[House Report 105-824]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Union Calendar No. 463
105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - - House Report 105-824
MONUMENTAL ABUSE: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S CAMPAIGN OF
MISINFORMATION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE
NATIONAL MONUMENT
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
October 16, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES
DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman
W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana GEORGE MILLER, California
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California BRUCE F. VENTO, Minnesota
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DALE E. KILDEE, Michigan
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Samoa
KEN CALVERT, California NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
RICHARD W. POMBO, California SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming OWEN B. PICKETT, Virginia
HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
LINDA SMITH, Washington CALVIN M. DOOLEY, California
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California CARLOS ROMERO-BARCELO, Puerto Rico
WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North MAURICE E. HINCHEY, New York
Carolina ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
WILLIAM M. (MAC) THORNBERRY, Texas SAM FARR, California
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
JOHN E. ENSIGN, Nevada ADAM SMITH, Washington
ROBERT F. SMITH, Oregon WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
CHRIS CANNON, Utah CHRIS JOHN, Louisiana
KEVIN BRADY, Texas DONNA CHRISTIAN-GREEN, Virgin
JOHN E. PETERSON, Pennsylvania Islands
RICK HILL, Montana RON KIND, Wisconsin
BOB SCHAFFER, Colorado LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Resources,
Washington, DC, October 16, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on
Resources, I submit the Committee's report to the 105th
Congress on ``Monument Abuse: The Clinton Administration's
Campaign of Misinformation in the Establishment of the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument.'' The report was adopted
and ordered reported to the House of Representatives by voice
vote on October 7, 1998.
Sincerely,
Don Young, Chairman.
Enclosure.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Introduction..................................................... 3
Committee Jurisdiction and Scope of Review....................... 4
History of Coal Mining on the Kaiparowits Plateau................ 6
``Rope in the Kaiparowits''...................................... 7
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Process for the Warm
Springs Project................................................ 8
Ecological Consequences of the Warm Springs Project.............. 10
Socioeconomic Consequences of the Warm Springs Project........... 12
Abuse of the NEPA Process........................................ 14
Attachment 1: March 25, 1996, E-Mail Message..................... 19
Attachment 2: Excerpts from Warm Springs Project PDEIS........... 21
Attachment 3: March 27, 1996, E-Mail Message..................... 192
Attachment 4: April 9, 1996, Memorandum.......................... 195
Attachment 5: April 3, 1996, E-Mail Message...................... 197
Attachment 6: April 4, 1996, E-Mail Message...................... 199
Attachment 7: DOI Organizational Chart........................... 201
Attachment 8: June 21, 1996, E-Mail Message...................... 203
Attachment 9: September 16, 1996, E-Mail & Note.................. 205
Attachment 10: Maps.............................................. 207
=======================================================================
MONUMENTAL ABUSE: THE CLINTON
ADMINISTRATION'S CAMPAIGN OF
MISINFORMATION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE
NATIONAL MONUMENT
=======================================================================
Introduction
On September 18, 1996, President Bill Clinton stood in the
Arizona sun on the rim of the Grand Canyon and announced the
establishment of the 1.7-million-acre Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument (Utah Monument), seventy miles away in Utah.
He quoted Teddy Roosevelt and praised the beauty of the Utah
lands he and Vice President Al Gore had chosen to ``protect.''
From what threat was the President protecting these lands? ``I
am concerned about a large coal mine proposed for the area,''
the President said. ``[W]e shouldn't have mines that threaten
our national treasures.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Remarks Announcing the Establishment of the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument at Grand Canyon National Park, Arizona, 32
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1785 (Sept. 23, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Far from threatening our national treasures, the mine
project inappropriately killed by the Clinton Administration
would have provided millions in funds for Utah's
schoolchildren--which Clinton and Gore call ``the greatest
resource in the country.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Gore Pushes Technology, Better Pay for Teachers, Greensborough
News & Record, May 29, 1997, at B5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the time the Utah Monument was designated by
Presidential Proclamation No. 6920, an environmental impact
review of the ``large coal mine'' (the Smoky Hollow Mine)
referred to by the President had been underway for nearly seven
years.\3\ As required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Office of
Surface Mining and Reclamation (OSM) had produced a
comprehensive preliminary draft environmental impact statement
(PDEIS) that was prepared for public comment. This report
reviews that PDEIS and shows that the characterization of the
project as a threat to the lands designated under the
Antiquities Act was purely a pretext and not supported by the
record. The substance of that review is contained in this
report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The American public, watching the Escalante campaign event,
may have believed the President when he warned of the mine's
supposed impact on sensitive lands. People had no reason not to
take the President at his word at that time. Documents and
records obtained by the House Committee on Resources and
reviewed in this report now show that the President's statement
was as far away from accuracy as he was from Utah. The only
thing the President was trying to protect by designating the
Utah Monument was his chance to win reelection. The ``threat''
motivating the President's action was electoral, not
environmental.
