    [House Report 105-828]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     Union Calendar No. 470

    105th Congress, 2d Session  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - House Report 105-828

     INVESTIGATION OF THE CONVERSION OF THE $1.7 MILLION CENTRALIZED WHITE
     HOUSE COMPUTER SYSTEM, KNOWN AS THE WHITE HOUSE DATABASE, AND RELATED
                                    MATTERS

                                   ----------

                                  FIFTH REPORT

                                     by the

                            COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
                              REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

                                 together with

                        MINORITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS

    October 30, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
                  State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                                     Union Calendar No. 470

    105th Congress, 2d Session  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - House Report 105-828

     INVESTIGATION OF THE CONVERSION OF THE $1.7 MILLION CENTRALIZED WHITE
     HOUSE COMPUTER SYSTEM, KNOWN AS THE WHITE HOUSE DATABASE, AND RELATED
                                    MATTERS

                                   __________

                                  FIFTH REPORT

                                     by the

                            COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT

                              REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

                                 together with

                        MINORITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS

    October 30, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
                  State of the Union and ordered to be printed

     INVESTIGATION OF THE CONVERSION OF THE $1.7 MILLION CENTRALIZED WHITE
     HOUSE COMPUTER SYSTEM, KNOWN AS THE WHITE HOUSE DATABASE, AND RELATED
                                     MATTERS

                  COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

                         DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
    BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois          TOM LANTOS, California
    CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland       ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    CHRISTOPHER COX, California          EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             GARY A. CONDIT, California
    STEPHEN HORN, California             CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
    THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia            ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
    DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana               DC
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana              CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
    JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida             ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona             DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
    MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South     DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
        Carolina                         JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire        JIM TURNER, Texas
    PETE SESSIONS, Texas                 THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
    MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey           HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
    VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas                         ------
    BOB BARR, Georgia                    BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    DAN MILLER, Florida                      (Independent)
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky
                          Kevin Binger, Staff Director
                     Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
               David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
                     Lisa Smith Arafune, Deputy Chief Clerk
                     Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director

       Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and
                               Regulatory Affairs

                      DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana, Chairman
    JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire        JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois          BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida             HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
    JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona             PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           GARY A. CONDIT, California
    VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas             DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    BOB BARR, Georgia                    ------ ------
    PETE SESSIONS, Texas

                                   Ex Officio

    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
                       Mildred J. Webber, Staff Director
                        J. Keith Ausbrook, Chief Counsel
                         Jay Apperson, Special Counsel
                    Chip Griffin, Professional Staff Member
                            R. Andrew Wilder, Clerk
                     Kristin L. Amerling, Minority Counsel
                     Elizabeth Mundinger, Minority Counsel

                             LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                                  ----------

                                      House of Representatives,
                                      Washington, DC, October 30, 1998.
    Hon. Newt Gingrich,
    Speaker of the House of Representatives,
    Washington, DC.
        Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on
    Government Reform and Oversight, I submit herewith the
    committee's fifth report to the 105th Congress. The committee's
    report is based on a study conducted by its Subcommittee on
    National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory
    Affairs.
                                                    Dan Burton,
                                                              Chairman.

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
      I. Summary and Overview.............................................1
     II. Perjury and Obstruction..........................................6
    III. Unlawful Distribution of White House Data and Conversion of White
         House Resources for Political Purposes..........................14
     IV. The President and First Lady Knew of the Conversion of Government
         Resources to Benefit the DNC and the Campaign...................49
      V. Conclusions.....................................................57
     VI. Rules Requirements..............................................57
    Endnotes.........................................................    59
    Index of supporting documents....................................    74

                                     VIEWS

    Minority views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon.
      Robert E. Wise, Jr., Hon. Major R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns,
      Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, Hon. Gary A. Condit, Hon. Bernard
      Sanders, Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton,
      Hon. Chaka Fattah, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Hon. Dennis J.
      Kucinich, Hon. Rod R. Blagojevich, Hon. Danny K. Davis, Hon.
      Thomas H. Allen, and Hon. Harold E. Ford, Jr...................   556
    Supplemental views of Hon. David M. McIntosh.....................   664

                                                     Union Calendar No. 470
    105th Congress                                                   Report
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

     2d Session                                                     105-828
    _______________________________________________________________________

     INVESTIGATION OF THE CONVERSION OF THE $1.7 MILLION CENTRALIZED WHITE
     HOUSE COMPUTER SYSTEM, KNOWN AS THE WHITE HOUSE DATABASE, AND RELATED
                                    MATTERS

                                    _______

    October 30, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
                  State of the Union and ordered to be printed

    _______________________________________________________________________

      Mr. Burton of Indiana, from the Committee on Government Reform and
                       Oversight, submitted the following

                               FIFTH R E P O R T

                                 together with

                        MINORITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS

        On October 9, 1998, the Committee on Government Reform and
    Oversight approved and adopted a report entitled,
    ``Investigation of the Conversion of the $1.7 Million
    Centralized White House Computer System, Known as the White
    House Database, and Related Matters.'' The chairman was
    directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

                            I. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW

        The story of the White House Database is one about a White
    House that disregarded the difference between the official
    business of the U.S. Government and the political business of
    reelecting the President. Because the line between official
    business and campaigning was obliterated, this President and
    his White House subordinates proceeded to spend at least $1.7
    million of government funds on a complex, centralized computer
    system known as the White House Database or ``WhoDB.'' It was
    used not just for official purposes; senior White House staff
    planned and, in fact, used it to advance the campaign
    fundraising objectives of the Democratic National Committee
    [DNC]. This conversion of government property to the use of the
    DNC constitutes a theft of government property under 18 U.S.C.
    Sec. 641.
        Similarly, White House staff, at the President's direction,
    used other White House resources to translate their new
    expertise in database development, acquired at government
    expense, to plan the development and use of databases for the
    DNC and other political committees in violation of the Hatch
    Act, 5 U.S.C Sec. 7324, which restricts government employee use
    of government property for political activities. This, too,
    represents a theft of government property.
        The conversion of the White House Database and other
    government resources to benefit the DNC and the President's
    campaign in this way was an integral part of the conversion of
    the Nation's White House into the political fundraising tool of
    the President and the DNC. With respect to the Database alone,
    the conversion of that resource was simply a continuation of
    the obliteration of any distinction between the official
    functions of the White House and the campaign to reelect the
    President.
        Prior to the deployment of the White House Database, lists
    generated by White House computers for invitations or
    attendance at social events, meetings, and other White House
    functions were routinely provided to the DNC and the Clinton/
    Gore '96 campaign. These lists included, for example, the 1993
    and 1994 Holiday Card lists, among others, that were assembled
    through White House computers, merged with DNC lists and
    campaign lists, and then left in the possession of the DNC and
    the Clinton/Gore campaign for their use. The names and
    addresses of the people to whom the President and First Lady
    send holiday cards are a very valuable asset to those entities.
    They are also the property of the U.S. Government.
        The President's involvement in the plan to convert
    government property to the DNC and the ultimate accomplishment
    of that plan (represented by the transfer of these lists and
    data to the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign) motivated the
    White House to mount an extraordinary effort to delay and
    impede the investigation. Incriminating documents were withheld
    until after the 1996 election--in one case, for more than a
    year. The White House refused to respond for months to repeated
    requests for documents and information. Most significantly,
    when called before the committee to explain the withholding of
    documents, Deputy Counsel to the President Cheryl Mills chose
    to give demonstrably false testimony. This matter has been
    referred to the Department of Justice for investigation of
    possible perjury and obstruction of the investigation.
        Finally, there is evidence that the President and First
    Lady were responsible for the development of the Database and
    were informed of the theft of this and other government
    property for political purposes. The unlawful conversion of
    government property to the use of the DNC or a political
    campaign represents not only the crime of theft of government
    property. It also represents an abuse of power by the
    President, who used his high office and the Nation's White
    House to achieve his and his political party's fundraising
    objectives. The committee issues this report to expose the
    evidence of the President's possible involvement in the theft
    of government property and his abuse of power.

     A. Deputy Counsel to the President Cheryl Mills Lied to the Committee
           and Obstructed the Investigation by Withholding Documents

        The committee found substantial evidence that Deputy White
    House Counsel Cheryl Mills perjured herself in testimony before
    the committee about her decision, made in concert with White
    House Counsel Jack Quinn, to withhold important documents
    responsive to the committee's requests. The withheld documents
    included: (1) the handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, an
    assistant to then-Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine
    Bowles,1 expressing the President's desire to
    integrate the White House Database with the DNC database; and
    (2) a June 28, 1994 memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold
    Ickes, Bruce Lindsey, and the First Lady,2 showing
    that the First Lady was informed of Marsha Scott's interest in
    using the Database for political purposes and employing White
    House staff to create political databases. To these proposals,
    the First Lady later wrote to Harold Ickes, ``This sounds
    promising. Please advise.'' 3
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Footnotes at end of report.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        While these documents were discovered at the White House in
    September 1996, they were both withheld until well after the
    1996 election. Marsha Scott's memorandum was produced to the
    committee in February 1997, after it was found by other members
    of the Counsel's Office in an independent search. Bailey's
    notes were not produced until October 1997, when they were
    discovered by other members of the Counsel's Office who were
    reviewing, apparently for the first time, files created by
    Cheryl Mills to contain withheld documents.
        Ms. Mills testified that she and Mr. Quinn had determined
    that the documents were not responsive, and that the Database
    referenced in one of them was not the White House Database, but
    was another database on which the author of the document,
    Marsha Scott, was working at the time. Subsequent deposition
    testimony establishes that there was no other database to which
    the document could have referred. Accordingly, not only is Ms.
    Mills's statement that she thought at the time that it was
    another database not credible, but so is her claim that she and
    Mr. Quinn determined that the documents were not responsive.
        The committee believes that Ms. Mills, in fact, determined
    that the documents were responsive, would expose unlawful
    activity, and would be politically damaging, if released
    shortly before the 1996 election. The withholding of these
    documents illegally obstructed the committee's investigation,
    delayed the discovery of important relevant evidence, and
    raised further questions about the truthfulness of the White
    House's representations to the committee throughout the
    investigation.

    B. White House Personnel Took Government Data and Transferred it to the
        Democratic National Committee to Assist in Campaign Fundraising

        The committee uncovered substantial evidence of plans to
    transfer, and the actual transfer of, official government data
    from the White House Database and other sources to entities
    outside of the Federal Government for use in campaign
    fundraising. Additionally, White House personnel converted
    official resources, such as White House computers,
    photocopiers, stationery, office equipment, and possibly even
    the time of career staff for activities expressly related to
    the President's reelection campaign. The knowing transfer of
    government data for an unofficial use and the use of government
    resources for campaign purposes constitute the theft of
    government property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
        The documents withheld by Cheryl Mills make clear that (1)
    the President himself wanted to integrate the Database with the
    DNC database and (2) the First Lady was interested in using the
    design of the Database and White House personnel for the
    development of political databases outside of the White House.
    Many documents also suggest that Senior White House officials,
    such as then-Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes and Deputy
    Counsel to the President Bruce Lindsey, were frequently
    informed of plans for the political use of the Database and
    plans to manage outside data using White House resources.
    Testimony from numerous White House and DNC witnesses
    establishes that DNC fundraising staff, in concert with Social
    Office and Office of Political Affairs staff, mined the White
    House Database for valuable information to enable the DNC to
    accomplish its fundraising goals.
        Other data was also transferred to the Clinton/Gore
    campaign or the DNC. The committee has obtained evidence that
    the 1993 White House Holiday Card list was transmitted to and
    retained by the Clinton/Gore campaign and is still in their
    possession. The 1994 White House Holiday Card list was
    transmitted to the DNC and remains in its possession. Also, the
    committee obtained documents that show that the President
    routinely transferred names and addresses obtained through the
    official White House mail to his campaign database.

      1. Data from the White House Database and other Government Databases

        The committee has obtained substantial credible evidence
    that data from the White House Database was systematically made
    available to the DNC to assist in its fundraising efforts.
    Documentary evidence and sworn testimony establish that members
    of the DNC Finance Department contacted the White House on a
    routine basis to ask for information on who had attended
    previous White House social events. This information was then
    used by the DNC Finance staff to determine who would be
    recommended to the White House by the DNC Finance staff for
    invitations to future White House events.
        DNC Finance staff testified to this process in depositions,
    as did White House Political Affairs staff. In addition, White
    House Social Office staff testified to giving out such
    information from the Database to White House Political Affairs
    staff who then passed it on to DNC fundraisers. One document
    produced by the White House states that the DNC obtained direct
    access to Social Office Information by sending a staff person
    to the White House Social Office to research event attendance.
        The committee obtained evidence that the distribution of
    this data to the DNC was authorized by Erskine Bowles (at that
    time, Deputy Chief of Staff) in a meeting in March 1995 with
    Truman Arnold (at that time, DNC Finance Chairman) and Ann
    Stock, the White House Social Secretary. Truman Arnold
    testified that he met with Erskine Bowles and Ann Stock to seek
    better access to Social Office information. Erskine Bowles and
    Ann Stock testified that they had no recollection of that
    meeting. Erskine Bowles was unable to produce a calendar from
    that time to verify whether such a meeting took place.
        The committee finds this to be part of a recurring pattern
    in which witnesses who had regular contact with the President
    develop faulty memories about key meetings and events that
    implicate the President and White House staff in wrongdoing.
    Nevertheless, these same witnesses can remember in striking
    detail those events that exculpate the President and his staff.
        The committee also discovered, in the possession of the
    DNC, lists generated by the White House Database and other
    White House data systems, including (1) a list of Asian Pacific
    Americans prepared by the White House Office of Public Liaison,
    (2) the White House calligrapher's list prepared by the Social
    Office for the President's ``Yale Dinner'' and White House
    holiday parties, and (3) lists prepared by the Social Office of
    those invited to the White House Arts and Humanities Dinner in
    October 1995. While the White House permitted the DNC to have
    some of these lists without redacting personal information,
    such as home addresses, the committee was denied this
    information in the copy of the Database produced to the
    committee on the ground that it was too personal.

                2. 1993 and 1994 White House Holiday Card Lists

        Although the 1993 and 1994 White House Holiday Card lists
    were prepared in a government database that predated the White
    House Database, they constitute government property of
    substantial value. The transfer of data through the 1993 and
    1994 Holiday Card project came to light as the committee
    investigated the data used to populate the White House
    Database, which included the 1994 Holiday Card list. The
    knowing delivery of these lists to others outside of the
    government would also constitute the theft of government
    property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
         The committee's evidence shows that the 1994 list was
    deliberately transmitted to the DNC and not returned,
    notwithstanding a February 1997 letter to the committee from
    White House Counsel Charles Ruff stating that the list was
    inadvertently sent to the DNC and returned immediately upon the
    White House's discovery that it was in the possession of the
    DNC. Documents and deposition testimony show that White House
    staff was fully aware that the DNC had the list in November
    1994 and that there was no documentation that the White House
    had imposed any restrictions on its use. Moreover, while the
    DNC returned one copy to the White House, it retained a copy
    for itself.
        The transmission of the 1994 Holiday Card list from the
    White House to the DNC did not differ significantly from the
    handling of the 1993 Holiday Card list. The 1993 Holiday Card
    list was delivered to W.P. Malone, Inc. (Malone), a contractor
    to the Clinton/Gore campaign in Arkadelphia, AR, which
    maintained the campaign supporter lists in a database known as
    PeopleBase. The 1993 list from the White House was combined
    with the holiday card lists from the campaign and the DNC into
    one computer at Malone. This list was retained in that computer
    in Arkadelphia until the computer was shipped to the Clinton/
    Gore campaign offices in Washington, DC, in 1995, where it
    still resides.

     C. The President and First Lady Directed the Development of the White
     House Database and Were Informed of and Involved in Plans for the Use
    of Government Resources to Advance the President's Re-election Campaign

        As Marsha Scott, the architect of the White House Database
    and of at least one plan for integrating the White House with
    the campaign by converting the Database to campaign uses, noted
    regarding that plan: ``This is the President's idea and it's a
    good one.'' 4 Numerous documents make clear that the
    President and First Lady directed the development of the White
    House Database and were aware of and kept informed of its
    potential uses. The First Lady actually received a
    demonstration of the Database. The President approved a job
    description for Marsha Scott that specifically referenced her
    access to the Database. Also, contrary to the written opinion
    of the White House Counsel's Office, the President routinely
    continued to build PeopleBase with the names and addresses of
    individuals who communicated with him through the official
    White House mail. The pattern of evidence obtained by the
    committee implicates the President and the First Lady in the
    possible theft of government property.

                     D. Summary of Findings and Conclusions

        Senior officials in the White House sought to obstruct the
    committee's investigation of the systematic transfer of data
    from the White House to campaign entities and the President's
    and First Lady's knowledge and involvement in the conversion of
    the White House Database and other official resources to the
    use of the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign. This obstruction
    culminated in the perjury of Cheryl Mills, Deputy Counsel to
    the President. Despite the efforts of White House officials to
    obstruct the investigation, the committee found substantial
    evidence that White House officials, including possibly the
    President and the First Lady, knowingly and willfully planned
    to convert, and did in fact convert, valuable government
    property, including data from the White House Database, to the
    DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    Sec. 641. Such conduct by the President represents not only a
    theft of government property; it represents an abuse of power
    by the President.

                          II. PERJURY AND OBSTRUCTION

        On June 27, 1996, pursuant to the direction of the Chairman
    of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee,
    Representative William J. Clinger, Representative David M.
    McIntosh, Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Economic
    Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, first wrote
    to then-Chief of Staff to the President Leon Panetta requesting
    information on the White House Database, known inside the White
    House as ``WhoDB.'' 5 Since the committee's very
    first efforts to discover the facts about the Database,
    including its planned and actual use, and its costs, the
    committee encountered unprecedented efforts by the White House
    to withhold documents and information and to mislead the
    committee with materially false statements as to its use.
        Through its investigation, the committee has uncovered
    substantial disturbing evidence of repeated false or misleading
    statements emanating from the highest levels of the White
    House, including the White House Counsel's Office and the
    Office of the Press Secretary, concerning how the Database was
    planned and used. The investigation has uncovered evidence
    which reveals that persons in the White House Counsel's Office,
    which was charged with responding to the committee's inquiry,
    were themselves central figures in the scheme to put the
    Database to prohibited uses. Those same persons, with ample
    motivation to protect at least themselves, actively sought to
    provide misleading explanations and conceal and alter
    documents.
        These actions severely hampered the committee in the
    exercise of its proper oversight role and needlessly prolonged
    the investigation at taxpayer expense. More importantly,
    despite the best efforts to find the facts and to present them
    to the American people, the committee may never know many of
    the facts which would be revealed by the production of
    contemporaneous documents which the committee has specifically
    sought, but which the White House reports ``cannot be found.''
    In addition, responsive documents that (1) the White House did
    locate and (2) are evidence of the President's and First Lady's
    involvement in plans to convert the Database and other White
    House resources to campaign uses were deliberately withheld
    from the committee just before the 1996 election and not
    produced until February 1997 in one instance, and for more than
    a year in another case.
        To consider adequately the White House's efforts to
    obstruct the committee's investigation, it is important to
    recognize the fundamental legal principle applicable to data in
    the White House Database and other government data
    repositories. That principle is that once data is entered into
    an official government, taxpayer-funded database, distribution
    to any outside entity, including partisan political entities,
    is prohibited. As Cheryl Mills, then-Associate Counsel to the
    President, wrote with respect to this issue on January 17, 1994
    in an internal White House memorandum:

              Once White House employees integrate information
            provided by any source into the database system, it
            becomes government property in the form that it is
            stored in the database system. Therefore, data from the
            database system may be provided to a source outside the
            federal government only for authorized purposes. 5 CFR
            Sec. 2635.704. Authorized purposes are those specified
            by law or regulation or those purposes for which
            Government property is made available to the public.
            Id.6

    David Watkins, Assistant to the President for Administration,
    expressed the same view of the government's ownership of the
    data in the White House Database.

              [T]he White House Database will be government
            property and cannot be given to or used by a campaign
            entity (unless made public and thus available to any
            campaign entity).7

        During the course of the committee's investigation, White
    House officials, and in particular the White House Counsel's
    Office, repeatedly misled the committee as to whether anyone in
    the White House planned to transfer, or in fact transferred,
    data from the White House Database. Very early in the
    investigation, on June 28, 1996, Jack Quinn, then Counsel to
    the President, told the committee:

              The database is for White House use only; we prohibit
            distribution to outside entities or political
            organizations--including the Democratic National
            Committee or the Clinton-Gore '96
            Committee.8

        Despite such steadfast denials by the White House, the
    investigation has revealed the systematic distribution of data
    from the White House Database and other official sources to the
    DNC, including the ongoing distribution of such data to the DNC
    Finance Department which the DNC Finance Director stated in his
    deposition ``should properly be called the fundraising
    division.'' 9 In addition, there is substantial
    evidence that contrary to specific written advice from the
    White House Counsel's Office, other official resources, such as
    computer time, stationery, photocopying equipment, and other
    office equipment and supplies, were converted to help manage
    the DNC's and the Clinton/Gore campaign's data.

      A. Members of the White House Counsel's Office and Possibly Others
     Obstructed the Committee's Investigation to Prevent Disclosure of the
       Theft of Government Property and the Possible Involvement of the
                            President and First Lady

        The principle that the distribution of government data to
    campaign entities is prohibited provides ample motive for the
    White House to obstruct the committee's investigation. In one
    specific instance, that obstruction, followed by material false
    statements by Deputy Counsel to the President Cheryl Mills
    during an open hearing before the committee, was especially
    significant because it marked the most obvious effort to
    conceal the clearest evidence that the President and the First
    Lady were involved in the distribution of such data and
    conversions of other government resources to serve the
    interests of political campaign entities.
        The committee believes that there is substantial evidence
    that in September 1996 then-Associate (now-Deputy) Counsel to
    the President Cheryl Mills, with the knowledge and concurrence
    of then-White House Counsel Jack Quinn, knowingly and wilfully
    obstructed the investigative authority of this committee by
    withholding documents that were plainly responsive to the
    committee requests for documents and information. Moreover,
    when this obstruction was brought to light in a hearing before
    the committee, Ms. Mills lied under oath about the documents
    and the circumstances surrounding their nonproduction.
        Ms. Mills's actions, withholding responsive documents from
    the committee, delayed the committee for more than a year from
    obtaining important evidence that the President wanted to
    ``integrate'' the White House Database with the DNC database
    and delayed until after the 1996 election the disclosure of the
    use of White House personnel and office equipment to assist the
    DNC in its efforts to develop a new database. Consequently, not
    only did the American public not have relevant information
    regarding the conversion of official resources prior to the
    1996 election, the committee's ongoing investigation was
    impeded by the delay in producing those important documents.
        Moreover, the failure to produce these documents when they
    were discovered in September 1996 had the effect of delaying
    the committee's investigation long enough to allow memories of
    relevant witnesses to fade for more than a year until they
    could plausibly testify that they could no longer remember the
    meetings or conversations reflected in the documents. The
    committee believes that Ms. Mills was fully aware of these
    potential effects and deliberately engaged in the withholding
    of documents for that purpose. In the second term, she was
    promoted from Associate Counsel to the President to Deputy
    Counsel to the President.
        On October 28, 1997, White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff
    produced to the committee a document containing the handwritten
    notes of Brian Bailey, an assistant to then-Deputy Chief of
    Staff Erskine Bowles, that read:

              HAROLD [ICKES] AND DEBORAH DELEE WANT TO MAKE SURE
            WHODB IS INTEGRATED W/DNC DATABASE--SO WE CAN SHARE--
            EVIDENTLY, POTUS WANTS THIS TO[O]! (MAKES SENSE)
            10

        A letter from Mr. Ruff and a production log accompanied the
    document and other documents produced to the committee that
    day.11 The letter was intended to apprise the
    committee of ``some new information and to correct certain
    statements regarding two earlier aspects of [the White House]
    document production.'' 12
        Mr. Ruff's letter and the production log raised as many
    questions as it purported to answer. With respect to the
    handwritten notes, Mr. Ruff explained that these notes, along
    with other documents, had been found in September 1996, more
    than a year earlier, and set aside in folders.13 Mr.
    Ruff's letter also sought to obscure whether the previously
    withheld notes were responsive to the committee's request,
    saying: ``Although certain of these documents [including the
    notes] are arguably not responsive, we are erring on the side
    of production.'' 14
        While Mr. Ruff's explanation for the nonproduction of the
    notes sought to avoid the admission that they were responsive
    and had been withheld, he was unable to make such a claim with
    respect to a June 28, 1994 memorandum 15 from White
    House Office of Political Affairs staff member Marsha Scott to
    Harold Ickes, Bruce Lindsey, and the First Lady that was also
    found in September 1996. That document included evidence
    suggesting that the White House Database would be useful for
    the campaign and urging that Marsha Scott and her database
    development team of government employees be allowed to continue
    to work with the DNC and others to develop databases outside of
    the White House.
        This document had already been produced in February 1997 by
    Mr. Ruff, who at that time apparently was unaware that Ms.
    Mills had discovered the document in September 1996 and
    withheld it as nonresponsive. When Mr. Ruff produced it, he
    included it in a production of documents that he represented in
    his February 27, 1997 transmittal letter as ``responsive''
    16 to the committee's request and also admitted in
    open hearings before the committee that he had determined that
    it was responsive.17
        The complete sequence of events relating to Ms. Mills's
    withholding of the document and her testimony before the
    committee is as follows:

    August 2, 1996

        The Majority Members of the Subcommittee on National
    Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs
    write to President Clinton requesting, among other things,
    ``All communications related to the WhoDB'' which ``includes
    all documents and materials that memorialize conversations,
    meetings, or other communication.'' 18

    September 18, 1996

        Deputy Counsel to the President Cheryl Mills discovers (1)
    handwritten notes reflecting the President's desire to
    integrate the White House Database with the DNC database
    19 and (2) a June 28, 1994 memorandum 20
    from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey (with a
    copy to the First Lady) regarding the White House Database and
    the development of the DNC and other databases outside of the
    White House using government resources.

    September 19-24, 1996

        Despite Cheryl Mills's discovery, the thousands of pages of
    documents produced by Ms. Mills and White House Counsel Jack
    Quinn during this time do not include either document.

    February 26, 1997

        Apparently unaware that Cheryl Mills had previously
    discovered the June 28, 1994 memorandum, White House Counsel
    Chuck Ruff produces it to the committee and another copy of it
    that includes the First Lady's note to Harold Ickes that ``This
    sounds promising.'' 21

    March 6, 1997

        Mr. Ruff inaccurately represents that the memorandum was
    discovered ``over the last few months as part of the ongoing
    review of files . . . .'' 22

    October 28, 1997

        White House Counsel Charles Ruff produces a copy of the
    handwritten notes, and discloses that the notes and the
    memorandum had been discovered in September 1996.23

    November 6-7, 1997

        Cheryl Mills testifies under oath that:
             (1) she determined that notes reflecting the
            President's interest in integrating the White House
            Database with the DNC database ``were not responsive to
            the seven enumerated items'' requested by the
            committee; 24
             (2) ``the particular [database referenced in the
            second paragraph of the June 28, 1994 memorandum], at
            the time [she] had knowledge of, was not related to the
            WhoDB;'' 25
             (3) her ``impression at the time'' of production of a
            January 17, 1994 memorandum 26 was that the
            database in that memorandum was not the White House
            Database; 27 and
             (4) ``[u]ltimately, they ended up using WhoDB, which
            is not modeled on PeopleBase.'' 28
        Each and every one of these statements is a material false
    statement, and the evidence obtained by the committee shows
    that Ms. Mills knew they were false at the time that she made
    them.

    B. The Evidence Before the Committee Establishes That The Testimony of
     Cheryl Mills Before the Committee Was False and That She Knew it Was
                                     False

        The evidence obtained by the committee contradicts Ms.
    Mills's testimony in every respect. The sworn deposition
    testimony of five other witnesses makes clear that at the time
    the documents were withheld, Ms. Mills could not have believed
    that they were not responsive, deliberately withheld them, and
    lied to the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
    about withholding them.

      1. Ms. Mills's Testimony regarding the Notes Was Demonstrably False

        Not only are the notes on their face responsive to the
    committee's request. But the author of the notes, Brian Bailey
    (an assistant to then-Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles),
    testified that the notes did indeed memorialize a
    ``communication,'' 29 which falls clearly within the
    scope of the committee's August 2, 1996 request.

      2. Ms. Mills's Testimony Regarding the June 28, 1994 Memorandum Was
                               Demonstrably False

        Like the notes, the memorandum on its face was responsive
    to the committee's request. The second paragraph states:
    ``Currently in the White House we are preparing, as you know,
    to implement a new database system starting August 1.'' There
    is no other database system to which that sentence and the
    ensuing paragraph could have referred. Not only is that true
    from the face of the document, but that fact was confirmed by
    the testimony of four other witnesses whose testimony is
    consistent with the testimony of each other and who had no
    reason to lie.
        Moreover, when that document was discovered by White House
    Counsel Charles Ruff, independent of Ms. Mills's discovery, he
    immediately produced it as a document responsive to the
    committee's request. He did not, at the time of production,
    qualify its responsiveness in any way. Mr. Ruff also expressly
    testified that the memorandum was responsive to the committee's
    request.30
                a. Marsha Scott's testimony contradicts Cheryl Mills's
                        testimony
        Marsha Scott, who developed the White House Database,
    contradicted Ms. Mills's testimony, stating under oath that the
    database referenced in the June 1994 memorandum was indeed the
    White House Database and that the description, including that
    the WhoDB was modeled after PeopleBase, accurately described
    the White House Database.31
        The White House has been mysteriously unable to produce the
    January 11, 1994 memorandum from Marsha Scott or the January
    13, 1994 memorandum from Erich Vaden, one of Marsha Scott's
    principal assistants on the White House Database project,
    requesting the advice provided in Ms. Mills's January 17, 1994
    memorandum. Having those documents would assist in determining
    whether the January 17, 1994 memorandum was intended to be
    responsive to a request for advice regarding the White House
    Database or some other database as Cheryl Mills claimed.
        Notwithstanding these missing documents, counsel for Marsha
    Scott insisted in Ms. Scott's deposition that a December 16,
    1993 memorandum to Cheryl Mills with the subject heading of
    ``White House Database'' 32 ``track[ed]'' the advice
    in Cheryl Mills's January 17, 1994 memorandum.33 Ms.
    Scott also confirmed in her testimony that Ms. Mills's
    memorandum addressed some of the same issues raised in her
    December 16, 1993 memorandum seeking advice on the White House
    Database,34 which contradicts Ms. Mills's claims
    that her January 17, 1994 memorandum referenced some other
    database.
                b. Erich Vaden's testimony contradicted Cheryl Mills's
                        testimony
        Erich Vaden, Marsha Scott's principal assistant who was
    largely responsible for the technical development of the
    Database and who became the Database Administrator,
    contradicted Ms. Mills when he testified that:
              (1) the database referred to in the second paragraph
            of the June 28, 1994 memorandum could be no database
            other than the White House Database; 35
              (2) nothing in that paragraph suggested to him that
            the referenced database was not the White House
            Database; 36
              (3) Marsha Scott was not involved in the development
            of databases in the White House other than the White
            House Database at that time; 37 and
              (4) he had specifically and expressly discussed with
            Cheryl Mills in January 1994 that the database
            referenced in her January 17, 1994 memorandum was the
            White House Database, not some other Correspondence
            Department database, which she acknowledged at that
            time.38
                c. Laura Tayman's testimony contradicts Cheryl Mills's
                        testimony
        Laura Tayman, who also worked with Marsha Scott and Erich
    Vaden on the development of the White House Database,
    contradicted Ms. Mills's testimony when she confirmed that:
              (1) there were no other databases in the White House
            to which the June 1994 memorandum could be referring;
            39
              (2) the database referenced in the January 17, 1994
            memorandum was, and could only have been, the White
            House Database; 40 and
              (3) the White House Database was designed to include
            features from PeopleBase.41
                d. Miscellaneous other testimony regarding the use of
                        PeopleBase as a model for the White House Database
                        contradicts Cheryl Mills's testimony
        That the White House Database was, in fact, modeled after
    PeopleBase (contrary to Ms. Mills's testimony) is also
    confirmed by the testimony of Erich Vaden 42 and
    Mark Bartholomew, a career White House technical staff member
    who worked on the White House Database project.43

    C. Cheryl Mills Could Not Have Believed That Her Testimony Was Truthful

        The testimony of these five witnesses contradicts Cheryl
    Mills's testimony and establishes that she did not believe, and
    indeed could not have believed, that her statements before the
    committee were true, namely that (1) the handwritten notes were
    not responsive to the committee's request; (2) the database
    referenced in the second paragraph of the June 28, 1994
    memorandum was not the White House Database; and (3) the
    database in the January 17, 1994 memorandum was not the White
    House Database.

     D. Ms. Mills's False Testimony Before the Committee is Evidence That
     She and Possibly White House Counsel Jack Quinn and Others Obstructed
     the Committee's Investigation by Withholding Documents Responsive to
                            the Committee's Inquiry

        Ms. Mills's false testimony to Congress is also evidence of
    unlawful obstruction of the committee's investigation. The
    evidence contradicting Ms. Mills shows that instead of
    determining that the withheld documents were not responsive,
    she determined that the documents were responsive.
        Consequently, she, White House Counsel Jack Quinn, and
    possibly others deliberately determined without legitimate
    justification to withhold documents that were the subject of
    the committee's request. Mr. Ruff's October 28, 1997 letter
    admits that the documents had been found in September
    1996.44 Ms. Mills admitted that she and White House
    Counsel Jack Quinn reviewed the handwritten notes in September
    1996.45 She also admitted that she placed both the
    handwritten notes and the June 28, 1994 memorandum in separate
    folders in the Counsel's Office in September 1996.46
        Finally, Ms. Mills testified that she and Mr. Quinn made
    the decision jointly to withhold the documents as
    nonresponsive.47 The withholding of these documents
    without justification did, in fact, impede the committee's
    investigation and constitutes unlawful obstruction under 18
    U.S.C. Sec. 1505.

     E. Ms. Mills Prevented the American People From Learning Just Before
    the 1996 Presidential Election That the President of the United States
     and the First Lady Were Involved in the Theft of Government Data and
        Other Government Resources to Benefit Their Political Campaigns

        The act of withholding the documents themselves and then
    lying to cover up the obstruction is significant evidence of
    Ms. Mills's consciousness that the contents of the documents
    reflected involvement of the President and the First Lady in
    various efforts to convert government property for unauthorized
    purposes. Significantly, the documents were withheld only 6
    weeks before the 1996 Presidential election. There can be no
    doubt that Ms. Mills knew that the release of the withheld
    documents would have been, at the very least, politically
    damaging if the documents had been released shortly before the
    1996 Presidential election. Indeed, the documents attracted
    substantial media attention when they were released in
    1997.48
        Since the production of the documents, the committee has
    also obtained other corroborating evidence of the theft of
    government property, i.e., that data was transferred to the DNC
    and that other White House resources were converted. However,
    Ms. Mills's failure to produce the documents at the time when
    they were discovered was detrimental to the committee's
    investigation and delayed the discovery of both the documents
    withheld and other important evidence.
        The committee considers giving false testimony before it to
    be a very serious matter that may subject a witness to serious
    penalties for perjury, making false statements in a
    congressional investigation, and obstruction under the criminal
    code of the United States. Consequently, the committee
    acknowledges that Chairman McIntosh has already referred
    evidence obtained relating to this matter to the Justice
    Department for further investigation and appropriate
    prosecution.

