepted, responded, regretted or whatever. The 
        other system you could only see one record.

Id. (emphasis added).
    172. Swiller deposition, p. 36. Swiller participated in sending DNC 
names for both official events (p. 37) and DNC sponsored events at the 
White House (p. 21). Id. pp. 21, 37.
    173. Facsimile from Judy Spangler, Office of the Social Secretary, 
Executive Office of the President, to Jennifer Scully, DNC, Apr. 15, 
1994, DNC 3058341-3058351 (11-page White House computer report dated 
Apr. 15, 1994 reflecting the names of invitees and their acceptance-
regret-no response status as of 1 p.m. on that date for an upcoming DNC 
Trustee Reception to take place at the White House).
    174. See id. Ari Swiller, of the DNC Finance Division, testified 
that he saw such White House-generated lists which had been faxed to 
the DNC ``every couple of months'' during the time period 1993 through 
1997, and that he had personally received such faxed lists from persons 
in the White House Social Office, namely Judy Spangler, Tracy LeBreque 
and perhaps Kim Widdess. Swiller deposition, pp. 18-19. See also id. at 
pp. 29-30 (received lists both before and after events).
    175. Swiller deposition, pp. 31-32 (stating that DNC personnel, 
after identifying persons who had not responded, telephoned such 
persons to remind them of the invitation and to inquire whether they 
wished to attend). Swiller personally made ``dozens'' of such calls 
connected with at least two events. Id.
    176. See Widdess deposition, p. 115 (stating that White House 
employees ``frequently'' contacted the DNC to obtain telephone numbers 
of non-responding persons so that White House employees could make 
follow-up telephone calls to such persons); Stock deposition, p. 87 
(``You have a slight problem with this list. It is Apr. 15th, and the 
event is Apr. 19th, and no one has responded, which is why they are 
sending the list to find out if anybody has phone numbers to figure out 
how to call people and see if they either--my guess is this was not an 
invitation that went out on an invitation list, and it was a phone 
list, and they have bad phone numbers, and it was 108 on the 15th, and 
it is 3\1/2\ days later. Basically you are looking at a completely 
unresponsive list.'').
    177. Memorandum from Minyon Moore to Chair [Deborah] DeLee, Bobby 
Watson, Laura Hartigan, Jill Alper, and Vida Benavides, ``Upcoming 
Holiday Events at the White House,'' Dec. 9, 1994, DNC 0908516-0908663.
    178. Letter from Lanny Breuer, Special Counsel to the President, to 
Mildred Webber, Staff Director, Subcommittee on National Economic 
Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, June 2, 1997.
    179. See letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, 
to Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997; Affidavit of Carl Mecum, Sept. 4, 
1998.
    180. ``Economic Conference List--Southern Region, Invitation List 
of Panelists and Observers as of 3/21/95,'' Mar. 21, 1995, DNC 3236693-
3236694, 3236696-3236699, 3236712.
    181. White House Office of Public Liaison, ``APA Opinion Leaders,'' 
DNC 0626453-0626472; letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the 
President, to Chairman McIntosh, June 6, 1997.
    182. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie 
Williams, and Jim Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684-1019685.
    183. See Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995 
Holiday Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995, M 24915-24917.
    184. Handwritten notes of Erich Vaden, undated, M 20536 (``MS . . . 
--Christmas List as vehicle to get out? . . . --Meeting w/Cheryl.'').
    185. Vaden deposition, p. 183. Apparently, Scott also advanced the 
argument that the White House could provide the DNC the final list 
because they were paying for the mailing. Id. (referencing de minimis 
language in Cheryl Mills's Memorandum, cited supra n.6 (M 24918-
24920)).
    186. Vaden deposition, p. 183.
    187. Handwritten reply inscribed on copy of Memorandum from Brooke 
Stroud to Tara Burns, ``X-mas List,'' June 17, 1994, DNC 1019608. 
Marsha Scott also suggested that the DNC could come to the White House 
and review lists. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles, 
``Meetings To Be Held While I Am Gone,'' Oct. 28, 1994, M 33082-33083.
    188. Stroud deposition, Nov. 4, 1997, p. 133.
    189. Id., pp. 142-143.
    190. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, pp. 36-37. See also Id. p. 
106 (``White House lists were uploaded into the DNC system. . . .''); 
Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar and Maggie Williams, 
Nov. 9, 1994, DNC 1020078; Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice 
Pushkar, Maggie Williams, and Jim Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684-
1019685. The only two persons at DNC capable of entering the tape into 
the AS 400 were Al Hurst and Bryan Daines. Neither has a recollection 
of having done so. See Committee deposition of Al Hurst, Mar. 13, 1998, 
p. 40; Committee deposition of Bryan Daines, Apr. 6, 1998, p. 29.
    191. Stroud deposition, Nov. 4, 1997, p. 169; Stroud deposition, 
Nov. 18, 1997, p. 30.
    192. Despite Brooke Stroud's recollection that she believed that 
she had boxed the printout at the DNC to send to Archives and despite 
the specific request for its production, the DNC has not produced it. 
Also unaccounted for is a ``Sampling'' or partial printout of the 
merged lists from Saturn which was delivered to Stroud at the DNC. 
Stroud testified that she did not recall what had happened to the 
sample printout. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, pp. 10-12, 28-29.
    193. Sullivan deposition, Mar. 5, 1998, pp. 44-46.
    194. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, pp. 10-11.
    195. Id. pp. 28-29.
    196. Saturn documents 0000607, 0000005, 0000006; Stroud deposition, 
Nov. 18, 1997, p. 100. See also Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice 
Pushkar and Maggie Williams, Nov. 9, 1994, DNC 1020078 (``White House 
lists are contained on multiple discs . . . . Saturn delivered that 
list to the DNC today, we will begin manual de-duping immediately. . . 
. Saturn will deliver [disks 6 & 7] on Friday [Nov. 11, 1994].''); 
Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie Williams and 
James Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684-1019685 (``Disks Six and 
Seven have been uploaded. We will complete clean-up no later than 
Friday. . . .'').
    197. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, p. 36.
    198. Stroud deposition, Nov. 4, 1997, pp. 164-67.
    199. Daines deposition, p. 29 (``Just Al [Hurst] and myself [were 
the persons at the DNC in 1994 who had the expertise and the know-how 
to upload data from a magnetic tape into the DNC computer so that the 
data could be worked on.]'').
    200. See Daines deposition, p. 24 (no recollection of volunteers 
working on 1994 Holiday Card list on any weekend in 1994); p. 37 (no 
recollection of volunteers being asked to modify data in a database at 
DNC); p. 40 (no recollection of data being received in Nov. 1994 from 
an outside entity to which Brooke Stroud was granted access); p. 40 (no 
recollection of having met Sharon Lewis); p. 44 (even after being shown 
documents reflecting disk deliveries from Saturn, no recollection of 
DNC receiving such disks).
    201. Hurst deposition, p. 41 (``No, I don't recall any contact with 
Brooke Stroud over Veterans Day weekend.''); id. (``I worked at the DNC 
on Saturdays and Sundays, but it is not my practice to.''); id. (``No, 
I don't recall working on Veterans Day Weekend of 1994.''). Hurst had 
no recollection of any of events concerning the delivery of tapes over 
the Veterans Day weekend or the use of White House volunteers in that 
effort. Id. p. 100 (``I never received any disks.'').
    202. Hurst deposition, p. 41 (``I worked at the DNC on Saturdays 
and Sundays, but it is not my practice to.''). Daines deposition, p. 24 
(``No, I very rarely was there weekends.'').
    203. Committee deposition of Joseph Birkenstock, June 2, 1998, p. 
114.
    204. See Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie 
Williams and James Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684-1019685 
(``[T]he de-duped list will be returned to Saturn Corporation to be 
placed in a postal-presorted order . . . . [T]he laser house . . . will 
begin [lasering, stuffing and stamping] . . . as soon as they receive 
the tape from Saturn . . . .'' ); letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric 
Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994, Saturn documents 0000604-0000607) (``The output 
tapes from the DNC were sent back to Saturn in the Saturn format for 
presort processing . . . . Tapes [were] received back from the DNC [on 
November 30, 1994] . . . .'' ).
    205. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994, Saturn 
documents 0000604-0000607 (``4. The presort processing was accomplished 
by Saturn and a tape was sent to The Last Word for imaging on the 
envelopes; . . . [Attachment:] Tapes shipped to the Last Word . . . 12/
02/94.'').
    206. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994, Saturn 
documents 0000604-0000605 (``Saturn received the 3 pre-sorted files 
back from The Last Word on Wednesday, December 14.'').
    207. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Brooke Stroud, Dec. 20, 1994, 
Saturn document 0000633 (discussing the ``problem'' with the tape, 
``based on our meeting at the DNC on Friday December 16, 1994.'').
    208. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994, Saturn 
Document 0000604-0000607 (``On Friday [December 16] after your call, we 
identified the problem in talking with Al [presumably Al Hurst] at your 
offices and came over to review the problem.'').
    209. Hurst deposition, p. 28 (``[The only contact with Saturn was] 
when it was discovered there was a problem with the tape.''); p. 30 
(``[T]hey brought a tape back to us prior to the mailing of the 
Christmas cards when there was a problem.''); pp. 37-38 (``It is my 
recollection that Brooke Stroud called me upstairs and she was up there 
talking to the people from Saturn.'').
    210. Id. p. 30 (``[T]hey brought a tape back to us prior to the 
mailing of the Christmas cards when there was a problem.''); p. 32 
(``Q. The tape that came back from Saturn that was associated with the 
problem, what, if anything, was done with that tape at the DNC when you 
all received it back? A. I uploaded it to a secure place on the AS400 . 
. . . We uploaded it to a library on the AS400 that only a programmer 
would have the capacity to look at.'').
    211. Id. pp. 37-38 (``The only thing we did with it was to view it 
on the screen to see which records had problems with them . . . [The 
viewing was done by] myself and Brooke Stroud . . . [but no one else] 
that I remember.'').
    212. Id. p. 35.
    213. Id. pp. 52-53 (``[S]he wanted a tape made of the problem 
data.'').
    214. Id. p. 54 (``I have no idea what she did with the tape.''); 
id. (``I don't recall ever seeing that tape-ever again.'').
    215. Hurst deposition, p. 53.
    216. Id. p. 45.
    217. Id. p. 79.
    218. Id. p. 82 (``I deleted the file on the system. The data was 
now on the tape.''); id. (``I put it on the tape rack . . . in the 
computer room of the DNC. . [and] labeled [the tape] S-A-T-M-S-T.''). 
Hurst testified that while he believes the tape remained on the tape 
rack until approximately March 1997, he acknowledged that ``[a]nyone 
who came into the computer room could have pulled it off the rack,'' 
and that, other than on weekends, the room generally was not locked. 
Id. pp. 83-84.
    219. Id. p. 16.
    220. Id. p. 46 (``I don't recall asking anyone.'').
    221. Hurst deposition, p. 45.
    222. Id. p. 62 (``No, I don't recall [the volume of information 
that was in the file].''). See also Id. p. 85 (``I don't remember what 
the size of the file was and the number of records.''). Hurst's failure 
to recollect is particularly odd in light of his specific recollections 
of seemingly unimportant details, as well as the fact that the volume 
of the data--``taking up too much space''--was the very reason he 
articulated for deciding to delete the file in the first place. 
Further, he testified that there were but two criteria which he 
employed in deciding to delete files, one of which was the ``size'' or 
volume of the file.  Id. p. 45. The volume of the file was an important 
factor, not only with respect to the deletions in Jan. 1996, but also 
with respect to copying the data onto a tape. As Hurst testified, the 
time it took to make tape copies of the data depended upon the volume 
of data: ``A larger tape would take longer to upload than a smaller 
tape would, because of the number of fields in the file and the total 
number of records in the file.'' Id. pp. 74-75. Hurst, in fact, dealt 
with this tape at least five times: first, when he uploaded it into the 
DNC computer; second, when he made a copy tape for Brooke Stroud; 
third, when he decided to delete the data (using his volume criterion); 
fourth, when he made another copy tape prior to deleting the file; and 
fifth, in March 1997, when he was given the tape by DNC counsel to copy 
yet again.
    223. Hurst deposition, p. 46.
    224. Id. p. 68 (``No, I don't recall looking--I don't recall 
checking that criteria.'').
    225. Id. p. 68 (``No, I don't know why I didn't check that 
criteria.'').
    226. Id. p. 80 (``I don't remember why I made the copy [in January 
1996]. I don't remember what drove me to make the copy of that 
tape.''). See also Id. p. 81 (``I made the copy of the tape, and, I 
don't remember why I made a copy, but after I made the copy I deleted 
[the file] off the system.'').
    227. Id. p. 117; see id. at 114 (``I recall another tape came from 
Saturn after all the Christmas cards were mailed.'') (emphasis added).
    228. Id. pp. 34-35 (``I put it on the tape rack . . . in the 
computer room at the DNC. . . . Q. What were you [just] talking about 
that you had put on the tape rack? A. The tape that we received from 
Saturn after the Christmas cards were mailed.'') (emphasis added);
    229. Hurst deposition, p. 62-63, 114
    230. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 1.
    231. Committee deposition of Alice Pushkar, Jan. 13, 1998, pp. 49, 
163.
    232. Memorandum from Alice J. Pushkar to Cheryl Mills, Aug. 3, 
1995, M 033308-033309 (``The DNC has a tape of the entire 1994 holiday 
card list.'').
    233. Mills immediately told Pushkar verbally that the DNC should 
not have the tape. That specific response was recorded by Pushkar in 
her contemporaneous handwritten notes of that conversation which she 
entered on her copy of her memorandum to Mills. Handwritten notes of 
Alice Pushkar, undated, M 33308 (``Shouldn't have tape''). Pushkar 
testified that after receiving the memorandum, ``[Cheryl Mills] 
immediately called me back and said, you know, the list should have 
been returned to the White House.'' Pushkar deposition, p. 95. See also 
id. pp. 113-114 (``I just recall her saying . . . they shouldn't have 
the tape . . ..''); p. 114 (Mills understood Pushkar was going to try 
to get the tape back).
    234. Vaden deposition, pp. 225-226.
    235. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, Oct. 3, 1996.
    236. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, Oct. 28, 1996.
    237. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, Nov. 13, 1996.
    238. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, Jan. 10, 199[7].
    239. On Jan. 17, 1997, Quinn wrote to the Committee that, with 
respect to the Oct. 3, 1996 questions, ``That response is almost 
complete and I expect it will be finished at the end of next week.'' 
Letter to Chairman McIntosh from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, 
Jan. 17, 1997.
    240. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to 
the President, Feb. 21, 1997.
    241. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to 
the President, Feb. 27, 1997.
    242. White House Press Briefing, transcript p. 13.
    243. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 1.
    244. Id.
    245. Pushkar deposition, pp. 47-48.
    246. Id. pp. 48, 163-164.
    247. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, p. 36.
    248. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, July 15, 1997.
    249. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Director of 
the Office of the First Lady's Correspondence, and Maggie Williams, 
Chief of Staff to the First Lady, Nov. 9, 1994, DNC 1020078.
    250. Memorandum from Brook Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie 
Williams, and James Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684.
    251. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, pp. 6-7, 34-37.
    252. Id. pp. 15-23. See also Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice 
Pushkar, Maggie Williams and Jim Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1997, DNC 1019684.
    253. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, p. 49.
    254. Id. p. 50.
    255. Handwritten notations of Alice Pushkar, undated, M 033308-
033309 (reflecting Mills's responses to Aug. 3, 1995 memorandum from 
Alice Pushkar to Cheryl Mills). See also Pushkar deposition, pp. 113-
116 (stating that Cheryl Mills informed her that ``[the DNC] shouldn't 
have the tape.'').
    256. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995 Holiday 
Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995, M 24815-24817 at M 24916 (emphasis 
added).
    257. Pushkar deposition, pp. 139-140. Similarly Brook Stroud could 
not recall giving computer personnel at the DNC any instructions with 
respect to limitations on access, use or copying of the White Hose 
data. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, p. 87.
    258. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995 Holiday 
Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995, M 24915-24917 at M 24917 (``Despite the 
use restrictions we impose on the DNC, for appearance [sic] purposes, 
the vendor should provide either of those two lists [White House 
portion and final merged lists] only to the White House.''). It is not 
at all clear whether she was suggesting that the ``use restrictions'' 
were only for appearances, or whether having the tapes returned to the 
White House was only for appearances.
    259. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995 Holiday 
Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995, M 24915-24917 at M 24915.
    260. By a letter of Oct. 9, 1997, the committee requested the 
following:

          Any and all contracts, and, or, ``use agreements,'' in 
        whatever form, drafted, negotiated or entered into between the 
        White House or Executive Office of the President and any 
        vendor, the Democratic National Committee, the Clinton-Gore 
        Campaign, the Clinton-Gore reelect committee, or other entities 
        with respect to the planning, implementation or production of 
        the 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 `'Holiday Card Project.'' Such 
        contracts, or ``use agreements'' are reference in Cheryl Mill's 
        [sic] August 14, 1995 memorandum (M 24915--M 24917). Documents 
        provided pursuant to this request should include, but not be 
        limited to, those referred to in that memorandum. Those 
        referred to in that memorandum should be identified as such in 
        your response.

Letter from Chairman McIntosk to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the 
President, Oct. 9, 1997.
    261. By Subpoena, the following records were compelled to be 
produced:

          Any and all contracts, and, or, ``use agreements,'' in 
        whatever form, drafted, negotiated or entered into between the 
        White House or Executive Office of the President and any 
        vendor, the Democratic National Committee, the Clinton-Gore 
        Campaign, the Clinton-Gore reelect committee, or other entities 
        with respect to the planning, implementation or production of 
        the 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 ``Holiday Card Project.''

Subpoena of Charles F.C. Ruff, Dec. 16, 1997 (originally returnable 
Jan. 15, 1998), item 2(b). See also id. item 2(c).
    262. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, Nov. 19, 1997, response to question 2.
    263. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, Nov. 19, 1997, response to question 2.
    264. Subpoena of Charles F.C. Ruff, Dec. 16, 1997 (originally 
returnable Jan. 15, 1998), item 2(b). See also id., item 2(c).
    265. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday 
Card Numbers,'' Nov. 10, 1993, M 034954 (``White House[:] . . . 33,000 
. . . '').
    266. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott, to 
Mack McLarty, ``Holiday Cards,'' Dec. 2, 1993, M 034960-044962 and M 
04961-034962 (``White House List[:) . . . 43,000'').
    267. The Clinton-Gore campaign committee is the owner of 
PeopleBase. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim 
Dorskind, ``Holiday Card Problem Areas and Considerations,'' Aug. 29, 
1993, M 034907-034909 at M 034908.
    268. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Maggie Williams, ``Holiday 
Cards,'' Nov. 9, 1993, M 034950 (``The internal White House holiday 
card list went to Little rock last night. Malone, Inc. will work with 
it and other lists in maintains to come up with the agreed upon 
database of 250,000 names.'').
    269. Affidavit of Carl Mecum, Apr. 29, 1998, para.para. 5, 7, 16.
    270. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday 
Card Wrap-Up,'' Jan. 13, 1994, M 034980-034982 at M 034981 (`'I already 
have requested a copy of the master list from Malone so that we can 
review and eliminate duplicates. That list should arrive by week's 
end.'').
    271. Letter from Daniel W. Burkhardt, Special Assistant and Counsel 
to the Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages, to Monica 
Breedlove, W.T. [sic] Malone, Inc., Mar. 2, 1994, M 034984 (directing 
that the information be used to correct the campaign database). 
Burkhardt this action despite his won documented knowledge that such 
action was unlawful. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhandt to Marsha Scott, 
``Holiday Card lists,'' Dec. 7, 1993, M 034965 (``[I]t has always been 
my understanding from White House counsel that the White House could 
not provide the resources to modify or correct lists coming from Malone 
or the DNC . . .'').
    272. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, `'Holiday 
Card Wrap-Up,'' Jan. 13, 1994, M 034980-M 034982 at M 034980 (``[A]s of 
[January 13, 1994] we have received only 8,000 returns.'').
    273. Letter from Daniel W. Burkhardt, Special Assistant and Counsel 
to the Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages, to Monica 
Breedlove, W.P. Malone, Inc., Mar. 2, 1994, M 034984.
    274. Memorandum from Lyn Utrecht, ``Database at W.P. Malone,'' Mar. 
9, 1995 Attachment 2, `'Database Status Report (Summary),'' M 036558-
036560 and M 036560 (``Address corrections entered as received to 
include 1993 Christmas card mailings and DNC summer, 1994 mailing''). 
the more detailed memorandum discussing this fact was withheld from the 
committee by the White House. In a letter to the committee of Mar. 13, 
1998, the White House stated that the memo was withheld because it was 
``subject to attorney-client privilege held by Clinton-Gore, and ha[s] 
not been produced.'' Letter from Lanny Breuer, Special Counsel to the 
President, to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels to the 
committee, Mar. 13, 1998.
    275. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, via Matt Moore, to David 
Watkins, Oct. 28, 1993, M 034826-034827 at M 034826.
    276. Id. (``Initially, this [White House] list was going to be 
provided to the Democratic National Committee [DNC].'').
    277. See letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, 
Counsel to the President Mar. 2, 1998, p. 1, item 2 (seeking production 
of this memorandum); letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to 
the President, to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels to the 
committee, Mar. 13, 1998, response to item 2 (``[W]e have not located a 
copy of this document.'').
    278. E-mail Memorandum from Matthew L. Moore to Cherly Mills, 
``Christmas Card Lists,'' Oct. 20, 1993, M 034831.
    279. See letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, 
Counsel to the President, Mar. 2, 1998, p. 1, item 2 (seeking 
production of this memorandum); letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special 
Counsel to the President, to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels 
to the committee, Mar. 13, 1998, response to item 2 (`'We have not 
located a copy of this document.'').
    280. E-mail Memorandum from Matthew L. Moore to Cheryl Mills, 
``Christmas Card Lists,'' Oct. 20, 1993, M 034831 (emphasis added).
    281. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to 
the President, Mar. 2, 1998, pp. 1-2, item 5.
    282. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to the President, 
to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels to the committee, Mar. 13, 
1998, response to item 5.
    283. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to 
the President, Mar. 2, 1998, p. 2, item 6.
    284. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to the President, 
to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels to the committee, Mar. 13, 
1998, response to item 6.
    285. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills via Matt Moore, to David Watkins 
(cc: Dan Burkhardt), Oct. 28, 1998, M 034826-M 034827 at M 034826 
(emphasis added).
    286. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim 
Dorskind, ``Holiday Card Lists,'' Aug. 29, 1993, M 034894-034898, at 
034896.
    287. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt via Marsha Scott to Mack 
McLarty, ``Holiday Cards,'' Dec. 2, 1993, M 034960-034962 at M 034961.
    288. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott to Mack 
McLarty, ``Holiday Cards,'' Dec. 2, 1993, M 034960-034962 at M 034961-
034962.
    289. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim 
Dorskind, ``Holiday card Lists,'' Aug. 29, 1993, M 034894-034898 at M 
034897.
    290. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, via Matt Moore, to David 
Watkins, ``Holiday Greeting Cards II,'' Oct. 18, 1993, M 034826-034827 
at M 034826
    291. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Dan Burkhardt, ``Holiday 
Greeting Card Project,'' Aug. 11, 1993, M 034899 (emphasis added).
    292. Memorandum from Daniel W. Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott, to 
Cheryl Mills, ``Democratic National Committee participation in Holiday 
Card Project,'' Aug. 6, 1993, M 034893.
    293. Memorandum from Helen Dickety to Kelly Crawford, Oct. 17, 
1994, M 034692.
    294. White House telephone call log, ``PHONE CALLS CONCERNING POTUS 
AND THE ADMINISTRATION, LOG START DATE 1/8/96, LOG END DATE 1/26/96,'' 
M 034780.
    295. Cover note and list from Kelly Crawford to Monica Breadlove, 
July 27, 1993, M 036286-036301.
    296. See supra notes 50-51 (regarding Nussbaum, Cutler, and Mikva 
memoranda).
    297. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, May 22, 1997; Scott deposition, Feb. 19, 1998, pp. 
94-102.
    298. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, 
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New 
Database,'' Jan. 28, 1994, M 32433-32434 (emphasis added).
    299. Scott deposition, Feb. 19, 1988, p. 83 (``Q. And who on your 
team was discussing this with the DNC? A. . . . It was Erich Vaden, it 
was myself, and it was Mark Bartholomew.''); Vaden deposition, pp. 256-
257 (``I considered [all work related to WhoDB] to be official duties . 
. .'').
    300. Committee deposition of Jerry R. Carlson, Aug. 28, 1997, pp. 
60-62.
    301. Id. pp. 68-69.
    302. Committee deposition of Mark Barthotholomew, Sept. 16, 1997, 
pp. 40-43; Committee deposition of Karl H. Heissner, Sept. 9, 1997, pp. 
59-62.
    303. Heissner deposition, Sept. 9, 1997, p. 61.
    304. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, and 
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New 
Database,'' June 28, 1994, M 32438-32439 (``My team and I are also 
engaged in conversations with the DNC about their new system they are 
proposing. We have asked that their system be modeled after whatever 
system we decide to use outside the White House. I need you to make 
very clear to them that their system must be technologically 
compatible, if not the same, as whatever system we decide to use for 
political purposes later on. These discussions are currently in 
progress. . . . [L]et my team work with the DNC to help them design a 
system that will meet our needs and technical specifications. We can 
show them what to do and then close another system for our specific 
uses later on.'').
    305. Id.
    306. Id.
    307. See Affidavit of Carl Mecum.
    308. Id. para. 7.
    309. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Database 
Outside WH,'' May 31, 1994, M 036280.
    310. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and 
Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 32463-
32466 at M 32463 (emphasis added).
    311. See Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and 
Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 25634-
25637 at M 25634.
    312. Meeting agenda, Feb. 2, 1994, M 33044.
    313. Unidentified note, Dec. 6, 1994, M 33181.
    314. Id.
    315. Memorandum from Harold Ickes to Leon Panetta and Evelyn 
Lieberman, May 17, 1996, M 33215-33219 at M33217 (reflecting approval 
of new job description fro Marsha Scott).
    316. Committee deposition of Harold Ickes, Mar. 12, 1998, pp. 50, 
122.
    317. Id. p. 123.
    318. Id. p. 51.
    319. Id. p. 57.
    320. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to the First Lady and Bruce 
Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 32463-32466.
    321. Letter from White House counsel Charles F.C. Ruff to Chairman 
McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 2.
    322. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to Deputy Chief 
of Staff Erskine Bowles, undated, M 033298.
    323. Bailey deposition, p. 13 (testifying that he was employed in 
the White House Chief of Staff's Office from Sept. 1994 to Nov. 1995).
    324. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to Deputy Chief 
of Staff Erskine Bowles, undated, M 033298.
    325. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the 
President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President, Jan. 17, 
1994, M 24918-24920.
    326. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and 
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New 
Database,'' June 28, 1994, M 32433-32434.
    327. Id. at M 32434.
    328. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and 
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), June 28, 1994, M 32438-32439, at 
32439 (copy inscribed with handwritten notes of the First Lady).
    329. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Chief of Staff [Mack 
McLarty], undated (computer archive date Feb. 11, 1995), M 33054-33057 
at M 33057.
    330. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, undated 
(computer archive date Feb. 11, 1995), M 33054-33057.
    331. Id. (emphasis added).
    332. Id. (emphasis added).
    333. ``WhoDB Requirements Report,'' undated.
    334. Id. p. 3.
    335. Id.
    336. ``Centralized White House Database Security Brief,'' Jan. 12, 
1993, M 2778-2780. See also, Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack 
McLarty (cc: Bruce Lindsey), ``Master Database'', Dec. 7, 1993, M 25921 
(``Both the President and the First Lady have asked that I make this my 
top priority.''); Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Cheryl Mills ``White 
House Database,'' Dec. 16, 1993, M 25101 (``I am working on a project 
that is of high priority to the President and the First Lady''); 
Memorandum from Marsha Scott to James L. McDonald, Jr. ``Continuing 
efforts for the First Lady,'' Feb. 4, 1994, M 25334 (``These projects 
are very important to the President and the First Lady and should be a 
priority for us all.''); Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Phil Lader, 
Mack McLarty, and Harold Ickes ``Follow-up to [Hillary Rodham Clinton] 
Meeting,'' Mar. 7, 1994, M 32447 (``. . . Hillary's desire to have me 
proceed unimpeded with the Database Project. . . .''); Internal White 
House E-mail message from Jerry Carlson to Patsy Thomasson, undated, 
``Update on 11-14-9[4] Meeting Regarding Project,'' M 26251-26252 
(``Erskine [Bowles] . . . asked that the report and output formats be 
reviewed in detail to insure the President gets what he is expecting. 
Erskine . . . will then take this to the President for input.''); 
``Project Outline and Discussion, Updated 3-5-96,'' M 23168-23169 at M 
23169 (``. . . Marsha Scott is expecting to deliver reports on a weekly 
basis to the President and First Lady starting in March.'').
    337. Draft Memorandum from Paul Antony and Brian Bailey to Erskine 
Bowles, ``Update on White House Database Project,'' Oct. 25, 1994, 
M21402-21404.
    338. Id. M 21402 (all capitals in original).
    339. Id. (underline and capitals in original).
    340. Id.
    341. Bailey deposition, p. 13 (testifying that he was employed in 
the White House Chief of Staff's Office from Sept. 1994 to Nov. 1995).
    342. Id. pp. 27-28.
    343. Letter from White House counsel Charles F.C. Ruff to Chairman 
McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 2.
    344. Memorandum from Erich Vaden to Marsha Scott, ``Number of 
Items,'' Mar. 2, 1995, M 25639.
    345. Id.
    346. Memorandum [for Multiple distribution] from Erskine Bowles, 
``Clean-up and Coding of database Records,'' Mar. 28, 1995, M 32493.
    347. Id.
    348. Id.
    349. Id.
    350. Id.
    351. Memorandum from Harold Ickes to Janice Enright, ``Terry 
McAuliffe's Requests to POTUS,'' Jan. 6, 1995, EOP 35937; Handwritten 
notes, undated, CGRO 1570 (reflecting President's communication cited 
within the memorandum).
    352. Memorandum from Harold Ickes to Leon Panetta and Evelyn 
Lieberman, ``Marsha Scott, VIP Operation at the Democratic National 
Committee,'' May 17, 1996, M 33215-33219.
    353. Id. M 33217.
    354. Id.
    355. Memorandum for the President from Harold Ickes, ``Marsha 
Scott,'' May 14, 1996, M 33227.
    356. Memorandum for the President from Harold Ickes, ``Marsha 
Scott,'' May 14, 1996, M 33220.
    357. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and 
Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 32463-
32466.
    358. Id. M 32463.
    359. Id.
    360. Scott deposition, Feb. 18, 1998, p. 69.
    361. Affidavit of Carl Mecum, para. 10.
    362. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Database 
Outside White House,'' May 31, 1994, M036280; Notes of meeting with 
HRC, Lader, Ickes, ``Database Update,'' Feb. 2, 1994, M 033044; 
Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Outside Data,'' Nov. 
21, 1994, M 33050-33052; and Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold 
Ickes, ``DNC Offices and Surrogate Speakers,'' Aug. 19, 1994, M 33283-
33285.
    363. Scott deposition, Feb. 19, 1998, pp. 71-72.
    364. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and 
Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 25634-
25637.
    365. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and 
Bruce Lindsey. ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 25634-
25637.
    366. Id. M 32465.
    367. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Phil Lader, ``Meeting Follow-
up,'' Mar. 4, 1994, M 27470-27475.
    368. Scott deposition, Apr. 28, 1998, p. 14 (emphasis added).
    369. Id. p. 101.
    370. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and 
Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 32463-
32466.
    371. Carlson deposition, p. 22.
    372. Id. p. 23.