The Utah Monument was designated pursuant to Section 2 of
the Act of June 8, 1906 (Antiquities Act), which allows the
President to reserve parcels of federal land as national
monuments by public proclamation.\4\ The language of the
Antiquities Act makes clear, however, that the land reserved
``shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the
proper care and management of the objects to be protected.''
\5\ The Act contemplates that objects to be protected must be
threatened or endangered in some way. For example, a
proclamation withdrawing Devil's Hole in Nevada was upheld in
court because it was not solely for the purpose of preserving
the unique limestone formations in Devil's Hole pool, but also
to protect the endangered pupfish from possible extinction due
to agricultural use of the pool's water.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ 16 U.S.C. Sec. 431 et seq.
\5\ ID.
\6\ U.S. v. Cappaert, 508 F. 2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 426
U.S. 128 (1976). For further discussion of Congressional intent
regarding the limited application of the Antiquities Act see the House
debate at 40 Cong. Rec. H7888 (June 5, 1906). See also Report to
accompany S. 4698, Rpt. No. 3797, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 24, 1906).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It follows that for the designation of the Utah Monument to
be proper its lands had to be somehow threatened or endangered.
The Clinton Administration knew that they were not. In a March
25, 1996, email message to T.J. Glauthier at the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and Linda Lance at the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ), Kathleen McGinty (the Chair of
CEQ) stated her doubts about the planned designation:
I'm [sic] increasingly of the view that we should just
drop these utah [sic] ideas. we [sic] do not really
know how the enviros will react and I do think there is
a danger of ``abuse'' of the withdraw/antiquities
authorities especially because these lands are not
really endangered.\7\ [Emphasis added.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Staff of House Comm. on Resources, Behind Closed Doors: The
Abuse of Trust and Discretion in the Establishment of the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument, H.R. Rep. No. 105-D, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 28 (Comm. Print 1997) (emphasis added). Attachment
1.
To have at least the appearance of credibility, the
President had to point to some sort of threat. As far as the
Clinton Administration was concerned, the coal mine fit the
bill. After all, in a campaign where image reigned supreme,
reality was of little consequence. After election day, however,
reality remained. As the campaign dust settled, a new question
arose: was the development of the coal mine actually a threat
sufficient to justify sealing off 1.7 million acres of southern
Utah? The PDEIS makes it clear the answer is no. In fact, the
Clinton Administration's own agencies determined after a full
review, that between killing the mine and approving it,
approval was the ``preferred alternative.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Warm Springs Project PDEIS 2-1 (Dec. 11, 1995) [hereinafter
PDEIS (1995)]. For all references to the PDEIS, refer to Attachment 2
of this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee Jurisdiction and Scope of Review
The Committee on Resources has jurisdiction over the
Antiquities Act and the creation of the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument under Articles I and IV of the U.S.
Constitution, Rules X and XI of the Rules of the U.S. House of
Representatives, and Rule 6(a) of the Rules for the Committee
on Resources (Committee Rules), jurisdiction that is delegated
under Rule 6(d) of the Committee Rules to the Subcommittee on
National Parks and Public Lands.
The Subcommittee has a continuing responsibility under Rule
6(b) of the Committee Rules to monitor and evaluate
administration of laws within its jurisdiction. In relevant
part, that Rule states:
Each Subcommittee shall review and study, on a
continuing basis, the application, administration,
execution, and effectiveness of those statutes or parts
of statutes, the subject matter of which is within that
Subcommittee's jurisdiction; and the organization,
operation, and regulations of any Federal agency or
entity having responsibilities in or for the
administration of such statutes, to determine whether
these statutes are being implemented and carried out in
accordance with the intent of Congress.
In accordance with its Rule 6(d) responsibility, the
Committee and Subcommittee Chairmen initiated a review of the
creation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument.