    III. UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF WHITE HOUSE DATA AND CONVERSION OF WHITE
                     HOUSE RESOURCES FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES

         The documents ultimately produced by the White House and
    the testimony of numerous witnesses reveals that the theft of
    data from the White House Database for political purposes was
    an integral part of an illegal scheme to convert government
    data and other resources that was planned and executed to aid
    the DNC fundraising effort and the Clinton/Gore campaign. On
    May 22, 1997, Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, told
    the committee that ``there is no evidence . . . that WhoDB was
    planned to be used for political purposes . . . .''
    49 Notwithstanding this denial, the handwritten
    notes of Brian Bailey that were withheld by Cheryl Mills and
    produced 5 months after Mr. Ruff's letter reflect that the
    President of the United States wanted to integrate the White
    House Database and the DNC database to share data in violation
    of 18 U.S.C Sec. 641.
        In addition to the Federal criminal code's prohibition
    against converting government property, the White House also
    had a clear policy that government resources could not be used
    for political purposes, even if White House staff could engage
    in political activity under the Hatch Act. Cheryl Mills had
    prepared, with former White House Counsels Bernard Nussbaum,
    Lloyd Cutler, and Abner Mikva, memoranda to White House staff,
    essentially advising that they could engage in political
    activity provided they did not use White House resources to
    support it.50 Mills testified before the committee
    when asked why, as reflected in the June 28, 1994 memorandum,
    government employees were working on the DNC's database:

              As you are probably aware, White House officials and
            others are allowed to engage in political activity and
            they are allowed to use their time in that way when
            they volunteer to provide political activity, so to the
            extent that Ms. Scott wanted to provide or make herself
            available to engage in those activities, provided she
            did not use Government resources, that would be
            consistent with the Hatch Act.51

    Congressman Shadegg further inquired regarding the use of
    government resources:

              Government resources seems to be a good question.
            This is on stationery which says the White House,
            Washington. I presume that would be a Government
            resource, wouldn't it? 52

    Ms. Mills responded to that question by admitting twice that
    the stationery was, in fact, a government
    resource.53
         For a similar use of government resources, including
    merely government photocopying paper, the Clinton
    administration prosecuted Peter Collins for the theft of
    government property. United States v. Peter Collins, 56 F.3d
    1416 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In that case, the Court of Appeals for
    the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the conviction of Mr.
    Collins for using office supplies, including paper for making
    photocopies, to support the U.S. Amateur Ballroom Dancing
    Association. Id. at 1421. The court also expressly acknowledged
    that the theft of computer time and storage could also
    constitute the theft of government property under 18 U.S.C.
    Sec. 641. Id. at 1420. The court also noted that intangible
    property, including the mere content of a writing, is a thing
    of value that can be converted to an unofficial use in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641. Id. (citing United States v.
    Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871
    (1979)).
        The committee found evidence, beyond the withholding of
    incriminating documents, of both the systematic transfer of
    data from the White House Database and other data systems to
    political entities and the systematic use of other government
    resources to advise and assist those entities in the
    development and management of their data systems. These
    conversions of government property, according to the Deputy
    Counsel to the President and the rationale of United States v.
    Collins, are inconsistent with the Hatch Act and constitute the
    theft of government property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.

      A. Marsha Scott Developed a Plan for the President To Use the White
                 House Database for Partisan Political Purposes

        The committee has unearthed abundant evidence that the
    planned uses for the WhoDB included partisan political ones for
    the 1996 reelection effort. Multiple documents expressly
    identify using the WhoDB as critical to election year efforts
    to energize the President's friends and supporters. The
    withheld June 28, 1994 memorandum includes a timeframe for
    development and deployment that is directed at the 1996
    campaign. The memorandum states:

              By the first of the year [1995] we should have any
            flaws identified and corrected and the majority of the
            White House using the system. We will then have a year
            [until 1996] to fully train and familiarize our folks
            to its many possibilities and uses.

    Although the timeframes in the memorandum plainly are aimed at
    making certain that the White House Database was fully
    operational by 1996, Marsha Scott denied that the dates had
    anything to do with the campaign.\54\
        A draft of another memorandum written by Marsha Scott for
    White House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty reveals a plan to:
    ``reach[] out to [the President's] friends and supporters . .
    .; identify and contact the key early supporters in all fifty
    states . . .; put in WhoDB the names and relevant information
    about those early supporters . . .; [and] add to this base
    group by early 1995, those folks we will be working with in
    1996.'' \55\
        The draft further outlines the plan to use the White House
    Database to ``recreate the Primary campaign structure . . .;
    establish a database to hold and work these names. (WhoDB will
    be fully functional by January [1995]) . . .; recreate the
    General campaign structure using the same method we employed
    for recreating the Primary . . . [,] add[ing] the DNC and
    campaign records . . .; identify by early 1995, key financial
    and political folks in each state who can work with us'' with
    the expectation that ``[t]hrough consistent dialogue and
    follow-up, leaders will emerge'' to allow ``[c]o-ordinat[ion]
    with DNC and DLC about what they are doing for these folks.''
    \56\ With respect to this plan, Scott states directly, ``This
    is the President's idea and it's a good one.'' \57\
        The final memorandum prepared and actually sent to Deputy
    Chiefs of Staff Erskine Bowles and Harold Ickes 58
    tracks the draft in key, although not all, respects. In
    producing this final memorandum, the White House first produced
    it without the most damaging information. The concealed text
    included all references to using the data, and people
    identified in the database, for the 1996 reelection campaign,
    as well as the fact that the planned use was personally
    approved by--indeed originated with--the President.\59\
    Although the draft memorandum itself, not just the final
    version that was withheld, was responsive to the committee's
    original August 2, 1996 request, it was not produced until May
    13, 1997. When Marsha Scott was questioned about the contents
    of this memorandum, she acknowledged that this plan involved
    using the White House Database to identify leaders for the 1996
    campaign.\60\

      B. The White House Social and Political Affairs Offices Shared Data
               From the White House Database With DNC Fundraisers

        The transfer of data from the White House Database was a
    significant tool in the conversion of White House resources to
    the use of the DNC to exchange White House invitations and
    other perks for campaign contributions. Individuals in the
    White House Social Office and Political Affairs Office were the
    points of contact through which White House data was converted
    to the use of DNC fundraisers.
        The transfer of data was so significant that first, Jack
    Quinn denied that such transfers happened. Then, confronted
    with newspaper reports that such transfers did occur, the White
    House Press Office staff acknowledged the reports, while at the
    same time the Counsel's Office staff and the Press Secretary
    himself were secretly helping to draft a misleading press
    release for DNC Finance Chairman Truman Arnold. When new White
    House Counsel Chuck Ruff was confronted with the press reports
    and the Press Office statements, he sought to qualify and
    minimize the use of the data, claiming that it happened only
    occasionally. However, the committee uncovered that DNC Finance
    Chairman Truman Arnold and Erskine Bowles agreed to a plan to
    allow DNC fundraisers to obtain regular access to data from the
    White House Database to select donors for attendance at White
    House events.
        The committee uncovered a scheme to use data from the White
    House Database to enhance DNC fundraising efforts. This scheme
    involved the White House staff using the White House Database
    to identify for the DNC individuals who had attended White
    House social events. The DNC would then use that information to
    determine whom to recommend for invitations to upcoming White
    House social events. In this way the DNC ensured that it was
    able to reward its donors appropriately with White House
    invitations.

     1. the white house counsel and the white house press office concealed
       the regular and continuous transfer of data from the white house
                              database to the DNC

        The White House Counsel consistently denied or sought to
    minimize the transfer of any data stored in White House
    databases to the DNC or other partisan political entities,
    including specific denials of dissemination of data from White
    House computers in the specific context of generating
    invitations to White House events. In a June 28, 1996 letter to
    the committee, White House Counsel Jack Quinn stated:

              The database maintained by the White House is a list
            of names, addresses and other pertinent information for
            generating invitations to White House events. . . . The
            database is for WhiteHouse use only; we prohibit
    distribution to outside entities or political organizations--including
    the Democratic National Committee or the Clinton-Gore '96
    Committee.61

        This denial was untrue. On January 30, 1997, the Los
    Angeles Times reported that White House staff frequently
    retrieved data on large contributors and turned it over to the
    DNC to help raise money for the President's reelection. The
    L.A. Times story by investigative reporter Glenn F. Bunting,
    reported that former DNC National Finance Chairman, Truman
    Arnold told him that:

    [the DNC finance] staff routinely used WhoDB to identify likely
    candidates for increased donations. . . . [T]he staff found out
    how many White House invitations certain donors were receiving,
    so they could arrange more events for prospective contributors.
    . . . I started checking back with the White House just as a
    routine matter. . . . It didn't seem very privileged to me. It
    was open to a lot of people.

               *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        [P]eople familiar with the system said that during the last
    two years DNC workers routinely used the database as a fund-
    raising tool to recruit prospective donors and to solicit large
    contributions.

               *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        Arnold said he focused on reconnecting the party with
    contributors who had given in 1992 but who had ``fallen from
    the fold.'' To do this, Arnold said, party staff members tapped
    the White House computer base, usually calling for the
    information. . . . ``It was most helpful to us because we were
    looking to the disaffected,'' Arnold said. ``The database
    helped us to see who had been invited to what.'' 62

        That day's White House Press Briefing was largely dominated
    by questions stemming from the story. With no mention of the
    White House Counsel's prior denial that any such data had been
    disseminated to the DNC, the White House Deputy Press Secretary
    Barry Toiv after talking with the White House Counsel,
    responded repeatedly that giving such White House data to the
    DNC was appropriate:

              If the DNC, in the context of putting together a list
            of people that they might want to ask to be invited to
            an event here, asked the question, was this particular
            person invited to previous events, or did this person
            previously attend events at the White House, it would
            be entirely appropriate for the Social Office to answer
            that question. . . . If they didn't know [the answer],
            the place where that information was kept was in the
            database.63

        This statement is wholly inconsistent with Mr. Quinn's
    assertion 6 months earlier that the White House prohibits the
    distribution of such data to the DNC. The White House now
    admitted that what was prohibited 64 was, in fact,
    ``entirely appropriate.'' In addition, the White House had
    refused to provide this very information to the committee for
    over 3 months. On October 3, 1996 the committee had
    specifically asked the White House to acknowledge whether ``the
    White House ever provided any data from the WhoDB to an outside
    organization or individual.'' 65
        The committee requested an answer by October 9, 1996. The
    White House failed to answer by that date, was asked again to
    respond by October 29, 1996,66 again failed to
    answer, was again asked to respond by November 18,
    1996,67 again failed to answer, was again asked to
    do so by January 14, 1997,68 and again did not
    respond.69 Indeed, the answer to this question was
    never provided during the tenure of Jack Quinn as Counsel to
    the President.
        Even after Mr. Ruff's arrival as Counsel to the President,
    and after the press briefing admission of the data transfer to
    the DNC, the White House still failed to answer the committee's
    questions with respect to that very matter. The committee once
    again, requested answers to these questions by February 26,
    1997.70 The White House once more failed to answer
    and was asked again to do so by February 28, 1997.71
    Not until February 28, 1997, almost 5 months after first being
    asked, well after the 1996 Presidential election, and well
    after the previously denied facts had been exposed by the LA
    Times, did the White House finally admit to the committee that
    data from the White House Database had been funneled to the
    DNC.72
        In addition to the White House Counsel repeatedly refusing
    to answer the committee's questions, the President's Press
    Secretary Mike McCurry also concealed his own role in the story
    at a White House press briefing. Although Mr. McCurry had
    assisted Mr. Arnold in drafting a statement regarding the use
    of the Database, he turned the briefing over to his assistant
    Barry Toiv. When Toiv was asked if anyone in the White House
    had spoken with Truman Arnold, he responded, ``I don't know.''
    73 Mike McCurry, although still present, said
    nothing. Four questions later, when reporters pressed the
    issue, asking ``[D]on't you think you might want to ask
    [Arnold] about that? [] Given all the reports you all haven't
    talked to [Arnold] yet[,]'' McCurry interjected to tell Toiv
    ``Barry, the Counsel's Office has. . . .'' 74 To
    this, Toiv admitted, ``That's true. The Counsel's Office has
    contacted him. . . .'' 75
        At no time did McCurry reveal the fact that he had talked
    to Arnold the previous night. The committee had asked who in
    the White House had contacted Arnold.76 In response,
    theWhite House revealed that McCurry had indeed talked to
    Arnold about these matters on the evening of January 29, 1997:

              Later that evening [January 29, 1997], Mr. McCurry
            returned Mr. Arnold's call. * * * Mr. Arnold said that
            he trusted Mr. McCurry's opinion and wanted some
            guidance as to how to respond to a number of press
            inquiries related to the WhoDB * * *.77

        Not only was McCurry silent about his own conversation with
    Arnold on the night before the briefing, neither he nor Toiv
    revealed the White House Counsel's role in conveying a
    misleading denial for the DNC to issue. On the very day of the
    press briefing, [January 30, 1997] Sally Paxton, Associate
    Counsel to the President, after Arnold read her a prepared
    written statement denying aspects of data transfer matters
    attributed to him by the L.A. Times, secretly received and
    thereafter transmitted to the DNC, Arnold's written
    denial.78
        The following day Arnold was ``unavailable'' and instead
    issued a statement under his name claiming he had never heard
    of WhoDB.79 Presumably, this was the statement which
    had previously been read to Paxton, received at the White
    House, and faxed to the DNC. Of course, the committee's
    investigation has established that many aspects of the data
    transfer described by Truman Arnold to the L.A. Times were, in
    fact, true.

      2. Sworn Testimony Indicates That The DNC Obtained Data Exactly as
                     Arnold Had Revealed to the L.A. Times

        The committee's investigation confirmed that Mr. Arnold had
    set up a scheme with Erskine Bowles and Ann Stock in March 1995
    to allow DNC fundraisers to contact the White House Social
    Office to obtain the valuable information contained in the
    White House Database regarding who had attended events at the
    White House. Prior to this confirmation by the committee's
    investigation, the White House sought to downplay the extent
    and frequency of the data flow to the DNC. In his February 28,
    1997 letter to the committee, Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the
    President, stated that

            the DNC occasionally called the White House to inquire
            whether specific individuals had been to prior events,
            such as state dinners. [White House] [s]taff sometimes
            would consult WhoDB to answer a specific
            question.80

    This attempt to minimize the conduct was contrary to what
    Truman Arnold had revealed to the L.A. Times. Arnold is
    reported to have admitted: ``I started checking back with the
    White House just as a routine matter.'' 81 The L.A.
    Times also reported:

            people familiar with the system said that during the
            last two years DNC workers routinely used the database
            as a fund-raising tool to recruit prospective donors
            and to solicit large contributions.82

        More importantly, as set forth infra, the evidence
    uncovered by the committee's investigation, including the sworn
    testimony of numerous witnesses, both at the White House and
    the DNC, revealed that such conduct was not at all occasional,
    but was a significant, regular, and ongoing practice which
    allowed the DNC access to the prohibited White House data. This
    evidence included Truman Arnold's testimony in a committee
    deposition in which he stood by his publicly reported statement
    that the DNC ``started checking back with the White House just
    as a routine matter.'' 83
        Indeed from documents and testimony obtained as part of the
    investigation, both from the White House and the DNC, as well
    as the testimony of participants in the data flow scheme both
    at the White House and the DNC, a clear picture emerges of the
    regular and ongoing practice of supplying the DNC with
    government-owned proprietary data. Further, the investigation
    reveals that this data was indeed used in a sophisticated
    scheme to directly further the fundraising goals of the DNC.

     3. Obtaining the data on social event attendance was directly tied to
                              fundraising efforts

        Obtaining invitations to White House events and other perks
    was part of a direct coordinated scheme between the White House
    and the DNC to convert the White House into nothing more than a
    fundraising machine. As recently as May 25, 1998, the
    Washington Post starkly revealed not only the tremendous value
    of White House event attendance, but the very effective use of
    such attendance in assuring a huge flow of money to the
    DNC.84
        Bernard Schwartz, described as ``the party's largest single
    individual donor,'' 85 was reported to have been
    ``twice invited to stay in the Lincoln Bedroom but couldn't
    make it. He attended state dinners for the Emperor of Japan and
    British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and was toasted at a White
    House dinner two years ago on his 70th Birthday.''
    86 Schwartz was quoted as saying, ``It's awesome to
    go to the White House, an extraordinary privilege.''
    87 Indeed, the article quotes a former DNC official:
    ``He was really sort of your perfect donor--just wanted to
    attend events and never asked for anything.'' 88
                a. The DNC planned to use White House event invitations as
                        a fundraising tool
        Documents found within the White House show that the DNC in
    concert with the White House staff used access to events as a
    tool to achieve fundraising goals. A May 5, 1994 DNC memorandum
    written by DNC staffer Martha Phipps sets forth the plan to use
    event invitations to meet DNC fundraising goals. The memorandum
    identifies as essential to reaching a goal of $40 million
    offering invitations to specific events, including ``[s]ix
    seats at all White House Private dinners * * * [s]ix to eight
    spots at all White House events * * * White House residence
    visits and overnight stays * * * [t]wo places per week at the
    Presidential CEO lunches * * * [and] [t]en places per month at
    White House film showings.'' 89
        This memorandum was discovered in the Office of the White
    House Chief of Staff (Leon Panetta at the time the memorandum
    was written) in a file marked ``Democratic National Committee,
    FINANCE SUPPORTERS, Revised 5/4/94.'' 90 Also
    contained in the file was another page which appears to be from
    a larger document. In addition to its location in a DNC file,
    the content of this page, and its wording, gives every
    appearance that it was written by someone at the DNC. It
    significantly states:

        The White House Social Office has been relatively
    inaccessible to the DNC. * * * We are on the same team and
    would like to share information in a legal and ethical manner.
    If we can break down the territorial nature of the Social
    office, we will accomplish a great deal more for the President
    and the party.

                                    problems

    Events
        At this time we do not have access to calendars or advance
    notice of events and dates. We frequently face the embarrassing
    situation of being notified of upcoming events by the
    contributors. Additionally, we can match the most appropriate
    people and events, given some advance notice.
    Follow Up
        The DNC is not aware of who has been taken care of to date.
    Only recently have we been allowed to send a staffer to the
    Social office to look up Trustee involvement for the past year.
    Having this information in a timely fashion is important to our
    fundraising efforts.
    Cooperation
        The nature of fundraising is very last minute. Contributors
    often come in at the last minute for a specific event. * * * We
    need flexibility to make changes where appropriate.
    Fundraising Interference
        DNC solicitation is subverted due to major donors being
    invited to high level White House events regardless of the date
    or amount of contribution. This is a disincentive especially
    for the Trustee level contributor.
    Understanding the contributor
        The Trustee consist [sic] of many of the nation's
    wealthiest and most influencial profiles. Some White House
    staffers fully understand the profiles of these contributors.
    We avoid events with huge crowds that may make the donors feel
    unimportant.91

        Yet another page contained in the file contains handwritten
    notes reflecting that 30 percent of the DNC Managing Trustees
    (DNC Trustees raised or donated $100,000 or more to the DNC)
    92 had not been to the White House. The notes
    further reflect the need for a ``list of who has been [to the
    White House].'' 93
        These documents found inside the White House parallel other
    documents discovered inside the DNC complaining of the
    inability to gain access to internal White House information.
    These documents include internal DNC memorandum prepared by DNC
    Fundraising staff. This fact cannot be over-emphasized. DNC
    Finance Director Richard Sullivan testified in depositions both
    before the Senate and House that the Finance Division at the
    DNC ought to have been named ``the fundraising division.''
    94 Sullivan described his duties:

              The finance director reported to the Finance
            Chairman. Essentially, the finance director had the
            day-to-day interaction with the fundraising staff, and
            worked with the fund-raising chairman in working
            towards the goals of how much money was to be raised
            and in what way.95

        Significantly, Sullivan testified that he had no other
    duties at the DNC other than fundraising.96 In 1995
    one of Sullivan's top fundraising assistants, Ari Swiller,
    served as Director of ``major supporter fund-raising,'' whose
    duties including ``work[ing] in raising money from our top tier
    of donors.'' 97 Indeed, Swiller headed the DNC
    Trustee program which Swiller described as ``a group of major
    donors and contributors to the Democratic Party as well as
    major fundraisers.'' 98 He described duties in
    heading the program as ``speaking with donors, following up
    with them, working on events and soliciting contributions from
    new donors.'' 99
                b. The plan involved the transfer of prior attendance
                        information by the White House Social Office to the
                        DNC
        The committee found evidence that the White House staff and
    the DNC planned to facilitate DNC fundraising by providing the
    proprietary prior event attendance information to DNC
    fundraisers. While witnesses sought to assert that providing
    this information was part of an ``official'' invitation
    process, much of it was, in fact, nothing more than a scheme to
    allow DNC fundraisers to have better information on the
    susceptibility of prospective donors to solicitations. By
    obtaining information from White House computers on previous
    event attendance, DNC fundraisers could decide who had already
    been rewarded, who needed to be rewarded, and who needed to be
    inspired through a White House invitation to raise and give
    money to the DNC.
        It is clear that within the White House the guest lists
    detailing who has been invited, who has accepted, and who has
    attended White House social events is jealously guarded. This
    information was maintained in the White House Database with
    respect to events such as official State dinners with foreign
    Heads of State, State arrival ceremonies for visiting Heads of
    State, receptions, and other official events. It is equally
    clear from the evidence that the DNC wanted this information,
    and complained when they could not get it.
        In March 1995, the DNC fundraising staff's complaints about
    access to the White House Social Office reached the new DNC
    Finance Chairman Truman Arnold in a memorandum from Richard
    Sullivan.100 The memorandum included complaints that
    mid-level White House staff compiled the event invitation lists
    and recommended who should be included in White House
    functions--``When we follow up, our requests are often second
    guessed, questioned and scrutinized by this tier of staff.''
    101 It descibed the ``need to sell and represent our
    donors as supporters that represent more than contributions,''
    102 and proposed, under the heading
    ``COORDINATION,'' that ``[e]ach agency and WH department should
    have a list of supporters and a staff person identified and
    devoted to handle matters related to reaching out to our
    donors.'' 103
        Significantly, the memorandum recommends:

        [W]e might be able to work out a situation with the Social
    Office for us to get a copy of invited guests after WH affairs
    have occurred.

               *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        If there's a problem sending it to [DNC] finance then
    perhaps it could be sent to the Chairman's office and then
    routed to finance.104

        Ari Swiller, DNC Deputy Finance Director under Richard
    Sullivan, testified that many of the ideas in the memorandum
    represented the perception of those persons, including himself,
    in the DNC finance division.105 Swiller testified
    that he formed his perception based upon his own experience of
    having made calls to the White House Social Secretary's Office
    and having his ``requests for information about upcoming events
    []not responded to, because persons in the White House [he]
    dealt with felt that there shouldn't be preferential treatment
    given to the finance division.'' 106
        Swiller testified that there was a time when the DNC could
    not get information from the White House staff reflecting who
    had been invited to or attended White House
    events,107 and that both he and others in the DNC
    Finance Division desired to obtain White House Social Secretary
    lists of persons who had attended events at the White
    House.108 Indeed, this information was extremely
    valuable to the DNC Finance Division because whether or not a
    person had attended a prior event at the White House was a
    factor used by the DNC fundraising division in determining who
    it would recommend for invitations to upcoming
    events.109
        DNC Finance Chairman 110 Truman Arnold, was very
    candid in his deposition with respect to how prior attendance
    information was used as part of the DNC fundraising effort.
    Arnold testified that the reason the DNC obtained the prior
    attendance information was:

              Because in trying to reactivate the people who had
            stopped contributing . . . 111
              There were people in Washington, inside Washington
            who know how to work the system to get to a lot of
            events that don't ever give a dime, or work, . . .
            112
              So it was our way of bringing equity to the system .
            . . to make sure that the DNC was not being abused, and
            that the President wouldn't be abused.113

    Arnold admitted that the system of making sure people got
    invited to the White House was designed to ``energize'' them to
    raise and give money.114 He went on to compare the
    DNC fundraising operation in this regard to people who attend
    church being expected to tithe:

              . . . [I]f you attend church, you are supposed to be
            a tither. So if I can hopefully give a little
            explanation, short philosophical approach to what I was
            doing that may clarify some other questions, I am not a
            hard s[ell]. I have been in sales all of my life, but
            my whole philosophy is to include and to involve people
            in the process, and if they like it and embrace it,
            they will do their part without being asked. And if
            they don't like it they won't.
              Whether it be charity drives that I have had for my
            hospitals, for my church, for civic endeavors in the
            community, mine is one of doing my part, stepping up,
            including and involving and engaging. They become
            energized, take part, take a role, and the balance
            follows. This was my approach to this. This is what I
            was attempting to do.115

        Indeed, Ari Swiller, also admitted that there were
    discussions with respect to people being invited over and over
    again to the White House even though they had not contributed
    recently.116
        Truman Arnold admitted that the White House attendance
    information was used in the preparation of DNC lists:

        [W]e had the list--how many times they had attended White
    House social events.

               *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        [T]he list would have already been prioritized, and there
    were references who they were and the nature of their business
    and how they had come to be contributors.117

        Another internal DNC memorandum to DNC Deputy Finance
    Director David Mercer, revealed that ``The only way [the DNC]
    can get the things we need to have done is through the [White
    House Chief of Staff's] office. This person is critical to our
    abilities.118 Indeed, it was the Chief of Staff's
    Office 119 to whom the DNC Finance Chairman, Truman
    Arnold, turned to break the logjam and permit the information
    flow. As set out below, Arnold went to the White House to
    obtain an agreement that the White House would provide the DNC
    with the information it sought.120
        In March 1995, shortly after taking over the helm as DNC
    Finance Chairman, and after the fundraising staff voiced to him
    their complaints about the inability to get proprietary White
    House attendance data,121 Arnold went to the White
    House and met with Erskine Bowles, Deputy Chief of Staff, and
    Ann Stock, White House Social Secretary. Although Arnold
    testified that the data flow arrangement had been in place
    before he arrived at the DNC,122 he explained that
    the meeting was arranged ``because there was a lot of confusion
    on how the system worked and what the responsibility was. I
    wanted to find the responsibility of the DNC and how it
    interfaced with the White House Social Office.'' 123
        It was at this meeting that Arnold learned of the Social
    Office event data which the White House would make available to
    the DNC:

              So I met with [Ann Stock] and * * * Erskine Bowles
            and we had a discussion about the protocol and how the
            system worked. And as a result of that, I knew that
            they had an internal record of everyone and the number
            that had attended a social event, and what that event
            was, and how many times they had attended as part of
            the Social Office.
              So, from that, the understanding that I had with the
            Social Office is that we would check [for prior
            attendance].124

        While Mr. Arnold's testimony was refreshingly candid with
    respect to most matters, one troubling aspect of his testimony
    on this crucial meeting was Arnold's seeming attempt to suggest
    that the DNC was permitted to obtain proprietary White House
    data in an effort to ``screen'' inappropriate persons from
    attending events.125 The record as a whole, however,
    makes clear that obtaining event attendance information had
    nothing to do with screening for inappropriate persons, as
    Arnold himself made clear. Arnold elsewhere repeatedly
    testified that non-familiar DNC names were already screened by
    the DNC before the DNC called the White House for attendance
    data. He said:
              [W]hen we had our list screened, our nominees
            screened, we would call over to rate them and
            prioritize them to see what the record was, because we
            knew how many that the DNC had invited them to, but
            they could have come from a lot of different directions
            to other events.126
              The only thing we called for was to see the number of
            times that this list, that we had already screened, the
            number of times that they had attended functions
            because we did not have that information. * * * the
            only thing we used it for was to prioritize the
            attendees.127
              [I told the fundraising staff] [t]hat we had the
            responsibility to screen. In our recommendations, we
            would assume major responsibility for screening of IDs
            to the White House, and the procedure we would use is
            to do the best we could with the tools we had to work
            with and then we would call the White House to see,
            after we screened them, how many times they had
            attended, as part of prioritizing. * * * 128

        As with his fleeting and seemingly half-hearted suggestion
    concerning a ``non-fundraising'' screening function, Arnold
    also sought to defend the appropriateness of receiving the
    information by suggesting that:

              I never discussed financial terms in any form or
            fashion with the Social Office. They never knew in the
            list how much had been contributed, why they were being
            submitted, what kind of workers they were. There was a
            Chinese wall between the Social Office and the
            Financial Office.129

        While it may very well be true that the DNC Finance
    Division did not discuss contributions with the Social Office,
    that is beside the point. There was no need to discuss
    contributions with the Social Office because the DNC Finance
    Division already had the financial and contributor information
    about every donor and potential donor. What they lacked was the
    proprietary White House data about past event attendance.
        Far from keeping that valuable data from the DNC--the White
    House agreed to provide it, and indeed thereafter did so on a
    regular and ongoing basis. It cannot be overstated that the
    White House agreed to provide the information that Arnold
    sought directly to the DNC Finance Division, the very entity
    which was charged with raising money.
        Neither Erskine Bowles nor Ann Stock recall the meeting at
    all. Stock testified that she had no recollection of a meeting
    with Arnold and Erskine Bowles. She recalled a meeting in her
    office in the White House with Arnold and his wife, where they
    discussed the logistics of the Arnolds' move to Washington, DC,
    but has no recollection of any discussions with Truman Arnold
    concerning the DNC and White House event
    attendance.130 Significantly, Stock testified--
    directly contrary to Truman Arnold with respect to White House
    authorization for DNC staff to call and obtain information from
    the White House databases. Stock pointedly stated that Arnold
    ``may have had the desire [to obtain such information] but he
    didn't have the ability to do that.'' 131
        Similarly, Erskine Bowles testified that he had no
    recollection of any such meeting. He testified that he did not
    remember a meeting with Arnold and Stock at any time, and
    recalled no meeting with Arnold in March 1995.132
    Prior to his deposition, committee staff had specifically
    requested Mr. Bowles to bring his calendar for 1995 for use
    during the questioning. Bowles neither brought his calendar,
    nor reviewed it. He testified ``I don't know where it is.''
    133 Bowles did recall meeting with Arnold at some
    time during Bowles's tenure as Deputy Chief of Staff and
    recalled Arnold complaining about problems of getting people
    invited to White House events.134 Bowles testified
    that he was unaware of any White House event attendance data
    which was ever provided to Arnold.135
        It is difficult to reconcile the testimony of Truman Arnold
    and the testimony of Erskine Bowles and Ann Stock without
    concluding that the meeting to discuss the arrangement took
    place. Arnold has a clear memory of it; the others do not.
        Moreover, it is during this period that Brian Bailey worked
    for Erskine Bowles and created the handwritten notes reflecting
    that the President agreed that the WhoDB and the DNC database
    should be integrated.136 These notes are evidence
    that the President signed off on a plan to give DNC Finance
    Chairman Truman Arnold the very data that he sought in his
    meeting with Erskine Bowles and Ann Stock.
        The inescapable conclusion is that Truman Arnold and
    Erskine Bowles agreed that the DNC would receive the
    proprietary White House information to--in Truman Arnold's
    words--``reactivate the people who had stopped contributing''
    137 and with the ``hope'' that they would be
    ``energized'' to raise money.138 The best evidence
    that individuals at the highest levels in the White House
    agreed to provide the data is the fact that the data was
    thereafter regularly provided.
                c. Richard Sullivan, Ari Swiller, and others obtained data
                        from the White House Social Office and the Office
                        of Political Affairs
        Apparently in response to DNC complaints about not knowing
    about White House events for which they might submit names for
    invitations, at least while Erskine Bowles served as Deputy
    Chief of Staff, a group operated within the White House which
    held regular weekly ``list creation meetings.'' This group
    permitted the notification of upcoming official White House
    events to coordinate component entities to be able to submit
    names for invitations.139 Remarkably, the DNC as
    well as the the Clinton-Gore reelection campaign, and the
    Democratic Leadership Council [DLC] were regular participants.
    The DNC representative to the group, Brooke Stroud, admitted
    that the DNC was ``just like any other department within the
    White House.'' 140
        Following the weekly list creation meetings at the White
    House, DNC personnnel armed with the knowledge of upcoming
    events, informed the respective DNC offices of those events and
    invited all offices to submit names to the DNC ``Office of
    Constituent Services.'' According to testimony received by the
    committee it was this entity, the Office of Constituent
    Services, within the DNC which was the official entity to
    collect DNC names, prioritize them, and send them to the White
    House as part of the invitation process.141 The
    number of events for which DNC submitted names was
    approximately 20 a month.142
        This system itself provided a mechanism which allowed for a
    significant flow of proprietary White House information to the
    DNC (and presumably to the DLC and to the Clinton-Gore
    reelection campaign). This data included otherwise jealously
    guarded (even within the White House) information revealing
    which individuals had been selected for invitations to upcoming
    official White House events,143 and who had been
    invited to past events.144 The information
    concerning who had been invited to upcoming White House events
    was widely sought by persons both within and outside of the
    White House. However, this information was kept highly
    confidential by the Social Office. As Ann Stock, the White
    House Social Secretary testified:

              [Persons in the White House] could possibly call and
            ask [who had been invited to an upcoming event from
            their recommended list] but that wasn't really a
            regular occurrence, because we had a policy of not
            releasing lists, because we wanted invitations to come
            from President and Mrs. Clinton, not from people who
            had suggested names. So we had a policy of not
            releasing the lists [either inside or outside of the
            White House].145
              We chose not to submit [the invitation] list and
            circulate it through the White House so that the
            President and First Lady would have the opportunity to
            invite people . . . rather than somebody decide that
            they wanted to call up and say, I put you on the list.
            That is why it was kept very
            confidential.146
              We usually didn't give them the information, which
            was a source of contention, because we maintained [the
            invitee list] until the people came to the White House,
            the list was under the purview of President and Mrs.
            Clinton, how and why they had been invited, and we
            didn't circulate the list.147

    The value of this information was expressed most pointedly by
    Stock when she testified:

              People want to claim credit for getting someone
            invited to the White House. That is why we did not
            circulate those lists. . . . 148
              People like to have the information.149

        Beyond the list creation meetings, specific staff members
    of the DNC called specific individuals in the Social Office and
    Office of Political Affairs to obtain lists and information
    about prior attendance at White House events. Richard Sullivan,
    the DNC Finance Director himself testified that he obtained
    lists of attendance at White House CEO lunches and the White
    House Economic Conference and that he used those lists to raise
    money.150 Karen Hancox, the Deputy Director of the
    Office of Political Affairs testified that Sullivan called her
    and asked for information about prior event attendance, that
    she called the Social Office staff for such information, which
    was given to her, and that she, in turn, gave it to
    Sullivan.151
        Ari Swiller, the Director of the DNC's major donor program,
    similarly testified that he and two other DNC staff members
    called for such information from the staff in the Social
    Office.152 He also testified that it was his
    impression that Donald Dunn in the White House Office of
    Political Affairs was looking up data on a computer when he
    provided such data toSwiller.153 Donald Dunn, whom
    DNC Director of Constituent Services Brooke Stroud called ``Information
    Central,'' 154 confirmed that Swiller contacted him and that
    he used the White House Database to provide him with
    data.155 Swiller also testified that he received lists from
    the White House when he had inquired about prior
    attendance.156
        Consistent with Arnold's and Bowles's plan, it plainly
    became a routine matter for DNC staff to contact the White
    House staff to obtain this information. Moreover, the
    President's objective of integrating the White House Database
    was effectively achieved. DNC fundraisers had obtained access
    to the crucial and valuable data in the White House Database.
                d. The White House Database was used to supply data to the
                        DNC for planning DNC events at the White House
        After Arnold exposed the practice of the White House
    providing the DNC with proprietary White House information in
    connection with official White House events, the White House
    Press Office sought to transform what Jack Quinn had said was
    prohibited 157 into something fully appropriate,
    claiming that the DNC by obtaining proprietary information was
    somehow performing an offical governmental
    function.158 During the January 30, 1997 press
    briefing Deputy White House Press Secretary Barry Toiv also
    suggested that the data flow to the DNC was limited only to
    ``official'' White House functions:

        The only contact that we're aware of that the DNC would
    have had would have been when the Social Office was putting
    together lists of people to invite to official events here . .
    . .