                     index of supporting documents

    1. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to Deputy Chief of 
Staff Erskine Bowles, undated (M 033298).
    2. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey 
(cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New Database,'' 
June 28, 1994 (M 32433-32434).
    3. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey 
(cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New Database,'' 
June 28, 1994 (copy with handwritten notes of First Lady, undated) (M 
32438-32439).
    4. Letter from Chairman Dan Burton to Subcommittee Chairman David 
M. McIntosh, July 17, 1997.
    5. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Marsha Scott, Jan. 17, 1994 (M 
24918-24920).
    6. David Watkins, ``Briefing Paper on Databases--Eyes Only,'' Jan. 
31, 1994 (M 32467-32472).
    7. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman 
McIntosh, June 28, 1996.
    8. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, Oct. 28, 1997.
    9. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to 
the President, Feb. 27, 1997.
    10. Letter from the majority members of the Subcommittee on 
National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs to 
President William J. Clinton, Aug. 2, 1996.
    11. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, Mar. 6, 1997.
    12. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Cheryl Mills, Dec. 16, 1993 (M 
25101).
    13. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, May 22, 1997.
    14. ``Withheld documents say President wanted database to share 
with DNC,'' Associated Press, Oct. 30, 1997.
    15. ``Lawmaker Suggests Obstruction in Late Delivery of Memo on 
White House Database,'' the Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1997, p. A8.
    16. ``White House Retained Memo on Database,'' Wall Street Journal, 
Nov. 7, 1997.
    17. ``Committee chairman warns White House lawyers on delays,'' 
Associated Press, Nov. 6, 1997.
    18. Memorandum from Bernard W. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, 
and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to White House 
Staff, July 12, 1993 (M 033320-033330).
    19. Memorandum from Lloyd Cutler, Special Counsel to the President, 
and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to White House 
Staff, Apr. 6, 1994 (M 033331-033342).
    20. Memorandum from Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President, and 
Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to Executive Office 
of the President Staff, Oct. 12, 1994 (M 033343-033355).
    21. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, Feb. 11, 
1995 (M 33054-33057).
    22. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold 
Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, (unredacted copy) (M 32457-32461).
    23. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold 
Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, (redacted copy) (M 25673-25677).
    24. ``Fund-Raisers' Use of White House Database Reported,'' Los 
Angeles Times, Thursday, Jan. 30, 1997, p. A1.
    25. White House Press Briefing by Mike McCurry and Barry Toiv, Jan. 
30, 1997 (12:45 p.m. EST), transcript, pp. 1, 6-21.
    26. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, Oct. 3, 1996.
    27. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, Oct. 28, 1996.
    28. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, Nov. 13, 1996.
    29. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, Jan. 10, 199[7].
    30. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman 
McIntosh, Jan. 17, 1997.
    31. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to 
the President, Feb. 21, 1997.
    32. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the 
President, Jan. 31, 1997.
    33. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman 
McIntosh, Feb. 3, 1997.
    34. ``DNC Statement on the White House Database,'' Jan. 30, 1997 (M 
037428).
    35. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997.
    36. ``Big Donor Calls Favorable Treatment a Coincidence,'' the 
Washington Post, Monday, May 25, 1998, p. A1.
    37. Memorandum from Martha Phipps to Ann Cahill, ``White House 
Activities,'' May 5, 1994 (EOP 036287).
    38. Draft memorandum to Martha Phipps, Apr. 28, 1994 (EOP 036294).
    39. Notes, undated (EOP 036283-036286).
    40. Memorandum from David Mercer, Fran Wakem, Ari Swiller, Jennifer 
Scully, and Peter O'Keefe to [Truman] Arnold and Richard Sullivan, 
``Proposed Communications & Marketing Ideas: INTERNAL MEMO--NOT FOR 
DISTRIBUTION,'' Mar. 14, 1995 (DNC 3236734-3236737).
    41. Memorandum to David Mercer, ``Finance Needs,'' Mar. 13, 1994 
(DNC 3236707).
    42. White House Automated Verification Entry System [WAVES] 
records, Mar. 24, 1995 (EOP 040404).
    43. Facsimile from Judy Spangler, White House Office of the Social 
Secretary, to Jennifer Scully, DNC, Apr. 15, 1994 (print-out from White 
House computers reflecting status of persons invited to an upcoming 
Apr. 19, 1994 DNC Trustee Reception at the White House) (DNC 3058341-
3058351).
    44. Memorandum from Minyon Moore to Chair [Deborah] DeLee, Bobby 
Watson, Laura Hartigan, Jill Alper, and Vida Benavides, ``Upcoming 
Holiday Events at the White House,'' Dec. 9, 1994 (DNC 0908516-
0908663).
    45. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to the President, 
to Mildred Webber, staff director, Subcommittee on National Economic 
Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, June 2, 1997.
    46. Affidavit of Carl Mecum, Sept. 4, 1998.
    47. ``Economic Conference List--Southern Region, Invitation List of 
Panelists and Observers as of 3/21/95,'' Mar. 21, 1995 (DNC 3236693-
3236694, 3236696-3236699, 3236712).
    48. White House Office of Public Liaison, ``APA Opinion Leaders'' 
(DNC 0626453-0626472).
    49. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, June 6, 1997.
    50. Handwritten notes of Erich Vaden, undated (M 20536).
    51. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Tara Burns, ``X-mas List,'' 
June 17, [1994] (DNC 1019608).
    52. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles, ``Meetings To 
Be Held While I Am Gone,'' Oct. 28, 1994 (M 33082-33083).
    53. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar and Maggie 
Williams, ``Holiday Card,'' Nov. 9, 1994 (DNC 1020078).
    54. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie 
Williams, and Jim Dorskind, ``Holiday Card: an update,'' Nov. 15, 1994 
(DNC 1019684-1019685).
    55. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994 (Saturn 
Documents 0000604-0000607).
    56. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Brooke Stroud, Dec. 20, 1994 
(Saturn Document 0000633-0000634).
    57. Memorandum from Alice Pushkar to Cheryl Mills, ``Holiday Card 
Project,'' Aug. 3, 1995 (M 033308-033309).
    58. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, July 15, 1997.
    59. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995 Holiday 
Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995 (M 24915-24917).
    60. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to 
the President, Oct. 9, 1997.
    61. Subpoena of Charles F.C. Ruff, Dec. 16, 1997.
    62. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to 
Chairman McIntosh, Nov. 19, 1997.
    63. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday Card 
Numbers,'' Nov. 10, 1993 (M 034954).
    64. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott, to Mack 
McLarty, ``Holiday Cards,'' Dec. 2, 1993 (M 034960-034962).
    65. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim Dorskind, 
``Holiday Card Problem Areas and Considerations,'' Aug. 29, 1993 (M 
034907-034909).
    66. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Maggie Williams, ``Holiday 
Cards,'' Nov. 9, 1993 (M 034950).
    67. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday Card 
Wrap-Up,'' Jan. 13, 1994 (M 034980-034982).
    68. Letter from Daniel W. Burkhardt, Special Assistant and Counsel 
to the Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages, to Monica 
Breedlove, W.P. Malone, Inc., Mar. 2, 1994 (M 034984).
    69. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday Card 
Lists,'' Dec. 7, 1993 (M 034965).
    70. Memorandum from Lyn Utrecht to Bruce Lindsey, ``Database at 
W.P. Malone,'' Mar. 9, 1995 (M 036558-036560).
    71. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, via Matt Moore, to David Watkins, 
Oct. 28, 1993 (M 034826-034827).
    72. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to 
the President, Mar. 2, 1998.
    73. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to the President, 
to Keith Ausbrook, senior counsel, and Jay Apperson, special counsel, 
Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and 
Regulatory Affairs, Mar. 13, 1998.
    74. E-mail Memorandum from Matthew L. Moore to Cheryl Mills, 
``Christmas Card Lists,'' Oct. 20, 1993 (M 034831).
    75. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim Dorskind, 
``Holiday Card Lists,'' Aug. 29, 1993 (M 034894-034898).
    76. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Dan Burkhardt, ``Holiday 
Greeting Card Project,'' Aug. 11, 1993 (M 034899).
    77. Memorandum from Daniel W. Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott, to 
Cheryl Mills, ``Democratic National Committee participation in Holiday 
Card Project,'' Aug. 6, 1993 (M 034893).
    78. Memorandum from Kelly Crawford to Helen Dickey, Oct. 17, 1994 
(M 034692).
    79. White House telephone call log, ``PHONE CALLS CONCERNING POTUS 
AND THE ADMINISTRATION, LOG START DATE 1/8/96, LOG END DATE 1/26/96,'' 
(M 034780).
    80. Cover note and list from Kelly Crawford to Monica Breedlove, 
July 27, 1993 (M 03286-03301).
    81. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Database 
Outside WH,'' May 31, 1994 (M 036280).
    82. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and 
Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994 (M 32463-
32466).
    83. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and 
Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994 (M 25634-
25637).
    84. Meeting agenda, Feb. 2, 1994 (M 33044).
    85. Unidentified note, Dec. 5, 1994 (M 33181).
    86. Memorandum from Harold Ickes to Leon Panetta and Evelyn 
Lieberman, ``Marsha Scott, VIP Operation at the Democratic National 
Committee,'' May 17, 1996 (M 33215-33219).
    87. ``Centralized White House Resource Database Security Brief,'' 
Jan. 2, 1993 (M 2778-2782).
    88. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, ``Master 
Database,'' Dec. 7, 1993 (M 25921).
    89. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to James L. McDonald, Jr., 
``Continuing Efforts for the First Lady,'' Feb. 4, 1994 (M 25334).
    90. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Phil Lader, Mack McLarty, and 
Harold Ickes, ``Follow-up to [Hillary Rodham Clinton] Meeting,'' Mar. 
7, 1994 (M 32447).
    91. Internal White House E-mail message from Jerry Carlsen to Patsy 
Thomasson, ``Update on 11-14-9[4] Meeting Regarding Project,'' undated 
(M 26251-26252).
    92. ``Project Outline and Discussion, Updated 3-5-96'' (M 23168-
23169).
    93. Draft Memorandum from Paul Antony and Brian Bailey to Erskine 
Bowles, ``Update on White House Database Project,'' Oct. 25, 1994 (M 
21402-21404).
    94. Memorandum from Erich Vaden to Marsha Scott, ``Number of 
Items,'' Mar. 2, 1995 (M 25639).
    95. Memorandum [for Multiple Distribution] from Erskine Bowles, 
``Clean-up and Coding of Database Records,'' Mar. 28, 1995 (M 32493).
    96. Memorandum from Janice Enright to Harold Ickes, ``Terry 
McAuliffe's requests to POTUS,'' Jan. 6, 1995 (EOP 035937).
    97. Handwritten notes, undated (CGRO-1570).
    98. Memorandum for the President from Harold Ickes, ``Marsha 
Scott,'' May 14, 1996 (M 33227).
    99. Memorandum for the President from Harold Ickes, ``Marsha 
Scott,'' May 14, 1996 (M 33220).
    100. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Outside 
Data,'' Nov. 21, 1994 (M 33050-33052).
    101. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``DNC Offices 
and Surrogate Speakers,'' Aug. 19, 1994 (M 33283-33285).
    102. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Phil Lader, ``Meeting Follow-
up,'' Mar. 4, 1994 (M 27470-27475).

    [The supporting documents referred to follow:]





MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, HON. TOM LANTOS, HON. ROBERT E. 
   WISE, JR., HON. MAJOR R. OWENS, HON. EDOLPHUS TOWNS, HON. PAUL E. 
 KANJORSKI, HON. GARY A. CONDIT, HON. BERNARD SANDERS, HON. CAROLYN B. 
MALONEY, HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, HON. CHAKA FATTAH, HON. ELIJAH E. 
CUMMINGS, HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH, HON. ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, HON. DANNY 
      K. DAVIS, HON. THOMAS H. ALLEN, AND HON. HAROLD E. FORD, JR.