The initial review focused on the actions of the Executive
Branch in the designation of the Monument. This review resulted
in a majority staff report entitled ``Behind Closed Doors: The
Abuse of Trust and Discretion in the Establishment of the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument.'' \9\ The report made
several findings supported by evidence discovered by the
Committee. The significant findings, as summarized in the
report, are as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ H.R. Rep. No. 105-D, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) the designation of the Monument was almost
entirely politically motivated to assist the Clinton-
Gore reelection effort;
(2) the plan to designate the monument was
purposefully kept secret from Americans and the Utah
congressional delegation;
(3) the Monument designation was put forward even
though Administration officials did not believe that
the lands proposed for protection were in danger;
(4) use of the Antiquities Act was intended to
overcome Congressional involvement in land designation
decisions;
(5) use of the Antiquities Act by the Clinton
Administration was planned to evade the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Indeed, its use was
specifically intended to evade the provisions of NEPA
and other Federal administrative requirements.
As a consequence of this report, the Subcommittee requested
a further review of the question whether there was any actual
threat posed by development of the Smokey Hollow Mine that was
sufficient to justify the use of the Antiquities Act to
``protect'' Utah's ``threatened'' national treasures. On
November 5, 1997, the Committee sent a letter to Secretary of
Interior Bruce Babbitt requesting each version of the
preliminary draft environmental impact statement prepared for
the Warm Springs Project/Smokey Hollow Mine. The Committee's
request was met with the threat of a claim of privilege based
upon the ``predecisional'' nature of the documents, in spite of
the fact that no such privilege applies to Congress. On
November 12, 1997, consistent with the Committee's oversight
powers, a subpoena was served on the Department of Interior and
the requested documents were received by the Committee one week
later.
The subpoenaed materials included not only the complete
text of all versions of the PDEIS but also copies with marginal
notes and correspondence regarding the Warm Springs Project.
This report, based on a review of the documents provided, was
developed for and provided to Members of the Committee on
Resources for their information so that Members can undertake
their legislative and oversight responsibilities under the
Constitution, the Rules of the House of Representatives, and
the Rules for the Committee on Resources.
While the earlier staff report demonstrates that the
President acted without legal authority in designating the Utah
Monument, this Committee report shows that the President's
environmental conservation justification was just as illusory.
History of Coal Mining on the Kaiparowits Plateau
The proposed Smoky Hollow Mine was to be located on the
Kaiparowits Plateau.\10\ The sweeping, arid plateau covers
approximately 1,650 square miles of southern Utah. It extends
65 miles north to south, 20 miles across its northern boundary,
and 55 miles across its southern boundary. The Plateau contains
an original coal resource of 62.3 billion short tons, though
only about 30 billion short tons are in areas where geologic
conditions are favorable for current underground mining
technology. Overall, the Kaiparowits Plateau contains about 1.5
percent of the Nation's total coal resource in the lower forty-
eight states. The low sulfur content of Kaiparowits coal
creates a relatively low polluting power plant fuel, while the
thickness of the seams make it attractive for mining. Except
for the Monument designation, the region would be an important
source of low-cost, environmentally safe fuel for the Nation's
needs in the 21st century.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Refer to maps at Attachment 10.
\11\ See U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 96-539,
Preliminary investigations of the distribution and resources of coal in
the Kaiparowits Plateau, southern Utah (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coal in the region was first mined by settlers in the late
1800's near the town of Escalante, Utah, with several small
mines producing coal for local needs until the early 1960's. In
the 1970's, about 12,000 tons of coal were mined from a test
mine (the Missing Canyon Coal Mine) whichwas part of a larger
project to develop a 3,000-megawatt coal-burning power plant.
Construction plans for the plant were eventually halted due to
development difficulties.
The prior incidence of development in southern Utah caused
BLM to exclude most of the land in the mining area from its
wilderness review. In BLM's initial review three areas (Warm
Creek, Nipple Bench, and Head of the Creeks) were excluded
because they ``clearly and obviously'' did not meet wilderness
criteria. In BLM's Final Utah Wilderness EIS, released in 1990,
the remaining two areas (Wahweap and Burning Hills) were also
not recommended for wilderness. This was due to the fact that
neither Burning Hills nor Wahweap's geologic features were
considered to be of National or regional importance and their
potential for energy mineral extraction outweighed their low
wilderness values.\12\ According to BLM's scientists and land
managers, the land that would be affected by the proposed coal
mine was not, as President Clinton would later say ``the most
remarkable land in the world.''.\13\ Its high potential for
future energy development outweighed its low wilderness
values.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ ``BLM concluded that although the Wahweap WSA is in a natural
state, only about 10 percent of the WSA has outstanding opportunities
for solitude. About 17 percent of the WSA has high scenic values, in
six scattered locations. Opportunities for primitive recreation are not
outstanding. About 1,000 acres of comparatively old pinyon and juniper
trees and 11,700 acres of features with geologic interest in the WSA
are not considered to be of National or regional importance.'' PDEIS 3-
89 (1995).