               *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        [T]hose [DNC events at the White House such as coffees] are
    not the events I'm talking about.

               *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        It would not have been appropriate to use the database to
    determine who ought to come to a DNC event. And--well, that's
    the answer.159

        Although Toiv was correct that it would not be appropriate
    to use the White House Database ``to determine who ought to
    come to a DNC event,'' he failed to answer the question of
    whether the Database had, in fact, been used to determine who
    ought to come to a DNC event. The committee's investigation
    revealed that the DNC did obtain data from the Database in the
    planning of DNC events at the White House.
        Richard Sullivan testified that the DNC finance staff
    ``probably'' contacted the White House and obtained prior event
    attendance information with respect to putting together
    invitees to DNC sponsored dinners, lunches, and receptions held
    both at the White House and outside the White
    House.160 Similarly, Truman Arnold testified that
    his DNC staff did indeed obtain for use by DNC fundraisers
    prior White House attendance in preparing lists for DNC
    events.161 Ari Swiller, who was very active in
    seeking and obtaining White House information, made no
    distinction between official events and DNC sponsored events at
    the White House.162 Swiller testified:

              Often we would submit a list of names to be included
            at an event at the White House, and when we did that,
            we wanted to see if people we were submitting had been
            invited to previous events and attended or regretted,
            or been invited at all.163

    He added that this happened without distinction between
    official or DNC events.164
        Furthermore, it is clear that with respect to DNC events at
    the White House the DNC got more information from White House
    databases in the form of actual lists and printouts both for
    upcoming events at the White House and for previous events at
    the White House. In addition, the committee has exposed the
    establishment of an entire infrastructure, including government
    manpower, computer time and resources, fax transmissions, and
    telephone reports paid for by government funds, which were
    converted to the DNC fundraising efforts.
                e. The White House infrastructure was dedicated to helping
                        the DNC raise money through White House invitations
        The resources dedicated to these events represent the
    conversion of the taxpayer-funded White House infrastructure to
    help the DNC raise money. That infrastructure included the
    preparation and mailing of invitations to DNC
    events.165 White House computer systems, including
    the White House Database, were utilized for inputting the DNC
    names into a list for each DNC event at the White
    House.166 Once the list was inputted, it was then
    printed from the White House Database (and, previously, its
    predecessor system) and sent to the White House Calligrapher's
    Office where the written invitations were prepared for mailing
    from the White House.167
        Thereafter, the White House Social Office received
    responses from those invited, and tracked whether they accepted
    or declined the invitation. White House personnel received the
    responses of those accepting or regretting and entered that
    respones and for those accepting, their date of birth and
    Social Security number into the White House
    Database,168 or its DOS predecessor database
    system.169
        All of this information, including the updated accept/
    regret responses was able to be printed out in hard copy
    updates from both the White House Database and its DOS
    predecessor system.170 When the White House Database
    was installed, it permitted White House staff to view an entire
    list on the computer screen without the need to print out a
    report.171
        After handling invitations at government
    expense,172 the White House faxed to the DNC updated
    guest status lists from government computer systems for
    upcoming DNC events at the White House. These lists provided
    up-to-date information from the White House computer systems
    reflecting who had been invited, and who had accepted, who had
    declined an invitation.173
        Both prior to and after the installation of the White House
    Database, these White House-generated and updated lists were
    regularly sent by persons in the White House to the DNC to
    facilitate event attendance.174 While the DNC
    actually solicited the contributions, the White House
    infrastructure handled all of the arrangements for the events
    to which the contributions were attributed.
        Having the lists prepared by White House staff on White
    House computers permitted the DNC to ``work the phones,''
    targeting calls to those who had not responded to the White
    House to check on their intentions.175 Remarkably,
    this appeared to be the exception. The usual practice was for
    government employees to make these calls in follow-up to
    invitations.176 The use of the White House staff to
    generate attendance cloaked the DNC's involvement, concealing
    the role that contribtions played in obtaining the invitations.
    This process effectively integrated the White House
    infrastructure with the DNC staff for the purpose of raising
    money through White House invitations.

      4. the transfer of data from the white house database as part of a
    scheme to convert the white house infrastructure to the benefit of the
              dnc may constitute the theft of government property

        18 U.S.C. Sec. 641 provides:

              Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly
            converts to his use or the use of another, or without
            authority, sells, conveys, or disposes of any record,
            voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States
            or of any department or agency thereof, or any property
            made or being made under contract for the United States
            or any department or agency thereof; or
              Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with
            intent to convert it to his own use or gain, knowing it
            to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined, or
            converted--
              Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
            more than ten years or both; but if the value of such
            property does not exceed the sum of $10,000, he shall
            be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 1
            year, or both.

        The evidence obtained by the committee shows that
    individuals in the White House may have violated this section
    of the Federal criminal code by converting to the use of the
    DNC a thing of value, namely data from the White House
    Database. The information was plainly a thing of value in the
    scheme to use White House invitations to reward and energize
    donors.
        There can be no suggestion that they did not transfer this
    data knowingly and without authority. White House Counsel Jack
    Quinn plainly recognized that such transfers were prohibited,
    and memoranda from the Counsel's Office to all White House
    staff advised that the use of White House property was not
    permitted under the provisions of the Hatch Act that otherwise
    permit political activity by White House staff.
        Erskine Bowles and Truman Arnold knowingly and willfully
    planned the transfer of data to support the conversion of the
    White House infrastructure to an effective fundraising machine.
    The DNC fundraisers knowingly and willfully carried out that
    scheme to obtain the data and to convert the White House
    infrastructure to the use of the DNC for fundraising. And White
    House staff knowingly and willfully cooperated in that scheme
    by giving out the data and by allowing the White House to
    become a fundraising tool of the DNC.
        Obtaining the data itself was a critical element in
    advancing the scheme to use the White House for fundraising to
    meet DNC fundraising objectives. Without the information from
    the White House Database, the DNC would have wasted precious
    fundraising resources--White House invitations--on at least
    those who had already been rewarded for their generosity.
    Obtaining the data allowed the DNC to integrate their
    fundraising with the White House Social Office.

    C. White House Staff Transferred Other Data to the DNC and the Clinton/
         Gore Campaign Before the White House Database Was Operational

        The sharing of White House data did not begin with the
    White House Database. Prior to the development of the Database,
    White House staff apparently distributed White House lists to
    the DNC. The committee found numerous White House lists in the
    hands of the DNC and the campaign that pre-dated the White
    House Database.
        These lists included calligraphers' lists with hundreds of
    names and addresses from White House holiday receptions in 1994
    and the President's Yale Dinner in December of the same year,
    which were produced to the commiteee by the DNC.177
    The Yale Dinner list, although available to DNC fundraisers,
    was withheld from the committee by the White
    House.178 They also included the 1993 and 1994
    Holiday Card lists that were transferred to the campaign and
    theDNC, respectively.179 The list of those invited
    to attend the White House Economic Conference in 1994 was also produced
    by the DNC.180 A White House Office of Public Liaison list
    of Asian Pacific American leaders was given, according to the White
    House Counsel, possibly to John Huang while he was employed by the
    DNC.181 The transfer of the lists, which are things of
    value, and the knowing conversion of them to the use of the DNC is a
    theft of government property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641, which punishes
    the knowing conversion of government property.
        Finally, although Cheryl Mills had prepared a memorandum
    specifically advising that names and addresses from the
    official mails could not be sent to the DNC (in the context of
    the 1993 Holiday Card project), the President routinely
    directed that names and addresses from official correspondence
    that had not been entered in the WhoDB be included in
    PeopleBase. This, too, could constitute theft of government
    property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641. It is hardly surprising that
    with this history of sharing data that the White House
    Database, when it became operational, was used as a vehicle to
    transfer similar valuable data to outside entities.

         1. White House Staff Knew that the 1994 Holiday Card List was
                             Transferred to the DNC

        The committee discovered that the Holiday Card project, at
    least in 1994, served as a vehicle to funnel massive amounts of
    proprietary government data, at least 76,000 names and
    addresses,182 from White House computers (prior to
    the creation of the White House Database) to the DNC. The
    Holiday Card projects undertaken during previous
    administrations are appropriate and legal joint undertakings by
    the White House, the national political party of the President,
    and his campaign entity, if any.
         While the national party traditionally pays for the
    production and mailing of the White House holiday cards,
    government data is prohibited from being provided to the
    national party by the White House. In order to ensure that the
    law is not violated, the White House, the political party, and
    the campaign often transmit their respective lists to a third-
    party professional outside vendor to merge the lists and mail
    the cards.183 The purpose of this process is to
    ensure that the political party does not receive the White
    House list, which is government property.
        Despite these legal restrictions, the committee dislodged
    evidence that persons within the Clinton White House sought to
    use the Holiday Card project to unlawfully transmit government
    data to the DNC. Contemporaneous notes made by Erich Vaden
    reveal that Marsha Scott suggested that the Holiday Card
    project could be used as a vehicle to transmit the data to the
    DNC.184 These notes suggest a criminal conspiracy to
    circumvent the prohibition on transferring data to the DNC.
        According to Vaden's testimony, in response to Scott's
    suggestion that the White House names might be sent to DNC,
    Vaden felt it necessary to contact Cheryl Mills in the White
    House Counsel's Office to learn whether this was unlawful.
    ``Marsha was saying, `Hey, well, we are sending this to the
    public.' It is public knowledge. You know, we are not hiding
    who we send the Christmas card to. De facto, people find out.
    So it is then public? Is that a public record then?''
    185 Vaden testified that: ``to the extent possible
    that we could, we were looking for vehicles, you know, as ways
    to share that information with people.'' 186
        This statement is not the only instance of the expressed
    desire to accomplish what the law prohibited. In her reply to a
    June 17, 1994 memorandum from Brooke Stroud [DNC] to Tara Burns
    (White House), Burns suggested that the DNC bring over their
    list to the White House ``for a cross check''--``since we
    legally can't give it to you, I think it'd be helpful if you
    all could come over some time.'' 187
        Despite knowing the prohibition on transferring White House
    data to the DNC, and even suggesting during her deposition that
    she thought it was illegal,188 Brooke Stroud, Deputy
    Director of Membership Services at the DNC, who was in charge
    of the 1994 Holiday Card project for the DNC, oversaw the
    delivery of the merged list (including the White House lists)
    to the DNC in November 1994 from the Saturn Corp., a third-
    party contractor used for the production of the
    list.189 There, it was entered into the DNC
    computer.190 Further, a hard copy printout was made
    which reached 5 feet in height,191 which has not
    been located.192 This is troubling indeed, for as
    Richard Sullivan testified with respect to other White House
    lists:

              We assembled tens of lists to work off of, and I
            don't rule out that those lists may have been
            assimilated into this assimilation of tens of hundreds
            of lists that were floating around in the fund-raising
            division. * * * [I]t * * * would have accumulated with
            other lists that I had and others. * * * Generally when
            we were working on our big Washington galas, we would
            try to put together thousands of names for prospect
            mailings or for prospect list callings. So that we
            would ask everyone to produce whatever list they had. *
            * * 193

        The knowing transmission of this list to the DNC is a
    violation of White House policy and a violation of 18 U.S.C.
    Sec. 641, which prohibits the theft of government property. The
    mere possession of the list by the DNC is evidence of a theft
    of the property. But in addition to the possession of the list,
    there is other evidence that White House and DNC staff knew
    that they had no authority to transfer or receive and retain
    the list. Nevertheless, the list was transferred to the DNC not
    just once, but multiple times and retained in several forms.
    The multiple transfers are part of a pattern of evidence that
    White House staff provided and the DNC staff retained valuable
    government property. It is clear that these lists should not
    have been been sent to the DNC even once, much less the many
    times they were sent.
        The list was transferred to DNC computers multiple times.
    The data in the merged file from which duplicates were removed
    (called ``deduping'') at the DNC over the 1994 Veterans Day
    weekend itself remained as uploaded data in a file in the DNC
    computer. There were in factnumerous other tapes and computer
    files containing this government data which were impermissibly
    transferred to the DNC.
                a. At the direction of the DNC, Saturn delivered a sample
                        printout of the merged tape to the DNC
        After the DNC and White House lists had been combined or
    merged by the Saturn Corp., the DNC instructed Saturn to
    produce and deliver to the DNC for review a ``sampling'' of the
    lists (including the White House data).194 Stroud
    has no recollection as to what happened to the ``sample'' list
    which included White House data.195
                b. At the direction of the DNC and with the knowledge and
                        cooperation of White House staff, Saturn delivered
                        the merged computer file tape to the DNC
        Prior to the Veterans Day weekend in 1994 Brooke Stroud
    (with the full knowledge of White House personnel) directed
    Saturn to deliver the merged Holiday Card list including the
    White House data to the DNC headquarters. There, Stroud had
    arranged for the data to be entered into the DNC computer and
    to be further de-duped by White House volunteers under the
    direction of a government employee, Sharon Lewis. Saturn made
    deliveries of the merged data to the DNC in multiple
    installments on November 8, 9, and 11, 1994.196 The
    component parts making up the merged list were entered into the
    DNC computer where it was worked on and further de-
    duped.197 As Brooke Stroud testified:

        A. All the lists, PeopleBase, White House, DNC, all the
    lists were sent to a merge/purge house who did the de-duping.
    They did not--they didn't do a great job. So we brought the
    list in.

               *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        Q. All right. That list came back to the DNC?
        A. Right.198

        DNC personnel and White House volunteers worked on the data
    in the DNC computer at least during the Veterans Day weekend
    and thereafter. The two computer personnel at DNC testified
    that they had no recollection of these events involving
    volunteers or weekend work. Though, clearly someone beyond the
    technical level of Stroud would have been needed to enter the
    data and set up the terminal access for a dozen persons. Bryan
    Daines, the Director of Information services at the DNC,
    testified that only two DNC employees were technically capable
    of uploading data into the DNC system from a magnetic tape--he
    and Al Hurst, a DNC computer programmer.199 However,
    neither Daines 200 nor Hurst 201 had any
    recollection of performing such a task.
        It is likely they would have remembered this incident,
    given the unusual circumstances of the situation including the
    use of White House volunteers on a weekend.202 This
    suggests that someone other than these two entered the data
    into the DNC computer. The committee has been unable to
    discover in what file name or other identifying information it
    was entered, what, if any access limitations were built in, and
    who thereafter had access to the information thus entered is
    unknown to the committee.
        The committee requested all sign-in/sign-out logs and
    records for the time period covering the Veterans Day weekend
    which would reveal the names of those persons present in the
    DNC. The DNC did not produce those records, and refused to
    state what records they had produced and why they were
    produced. Finally, testimony revealed that these records had
    been destroyed.203
        On or about November 30, 1994, the DNC produced tapes from
    the DNC computer containing the de-duped, or cleaned-up,
    information. However, at least one set of tapes containing the
    merged data was returned to Saturn Corp. to be placed in postal
    presort format and then transferred to the laser house (``The
    Last Word'') for final mailing.204 The information
    transferred to the tape, of course also, as far as is known
    remained in the file within the DNC computer. No evidence
    exists that the data was deleted from the computer system after
    the tapes were made to be returned to Saturn.
                c. A so-called problem tape was delivered to the DNC and
                        retained
        The committee's investigation revealed that the prohibited
    data went to the DNC and into its computer system, yet again,
    this time, under the guise of a problem tape. After receiving
    the DNC de-duped tapes back from the DNC on or about November
    30, 1994, Saturn placed the data in a postal presort format. On
    or about December 2, 1994 Saturn delivered the data to the
    laser house for addressing and mailing.205
        However, the Last Word discovered what was perceived to be
    a problem with the tape provided by Saturn. The Last Word
    returned tapes to Saturn Corp. which Saturn received on
    December 14, 1994.206 Two days later, on Friday,
    December 16, 1994, Saturn representatives arrived at DNC with
    the problem tape. Two letters from Saturn, one dated December
    20, 1994 to Brooke Stroud,207 and one dated December
    22, 1994 to Eric Sildon,208 confirm the meeting of
    Saturn personnel at the DNC on that date concerning the problem
    tape.
        With respect to these events, Al Hurst, the computer
    programmer at the DNC, recalled that his only contact with
    Saturn personnel occurred at the time of the ``the problem
    tape.'' 209 He testified that when Saturn brought
    the ``problem tape'' to the DNC, ``we uploaded it to a secure
    place on the AS400 [the DNC computer database system].''
    210 Beyond his recollection that he once viewed the
    problem tape on the computer screen with Brooke
    Stroud,211 Hurst has norecollection as to what
    happened to the tape itself, which Saturn brought to the DNC on
    December 16, 1994 and which Hurst uploaded into the
    computer.212
        With respect to the data from the tape which had been
    uploaded into the DNC computer system, the record establishes
    that it remained in the computer for an extended period of
    time. At some time after 1994, at Brooke Stroud's request,
    Hurst made yet another tape containing this data.213
    He gave the tape to Brooke Stroud, but has no idea what she did
    with that copy.214 In addition to this copy of the
    data on yet another tape, the data also remained in the DNC
    computer system thereafter.215
        In fact, this data remained in the specified file in the
    DNC computer system for a total of over a year, until in
    approximately January 1996, Hurst testified he deleted the file
    from the DNC system.216 However, before deleting the
    data, Hurst made yet another tape which contained the
    data.217 This copy was placed on a tape rack in the
    unsecured DNC computer room.218
        Hurst's testimony regarding the deletion of the data from
    the DNC computer system is unusual. Hurst is a computer
    programmer. He described his duties as being ``to keep the
    computer running, to train people how to use the computer, and
    to make enhancements and changes to the programs that are on
    the computer.'' 219
        Yet Hurst, seemingly out of the blue and of his own
    volition, made the independent judgment to delete the file from
    the system--a file which contained data that he produced in the
    form of a tape for Brooke Stroud. Hurst testified that he did
    not ask anyone else whether the file should be
    deleted.220 He stated that he made the determination
    because ``it was taking up a lot of space on the system.''
    221 Despite specific recollections of having deleted
    this particular file, the name he gave to the file, and when he
    deleted it, Hurst was unable to recall the volume of the data
    in this file.222
        In addition, despite his earlier testimony that the other
    criteria he used in determining whether to delete a file was
    how often it was used, he admitted that he consulted no one
    about this file's use.223 and that he did not check
    the computer program data which would have revealed its
    ``use.'' 224 He could not explain why he did not
    check that information before deleting the file.225
    Nor could Hurst provide any explanation as to why he copied the
    data onto a copy tape prior to deleting the file in January
    1996.226
        In sum, this data (from the supposed ``problem tape'') was
    purposefully and deliberately entered into the DNC computer
    system where it remained for at least a year. Further, numerous
    copy tapes were produced from downloading that data, some of
    which, at least, remained unsecured in the possession of the
    DNC for years. At least one such copy remains in the possession
    of the the DNC at this very moment. And the original Saturn
    tape from which the data was originally uploaded remains
    unaccounted for, last seen at the DNC when uploaded.
                d. After the mailing, the final merged tape was returned to
                        the DNC, not the White House
        Following the lasering and the mailing of the 1994 holiday
    cards, the final tape containing White House data was returned
    not to the White House, but to the DNC. Al Hurst understood it
    had come from Saturn in as much as it had a Saturn label on the
    tape.227 However he received it and placed it on the
    tape rack in the unsecured computer room at the
    DNC.228 Hurst did not recall uploading this tape
    into the computer, or whether anyone else may have in March
    1997. This tape was subsequently retrieved by Hurst in March
    1997 from the tape rack for a copy to be made at DNC counsel's
    request.229

     2. The White House Counsel Sought to Evade the Committee's Questions
     about the 1994 Holiday Card Tape because the Staff Knew that the Tape
                   Had Been Transmitted to the DNC Illegally

        The White House has sought to conceal many of these facts
    and to mislead investigators concerning the unlawful access.
    These efforts to mislead are evidenced by the convoluted
    language in the attachment to White House Counsel Charles F.C.
    Ruff's letter of February 28, 1997.
        One of the most glaring examples is the White House's
    assertion that it had only ``recently become aware'' of the DNC
    receipt of the White House list.230 In fact, Maggie
    Williams, Chief of Staff to the First Lady, Alice Pushkar,
    Director of the Office of the First Lady's Correspondence, Jim
    Dorskind, Director of White House Correspondence, Sharon Lewis,
    who directed the White House volunteers, and perhaps Cheryl
    Mills, then-Associate Counsel to the President, were all fully
    aware in November 1994 that the White House data was unlawfully
    transferred to the DNC.
        The White House certainly knew as early as August 1995 that
    the final list was unlawfully at the DNC. Alice Pushkar
    testified that she knew it by that date, and prior to that had
    always ``assumed'' that the DNC and not the White House had
    received the final list after the 1994 mailing.231
    However, in August 1995, Pushkar told Cheryl Mills, Deputy
    Counsel to the President, in a written memorandum that the DNC
    had the tape.232 Indeed, Mills responded that the
    DNC could not legally have the list.233
        While Erich Vaden testified that to his knowledge the
    Holiday Card list was not shared with the DNC,234
    the evidence clearly reveals that, at least in 1994, it was.
    More importantly, the elaborate efforts taken by the White
    House to conceal the facts and to misrepresent the
    circumstances of the delivery of the data has not only
    obstructed the committee's investigation, but suggests a
    consciousness of criminal guilt surrounding the delivery.
        At least by October 1996, the committee's investigation had
    identified the possible improper use of official data under the
    guise of the traditional joint White House/DNC Holiday Card
    projects. On October 3, 1996, the committee requested answers
    to specific questions surrounding the Holiday Card projects.
        While many of the questions focused on the 1995 and 1996
    Holiday Card projects, the final question asked the White House
    to ``identify any and all outside contractors who assist or
    have assisted in the preparation and/or mailing of the White
    House holiday cards.'' 235 The committee requested
    answers by October 9, 1996. The White House failed to answer by
    that date and was asked again to respond by October 29,
    1996.236 White House Counsel Jack Quinn again failed
    to answer and was asked to respond by November 18,
    1996.237 He again failed to answer, was again asked
    to do so, this time by January 14, 1997,238 and
    again, he did not respond.239 Indeed, answers to
    these questions concerning the Holiday Card project were never
    provided during the tenure of Jack Quinn as White House
    Counsel, despite representations that such answers would be
    forthcoming.
        After Mr. Ruff's arrival, the White House had still failed
    to answer the holiday card questions. The committee, once
    again, requested answers to these questions by February 26,
    1997.240 The White House once more failed to answer,
    was asked again to do so by February 28, 1997.241
    Not until February 28, 1997, almost 5 months after first being
    asked, and well after the 1996 Presidential election, did the
    White House Counsel's Office respond--only then revealing for
    the first time the illegal transfer of massive amounts of data
    from the White House to the DNC in the guise of the 1994
    Holiday Card project.
        At a White House press briefing on January 30, 1997, White
    House spokesman Barry Toiv stated categorically that at no time
    did the DNC ever get to see any list from White House computers
    for the Holiday Card project. He further emphasized that ``the
    entire [merged list] was then brought back [to the White
    House],'' that only the printer would see the whole list, and
    that ``The DNC would not see the White House list.''
    242
         In a February 28, 1997 letter, the White House Counsel
    told the committee that in 1994 the arrangements for the
    preparation and mailing of holiday cards was ``similar'' to
    that in 1995 and 1996. The White House suggested that in 1994
    (as in 1995 and 1996):

              The White House, [and] the DNC [] independently
            submitted their respective lists directly to an outside
            vendor. The vendor then compiled the lists into a
            single list, attempted to eliminate duplicates and
            mailed the same White House card to everyone on the
            list.243

        Mr. Ruff's letter further stated that ``there was a clear
    understanding that, after the various lists had been merged and
    the duplicates eliminated, the final list was to be returned to
    the White House only.'' 244 In fact, this was simply
    not true. The White House was unable to produce any documentary
    evidence reflecting that the vendor understood that it was to
    return the deduped lists only to the White House. Indeed, no
    documents produced by Saturn included anyinstruction that the
    final list was to be returned only to the White House. The person in
    charge of the project at the White House similarly testified that she
    could not recall any discussions about the requirement of either the
    original White House tape or the merged tape being returned to the
    White House,245 and that with respect to the final merged
    tape, she ``assumed it would go back to [the DNC].'' 246
        The evidence uncovered by the committee revealed Saturn was
    instructed to send the merged lists not to the White House but
    to the DNC. Prior to the final mailing, the merged lists were
    delivered to the DNC where the list was entered into the DNC AS
    400 computer system.247
        The White House Counsel's Office further characterized the
    delivery of the merged tape to the DNC as a ``mistake'' and a
    ``mix-up.'' 248 In fact it was not a mistake or a
    mix-up at all, but was intentionally sent to the DNC to be
    entered into its computer and cleaned up or ``deduped'' by
    White House volunteers directed by White House employees. Not
    only had Saturn Corp. done exactly what the DNC asked it to
    do--deliver the merged tape to the DNC--it did so with the full
    knowlege of White House officials in charge of the 1994 Holiday
    Card project. In memoranda dated November 9, 1994
    249 and again on November 15, 1994,250
    Brooke Stroud at the DNC, informed Maggie Williams and Alice
    Pushkar at the White House that White House lists were at the
    DNC for ``manual de-duplication,'' having been delivered from
    Saturn to the DNC.
        Further, White House employee Sharon Lewis was fully aware
    that White House lists had been entered into the DNC computer,
    because she coordinated White House volunteers to dedupe the
    merged lists at the DNC headquarters on the Veterans Day
    weekend in 1994.251 Jim Dorskind, Assistant to the
    President and Director of White House Correspondence, was also
    fully and specifically aware of the fact and directed Lewis to
    direct White House volunteers to the DNC for the
    project.252
        In addition, it is quite possible that Cheryl Mills had
    specific knowlege of the unlawful transfer of data to the DNC.
    Brooke Stroud testified that ``Cheryl Mills might have [had
    knowledge of the project and the use of White House volunteers
    to dedupe the list at DNC], but I don't remember.''
    253 Stroud stated, that while she had no distinct
    memory of Mills having such knowlege, Mills ``was on the
    telephone for most of our meetings, or most of the holiday card
    group meetings.'' 254
        Additional evidence, suggesting that other White House
    staff, including Mills, had actual knowledge of the prohibited
    transfer of data at the time of the transfer, is Mills's later
    attempts at damage control in her 1995 memoranda. For example,
    in her memorandum to Alice Pushkar of August 14, 1995, Mills
    retreated from her earlier categorical response to Alice
    Pushkar that the DNC ``shouldn't have [the] tape''
    255 to her more expedient advice that
    ``[n]evertheless, the DNC is, as you know, prohibited from
    using the official Holiday Card list for any purposes other
    than the Holiday Card project.'' 256
        Pushkar testified that she had no idea what Mills meant by
    ``use restrictions'' and that she (Pushkar) wasn't concerned
    about use restrictions at the DNC.257 Mills's
    memorandum further suggests that not only was the DNC
    prohibited from using the list for any purpose other than the
    Holiday Card project, but also that such ``use restrictions''
    had been imposed on the DNC by the White House.258
    Mills's memorandum clearly states that prior to 1995 the White
    House had ``entered into use agreements to protect the use of
    the White House list against any other use than the holiday
    [card] project.'' 259
        The committee sought from the White House copies of all
    such ``use agreements,'' both by letter request,260
    and later subpoena.261 Such agreements between the
    White House and the DNC would, of course, clearly establish
    that the White House staff knew very well that the DNC had
    obtained the prohibited data. Despite the compelled production
    of these critical documents, the White House has never produced
    these records, claiming that they are missing. On November 19,
    1997, the White House Counsel's Office responded to the
    committee that:

             We have been unable to locate any use agreements for
            any years between any holiday card vendors or the DNC
            and the White House. * * * 262

        The White House Counsel's staff provided no further
    explanation concerning these suddenly missing documents,
    casually suggesting that ``should we subsequently locate
    responsive material, it will be provided promptly.''
    263 Thereafter, at the committee's request a
    subpoena was issued compelling production of this material.
    Further, in an attempt to discover why the White House was
    ``unable to locate'' these records, the subpoena compelled all
    records reflecting efforts made by the White House Counsel's
    Office to locate them.264 No documents have been
    produced in response to this subpoena.
        It is reasonable to conclude in light of this record that
    the list was delivered to the DNC without any use restrictions.
    Mills's memo suggests that she believed either that the DNC had
    the list or that it was better to lie about the existence of
    such use restrictions than to admit that the DNC had the list
    without them.
        There is ample reason to prepare a memorandum after the
    fact, saying that use restrictions were imposed when they were
    not. Preparation of such a memorandum would conceal the fact
    that the lists were delivered to the DNC without restrictions.
    The memorandum would lead the reader to believe that even if
    the DNC had the tape, it could not and would not use it for
    fundraising purposes. The inability of the White House to
    produce any agreements or any evidence of agreements, other
    than Mills's self-serving memorandum, leads the committee to
    conclude that White House staff knowingly allowed the list to
    be delivered to the DNC without restriction in violation of
    law, and in direct contradiction to the White House's later
    statements to the committee that the lists were sent to the DNC
    inadvertently.

     3. The Clinton/Gore Campaign Impermissibly Received the 1993 Holiday
                                   Card List.

        The committee has exposed the fact that White House staff
    not only impermissibly transferred the 1994 White House Holiday
    Card list to the DNC, but also that the White House portion of
    the 1993 Holiday Card list was transferred into the Clinton/
    Gore computer system. The documentary evidence discloses that
    the Clinton/Gore campaign acquired between 33,000
    265 to 43,000 266 names and addresses
    from the White House, which were entered and still reside in a
    Clinton/Gore campaign computer.
        In 1993, the entity selected to merge the Holiday Card list
    was W.P. Malone, Inc. (Malone), an Arkadelphia, AR firm which
    was also the entity which had maintained the Clinton PeopleBase
    campaign database.267 Documents obtained by the
    committee reveal that the White House list went to Malone on or
    about November 8, 1993.268
        As a result of interviews with Malone employees conducted
    by committee staff in Arkadelphia on April 29, 1998, a Malone
    staff member supplied a sworn affidavit to the committee that
    (1) the White House portion of the 1993 Holiday Card list was
    received in disk or tape form and was merged with both DNC and
    PeopleBase lists to create a master database for the card
    mailing; (2) this separate database was entered into the
    Clinton/Gore ICL DRS 6000 computer which was later moved to the
    offices of the Clinton/Gore '96 campaign in 1995; and (3) he
    has no recollection that he was asked to return these disks to
    the White House, or to return the master merged lists
    containing the White House submissions to the White
    House.269
        This retention of the final merged list by Malone was no
    mistake or inadvertent oversight. Indeed, the retention by
    Malone of the merged list, including the White House data, was
    fully known by persons in the White House, including Marsha
    Scott and Dan Burkhardt. In January 1994, for example,
    Burkhardt had asked Malone--not for the return of the final
    master list--but for a copy of it for White House clean
    up.270
        Not only was the original list retained by the Clinton/Gore
    campaign following the 1993 Holiday Card mailing, but also,
    corrections to the list made by White House employees on White
    House stationery and at government expense were transmitted to
    the Clinton campaign to be used to clean up the campaign
    database.271 The best evidence suggests that the
    number of returned envelopes totaled approximately
    8,000.272 The White House sent the directive to
    Malone, with instructions to use the information gleaned from
    the mailing to clean up the database, with specific instruction
    to drop listings from the database where the envelopes
    reflected insufficient addresses, and where new address
    information had been provided, the new listings ``can be
    updated on the database.'' 273
        That the 1993 information was intentionally used to clean
    the campaign database was known at the highest levels of the
    Clinton-Gore campaign and the White House. Documents attached
    to a March 9, 1998 memorandum from Lyn Utrecht, counsel to the
    Clinton/Gore campaign, to Bruce Lindsey and recovered from
    White House files, make clear that the 1993 White House Holiday
    Card mailing was used to correct addresses in the campaign
    database.274
        There were, in fact, elaborate efforts made in 1993 to get
    the 1993 White House holiday card data not only to the Clinton-
    Gore campaign, but to the DNC. There is evidence that plans
    were underway to send White House lists directly to the DNC.
    The data sought to be transfered under the guise of holiday
    card lists had been compiled by White House employees based
    upon official lists including ``correspondence, event
    attendance lists, outreach lists and other sources. * * *''
    275 The DNC transfer plan was apparently set forth
    in a September 15, 1993 memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Maggie
    Williams, entitled ``Holiday Greeting Cards.'' 276
    Yet this crucial document is inexplicably missing. The White
    House Counsel informed the committee that it has ``not
    located'' a copy of this document.277
        Thereafter, persons in the White House sought to implement
    complex schemes to transfer both campaign lists and White House
    lists to the DNC. Evidence suggests that the first scheme was
    designed to funnel campaign lists (presumably from PeopleBase)
    through the White House and then to the DNC. This scheme would
    have hidden evidence of a direct transfer of campaign data to
    the DNC. While providing such lists may be legal under certain
    circumstances, providing them also triggers reporting
    requirements as well as in-kind contribution limits which could
    have been avoided by sending the data through the White House.
        Whatever the reason, it appears that Cheryl Mills took the
    position that such a transfer scheme was ``impermissible.''
    278 The White House has been unable to ``locate[] a
    written memorialization of the `explanation of the
    impermissibility of a list from campaign to [White House] to
    DNC[,]' '' 279 which presumably would elucidate both
    the details of the scheme and the reasons for opposing it.
        Another effort was made to use an outside entity to funnel
    the data to the DNC. It is not clear whether these efforts were
    designed to funnel the campaign data to the DNC, similar to the
    first scheme, or to funnel the White House data to the DNC, or
    both. In an October 20, 1998 e-mail message from Matthew Moore
    to Cheryl Mills, Moore informed Mills that:

              Dan Burkhardt, in light of your explanation of the
            impermissibility of a list from campaign to WH to DNC,
            inquired as to the permissibility of sending our
            created list to a third party, having the campaign and/
            or transition send similar lists to the same third
            party (for elimination of duplicates on the list and
            creation of a master list), who would then send the
            resultant list to the DNC.
              Again: Campaign/Transition to Joakum Doe to DNC
            parallel to: WH to Joakum Doe to DNC. With all
            resulting list being sent to the DNC.
              Please advise.280

        The committee's efforts to fully understand the specific
    details of this proposal has also been prevented by missing
    records. In response to the committee's request for the
    memorialization of Daniel Burkhardt's inquiry as to the
    permissibility of sending a list to the DNC through third
    parties,281 the White House Counsel's Office
    responded that it has ``not located [such] a written
    memorialization.'' 282 In response to the
    committee's request for Mills's response to the e-mail
    proposal,283 the White House Counsel stated, ``[w]e
    have not located a memorialization of a response to the October
    20, 1993 e-mail from Matthew Moore to Cheryl Mills.''
    284
        However, by October 28, 1993, Cheryl Mills had provided a
    remarkable attempt at ``legal cover'' in the form of a
    memorandum, allowing the transfer of White House data to any
    outside entity, including the DNC. Despite clear pronouncement
    elsewhere that once data is entered into databases in the White
    House, it cannot thereafter be transfered to outside sources,
    here, Mills states:

              Because the White House did not use mailing lists
            created from the official government mail from members
            of the public who wrote to the President (or the First
            Lady or any other White House entity), but rather
            created a list of supporters of the Administration
            based upon personal knowledge of staff members, this
            list properly can be provided to a non-federal entity,
            including the DNC or a non-governmental
            individual.285

        This analysis of what data may be used for the holiday card
    lists sent to the DNC makes no sense. It is simply not credible
    that a list of approximately 43,000 names, with their
    accompanying addresses was ``created * * * based on personal
    knowlege of staff members.'' Indeed, the names are gathered by
    White House personnel in performance of their official duties
    at the White House, and included: 2,500 names of military
    personnel including ``all military assigned to the White
    House;'' 286 the internal White House and taxpayer-
    funded Presidential contact [PCON] database list;
    287 lists of invitees to the White House, the
    diplomatic corps, and the Secret Service.288 It also
    included State Department lists which were provided by ``a
    career person who has background or who has received lists in
    the past.'' 289 Further, Mills herself describes the
    source of this White House data in the very same memo--not as
    coming from the memories of individuals--but from White House
    staff who ``reviewed their correspondence, event attendance
    lists, outreach lists and other sources * * *.'' 290
        In addition, only as recently as August 11, 1993, Cheryl
    Mills had concluded that the very same White House Holiday Card
    list ``was created from the official mail of the President. . .
    .'' 291 Indeed, Mills had been specifically told on
    August 6, 1993 that the White House Holiday Card list ``will
    come from databases within the White House.'' 292
    Yet, less than 3 months later, she authored a memorandum
    purporting to reach the exact opposite conclusion and
    concocting an argument to allow the flow of prohibited data to
    the DNC, and key documents which would reveal the circumstances
    of this remarkable turnaround are inexplicably missing.
        The committee uncovered that the White House staff, under
    the guidance of Cheryl Mills, assembled the 1993 Holiday Card
    list and forwarded it to the operator of PeopleBase, the
    Clinton/Gore campaign database operator, where it was merged
    with the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign lists, cleaned up
    based on the returns after the mailing, and has been retained
    in the Clinton/Gore computer to this day.
        Indeed, the Clinton/Gore campaign is well aware that it has
    this list and has yet to notify the committee of its return to
    the rightful owner, which is the White House, or its
    destruction. As recently as August 21, 1998, Carl Mecum
    analyzed the file, presumably under the direction and with the
    permission of the Clinton/Gore campaign, to prepare the
    affidavit for the record of this investigation. Despite this
    notice of its possession of the lists, as far as the committee
    knows, no steps have been taken to return the government's
    property.
        While the original transfer may constitute a theft of
    government property, the retention of the list knowing it to be
    stolen also constitutes theft under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641. The
    Clinton/Gore campaign, because of the committee's
    investigation, is on notice that the data belongs to the
    government. Accordingly, the continued retention of the list
    constitutes a theft independent of the original theft.