                                CONTENTS

 I. Executive Summary
II. Findings
    A. The Development of WhoDB
    B. Event Planning
     1. Official Events
     2. Events Sponsored by Outside Entities
    C. The Holiday Card Project
    D. The Involvement of the President and First Lady
III.Response to Majority Allegations

    A. The Alleged ``Theft'' of the Holiday Card List
    B. The Alleged ``Theft'' Concerning Event Attendance Information
    C. The Alleged ``Conversion'' of Government Personnel and Resources
    D. The Allegation of a White House ``Infrastructure'' to Support 
    DNC
    E. The Allegations Regarding the President and First Lady
    F. The Allegations Regarding Cheryl Mills
     1. The Majority's ``Evidence'' of Perjury and Obstruction
      a. Scott Memo
      b. Bailey Notes
     2. The Majority's Allegations Regarding Motive
IV. The Costs of the WhoDB Investigation
 V. Conclusion
    Appendix I

                          I. Executive Summary

    The majority report accuses the President, the First Lady, 
senior White House staff, and Democratic National Committee 
[DNC] employees of theft of government property. These 
conclusions are extraordinary. Simply put, the record does not 
support an allegation of theft. It is not theft to remove 
duplicate addresses from the President's holiday card list so 
that recipients do not receive duplicate cards. It is not theft 
to answer an inquiry as to whether an individual has attended 
an event at the White House. Yet, at bottom, this is the type 
of evidence the majority cites as support for its conclusions.
    There has not been any prosecution for ``theft of 
government property'' that even remotely resembles the conduct 
examined here--nor will there ever be. Violation of the 
``theft'' statute occurs where an individual ``embezzles, 
steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use 
of another, or without authority sells, conveys or disposes of 
any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United 
States.'' As the Supreme Court has ruled, to be guilty of this 
crime a person must have a ``criminal intent to steal.''
    No one ``stole'' the President's holiday card list. In both 
the Republican and Democratic administrations, the President's 
holiday cards are paid for by the President's political party, 
so as to avoid any appearance that taxpayer money is being used 
to pay for greetings to political supporters. In the case of 
the 1994 list, a conscientious DNC employee, Brooke Stroud, 
learned that the contractor that had been hired by the DNC to 
remove duplicate addresses from the President's holiday card 
list did not properly ``de-dupe'' the list. She therefore 
worked over a weekend with her parents and several volunteers 
to properly remove duplicate addresses from the list. This is 
not embezzling, stealing, or purloining the holiday card list. 
Ms. Stroud obtained the holiday card list for the purpose of 
insuring that the President did not send two cards to the same 
address--not for the purpose of stealing the list.
    Similarly, there was no theft of the 1993 holiday card 
list. Apparently, the contractor charged with ``de-duping'' the 
1993 holiday card list failed to remove the list from its 
computer. The computer was later moved--for unrelated reasons--
to the 1996 Clinton/Gore campaign. There is no evidence that 
this list was used for campaign purposes. In fact, the Clinton-
Gore campaign never even accessed this list. Not only was there 
no intent to steal, but it appears that the Clinton-Gore 
campaign was not even aware that it possessed the list.
    The majority's assertion that it is theft to disclose 
attendance at White House events has even less of a foundation. 
When the White House Social Office was planning official events 
like a state dinner, the office had the responsibility of 
submitting a proposed guest list to the President and the First 
Lady. In order to assemble an appropriate list, the Social 
Office asked various parties, including the DNC, for 
suggestions. This was exactly the same practice followed in 
prior administrations.
    To avoid recommending individuals to the White House who 
had recently been to theWhite House, the DNC, on occasion, 
asked the White House Social Office whether certain individuals had 
attended an event at the White House recently. When White House 
employees answered these legitimate inquiries, they were not stealing 
government property. They were simply helping to insure that the 
President and the First Lady were presented with a better guest list.
    A legitimate question is whether anyone improperly used 
government resources for political purposes. On this issue, 
however, the relevant witnesses testified that they had no 
reason to believe that the holiday card list or the attendance 
information--or any other information derived from the White 
House database--was ever used for campaign or political 
fundraising purposes. The Committee fully investigated every 
minuscule transfer of information from the White House to the 
DNC and did not establish that any of the information was used 
improperly.
    It is tempting not to dignify the majority report's 
accusations regarding the President and First Lady with a 
response. Since the charge has been made, however, it is 
necessary to correct the record. The majority report's attempt 
to implicate the President and First Lady in the theft 
``scheme'' is not, in any way, substantiated by the evidence. 
First, it is impossible to implicate the First Family in a 
crime that has not been committed. Further, the record 
indicates that the President and First Lady were only 
peripherally involved with the database. The staff involved in 
the database project could recall only a handful of 
conversations with the President and First Lady about the 
database--and those discussions were general in nature and 
raise no concerns.
    The majority also unfairly claims that Cheryl Mills, Deputy 
White House Counsel, has committed perjury and obstruction 
because Ms. Mills and other White House counsel disagreed with 
Rep. McIntosh's conclusion about whether two documents were 
responsive to his document request. It is not a crime to reach 
a different conclusion than Rep. McIntosh.
    Two years ago, Rep. McIntosh falsely accused SEC Chairman 
Arthur Levitt of flying first-class at taxpayer expense, 
leading a Wall Street Journal columnist to observe:

          Rep. David M. McIntosh has been chasing SEC Chairman 
        Arthur Levitt Jr. all over Planet Washington. He does 
        so in pursuit of a ``scandal'' that, when we press our 
        x-ray spectrometer up against it, seems to consist of 
        the substance of interstellar space, which is to say, 
        nothing.
          Mr. Levitt is accused of flying first class and 
        staying in nice hotels, and digging into his own pocket 
        to pay for it.
          It takes a special kind of ingenuity to find 
        something to get outraged about here.\1\

    \1\ Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Business World: Fly First Class (With 
the Other Criminals), Wall Street Journal (July 15, 1997) (attached as 
exhibit 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It also takes ``special ingenuity'' to discern a theft of 
government property in this case. It may be frustrating to 
spend over two years investigating an esoteric issue like the 
White House database and find nothing. However, this does not 
justify smearing the reputations of numerous public servants 
and others without factual or legal support, nor does it 
justify making ludicrous charges about the President and the 
First Lady.

                              II. Findings

    The White House Database (``WhoDB'') is a computerized 
Rolodex used to track contacts of citizens with the White House 
and to create a holiday card list. Well over two years ago, 
Rep. McIntosh, Chairman of the Subcommittee on National 
Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs 
began a sprawling investigation into the development and use of 
the WhoDB.\2\ The Subcommittee, in conjunction with the 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, has deposed 34 
witnesses exclusively on WhoDB issues,\3\ and obtained over 
43,000 pages of documents. It spent a great deal of taxpayer 
money on this investigation. Yet neither the Subcommittee nor 
the Committee held a public hearing on merits of the 
investigation in the entire 105th Congress. What the evidence 
gathered by the Committee shows is summarized below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Letter from Subcommittee Chairman David M. McIntosh to Leon 
Panetta (June 27, 1996).
    \3\ The deposition of one additional witness focused on both WhoDB 
and other campaign finance related matters. See Deposition of Truman 
Arnold, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (July 18, 
1997). All depositions referenced in this report, unless otherwise 
noted, were conducted by this Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      A. The Development of WhoDB

    The Clinton administration inherited a number of different 
computer systems that various offices within the White House 
had used to track contacts. The Clinton administration planned 
to update the computer systems by creating one White House 
database that a number of the offices could access for the most 
up-to-date contact information on individuals such as addresses 
and phone numbers.4 The idea for such a system 
apparently was not unique to the Clinton administration. A 
database contract proposed late in the Bush administration 
similarly described a system that would maintain a ``list of 
names and addresses of individuals identified as important to 
the President.'' 5
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Deposition of Laura Tayman, 29 (Mar. 20, 1998); Deposition of 
Marsha Scott, 26-27, 58-59 (Feb. 18, 1998); Deposition of Erich Vaden, 
15-16 (Jan. 25, 1998); Deposition of Mark Bartholomew, 36-37 (Aug. 15, 
1997).
    \5\ See The Propriety of the Taxpayer-funded White House Database, 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural 
Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the Committee on Government Reform 
and Oversight, 53 (Sept. 10, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The new database eventually became what is known as the 
White House database or the ``WhoDB.'' According to a survey by 
the Government Accounting Office, the White House estimated 
that the WhoDB contains approximately 200,000 names of 
individuals, as well as information such as the individuals' 
addresses, organizational affiliations, and relationships with 
the First Family.6 The White House estimates that 
the total cost of development, operations, and maintenance of 
the database from FY 1994 through August 1998 is 
$785,467.7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Id. at 97.
    \7\ This estimate was provided by the Office of White House Counsel 
in September 1998. The majority does not explain anywhere in its report 
how it reached the conclusion that the WhoDB cost $1.7 million, and no 
witnesses deposed by the Committee confirmed that that number was 
accurate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although early plans anticipated that WhoDB would be used 
by many offices within the White House, the two main users were 
the Social Office, which used it to create guest lists for 
events held at the White House, and the Correspondence Office, 
which used it to create a list of names and addresses of 
individuals who would receive holiday cards from the President.
    After conducting a lengthy investigation into the 
development and use of the WhoDB, the Subcommittee has learned 
that those involved in developing the WhoDB regularly consulted 
White House counsel on database issues, including the limits on 
the receipt and use of information contained in the 
WhoDB.8 For example, Brian Bailey, who was an 
assistant to then-Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles, 
testified as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ See, e.g., Deposition of Erskine Bowles, 30, 107-08 (May 5, 
1998); Deposition of Laura Tayman, 79-80 (Mar. 20, 1998); Deposition of 
Marsha Scott, 90-91 (Feb. 18, 1998); Deposition of Erich Vaden, 101-04 
(Jan. 25, 1998); Deposition of Brian Bailey, 27-28 (Feb. 6, 1998).

          Erskine, from day one, was insistent that . . . this 
        is a short-term assignment and it just didn't make any 
        sense to even think about doing anything illegal, 
        immoral, or unethical. He used those three words all 
        the time. And he said, if there is anything that you 
        have one ounce of question about or even a shade of 
        gray in, go talk to the White House Counsel, and if 
        White House Counsel says no, then the answer is 
        no.9
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Deposition of Brian Bailey, 27 (Feb. 6, 1998).

    The advice from White House counsel to those who worked on 
the WhoDB distinguished between the transfer of data from 
outside sources into a White House database and the transfer of 
data from a White House database to outside sources. The 
counsel's office advised that the White House can receive data 
for a White House database from any source, including ``private 
entities or individuals, non-profit organizations, political 
organizations, and other sources.'' 10 For example, 
if the Clinton-Gore campaign had a computerized Rolodex of 
contacts who were important to the President, it would not be 
illegal to import this data into the WhoDB, just as it would 
not be illegal for a new government employee to bring the 
employee's personal Rolodex with him or her into government 
service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the 
President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President and 
Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages (Jan. 17, 1994), 
White House Bates No. M24918-20. All documents produced by the White 
House for the WhoDB investigation are designated with the letter ``M.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The White House counsel took a dimmer view of transferring 
data from a White House database to outside sources. The 
counsel advised ``data from the database system may be provided 
to a source outside the federal government only for authorized 
purposes.'' 11 All of the relevant witnesses 
testified that there was no transfer of data from the WhoDB to 
databases outside the White House.12
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the 
President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President and 
Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages (Jan. 17, 1994), 
M24918-20.
    \12\ E.g., Deposition of Erich Vaden, 296 (Jan. 25, 1998); 
Deposition of Marsha Scott, 133 (Feb. 18, 1998); Deposition of Mark 
Bartholomew, 88-89 (Aug. 15, 1997); Deposition of Al Hurst, 112 (Mar. 
13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In fact, according to testimony, the WhoDB system had a 
warning banner stating that data was for official use, and 
users had to acknowledge this before logging on.13 
Not only were employees made aware of the legal limits on the 
WhoDB, witness after witness testified that they had no reason 
to believe that the legal advice from White House counsel was 
ever disregarded.14
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Deposition of Erich Vaden, 115-16 (Jan. 25, 1998).
    \14\ See, e.g., Deposition of Erskine Bowles, 107-08 (May 5, 1998); 
Deposition of Laura Tayman, 142 (Mar. 20, 1998); Deposition of Harold 
Ickes, 132-33 (Mar. 12, 1998); Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 162 
(Feb. 20, 1998); Deposition of Marsha Scott, 134 (Feb. 19, 1998); 
Deposition of Donald Dunn, 151 (Jan. 27, 1998); Deposition of Erich 
Vaden, 296 (Jan. 25, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           B. Event Planning

    The Social Office uses the WhoDB when planning official 
White House events and unofficial events held on the White 
House grounds. The Clinton administration's Social Office has 
helped plan thousands of events to which hundreds of thousands 
of guests were invited to the White House.15
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ See Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 54-57 (Feb. 20, 1998) 
(testifying that the Social Office held about 2,000 events in 4 years, 
entertaining about half a million people in 4\1/2\ years).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Official events

    According to deposition witnesses, official events include 
events such as state dinners, arrival ceremonies, and bill 
signings. Following the practices of previous administrations, 
for these events, the Social Office collects a list of 
recommended invitees from other offices within the White House 
and from relevant outside entities such as congressional 
offices, the DNC, and interested parties.\16\ These lists are 
compiled into one list which is reviewed by the President, the 
First Lady, or the White House Counsel's Office.\17\ The guest 
list is then input onto the WhoDB.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 32-37 (Feb. 20 , 1998) 
(``again, what we're going on is a precedent of me sitting down with 
previous social secretaries and asking them how they did that and how 
they went about building lists'').
    \17\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 68, 76 (Feb. 20, 1998).
    \18\ Deposition of Kimberly Widdess, 26-28 (Feb. 24, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The WhoDB list is apparently used to create a 
calligrapher's list of names and addresses for producing 
written invitations; a Presidential identifier list which lists 
the names and affiliations of the guests for the President; a 
security list which lists names, social security numbers, and 
birthdates which is sent to the WAVES computerized security 
system; a gate list used for check-in on the date of the event 
which contains the list of guests approved by security; and a 
final attendee list which the gate sends to the Usher's Office 
after the event.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 90-95 (Feb. 20, 1998); 
Deposition of Kimberly Widdess, 129 (Feb. 24, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to the testimony of relevant White House and DNC 
staff, the White House did not want the same people to be 
invited repeatedly to official White House events.\20\ 
Therefore, before the DNC recommended potential invitees, DNC 
staff would sometimes call the White House and ask whether a 
particular individual had been to a past White House event.\21\ 
These calls generally involved a request about the attendance 
of one or two individuals.\22\ The White House sometimes did 
not respond to these requests and sometimes did--at times 
consulting WhoDB.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 98 (Feb. 20, 1998) (``Of 
course. We don't want duplicate invitations''); Deposition of Donald 
Dunn, 152 (Jan. 27, 1998); Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 59 (Oct. 22, 
1997); Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 182-83 (Jan. 6, 1998); 
Deposition of Karen Hancox, 60 (Dec. 18, 1997) (stating that the 
``genesis'' of such calls was that the White House Social Secretary was 
concerned that DNC staff was submitting names of people who had been 
invited a lot to the White House).
    \21\ Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 33 (Oct. 22, 1997); Deposition 
of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 105-06 (Jan. 6, 1998).
    \22\ E.g., Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 105-06 (Jan. 6, 
1998); Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 72-73 (Oct. 22, 1997).
    \23\ E.g., Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 70, 80-81, 86 (Jan. 
6, 1998) (testifying that ``often'' DNC requests to the White House for 
information about upcoming events ``were not responded to,'' and that 
DNC requests to the White House for event attendance lists were 
``often'' denied); Letter from Charles Ruff, Counsel to the President, 
to Subcommittee Chairman McIntosh (Feb. 28, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As a general rule, after guest recommendations were 
submitted to the Social Office by outside entities, the Social 
Office did not inform them whether their suggested invitees had 
been invited. However, on a few occasions, this information was 
verbally provided--sometimes to the DNC.\24\ In addition, for 
about a month (five to six events), the Social Office provided 
written lists of invitees to the offices and outside entities 
that had made recommendations.\25\ However, this process was 
dropped as too cumbersome.\26\ The Social Secretary assumed the 
entity wanted this information in order to set up appointments 
while the invitee was in town.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 54-64, 97-99, (Feb. 20, 1998) 
(``we didn't have time, energy, or the inclination to give that 
information . . . That is not the business I was in . . . I did not 
provide the information . . . The rule was not of not giving out the 
list . . . I don't know if [Social Office Staff] ever provided it''); 
Deposition of Kimberly Widdess, 76-77 (Feb. 24, 1998) (noting that the 
Social Office received requests from entities such as the Ford Theater 
and the Kennedy Center for information about who had accepted or 
regretted invitations, and that the Social Office treated such requests 
``the same way we treated the [DNC] requests''); Deposition of Jacob 
Aryeh Swiller, 70 (Jan. 6, 1998); Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 86-88 
(Oct. 22, 1997) (Mr. Sullivan remembers other DNC employees making this 
type of call on 4-6 occasions); Deposition of Donald Dunn, 107-109 
(Jan. 27, 1998) (Mr. Dunn testified that on some occasions he provided 
information to the DNC regarding the status of persons invited to an 
upcoming event. He did not specify whether this information concerned 
official or unofficial White House events).
    \25\ According to testimony, such lists were created and printed 
off of a Wordperfect system--not off of WhoDB. Deposition of Kim 
Widdess, 27-28, 108 (Feb. 24, 1998).
    \26\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 54-64 and 143 (Feb. 20, 1998); 
Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 87 (Nov. 4, 1997) (noting that she saw 
such lists ``once in a blue moon . . . rarely'').
    \27\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 57-62 (Feb. 20, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Events sponsored by outside entities