\13\ PDEIS 3-89 (1995).
\14\ PDEIS 3-89 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Rope in the Kaiparowits''
If, as BLM concluded, the Kaiparowits Plateau's greatest
value was for energy development and it ``clearly and
obviously'' did not meet wilderness criteria, what is the
Plateau doing in a national monument? The answer has more to do
with political expediency than environmental protection.
To invoke the Antiquities Act, the President needed to
point his finger at a credible threat. The northern end of the
Utah Monument (which does arguably have geologic features of
significance) was not threatened in the least and could not
have been designated standing alone. The President faced a
Catch-22: the geologically and culturally significant lands
were not threatened, while the purportedly ``threatened'' lands
were not significant. Faced with this difficulty in the
campaign scheme, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was
ready to drop the project altogether. On March 25, 1996,
Kathleen McGinty, Chair of CEQ, expressed her doubts about the
planned designation in an e-mail message to T.J. Glauthier at
OMB and Linda Lance at CEQ, stating:
I'm [sic] increasingly of the view that we should just
drop these utah [sic] ideas. we [sic] do not really
know how the enviros will react and I do think there is
a danger of ``abuse'' of the withdraw/antiquities
authorities especially because these lands are not
really endangered.\15\ [Emphasis added.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Staff of House Comm. on Resources, Behind Closed Doors: The
Abuse of Trust and Discretion in the Establishment of the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument, H.R. Rep. No. 105-D, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 28 (Comm. Print 1997) (emphasis added.) Attachment
1.
Two days later, however, the campaign-style event was back
on track. Someone at CEQ had the idea of simply adding the
1,650-square-mile Kaiparowits Plateau to the planned monument
package. Doing so would provide a pretext that would allow the
Administration to claim the land was ``threatened'' by the mine
and in need of ``protection'' through a withdrawal. The fact
that the supposedly ``threatened'' area and the ``significant''
area were separated by a considerable distance was of no
importance to the President.
The first mention of this idea is in a March 27, 1996, e-
mail message by Tom Jensen at CEQ directed to Linda Lance, T.J.
Glauthier, and Kathleen McGinty:
KM \16\ and others may want to rope in the Kaiparowits
and Escalante Canyons regions if this package
ultimately doesn't seem adequate to the President's
overall purpose.\17\ [Emphasis added.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Probably Kathleen McGinty.
\17\ Id. at 29 (emphasis added). Attachment 3.
``Roping in the Kaiparowits'' may have given the
Administration what it wanted--the appearance of credibility in
the designation of the Utah Monument. However, it also meant
that the Utah Monument's area had to be expanded to 1.7 million
acres. Since there is no actual justification for the inclusion
of the Kaiparowits in the Utah Monument, the Utah Monument
violates the requirement of the Antiquities Act that the land
reserved ``shall be confined to the smallest area compatible
with the proper care and management of the objects to be
protected.'' \18\ And, if the other lands were not appropriate
as a stand-alone monument, then ``roping-in'' the allegedly
``threatened'' Kaiparowits did not make them so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ 16 U.S.C. Sec. 431 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fact that the ``roping in'' of Kaiparowits was
unjustified is clearly demonstrated by the Warm Springs Project
EIS, discussed below. It is equally clear, for the Clinton
Administration, facts were of little consequence. In its view,
the ends justified the means.
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Process for the Warm Springs
Project
The Warm Springs Project (Project) was the collective name
given to the proposed Smoky Hollow Mine and the facilities
necessary to mine and deliver the coal to market, including its
power, communication, and loadout facilities, the Fredonia/
Hurricane truck maintenance facility, and the Warm Creek/
Benchtop Road. Andalex Resources, Inc. (Andalex), the largest
federal leaseholder in the southern part of the Kaiparowits
coal field, proposed reopening the inactive Missing Canyon Mine
and mining 100 to 120 million tons of coal over a 45-year
period.
The company began contacting various entities involved with
possible development of their leases as early as 1988. In May
1990, it was determined that an environmental impact statement
(EIS) should be prepared. An EIS is an analytical document
which evaluates potential impacts to the human environment of a
proposed course of action and its reasonable alternatives as
required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA).\19\ NEPA compliance is overseen by the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ), chaired by Kathleen McGinty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4321, et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Bureau of Land Management and the Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (the agencies) were jointly
responsible for preparing the EIS, including the determination
of content, the level of analysis, and the assessment of any
impacts. In addition, private third-party contractors were
retained to provide outside expertise and independent analysis.