    4. The Names and Addresses from the Official Mail Sent to the President
                         were Transferred to PeopleBase

        While Cheryl Mills's October 28, 1993 memorandum could not
    have been clearer--that data from the official mail could not
    be transmitted to the DNC--the names and addresses of people
    who contacted the President through the official mails or
    through the White House switchboard were routinely referred for
    entry into PeopleBase. Such transfers of official government
    data to the President's campaign database could constitute the
    theft of government property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
        According to an October 17, 1994 memorandum prepared by
    White House staff, ``Quite frequently, the President will ask
    that certain names and addresses be added to the `supporter
    file'. * * * Attached is a list of supporter file information.
    Please make sure all this information is added to the Data Base
    System. Also, can you send this information to Arkansas or do
    you need me to? '' 293
        While the nature and extent of this practice was not fully
    explored, the committee obtained several specific examples of
    lists that were forwarded to PeopleBase from the White House,
    including a January 1996 White House phone log with notations
    in the margin in unidentified handwriting ``PB'' and
    ``WhoDB'',294 and a July 1993 list of addresses with
    a cover note to Monica Breadlove who operated PeopleBase, to
    add the names and addresses on the list to
    PeopleBase.295 It is not clear whether the President
    asked for these lists to be forwarded to PeopleBase or what the
    criteria for directing these particular addresses to PeopleBase
    was. If the the names and addresses were, indeed, from the
    official mails or derived from other official sources, the
    transfer of the data to PeopleBase could be considered a theft.

      D. Marsha Scott Converted Other Government Resources To Benefit the
                 Democratic National Committee and the Campaign

        The committee has uncovered information that government
    personnel and resources were converted to directly benefit
    outside political campaigns. Marsha Scott, in memorandum after
    memorandum, appeared to be advising and/or managing the
    campaign database and/or DNC databases, as well as other DNC
    operations. The knowing use of government computers, paper, and
    other office supplies and resources for the benefit of the DNC
    or the Clinton/Gore campaign constitutes the theft of
    government property. See United States v. Peter Collins, 56
    F.3d 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
        Even if Ms. Scott was permitted to engage in political
    activity on her own time, it is clear that she knowingly and
    wilfully used her White House computer and other office
    equipment and supplies to translate her new-found expertise in
    database development and data management to the benefit of the
    DNC or the President's campaign. This activity is contrary to
    Cheryl Mills's advice and testimony discussed earlier in this
    report that White House staff are prohibited from using White
    House resources to engage in political activity.296
        Marsha Scott's June 28, 1994 memorandum makes clear that
    she was seeking to do just that. As Mr. Shadegg and Ms. Mills
    agreed at the committee hearing on November 7, 1997, Ms. Scott
    used government resources to prepare her memorandum to Harold
    Ickes, Bruce Lindsey, and the First Lady regarding her
    involvement in developing the DNC and other outside databases.
    That in itself is a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
        Both White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff and Ms. Scott in
    her deposition acknowledged that the memorandum dealt with
    working on outside databases.297 Indeed, in Mr.
    Ruff's case, his insistence that these were outside databases
    was intended to clarify that the memorandum was not discussing
    the use of the White House Database to populate other outside
    databases. Thus, to defend Ms. Scott from a charge that she was
    using the White House Database improperly, Mr. Ruff was willing
    to admit, as was she, that she was using other government
    resources to make plans for the DNC and other political
    databases, a violation as well.
        Indeed elsewhere, in Marsha Scott's June 28, 1994
    memorandum to Harold Ickes, Bruce Lindsey and the First Lady,
    Marsha Scott reported having used government resources and
    personnel to work with the DNC on the development of their
    database. She also sought Ickes's, Lindsey's, and Mrs.
    Clinton's intervention to direct the DNC to allow her team of
    government personnel to work with the DNC on its database to
    ensure compatibility with future political databases outside of
    the White House.

        My team and I are also engaged in conversations with the
    DNC about the new system they are proposing. We have asked that
    their system be modeled after whatever system we decide to use
    outside the White House. I need you to make very clear to them
    that their system must be technologically compatible, if not
    the same, as whatever system we decide to use for political
    purposes later on. These discussions are currently in progress
    and a clear direction from you to the DNC will eliminate much
    unnecessary wrangling.

               *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        * * * [L]et my team work with the DNC to help them design a
    system that will meet our needs and technical specifications.
    We can show them what to do and then clone another system for
    our specific uses later on. Any information stored in
    PeopleBase could then be dumped into the new system and made
    available * * * for political purposes.

               *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        * * * I am proceeding as if this is the plan.298

        The ``team'' to which Scott referred was composed of White
    House personnel, including career personnel who thought they
    were performing only official government services with respect
    to all aspects of their database work with Marsha
    Scott.299
        Indeed, career employees were sent to the DNC by White
    House officials. One career employee testified that ``[I]t just
    didn't look right for us to go to the DNC. We were Federal
    employees * * * [M]y entire team was questioning us going to
    the DNC when we went, yes * * *,'' until his career supervisors
    put a stop to any further visits.300 He further
    testified that ``[W]hen we visited the DNC there was some
    discussion about being able to swap systems and information and
    things like that; but that was brought to a
    halt''.301
        Other career employees testified that members of the WhoDB
    team had been sent to the DNC for yet another meeting. While at
    the DNC, the team was contacted by beeper, and ordered back to
    the White House.302 A career employee who was sent
    and then ordered back explained ``The sense was that it wasn't
    appropriate for Federal employees to have direct contact with
    DNC''.303
        The White House Counsel's Office would later make
    extraordinary and elaborate attempts to cloak the diversion of
    official personnel and resources to political activity as being
    permitted by the Hatch Act. There is no doubt, but that certain
    White House officials may, in appropriate circumstances, engage
    in partisan political activities on their own time. However,
    while individuals are free to voluntarily engage in certain
    partisan political activities, the law does not sanction White
    House employers directing individuals to perform political work
    without their knowledge or consent. That is a diversion of
    official government resources, which is unlawful.
        In addition, the committee uncovered the fact that much of
    the work on database development, which the White House later
    sought to characterize as work on campaign databases, had
    involved government resources, including White House
    stationery, fax machines, et cetera, for which, as far as we
    have been able to determine, there has been no reimbursement
    from any campaign or party entity. The record is unmistakable
    that in the Clinton White House, the lines between official and
    partisan political acts were so blurred as to be non-existent.
    This led White House staff to involve themselves in political
    activity using government resources in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    Sec. 641.
        Beyond that, the efforts to label certain database work as
    campaign-related, was an after-the-fact attempt to justify the
    nonproduction of records related to the official White House
    Database. Those records make clear that persons at the highest
    levels of the White House, including the First Lady, knew of
    the use of official government resources for partisan campaign
    activities 304 in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
        The crucial June 28, 1994 memorandum from Marsha Scott to
    Harold Ickes, Bruce Lindsey, and the First Lady, was itself
    written on official White House stationery and prepared on
    government-owned word processor equipment and systems. It
    conveyed and update not only on the White House Database
    project, but a report of the White House Database team, (whom
    Scott referred to as ``my staff'') and its trip to Arkadelphia
    to review the PeopleBase system. The memorandum further
    provides an update on the implementation of the White House
    Database,

              By the first of the year [1995] we should have any
            flaws identified and corrected and the majority of the
            White House using the new system. We will then have a
            year [until 1996] to fully train and familiarize our
            folks to its many possibilities and uses.\305\

        After reviewing this memorandum, the First Lady responded:
    ``This sounds promising. Please advise. HRC''--and directed the
    memo, along with the notation to Harold Ickes.\306\ This is
    indeed a remarkable memorandum. It reveals that persons at the
    highest levels of the WhiteHouse, including the First Lady,
    knew of, and approved the planned use of the White House Database for
    partisan political purposes, or the use of government personnel and
    resources to work on outside partisan political databases. Either
    scenario is simply unlawful, and represents a planned theft of
    government property for partisan political activities.
        Further, the committee's investigation uncovered the
    significance of Marsha Scott's proposal to use government
    personnel to set up an outside database for future political
    purposes into which ``any information stored with PeopleBase
    could then be dumped.'' The evidence obtained by the committee
    shows that by June 28, 1994 the ``information stored with
    PeopleBase'' included over 40,000 names and accompanying data
    from White House computers.307 The committee found
    that the unlawfully transfered data ended up in the Clinton-
    Gore `96 campaign computer.308
        The many other memoranda written by Ms. Scott to her
    superiors regarding her political activity equally reflect a
    diversion of government resources to the benefit of the DNC and
    the campaign. In addition to her June 28, 1994 memorandum, Ms.
    Scott wrote to Harold Ickes regarding ``DATABASE OUTSIDE WHITE
    HOUSE.'' 309 On January 26, 1994, she had written a
    ``CONFIDENTIAL'' memorandum to Hillary Rodham Clinton and Bruce
    Lindsey outlining plans to use White House resources and
    personnel to clean up and correct campaign lists for future
    campaign use:
    Status of Outside Databases

               *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        Another way we can insure accuracy, is by providing
    corrections to any data sent to us. As long as we are not
    giving ``updated or supplemental information about data the
    entity may have initially provided'', we can correct ``where
    the action is de minimis.'' (See Cheryl's [Mills] memo attached
    for a full explanation.) I will work with Cheryl on a case by
    case basis and am anxious to discuss this with you
    further.310

    As with other documents, the White House Counsel sought to
    conceal this very information from the committee by altering
    documents to delete the information reflecting work on outside
    political databases.311 Another draft of notes or an
    agenda for a meeting with the First Lady and Deputy Chiefs of
    Staff Phil Lader and Harold Ickes references ``Systems outside
    White House,'' ``Database for campaign use,'' and ``resources
    available to fund outside databases.312
        It is apparent that these kinds of notes and memos finally
    were enough for Harold Ickes. In a note dated December 5, 1994,
    he was reminded of a scheduled meeting with Marsha Scott in
    which he was ``supposed to be getting her clear on what she
    will be doing and what she will not be doing.'' 313
    The note further exposes exasperation with Marsha Scott's
    communications: ``As you know, until you have this
    conversation, you will continue to get memos from her and
    copies of memos she is sending around to different people * *
    *.'' 314
        Ultimately, in May 1996, the President approved a new job
    description for Marsha Scott, prepared mostly by Deputy Chiefs
    of Staff Evelyn Lieberman and Harold Ickes, expressly
    authorizing Marsha Scott to involve the President's supporters
    in fundraising from her government position and purporting to
    limit her access to the White House Database to uses that were
    ``only in connection with her official duties.'' 315
    However, those official duties, according to the same memo,
    included fundraising. The use of the Database for fundraising
    constitutes theft of the data for the DNC's use.
        In his deposition, Harold Ickes described Marsha Scott's
    views of her responsibilities as ``expansive.'' 316
    When asked whether he ever expressed concern to Marsha Scott
    about this view of her responsibilities, he said, ``No. Well,
    the answer is, I didn't worry about it, because I knew that
    this was--if it were going to go anywhere, it would have to
    come back up through me, and I had no problem with her writing
    memos about it.'' 317 Ickes also testified that he
    did not concern himself with Marsha Scott's June 28, 1994
    memorandum regarding plans to develop a new DNC database
    because ``I don't think [the DNC] had the money at that time to
    even think about a new computer system. They were lucky to turn
    on the electricity of the one they had.'' 318 He
    further added: ``I knew what the financial situation of the DNC
    was. They had a database that had been there for years. They
    hardly had the money to turn on the damn database, much less
    establish a new one, so this sort of stuff didn't worry me.''
    319
        This testimony demonstrates that Harold Ickes knew that
    Marsha Scott was using an ``overexpansive'' view of her
    responsibilities to work on the development of DNC databases at
    a time when the DNC had no money to do it itself. Without DNC
    financial capability, it was even more important that White
    House staff, such as Marsha Scott, conduct as much development
    and planning activity as possible from a position where the DNC
    would not have to pay her. Ickes knowingly continued to allow
    the diversion of government resources to the DNC at a time when
    he also knew that the DNC itself lacked resources. Thus, at the
    taxpayers expense, Marsha Scott was allowed to plan databases
    for the DNC.

     IV. THE PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY KNEW OF THE CONVERSION OF GOVERNMENT
                 RESOURCES TO BENEFIT THE DNC AND THE CAMPAIGN

              ``The President and the First Lady want this done.
            Translating this into action on the part of others is
            the rub.'' 320

        This statement, included in a memorandum from Marsha Scott
    to the First Lady and Bruce Lindsey, describes the essence of
    the President's and First Lady's involvement in the White House
    Database project. This and other documents and testimony
    showing that thePresident and the First Lady were informed of
    the use of official resources for unofficial political purposes suggest
    that the President and the First Lady were aware of the conversion of
    government resources to support the DNC and the campaign. See Section
    III.A and III.D (regarding Scott's conversion of government resources
    for political purposes).
        The committee believes that the President's involvement in
    the conversion of the White House into a fundraising tool
    represents an abuse of power. The President is entrusted with
    the conservation of the White House as a national landmark. The
    scheme to transfer data from the White House Database and other
    data sources supported the overall objective of systematically
    using White House invitations to accomplish political
    fundraising goals. The committee has issued this report to
    expose the evidence of this abuse of power.
        The documents plainly show that the President and the First
    Lady jointly directed the use of official resources to create
    the Database, with Marsha Scott in charge. Even after the
    initiation of the project, the President and First Lady
    remained deeply involved in the ongoing development and use of
    the Database. In this regard, the First Lady's actions with
    respect to the Database and the conversion of other official
    resources should be viewed as the President's.
        The evidence suggests that the President and the First Lady
    were involved in the enhancement of the DNC fundraising
    operation through the use of White House staff and resources,
    including the White House Database. See Section III.B
    (regarding the conversion of data from the White House Database
    to the use of DNC fundraisers). While having an official
    purpose, the White House Database was susceptible to being used
    for both official and unofficial purposes. The President and
    the First Lady capitalized on the Database's susceptibility to
    misuse for political purposes. The White House Database
    included financial information, 321 which allowed
    internal decisions on invitations to White House events to be
    determined by the degree of financial support given by
    potential invitees. The President's and First Lady's
    involvement in the details of the Database suggest that they
    knew what a powerful tool the Database would be not only for
    internal data management, but also for working with the DNC and
    the campaign to upgrade their data and data management systems.
        The DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign also benefitted from
    the President's and First Lady's knowledge and approval of the
    use of official resources, in addition to the Database, for
    unofficial purposes. The connection between the conversion of
    the White House Database and the conversion of other resources
    is reflected in the memoranda that address the internal data
    needs of the White House while at the same time seeking to
    address the database needs of the DNC and the campaign. Indeed,
    those sections of documents that addressed the issues of
    management of the DNC were originally withheld from the
    committee to conceal the relationship between the White House
    Database and the other efforts to use official resources for
    political purposes.

    A. Evidence Relating to the President's and First Lady's Knowledge of,
    Approval of, and Involvement in the Conversion of Resources, Including
             the White House Database, to the DNC and the Campaign

        Several documents produced to the committee reflect the
    President's and First Lady's knowledge, approval, and
    involvement in the conversion of government resources,
    including the White House Database, to the DNC and the
    campaign.

    1. The President Wanted to ``Integrate'' the White House Database with
       the DNC Database: Handwritten Notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to
              Deputy Chief of Staff, Erskine Bowles 322

        The handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to then-
    Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles, express most clearly the
    President's involvement in efforts to convert the White House
    Database to the use of the DNC. These notes, written in late
    1994 or 1995,323 expressly say that the President
    wants to ``integrate'' the White House Database with the DNC
    database to ``share'' data.324 Associate Counsel
    Cheryl Mills had opined that once data is entered in an
    official government database, sharing it with anyone for
    political purposes violates the law.325 The
    President's interest in sharing data with the DNC suggests that
    the President was willing to convert the White House Database
    to the use of the DNC in violation of clear White House legal
    advice and in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641, which prohibits
    the theft of government property.
        The withholding of this document by Cheryl Mills herself
    further corroborates that the President was interested in
    illegally integrating the Database. As discussed in Section II,
    there would be no reason to withhold this document, which was
    obviously responsive to the committee's request, unless it
    implicated the President in wrongdoing.

      2. Conversion of White House Resources ``Sounds Promising'' to The
    First Lady: June 28, 1994 Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes
        and Bruce Lindsey, with a copy to the First Lady 326

        In her June 28, 1994 memorandum, Marsha Scott communicated
    to the First Lady her interest in and efforts to develop
    databases for the DNC or ``other entities we choose to work
    with for political purposes later on.'' 327 The
    First Lady responded to this memo with a handwritten comment at
    the top of the page: ``This sounds promising. Please advise.''
    328 This memorandum shows that the First Lady was
    informed of this conversion of government staff and other
    resources for political purposes and even found it a
    ``promising'' project.
        As with the Bailey handwritten notes, the deliberate
    withholding of a version of this document (which is in itself a
    criminal violation) corroborates its incriminating content.
    This evidence is particularly strong corroboration because the
    document was withheld, again by Cheryl Mills, who had provided
    advice through three separate memos to White House staff that
    such work using government resources was prohibited by law.
    Cheryl Mills knew that this memorandum implicated the First
    Lady in Marsha Scott's conversion of government property and
    withheld it for that reason. See Section II.E.

     3. The President Recreates the Campaign: Draft Memorandum to Chief of
                    Staff on Early Supporters 329

        ``This is the President's idea and it's a good one,''
    announces a memorandum, which was originally produced to the
    committee in draft and was written by Marsha Scott for White
    House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty.330 This draft
    memo reveals a plan to: ``reach[] out to [the President's]
    friends and supporters * * *; identify and contact the key
    early supporters in all fifty states * * *; put in WhoDB the
    names and relevant information about those early supporters * *
    *; [and] add to this base group by early 1995, those folks we
    will be working with in 1996.'' 331
        The draft further outlines the plan to use the White House
    Database to ``recreate the Primary campaign structure * * *;
    establish a database to hold and work these names. (WhoDB will
    be fully functional by January [1995] * * *; recreate the
    General campaign structure using the same method we employed
    for recreating the Primary * * *[,] add[ing] the DNC and
    campaign records * * *; identify by early 1995, key financial
    and political folks in each state who can work with us'' with
    the expectation that ``[t]hrough consistent dialogue and
    follow-up, leaders will emerge'' to allow ``[c]o-ordinat[ion]
    with DNC and DLC about what they are doing for these folks.''
    332

          4. The President Approved the White House Database: ``WhoDB
                      Requirements Report'' 333

        The WhoDB Requirements Report expressly set forth the early
    history of the project. It stated: ``The President and First
    Lady have requested from Marsha Scott that a resource database
    containing relevant information about all White House events
    and contacts be designed and implemented.'' 334 That
    document further stated that the objectives of the Database
    would be to ``[p]rovide the President and the First Lady with a
    database that tracks all contacts with individuals and
    organizations that are important to the Presidency.''
    335
        The knowledge and involvement of the President and the
    First Lady in directing the creation of the White House
    Database suggests that they had a particular interest in the
    Database project, such as the possible political uses of
    databases, with which they were familiar from their use of the
    campaign database, PeopleBase. Moreover, the potential for
    conversion of the White House Database to political purposes
    was enhanced by choosing Marsha Scott, a long-time friend of
    the President who was involved in other schemes to convert
    government resources for unofficial political purposes. This
    document is also consistent with numerous other memoranda that
    invoke the President's and First Lady's names for the Database
    project.336

      5. WhoDB Was Intended to Support the Fundraising Objectives of the
      President and the First Lady: October 25, 1994 Draft Memorandum to
        Erskine Bowles from Paul Antony and Brian Bailey 337

        The draft October 25, 1994 memorandum from Paul Antony and
    Brian Bailey to Erskine Bowles, ``Update on White House
    Database Project,'' confirms that the President and the First
    Lady thought that the Database would be a useful tool to track
    events and contributions. The memo expressly states under the
    heading ``WILL IT MEET THE NEEDS OF POTUS AND THE FIRST LADY?''
    that those needs include ``keep[ing] accurate records of
    individuals' dealings with the White House (invitations,
    contributions, meetings) * * *'' 338 The answer was
    ``YES?'' 339
        Clearly, this memo indicates that the President wanted the
    Database to be able to correlate contributions, invitations to,
    and attendance at events and so-called ``meetings.'' This
    document reflects the contemporaneous communication to Brian
    Bailey (an assistant to then-Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine
    Bowles) by Marsha Scott, regarding what needs the First Lady
    expressed regarding the Database--that is, to track
    ``invitations, contributions, and meetings.'' 340 At
    the time Brian Bailey wrote this memorandum, he had been in the
    White House only a few weeks 341 and had no reason
    not to write down what he was told about needs for the
    Database. Although he testified that he consulted with Cheryl
    Mills frequently, he could not remember whether he had spoken
    with her prior to the drafting of this
    memorandum.342
        The final database that was created, in fact, met, the
    President's and the First Lady's needs. It included
    designations of contributors, such as DNC Trustee or DNC
    Managing Trustee,343 which correspond to specific
    dollar contributions. Not only were the designations within the
    Database useful for the President and First Lady to identify
    donors for invitations, the committee now knows that DNC
    fundraisers matched up their contributor information with WhoDB
    attendance information (see Section III.B) to appropriately
    reward donors. The combined efforts of the DNC and the White
    House most effectively and efficiently ensured the maximization
    of fundraising by matching DNC data on donors and White House
    data on attendance. This document indicates that these
    functions were designed to meet a ``need'' of the President to
    have such information.

     6. The First Lady Received a Demonstration of the Database and Asked
    for a Specific List to be Included: March 2, 1995 Memorandum from Erich
                      Vaden to Marsha Scott 344

        On March 2, 1995, Erich Vaden wrote a memorandum to Marsha
    Scott that reflected that he had given the First Lady a
    demonstration of the Database. From that demonstration, the
    First Lady asked that a specific list, the ``Miles Rubin Rapid
    Response List,'' be included in the Database.345
    This memorandum shows the substantial involvement of the First
    Lady in the details of this Database in that (1) she wanted a
    demonstration and (2) she wanted a particular list added to the
    Database.
        Moreover, at the same time as she was asking for data to be
    put into the Database, others were devising a plan to send data
    to the DNC from the Database. Just a few weeks later, Truman
    Arnold and Erskine Bowles met to devise the plan for the White
    House to share data with the DNC (see III.B.2). This plan set
    forth an illegal scheme to convert official resources (the
    Database and White House personnel) to implement fundraising
    based on meetings and contact with the President through such
    activities as coffees, overnights in the Lincoln Bedroom, and
    invitations to White House events.

     7. The President Regularly Views Data and Places ``High Priority'' on
     Data Clean-up: March 28, 1995 Memorandum [for multiple distribution]
       from Erskine Bowles, ``Clean-up and Coding of Database Records''
                                 346

        Indeed, 4 days after the meeting between Erskine Bowles and
    Truman Arnold, Erskine Bowles wrote a memorandum to various
    White House staff asking them to verify the data in the
    Database.347 The memorandum stated that the new
    Database would ``speed up the list creation process by giving
    us the ability to identify and target individuals.''
    348 It further represented that ``The President and
    First Lady will view this information on a regular basis.''
    349 In addition, the memorandum stated: ``This
    clean-up project is one of the highest priorities for the
    President and your office should treat it as such.''
    350
        The new Database would in fact speed up the list creation
    process because it would allow the DNC to identify more readily
    those donors who were due for invitations to the White House.
    Because of the commitment to supply data to the DNC, it was
    important to clean up the data. It is logical to conclude that
    the President placed a high priority on the data because of the
    enhanced role of White House invitations in the DNC fundraising
    plan.
        Identifying the appropriate people in the Database for
    White House invitations took on new importance at this time. In
    March of 1995, the President was attempting to raise millions
    of dollars from Democrat party supporters to counter the
    Republican electoral gains the previous November. In January,
    he had personally authorized the use of overnight stays to
    raise money, asking for ``names at 100,000 or more, 50,000 or
    more'' and noting in his own handwriting that he was ``ready to
    start the overnights right away.'' 351 Logically, a
    President so personally involved in fundraising (and using
    White House invitations to do it) needed access to the right
    kind of data to make his efforts successful.

     8. The President Signs Off on Official Fundraising Job: The May 1996
                  Marsha Scott Job Description 352

        In May 1996, the President approved a job description for
    Marsha Scott. That description included: ``insur[ing] that the
    President's supporters were involved in fundraising activities
    to the extent possible'' and ``attend[ing] political
    fundraising coffee/events, and certain other events * * *''
    353 The description also stated that Scott will
    ``have appropriate access to the White House database [sic] but
    only in connection with her official duties.'' 354
    According to the documents produced regarding this description,
    the President asked to ``discuss once more'' the description
    with Harold Ickes 355 and approved it only after the
    discussion (``okay, per our discussion'').356
        It is not clear what official function is fulfilled by
    Marsha Scott's efforts to involve supporters in fundraising and
    attending fundraisers. However, the committee regards the
    disclaimer of use of the White House Database ``only in
    connection with her official duties'' to be nothing but boiler
    plate language with little or no meaning in this context. Here,
    the President approved a job description that included as an
    ``official duty'' the involvement of others in fundraisers. By
    including that definition within the definition of official
    responsibilities, the President essentially gave a license to
    use the White House Database for Marsha Scott's work involving
    fundraisers.

     9. The First Lady was Aware of Marsha Scott's Transfer of White House
     Data from the White House Database to the Campaign, the Conversion of
       Government Resources for the DNC, and The Political Nature of the
      Database: January 26, 1994 Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary
                Rodham Clinton and Bruce Lindsey 357

        On January 26, 1994, Marsha Scott prepared a memorandum
    detailing proposals to help clean up data in the campaign
    database and at the DNC. Marsha Scott informed the First Lady
    that she was working to clean up the campaign data from the
    campaign database by ``providing corrections to any data sent
    to us.'' 358 Not only was Marsha Scott's use of
    government resources to work on the outside resources a
    conversion of government property; making corrections to the
    data of others using White House data was also a conversion.
                a. Transfer of data through providing corrections to the
                        Campaign
        In this memorandum, Marsha Scott communicates to the First
    Lady about her efforts to convert government data to the
    campaign. The memorandum states that the White House staff can
    ensure the accuracy of data ``by providing corrections to any
    data sent to us.'' 359 In her deposition, she
    insisted that this was permissible regardless of the quantity
    of data.360 But the corrections to PeopleBase
    enhanced the value of the list that was ultimately delivered to
    the 1996 Clinton/Gore campaign.361
        The view that address corrections were of ``de minimis''
    value is preposterous. The entire value of a list of names and
    addresses is derived from its accuracy. To correct a list of
    thousands of names, even if each correction is minor, adds
    significant value to that list. If that correction is taken
    from a White House data source, it is a theft of government
    property. Yet, this memorandum expressly explains to the First
    Lady how government property can be stolen.
                b. Conversion of government resources for the DNC and the
                        Clinton/Gore campaign
        This memorandum to the First Lady is one of several
    memoranda to the First Lady and others prepared by Marsha Scott
    reflecting her involvement in the conversion of government
    resources to benefit the DNC and the campaign.362
    These memos reflect her systematic use of her time and other
    government resources to improve the data at the DNC and the
    campaign. In her deposition, Scott admitted that, like the June
    28, 1994 memorandum, this memorandum was written on a White
    House computer and on White House stationery.363 As
    discussed in section III.D, this use of government resources to
    benefit the DNC and the Clinton campaign represents a theft of
    government property, even if White House staff are permitted to
    use their time to engage in political activity at the White
    House. There is no evidence that the First Lady, Harold Ickes
    (who was the recipient of most of these memos), or anyone else
    did anything to stop it.
        Further evidence of the incriminating nature of the
    portions of this document dealing with the outside databases
    includes the fact that White House Counsel Jack Quinn, with the
    involvement of Cheryl Mills, originally produced this
    memorandum without any of the information regarding outside
    databases.364 The committee views this as an attempt
    to conceal incriminating information from the committee. Cheryl
    Mills, who had prepared three memoranda on the scope of
    permissible political activity, withheld those portions of the
    documents because she knew that the information withheld would
    expose that the First Lady had been informed of Marsha Scott's
    impermissible political activities.
                c. The Database as a political project
        Marsha Scott communicated in this memorandum to the First
    Lady her view that the White House Database was a political
    project. She identified a career employee on her team as a
    ``closet Democrat,'' explained that his work on the Database
    was kept secret, and complained about the other career staff's
    lack of loyalty to the President.365 She wrote that
    she found ``an inherent conflict in having our entire
    information management system developed and supervised by
    people who do not know and may not support the President.''
    366 She later sent a memorandum to Deputy Chief of
    Staff Phil Lader complaining about the allegiance of the career
    technical staff.367 All of these steps suggest that
    the Database was more than just a White House management tool--
    it required political loyalty and secrecy.

            B. The Contemporaneous Documentary Evidence Is Credible

        The contemporaneous documentary evidence, suggesting that
    the President and the First Lady knew of, approved of, and
    continued to be involved in the conversion of White House
    resources to the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign, is very
    credible. These documents represent the best evidence of the
    real thoughts and actions of individuals at the time, and they
    are supported by credible testimony.
        In one case, although Marsha Scott testified that she has
    ``no memory of a conversation with the President'' regarding
    the Database other than a passing remark that she made to him
    that she was ``'working on something to get a social system
    up,'' 368 nevertheless, admitting that she had read
    the WhoDB Requirements Report,369 she did not change
    its text about the President and First Lady's involvement. This
    suggests that, at the time, she viewed it as accurate.
        In addition, there is no reason to discount invocations of
    the President's name in these documents. Marsha Scott, who had
    known the President for many years and appears to have frequent
    access to the President, made these invocations. Further, she
    made them to persons at the highest levels of the White House--
    persons who would have reason to know if the invocations were
    not accurate, including White House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty
    and Deputy Counsel to the President Bruce Lindsey.
        Moreover, one making false invocations is not likely to do
    so to the very person whose name one is invoking. However, that
    is exactly what Marsha Scott did. In her January 26, 1994
    memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
    Bruce Lindsey, Scott states ``The President and the First Lady
    want this done. Translating this into action on the part of
    others is the rub.'' 370
        Finally, Jerry Carlsen, a career employee of the Office of
    Administration, and Manager of the Systems Integration and
    Development Branch of the Office of Information Systems and
    Technology who was asked to lead the White House Database
    development team, testified that Marsha Scott told him that the
    Database was a top priority for the President.371 He
    further testified that he had never heard the President's
    authority invoked with respect to another project at the White
    House.372
        The President and the First Lady clearly involved
    themselves more deeply in projects like the White House data
    management systems than other Presidents and First Ladies. Of
    course, they recognized that the Database had a value greater
    than just running an efficient White House, such as the value
    of using the Database for other unofficial political purposes.
    The clear involvement in the development of the Database, the
    President's desire to integrate the White House Database with
    the DNC database, and the circumstances surrounding the
    distribution of data from the Database (see Section III.B) are
    compelling evidence that the President and First Lady planned
    and carried out those plans to develop a database that could
    be, and was, used for unofficial political purposes.
        The President's encouragement of sharing official
    resources, such as the White House Database, to benefit the
    DNC, seconded by his agent, the First Lady, in her support for
    the development of outside databases referenced in the June 28,
    1994 memo, plainly represents the dedication of White House
    resources to unofficial political activity. There is simply no
    evidence that the President or the First Lady, having been
    informed of these activities using White House property, ever
    did anything to stop them.

                                 V. CONCLUSIONS

        The committee has obtained evidence that (1) Deputy Counsel
    to the President Cheryl Mills perjured herself and obstructed
    the investigation to prevent Congress and the American public
    from finding out that the President and the First Lady were
    involved in the unlawful conversion of government property; (2)
    the President and the First Lady were involved in the unlawful
    conversion of government property to the use of the DNC and the
    Clinton/Gore campaign; and (3) numerous other individuals,
    including Truman Arnold, Erskine Bowles, and Marsha Scott were
    also involved in the unlawful conversion of government property
    to the use of the DNC and the campaign through the diversion of
    data and resources.

                             VI. RULES REQUIREMENTS

                          A. Committee Action and Vote

        Pursuant to clause 2(l)(2) (A) and (B) of House Rule XI, a
    majority of the Committee having been present, the report was
    approved by a vote of 7 ayes to 3 nays.

        B. Statement of Committee Oversight Findings and Recommendations

        Pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of House Rule XI and clause
    2(b)(1) of House Rule X, the findings and recommendations of
    the committee are contained in the foregoing sections of this
    report.

             C. Statement on New Budget Authority and Related Items

        Pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(B) of House Rule XI and Section
    308(a)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the
    committee finds that no new budget authority, new spending
    authority, new credit authority, or an increase or decrease in
    revenues or tax expenditures result from approval of this
    report.

                D. Statement of CBO Cost Estimate and Comparison

        Pursuant to House Rule XI(2)(l)(3)(C) and Section 403(a) of
    the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the committee finds that
    a statement of Congressional Budget Office cost estimate is not
    required as this report is not of a public character.

                    E. Statement of Constitutional Authority

        Pursuant to House Rule XI(2)(l)(4), the committee finds
    that a statement of constitutional authority to approve the
    report is not required as this report is not of a public
    character.