    As with prior administrations, outside entities sponsored 
events at the White House, meaning that these entities 
reimbursed costs of events held on White House grounds. In the 
Clinton administration, entities sponsoring such events have 
included the Kennedy Center, the Ford's Theater, and the 
International Olympics Committee, among others. The DNC has 
also sponsored events at the White House.28
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on Treasury, 
Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 
1998, Part 3, 113-142.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the Reagan and Bush administrations, political 
entities also held events at the White House.29 
Former Clinton administration Social Secretary Judith Ann Stock 
testified that ``[i]t's the same as if there were a Republican 
President, the RNC also would pay for an event that might be 
sponsored in the White House with the Eagles. That's what we 
based our judgment on. And that was something that was well 
defined and well understood  . . . by previous administrations 
as well as this administration.'' 30
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ For example, Republican donor program events at the White 
House during the Bush administration include: Oct. 17, 1991, Team 100 
dinner hosted by President Bush; Feb. 20, 1992, National Republican 
Senatorial Committee Trust reception, hosted by President Bush; Mar. 9, 
1992, National Republican Senatorial Committee [NRSC] and National 
Republican Congressional Committee [NRCC] fundraising planning event in 
which President Bush met with members of the NRSC and NRCC to discuss 
the President's Dinner, a joint fundraising event; Apr. 8, 1992, Eagles 
reception hosted by President and Mrs. Bush; Apr. 9, 1992, Eagles 
reception hosted by President and Mrs. Bush; May 14, 1992, NRCC 
President's Forum and House Council briefing and reception involving 
meeting with President Bush; Jan. 6, 1993, Presidential Trust and 
Eagles reception hosted by President and Mrs. Bush; Jan. 7, 1993, 
Presidential Trust and Eagles reception hosted by President and Mrs. 
Bush; Jan. 12, 1993, Team 100 dinner hosted by President Bush. 
Republican donor program events at the White House during the Reagan 
administration include: July 9, 1981, two Eagles receptions hosted by 
President Reagan; Sept. 22, 1981, Eagles reception hosted by President 
Reagan; Apr. 16, 1982, Eagles reception hosted by President Reagan; 
June 21, 1982, Senatorial Trust reception hosted by President Reagan; 
Sept. 13, 1983, Eagles reception hosted by President Reagan; Nov. 22, 
1983, Senatorial Trust reception hosted by President Reagan; May 10, 
1984, reception for the President's Dinner Committee hosted by 
President Reagan; August 29, 1984, reception for GOP Re-elect Committee 
hosted by President Reagan; Apr. 2, 1985, Presidential Trust reception 
hosted by President Reagan; Apr. 22, 1985, reception for the Republican 
Congressional Leadership Council; Sept. 12, 1985, Eagles reception; 
Dec. 9, 1986, Eagles meeting attended by President Reagan; Dec. 16, 
1986, reception for House-Senate dinner fundraisers hosted by President 
Reagan; Apr. 29, 1987, President's Dinner reception hosted by President 
Reagan; May 28, 1987, meeting hosted by President Reagan with GOPAC, a 
political action committee founded by Congressman Newt Gingrich; Sept. 
15, 1987, NRCC meeting with President Reagan; Sept. 30, 1987, Eagles 
meeting with President Reagan; Apr. 14, 1988, President's dinner state 
chairmen meeting with President Reagan; May 11, 1988, President's 
dinner donors meeting with President Reagan; June 30, 1988, Republican 
Congressional Leadership Council reception hosted by President Reagan; 
July 26, 1988, NRSC meeting with President Reagan; July 29, 1988 
Presidential Trust meeting with President Reagan. See Minority Report, 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Investigation of Illegal or 
Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns, 
S. Rept. No. 167, 105th Cong., 2d sess., v. 5., pp. 8053-55, appendix 
to Chapter 28 (Mar. 10, 1998) (hereafter ``Senate Minority Report'').
    \30\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 21 (Feb. 20, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As in prior administrations, invitation lists for White 
House events sponsored by outside entities generally were kept 
in White House databases, and the invitations were sent from 
the White House. 31 The guest lists were vetted with 
the counsel's office to ensure the potential invitees were 
``appropriate to be admitted to the White House.'' 
32 The lists were then put into a database--like the 
WhoDB--to create a list for the calligraphers' office, which 
sent out the invitations. The Office of the Social Secretary 
would receive invitation responses and ask for the social 
security numbers and birthdates of guests. According to the 
Social Secretary, that system had been ``in place since they've 
been using the Secret Service to admit people through the White 
House.'' 33 Thus, as in previous administrations, 
the Clinton administration used White House resources and staff 
to input information from outside organizations like the DNC 
into White House databases and to process RSVPs and guest 
admission for events sponsored by outside entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 27-29 (Feb. 20, 1998).
    \32\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 27 (Feb. 20, 1998).
    \33\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 28 (Feb. 20, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The White House Social Secretary testified that the Chief 
Usher of the White House was responsible for reimbursement for 
the time and resources of the persons involved in the 
invitation process. She stated that the Chief Usher's system 
regarding what was reimbursed was ``again based on what the 
Bushes had used.'' 34
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 29 (Feb. 20, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The record indicates that, on a few occasions, the Clinton 
White House provided status reports to the sponsoring entity 
regarding who had RSVPed.35 The White House Social 
Secretary suggested that the purpose of providing such 
information was to help the sponsor determine whether it needed 
to follow-up on inviting people to the event.36 
Because guests generally RSVP directly to the White House, the 
entity would have no other way of obtaining up-to-date RSVP 
information. The White House provided such information to 
sponsoring entities such as the Library of Congress, the DNC, 
and others.37 The record also indicates that the DNC 
received from the White House a few attendance lists regarding 
past DNC-sponsored events at the White House.38 Mr. 
Swiller of the DNC testified that ``sporadically, every couple 
of months'' the DNC would receive such lists.39
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ E.g., Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 87 (Feb. 20, 1998).
    \36\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 87 (Feb. 20, 1998).
    \37\ See Deposition of Kimberly Widdess, 76-77 (Feb. 24, 1998); 
Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 30-31 (Feb. 20, 1998).
    \38\ E.g., List for ``Reception (DNC Trustees),'' with cover fax 
sheet dated Apr. 4, 1994, DNC B No. 3058341.
    \39\ Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 18-20 (Jan. 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      C. The Holiday Card Project

    Since 1995, the WhoDB was also used to create a list of 
names and addresses for individuals designated to receive a 
holiday card from the President. The Clinton administration 
followed the holiday card procedure established by previous 
administrations.40 A number of entities--including 
the White House, the DNC, the campaign, and others connected 
with the President--created lists of card recipients. The DNC 
paid outside contractors to merge the lists and to produce and 
mail the cards.41 As was the practice in prior 
administrations, the President's political party (in this case, 
the DNC) paid for the costs of producing and mailing the cards 
to avoid any appearance that federal funds were being used to 
send greetings to the President's supporters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Deposition of Alice Pushkar, 158 (Jan. 13, 1998).
    \41\ Deposition of Alice Pushkar, 158 (Jan. 13, 1998); Deposition 
of Jodie Torkelson, 99 (Sept. 9, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The record indicates that the holiday card lists that were 
on the WhoDB were not provided by the White House to any 
outside entity other than the contractors who were hired to 
merge and purge the lists and print the cards. No relevant 
witnesses had reason to believe the lists were used for 
campaign fundraising or any inappropriate 
purposes.42
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 90-92 (Nov. 18, 1997); Deposition 
of Alice Pushkar, 157 (Jan. 13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, in 1994, before the WhoDB was used for the holiday 
card project, the contractor charged with merging the various 
lists provided a copy of a holiday card list to the DNC. The 
White House informed the Subcommittee of this fact even though 
the Subcommittee had not requested this pre-WhoDB 
information.43 Although relevant witnesses were 
questioned for numerous hours on the 1994 holiday card project, 
the record does not indicate that the 1994 holiday card list 
was used for any purpose other than the holiday card 
project.44
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ Letter from the Executive Office of the President to 
Subcommittee Chairman McIntosh (Feb. 28, 1997).
    \44\ See, e.g. Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 92 (Nov. 18, 1997); 
Deposition of Al Hurst, 110-11 (Mar. 13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Apparently, the DNC and White House employees responsible 
for the 1994 holiday card project were not satisfied with the 
work done by the contractor who merged the lists. Therefore, 
the DNC employee charged with the project, Brooke Stroud, along 
with her parents, spent a holiday weekend at the DNC with 
volunteers (apparently women who had volunteered to help with 
the holiday card project in previous administrations) removing 
duplicate names and addresses from a holiday card 
list.45
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 164-175 (Nov. 4, 1997). It also 
should be noted that the list that was de-duped at the DNC may not have 
included information that came from the White House. Although Brooke 
Stroud believed it did include White House information, documents 
relating to the de-duplicating project show that it may have been 
limited to a ``merge and purge'' of information provided by the DNC and 
the PeopleBase. Ms. Stroud explained, ``The way I remember it is 
different than the way it is being described here (in the documents), 
but that doesn't mean that my memory is the one to go with.'' 
Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 97, 103 (Nov. 18, 1997). Furthermore, 
James Dorskind, a White House employee who worked on the 1994 holiday 
card, testified that he believed that de-duplication did not include 
White House information. Deposition of James Dorskind, 90-91 (Oct. 3, 
1997) (``there were volunteers who assisted in 1994 in de-duping the 
PeopleBase list, as I recall it, or the DNC, whatever it was that was 
going in for the purpose of the holiday card project'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During this process, only two DNC employees had access to 
this list, Ms. Stroud and computer specialist Al Hurst. Both 
testified that they had no reason to believe the information 
was used for campaign fundraising or any campaign 
purpose.46 They only used the information for the 
holiday card project.47
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 92 (Nov. 18, 1997); Deposition of 
Al Hurst, 110-11 (Mar. 13, 1998).
    \47\ Deposition of Al Hurst, 111-12 (Mar. 13, 1998); Deposition of 
Brooke Stroud, 91-94 (Nov. 18, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It also appears that the contractor responsible for ``de-
duping'' the 1993 holiday card list failed to remove the list 
from its computer when the project was completed. The list 
ended up in the hands of the 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign by 
accident when the contractor moved its computer to the Clinton-
Gore campaign in October 1995 so the campaign could access a 
different database on that computer (PeopleBase). Again there 
is no evidence that the list was used for campaign fundraising 
or any unofficial purpose.48 To the contrary, the 
date-tag on the computerized file containing the holiday card 
list indicates that the file was not accessed after the 
computer was moved to the campaign.49 Apparently, 
the campaign was not even aware of the existence of this file.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Affidavit of Carl Mecum (Sept. 4, 1998).
    \49\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           D. The Involvement of the President and First Lady

    The Committee thoroughly investigated the extent to which 
both the President and First Lady were involved in the WhoDB 
project. The record indicates that the President and First Lady 
were interested in and aware of the database, but had little 
involvement in its development or use. Several individuals who 
have regular contact with the President and First Lady 
testified about this matter.
    Marsha Scott, then Director of Correspondence at the White 
House, who led the WhoDB project, testified that she felt 
confident that ``at some point I probably said [to the 
President], `I am working on something to get a social system 
up.' '' She had no memory, however, of specific discussions 
with the President about the database. She further testified 
that she did not believe that she ever made a progress report 
to him on the project.50
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 14-25 (Apr. 28, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Erskine Bowles, then-Deputy Chief of Staff to the 
President, testified that he spoke with the President about the 
database ``maybe twice.'' 51 Harold Ickes, also 
then-Deputy Chief of Staff to the President, testified that he 
believes he had ``one or two conversations'' with the President 
about the database, but that ``it was not something that he was 
particularly focused on.'' Mr. Ickes noted that the President's 
concern was that ``people be remembered.'' 52
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ Deposition of Erskine Bowles, 18 (May 5, 1998).
    \52\ Deposition of Harold Ickes, 22-28 (Mar. 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, the record indicates that the President was 
not involved in discussions with White House staff regarding 
outside databases. Ms. Scott testified that she does not 
believe she ever spoke with the President about outside 
databases.53 Mr. Ickes testified that he did not 
ever have an understanding that the President wanted the White 
House and DNC databases integrated or compatible.54
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 22 (Apr. 28, 1998).
    \54\ Deposition of Harold Ickes, 63-64 (Mar. 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Evidence indicates that the First Lady wanted a database of 
White House contacts, but that her involvement with the details 
of the WhoDB project was peripheral. Ms. Scott testified that 
she only recalled one conversation with the First 
Lady.55 This discussion occurred early on in the 
development of the WhoDB. She discussed that conversation as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 17 (Apr. 28, 1998).