                           F. Changes in Existing Law

        Pursuant to House Rule XIII(3), the committee finds that a
    statement of changes in existing law is not necessary, as the
    report does not alter existing law.

                    G. Statement of Committee Cost Estimate

        Pursuant to House Rule XIII(7)(a), the committee finds that
    a statement of committee cost estimate is not necessary as the
    report is not of a public character.

                        H. Statement of Federal Mandates

        Pursuant to the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and Section
    423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the committee
    finds that a statement of Federal mandates is not necessary as
    this report is not of a public character.

                                    ENDNOTES

        1. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to Deputy Chief of
    Staff Erskine Bowles, undated, White House document production Bates
    Stamp No. M 033298. (Hereinafter, document numbers preceded by ``M'' or
    ``EOP'' indicate White House documents.)
        2. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and
    Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New
    Database,'' June 28, 1994, M 32433-32434.
        3. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and
    Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New
    Database,'' June 28, 1994, (copy inscribed with handwritten notes of
    the First Lady) M 32438-32439.
        4. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, undated
    (computer archive date February 11, 1995), M 33054-33057; Memorandum
    from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, M
    32457-32461 (unredacted copy).
        5. The scope of the committee's investigation is set forth in the
    July 17, 1997 referral from the chairman of the House Committee on
    Government Reform and Oversight, which provides in pertinent part:

              [T]he content of the WhoDB and any other database and
            comparable information repository; its purposes and uses, both
            planned and implemented; the planning, creation, design,
            implementation, management of the same; the sources of
            information that were used, planned or contemplated to be used
            to populate the same; the use and dissemination of any
            information at any time contained in any such repository to any
            person or entity; the use of government time and resources in
            any of these matters; the knowledge, direction, encouragement,
            assistance or acquiescence of any person with respect to any of
            these matters; and any matter that might reasonably lead to the
            production of relevant evidence concerning these matters.
              In addition, the Subcommittee should investigate any attempt,
            plan, scheme, or other action which would impede or prevent a
            thorough investigation of these matters, including, but not
            limited to, nonresponsive or misleading answers, evasive acts,
            attempts at delay, or unsupported claims of privilege.

    Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform and
    Oversight, to David M. McIntosh, chairman, Subcommittee on National
    Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, July 17,
    1997, (Hereinafter, letters to or from the subcommittee chairman shall
    be designated as letters to or from ``Chairman McIntosh.'')
        6. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the
    President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President and
    Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages, Jan. 17, 1994, M
    24918-24920 (citing 5 CFR Sec. 2635.704) (emphasis added). 5 CFR
    Sec. 2635.704 provides, in pertinent part:

              (a) Standard. An employee has a duty to protect and conserve
            Government property and shall not use such property, or allow
            its use, for other than authorized purposes.
              (b) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
                      (1) Government property includes any form of real or
                    personal property in which the Government has an
                    ownership . . . or other property interest as well as
                    any right or other intangible interest that is
                    purchased with Government funds, including the services
                    of contractor personnel. The term includes . . .
                    automated data processing capabilities . . . [and]
                    Government records.
                      (2) Authorized purposes are those purposes for which
                    Government property is made available to members of the
                    public or those purposes authorized in accordance with
                    law or regulation.
    See also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641, which provides in pertinent part:
              Whoever embezzles, steal, purloins, or knowingly converts to
            his use or the use of another, or without authority . . .
            conveys or disposes of any record, . . . or thing of value of
            the United States or of any department or agency thereof . . .;
            or
              Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent
            to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been
            embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted--
              Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
            ten years, or both. . . .
    Id. (emphasis added).
        7. David Watkins, ``Briefing Paper on Databases--Eyes Only,'' Jan.
    31, 1994, M 32467-32472.
        8. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
    McIntosh, June 28, 1996 (emphasis added).
        9. Committee deposition of Richard Sullivan, Oct. 22, 1997, p. 17.
        10. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, undated, M 033298 (all
    capitals in original).
        11. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, Oct. 28, 1997.
        12. Id.
        13. Id.
        14. Id.
        15. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and
    Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), June 28, 1994, M 32433-32434.
        16. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 27, 1997.
        17. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings
    Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th
    Cong., 1st sess., p. 240 (1997) (testimony of Charles F.C. Ruff,
    Counsel to the President).
        18. Letter from the majority members of the Subcommittee on
    National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs to
    President William J. Clinton, Aug. 2, 1996.
        19. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, undated, M 033298.
        20. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and
    Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), June 28, 1994, M 32433-32434.
        21. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and
    Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), June 28, 1994, M 32438-32439 (copy
    inscribed with handwritten notes of the First Lady).
        22. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, Mar. 6, 1997.
        23. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, Oct. 28, 1997.
        24. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings
    Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th
    Cong., 1st sess., p. 115 (1997) (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy
    Counsel to the President).
        25. Id. p. 241.
        26. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the
    President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President, Jan. 17,
    1994, M 24918-24920.
        27. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings
    Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th
    Cong., 1st sess., p. 241 (1997) (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy
    Counsel to the President).
        28. Id.
        29. Committee deposition of Brian Bailey, Feb. 6, 1998, p. 135.
        30. White House Compliance with Committee Subpoenas: Hearings
    before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th
    Cong., 1st sess., p. 240 (1997) (testimony of Charles F.C. Ruff,
    Counsel to the President).
        31. Committee deposition of Marsha Scott, Feb. 19, 1998, pp. 90-91.
        32. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Cheryl [Mills], Dec. 16, 1993,
    M 25101.
        33. Committee deposition of Marsha Scott, Feb. 18, 1998, p. 84.
        34. Id. p. 89.
        35. Committee deposition of Erich Vaden, Jan. 25, 1998, p. 258.
        36. Id.
        37. Id. p. 260.
        38. Id. pp. 25-27, 34, 81, 98-99.
        39. Committee deposition of Laura Tayman, Mar. 20, 1998, p. 136.
        40. Id. pp. 122-124.
        41. Id. pp. 50-51.
        42. Vaden deposition, pp. 144-145.
        43. Committee deposition of Mark Bartholomew, Aug. 15, 1997, p. 73.
        44. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, Oct. 28, 1997.
        45. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings
    Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th
    Cong., 1st sess., pp. 114-115 (1997) (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy
    Counsel to the President).
        46. Id. p. 133.
        47. Id. pp. 248, 265.
        48. See, e.g., Guy Gugliotta, ``Lawmaker Suggests Obstruction in
    Late Delivery of Memo on White House Database,'' the Washington Post,
    Friday, Oct. 31, 1997, p. A8; Jeanne Cummings, ``White House Retained
    Memo on Database,'' the Wall Street Journal, Friday, Nov. 7, 1997, p.
    A4; Larry Margasak, ``Committee Chairman Warns White House Lawyers on
    Delays,'' Associated Press, Nov. 6, 1997; John Solomon, ``Withheld
    Documents Say President Wanted Database to Share With DNC,'' Associated
    Press, Oct. 30, 1997.
        49. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, May 22, 1997.
        50. Memorandum from Bernard W. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President,
    and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to White House
    Staff, July 12, 1993, M 033320-033330; Memorandum from Lloyd Cutler,
    Special Counsel to the President, and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel
    to the President, to Executive Office of the President Staff, Apr. 6,
    1994, M 033331-033342; Memorandum from Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the
    President, and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to
    Executive Office of the President Staff, Oct. 12, 1994, M 033343-
    033355.
        51. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings
    Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th
    Cong., 1st sess., p. 241 (1997) (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy
    Counsel to the President) (emphasis added).
        52. Id. (statement of Representative Shadegg).
        53. Id. (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy Counsel to the
    President).
        54. Scott deposition, Feb. 19, 1998, pp. 93-94.
        55. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, undated
    (computer archive date Feb. 11, 1995), M 33054-33057 (emphasis added).
        56. Id.
        57. Id.
        58. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold
    Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, M 32457-32461 (unredacted copy).
        59. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold
    Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, M 25673-25677 (redacted copy).
        60. Scott deposition, Feb. 18, 1998, pp. 144-146.
        61. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
    McIntosh, June 28, 1996 (emphasis added).
        62. ``Fund-Raisers' Use of White House Database Reported,'' Los
    Angeles Times, Thursday, Jan. 30, 1997, p. A1.
        63. White House Press Briefing by Mike McCurry and Barry Toiv, Jan.
    30, 1997 (12:45 p.m. EST), transcript, p. 9 (emphasis added)
    (hereinafter ``White House Press Briefing'').
        64. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
    McIntosh, June 28, 1996 (``The database is for White House use only; we
    prohibit distribution to outside entities or political organizations--
    including the Democratic National Committee.'') (emphasis added).
        65. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
    President, Oct. 3, 1996, response to question 1(I) (emphasis in
    original).
        66. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
    President, Oct. 28, 1996.
        67. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
    President, Nov. 13, 1996.
        68. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
    President, Jan. 10, 199[7].
        69. On Jan. 17, 1997, Quinn wrote to the Committee that, with
    respect to the Oct. 3, 1996 questions, ``That response is almost
    complete and I expect it will be finished at the end of next week.''
    Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman McIntosh,
    Jan. 17, 1997.
        70. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
    the President, Feb. 21, 1997.
        71. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
    the President, Feb. 27, 1997.
        72. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, response to question 1, Feb. 28, 1997.
        73. White House Press Briefing, transcript p. 8.
        74. Id. pp. 8-9.
        75. Id. p. 9.
        76. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
    President, Jan. 31, 1997.
        77. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
    McIntosh, Feb. 3, 1997.
        78. Id.
        79. ``DNC Statement on the White House Database,'' Jan. 30, 1997, M
    037428.
        80. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 1 (emphasis
    added).
        81. ``Fund-Raisers' Use of White House Database Reported,'' Los
    Angeles Times, Thursday, Jan. 30, 1997, p. A1 (emphasis added).
        82. Id. (emphasis added).
        83. Committee deposition of Truman Arnold, July 18, 1997, p. 124.
        84. ``Big Donor Calls Favorable Treatment a Coincidence,'' the
    Washington Post, Monday, May 25, 1998, p. A1.
        85. According to the Washington Post, Schwartz contributed $25,000
    in the 1991-92 election cycle; $112,000 in 1993-94; $602,000 in 1995-
    96; and $421,000 in 1997-98. Id.
        86. Id.
        87. Id.
        88. Id.
        89. Memorandum from Martha Phipps to Ann Cahill, ``White House
    Activities,'' May 5, 1994, EOP 036287. A previous draft of this
    memorandum which appears to have been prepared for Martha Phipps
    (inside the DNC) appears to have been faxed to the White House from the
    office of the Chairman of the DNC on Apr. 28, 1994. See draft
    memorandum to Martha Phipps, Apr. 28, 1994, EOP 036294. This earlier
    draft encompassed only items 1 through 10 of the later memo. It
    included, however, the following notation: ``NOTE: Any money above and
    beyond the $40 million goal would require two additional Presidential
    events outside of Washington, DC'' Id.
        90. Notes, undated, EOP 036283-036286. See also White House
    Production Log, ``Documents produced to the Committee on Government
    Reform and Oversight on June 6, 1997, EOP 32986-36699, Office of the
    Chief of Staff,'' June 6, 1997.
        91. Notes, updated, EOP 036286 (emphasis added).
        92. ``Fund-Raisers' Use of White House Database Reported,'' Los
    Angeles Times, Thursday, Jan. 30, 1997, p. A1.
        93. Handwritten notes, undated, EOP 036285.
        94. Sullivan deposition, Oct. 22, 1997, p. 17.
        95. Id. p. 19 (emphasis added).
        96. Id. p. 17.
        97. Id. p. 20.
        98. Committee deposition of Jacob Aryeh (``Ari'') Swiller, Jan. 6,
    1998, p. 16.
        99. Id. p. 17 (emphasis added).
        100. Memorandum from David Mercer, Fran Wakem, Ari Swiller,
    Jennifer Scully, and Peter O'Keefe to [Truman] Arnold and Richard
    Sullivan, ``Proposed Communications & Marketing Ideas: INTERNAL MEMO--
    NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION,'' Mar. 14, 1995, DNC 3236734-3236737, at DNC
    3236734.
        101. Id. DNC 3236735.
        102. Id.
        103. Id.
        104. Id.
        105. Swiller deposition, p. 69.
        106. Swiller deposition, p. 70
        107. Id. p. 92.
        108. Id. pp. 79-80.
        109. Id. p. 54 (stating that whether or not someone had been to an
    event at the White House was ``a factor'' in DNC finance prioritization
    of names to recommend for invitations); pp. 57-58 (stating that
    information he received from the White House about prior event
    attendance and prior invitations to attend events was a factor that
    would be considered in the prioritization of recommendations for
    invitations to future White House events).
        110. Arnold had been personally asked to become DNC finance
    chairman by President Clinton after declining the position when asked
    by DNC Chairman Don Fowler. Arnold deposition, pp. 63-64. The
    President's charge to Arnold was ``to raise the money and to make sure
    it was spent frugally.'' Id. p. 64.
        111. Id. p. 122.
        112. Id. p. 116.
        113. Id. p. 116.
        114. Id. pp. 123-124.
        115. Id. p. 124. See also id., p. 77 (``[P]eople . . . contribute
    if they were included and made aware of the need.'').
        116. Swiller deposition, p. 95.
        117. Arnold deposition, pp. 117-118.
        118. Memorandum to David Mercer, ``Finance Needs,'' Mar. 13, 1994,
    DNC 3236707. This memorandum also states that ``[m]ajor contributors or
    raisers should have the opportunity to dine in the White House Mess. We
    have not been able to get this done with any consistency, and I do not
    understand why?'' Id. The memorandum also outlines the importance of
    movies, the White House Tennis Court, and theater tickets. Id.
        119. The very office in which DNC documents reflecting the DNC
    fundraising staff's desire for the information and their complaints
    about getting it. See Production Log, June 6, 1997, EOP 036286.
        120. Arnold deposition, pp. 126, 141, 142.
        121. White House Automated Verification Entry System [WAVES]
    records reflect Arnold's entry for a meeting with Ann Stock on Mar. 24,
    1995. See WAVES records, Mar. 24, 1995, EOP 040404. This was 10 days
    after the Finance Staff memo was prepared which outlined complaints and
    sought DNC-White House coordination for servicing DNC donors.
    Memorandum, Mar. 14, 1995, DNC 3236734-3236737. Ari Swiller testified
    that the topics in the memorandum had been discussed at a fundraising
    staff meeting around Mar. 14, 1995, and that both Richard Sullivan and
    Truman Arnold appeared to be receptive to the ideas expressed at the
    meeting. See Swiller deposition, pp. 63-64 (``[P]art of this discussion
    . . . is [that] there was a concern that on certain occasions we were
    unable to get information about who attended or was invited to White
    House events.''); p. 66 (``[The discussion would] probably [have]
    be[en] about the same time period.''); p. 84 (stating that Mr. Sullivan
    and Mr. Arnold were receptive to the concerns).
        122. Arnold deposition, p. 121 (``[I]t was a procedure in place. It
    seemed to work well . . .''); p. 126 (stating that procedure was in
    place before Arnold arrived).
        123. Arnold deposition, p. 126. Despite the transcript reference on
    this page (p. 126) to his having met with Marsha Scott, the record
    makes clear that his meeting was only with Bowles and Stock (not Marsha
    Scott). See id. pp. 133, 137, 141, 142, 144, 108 (``[I] never met with
    [Marsha Scott] on official business at the White House.'').
        124. Arnold deposition, p. 126 (emphasis added).
        125. See id., pp. 126-127:

              [Bowles and Stock] were concerned about someone inappropriate
            having access to the White House. So I assumed responsibility
            for doing the very best that we could with information that was
            available to bring equity to the system so it wouldn't be
            overrun with people who knew how to work the system; they would
            be legitimate people of good reputation. So we shored up our
            responsibilities. Not only were we raising money, we were
            making sure that appropriate people were being invited and
            included.

    Id.
        126. Arnold deposition, p. 115 (emphasis added).
        127. Id. pp. 133-134 (emphasis added).
        128. Id. p. 143 (emphasis added).
        129. Id. 122. See also id., p. 137. At the meeting with Bowles and
    Stock, neither told Arnold that there was any information which the
    White House could not provide to the DNC. Id. However, Arnold did
    testify that ``[t]he ground rules were discussed that there would be no
    financial information across those lines. The White House didn't want
    to know it, was not allowed to know it. Whether it was legal or policy,
    I'm not sure.'' id.
        130. Committee deposition of Judith Ann Stock, Feb. 20, 1998, pp.
    126-128.
        131. Id. pp. 127-128.
        132. Committee deposition of Erskine Bowles, May 5, 1998, pp. 53-
    54.
        133. Id. p. 58.
        134. Id. p. 54.
        135. Id. pp. 55-56.
        136. Bailey deposition, p. 13 (``[F]rom September 1994 until
    November 1995, I am not sure of the exact day, I worked at the White
    House Chief of Staff's Office.'').
        137. Arnold deposition, pp. 122-124.
        138. Id. p. 123-124.
        139. Stock deposition, pp. 33-34.
        140. Committee deposition of Brooke Stroud, Nov. 4, 1997, p. 47.
        141. Id. pp. 52-55.
        142. Id. p. 93.
        143. Id. p. 70. When DNC offices wanted to know who had ``made the
    cut'' or been included on the invitation list to an upcoming event,
    Stroud called and obtained that information from Kim Widdess. Id.
    Stroud thereafter passed on the information to the DNC requestor. Id.
    See also Id.  p. 71 (``[I]f they were really on the ball, they were
    able to fax over a list that said who was included. But that was
    rare.''); p. 77 (``Sometimes I never--never heard back at all.
    Sometimes somebody would want to know just about one person to make
    sure the one person off the list had been selected. And sometimes an
    actual list would be sent over that said who had been invited.'').
        144. Id. p. 78 (``[I]nconsistently, again, a list may or may not be
    sent over [from the White House to the DNC] afterward . . . But it was
    very rare.''). Such lists were sent to Brooke Stroud and were
    apparently also sent to DNC Finance Director Richard Sullivan. Id. p.
    79. Sullivan nevertheless obtained additional such White House lists,
    for Stroud saw them in Sullivan's office. Id. Stroud could not recall
    how many such lists she received; she testified that she filed them in
    her office. Id. p. 80. When the questioning turned to the location of
    her files, Stroud then said, ``I might have thrown them away, I might
    have kept them. I don't really know.'' Id. p. 81.
        145. Stock deposition, p. 56. She noted that the only instances in
    which White House lists were released were for State Dinners, but only
    for publication in the Washington Post after the dinner took place. Id.
    pp. 56-67.
        146. Id. p. 58 (emphasis added). Stock gave every indication that
    providing the information to anyone was done only with the approval of
    the President or First Lady based upon a demonstrated need by a senior
    White House official of the highest level: ``It went to President and
    Mrs. Clinton, and on occasion if the Chief of Staff asked to see
    something right before the event occurred, like an hour or two before
    it occurred, but we did not circulate lists through the White House . .
    .'' Id.
        147. Id. p. 59 (emphasis added).
        148. Id. (emphasis added).
        149. Id. p. 60.
        150. Committee deposition of Richard Sullivan, Mar. 5, 1998, pp.
    40-41, 81-86.
        151. Committee deposition of Karen Hancox, Dec. 18, 1997, pp. 55-
    56.
        152. Swiller deposition, pp. 57, 60.
        153. Id. pp. 99, 104.
        154. Stroud deposition, Nov. 4, 1997, p. 41.
        155. Committee deposition of Donald Dunn, Jan. 27, 1998, pp. 78-80.
        156. Swiller deposition p. 20.
        157. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
    McIntosh, June 28, 1996.
        158. White House Press Briefing, transcript pp. 6-7.
        159. White House Press Briefing, transcript pp. 6, 9.
        160. Sullivan deposition, Oct. 22, 1997, p. 92. Sullivan, the DNC
    Finance Director, testified that he did not believe this happened with
    respect to any of the DNC ``coffees,'' but that:

              I don't rule out the fact that in putting together the list
            of recommended invitations for the dinners or receptions or
            lunches that were held at the White House or DNC-sponsored,
            that, again Ari [Swiller] might not have made an inquiry to the
            Social Secretary's office. I don't remember specific instances,
            but I can't tell you definitely, no, because that could have
            happened.

    Id. p. 93. Sullivan also stated: ``I don't rule out that he may have
    made a call or two or three as they related to the lunches or
    receptions or dinners.'' Id. p. 95. Furthermore: ``I have a very, very
    vague recollection that [Ari Swiller] may have made a call in reference
    to an individual as we put together the list for a [DNC-sponsored]
    dinner or a lunch.'' Id. p. 96.
        161. Arnold deposition, pp. 120-121. Arnold testified as follows:

              Q. Did you use that same process with those kinds of events?
              A. Yes.
              Q. Did you use them for--let me make sure I understand. You
            used them for all the DNC events that you were involved in?
              A. Right.
              Mr. Ballen. Did he use what?
              Mr. Ausbrook. That process of vetting the list and screening
            them with the White House.
              The Witness. The number of times in attendance previous. The
            Social Office would tell us how many times they had been there.
            The staff did those. It was a procedure in place. It seemed to
            work well, because during this period of time there were no
            improprieties of anyone having attended or any problem being
            made, to my knowledge.

    Id.
        162. Swiller deposition, p. 21 (``I don't recall ever drawing a
    distinction [between official White House events as opposed to DNC-
    sponsored events at the White House].''). See also Id. p. 23 (``Again,
    you're drawing a distinction I was not familiar with when I was at the
    DNC, of what was a DNC-sponsored and what was official. . . . I didn't
    know of such a distinction at the time. When it would come to
    submitting names, I would review a list . . . [o]r I would submit a
    short list of names [which went to the White House].''); p. 24 (no
    distinction in his mind between official White House events and DNC-
    sponsored events).
        163. Id. p. 20 (emphasis added).
        164. Id. p. 36. Swiller participated in sending DNC names for both
    official events and DNC-sponsored events at the White House. See Id.
    pp. 21, 37.
        165. Stock deposition, pp. 30-33. White House staff usually
    prepared and mailed written invitations for DNC-sponsored events taking
    place at the White House. Id. In the case of ``last minute''
    invitations, White House personnel spent time telephoning from the DNC
    list to extend invitations. Id.
        166. Id. p. 28 (``[W]e would put [the list] into the White House
    Database to create a calligrapher's list so that invitations could be
    addressed. Those invitations were sent out.''). Stock testified that
    the process was the same for both political events, including DNC-
    sponsored events, and official events. Id. p. 31. See also Committee
    deposition of Kimberly Widdess, Feb. 24, 1998, p. 28 (``The [White
    House] database is used when we have a list of people that we are going
    to invite. We enter their names and addresses into the database and
    then it--that information is then printed out on a list that the
    calligraphers write the invitations off of. . . .''; p. 29 (``Most
    often, the invitations are sent--we have hard copy invitations and an
    actual card that is sent out to people.'').
        167. Stock deposition, p. 28 (``[W]e would put [the list] into the
    White House Database to create a calligrapher's list so that
    invitations could be addressed. Those invitations were sent out.'').
    Stock testified that the process was the same for both political
    events, including DNC-sponsored events and for official events. Id. p.
    31. See also Widdess deposition, p. 28 (``The [White House] database is
    used when we have a list of people that we are going to invite. We
    enter their names and addresses into the database and then it--that
    information is then printed out on a list that the calligraphers write
    the invitations off of. . . .''). p. 29 (``Most often, the invitations
    are sent--we have hard copy invitations and an actual card that is sent
    out to people.'').
        168. Widdess deposition, p. 28 (``[T]hen responses come to the
    office [of the Social Secretary], people responding to the event. That
    information is entered into the computer with their dates of birth and
    Social Security number.'').
        169. Id. pp. 29-30 (stating that, prior to installation of White
    House Database, a DOS-based computer system performed a similar
    function).
        170. Stock deposition, p. 87 (``WhoDB and the previous [White House
    computer system in the Social Office] generated exactly the same
    reports.''). See also Facsimile from Judy Spangler, White House Office
    of the Social Secretary, to Jennifer Scully, DNC, Apr. 15, 1994, DNC
    3058341-3058351 (print-out from White House Database reflecting status
    of persons invited to an upcoming Apr. 19, 1994 DNC Trustee Reception
    at the White House, as of Apr. 15, 1994 at 1 p.m).
        171. See Widdess deposition, pp. 30-31:

             You can see the entire guest list on the screen so you don't
            have to waste paper printing names out. It gives you
            information as to--immediately gives you information as to how
            many responses you have, how many responses you are waiting on.
            It is a much better system for us to use in the office for
            executing events. . . . The only way the old system you could
            see the guest list is if you printed it out. . . . The WhoDB
            lets you see the entire guest list and who their guest is and
            if they have accepted, responded, regretted or whatever. The
            other system you could only see one record.

    Id. (emphasis added).
        172. Swiller deposition, p. 36. Swiller participated in sending DNC
    names for both official events (p. 37) and DNC sponsored events at the
    White House (p. 21). Id. pp. 21, 37.
        173. Facsimile from Judy Spangler, Office of the Social Secretary,
    Executive Office of the President, to Jennifer Scully, DNC, Apr. 15,
    1994, DNC 3058341-3058351 (11-page White House computer report dated
    Apr. 15, 1994 reflecting the names of invitees and their acceptance-
    regret-no response status as of 1 p.m. on that date for an upcoming DNC
    Trustee Reception to take place at the White House).
        174. See id. Ari Swiller, of the DNC Finance Division, testified
    that he saw such White House-generated lists which had been faxed to
    the DNC ``every couple of months'' during the time period 1993 through
    1997, and that he had personally received such faxed lists from persons
    in the White House Social Office, namely Judy Spangler, Tracy LeBreque
    and perhaps Kim Widdess. Swiller deposition, pp. 18-19. See also id. at
    pp. 29-30 (received lists both before and after events).
        175. Swiller deposition, pp. 31-32 (stating that DNC personnel,
    after identifying persons who had not responded, telephoned such
    persons to remind them of the invitation and to inquire whether they
    wished to attend). Swiller personally made ``dozens'' of such calls
    connected with at least two events. Id.
        176. See Widdess deposition, p. 115 (stating that White House
    employees ``frequently'' contacted the DNC to obtain telephone numbers
    of non-responding persons so that White House employees could make
    follow-up telephone calls to such persons); Stock deposition, p. 87
    (``You have a slight problem with this list. It is Apr. 15th, and the
    event is Apr. 19th, and no one has responded, which is why they are
    sending the list to find out if anybody has phone numbers to figure out
    how to call people and see if they either--my guess is this was not an
    invitation that went out on an invitation list, and it was a phone
    list, and they have bad phone numbers, and it was 108 on the 15th, and
    it is 3\1/2\ days later. Basically you are looking at a completely
    unresponsive list.'').
        177. Memorandum from Minyon Moore to Chair [Deborah] DeLee, Bobby
    Watson, Laura Hartigan, Jill Alper, and Vida Benavides, ``Upcoming
    Holiday Events at the White House,'' Dec. 9, 1994, DNC 0908516-0908663.
        178. Letter from Lanny Breuer, Special Counsel to the President, to
    Mildred Webber, Staff Director, Subcommittee on National Economic
    Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, June 2, 1997.
        179. See letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President,
    to Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997; Affidavit of Carl Mecum, Sept. 4,
    1998.
        180. ``Economic Conference List--Southern Region, Invitation List
    of Panelists and Observers as of 3/21/95,'' Mar. 21, 1995, DNC 3236693-
    3236694, 3236696-3236699, 3236712.
        181. White House Office of Public Liaison, ``APA Opinion Leaders,''
    DNC 0626453-0626472; letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the
    President, to Chairman McIntosh, June 6, 1997.
        182. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie
    Williams, and Jim Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684-1019685.
        183. See Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995
    Holiday Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995, M 24915-24917.
        184. Handwritten notes of Erich Vaden, undated, M 20536 (``MS . . .
    --Christmas List as vehicle to get out? . . . --Meeting w/Cheryl.'').
        185. Vaden deposition, p. 183. Apparently, Scott also advanced the
    argument that the White House could provide the DNC the final list
    because they were paying for the mailing. Id. (referencing de minimis
    language in Cheryl Mills's Memorandum, cited supra n.6 (M 24918-
    24920)).
        186. Vaden deposition, p. 183.
        187. Handwritten reply inscribed on copy of Memorandum from Brooke
    Stroud to Tara Burns, ``X-mas List,'' June 17, 1994, DNC 1019608.
    Marsha Scott also suggested that the DNC could come to the White House
    and review lists. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles,
    ``Meetings To Be Held While I Am Gone,'' Oct. 28, 1994, M 33082-33083.
        188. Stroud deposition, Nov. 4, 1997, p. 133.
        189. Id., pp. 142-143.
        190. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, pp. 36-37. See also Id. p.
    106 (``White House lists were uploaded into the DNC system. . . .'');
    Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar and Maggie Williams,
    Nov. 9, 1994, DNC 1020078; Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice
    Pushkar, Maggie Williams, and Jim Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684-
    1019685. The only two persons at DNC capable of entering the tape into
    the AS 400 were Al Hurst and Bryan Daines. Neither has a recollection
    of having done so. See Committee deposition of Al Hurst, Mar. 13, 1998,
    p. 40; Committee deposition of Bryan Daines, Apr. 6, 1998, p. 29.
        191. Stroud deposition, Nov. 4, 1997, p. 169; Stroud deposition,
    Nov. 18, 1997, p. 30.
        192. Despite Brooke Stroud's recollection that she believed that
    she had boxed the printout at the DNC to send to Archives and despite
    the specific request for its production, the DNC has not produced it.
    Also unaccounted for is a ``Sampling'' or partial printout of the
    merged lists from Saturn which was delivered to Stroud at the DNC.
    Stroud testified that she did not recall what had happened to the
    sample printout. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, pp. 10-12, 28-29.
        193. Sullivan deposition, Mar. 5, 1998, pp. 44-46.
        194. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, pp. 10-11.
        195. Id. pp. 28-29.
        196. Saturn documents 0000607, 0000005, 0000006; Stroud deposition,
    Nov. 18, 1997, p. 100. See also Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice
    Pushkar and Maggie Williams, Nov. 9, 1994, DNC 1020078 (``White House
    lists are contained on multiple discs . . . . Saturn delivered that
    list to the DNC today, we will begin manual de-duping immediately. . .
    . Saturn will deliver [disks 6 & 7] on Friday [Nov. 11, 1994].'');
    Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie Williams and
    James Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684-1019685 (``Disks Six and
    Seven have been uploaded. We will complete clean-up no later than
    Friday. . . .'').
        197. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, p. 36.
        198. Stroud deposition, Nov. 4, 1997, pp. 164-67.
        199. Daines deposition, p. 29 (``Just Al [Hurst] and myself [were
    the persons at the DNC in 1994 who had the expertise and the know-how
    to upload data from a magnetic tape into the DNC computer so that the
    data could be worked on.]'').
        200. See Daines deposition, p. 24 (no recollection of volunteers
    working on 1994 Holiday Card list on any weekend in 1994); p. 37 (no
    recollection of volunteers being asked to modify data in a database at
    DNC); p. 40 (no recollection of data being received in Nov. 1994 from
    an outside entity to which Brooke Stroud was granted access); p. 40 (no
    recollection of having met Sharon Lewis); p. 44 (even after being shown
    documents reflecting disk deliveries from Saturn, no recollection of
    DNC receiving such disks).
        201. Hurst deposition, p. 41 (``No, I don't recall any contact with
    Brooke Stroud over Veterans Day weekend.''); id. (``I worked at the DNC
    on Saturdays and Sundays, but it is not my practice to.''); id. (``No,
    I don't recall working on Veterans Day Weekend of 1994.''). Hurst had
    no recollection of any of events concerning the delivery of tapes over
    the Veterans Day weekend or the use of White House volunteers in that
    effort. Id. p. 100 (``I never received any disks.'').
        202. Hurst deposition, p. 41 (``I worked at the DNC on Saturdays
    and Sundays, but it is not my practice to.''). Daines deposition, p. 24
    (``No, I very rarely was there weekends.'').
        203. Committee deposition of Joseph Birkenstock, June 2, 1998, p.
    114.
        204. See Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie
    Williams and James Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684-1019685
    (``[T]he de-duped list will be returned to Saturn Corporation to be
    placed in a postal-presorted order . . . . [T]he laser house . . . will
    begin [lasering, stuffing and stamping] . . . as soon as they receive
    the tape from Saturn . . . .'' ); letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric
    Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994, Saturn documents 0000604-0000607) (``The output
    tapes from the DNC were sent back to Saturn in the Saturn format for
    presort processing . . . . Tapes [were] received back from the DNC [on
    November 30, 1994] . . . .'' ).
        205. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994, Saturn
    documents 0000604-0000607 (``4. The presort processing was accomplished
    by Saturn and a tape was sent to The Last Word for imaging on the
    envelopes; . . . [Attachment:] Tapes shipped to the Last Word . . . 12/
    02/94.'').
        206. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994, Saturn
    documents 0000604-0000605 (``Saturn received the 3 pre-sorted files
    back from The Last Word on Wednesday, December 14.'').
        207. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Brooke Stroud, Dec. 20, 1994,
    Saturn document 0000633 (discussing the ``problem'' with the tape,
    ``based on our meeting at the DNC on Friday December 16, 1994.'').
        208. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994, Saturn
    Document 0000604-0000607 (``On Friday [December 16] after your call, we
    identified the problem in talking with Al [presumably Al Hurst] at your
    offices and came over to review the problem.'').
        209. Hurst deposition, p. 28 (``[The only contact with Saturn was]
    when it was discovered there was a problem with the tape.''); p. 30
    (``[T]hey brought a tape back to us prior to the mailing of the
    Christmas cards when there was a problem.''); pp. 37-38 (``It is my
    recollection that Brooke Stroud called me upstairs and she was up there
    talking to the people from Saturn.'').
        210. Id. p. 30 (``[T]hey brought a tape back to us prior to the
    mailing of the Christmas cards when there was a problem.''); p. 32
    (``Q. The tape that came back from Saturn that was associated with the
    problem, what, if anything, was done with that tape at the DNC when you
    all received it back? A. I uploaded it to a secure place on the AS400 .
    . . . We uploaded it to a library on the AS400 that only a programmer
    would have the capacity to look at.'').
        211. Id. pp. 37-38 (``The only thing we did with it was to view it
    on the screen to see which records had problems with them . . . [The
    viewing was done by] myself and Brooke Stroud . . . [but no one else]
    that I remember.'').
        212. Id. p. 35.
        213. Id. pp. 52-53 (``[S]he wanted a tape made of the problem
    data.'').
        214. Id. p. 54 (``I have no idea what she did with the tape.'');
    id. (``I don't recall ever seeing that tape-ever again.'').
        215. Hurst deposition, p. 53.
        216. Id. p. 45.
        217. Id. p. 79.
        218. Id. p. 82 (``I deleted the file on the system. The data was
    now on the tape.''); id. (``I put it on the tape rack . . . in the
    computer room of the DNC. . [and] labeled [the tape] S-A-T-M-S-T.'').
    Hurst testified that while he believes the tape remained on the tape
    rack until approximately March 1997, he acknowledged that ``[a]nyone
    who came into the computer room could have pulled it off the rack,''
    and that, other than on weekends, the room generally was not locked.
    Id. pp. 83-84.
        219. Id. p. 16.
        220. Id. p. 46 (``I don't recall asking anyone.'').
        221. Hurst deposition, p. 45.
        222. Id. p. 62 (``No, I don't recall [the volume of information
    that was in the file].''). See also Id. p. 85 (``I don't remember what
    the size of the file was and the number of records.''). Hurst's failure
    to recollect is particularly odd in light of his specific recollections
    of seemingly unimportant details, as well as the fact that the volume
    of the data--``taking up too much space''--was the very reason he
    articulated for deciding to delete the file in the first place.
    Further, he testified that there were but two criteria which he
    employed in deciding to delete files, one of which was the ``size'' or
    volume of the file.  Id. p. 45. The volume of the file was an important
    factor, not only with respect to the deletions in Jan. 1996, but also
    with respect to copying the data onto a tape. As Hurst testified, the
    time it took to make tape copies of the data depended upon the volume
    of data: ``A larger tape would take longer to upload than a smaller
    tape would, because of the number of fields in the file and the total
    number of records in the file.'' Id. pp. 74-75. Hurst, in fact, dealt
    with this tape at least five times: first, when he uploaded it into the
    DNC computer; second, when he made a copy tape for Brooke Stroud;
    third, when he decided to delete the data (using his volume criterion);
    fourth, when he made another copy tape prior to deleting the file; and
    fifth, in March 1997, when he was given the tape by DNC counsel to copy
    yet again.
        223. Hurst deposition, p. 46.
        224. Id. p. 68 (``No, I don't recall looking--I don't recall
    checking that criteria.'').
        225. Id. p. 68 (``No, I don't know why I didn't check that
    criteria.'').
        226. Id. p. 80 (``I don't remember why I made the copy [in January
    1996]. I don't remember what drove me to make the copy of that
    tape.''). See also Id. p. 81 (``I made the copy of the tape, and, I
    don't remember why I made a copy, but after I made the copy I deleted
    [the file] off the system.'').
        227. Id. p. 117; see id. at 114 (``I recall another tape came from
    Saturn after all the Christmas cards were mailed.'') (emphasis added).
        228. Id. pp. 34-35 (``I put it on the tape rack . . . in the
    computer room at the DNC. . . . Q. What were you [just] talking about
    that you had put on the tape rack? A. The tape that we received from
    Saturn after the Christmas cards were mailed.'') (emphasis added);
        229. Hurst deposition, p. 62-63, 114
        230. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 1.
        231. Committee deposition of Alice Pushkar, Jan. 13, 1998, pp. 49,
    163.
        232. Memorandum from Alice J. Pushkar to Cheryl Mills, Aug. 3,
    1995, M 033308-033309 (``The DNC has a tape of the entire 1994 holiday
    card list.'').
        233. Mills immediately told Pushkar verbally that the DNC should
    not have the tape. That specific response was recorded by Pushkar in
    her contemporaneous handwritten notes of that conversation which she
    entered on her copy of her memorandum to Mills. Handwritten notes of
    Alice Pushkar, undated, M 33308 (``Shouldn't have tape''). Pushkar
    testified that after receiving the memorandum, ``[Cheryl Mills]
    immediately called me back and said, you know, the list should have
    been returned to the White House.'' Pushkar deposition, p. 95. See also
    id. pp. 113-114 (``I just recall her saying . . . they shouldn't have
    the tape . . ..''); p. 114 (Mills understood Pushkar was going to try
    to get the tape back).
        234. Vaden deposition, pp. 225-226.
        235. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
    President, Oct. 3, 1996.
        236. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
    President, Oct. 28, 1996.
        237. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
    President, Nov. 13, 1996.
        238. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
    President, Jan. 10, 199[7].
        239. On Jan. 17, 1997, Quinn wrote to the Committee that, with
    respect to the Oct. 3, 1996 questions, ``That response is almost
    complete and I expect it will be finished at the end of next week.''
    Letter to Chairman McIntosh from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President,
    Jan. 17, 1997.
        240. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
    the President, Feb. 21, 1997.
        241. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
    the President, Feb. 27, 1997.
        242. White House Press Briefing, transcript p. 13.
        243. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 1.
        244. Id.
        245. Pushkar deposition, pp. 47-48.
        246. Id. pp. 48, 163-164.
        247. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, p. 36.
        248. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, July 15, 1997.
        249. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Director of
    the Office of the First Lady's Correspondence, and Maggie Williams,
    Chief of Staff to the First Lady, Nov. 9, 1994, DNC 1020078.
        250. Memorandum from Brook Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie
    Williams, and James Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684.
        251. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, pp. 6-7, 34-37.
        252. Id. pp. 15-23. See also Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice
    Pushkar, Maggie Williams and Jim Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1997, DNC 1019684.
        253. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, p. 49.
        254. Id. p. 50.
        255. Handwritten notations of Alice Pushkar, undated, M 033308-
    033309 (reflecting Mills's responses to Aug. 3, 1995 memorandum from
    Alice Pushkar to Cheryl Mills). See also Pushkar deposition, pp. 113-
    116 (stating that Cheryl Mills informed her that ``[the DNC] shouldn't
    have the tape.'').
        256. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995 Holiday
    Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995, M 24815-24817 at M 24916 (emphasis
    added).
        257. Pushkar deposition, pp. 139-140. Similarly Brook Stroud could
    not recall giving computer personnel at the DNC any instructions with
    respect to limitations on access, use or copying of the White Hose
    data. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, p. 87.
        258. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995 Holiday
    Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995, M 24915-24917 at M 24917 (``Despite the
    use restrictions we impose on the DNC, for appearance [sic] purposes,
    the vendor should provide either of those two lists [White House
    portion and final merged lists] only to the White House.''). It is not
    at all clear whether she was suggesting that the ``use restrictions''
    were only for appearances, or whether having the tapes returned to the
    White House was only for appearances.
        259. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995 Holiday
    Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995, M 24915-24917 at M 24915.
        260. By a letter of Oct. 9, 1997, the committee requested the
    following:

              Any and all contracts, and, or, ``use agreements,'' in
            whatever form, drafted, negotiated or entered into between the
            White House or Executive Office of the President and any
            vendor, the Democratic National Committee, the Clinton-Gore
            Campaign, the Clinton-Gore reelect committee, or other entities
            with respect to the planning, implementation or production of
            the 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 `'Holiday Card Project.'' Such
            contracts, or ``use agreements'' are reference in Cheryl Mill's
            [sic] August 14, 1995 memorandum (M 24915--M 24917). Documents
            provided pursuant to this request should include, but not be
            limited to, those referred to in that memorandum. Those
            referred to in that memorandum should be identified as such in
            your response.

    Letter from Chairman McIntosk to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the
    President, Oct. 9, 1997.
        261. By Subpoena, the following records were compelled to be
    produced:

              Any and all contracts, and, or, ``use agreements,'' in
            whatever form, drafted, negotiated or entered into between the
            White House or Executive Office of the President and any
            vendor, the Democratic National Committee, the Clinton-Gore
            Campaign, the Clinton-Gore reelect committee, or other entities
            with respect to the planning, implementation or production of
            the 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 ``Holiday Card Project.''

    Subpoena of Charles F.C. Ruff, Dec. 16, 1997 (originally returnable
    Jan. 15, 1998), item 2(b). See also id. item 2(c).
        262. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, Nov. 19, 1997, response to question 2.
        263. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, Nov. 19, 1997, response to question 2.
        264. Subpoena of Charles F.C. Ruff, Dec. 16, 1997 (originally
    returnable Jan. 15, 1998), item 2(b). See also id., item 2(c).
        265. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday
    Card Numbers,'' Nov. 10, 1993, M 034954 (``White House[:] . . . 33,000
    . . . '').
        266. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott, to
    Mack McLarty, ``Holiday Cards,'' Dec. 2, 1993, M 034960-044962 and M
    04961-034962 (``White House List[:) . . . 43,000'').
        267. The Clinton-Gore campaign committee is the owner of
    PeopleBase. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim
    Dorskind, ``Holiday Card Problem Areas and Considerations,'' Aug. 29,
    1993, M 034907-034909 at M 034908.
        268. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Maggie Williams, ``Holiday
    Cards,'' Nov. 9, 1993, M 034950 (``The internal White House holiday
    card list went to Little rock last night. Malone, Inc. will work with
    it and other lists in maintains to come up with the agreed upon
    database of 250,000 names.'').
        269. Affidavit of Carl Mecum, Apr. 29, 1998, para.para. 5, 7, 16.
        270. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday
    Card Wrap-Up,'' Jan. 13, 1994, M 034980-034982 at M 034981 (`'I already
    have requested a copy of the master list from Malone so that we can
    review and eliminate duplicates. That list should arrive by week's
    end.'').
        271. Letter from Daniel W. Burkhardt, Special Assistant and Counsel
    to the Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages, to Monica
    Breedlove, W.T. [sic] Malone, Inc., Mar. 2, 1994, M 034984 (directing
    that the information be used to correct the campaign database).
    Burkhardt this action despite his won documented knowledge that such
    action was unlawful. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhandt to Marsha Scott,
    ``Holiday Card lists,'' Dec. 7, 1993, M 034965 (``[I]t has always been
    my understanding from White House counsel that the White House could
    not provide the resources to modify or correct lists coming from Malone
    or the DNC . . .'').
        272. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, `'Holiday
    Card Wrap-Up,'' Jan. 13, 1994, M 034980-M 034982 at M 034980 (``[A]s of
    [January 13, 1994] we have received only 8,000 returns.'').
        273. Letter from Daniel W. Burkhardt, Special Assistant and Counsel
    to the Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages, to Monica
    Breedlove, W.P. Malone, Inc., Mar. 2, 1994, M 034984.
        274. Memorandum from Lyn Utrecht, ``Database at W.P. Malone,'' Mar.
    9, 1995 Attachment 2, `'Database Status Report (Summary),'' M 036558-
    036560 and M 036560 (``Address corrections entered as received to
    include 1993 Christmas card mailings and DNC summer, 1994 mailing'').
    the more detailed memorandum discussing this fact was withheld from the
    committee by the White House. In a letter to the committee of Mar. 13,
    1998, the White House stated that the memo was withheld because it was
    ``subject to attorney-client privilege held by Clinton-Gore, and ha[s]
    not been produced.'' Letter from Lanny Breuer, Special Counsel to the
    President, to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels to the
    committee, Mar. 13, 1998.
        275. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, via Matt Moore, to David
    Watkins, Oct. 28, 1993, M 034826-034827 at M 034826.
        276. Id. (``Initially, this [White House] list was going to be
    provided to the Democratic National Committee [DNC].'').
        277. See letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff,
    Counsel to the President Mar. 2, 1998, p. 1, item 2 (seeking production
    of this memorandum); letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to
    the President, to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels to the
    committee, Mar. 13, 1998, response to item 2 (``[W]e have not located a
    copy of this document.'').
        278. E-mail Memorandum from Matthew L. Moore to Cherly Mills,
    ``Christmas Card Lists,'' Oct. 20, 1993, M 034831.
        279. See letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff,
    Counsel to the President, Mar. 2, 1998, p. 1, item 2 (seeking
    production of this memorandum); letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special
    Counsel to the President, to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels
    to the committee, Mar. 13, 1998, response to item 2 (`'We have not
    located a copy of this document.'').
        280. E-mail Memorandum from Matthew L. Moore to Cheryl Mills,
    ``Christmas Card Lists,'' Oct. 20, 1993, M 034831 (emphasis added).
        281. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
    the President, Mar. 2, 1998, pp. 1-2, item 5.
        282. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to the President,
    to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels to the committee, Mar. 13,
    1998, response to item 5.
        283. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
    the President, Mar. 2, 1998, p. 2, item 6.
        284. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to the President,
    to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels to the committee, Mar. 13,
    1998, response to item 6.
        285. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills via Matt Moore, to David Watkins
    (cc: Dan Burkhardt), Oct. 28, 1998, M 034826-M 034827 at M 034826
    (emphasis added).
        286. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim
    Dorskind, ``Holiday Card Lists,'' Aug. 29, 1993, M 034894-034898, at
    034896.
        287. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt via Marsha Scott to Mack
    McLarty, ``Holiday Cards,'' Dec. 2, 1993, M 034960-034962 at M 034961.
        288. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott to Mack
    McLarty, ``Holiday Cards,'' Dec. 2, 1993, M 034960-034962 at M 034961-
    034962.
        289. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim
    Dorskind, ``Holiday card Lists,'' Aug. 29, 1993, M 034894-034898 at M
    034897.
        290. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, via Matt Moore, to David
    Watkins, ``Holiday Greeting Cards II,'' Oct. 18, 1993, M 034826-034827
    at M 034826
        291. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Dan Burkhardt, ``Holiday
    Greeting Card Project,'' Aug. 11, 1993, M 034899 (emphasis added).
        292. Memorandum from Daniel W. Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott, to
    Cheryl Mills, ``Democratic National Committee participation in Holiday
    Card Project,'' Aug. 6, 1993, M 034893.
        293. Memorandum from Helen Dickety to Kelly Crawford, Oct. 17,
    1994, M 034692.
        294. White House telephone call log, ``PHONE CALLS CONCERNING POTUS
    AND THE ADMINISTRATION, LOG START DATE 1/8/96, LOG END DATE 1/26/96,''
    M 034780.
        295. Cover note and list from Kelly Crawford to Monica Breadlove,
    July 27, 1993, M 036286-036301.
        296. See supra notes 50-51 (regarding Nussbaum, Cutler, and Mikva
    memoranda).
        297. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, May 22, 1997; Scott deposition, Feb. 19, 1998, pp.
    94-102.
        298. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes,
    Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New
    Database,'' Jan. 28, 1994, M 32433-32434 (emphasis added).
        299. Scott deposition, Feb. 19, 1988, p. 83 (``Q. And who on your
    team was discussing this with the DNC? A. . . . It was Erich Vaden, it
    was myself, and it was Mark Bartholomew.''); Vaden deposition, pp. 256-
    257 (``I considered [all work related to WhoDB] to be official duties .
    . .'').
        300. Committee deposition of Jerry R. Carlson, Aug. 28, 1997, pp.
    60-62.
        301. Id. pp. 68-69.
        302. Committee deposition of Mark Barthotholomew, Sept. 16, 1997,
    pp. 40-43; Committee deposition of Karl H. Heissner, Sept. 9, 1997, pp.
    59-62.
        303. Heissner deposition, Sept. 9, 1997, p. 61.
        304. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, and
    Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New
    Database,'' June 28, 1994, M 32438-32439 (``My team and I are also
    engaged in conversations with the DNC about their new system they are
    proposing. We have asked that their system be modeled after whatever
    system we decide to use outside the White House. I need you to make
    very clear to them that their system must be technologically
    compatible, if not the same, as whatever system we decide to use for
    political purposes later on. These discussions are currently in
    progress. . . . [L]et my team work with the DNC to help them design a
    system that will meet our needs and technical specifications. We can
    show them what to do and then close another system for our specific
    uses later on.'').
        305. Id.
        306. Id.
        307. See Affidavit of Carl Mecum.
        308. Id. para. 7.
        309. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Database
    Outside WH,'' May 31, 1994, M 036280.
        310. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
    Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 32463-
    32466 at M 32463 (emphasis added).
        311. See Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
    Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 25634-
    25637 at M 25634.
        312. Meeting agenda, Feb. 2, 1994, M 33044.
        313. Unidentified note, Dec. 6, 1994, M 33181.
        314. Id.
        315. Memorandum from Harold Ickes to Leon Panetta and Evelyn
    Lieberman, May 17, 1996, M 33215-33219 at M33217 (reflecting approval
    of new job description fro Marsha Scott).
        316. Committee deposition of Harold Ickes, Mar. 12, 1998, pp. 50,
    122.
        317. Id. p. 123.
        318. Id. p. 51.
        319. Id. p. 57.
        320. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to the First Lady and Bruce
    Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 32463-32466.
        321. Letter from White House counsel Charles F.C. Ruff to Chairman
    McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 2.
        322. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to Deputy Chief
    of Staff Erskine Bowles, undated, M 033298.
        323. Bailey deposition, p. 13 (testifying that he was employed in
    the White House Chief of Staff's Office from Sept. 1994 to Nov. 1995).
        324. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to Deputy Chief
    of Staff Erskine Bowles, undated, M 033298.
        325. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the
    President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President, Jan. 17,
    1994, M 24918-24920.
        326. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and
    Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New
    Database,'' June 28, 1994, M 32433-32434.
        327. Id. at M 32434.
        328. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and
    Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), June 28, 1994, M 32438-32439, at
    32439 (copy inscribed with handwritten notes of the First Lady).
        329. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Chief of Staff [Mack
    McLarty], undated (computer archive date Feb. 11, 1995), M 33054-33057
    at M 33057.
        330. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, undated
    (computer archive date Feb. 11, 1995), M 33054-33057.
        331. Id. (emphasis added).
        332. Id. (emphasis added).
        333. ``WhoDB Requirements Report,'' undated.
        334. Id. p. 3.
        335. Id.
        336. ``Centralized White House Database Security Brief,'' Jan. 12,
    1993, M 2778-2780. See also, Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack
    McLarty (cc: Bruce Lindsey), ``Master Database'', Dec. 7, 1993, M 25921
    (``Both the President and the First Lady have asked that I make this my
    top priority.''); Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Cheryl Mills ``White
    House Database,'' Dec. 16, 1993, M 25101 (``I am working on a project
    that is of high priority to the President and the First Lady'');
    Memorandum from Marsha Scott to James L. McDonald, Jr. ``Continuing
    efforts for the First Lady,'' Feb. 4, 1994, M 25334 (``These projects
    are very important to the President and the First Lady and should be a
    priority for us all.''); Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Phil Lader,
    Mack McLarty, and Harold Ickes ``Follow-up to [Hillary Rodham Clinton]
    Meeting,'' Mar. 7, 1994, M 32447 (``. . . Hillary's desire to have me
    proceed unimpeded with the Database Project. . . .''); Internal White
    House E-mail message from Jerry Carlson to Patsy Thomasson, undated,
    ``Update on 11-14-9[4] Meeting Regarding Project,'' M 26251-26252
    (``Erskine [Bowles] . . . asked that the report and output formats be
    reviewed in detail to insure the President gets what he is expecting.
    Erskine . . . will then take this to the President for input.'');
    ``Project Outline and Discussion, Updated 3-5-96,'' M 23168-23169 at M
    23169 (``. . . Marsha Scott is expecting to deliver reports on a weekly
    basis to the President and First Lady starting in March.'').
        337. Draft Memorandum from Paul Antony and Brian Bailey to Erskine
    Bowles, ``Update on White House Database Project,'' Oct. 25, 1994,
    M21402-21404.
        338. Id. M 21402 (all capitals in original).
        339. Id. (underline and capitals in original).
        340. Id.
        341. Bailey deposition, p. 13 (testifying that he was employed in
    the White House Chief of Staff's Office from Sept. 1994 to Nov. 1995).
        342. Id. pp. 27-28.
        343. Letter from White House counsel Charles F.C. Ruff to Chairman
    McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 2.
        344. Memorandum from Erich Vaden to Marsha Scott, ``Number of
    Items,'' Mar. 2, 1995, M 25639.
        345. Id.
        346. Memorandum [for Multiple distribution] from Erskine Bowles,
    ``Clean-up and Coding of database Records,'' Mar. 28, 1995, M 32493.
        347. Id.
        348. Id.
        349. Id.
        350. Id.
        351. Memorandum from Harold Ickes to Janice Enright, ``Terry
    McAuliffe's Requests to POTUS,'' Jan. 6, 1995, EOP 35937; Handwritten
    notes, undated, CGRO 1570 (reflecting President's communication cited
    within the memorandum).
        352. Memorandum from Harold Ickes to Leon Panetta and Evelyn
    Lieberman, ``Marsha Scott, VIP Operation at the Democratic National
    Committee,'' May 17, 1996, M 33215-33219.
        353. Id. M 33217.
        354. Id.
        355. Memorandum for the President from Harold Ickes, ``Marsha
    Scott,'' May 14, 1996, M 33227.
        356. Memorandum for the President from Harold Ickes, ``Marsha
    Scott,'' May 14, 1996, M 33220.
        357. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
    Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 32463-
    32466.
        358. Id. M 32463.
        359. Id.
        360. Scott deposition, Feb. 18, 1998, p. 69.
        361. Affidavit of Carl Mecum, para. 10.
        362. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Database
    Outside White House,'' May 31, 1994, M036280; Notes of meeting with
    HRC, Lader, Ickes, ``Database Update,'' Feb. 2, 1994, M 033044;
    Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Outside Data,'' Nov.
    21, 1994, M 33050-33052; and Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold
    Ickes, ``DNC Offices and Surrogate Speakers,'' Aug. 19, 1994, M 33283-
    33285.
        363. Scott deposition, Feb. 19, 1998, pp. 71-72.
        364. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
    Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 25634-
    25637.
        365. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
    Bruce Lindsey. ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 25634-
    25637.
        366. Id. M 32465.
        367. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Phil Lader, ``Meeting Follow-
    up,'' Mar. 4, 1994, M 27470-27475.
        368. Scott deposition, Apr. 28, 1998, p. 14 (emphasis added).
        369. Id. p. 101.
        370. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
    Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 32463-
    32466.
        371. Carlson deposition, p. 22.
        372. Id. p. 23.

                         index of supporting documents

        1. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to Deputy Chief of
    Staff Erskine Bowles, undated (M 033298).
        2. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey
    (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New Database,''
    June 28, 1994 (M 32433-32434).
        3. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey
    (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New Database,''
    June 28, 1994 (copy with handwritten notes of First Lady, undated) (M
    32438-32439).
        4. Letter from Chairman Dan Burton to Subcommittee Chairman David
    M. McIntosh, July 17, 1997.
        5. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Marsha Scott, Jan. 17, 1994 (M
    24918-24920).
        6. David Watkins, ``Briefing Paper on Databases--Eyes Only,'' Jan.
    31, 1994 (M 32467-32472).
        7. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
    McIntosh, June 28, 1996.
        8. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, Oct. 28, 1997.
        9. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
    the President, Feb. 27, 1997.
        10. Letter from the majority members of the Subcommittee on
    National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs to
    President William J. Clinton, Aug. 2, 1996.
        11. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, Mar. 6, 1997.
        12. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Cheryl Mills, Dec. 16, 1993 (M
    25101).
        13. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, May 22, 1997.
        14. ``Withheld documents say President wanted database to share
    with DNC,'' Associated Press, Oct. 30, 1997.
        15. ``Lawmaker Suggests Obstruction in Late Delivery of Memo on
    White House Database,'' the Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1997, p. A8.
        16. ``White House Retained Memo on Database,'' Wall Street Journal,
    Nov. 7, 1997.
        17. ``Committee chairman warns White House lawyers on delays,''
    Associated Press, Nov. 6, 1997.
        18. Memorandum from Bernard W. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President,
    and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to White House
    Staff, July 12, 1993 (M 033320-033330).
        19. Memorandum from Lloyd Cutler, Special Counsel to the President,
    and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to White House
    Staff, Apr. 6, 1994 (M 033331-033342).
        20. Memorandum from Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President, and
    Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to Executive Office
    of the President Staff, Oct. 12, 1994 (M 033343-033355).
        21. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, Feb. 11,
    1995 (M 33054-33057).
        22. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold
    Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, (unredacted copy) (M 32457-32461).
        23. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold
    Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, (redacted copy) (M 25673-25677).
        24. ``Fund-Raisers' Use of White House Database Reported,'' Los
    Angeles Times, Thursday, Jan. 30, 1997, p. A1.
        25. White House Press Briefing by Mike McCurry and Barry Toiv, Jan.
    30, 1997 (12:45 p.m. EST), transcript, pp. 1, 6-21.
        26. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
    President, Oct. 3, 1996.
        27. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
    President, Oct. 28, 1996.
        28. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
    President, Nov. 13, 1996.
        29. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
    President, Jan. 10, 199[7].
        30. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
    McIntosh, Jan. 17, 1997.
        31. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
    the President, Feb. 21, 1997.
        32. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
    President, Jan. 31, 1997.
        33. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
    McIntosh, Feb. 3, 1997.
        34. ``DNC Statement on the White House Database,'' Jan. 30, 1997 (M
    037428).
        35. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997.
        36. ``Big Donor Calls Favorable Treatment a Coincidence,'' the
    Washington Post, Monday, May 25, 1998, p. A1.
        37. Memorandum from Martha Phipps to Ann Cahill, ``White House
    Activities,'' May 5, 1994 (EOP 036287).
        38. Draft memorandum to Martha Phipps, Apr. 28, 1994 (EOP 036294).
        39. Notes, undated (EOP 036283-036286).
        40. Memorandum from David Mercer, Fran Wakem, Ari Swiller, Jennifer
    Scully, and Peter O'Keefe to [Truman] Arnold and Richard Sullivan,
    ``Proposed Communications & Marketing Ideas: INTERNAL MEMO--NOT FOR
    DISTRIBUTION,'' Mar. 14, 1995 (DNC 3236734-3236737).
        41. Memorandum to David Mercer, ``Finance Needs,'' Mar. 13, 1994
    (DNC 3236707).
        42. White House Automated Verification Entry System [WAVES]
    records, Mar. 24, 1995 (EOP 040404).
        43. Facsimile from Judy Spangler, White House Office of the Social
    Secretary, to Jennifer Scully, DNC, Apr. 15, 1994 (print-out from White
    House computers reflecting status of persons invited to an upcoming
    Apr. 19, 1994 DNC Trustee Reception at the White House) (DNC 3058341-
    3058351).
        44. Memorandum from Minyon Moore to Chair [Deborah] DeLee, Bobby
    Watson, Laura Hartigan, Jill Alper, and Vida Benavides, ``Upcoming
    Holiday Events at the White House,'' Dec. 9, 1994 (DNC 0908516-
    0908663).
        45. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to the President,
    to Mildred Webber, staff director, Subcommittee on National Economic
    Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, June 2, 1997.
        46. Affidavit of Carl Mecum, Sept. 4, 1998.
        47. ``Economic Conference List--Southern Region, Invitation List of
    Panelists and Observers as of 3/21/95,'' Mar. 21, 1995 (DNC 3236693-
    3236694, 3236696-3236699, 3236712).
        48. White House Office of Public Liaison, ``APA Opinion Leaders''
    (DNC 0626453-0626472).
        49. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, June 6, 1997.
        50. Handwritten notes of Erich Vaden, undated (M 20536).
        51. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Tara Burns, ``X-mas List,''
    June 17, [1994] (DNC 1019608).
        52. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles, ``Meetings To
    Be Held While I Am Gone,'' Oct. 28, 1994 (M 33082-33083).
        53. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar and Maggie
    Williams, ``Holiday Card,'' Nov. 9, 1994 (DNC 1020078).
        54. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie
    Williams, and Jim Dorskind, ``Holiday Card: an update,'' Nov. 15, 1994
    (DNC 1019684-1019685).
        55. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994 (Saturn
    Documents 0000604-0000607).
        56. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Brooke Stroud, Dec. 20, 1994
    (Saturn Document 0000633-0000634).
        57. Memorandum from Alice Pushkar to Cheryl Mills, ``Holiday Card
    Project,'' Aug. 3, 1995 (M 033308-033309).
        58. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, July 15, 1997.
        59. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995 Holiday
    Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995 (M 24915-24917).
        60. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
    the President, Oct. 9, 1997.
        61. Subpoena of Charles F.C. Ruff, Dec. 16, 1997.
        62. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
    Chairman McIntosh, Nov. 19, 1997.
        63. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday Card
    Numbers,'' Nov. 10, 1993 (M 034954).
        64. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott, to Mack
    McLarty, ``Holiday Cards,'' Dec. 2, 1993 (M 034960-034962).
        65. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim Dorskind,
    ``Holiday Card Problem Areas and Considerations,'' Aug. 29, 1993 (M
    034907-034909).
        66. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Maggie Williams, ``Holiday
    Cards,'' Nov. 9, 1993 (M 034950).
        67. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday Card
    Wrap-Up,'' Jan. 13, 1994 (M 034980-034982).
        68. Letter from Daniel W. Burkhardt, Special Assistant and Counsel
    to the Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages, to Monica
    Breedlove, W.P. Malone, Inc., Mar. 2, 1994 (M 034984).
        69. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday Card
    Lists,'' Dec. 7, 1993 (M 034965).
        70. Memorandum from Lyn Utrecht to Bruce Lindsey, ``Database at
    W.P. Malone,'' Mar. 9, 1995 (M 036558-036560).
        71. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, via Matt Moore, to David Watkins,
    Oct. 28, 1993 (M 034826-034827).
        72. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
    the President, Mar. 2, 1998.
        73. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to the President,
    to Keith Ausbrook, senior counsel, and Jay Apperson, special counsel,
    Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and
    Regulatory Affairs, Mar. 13, 1998.
        74. E-mail Memorandum from Matthew L. Moore to Cheryl Mills,
    ``Christmas Card Lists,'' Oct. 20, 1993 (M 034831).
        75. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim Dorskind,
    ``Holiday Card Lists,'' Aug. 29, 1993 (M 034894-034898).
        76. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Dan Burkhardt, ``Holiday
    Greeting Card Project,'' Aug. 11, 1993 (M 034899).
        77. Memorandum from Daniel W. Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott, to
    Cheryl Mills, ``Democratic National Committee participation in Holiday
    Card Project,'' Aug. 6, 1993 (M 034893).
        78. Memorandum from Kelly Crawford to Helen Dickey, Oct. 17, 1994
    (M 034692).
        79. White House telephone call log, ``PHONE CALLS CONCERNING POTUS
    AND THE ADMINISTRATION, LOG START DATE 1/8/96, LOG END DATE 1/26/96,''
    (M 034780).
        80. Cover note and list from Kelly Crawford to Monica Breedlove,
    July 27, 1993 (M 03286-03301).
        81. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Database
    Outside WH,'' May 31, 1994 (M 036280).
        82. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
    Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994 (M 32463-
    32466).
        83. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
    Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994 (M 25634-
    25637).
        84. Meeting agenda, Feb. 2, 1994 (M 33044).
        85. Unidentified note, Dec. 5, 1994 (M 33181).
        86. Memorandum from Harold Ickes to Leon Panetta and Evelyn
    Lieberman, ``Marsha Scott, VIP Operation at the Democratic National
    Committee,'' May 17, 1996 (M 33215-33219).
        87. ``Centralized White House Resource Database Security Brief,''
    Jan. 2, 1993 (M 2778-2782).
        88. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, ``Master
    Database,'' Dec. 7, 1993 (M 25921).
        89. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to James L. McDonald, Jr.,
    ``Continuing Efforts for the First Lady,'' Feb. 4, 1994 (M 25334).
        90. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Phil Lader, Mack McLarty, and
    Harold Ickes, ``Follow-up to [Hillary Rodham Clinton] Meeting,'' Mar.
    7, 1994 (M 32447).
        91. Internal White House E-mail message from Jerry Carlsen to Patsy
    Thomasson, ``Update on 11-14-9[4] Meeting Regarding Project,'' undated
    (M 26251-26252).
        92. ``Project Outline and Discussion, Updated 3-5-96'' (M 23168-
    23169).
        93. Draft Memorandum from Paul Antony and Brian Bailey to Erskine
    Bowles, ``Update on White House Database Project,'' Oct. 25, 1994 (M
    21402-21404).
        94. Memorandum from Erich Vaden to Marsha Scott, ``Number of
    Items,'' Mar. 2, 1995 (M 25639).
        95. Memorandum [for Multiple Distribution] from Erskine Bowles,
    ``Clean-up and Coding of Database Records,'' Mar. 28, 1995 (M 32493).
        96. Memorandum from Janice Enright to Harold Ickes, ``Terry
    McAuliffe's requests to POTUS,'' Jan. 6, 1995 (EOP 035937).
        97. Handwritten notes, undated (CGRO-1570).
        98. Memorandum for the President from Harold Ickes, ``Marsha
    Scott,'' May 14, 1996 (M 33227).
        99. Memorandum for the President from Harold Ickes, ``Marsha
    Scott,'' May 14, 1996 (M 33220).
        100. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Outside
    Data,'' Nov. 21, 1994 (M 33050-33052).
        101. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``DNC Offices
    and Surrogate Speakers,'' Aug. 19, 1994 (M 33283-33285).
        102. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Phil Lader, ``Meeting Follow-
    up,'' Mar. 4, 1994 (M 27470-27475).

        [The supporting documents referred to follow:]

    MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, HON. TOM LANTOS, HON. ROBERT E.
       WISE, JR., HON. MAJOR R. OWENS, HON. EDOLPHUS TOWNS, HON. PAUL E.
     KANJORSKI, HON. GARY A. CONDIT, HON. BERNARD SANDERS, HON. CAROLYN B.
    MALONEY, HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, HON. CHAKA FATTAH, HON. ELIJAH E.
    CUMMINGS, HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH, HON. ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, HON. DANNY
          K. DAVIS, HON. THOMAS H. ALLEN, AND HON. HAROLD E. FORD, JR.

                                    CONTENTS

     I. Executive Summary
    II. Findings
        A. The Development of WhoDB
        B. Event Planning
         1. Official Events
         2. Events Sponsored by Outside Entities
        C. The Holiday Card Project
        D. The Involvement of the President and First Lady
    III.Response to Majority Allegations

        A. The Alleged ``Theft'' of the Holiday Card List
        B. The Alleged ``Theft'' Concerning Event Attendance Information
        C. The Alleged ``Conversion'' of Government Personnel and Resources
        D. The Allegation of a White House ``Infrastructure'' to Support
        DNC
        E. The Allegations Regarding the President and First Lady
        F. The Allegations Regarding Cheryl Mills
         1. The Majority's ``Evidence'' of Perjury and Obstruction
          a. Scott Memo
          b. Bailey Notes
         2. The Majority's Allegations Regarding Motive
    IV. The Costs of the WhoDB Investigation
     V. Conclusion
        Appendix I

                              I. Executive Summary

        The majority report accuses the President, the First Lady,
    senior White House staff, and Democratic National Committee
    [DNC] employees of theft of government property. These
    conclusions are extraordinary. Simply put, the record does not
    support an allegation of theft. It is not theft to remove
    duplicate addresses from the President's holiday card list so
    that recipients do not receive duplicate cards. It is not theft
    to answer an inquiry as to whether an individual has attended
    an event at the White House. Yet, at bottom, this is the type
    of evidence the majority cites as support for its conclusions.
        There has not been any prosecution for ``theft of
    government property'' that even remotely resembles the conduct
    examined here--nor will there ever be. Violation of the
    ``theft'' statute occurs where an individual ``embezzles,
    steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use
    of another, or without authority sells, conveys or disposes of
    any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United
    States.'' As the Supreme Court has ruled, to be guilty of this
    crime a person must have a ``criminal intent to steal.''
        No one ``stole'' the President's holiday card list. In both
    the Republican and Democratic administrations, the President's
    holiday cards are paid for by the President's political party,
    so as to avoid any appearance that taxpayer money is being used
    to pay for greetings to political supporters. In the case of
    the 1994 list, a conscientious DNC employee, Brooke Stroud,
    learned that the contractor that had been hired by the DNC to
    remove duplicate addresses from the President's holiday card
    list did not properly ``de-dupe'' the list. She therefore
    worked over a weekend with her parents and several volunteers
    to properly remove duplicate addresses from the list. This is
    not embezzling, stealing, or purloining the holiday card list.
    Ms. Stroud obtained the holiday card list for the purpose of
    insuring that the President did not send two cards to the same
    address--not for the purpose of stealing the list.
        Similarly, there was no theft of the 1993 holiday card
    list. Apparently, the contractor charged with ``de-duping'' the
    1993 holiday card list failed to remove the list from its
    computer. The computer was later moved--for unrelated reasons--
    to the 1996 Clinton/Gore campaign. There is no evidence that
    this list was used for campaign purposes. In fact, the Clinton-
    Gore campaign never even accessed this list. Not only was there
    no intent to steal, but it appears that the Clinton-Gore
    campaign was not even aware that it possessed the list.
        The majority's assertion that it is theft to disclose
    attendance at White House events has even less of a foundation.
    When the White House Social Office was planning official events
    like a state dinner, the office had the responsibility of
    submitting a proposed guest list to the President and the First
    Lady. In order to assemble an appropriate list, the Social
    Office asked various parties, including the DNC, for
    suggestions. This was exactly the same practice followed in
    prior administrations.
        To avoid recommending individuals to the White House who
    had recently been to theWhite House, the DNC, on occasion,
    asked the White House Social Office whether certain individuals had
    attended an event at the White House recently. When White House
    employees answered these legitimate inquiries, they were not stealing
    government property. They were simply helping to insure that the
    President and the First Lady were presented with a better guest list.
        A legitimate question is whether anyone improperly used
    government resources for political purposes. On this issue,
    however, the relevant witnesses testified that they had no
    reason to believe that the holiday card list or the attendance
    information--or any other information derived from the White
    House database--was ever used for campaign or political
    fundraising purposes. The Committee fully investigated every
    minuscule transfer of information from the White House to the
    DNC and did not establish that any of the information was used
    improperly.
        It is tempting not to dignify the majority report's
    accusations regarding the President and First Lady with a
    response. Since the charge has been made, however, it is
    necessary to correct the record. The majority report's attempt
    to implicate the President and First Lady in the theft
    ``scheme'' is not, in any way, substantiated by the evidence.
    First, it is impossible to implicate the First Family in a
    crime that has not been committed. Further, the record
    indicates that the President and First Lady were only
    peripherally involved with the database. The staff involved in
    the database project could recall only a handful of
    conversations with the President and First Lady about the
    database--and those discussions were general in nature and
    raise no concerns.
        The majority also unfairly claims that Cheryl Mills, Deputy
    White House Counsel, has committed perjury and obstruction
    because Ms. Mills and other White House counsel disagreed with
    Rep. McIntosh's conclusion about whether two documents were
    responsive to his document request. It is not a crime to reach
    a different conclusion than Rep. McIntosh.
        Two years ago, Rep. McIntosh falsely accused SEC Chairman
    Arthur Levitt of flying first-class at taxpayer expense,
    leading a Wall Street Journal columnist to observe:

              Rep. David M. McIntosh has been chasing SEC Chairman
            Arthur Levitt Jr. all over Planet Washington. He does
            so in pursuit of a ``scandal'' that, when we press our
            x-ray spectrometer up against it, seems to consist of
            the substance of interstellar space, which is to say,
            nothing.
              Mr. Levitt is accused of flying first class and
            staying in nice hotels, and digging into his own pocket
            to pay for it.
              It takes a special kind of ingenuity to find
            something to get outraged about here.\1\

        \1\ Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Business World: Fly First Class (With
    the Other Criminals), Wall Street Journal (July 15, 1997) (attached as
    exhibit 1).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It also takes ``special ingenuity'' to discern a theft of
    government property in this case. It may be frustrating to
    spend over two years investigating an esoteric issue like the
    White House database and find nothing. However, this does not
    justify smearing the reputations of numerous public servants
    and others without factual or legal support, nor does it
    justify making ludicrous charges about the President and the
    First Lady.