          What I remember of my discussions with her was that 
        she hoped I would make this a high priority and she 
        wanted this to get done. I mean, we were in a 
        technological wasteland in the White House and it was 
        very, very time consuming for all of us, and 
        particularly for the offices that she controlled, which 
        was the Social Office, to get their work done. And she 
        wanted, before we got into another round of big 
        functions and holiday lists, she very strongly and I 
        would even say even desperately wanted us to have 
        something set up so it would be a lot easier on all the 
        staffs as we got into this.56
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 116 (Feb. 18, 1998).

    Mr. Ickes testified that he did not recall any 
conversations with the First Lady about the WhoDB.57
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ Deposition of Harold Ickes, 26-29 (Mar. 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 III. Response to Majority Allegations

    The majority report makes six major allegations regarding 
the WhoDB investigation: (1) the holiday card list was stolen, 
(2) event attendance information was stolen, (3) government 
resources and personnel were stolen, (4) an infrastructure at 
the White House was dedicated to supporting the Democratic 
National Committee, (5) the President and the First Lady were 
involved in the unlawful conversion of government property to 
the use of the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign, and (6) White 
House counsel, Cheryl Mills, committed perjury and obstructed 
the investigation. These allegations, however, are not 
substantiated by the Committee record. To the contrary, the 
majority's allegations conflict with the overwhelming weight of 
the testimony and evidence gathered by the Committee.
    Regrettably, despite the extensive resources devoted to 
investigating the WhoDB and the serious nature of the charges 
being made by the majority, the majority did not schedule a 
single day of hearings on the merits of the WhoDB investigation 
in the 105th Congress.58 As Rep. Waxman stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ In the 104th Congress, there was one hearing on the WhoDB. The 
Propriety of the Taxpayer-funded White House Database, Hearing Before 
the Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and 
Regulatory Affairs of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 
(Sept. 10, 1996). In the 105th Congress, the Committee addressed 
questions relating to document production, including the production of 
WhoDB material in a hearing, but never held a hearing on the merits of 
the investigation. White House Compliance with Committee Subpoenas, 
Hearing Before the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (Nov. 6 
and 7, 1997).

           Mr. McIntosh didn't hold a single hearing on this 
        investigation in the last two years, despite the fact 
        that he summoned 34 witnesses to depositions and 
        demanded 43,000 documents. . . . [T]hat means the 
        entire investigation has been conducted in secret. The 
        media and the public have had no opportunity to observe 
        Representative McIntosh's methods or evaluate the 
        credibility of his suspicions. In short, the public has 
        had no chance to see if the investigation of the 
        alleged Christmas card list caper was legitimate 
        oversight or political witch hunt, or just 
        foolishness.59
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ Business Meeting on Committee Report, Report on Investigation 
of the White House Database, and Release of Documents, House Committee 
on Government Reform and Oversight (Oct. 9, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           A. The Alleged ``Theft'' of the Holiday Card List

    The majority report claims that ``[t]he knowing delivery of 
[the] holiday card lists to others outside of the government . 
. . constitute[s] the theft of government property under 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 641.'' 60 The record simply does not 
support this accusation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ Majority report, Investigation of the Conversion of the 1.7 
Million Centralized White House Computer System, Known as the White 
House Database, and Related Matters, House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight (Oct. 9, 1998) (hereafter, the ``Majority 
Report'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The theft statute provides:

          Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly 
        converts to his use or the use of another, or without 
        authority sells, conveys, or disposes of any record, 
        voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States 
        or any department or agency thereof; or whoever 
        receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to 
        convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been 
        embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted--shall be 
        fined . . . or imprisoned not more than ten years, or 
        both.61
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ 18 U.S.C. 641.

    The majority claims that ``[t]he mere possession of the 
list by the DNC is evidence of a theft of the property,'' but 
this is not true. As the Supreme Court has held in Morissette 
v. United States,62 an individual does not commit 
theft under this statute unless there is ``criminal intent to 
steal or knowingly convert, that is, wrongfully to deprive 
another of possession of property.'' 63
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
    \63\ 342 U.S. 246, 276.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This crucial element of intent does not exist in the case 
of the alleged theft of the 1994 holiday card list. Ms. Stroud, 
the DNC employee who obtained the list, did not obtain the list 
from the contractor with an intent to deprive the White House 
of property that belongs to the White House. Instead, she 
obtained the list for an entirely legitimate reason: to remove 
duplicate addresses. This is not a crime. In fact, it is 
commendable.64
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ The majority report mentions other versions of the 1994 list 
that may have been sent to the DNC. Deposition testimony indicates that 
these versions, as well, stayed in the possession of two employees--
Brooke Stroud and a computer operator--until they were provided to DNC 
counsel in response to requests made pursuant to this investigation. 
Further, these lists were protected from disclosure to other employees 
and were only used for the purpose of sending out the holiday cards. 
Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 173-74 (Nov. 4, 1997); Deposition of 
Brooke Stroud, 32-33, 45-46, 92-95 (Nov. 18, 1997); Deposition of Al 
Hurst, 30-54, 66-91, 110-11 (Mar. 13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The same fundamental flaw--lack of criminal intent--
invalidates the majority's assertion that a theft of property 
occurred in connection with the 1993 holiday card list. This 
holiday card list ended up at the 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign by 
accident. It is not theft to unknowingly accept a used computer 
that happens to have White House data stored in its hard drive.
    In addition, the record indicates that neither of the 
holiday card lists were used for any purpose other than sending 
out holiday cards.65 In fact, the 1996 Clinton-Gore 
campaign apparently did not even know that it had received the 
1993 holiday card list and never accessed the list. Thus, there 
is no support for another element of the ``theft'' statute--
conversion of the property for his use or the use of another.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 92 (Nov. 18, 1997); Deposition of 
Al Hurst, 110-111 (Mar. 13, 1998); Affidavit of Carl Mecum (Sept. 4, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    B. the alleged ``theft'' concerning event attendance information

    The majority report also alleges that the White House and 
DNC committed ``theft'' by executing a ``scheme'' involving the 
use of WhoDB to help the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign. 
According to the majority, this plan purportedly was approved 
at a March 1995 meeting between then-DNC finance chair Truman 
Arnold, then-White House Social Secretary Ann Stock, and then-
Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles. The majority claims that 
``theft'' occurred because the White House responded to DNC 
inquiries about whether individuals had attended past White 
House events, and the DNC used that information in fundraising 
efforts.
    These allegations are not substantiated by the evidence. 
The evidence shows that the White House employees who provided 
event attendance information to the DNC did not commit a 
``theft'' of government property. To the contrary, they had a 
legitimate reason for responding to the DNC requests. The White 
House did not want to invite the same people repeatedly to 
White House events. Providing information on recent event 
attendance to entities like the DNC that were asked to submit 
recommendations for potential guests helped the White House 
build betterguest lists. The DNC, too, sought information for 
legitimate purposes: making sure they provided appropriate guest 
suggestions for White House events. Nothing in these actions reflects 
any sort of intent to wrongfully deprive the government of property.
    Further, it is difficult to see how the mundane information 
involving White House event attendance can even be ``stolen.'' 
Everyone who attends an event at the White House has this 
information, as they obviously can see who is there. In 
addition, the White House regularly publishes who attends state 
dinners in the newspaper.
    Other evidence also fundamentally contradicts the 
majority's claims. Relevant DNC witnesses testified that they 
did not use event attendance information from the White House 
for fundraising purposes. Richard Sullivan, former finance 
director of the DNC, testified as follows:

          Q: Now, to your knowledge, was anyone who had been 
        invited or who had attended official events--that's 
        still what we are talking about here--thereafter 
        contacted by anyone at the DNC to make a contribution 
        and reminded of their having been invited or attended 
        an event?
          A: Not to my knowledge.
          Q: You never contacted anybody who had been invited 
        or attended an event, asked for a contribution and 
        reminded them of their having been invited or having 
        attended?
          A: No.
          Q: Okay. . . . Did anyone at DNC ever contact a 
        potential contributor and ask for a contribution and 
        remind that contributor that a member of their family 
        or a business associate had attended or been invited to 
        such an event, to a White House event, to your 
        knowledge?
          A: No, not to my knowledge.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 89-90 (Oct. 22, 1997). Later 
in his testimony, Mr. Sullivan testified that he had made a few fund-
raising calls using names he saw on a list of attendees at a 1993-1994 
White House CEO luncheon. The list Mr. Sullivan used, however, was 
created before the WhoDB was operational. Moreover, the record before 
the Committee does not establish that the list even came from the White 
House. Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 21, 40-49 (Mar. 5, 1998).

    Ari Swiller, former head of the DNC trustee program, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
provided similar testimony:

          Q: Do you have any reason to believe anyone at the 
        DNC used this information that you received relating to 
        attendance to White House events to determine whether 
        or not to solicit a contribution from the invitee? For 
        instance, would you solicit contributions from 
        confirmed invitees and attendees and hold off 
        soliciting from recommended invitees who had not been 
        accepted by the White House?
          A: No.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 183 (Jan. 6, 1998). Mr. 
Swiller also testified that he had no reason to believe that WhoDB was 
used for political fundraising or campaign purposes. Id. at 182. See 
also Deposition of Brook Stroud, 90-91 (Nov. 18, 1998) (testifying that 
she did not use final attendance lists regarding White House events to 
determine whether or not the DNC should solicit a contribution from 
anyone on such lists, and that she never used these lists for campaign 
fundraising purposes).

    This testimony is inconsistent with the majority's claim 
that information was ``converted'' for the benefit of the DNC. 
Further, DNC staff requests to the White House were often 
ignored, and DNC staff testified that the DNC was not able to 
obtain information from the White House more readily following 
Mr. Arnold's March 1995 visit at the White House.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 70, 80-81, 86-87 (Jan. 6, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  C. The Alleged ``Conversion'' of Government Personnel and Resources

    The majority also alleges that the White House violated the 
``theft'' statute by converting ``government personnel and 
resources'' to directly benefit outside political 
campaigns.\69\ The main basis for the majority's assertion is a 
June 28, 1994, memo by Marsha Scott, who was leading the 
development of WhoDB at the time the memo was written.\70\ The 
majority's claim, however, ignores relevant testimony by the 
author of the document and others that directly contradicts the 
majority's conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ Majority Report.
    \70\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey, cc'd 
to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M32438.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The June 28, 1994, memo by Ms. Scott discusses four 
different databases, including the White House 
database.71 In the memo, Ms. Scott states that her 
``team'' and she are ``engaged in conversations with the DNC 
about the new systems they are proposing,'' and suggests, ``let 
my team work with the DNC to help them design a system that 
will meet our needs and technical specifications.'' 
72 Ms. Scott in her deposition testimony explained 
that she and the WhoDB team were working with the DNC to ensure 
that the WhoDB would be able to receive information from the 
DNC.73
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 89-101 (Feb. 19, 1998).
    \72\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey, cc'd 
to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M32438.
    \73\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 94-95 (Feb. 19, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the White House Counsel's Office had 
advised,74 these efforts were not illegal. Like many 
individuals in many other types of jobs, the President is 
entitled to build a Rolodex of individuals who he knows and 
with whom he is interested in maintaining contact. The DNC 
database had extensive information about individuals who the 
President knew. It was therefore a logical source of data for 
populating the electronic White House Rolodex.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ See, e.g., Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to 
the President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President (Jan. 
17, 1994), M24918-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Consistent with Ms. Scott's testimony, individuals who 
worked with her on WhoDB testified that they recalled talking 
with the DNC to discuss making sure the White House could 
receive data from the DNC.75 Nowhere in the 
voluminous deposition record is there evidence that any 
individuals on the WhoDB team--or any White House employee--
did, in fact, work on developing outside databases. In fact, 
when Ms. Scott's former assistant, Erich Vaden, was asked 
whether anyone worked with the DNC to design a system, he 
testified, ``I know she [Ms. Scott] would have liked that, but 
it never happened.'' 76
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ Deposition of Mark Bartholomew, 50-51 (Aug. 15, 1997), 47-48 
(Sept. 16, 1997); Deposition of Erich Vaden, 166-67 (Jan. 25, 1998).
    \76\ Deposition of Erich Vaden, 263 (Jan. 25, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The only use of government resources for unofficial 
purposes that this investigation demonstrated regarding the 
June 28, 1994, memo was that the memo itself arguably should 
not have been printed on government paper because, in addition 
to discussing WhoDB, it also discussed outside political 
databases. Under the Hatch Act, it is not illegal for certain 
employees of the Executive Office of the President to engage in 
political activity, but the costs associated with that activity 
cannot be paid by the government.77 Thus, it is 
arguable that a memo discussing outside political databases 
should not be written on official stationary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ 5 U.S.C. 7234(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority asserts that the use of government paper for 
the memo is ``similar'' to the conduct prosecuted in United 
States v. Collins.78 The conduct in Collins, 
however, involved a government employee with an apparent 
partiality to ballroom dancing who made approximately 76,500 
copies of ballroom dancing newsletters and calendars on a 
government copier, on government paper, for his personal 
use.79 It is irresponsible--and just plain silly--to 
compare that conduct to using two sheets of government paper 
for a memo discussing ideas on both government and 
nongovernment databases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \78\ 53 F.3d 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Majority Report.
    \79\ Collins, 53 United States F.3d at 1418.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  d. the allegation of a white house ``infrastructure'' to support dnc

    The majority report asserts that the investigation 
``exposed'' a White House ``infrastructure'' that processed 
invitations for DNC events at the White House.80 The 
majority fails to mention that the White House Social Office 
has processed invitations the same way for all outside entities 
holding an event at the White House, including the Kennedy 
Center and the Library of Congress. The majority also fails to 
mention that the system followed in the Clinton White House was 
based on the precedent set by past Republican 
administrations.81 The exclusion of this relevant 
evidence underscores that this investigation appears to be 
designed to generate allegations about the Clinton 
Administration, rather than seriously examine the way White 
House resources are used.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ Majority Report.
    \81\ See discussion above in Part II.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

       e. the allegations regarding the president and first lady

    The majority claims that the President and the First Lady 
were ``involved in the unlawful conversion of government 
property to the use of the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign.'' 
82 The record, however, does not even remotely 
support the majority's claim.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ Majority Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First, as discussed above, the conduct at issue in the 
WhoDB investigation did not violate the ``theft'' statute. It 
is impossible to implicate the President and First Lady when a 
crime did not occur.
    Second, as discussed above, the deposition testimony from 
the relevant witnesses indicates that the President and First 
Lady were interested in and aware of the database, but were not 
involved with the details of its planning and use.
    The majority cites nine documents to argue that the 
President and First Lady conspired to steal government 
property. In this discussion, however, the majority 
mischaracterizes most of the documents, fails to include any of 
the substantial exculpatory evidence that the Committee 
uncovered when questioning witnesses about these very 
documents, and makes enormous leaps of logic. Despite the 
majority's elaborate efforts to demonstrate a link between a 
scheme toillegally use the WhoDB and the First Family, the 
record simply does not support the majority's allegations.
    The following are a few examples of how the majority 
ignores exculpatory evidence, mischaracterizes documents, and 
makes arguments that strain credulity in order to tie the First 
Family to an alleged ``scheme'':

         Brian Bailey Notes.\83\ As its strongest 
        evidence, the majority cites to the handwritten notes 
        of Brian Bailey, former aide to Mr. Bowles, which state 
        that ``Harold [Ickes] and Deborah DeLee want to make 
        sure WhoDB is integrated w/DNC database--so we can 
        share--evidently, POTUS [the President] wants this 
        to.'' Although the majority asserts that these notes 
        indicate that the President wanted to transfer data 
        from the WhoDB to the DNC, these notes do not support 
        the majority's assertion. On their face, the notes do 
        not make clear whether the reference to ``sharing'' 
        information concerned White House receipt of 
        information from the DNC (which is appropriate) or DNC 
        receipt of White House database information (which 
        might not be appropriate). Moreover, the testimony of 
        all the relevant witnesses conflicts with the 
        majority's assertion. These witnesses uniformly 
        testified that they had a clear understanding that it 
        was inappropriate for the White House to share data 
        from its databases, and had no reason to believe that 
        the White House ever transferred information from WhoDB 
        to an outside database.\84\ In fact, none of the 35 
        witnesses that testified in the WhoDB investigation 
        said that they believed that WhoDB was inappropriately 
        linked with a DNC or other outside database, or that 
        the President wanted improper linkage to occur.\85\ Mr. 
        Bailey, the author of the notes, himself testified that 
        he had no personal knowledge of what the President 
        wanted with respect to the database, and that the notes 
        likely were based on information he heard in passing 
        and quickly wrote down to himself.\86\ He also 
        testified that he likely spoke with White House counsel 
        on this matter and had no reason to believe anyone at 
        the White House ignored legal advice relating to the 
        database.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \83\ Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey (undated), M033298.
    \84\ E.g., Deposition of Brian Bailey, 39, 129-32 (Feb. 6, 1998).
    \85\ See, e.g., Deposition of Harold Ickes, 61-63, 130-31 (Mar. 12, 
1998); Deposition of Brian Bailey, 129-132 (Feb. 6, 1998).
    \86\ Deposition of Brian Bailey, 129-30 (Feb. 6, 1998).
    \87\ Deposition of Brian Bailey, 36-37, 129-32 (Feb. 6, 1998).

         June 28, 1994, Marsha Scott Memo.\88\ The 
        majority claims that this memo from Marsha Scott to 
        Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey and ``cc'd'' to the 
        First Lady ``shows that the First Lady was informed of 
        the conversion of government staff and other 
        resources,'' because Ms. Scott describes her interest 
        in ensuring that the WhoDB is compatible with the DNC 
        database. As discussed above in Part III. C, however, 
        the record does not establish that this memorandum is 
        evidence of an illegal conversion of government 
        resources. In fact, the only wrongdoing that was 
        potentially established was that this two-page 
        memorandum was printed on government stationary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey, cc'd 
to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M032438.

         WhoDB Requirements Report.\89\ In one of its 
        more bizarre leaps of logic, the majority report points 
        to the language in a WhoDB requirements report that 
        states that the President and First Lady requested that 
        a database ``containing relevant information about all 
        White House events and contacts be designed and 
        implemented.'' \90\ Based on that language, the 
        majority concludes that the document suggests that the 
        President and First Lady ``had a particular interest in 
        the Database project, such as the possible political 
        uses of databases.'' \91\ There is simply no foundation 
        for this inference, however, since the WhoDB 
        requirements report never mentions any political uses 
        of databases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \89\ WhoDB Requirements Report, undated, produced by the White 
House with no bates stamp No.
    \90\ WhoDB Requirements Report, undated.
    \91\ Majority Report (emphasis added).

    The only evidence in the Committee record of direct 
involvement by the President in building any database concerns 
his occasional practice of passing along names and addresses of 
individuals to be incorporated into the PeopleBase database. 
The PeopleBase is the database developed by Malone, Inc., for 
President Clinton in the early 1980's which was used by 
President Clinton while he was Governor of Arkansas.\92\ 
President Clinton owns the data within the PeopleBase.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ Deposition of William Percy Malone, 14 (Oct. 1, 1997).
    \93\ Deposition of William Percy Malone, 55 (Oct. 1, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority report states in its opening pages that the 
President's conduct was illegal because ``the President 
routinely continued to build PeopleBase with the names and 
addresses of individuals who communicated with him through the 
official White House mail.'' 94 There are two 
fundamental problems with this assertion, however. First, the 
record does not establish that the President forwarded 
information from official White House mail to PeopleBase. In 
fact, the majority report simply ignores the testimony of the 
Committee witness who actually was responsible for forwarding 
names and addresses from the President to PeopleBase, and who 
was the only Committee witness with personal knowledge of the 
practice. This individual, former White House aide Laura 
Tayman, testified that she forwarded ``business cards and torn-
off sheets of paper with [the President's] actual writing. It 
was not any electronic information.'' She noted that she was 
generally asked to do this after the President had been 
traveling. Most importantly, Ms. Tayman stated flatly that she 
``never'' forwarded names from correspondence.95
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \94\ Majority Report (emphasis added).
    \95\ Deposition of Laura Tayman, 108-10 (Mar. 20, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, even if the President had forwarded to PeopleBase 
the names of certain individuals who had corresponded with him, 
it is not at all clear that this would be illegal. If the 
practice of occasionally transferring such information were 
prohibited, then no elected public officials would be able to 
put names and addresses of individuals they meet on the job 
into their personal Rolodexes.

               F. The Allegations Regarding Cheryl Mills

    Finally, the majority makes unsubstantiated accusations 
that smear the reputation of White House Deputy Counsel to the 
President, Cheryl Mills. On September 17, 1998, Rep. McIntosh 
requested that the Department of Justice investigate Ms. Mills 
for perjury and obstruction of justice because Rep. McIntosh 
disagreed with the White House's determination that two 
documents were not responsive to a request made pursuant to the 
WhoDB investigation. He also discussed his charges publicly, 
resulting in a Washington Post article containing his 
allegation that there was ```very strong evidence' that Ms. 
Mills lied to Congress.'' 96 The majority has now 
reiterated these claims in the majority report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ Database Criminal Probe Sought, Washington Post (Sept. 9, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority claims that Ms. Mills committed obstruction of 
justice and gave false testimony regarding the production of 
two documents: (1) the June 28, 1994, memo by Marsha 
Scott,97 and (2) the notes of White House aide Brian 
Bailey.98 The White House did not produce these 
documents in its initial September 1996 response to Mr. 
McIntosh's August 2, 1996, request. Upon further review of the 
documents, however, the White House, on its own initiative, 
produced them to Rep. McIntosh.99
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \97\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey, cc'd 
to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M32438.
    \98\ Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey (undated), M033298.
    \99\ The White House produced the Scott memo on Feb. 26, 1997, and 
the Bailey notes on Oct. 28, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority believes that the two documents at issue are 
responsive to the August 2, 1996 request and that the White 
House erred in failing to produce the documents in the initial 
September 1996 production. The majority reaches this conclusion 
after having had the benefit of the testimony of numerous 
witnesses on these documents, including the authors of the 
documents, which the White House did not have. The majority, 
however, is not justified in asserting that this difference in 
judgment--and Ms. Mills's subsequent testimony describing what 
happened--involved obstruction and lying.

1. The majority's ``evidence'' of perjury and obstruction

            a. Scott memo
    The majority claims that Ms. Mills made three false 
statements in her testimony regarding production of the Scott 
memo. The majority further alleges that these statements are 
evidence that Ms. Mills, and possibly other White House 
counsel, committed obstruction by ``withholding'' the Scott 
memo ``without justification.'' The record does not support the 
majority's claims.
    The Scott memo describes a number of different databases 
and does not explicitly mention WhoDB. The disputed paragraph 
of the memo states that ``Currently in the White House we are 
preparing, as you know, to implement a new database system 
starting August 1. While that system is modeled after the 
Peoplebase software, it has major differences.'' 100 
After the document was produced, the Committee learned from its 
author that the disputed paragraph refers to WhoDB. Ms. Mills, 
who consulted with her supervisor, the counsel to the 
President, on the production of documents that included the 
Scott memo, apparently had a different impression when she 
reviewed the document in September 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey, 
cc'd to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M32438.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority claims that Ms. Mills testified falsely by 
stating that, when she reviewed the Scott memo in September 
1996, she believed that the database referenced in the disputed 
paragraph was not WhoDB. The main basis for the majority's 
conclusion appears to be testimony of other witnesses regarding 
what they thought the memo meant. The judgments of others, 
however, cannot be imputed to Ms. Mills, and such evidence 
therefore does not support any charge that Ms. Mills was lying 
instead of having a different impression of the memo.
    Further, the majority omits testimony received by the 
Committee that shows that the disputed paragraph was ambiguous 
and subject to different interpretations. As noted above, the 
memo does not expressly refer to ``WhoDB.'' Moreover, it is a 
confusing document that discusses four different databases. 
Even Marsha Scott, the author of the memo, testified that the 
memo lacks clarity:

          This is a very poorly written memo, and I am very 
        embarrassed by it. It is one of several that I have 
        encountered 5 years later that embarrassed me greatly. 
        This is one that will go down in my own personal 
        history as being one of the worst that I have ever 
        written . . . So I can see why it is very confusing to 
        you. And on this particular memo, I actually don't mind 
        the questions because I think it is really poorly 
        written.101
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \101\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 99 (Feb. 19, 1998).

When specifically asked about the database referenced in the 
paragraph at issue, Ms. Scott also testified that her reference 
to a database was to her concept of WhoDB at the time of the 
memo, but that it ``didn't happen.'' 102
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \102\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 91 (Feb. 19, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In light of these ambiguities, the record does not support 
the majority's effort to criminalize Ms. Mills's impression of 
and testimony about this document.
    The majority also claims that Ms. Mills testified falsely 
during questioning about the Scott memo when she stated her 
view that the WhoDB is not modeled on a computer system known 
as ``PeopleBase.'' To support this claim, the majority cites to 
witnesses who do not in fact contradict Ms. Mills. One of these 
witnesses is former White House aide Erich Vaden. 
Unfortunately, in his September 17 letter to Attorney General 
Reno regarding his allegations about Ms. Mills, Mr. McIntosh 
selectively edited the testimony of Mr. Vaden to exclude 
statements by Mr. Vaden that support Ms. Mills's testimony.
    Mr. McIntosh attached to his letter only the following 
Vaden testimony discussing PeopleBase: ``[W]hat we wanted to 
use was sort of a list of its functionalities, the kind of data 
it stored, how it presented the data. You know, just as, I 
guess, an inspiration, so to speak, of similar type systems.'' 
Mr. McIntosh omitted what Mr. Vaden said immediately before the 
quoted passage. When the quoted passage is put in context, Mr. 
Vaden's testimony actually indicates that PeopleBase was not 
the model for WhoDB. Following is the entire relevant portion, 
with the portion Mr. McIntosh did not include in italics:

          Q. So were you in some way trying to use the design 
        of PeopleBase to help you design WhoDB?
          A. We didn't want to adopt the design of the system. 
        It is an old system. It's character-based, as opposed 
        to a GUI-based system, a graphical user interface. So 
        we never went down with the intention of adopting it or 
        adopting anything similar to it. But what we wanted to 
        use was sort of a list of its functionalities, the kind 
        of data it stored, how it presented the data. You know, 
        just as, I guess, an inspiration, so to speak, of 
        similar type systems.103
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \103\ Deposition of Erich Vaden, 143-44 (Jan. 25, 1998).

    Rep. Waxman informed the majority of the selective editing 
over a week before the majority issued its report on the WhoDB 
investigation.104 Nevertheless, the majority report 
still claims that Mr. Vaden's testimony ``confirms'' that WhoDB 
was modeled after PeopleBase, and fails to point out Mr. 
Vaden's statement that ``We didn't want to adopt the design of 
the system. It is an old system.'' The majority's conduct in 
discussing Mr. Vaden's testimony on PeopleBase--both in Mr. 
McIntosh's September 17 letter and in the majority report--
provides an illustration of the majority's unfair approach to 
presenting evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \104\ See Letter From Rep. Henry A. Waxman to Attorney General 
Janet Reno (Sept. 28, 1998) (cc'd to all members of the Committee) 
(exhibit 2 to these views).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The testimony of Mr. Bartholomew, another witness cited by 
the majority regarding the PeopleBase issue, also does not 
support the majority's claims. The Committee did not ask Mr. 
Bartholomew whether WhoDB was modeled after PeopleBase, nor did 
he testify one way or the other about this issue. The testimony 
cited by the majority simply states that PeopleBase was one of 
several systems identified to ``take under consideration'' in 
designing the new database.105 Therefore, Mr. 
Bartholomew's testimony, including the part cited by the 
majority, is irrelevant to this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \105\ Deposition of Mark Bartholomew, 73 (Aug. 15, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Further, the majority omits the testimony of other 
witnesses that supports Ms. Mills's understanding that WhoDB 
was not modeled after PeopleBase. One witness, Jerry Carlsen, 
was manager of systems integration and development at the White 
House and tasked to lead the development of WhoDB. He testified 
that he neither met with PeopleBase staff nor heard any 
discussions about PeopleBase beyond the fact that it was 
``somewhat highly inaccurate . . . and that it wasn't 
necessarily real user friendly.'' 106
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ Deposition of Jerry R. Carlsen, 65-66 (Aug. 28, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The third statement of Ms. Mills that the majority claims 
was ``false'' concerned her remarks about one of her own memos, 
a January 17, 1994, memo entitled ``Correspondence Department 
Database Project.'' Ms. Mills was questioned on this document 
during her testimony on the Scott memo. She testified that her 
``impression'' when she wrote the ``Correspondence Department 
Database Project'' memo was that it did not concern 
WhoDB.107 She also stated that there were many 
different databases at the White House.108 The 
majority claims that Ms. Mills's testimony regarding her 
impression of her memo constitutes perjury. This allegation, 
again, is based on impressions of other witnesses as to whether 
the memo related to WhoDB, and the majority's discussion of the 
allegation omits testimony that supports Ms. Mills.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \107\ Testimony of Cheryl Mills, Hearings Before the House 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, White House Compliance 
with Committee Subpoenas, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 105-61, 241 (Nov. 6 
and 7, 1997). Relevant excerpts of Ms. Mills's testimony are attached 
as exhibit 3.
    \108\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ``Correspondence Department Database Project'' memo 
does not expressly reference WhoDB. Further, Ms. Scott 
testified that, at the time the memo was created, there were 
two other ongoing Correspondence Department database 
projects.109 These facts, in addition to Ms. Mills's 
own testimony about her own impressions of her own document, 
underscore the unfairness of the majority's claims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \109\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 90 (Feb. 18, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             b. Bailey notes
    The majority also claims that Ms. Mills committed 
obstruction by failing to produce the Bailey notes in September 
1996 and lied by testifying that she determined the Bailey 
notes were ``not responsive to the seven enumerated items'' 
requested by the Subcommittee. Similar to their arguments on 
the Scott memo, the justification the majority provides for 
these serious charges is that Ms. Mills ``could not have 
believed'' that the Bailey notes were not responsive because 
the document is in fact responsive.
    In her testimony, Ms. Mills stated that she ``can't go back 
and recreate . . . at this time what information I had that led 
us to conclude that this material was not responsive to any of 
the seven enumerated items [in Mr. McIntosh's August 2, 1996 
request].'' 110 She discussed the process she went 
through, which she said involved reviewing the notes with then-
White House Counsel Jack Quinn.111 She further 
elaborated that she ``think[s]'' that they assumed that Mr. 
Bailey's own notes were not responsive to Mr. McIntosh's 
request for ``communications.'' 112
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \110\ Testimony of Cheryl Mills, Hearings Before the House 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, White House Compliance 
with Committee Subpoenas, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 105-61, 115 (Nov. 6 
and 7, 1997).
    \111\ Id.
    \112\ Id. at 263.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The White House may well have erred by not producing the 
Bailey notes. However, the Committee record, which includes a 
deposition of Mr. Quinn, does not support the majority's 
serious allegations that Ms. Mills ``deliberately withheld'' a 
document she believed to be responsive, or purposely misled the 
Committee in her testimony. This conclusion is reinforced by 
the fact that the Bailey notes were part of a large group of 
documents that were reviewed for responsiveness by White House 
counsel in a short period of time.113 It would not 
be surprising if honest mistakes were made under such time 
pressure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \113\ Id. at 114. Ms. Mills's testimony to the Committee indicates 
that the White House Counsel's Office produced to the Subcommittee over 
27,000 pages of documents for the WhoDB investigation within a short 
time after the Counsel's Office received the documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In light of these facts, it simply is not responsible to 
conclude that Ms. Mills committed obstruction and lied.