                                  II. Findings

        The White House Database (``WhoDB'') is a computerized
    Rolodex used to track contacts of citizens with the White House
    and to create a holiday card list. Well over two years ago,
    Rep. McIntosh, Chairman of the Subcommittee on National
    Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs
    began a sprawling investigation into the development and use of
    the WhoDB.\2\ The Subcommittee, in conjunction with the
    Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, has deposed 34
    witnesses exclusively on WhoDB issues,\3\ and obtained over
    43,000 pages of documents. It spent a great deal of taxpayer
    money on this investigation. Yet neither the Subcommittee nor
    the Committee held a public hearing on merits of the
    investigation in the entire 105th Congress. What the evidence
    gathered by the Committee shows is summarized below.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Letter from Subcommittee Chairman David M. McIntosh to Leon
    Panetta (June 27, 1996).
        \3\ The deposition of one additional witness focused on both WhoDB
    and other campaign finance related matters. See Deposition of Truman
    Arnold, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (July 18,
    1997). All depositions referenced in this report, unless otherwise
    noted, were conducted by this Committee.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          A. The Development of WhoDB

        The Clinton administration inherited a number of different
    computer systems that various offices within the White House
    had used to track contacts. The Clinton administration planned
    to update the computer systems by creating one White House
    database that a number of the offices could access for the most
    up-to-date contact information on individuals such as addresses
    and phone numbers.4 The idea for such a system
    apparently was not unique to the Clinton administration. A
    database contract proposed late in the Bush administration
    similarly described a system that would maintain a ``list of
    names and addresses of individuals identified as important to
    the President.'' 5
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Deposition of Laura Tayman, 29 (Mar. 20, 1998); Deposition of
    Marsha Scott, 26-27, 58-59 (Feb. 18, 1998); Deposition of Erich Vaden,
    15-16 (Jan. 25, 1998); Deposition of Mark Bartholomew, 36-37 (Aug. 15,
    1997).
        \5\ See The Propriety of the Taxpayer-funded White House Database,
    Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural
    Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the Committee on Government Reform
    and Oversight, 53 (Sept. 10, 1996).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The new database eventually became what is known as the
    White House database or the ``WhoDB.'' According to a survey by
    the Government Accounting Office, the White House estimated
    that the WhoDB contains approximately 200,000 names of
    individuals, as well as information such as the individuals'
    addresses, organizational affiliations, and relationships with
    the First Family.6 The White House estimates that
    the total cost of development, operations, and maintenance of
    the database from FY 1994 through August 1998 is
    $785,467.7
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Id. at 97.
        \7\ This estimate was provided by the Office of White House Counsel
    in September 1998. The majority does not explain anywhere in its report
    how it reached the conclusion that the WhoDB cost $1.7 million, and no
    witnesses deposed by the Committee confirmed that that number was
    accurate.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Although early plans anticipated that WhoDB would be used
    by many offices within the White House, the two main users were
    the Social Office, which used it to create guest lists for
    events held at the White House, and the Correspondence Office,
    which used it to create a list of names and addresses of
    individuals who would receive holiday cards from the President.
        After conducting a lengthy investigation into the
    development and use of the WhoDB, the Subcommittee has learned
    that those involved in developing the WhoDB regularly consulted
    White House counsel on database issues, including the limits on
    the receipt and use of information contained in the
    WhoDB.8 For example, Brian Bailey, who was an
    assistant to then-Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles,
    testified as follows:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ See, e.g., Deposition of Erskine Bowles, 30, 107-08 (May 5,
    1998); Deposition of Laura Tayman, 79-80 (Mar. 20, 1998); Deposition of
    Marsha Scott, 90-91 (Feb. 18, 1998); Deposition of Erich Vaden, 101-04
    (Jan. 25, 1998); Deposition of Brian Bailey, 27-28 (Feb. 6, 1998).

              Erskine, from day one, was insistent that . . . this
            is a short-term assignment and it just didn't make any
            sense to even think about doing anything illegal,
            immoral, or unethical. He used those three words all
            the time. And he said, if there is anything that you
            have one ounce of question about or even a shade of
            gray in, go talk to the White House Counsel, and if
            White House Counsel says no, then the answer is
            no.9
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ Deposition of Brian Bailey, 27 (Feb. 6, 1998).

        The advice from White House counsel to those who worked on
    the WhoDB distinguished between the transfer of data from
    outside sources into a White House database and the transfer of
    data from a White House database to outside sources. The
    counsel's office advised that the White House can receive data
    for a White House database from any source, including ``private
    entities or individuals, non-profit organizations, political
    organizations, and other sources.'' 10 For example,
    if the Clinton-Gore campaign had a computerized Rolodex of
    contacts who were important to the President, it would not be
    illegal to import this data into the WhoDB, just as it would
    not be illegal for a new government employee to bring the
    employee's personal Rolodex with him or her into government
    service.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the
    President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President and
    Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages (Jan. 17, 1994),
    White House Bates No. M24918-20. All documents produced by the White
    House for the WhoDB investigation are designated with the letter ``M.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The White House counsel took a dimmer view of transferring
    data from a White House database to outside sources. The
    counsel advised ``data from the database system may be provided
    to a source outside the federal government only for authorized
    purposes.'' 11 All of the relevant witnesses
    testified that there was no transfer of data from the WhoDB to
    databases outside the White House.12
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the
    President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President and
    Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages (Jan. 17, 1994),
    M24918-20.
        \12\ E.g., Deposition of Erich Vaden, 296 (Jan. 25, 1998);
    Deposition of Marsha Scott, 133 (Feb. 18, 1998); Deposition of Mark
    Bartholomew, 88-89 (Aug. 15, 1997); Deposition of Al Hurst, 112 (Mar.
    13, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In fact, according to testimony, the WhoDB system had a
    warning banner stating that data was for official use, and
    users had to acknowledge this before logging on.13
    Not only were employees made aware of the legal limits on the
    WhoDB, witness after witness testified that they had no reason
    to believe that the legal advice from White House counsel was
    ever disregarded.14
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ Deposition of Erich Vaden, 115-16 (Jan. 25, 1998).
        \14\ See, e.g., Deposition of Erskine Bowles, 107-08 (May 5, 1998);
    Deposition of Laura Tayman, 142 (Mar. 20, 1998); Deposition of Harold
    Ickes, 132-33 (Mar. 12, 1998); Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 162
    (Feb. 20, 1998); Deposition of Marsha Scott, 134 (Feb. 19, 1998);
    Deposition of Donald Dunn, 151 (Jan. 27, 1998); Deposition of Erich
    Vaden, 296 (Jan. 25, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               B. Event Planning

        The Social Office uses the WhoDB when planning official
    White House events and unofficial events held on the White
    House grounds. The Clinton administration's Social Office has
    helped plan thousands of events to which hundreds of thousands
    of guests were invited to the White House.15
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ See Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 54-57 (Feb. 20, 1998)
    (testifying that the Social Office held about 2,000 events in 4 years,
    entertaining about half a million people in 4\1/2\ years).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    1. Official events

        According to deposition witnesses, official events include
    events such as state dinners, arrival ceremonies, and bill
    signings. Following the practices of previous administrations,
    for these events, the Social Office collects a list of
    recommended invitees from other offices within the White House
    and from relevant outside entities such as congressional
    offices, the DNC, and interested parties.\16\ These lists are
    compiled into one list which is reviewed by the President, the
    First Lady, or the White House Counsel's Office.\17\ The guest
    list is then input onto the WhoDB.\18\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 32-37 (Feb. 20 , 1998)
    (``again, what we're going on is a precedent of me sitting down with
    previous social secretaries and asking them how they did that and how
    they went about building lists'').
        \17\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 68, 76 (Feb. 20, 1998).
        \18\ Deposition of Kimberly Widdess, 26-28 (Feb. 24, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The WhoDB list is apparently used to create a
    calligrapher's list of names and addresses for producing
    written invitations; a Presidential identifier list which lists
    the names and affiliations of the guests for the President; a
    security list which lists names, social security numbers, and
    birthdates which is sent to the WAVES computerized security
    system; a gate list used for check-in on the date of the event
    which contains the list of guests approved by security; and a
    final attendee list which the gate sends to the Usher's Office
    after the event.\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 90-95 (Feb. 20, 1998);
    Deposition of Kimberly Widdess, 129 (Feb. 24, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        According to the testimony of relevant White House and DNC
    staff, the White House did not want the same people to be
    invited repeatedly to official White House events.\20\
    Therefore, before the DNC recommended potential invitees, DNC
    staff would sometimes call the White House and ask whether a
    particular individual had been to a past White House event.\21\
    These calls generally involved a request about the attendance
    of one or two individuals.\22\ The White House sometimes did
    not respond to these requests and sometimes did--at times
    consulting WhoDB.\23\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 98 (Feb. 20, 1998) (``Of
    course. We don't want duplicate invitations''); Deposition of Donald
    Dunn, 152 (Jan. 27, 1998); Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 59 (Oct. 22,
    1997); Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 182-83 (Jan. 6, 1998);
    Deposition of Karen Hancox, 60 (Dec. 18, 1997) (stating that the
    ``genesis'' of such calls was that the White House Social Secretary was
    concerned that DNC staff was submitting names of people who had been
    invited a lot to the White House).
        \21\ Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 33 (Oct. 22, 1997); Deposition
    of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 105-06 (Jan. 6, 1998).
        \22\ E.g., Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 105-06 (Jan. 6,
    1998); Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 72-73 (Oct. 22, 1997).
        \23\ E.g., Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 70, 80-81, 86 (Jan.
    6, 1998) (testifying that ``often'' DNC requests to the White House for
    information about upcoming events ``were not responded to,'' and that
    DNC requests to the White House for event attendance lists were
    ``often'' denied); Letter from Charles Ruff, Counsel to the President,
    to Subcommittee Chairman McIntosh (Feb. 28, 1997).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As a general rule, after guest recommendations were
    submitted to the Social Office by outside entities, the Social
    Office did not inform them whether their suggested invitees had
    been invited. However, on a few occasions, this information was
    verbally provided--sometimes to the DNC.\24\ In addition, for
    about a month (five to six events), the Social Office provided
    written lists of invitees to the offices and outside entities
    that had made recommendations.\25\ However, this process was
    dropped as too cumbersome.\26\ The Social Secretary assumed the
    entity wanted this information in order to set up appointments
    while the invitee was in town.\27\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 54-64, 97-99, (Feb. 20, 1998)
    (``we didn't have time, energy, or the inclination to give that
    information . . . That is not the business I was in . . . I did not
    provide the information . . . The rule was not of not giving out the
    list . . . I don't know if [Social Office Staff] ever provided it'');
    Deposition of Kimberly Widdess, 76-77 (Feb. 24, 1998) (noting that the
    Social Office received requests from entities such as the Ford Theater
    and the Kennedy Center for information about who had accepted or
    regretted invitations, and that the Social Office treated such requests
    ``the same way we treated the [DNC] requests''); Deposition of Jacob
    Aryeh Swiller, 70 (Jan. 6, 1998); Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 86-88
    (Oct. 22, 1997) (Mr. Sullivan remembers other DNC employees making this
    type of call on 4-6 occasions); Deposition of Donald Dunn, 107-109
    (Jan. 27, 1998) (Mr. Dunn testified that on some occasions he provided
    information to the DNC regarding the status of persons invited to an
    upcoming event. He did not specify whether this information concerned
    official or unofficial White House events).
        \25\ According to testimony, such lists were created and printed
    off of a Wordperfect system--not off of WhoDB. Deposition of Kim
    Widdess, 27-28, 108 (Feb. 24, 1998).
        \26\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 54-64 and 143 (Feb. 20, 1998);
    Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 87 (Nov. 4, 1997) (noting that she saw
    such lists ``once in a blue moon . . . rarely'').
        \27\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 57-62 (Feb. 20, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Events sponsored by outside entities

        As with prior administrations, outside entities sponsored
    events at the White House, meaning that these entities
    reimbursed costs of events held on White House grounds. In the
    Clinton administration, entities sponsoring such events have
    included the Kennedy Center, the Ford's Theater, and the
    International Olympics Committee, among others. The DNC has
    also sponsored events at the White House.28
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on Treasury,
    Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year
    1998, Part 3, 113-142.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        During the Reagan and Bush administrations, political
    entities also held events at the White House.29
    Former Clinton administration Social Secretary Judith Ann Stock
    testified that ``[i]t's the same as if there were a Republican
    President, the RNC also would pay for an event that might be
    sponsored in the White House with the Eagles. That's what we
    based our judgment on. And that was something that was well
    defined and well understood  . . . by previous administrations
    as well as this administration.'' 30
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ For example, Republican donor program events at the White
    House during the Bush administration include: Oct. 17, 1991, Team 100
    dinner hosted by President Bush; Feb. 20, 1992, National Republican
    Senatorial Committee Trust reception, hosted by President Bush; Mar. 9,
    1992, National Republican Senatorial Committee [NRSC] and National
    Republican Congressional Committee [NRCC] fundraising planning event in
    which President Bush met with members of the NRSC and NRCC to discuss
    the President's Dinner, a joint fundraising event; Apr. 8, 1992, Eagles
    reception hosted by President and Mrs. Bush; Apr. 9, 1992, Eagles
    reception hosted by President and Mrs. Bush; May 14, 1992, NRCC
    President's Forum and House Council briefing and reception involving
    meeting with President Bush; Jan. 6, 1993, Presidential Trust and
    Eagles reception hosted by President and Mrs. Bush; Jan. 7, 1993,
    Presidential Trust and Eagles reception hosted by President and Mrs.
    Bush; Jan. 12, 1993, Team 100 dinner hosted by President Bush.
    Republican donor program events at the White House during the Reagan
    administration include: July 9, 1981, two Eagles receptions hosted by
    President Reagan; Sept. 22, 1981, Eagles reception hosted by President
    Reagan; Apr. 16, 1982, Eagles reception hosted by President Reagan;
    June 21, 1982, Senatorial Trust reception hosted by President Reagan;
    Sept. 13, 1983, Eagles reception hosted by President Reagan; Nov. 22,
    1983, Senatorial Trust reception hosted by President Reagan; May 10,
    1984, reception for the President's Dinner Committee hosted by
    President Reagan; August 29, 1984, reception for GOP Re-elect Committee
    hosted by President Reagan; Apr. 2, 1985, Presidential Trust reception
    hosted by President Reagan; Apr. 22, 1985, reception for the Republican
    Congressional Leadership Council; Sept. 12, 1985, Eagles reception;
    Dec. 9, 1986, Eagles meeting attended by President Reagan; Dec. 16,
    1986, reception for House-Senate dinner fundraisers hosted by President
    Reagan; Apr. 29, 1987, President's Dinner reception hosted by President
    Reagan; May 28, 1987, meeting hosted by President Reagan with GOPAC, a
    political action committee founded by Congressman Newt Gingrich; Sept.
    15, 1987, NRCC meeting with President Reagan; Sept. 30, 1987, Eagles
    meeting with President Reagan; Apr. 14, 1988, President's dinner state
    chairmen meeting with President Reagan; May 11, 1988, President's
    dinner donors meeting with President Reagan; June 30, 1988, Republican
    Congressional Leadership Council reception hosted by President Reagan;
    July 26, 1988, NRSC meeting with President Reagan; July 29, 1988
    Presidential Trust meeting with President Reagan. See Minority Report,
    Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Investigation of Illegal or
    Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,
    S. Rept. No. 167, 105th Cong., 2d sess., v. 5., pp. 8053-55, appendix
    to Chapter 28 (Mar. 10, 1998) (hereafter ``Senate Minority Report'').
        \30\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 21 (Feb. 20, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As in prior administrations, invitation lists for White
    House events sponsored by outside entities generally were kept
    in White House databases, and the invitations were sent from
    the White House. 31 The guest lists were vetted with
    the counsel's office to ensure the potential invitees were
    ``appropriate to be admitted to the White House.''
    32 The lists were then put into a database--like the
    WhoDB--to create a list for the calligraphers' office, which
    sent out the invitations. The Office of the Social Secretary
    would receive invitation responses and ask for the social
    security numbers and birthdates of guests. According to the
    Social Secretary, that system had been ``in place since they've
    been using the Secret Service to admit people through the White
    House.'' 33 Thus, as in previous administrations,
    the Clinton administration used White House resources and staff
    to input information from outside organizations like the DNC
    into White House databases and to process RSVPs and guest
    admission for events sponsored by outside entities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \31\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 27-29 (Feb. 20, 1998).
        \32\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 27 (Feb. 20, 1998).
        \33\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 28 (Feb. 20, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The White House Social Secretary testified that the Chief
    Usher of the White House was responsible for reimbursement for
    the time and resources of the persons involved in the
    invitation process. She stated that the Chief Usher's system
    regarding what was reimbursed was ``again based on what the
    Bushes had used.'' 34
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \34\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 29 (Feb. 20, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The record indicates that, on a few occasions, the Clinton
    White House provided status reports to the sponsoring entity
    regarding who had RSVPed.35 The White House Social
    Secretary suggested that the purpose of providing such
    information was to help the sponsor determine whether it needed
    to follow-up on inviting people to the event.36
    Because guests generally RSVP directly to the White House, the
    entity would have no other way of obtaining up-to-date RSVP
    information. The White House provided such information to
    sponsoring entities such as the Library of Congress, the DNC,
    and others.37 The record also indicates that the DNC
    received from the White House a few attendance lists regarding
    past DNC-sponsored events at the White House.38 Mr.
    Swiller of the DNC testified that ``sporadically, every couple
    of months'' the DNC would receive such lists.39
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \35\ E.g., Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 87 (Feb. 20, 1998).
        \36\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 87 (Feb. 20, 1998).
        \37\ See Deposition of Kimberly Widdess, 76-77 (Feb. 24, 1998);
    Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 30-31 (Feb. 20, 1998).
        \38\ E.g., List for ``Reception (DNC Trustees),'' with cover fax
    sheet dated Apr. 4, 1994, DNC B No. 3058341.
        \39\ Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 18-20 (Jan. 6, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          C. The Holiday Card Project

        Since 1995, the WhoDB was also used to create a list of
    names and addresses for individuals designated to receive a
    holiday card from the President. The Clinton administration
    followed the holiday card procedure established by previous
    administrations.40 A number of entities--including
    the White House, the DNC, the campaign, and others connected
    with the President--created lists of card recipients. The DNC
    paid outside contractors to merge the lists and to produce and
    mail the cards.41 As was the practice in prior
    administrations, the President's political party (in this case,
    the DNC) paid for the costs of producing and mailing the cards
    to avoid any appearance that federal funds were being used to
    send greetings to the President's supporters.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \40\ Deposition of Alice Pushkar, 158 (Jan. 13, 1998).
        \41\ Deposition of Alice Pushkar, 158 (Jan. 13, 1998); Deposition
    of Jodie Torkelson, 99 (Sept. 9, 1997).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The record indicates that the holiday card lists that were
    on the WhoDB were not provided by the White House to any
    outside entity other than the contractors who were hired to
    merge and purge the lists and print the cards. No relevant
    witnesses had reason to believe the lists were used for
    campaign fundraising or any inappropriate
    purposes.42
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \42\ Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 90-92 (Nov. 18, 1997); Deposition
    of Alice Pushkar, 157 (Jan. 13, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        However, in 1994, before the WhoDB was used for the holiday
    card project, the contractor charged with merging the various
    lists provided a copy of a holiday card list to the DNC. The
    White House informed the Subcommittee of this fact even though
    the Subcommittee had not requested this pre-WhoDB
    information.43 Although relevant witnesses were
    questioned for numerous hours on the 1994 holiday card project,
    the record does not indicate that the 1994 holiday card list
    was used for any purpose other than the holiday card
    project.44
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \43\ Letter from the Executive Office of the President to
    Subcommittee Chairman McIntosh (Feb. 28, 1997).
        \44\ See, e.g. Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 92 (Nov. 18, 1997);
    Deposition of Al Hurst, 110-11 (Mar. 13, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Apparently, the DNC and White House employees responsible
    for the 1994 holiday card project were not satisfied with the
    work done by the contractor who merged the lists. Therefore,
    the DNC employee charged with the project, Brooke Stroud, along
    with her parents, spent a holiday weekend at the DNC with
    volunteers (apparently women who had volunteered to help with
    the holiday card project in previous administrations) removing
    duplicate names and addresses from a holiday card
    list.45
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \45\ Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 164-175 (Nov. 4, 1997). It also
    should be noted that the list that was de-duped at the DNC may not have
    included information that came from the White House. Although Brooke
    Stroud believed it did include White House information, documents
    relating to the de-duplicating project show that it may have been
    limited to a ``merge and purge'' of information provided by the DNC and
    the PeopleBase. Ms. Stroud explained, ``The way I remember it is
    different than the way it is being described here (in the documents),
    but that doesn't mean that my memory is the one to go with.''
    Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 97, 103 (Nov. 18, 1997). Furthermore,
    James Dorskind, a White House employee who worked on the 1994 holiday
    card, testified that he believed that de-duplication did not include
    White House information. Deposition of James Dorskind, 90-91 (Oct. 3,
    1997) (``there were volunteers who assisted in 1994 in de-duping the
    PeopleBase list, as I recall it, or the DNC, whatever it was that was
    going in for the purpose of the holiday card project'').
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        During this process, only two DNC employees had access to
    this list, Ms. Stroud and computer specialist Al Hurst. Both
    testified that they had no reason to believe the information
    was used for campaign fundraising or any campaign
    purpose.46 They only used the information for the
    holiday card project.47
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \46\ Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 92 (Nov. 18, 1997); Deposition of
    Al Hurst, 110-11 (Mar. 13, 1998).
        \47\ Deposition of Al Hurst, 111-12 (Mar. 13, 1998); Deposition of
    Brooke Stroud, 91-94 (Nov. 18, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It also appears that the contractor responsible for ``de-
    duping'' the 1993 holiday card list failed to remove the list
    from its computer when the project was completed. The list
    ended up in the hands of the 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign by
    accident when the contractor moved its computer to the Clinton-
    Gore campaign in October 1995 so the campaign could access a
    different database on that computer (PeopleBase). Again there
    is no evidence that the list was used for campaign fundraising
    or any unofficial purpose.48 To the contrary, the
    date-tag on the computerized file containing the holiday card
    list indicates that the file was not accessed after the
    computer was moved to the campaign.49 Apparently,
    the campaign was not even aware of the existence of this file.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \48\ Affidavit of Carl Mecum (Sept. 4, 1998).
        \49\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               D. The Involvement of the President and First Lady

        The Committee thoroughly investigated the extent to which
    both the President and First Lady were involved in the WhoDB
    project. The record indicates that the President and First Lady
    were interested in and aware of the database, but had little
    involvement in its development or use. Several individuals who
    have regular contact with the President and First Lady
    testified about this matter.
        Marsha Scott, then Director of Correspondence at the White
    House, who led the WhoDB project, testified that she felt
    confident that ``at some point I probably said [to the
    President], `I am working on something to get a social system
    up.' '' She had no memory, however, of specific discussions
    with the President about the database. She further testified
    that she did not believe that she ever made a progress report
    to him on the project.50
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \50\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 14-25 (Apr. 28, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Erskine Bowles, then-Deputy Chief of Staff to the
    President, testified that he spoke with the President about the
    database ``maybe twice.'' 51 Harold Ickes, also
    then-Deputy Chief of Staff to the President, testified that he
    believes he had ``one or two conversations'' with the President
    about the database, but that ``it was not something that he was
    particularly focused on.'' Mr. Ickes noted that the President's
    concern was that ``people be remembered.'' 52
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \51\ Deposition of Erskine Bowles, 18 (May 5, 1998).
        \52\ Deposition of Harold Ickes, 22-28 (Mar. 12, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Furthermore, the record indicates that the President was
    not involved in discussions with White House staff regarding
    outside databases. Ms. Scott testified that she does not
    believe she ever spoke with the President about outside
    databases.53 Mr. Ickes testified that he did not
    ever have an understanding that the President wanted the White
    House and DNC databases integrated or compatible.54
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \53\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 22 (Apr. 28, 1998).
        \54\ Deposition of Harold Ickes, 63-64 (Mar. 12, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Evidence indicates that the First Lady wanted a database of
    White House contacts, but that her involvement with the details
    of the WhoDB project was peripheral. Ms. Scott testified that
    she only recalled one conversation with the First
    Lady.55 This discussion occurred early on in the
    development of the WhoDB. She discussed that conversation as
    follows:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \55\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 17 (Apr. 28, 1998).

              What I remember of my discussions with her was that
            she hoped I would make this a high priority and she
            wanted this to get done. I mean, we were in a
            technological wasteland in the White House and it was
            very, very time consuming for all of us, and
            particularly for the offices that she controlled, which
            was the Social Office, to get their work done. And she
            wanted, before we got into another round of big
            functions and holiday lists, she very strongly and I
            would even say even desperately wanted us to have
            something set up so it would be a lot easier on all the
            staffs as we got into this.56
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \56\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 116 (Feb. 18, 1998).

        Mr. Ickes testified that he did not recall any
    conversations with the First Lady about the WhoDB.57
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \57\ Deposition of Harold Ickes, 26-29 (Mar. 12, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     III. Response to Majority Allegations

        The majority report makes six major allegations regarding
    the WhoDB investigation: (1) the holiday card list was stolen,
    (2) event attendance information was stolen, (3) government
    resources and personnel were stolen, (4) an infrastructure at
    the White House was dedicated to supporting the Democratic
    National Committee, (5) the President and the First Lady were
    involved in the unlawful conversion of government property to
    the use of the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign, and (6) White
    House counsel, Cheryl Mills, committed perjury and obstructed
    the investigation. These allegations, however, are not
    substantiated by the Committee record. To the contrary, the
    majority's allegations conflict with the overwhelming weight of
    the testimony and evidence gathered by the Committee.
        Regrettably, despite the extensive resources devoted to
    investigating the WhoDB and the serious nature of the charges
    being made by the majority, the majority did not schedule a
    single day of hearings on the merits of the WhoDB investigation
    in the 105th Congress.58 As Rep. Waxman stated:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \58\ In the 104th Congress, there was one hearing on the WhoDB. The
    Propriety of the Taxpayer-funded White House Database, Hearing Before
    the Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and
    Regulatory Affairs of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
    (Sept. 10, 1996). In the 105th Congress, the Committee addressed
    questions relating to document production, including the production of
    WhoDB material in a hearing, but never held a hearing on the merits of
    the investigation. White House Compliance with Committee Subpoenas,
    Hearing Before the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (Nov. 6
    and 7, 1997).

               Mr. McIntosh didn't hold a single hearing on this
            investigation in the last two years, despite the fact
            that he summoned 34 witnesses to depositions and
            demanded 43,000 documents. . . . [T]hat means the
            entire investigation has been conducted in secret. The
            media and the public have had no opportunity to observe
            Representative McIntosh's methods or evaluate the
            credibility of his suspicions. In short, the public has
            had no chance to see if the investigation of the
            alleged Christmas card list caper was legitimate
            oversight or political witch hunt, or just
            foolishness.59
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \59\ Business Meeting on Committee Report, Report on Investigation
    of the White House Database, and Release of Documents, House Committee
    on Government Reform and Oversight (Oct. 9, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               A. The Alleged ``Theft'' of the Holiday Card List

        The majority report claims that ``[t]he knowing delivery of
    [the] holiday card lists to others outside of the government .
    . . constitute[s] the theft of government property under 18
    U.S.C. Sec. 641.'' 60 The record simply does not
    support this accusation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \60\ Majority report, Investigation of the Conversion of the 1.7
    Million Centralized White House Computer System, Known as the White
    House Database, and Related Matters, House Committee on Government
    Reform and Oversight (Oct. 9, 1998) (hereafter, the ``Majority
    Report'').
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The theft statute provides:

              Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly
            converts to his use or the use of another, or without
            authority sells, conveys, or disposes of any record,
            voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States
            or any department or agency thereof; or whoever
            receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to
            convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been
            embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted--shall be
            fined . . . or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
            both.61
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \61\ 18 U.S.C. 641.

        The majority claims that ``[t]he mere possession of the
    list by the DNC is evidence of a theft of the property,'' but
    this is not true. As the Supreme Court has held in Morissette
    v. United States,62 an individual does not commit
    theft under this statute unless there is ``criminal intent to
    steal or knowingly convert, that is, wrongfully to deprive
    another of possession of property.'' 63
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \62\ 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
        \63\ 342 U.S. 246, 276.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This crucial element of intent does not exist in the case
    of the alleged theft of the 1994 holiday card list. Ms. Stroud,
    the DNC employee who obtained the list, did not obtain the list
    from the contractor with an intent to deprive the White House
    of property that belongs to the White House. Instead, she
    obtained the list for an entirely legitimate reason: to remove
    duplicate addresses. This is not a crime. In fact, it is
    commendable.64
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \64\ The majority report mentions other versions of the 1994 list
    that may have been sent to the DNC. Deposition testimony indicates that
    these versions, as well, stayed in the possession of two employees--
    Brooke Stroud and a computer operator--until they were provided to DNC
    counsel in response to requests made pursuant to this investigation.
    Further, these lists were protected from disclosure to other employees
    and were only used for the purpose of sending out the holiday cards.
    Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 173-74 (Nov. 4, 1997); Deposition of
    Brooke Stroud, 32-33, 45-46, 92-95 (Nov. 18, 1997); Deposition of Al
    Hurst, 30-54, 66-91, 110-11 (Mar. 13, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The same fundamental flaw--lack of criminal intent--
    invalidates the majority's assertion that a theft of property
    occurred in connection with the 1993 holiday card list. This
    holiday card list ended up at the 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign by
    accident. It is not theft to unknowingly accept a used computer
    that happens to have White House data stored in its hard drive.
        In addition, the record indicates that neither of the
    holiday card lists were used for any purpose other than sending
    out holiday cards.65 In fact, the 1996 Clinton-Gore
    campaign apparently did not even know that it had received the
    1993 holiday card list and never accessed the list. Thus, there
    is no support for another element of the ``theft'' statute--
    conversion of the property for his use or the use of another.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \65\ Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 92 (Nov. 18, 1997); Deposition of
    Al Hurst, 110-111 (Mar. 13, 1998); Affidavit of Carl Mecum (Sept. 4,
    1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        B. the alleged ``theft'' concerning event attendance information

        The majority report also alleges that the White House and
    DNC committed ``theft'' by executing a ``scheme'' involving the
    use of WhoDB to help the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign.
    According to the majority, this plan purportedly was approved
    at a March 1995 meeting between then-DNC finance chair Truman
    Arnold, then-White House Social Secretary Ann Stock, and then-
    Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles. The majority claims that
    ``theft'' occurred because the White House responded to DNC
    inquiries about whether individuals had attended past White
    House events, and the DNC used that information in fundraising
    efforts.
        These allegations are not substantiated by the evidence.
    The evidence shows that the White House employees who provided
    event attendance information to the DNC did not commit a
    ``theft'' of government property. To the contrary, they had a
    legitimate reason for responding to the DNC requests. The White
    House did not want to invite the same people repeatedly to
    White House events. Providing information on recent event
    attendance to entities like the DNC that were asked to submit
    recommendations for potential guests helped the White House
    build betterguest lists. The DNC, too, sought information for
    legitimate purposes: making sure they provided appropriate guest
    suggestions for White House events. Nothing in these actions reflects
    any sort of intent to wrongfully deprive the government of property.
        Further, it is difficult to see how the mundane information
    involving White House event attendance can even be ``stolen.''
    Everyone who attends an event at the White House has this
    information, as they obviously can see who is there. In
    addition, the White House regularly publishes who attends state
    dinners in the newspaper.
        Other evidence also fundamentally contradicts the
    majority's claims. Relevant DNC witnesses testified that they
    did not use event attendance information from the White House
    for fundraising purposes. Richard Sullivan, former finance
    director of the DNC, testified as follows:

              Q: Now, to your knowledge, was anyone who had been
            invited or who had attended official events--that's
            still what we are talking about here--thereafter
            contacted by anyone at the DNC to make a contribution
            and reminded of their having been invited or attended
            an event?
              A: Not to my knowledge.
              Q: You never contacted anybody who had been invited
            or attended an event, asked for a contribution and
            reminded them of their having been invited or having
            attended?
              A: No.
              Q: Okay. . . . Did anyone at DNC ever contact a
            potential contributor and ask for a contribution and
            remind that contributor that a member of their family
            or a business associate had attended or been invited to
            such an event, to a White House event, to your
            knowledge?
              A: No, not to my knowledge.\66\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \66\ Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 89-90 (Oct. 22, 1997). Later
    in his testimony, Mr. Sullivan testified that he had made a few fund-
    raising calls using names he saw on a list of attendees at a 1993-1994
    White House CEO luncheon. The list Mr. Sullivan used, however, was
    created before the WhoDB was operational. Moreover, the record before
    the Committee does not establish that the list even came from the White
    House. Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 21, 40-49 (Mar. 5, 1998).