2. The majority's allegations regarding motive

    The majority alleges that Ms. Mills had a motive to 
obstruct the Committee's investigation and commit perjury 
because the documents at issue reflect involvement by the 
President and First Lady in ``conversion'' of government 
property and would have been ``politically damaging'' to 
release before the November 1996 election. This is a bootstrap 
argument. As discussed above, the Committee record does not 
establish that there was ``conversion'' of government property. 
In fact, despite the extraordinary investment of resources in 
the WhoDB investigation, the majority failed to uncover any 
serious wrongdoing. The majority's suggestion that the White 
House had a motive to withhold documents is in direct conflict 
with the fact that there was simply no wrongdoing to cover up.
    Further, not one of the 35 witnesses that the Committee 
deposed on WhoDB issues questioned Ms. Mills's honesty or 
integrity. Ms. Mills also showed these documents to the White 
House counsel, her supervisor, who agreed with her analysis and 
interpretation.114
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \114\ Testimony of Cheryl Mills, Hearings on White House Compliance 
with Committee Subpoenas, House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, 115, 248-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As discussed in more detail in Rep. Waxman's September 28, 
1998, letter to Attorney General Janet Reno,115 
these and other facts demonstrate that the majority's 
assertions about Ms. Mills are based on selective testimony of 
other individuals about their impressions of the documents at 
issue, as well as speculation about Ms. Mills's motives. It is 
wrong to base such serious allegations on such insubstantial 
and incomplete evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \115\ Letter from Mr. Waxman to Attorney General Janet Reno (Sept. 
28, 1998). This letter describes how Mr. McIntosh's allegations of 
perjury and obstruction are unsubstantiated and do not warrant further 
review. The letter also addresses numerous other unfounded statements 
made by the majority regarding Ms. Mills.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    All of the majority's allegations relating to Ms. Mills 
essentially boil down to a disagreement between the majority 
and the White House about the relevance of two documents. 
Disputes between lawyers over the relevance of documents are 
commonplace and legitimate. What is extraordinary is the 
majority's attempt to elevate this run-of-the-mill document 
dispute into a federal criminal case. Not only do the 
majority's accusations lack foundation in fact, but they also 
set a dangerous precedent: that to disagree with Mr. McIntosh 
on the relevance of documents is to risk being publicly smeared 
and called a criminal.

                IV. The Costs of the WhoDB Investigation

    Although this investigation of the esoteric subject of a 
computerized Rolodex did not reveal any serious wrongdoing, it 
did eat up a great deal of resources and taxpayer funds. The 
WhoDB investigation began over 27 months ago, on June 27, 
1996.116 The Subcommittee spent so much time and 
energy on this investigation that it did not hold hearings on 
any topic between June 16, 1997 and March 5, 1998. During those 
nine months, Subcommittee resources were devoted almost 
exclusively to the investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \116\ Letter from Subcommittee Chairman McIntosh to Leon Panetta 
(June 27, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Subcommittee requested information from 14 different 
entities who produced over 43,000 pages of documents. Over 16 
subpoenas were sent and 250 letters written on the subject. In 
addition, the Committee deposed 35 witnesses for a total of 
more than 135 hours of questioning on the WhoDB. In fact, about 
20 percent of all of the depositions taken by this Committee in 
the $7.4 million campaign finance investigation were limited to 
WhoDB issues. Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact 
cost of the WhoDB investigation, it would appear to dwarf the 
cost of developing and using the WhoDB, which the White House 
estimates to be less than $800,000.117
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \117\ In Sept. 1998, the Office of White House Counsel estimated 
that the cost of the development and operation of the WhoDB was about 
$785,467.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee's first three depositions in the WhoDB 
investigation illustrate the significant costs that the 
Committee frequently imposed on witnesses for no tangible 
benefit. These depositions concerned document production by 
PRC, a White House computer contractor that provided systems 
support to the WhoDB. When PRC received a request for 
documents, it informed the Subcommittee that its contract with 
the White House required that it obtain White House 
authorization before providing White House information to the 
Subcommittee.118 PRC requested and received the 
necessary authorization,119 and provided the 
documents to the Subcommittee within three weeks of receiving 
the request for documents.120 Nothing in the record 
regarding this timely response suggests that the White House 
obstructed the investigation. Nevertheless, the Committee 
conducted three depositions to try to determine if the few days 
it took the White House to authorize PRC to respond was a 
deliberate attempt to frustrate the Committee's investigation. 
According to one of the witnesses, PRC, Inc., spent more 
responding to document requests and attending depositions 
related to the WhoDB investigation than it did fulfilling the 
terms of its White House contract.121
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \118\ Deposition of Donald Upson, 66 (Aug. 7, 1997).
    \119\  Letter from the Executive Office of the President to PRC, 
Inc. (Aug. 15, 1996) and Deposition of Donald Upson, 66 (Aug. 7, 1997).
    \120\ Letter request from Subcommittee Chairman McIntosh to PRC, 
Inc. (July 30, 1996); Letter from PRC, Inc. to Subcommittee Chairman 
McIntosh (Aug. 19, 1996).
    \121\ Deposition of Donald Upson, 61 (Aug. 7, 1997). Mr. Upson 
testified that the document request and related depositions cost PRC 
more than it spent on ``porting the WhoDB,'' which he estimated to cost 
$40,000-$50,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another witness who was unnecessarily burdened and harassed 
during the course of the investigation was Marsha Scott, the 
White House official who supervised the development of the 
WhoDB. Her unfortunate experiences, which included providing 
eight days of testimony for nearly 40 hours to congressional 
investigators, are described in detail in the minority views 
accompanying the Committee's report on the campaign finance 
investigation.
    There are numerous other examples of unnecessary burdens 
imposed by the Committee during the WhoDB investigation. For 
example:

         One witness, Charles Benjamin, former 
        associate director in the White House Office of 
        Administration, estimated that he spent about 1,500 
        hours--the equivalent of over 37 work weeks--between 
        June 1996 and September 1997 responding to requests for 
        information relating to WhoDB. He said that such 
        responses consumed about one-half to three-quarters of 
        his time, and that ``quite frequently'' he had to work 
        after hours to respond to these requests.122
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \122\ Deposition of Charles Benjamin, 130-31 (Sept. 5, 1997).

         The White House estimated that the computer 
        division of the Office of Administration, which is 
        charged with running the database, devoted over 5,500 
        hours to answering questions. That's the equivalent of 
        one full-time employee devoting two and a half years to 
        nothing but responding to Committee questions. During 
        just one three-month period in which the White House 
        tracked the cost of responding to this investigation 
        and the related GAO audit, it estimated that the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        response cost the taxpayers $155,000.

         The Committee required Bryan Daines, a former 
        computer operator at the DNC, to fly to Washington, DC 
        from Bend, Oregon for 1\1/2\ hours of questioning in a 
        deposition on issues about which the witness had little 
        substantive knowledge. Prior to the deposition, the 
        witness's attorney informed the Committee that Mr. 
        Daines had little relevant knowledge and offered to 
        make him available for a phone interview. The Committee 
        refused this sensible alternative, forcing the witness 
        to spend between two and three days preparing for and 
        traveling to this deposition.123
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \123\ Deposition of Bryan Daines, 85-86 (Apr. 6, 1998).

         Even Jacqueline Bellanti, an unpaid volunteer 
        at the White House who is accused of no wrongdoing, was 
        forced to hire a lawyer to represent her at a 
        deposition.124
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \124\ Deposition of Jacqueline Bellanti, 66 (Oct. 7, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             V. Conclusion

    Rep. McIntosh's investigation of the WhoDB is reminiscent 
of his investigation of the travel practices of SEC Chairman 
Arthur Levitt. A Wall Street Journal opinion piece by Holman 
Jenkins summarized the Levitt investigation as follows:

          Rep. David M. McIntosh has been chasing SEC Chairman 
        Arthur Levitt Jr. all over Planet Washington. He does 
        so in pursuit of a ``scandal'' that, when we press our 
        x-ray spectrometer up against it, seems to consist of 
        the substance of interstellar space, which is to say, 
        nothing.
          Mr. Levitt is accused of flying first class and 
        staying in nice hotels, and digging into his own pocket 
        to pay for it.
          It takes a special kind of ingenuity to find 
        something to get outraged about here, but Mr. Levitt 
        did use legitimate government-paid upgrades to defray 
        the cost of upgrading even further. If you stand back 
        and twist your head at a funny angle, you can pretend 
        this means taxpayers ``paid'' for Mr. Levitt to fly 
        first class. . . .
          Perhaps there is a secret McIntosh method here--a 
        plan to disable the Clinton administration by hassling 
        one of its few grown-ups. But Republicans should 
        remember that someday, perhaps within the lifetimes of 
        our grandchildren, they could conceivably end up the 
        party of government again. Then they might want to coax 
        some grown-ups into service too. The precedent here is 
        not an inviting one. . . .
          Life being short, Mr. Levitt entered into a plea 
        bargain with Mr. McIntosh's subcommittee and has agreed 
        to suffer in business class at taxpayer expense rather 
        than loll in first class at his own. We are honestly at 
        a loss to understand what principle of good government 
        is served by this outcome, but that's par for the 
        course. It would be interesting, though, to get a full 
        accounting of how much of the taxpayer's money Rep. 
        McIntosh spent to bring this heroic denouement. The SEC 
        calculates it alone has spent $187,000 responding to 
        Mr. McIntosh's request for documents and accounting of 
        Mr. Levitt's every limo ride.125
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \125\ Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Business World: Fly First Class (With 
the Other Criminals), Wall Street Journal (July 15, 1997).

    Regrettably, much of what Mr. Jenkins said about the Levitt 
investigation seems to apply with equal force to the WhoDB 
investigation. Once again, the Committee has been in pursuit of 
the ``scandal'' that ``seems to consist of the substance of 
interstellar space, which is to say, nothing.''
                                   Henry A. Waxman.
                                   Tom Lantos.
                                   Robert E. Wise, Jr.
                                   Major R. Owens.
                                   Edolphus Towns.
                                   Paul E. Kanjorski.
                                   Gary A. Condit.
                                   Bernard Sanders.
                                   Carolyn B. Maloney.
                                   Eleanor Holmes Norton.
                                   Chaka Fattah.
                                   Elijah E. Cummings.
                                   Dennis J. Kucinich.
                                   Rod R. Blagojevich.
                                   Danny K. Davis.
                                   Thomas H. Allen.
                                   Harold E. Ford, Jr.
    [Supporting documentation follows:]





                SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF DAVID M. McINTOSH

    During consideration of the Committee's Report, Mr. Waxman 
referred to a previous investigation, conducted by the 
Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, 
and Regulatory Affairs of the travel practices of senior agency 
officials. Unable to address the evidence in the Report, Mr. 
Waxman instead attempted to smear the Subcommittee and its 
staff for their work on that investigation and the evidence 
discovered about the failure of Securities and Exchange 
Commission [SEC] Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. to conform his 
travel practices to the travel policies of his own agency.
    The single most important point that the Minority ignores 
is that the SEC travel policy prohibited flying first class 
even when paid for with personal funds. Chairman Levitt 
violated this policy and used taxpayer funds to help defray the 
cost of upgrading from coach to first class. In contrast to the 
biased and polemical Wall Street Journal article referenced by 
Mr. Waxman, the Washington Post reported that SEC documents and 
other records show that Mr. Levitt ``often flies first class 
and stays at luxury hotels, partly at government expense, and 
sometimes attaches personal travel to official trips . . .\1\ 
According to the Post, ``The documents show that Mr. Levitt 
uses government-paid upgrades and reimbursements to help reduce 
his own costs when he chooses more expensive accommodations 
than government rules allow.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Brett D. Fromson, Levitt's Travel Practices Scrutinized, the 
Washington Post, (July 3, 1997) (emphasis supplied).
    \2\ Id.
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    Mr. Waxman's attacks on that investigation are entirely 
unwarranted. He failed to recognize that the Subcommittee's 
investigation of Mr. Levitt brought Mr. Levitt's travel 
practices into conformity with the SEC's policy. As a result of 
the Subcommittee's investigation, Mr. Levitt stopped flying 
first class, at least for a while, until the SEC changed its 
travel policy to allow first class travel paid for with 
personal funds. The Subcommittee will continue to investigate 
ways to save taxpayer funds through ensuring that agency travel 
practices are in conformity with agency policy.
    Mr. Levitt's willingness to change his practices and then 
change the SEC policy is ample evidence that his practices were 
not in conformity with SEC policy. Apparently, it is not Mr. 
Waxman's view that regulators should abide by their own 
regulations.

                                   Hon. David M. McIntosh.
    [Supporting documentation follows:]





                                
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