        Ari Swiller, former head of the DNC trustee program,
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    provided similar testimony:

              Q: Do you have any reason to believe anyone at the
            DNC used this information that you received relating to
            attendance to White House events to determine whether
            or not to solicit a contribution from the invitee? For
            instance, would you solicit contributions from
            confirmed invitees and attendees and hold off
            soliciting from recommended invitees who had not been
            accepted by the White House?
              A: No.\67\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \67\ Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 183 (Jan. 6, 1998). Mr.
    Swiller also testified that he had no reason to believe that WhoDB was
    used for political fundraising or campaign purposes. Id. at 182. See
    also Deposition of Brook Stroud, 90-91 (Nov. 18, 1998) (testifying that
    she did not use final attendance lists regarding White House events to
    determine whether or not the DNC should solicit a contribution from
    anyone on such lists, and that she never used these lists for campaign
    fundraising purposes).

        This testimony is inconsistent with the majority's claim
    that information was ``converted'' for the benefit of the DNC.
    Further, DNC staff requests to the White House were often
    ignored, and DNC staff testified that the DNC was not able to
    obtain information from the White House more readily following
    Mr. Arnold's March 1995 visit at the White House.\68\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \68\ Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 70, 80-81, 86-87 (Jan. 6,
    1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      C. The Alleged ``Conversion'' of Government Personnel and Resources

        The majority also alleges that the White House violated the
    ``theft'' statute by converting ``government personnel and
    resources'' to directly benefit outside political
    campaigns.\69\ The main basis for the majority's assertion is a
    June 28, 1994, memo by Marsha Scott, who was leading the
    development of WhoDB at the time the memo was written.\70\ The
    majority's claim, however, ignores relevant testimony by the
    author of the document and others that directly contradicts the
    majority's conclusion.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \69\ Majority Report.
        \70\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey, cc'd
    to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M32438.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The June 28, 1994, memo by Ms. Scott discusses four
    different databases, including the White House
    database.71 In the memo, Ms. Scott states that her
    ``team'' and she are ``engaged in conversations with the DNC
    about the new systems they are proposing,'' and suggests, ``let
    my team work with the DNC to help them design a system that
    will meet our needs and technical specifications.''
    72 Ms. Scott in her deposition testimony explained
    that she and the WhoDB team were working with the DNC to ensure
    that the WhoDB would be able to receive information from the
    DNC.73
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \71\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 89-101 (Feb. 19, 1998).
        \72\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey, cc'd
    to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M32438.
        \73\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 94-95 (Feb. 19, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As the White House Counsel's Office had
    advised,74 these efforts were not illegal. Like many
    individuals in many other types of jobs, the President is
    entitled to build a Rolodex of individuals who he knows and
    with whom he is interested in maintaining contact. The DNC
    database had extensive information about individuals who the
    President knew. It was therefore a logical source of data for
    populating the electronic White House Rolodex.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \74\ See, e.g., Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to
    the President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President (Jan.
    17, 1994), M24918-20.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Consistent with Ms. Scott's testimony, individuals who
    worked with her on WhoDB testified that they recalled talking
    with the DNC to discuss making sure the White House could
    receive data from the DNC.75 Nowhere in the
    voluminous deposition record is there evidence that any
    individuals on the WhoDB team--or any White House employee--
    did, in fact, work on developing outside databases. In fact,
    when Ms. Scott's former assistant, Erich Vaden, was asked
    whether anyone worked with the DNC to design a system, he
    testified, ``I know she [Ms. Scott] would have liked that, but
    it never happened.'' 76
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \75\ Deposition of Mark Bartholomew, 50-51 (Aug. 15, 1997), 47-48
    (Sept. 16, 1997); Deposition of Erich Vaden, 166-67 (Jan. 25, 1998).
        \76\ Deposition of Erich Vaden, 263 (Jan. 25, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The only use of government resources for unofficial
    purposes that this investigation demonstrated regarding the
    June 28, 1994, memo was that the memo itself arguably should
    not have been printed on government paper because, in addition
    to discussing WhoDB, it also discussed outside political
    databases. Under the Hatch Act, it is not illegal for certain
    employees of the Executive Office of the President to engage in
    political activity, but the costs associated with that activity
    cannot be paid by the government.77 Thus, it is
    arguable that a memo discussing outside political databases
    should not be written on official stationary.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \77\ 5 U.S.C. 7234(b)(1).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The majority asserts that the use of government paper for
    the memo is ``similar'' to the conduct prosecuted in United
    States v. Collins.78 The conduct in Collins,
    however, involved a government employee with an apparent
    partiality to ballroom dancing who made approximately 76,500
    copies of ballroom dancing newsletters and calendars on a
    government copier, on government paper, for his personal
    use.79 It is irresponsible--and just plain silly--to
    compare that conduct to using two sheets of government paper
    for a memo discussing ideas on both government and
    nongovernment databases.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \78\ 53 F.3d 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Majority Report.
        \79\ Collins, 53 United States F.3d at 1418.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      d. the allegation of a white house ``infrastructure'' to support dnc

        The majority report asserts that the investigation
    ``exposed'' a White House ``infrastructure'' that processed
    invitations for DNC events at the White House.80 The
    majority fails to mention that the White House Social Office
    has processed invitations the same way for all outside entities
    holding an event at the White House, including the Kennedy
    Center and the Library of Congress. The majority also fails to
    mention that the system followed in the Clinton White House was
    based on the precedent set by past Republican
    administrations.81 The exclusion of this relevant
    evidence underscores that this investigation appears to be
    designed to generate allegations about the Clinton
    Administration, rather than seriously examine the way White
    House resources are used.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \80\ Majority Report.
        \81\ See discussion above in Part II.B.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           e. the allegations regarding the president and first lady

        The majority claims that the President and the First Lady
    were ``involved in the unlawful conversion of government
    property to the use of the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign.''
    82 The record, however, does not even remotely
    support the majority's claim.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \82\ Majority Report.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        First, as discussed above, the conduct at issue in the
    WhoDB investigation did not violate the ``theft'' statute. It
    is impossible to implicate the President and First Lady when a
    crime did not occur.
        Second, as discussed above, the deposition testimony from
    the relevant witnesses indicates that the President and First
    Lady were interested in and aware of the database, but were not
    involved with the details of its planning and use.
        The majority cites nine documents to argue that the
    President and First Lady conspired to steal government
    property. In this discussion, however, the majority
    mischaracterizes most of the documents, fails to include any of
    the substantial exculpatory evidence that the Committee
    uncovered when questioning witnesses about these very
    documents, and makes enormous leaps of logic. Despite the
    majority's elaborate efforts to demonstrate a link between a
    scheme toillegally use the WhoDB and the First Family, the
    record simply does not support the majority's allegations.
        The following are a few examples of how the majority
    ignores exculpatory evidence, mischaracterizes documents, and
    makes arguments that strain credulity in order to tie the First
    Family to an alleged ``scheme'':

             Brian Bailey Notes.\83\ As its strongest
            evidence, the majority cites to the handwritten notes
            of Brian Bailey, former aide to Mr. Bowles, which state
            that ``Harold [Ickes] and Deborah DeLee want to make
            sure WhoDB is integrated w/DNC database--so we can
            share--evidently, POTUS [the President] wants this
            to.'' Although the majority asserts that these notes
            indicate that the President wanted to transfer data
            from the WhoDB to the DNC, these notes do not support
            the majority's assertion. On their face, the notes do
            not make clear whether the reference to ``sharing''
            information concerned White House receipt of
            information from the DNC (which is appropriate) or DNC
            receipt of White House database information (which
            might not be appropriate). Moreover, the testimony of
            all the relevant witnesses conflicts with the
            majority's assertion. These witnesses uniformly
            testified that they had a clear understanding that it
            was inappropriate for the White House to share data
            from its databases, and had no reason to believe that
            the White House ever transferred information from WhoDB
            to an outside database.\84\ In fact, none of the 35
            witnesses that testified in the WhoDB investigation
            said that they believed that WhoDB was inappropriately
            linked with a DNC or other outside database, or that
            the President wanted improper linkage to occur.\85\ Mr.
            Bailey, the author of the notes, himself testified that
            he had no personal knowledge of what the President
            wanted with respect to the database, and that the notes
            likely were based on information he heard in passing
            and quickly wrote down to himself.\86\ He also
            testified that he likely spoke with White House counsel
            on this matter and had no reason to believe anyone at
            the White House ignored legal advice relating to the
            database.\87\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \83\ Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey (undated), M033298.
        \84\ E.g., Deposition of Brian Bailey, 39, 129-32 (Feb. 6, 1998).
        \85\ See, e.g., Deposition of Harold Ickes, 61-63, 130-31 (Mar. 12,
    1998); Deposition of Brian Bailey, 129-132 (Feb. 6, 1998).
        \86\ Deposition of Brian Bailey, 129-30 (Feb. 6, 1998).
        \87\ Deposition of Brian Bailey, 36-37, 129-32 (Feb. 6, 1998).

             June 28, 1994, Marsha Scott Memo.\88\ The
            majority claims that this memo from Marsha Scott to
            Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey and ``cc'd'' to the
            First Lady ``shows that the First Lady was informed of
            the conversion of government staff and other
            resources,'' because Ms. Scott describes her interest
            in ensuring that the WhoDB is compatible with the DNC
            database. As discussed above in Part III. C, however,
            the record does not establish that this memorandum is
            evidence of an illegal conversion of government
            resources. In fact, the only wrongdoing that was
            potentially established was that this two-page
            memorandum was printed on government stationary.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \88\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey, cc'd
    to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M032438.

             WhoDB Requirements Report.\89\ In one of its
            more bizarre leaps of logic, the majority report points
            to the language in a WhoDB requirements report that
            states that the President and First Lady requested that
            a database ``containing relevant information about all
            White House events and contacts be designed and
            implemented.'' \90\ Based on that language, the
            majority concludes that the document suggests that the
            President and First Lady ``had a particular interest in
            the Database project, such as the possible political
            uses of databases.'' \91\ There is simply no foundation
            for this inference, however, since the WhoDB
            requirements report never mentions any political uses
            of databases.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \89\ WhoDB Requirements Report, undated, produced by the White
    House with no bates stamp No.
        \90\ WhoDB Requirements Report, undated.
        \91\ Majority Report (emphasis added).

        The only evidence in the Committee record of direct
    involvement by the President in building any database concerns
    his occasional practice of passing along names and addresses of
    individuals to be incorporated into the PeopleBase database.
    The PeopleBase is the database developed by Malone, Inc., for
    President Clinton in the early 1980's which was used by
    President Clinton while he was Governor of Arkansas.\92\
    President Clinton owns the data within the PeopleBase.\93\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \92\ Deposition of William Percy Malone, 14 (Oct. 1, 1997).
        \93\ Deposition of William Percy Malone, 55 (Oct. 1, 1997).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The majority report states in its opening pages that the
    President's conduct was illegal because ``the President
    routinely continued to build PeopleBase with the names and
    addresses of individuals who communicated with him through the
    official White House mail.'' 94 There are two
    fundamental problems with this assertion, however. First, the
    record does not establish that the President forwarded
    information from official White House mail to PeopleBase. In
    fact, the majority report simply ignores the testimony of the
    Committee witness who actually was responsible for forwarding
    names and addresses from the President to PeopleBase, and who
    was the only Committee witness with personal knowledge of the
    practice. This individual, former White House aide Laura
    Tayman, testified that she forwarded ``business cards and torn-
    off sheets of paper with [the President's] actual writing. It
    was not any electronic information.'' She noted that she was
    generally asked to do this after the President had been
    traveling. Most importantly, Ms. Tayman stated flatly that she
    ``never'' forwarded names from correspondence.95
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \94\ Majority Report (emphasis added).
        \95\ Deposition of Laura Tayman, 108-10 (Mar. 20, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Second, even if the President had forwarded to PeopleBase
    the names of certain individuals who had corresponded with him,
    it is not at all clear that this would be illegal. If the
    practice of occasionally transferring such information were
    prohibited, then no elected public officials would be able to
    put names and addresses of individuals they meet on the job
    into their personal Rolodexes.

                   F. The Allegations Regarding Cheryl Mills

        Finally, the majority makes unsubstantiated accusations
    that smear the reputation of White House Deputy Counsel to the
    President, Cheryl Mills. On September 17, 1998, Rep. McIntosh
    requested that the Department of Justice investigate Ms. Mills
    for perjury and obstruction of justice because Rep. McIntosh
    disagreed with the White House's determination that two
    documents were not responsive to a request made pursuant to the
    WhoDB investigation. He also discussed his charges publicly,
    resulting in a Washington Post article containing his
    allegation that there was ```very strong evidence' that Ms.
    Mills lied to Congress.'' 96 The majority has now
    reiterated these claims in the majority report.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \96\ Database Criminal Probe Sought, Washington Post (Sept. 9,
    1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The majority claims that Ms. Mills committed obstruction of
    justice and gave false testimony regarding the production of
    two documents: (1) the June 28, 1994, memo by Marsha
    Scott,97 and (2) the notes of White House aide Brian
    Bailey.98 The White House did not produce these
    documents in its initial September 1996 response to Mr.
    McIntosh's August 2, 1996, request. Upon further review of the
    documents, however, the White House, on its own initiative,
    produced them to Rep. McIntosh.99
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \97\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey, cc'd
    to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M32438.
        \98\ Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey (undated), M033298.
        \99\ The White House produced the Scott memo on Feb. 26, 1997, and
    the Bailey notes on Oct. 28, 1997.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The majority believes that the two documents at issue are
    responsive to the August 2, 1996 request and that the White
    House erred in failing to produce the documents in the initial
    September 1996 production. The majority reaches this conclusion
    after having had the benefit of the testimony of numerous
    witnesses on these documents, including the authors of the
    documents, which the White House did not have. The majority,
    however, is not justified in asserting that this difference in
    judgment--and Ms. Mills's subsequent testimony describing what
    happened--involved obstruction and lying.

    1. The majority's ``evidence'' of perjury and obstruction

                a. Scott memo
        The majority claims that Ms. Mills made three false
    statements in her testimony regarding production of the Scott
    memo. The majority further alleges that these statements are
    evidence that Ms. Mills, and possibly other White House
    counsel, committed obstruction by ``withholding'' the Scott
    memo ``without justification.'' The record does not support the
    majority's claims.
        The Scott memo describes a number of different databases
    and does not explicitly mention WhoDB. The disputed paragraph
    of the memo states that ``Currently in the White House we are
    preparing, as you know, to implement a new database system
    starting August 1. While that system is modeled after the
    Peoplebase software, it has major differences.'' 100
    After the document was produced, the Committee learned from its
    author that the disputed paragraph refers to WhoDB. Ms. Mills,
    who consulted with her supervisor, the counsel to the
    President, on the production of documents that included the
    Scott memo, apparently had a different impression when she
    reviewed the document in September 1996.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \100\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey,
    cc'd to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M32438.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The majority claims that Ms. Mills testified falsely by
    stating that, when she reviewed the Scott memo in September
    1996, she believed that the database referenced in the disputed
    paragraph was not WhoDB. The main basis for the majority's
    conclusion appears to be testimony of other witnesses regarding
    what they thought the memo meant. The judgments of others,
    however, cannot be imputed to Ms. Mills, and such evidence
    therefore does not support any charge that Ms. Mills was lying
    instead of having a different impression of the memo.
        Further, the majority omits testimony received by the
    Committee that shows that the disputed paragraph was ambiguous
    and subject to different interpretations. As noted above, the
    memo does not expressly refer to ``WhoDB.'' Moreover, it is a
    confusing document that discusses four different databases.
    Even Marsha Scott, the author of the memo, testified that the
    memo lacks clarity:

              This is a very poorly written memo, and I am very
            embarrassed by it. It is one of several that I have
            encountered 5 years later that embarrassed me greatly.
            This is one that will go down in my own personal
            history as being one of the worst that I have ever
            written . . . So I can see why it is very confusing to
            you. And on this particular memo, I actually don't mind
            the questions because I think it is really poorly
            written.101
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \101\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 99 (Feb. 19, 1998).

    When specifically asked about the database referenced in the
    paragraph at issue, Ms. Scott also testified that her reference
    to a database was to her concept of WhoDB at the time of the
    memo, but that it ``didn't happen.'' 102
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \102\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 91 (Feb. 19, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In light of these ambiguities, the record does not support
    the majority's effort to criminalize Ms. Mills's impression of
    and testimony about this document.
        The majority also claims that Ms. Mills testified falsely
    during questioning about the Scott memo when she stated her
    view that the WhoDB is not modeled on a computer system known
    as ``PeopleBase.'' To support this claim, the majority cites to
    witnesses who do not in fact contradict Ms. Mills. One of these
    witnesses is former White House aide Erich Vaden.
    Unfortunately, in his September 17 letter to Attorney General
    Reno regarding his allegations about Ms. Mills, Mr. McIntosh
    selectively edited the testimony of Mr. Vaden to exclude
    statements by Mr. Vaden that support Ms. Mills's testimony.
        Mr. McIntosh attached to his letter only the following
    Vaden testimony discussing PeopleBase: ``[W]hat we wanted to
    use was sort of a list of its functionalities, the kind of data
    it stored, how it presented the data. You know, just as, I
    guess, an inspiration, so to speak, of similar type systems.''
    Mr. McIntosh omitted what Mr. Vaden said immediately before the
    quoted passage. When the quoted passage is put in context, Mr.
    Vaden's testimony actually indicates that PeopleBase was not
    the model for WhoDB. Following is the entire relevant portion,
    with the portion Mr. McIntosh did not include in italics:

              Q. So were you in some way trying to use the design
            of PeopleBase to help you design WhoDB?
              A. We didn't want to adopt the design of the system.
            It is an old system. It's character-based, as opposed
            to a GUI-based system, a graphical user interface. So
            we never went down with the intention of adopting it or
            adopting anything similar to it. But what we wanted to
            use was sort of a list of its functionalities, the kind
            of data it stored, how it presented the data. You know,
            just as, I guess, an inspiration, so to speak, of
            similar type systems.103
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \103\ Deposition of Erich Vaden, 143-44 (Jan. 25, 1998).

        Rep. Waxman informed the majority of the selective editing
    over a week before the majority issued its report on the WhoDB
    investigation.104 Nevertheless, the majority report
    still claims that Mr. Vaden's testimony ``confirms'' that WhoDB
    was modeled after PeopleBase, and fails to point out Mr.
    Vaden's statement that ``We didn't want to adopt the design of
    the system. It is an old system.'' The majority's conduct in
    discussing Mr. Vaden's testimony on PeopleBase--both in Mr.
    McIntosh's September 17 letter and in the majority report--
    provides an illustration of the majority's unfair approach to
    presenting evidence.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \104\ See Letter From Rep. Henry A. Waxman to Attorney General
    Janet Reno (Sept. 28, 1998) (cc'd to all members of the Committee)
    (exhibit 2 to these views).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The testimony of Mr. Bartholomew, another witness cited by
    the majority regarding the PeopleBase issue, also does not
    support the majority's claims. The Committee did not ask Mr.
    Bartholomew whether WhoDB was modeled after PeopleBase, nor did
    he testify one way or the other about this issue. The testimony
    cited by the majority simply states that PeopleBase was one of
    several systems identified to ``take under consideration'' in
    designing the new database.105 Therefore, Mr.
    Bartholomew's testimony, including the part cited by the
    majority, is irrelevant to this issue.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \105\ Deposition of Mark Bartholomew, 73 (Aug. 15, 1997).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Further, the majority omits the testimony of other
    witnesses that supports Ms. Mills's understanding that WhoDB
    was not modeled after PeopleBase. One witness, Jerry Carlsen,
    was manager of systems integration and development at the White
    House and tasked to lead the development of WhoDB. He testified
    that he neither met with PeopleBase staff nor heard any
    discussions about PeopleBase beyond the fact that it was
    ``somewhat highly inaccurate . . . and that it wasn't
    necessarily real user friendly.'' 106
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \106\ Deposition of Jerry R. Carlsen, 65-66 (Aug. 28, 1997).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The third statement of Ms. Mills that the majority claims
    was ``false'' concerned her remarks about one of her own memos,
    a January 17, 1994, memo entitled ``Correspondence Department
    Database Project.'' Ms. Mills was questioned on this document
    during her testimony on the Scott memo. She testified that her
    ``impression'' when she wrote the ``Correspondence Department
    Database Project'' memo was that it did not concern
    WhoDB.107 She also stated that there were many
    different databases at the White House.108 The
    majority claims that Ms. Mills's testimony regarding her
    impression of her memo constitutes perjury. This allegation,
    again, is based on impressions of other witnesses as to whether
    the memo related to WhoDB, and the majority's discussion of the
    allegation omits testimony that supports Ms. Mills.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \107\ Testimony of Cheryl Mills, Hearings Before the House
    Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, White House Compliance
    with Committee Subpoenas, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 105-61, 241 (Nov. 6
    and 7, 1997). Relevant excerpts of Ms. Mills's testimony are attached
    as exhibit 3.
        \108\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The ``Correspondence Department Database Project'' memo
    does not expressly reference WhoDB. Further, Ms. Scott
    testified that, at the time the memo was created, there were
    two other ongoing Correspondence Department database
    projects.109 These facts, in addition to Ms. Mills's
    own testimony about her own impressions of her own document,
    underscore the unfairness of the majority's claims.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \109\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 90 (Feb. 18, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 b. Bailey notes
        The majority also claims that Ms. Mills committed
    obstruction by failing to produce the Bailey notes in September
    1996 and lied by testifying that she determined the Bailey
    notes were ``not responsive to the seven enumerated items''
    requested by the Subcommittee. Similar to their arguments on
    the Scott memo, the justification the majority provides for
    these serious charges is that Ms. Mills ``could not have
    believed'' that the Bailey notes were not responsive because
    the document is in fact responsive.
        In her testimony, Ms. Mills stated that she ``can't go back
    and recreate . . . at this time what information I had that led
    us to conclude that this material was not responsive to any of
    the seven enumerated items [in Mr. McIntosh's August 2, 1996
    request].'' 110 She discussed the process she went
    through, which she said involved reviewing the notes with then-
    White House Counsel Jack Quinn.111 She further
    elaborated that she ``think[s]'' that they assumed that Mr.
    Bailey's own notes were not responsive to Mr. McIntosh's
    request for ``communications.'' 112
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \110\ Testimony of Cheryl Mills, Hearings Before the House
    Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, White House Compliance
    with Committee Subpoenas, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 105-61, 115 (Nov. 6
    and 7, 1997).
        \111\ Id.
        \112\ Id. at 263.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The White House may well have erred by not producing the
    Bailey notes. However, the Committee record, which includes a
    deposition of Mr. Quinn, does not support the majority's
    serious allegations that Ms. Mills ``deliberately withheld'' a
    document she believed to be responsive, or purposely misled the
    Committee in her testimony. This conclusion is reinforced by
    the fact that the Bailey notes were part of a large group of
    documents that were reviewed for responsiveness by White House
    counsel in a short period of time.113 It would not
    be surprising if honest mistakes were made under such time
    pressure.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \113\ Id. at 114. Ms. Mills's testimony to the Committee indicates
    that the White House Counsel's Office produced to the Subcommittee over
    27,000 pages of documents for the WhoDB investigation within a short
    time after the Counsel's Office received the documents.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In light of these facts, it simply is not responsible to
    conclude that Ms. Mills committed obstruction and lied.

    2. The majority's allegations regarding motive

        The majority alleges that Ms. Mills had a motive to
    obstruct the Committee's investigation and commit perjury
    because the documents at issue reflect involvement by the
    President and First Lady in ``conversion'' of government
    property and would have been ``politically damaging'' to
    release before the November 1996 election. This is a bootstrap
    argument. As discussed above, the Committee record does not
    establish that there was ``conversion'' of government property.
    In fact, despite the extraordinary investment of resources in
    the WhoDB investigation, the majority failed to uncover any
    serious wrongdoing. The majority's suggestion that the White
    House had a motive to withhold documents is in direct conflict
    with the fact that there was simply no wrongdoing to cover up.
        Further, not one of the 35 witnesses that the Committee
    deposed on WhoDB issues questioned Ms. Mills's honesty or
    integrity. Ms. Mills also showed these documents to the White
    House counsel, her supervisor, who agreed with her analysis and
    interpretation.114
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \114\ Testimony of Cheryl Mills, Hearings on White House Compliance
    with Committee Subpoenas, House Committee on Government Reform and
    Oversight, 115, 248-49.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As discussed in more detail in Rep. Waxman's September 28,
    1998, letter to Attorney General Janet Reno,115
    these and other facts demonstrate that the majority's
    assertions about Ms. Mills are based on selective testimony of
    other individuals about their impressions of the documents at
    issue, as well as speculation about Ms. Mills's motives. It is
    wrong to base such serious allegations on such insubstantial
    and incomplete evidence.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \115\ Letter from Mr. Waxman to Attorney General Janet Reno (Sept.
    28, 1998). This letter describes how Mr. McIntosh's allegations of
    perjury and obstruction are unsubstantiated and do not warrant further
    review. The letter also addresses numerous other unfounded statements
    made by the majority regarding Ms. Mills.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        All of the majority's allegations relating to Ms. Mills
    essentially boil down to a disagreement between the majority
    and the White House about the relevance of two documents.
    Disputes between lawyers over the relevance of documents are
    commonplace and legitimate. What is extraordinary is the
    majority's attempt to elevate this run-of-the-mill document
    dispute into a federal criminal case. Not only do the
    majority's accusations lack foundation in fact, but they also
    set a dangerous precedent: that to disagree with Mr. McIntosh
    on the relevance of documents is to risk being publicly smeared
    and called a criminal.

                    IV. The Costs of the WhoDB Investigation

        Although this investigation of the esoteric subject of a
    computerized Rolodex did not reveal any serious wrongdoing, it
    did eat up a great deal of resources and taxpayer funds. The
    WhoDB investigation began over 27 months ago, on June 27,
    1996.116 The Subcommittee spent so much time and
    energy on this investigation that it did not hold hearings on
    any topic between June 16, 1997 and March 5, 1998. During those
    nine months, Subcommittee resources were devoted almost
    exclusively to the investigation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \116\ Letter from Subcommittee Chairman McIntosh to Leon Panetta
    (June 27, 1996).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Subcommittee requested information from 14 different
    entities who produced over 43,000 pages of documents. Over 16
    subpoenas were sent and 250 letters written on the subject. In
    addition, the Committee deposed 35 witnesses for a total of
    more than 135 hours of questioning on the WhoDB. In fact, about
    20 percent of all of the depositions taken by this Committee in
    the $7.4 million campaign finance investigation were limited to
    WhoDB issues. Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact
    cost of the WhoDB investigation, it would appear to dwarf the
    cost of developing and using the WhoDB, which the White House
    estimates to be less than $800,000.117
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \117\ In Sept. 1998, the Office of White House Counsel estimated
    that the cost of the development and operation of the WhoDB was about
    $785,467.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Committee's first three depositions in the WhoDB
    investigation illustrate the significant costs that the
    Committee frequently imposed on witnesses for no tangible
    benefit. These depositions concerned document production by
    PRC, a White House computer contractor that provided systems
    support to the WhoDB. When PRC received a request for
    documents, it informed the Subcommittee that its contract with
    the White House required that it obtain White House
    authorization before providing White House information to the
    Subcommittee.118 PRC requested and received the
    necessary authorization,119 and provided the
    documents to the Subcommittee within three weeks of receiving
    the request for documents.120 Nothing in the record
    regarding this timely response suggests that the White House
    obstructed the investigation. Nevertheless, the Committee
    conducted three depositions to try to determine if the few days
    it took the White House to authorize PRC to respond was a
    deliberate attempt to frustrate the Committee's investigation.
    According to one of the witnesses, PRC, Inc., spent more
    responding to document requests and attending depositions
    related to the WhoDB investigation than it did fulfilling the
    terms of its White House contract.121
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \118\ Deposition of Donald Upson, 66 (Aug. 7, 1997).
        \119\  Letter from the Executive Office of the President to PRC,
    Inc. (Aug. 15, 1996) and Deposition of Donald Upson, 66 (Aug. 7, 1997).
        \120\ Letter request from Subcommittee Chairman McIntosh to PRC,
    Inc. (July 30, 1996); Letter from PRC, Inc. to Subcommittee Chairman
    McIntosh (Aug. 19, 1996).
        \121\ Deposition of Donald Upson, 61 (Aug. 7, 1997). Mr. Upson
    testified that the document request and related depositions cost PRC
    more than it spent on ``porting the WhoDB,'' which he estimated to cost
    $40,000-$50,000.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Another witness who was unnecessarily burdened and harassed
    during the course of the investigation was Marsha Scott, the
    White House official who supervised the development of the
    WhoDB. Her unfortunate experiences, which included providing
    eight days of testimony for nearly 40 hours to congressional
    investigators, are described in detail in the minority views
    accompanying the Committee's report on the campaign finance
    investigation.
        There are numerous other examples of unnecessary burdens
    imposed by the Committee during the WhoDB investigation. For
    example:

             One witness, Charles Benjamin, former
            associate director in the White House Office of
            Administration, estimated that he spent about 1,500
            hours--the equivalent of over 37 work weeks--between
            June 1996 and September 1997 responding to requests for
            information relating to WhoDB. He said that such
            responses consumed about one-half to three-quarters of
            his time, and that ``quite frequently'' he had to work
            after hours to respond to these requests.122
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \122\ Deposition of Charles Benjamin, 130-31 (Sept. 5, 1997).

             The White House estimated that the computer
            division of the Office of Administration, which is
            charged with running the database, devoted over 5,500
            hours to answering questions. That's the equivalent of
            one full-time employee devoting two and a half years to
            nothing but responding to Committee questions. During
            just one three-month period in which the White House
            tracked the cost of responding to this investigation
            and the related GAO audit, it estimated that the
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            response cost the taxpayers $155,000.

             The Committee required Bryan Daines, a former
            computer operator at the DNC, to fly to Washington, DC
            from Bend, Oregon for 1\1/2\ hours of questioning in a
            deposition on issues about which the witness had little
            substantive knowledge. Prior to the deposition, the
            witness's attorney informed the Committee that Mr.
            Daines had little relevant knowledge and offered to
            make him available for a phone interview. The Committee
            refused this sensible alternative, forcing the witness
            to spend between two and three days preparing for and
            traveling to this deposition.123
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \123\ Deposition of Bryan Daines, 85-86 (Apr. 6, 1998).

             Even Jacqueline Bellanti, an unpaid volunteer
            at the White House who is accused of no wrongdoing, was
            forced to hire a lawyer to represent her at a
            deposition.124
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \124\ Deposition of Jacqueline Bellanti, 66 (Oct. 7, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 V. Conclusion

        Rep. McIntosh's investigation of the WhoDB is reminiscent
    of his investigation of the travel practices of SEC Chairman
    Arthur Levitt. A Wall Street Journal opinion piece by Holman
    Jenkins summarized the Levitt investigation as follows:

              Rep. David M. McIntosh has been chasing SEC Chairman
            Arthur Levitt Jr. all over Planet Washington. He does
            so in pursuit of a ``scandal'' that, when we press our
            x-ray spectrometer up against it, seems to consist of
            the substance of interstellar space, which is to say,
            nothing.
              Mr. Levitt is accused of flying first class and
            staying in nice hotels, and digging into his own pocket
            to pay for it.
              It takes a special kind of ingenuity to find
            something to get outraged about here, but Mr. Levitt
            did use legitimate government-paid upgrades to defray
            the cost of upgrading even further. If you stand back
            and twist your head at a funny angle, you can pretend
            this means taxpayers ``paid'' for Mr. Levitt to fly
            first class. . . .
              Perhaps there is a secret McIntosh method here--a
            plan to disable the Clinton administration by hassling
            one of its few grown-ups. But Republicans should
            remember that someday, perhaps within the lifetimes of
            our grandchildren, they could conceivably end up the
            party of government again. Then they might want to coax
            some grown-ups into service too. The precedent here is
            not an inviting one. . . .
              Life being short, Mr. Levitt entered into a plea
            bargain with Mr. McIntosh's subcommittee and has agreed
            to suffer in business class at taxpayer expense rather
            than loll in first class at his own. We are honestly at
            a loss to understand what principle of good government
            is served by this outcome, but that's par for the
            course. It would be interesting, though, to get a full
            accounting of how much of the taxpayer's money Rep.
            McIntosh spent to bring this heroic denouement. The SEC
            calculates it alone has spent $187,000 responding to
            Mr. McIntosh's request for documents and accounting of
            Mr. Levitt's every limo ride.125
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \125\ Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Business World: Fly First Class (With
    the Other Criminals), Wall Street Journal (July 15, 1997).

        Regrettably, much of what Mr. Jenkins said about the Levitt
    investigation seems to apply with equal force to the WhoDB
    investigation. Once again, the Committee has been in pursuit of
    the ``scandal'' that ``seems to consist of the substance of
    interstellar space, which is to say, nothing.''
                                       Henry A. Waxman.
                                       Tom Lantos.
                                       Robert E. Wise, Jr.
                                       Major R. Owens.
                                       Edolphus Towns.
                                       Paul E. Kanjorski.
                                       Gary A. Condit.
                                       Bernard Sanders.
                                       Carolyn B. Maloney.
                                       Eleanor Holmes Norton.
                                       Chaka Fattah.
                                       Elijah E. Cummings.
                                       Dennis J. Kucinich.
                                       Rod R. Blagojevich.
                                       Danny K. Davis.
                                       Thomas H. Allen.
                                       Harold E. Ford, Jr.
        [Supporting documentation follows:]

                    SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF DAVID M. McINTOSH

        During consideration of the Committee's Report, Mr. Waxman
    referred to a previous investigation, conducted by the
    Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources,
    and Regulatory Affairs of the travel practices of senior agency
    officials. Unable to address the evidence in the Report, Mr.
    Waxman instead attempted to smear the Subcommittee and its
    staff for their work on that investigation and the evidence
    discovered about the failure of Securities and Exchange
    Commission [SEC] Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. to conform his
    travel practices to the travel policies of his own agency.
        The single most important point that the Minority ignores
    is that the SEC travel policy prohibited flying first class
    even when paid for with personal funds. Chairman Levitt
    violated this policy and used taxpayer funds to help defray the
    cost of upgrading from coach to first class. In contrast to the
    biased and polemical Wall Street Journal article referenced by
    Mr. Waxman, the Washington Post reported that SEC documents and
    other records show that Mr. Levitt ``often flies first class
    and stays at luxury hotels, partly at government expense, and
    sometimes attaches personal travel to official trips . . .\1\
    According to the Post, ``The documents show that Mr. Levitt
    uses government-paid upgrades and reimbursements to help reduce
    his own costs when he chooses more expensive accommodations
    than government rules allow.'' \2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Brett D. Fromson, Levitt's Travel Practices Scrutinized, the
    Washington Post, (July 3, 1997) (emphasis supplied).
        \2\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Waxman's attacks on that investigation are entirely
    unwarranted. He failed to recognize that the Subcommittee's
    investigation of Mr. Levitt brought Mr. Levitt's travel
    practices into conformity with the SEC's policy. As a result of
    the Subcommittee's investigation, Mr. Levitt stopped flying
    first class, at least for a while, until the SEC changed its
    travel policy to allow first class travel paid for with
    personal funds. The Subcommittee will continue to investigate
    ways to save taxpayer funds through ensuring that agency travel
    practices are in conformity with agency policy.
        Mr. Levitt's willingness to change his practices and then
    change the SEC policy is ample evidence that his practices were
    not in conformity with SEC policy. Apparently, it is not Mr.
    Waxman's view that regulators should abide by their own
    regulations.

                                       Hon. David M. McIntosh.
        [Supporting documentation follows:]