Under the terms of the contract, the third-party contractors
were specifically barred from any communication with Andalex or
others affected by the EIS.
The NEPA process requires two documents before a
significant federal action can occur: (1) a public draft EIS
which fully analyzes the proposed actions and their potential
impacts; and (2) a final EIS which incorporates public comments
to the draft and is used by the decision-maker to make a final
determination.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ 40 CFR Sec. 1502.9 (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the regulations implementing NEPA, the draft
``must fulfill and satisfy to the fullest extent possible the
requirements established for final statements * * *'' \21\ This
means that a ``draft'' EIS is expected to be as close to a
final as possible, lacking only public comment. The regulations
do not address the relative authority of a ``preliminary''
draft EIS. Though the draft stage for the Warm Springs Project
was substantially completed, the document was never released to
the public and the effort to finish it was abandoned soon after
the designation of the Utah Monument.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ 40 CFR Sec. 1502.9(a) (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over a period of nearly seven years at an estimated cost to
Andalex of $8 million, federal agencies completed six
iterations of the EIS leading to a preliminary draft
environmental impact statement (PDEIS) in December 1995.\22\
The 1995 iteration of the PDEIS was distributed to other
federal agencies for their comments. Their comments were
integrated into the seventh iteration of the PDEIS which was
nearing completion at the time the Utah Monument was
designated.\23\ A member of the EIS team estimated that, but
for the designation, the draft EIS would have been completed
and ready for public comment in the spring of 1997.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ The dates of the iterations are: Round #1, 10/19/94; Rd. #2,
2/8/95; Rd. #3, 6/6/95; Rd. #4, 8/3/95; Rd. #5, 12/11/95; Rd. #6, 12/
12/95.
\23\ The seventh iteration began on or around 6/18/96 and was
finally abandoned around 11/20/96.
\24\ Staff Communication with Warm Springs EIS team member 5/14/98.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The last complete version of the EIS to be produced before
the designation is a comprehensive, 561-page document
reflecting nearly seven years of study and analysis. If the
Smoky Hollow Mine was indeed the threat alleged by President
Clinton, some indication of its danger would be evident in the
documents produced by the federal scientists and managers who
studied the project for seven years. No such indication of
environmental threat exists.
Of the PDEIS's eight chapters and five appendices, the most
significant is chapter four, entitled ``Environmental
Consequences.'' It discusses the anticipated impacts to the
human environment, both with the Warm Springs Project
(Alternative 1) and without the Project (Alternative 2). The
chapter contains an analysis of the impacts of the Project on
14 broad subject areas such as wildlife, geology, paleontology,
socioeconomics, hydrology, and recreation. Each potential
impact was assessed both in terms of its anticipated magnitude
and its anticipated importance to the human environment. The
magnitude scale ranges from ``none'' to ``major.'' The
importance scale ranges from ``insignificant'' to
``significant.'' Impacts were assumed to be insignificant
unless otherwise indicated.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ For a full definition of ``significantly'' as used in NEPA,
see 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1508.27 (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is notable that, as detailed in the earlier staff
report, Andalex was required by CEQ to comply with the NEPA
process at the same time CEQ--through its Chair, Kathleen
McGinty--was advising the President on how to evade NEPA's
requirements in the creation of the Utah Monument.\26\ No
environmental impact statement was ever conducted or requested
by CEQ on the possible ecological or socioeconomic consequences
of the Monument, yet Andalex was required by CEQ to fully
observe NEPA's provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Staff of House Comm. on Resources, Behind Closed Doors: The
Abuse of Trust and Discretion in the Establishment of the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument, H.R. Rep. No. 105-D, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 12, 13 (Comm. Print 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ecological Consequences of the Warm Springs Project
Chapter four of the PDEIS does not list a single major
impact associated with development of the Warm Springs Project
that would affect the list of ``environmental values''
supposedly protected by the designation of the Utah Monument:
1. In his proclamation, President Clinton specifically
mentioned the ``world class paleontological sites'' he wanted
to protect from the mine.\27\ The PDEIS, however, states that
impacts to paleontological resources in the Smoky Mountain area
would be ``minor over the short term, negligible over the long
term.'' \28\ [Emphasis added.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996).
\28\ PDEIS 4-12 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. President Clinton mentioned the important ``cultural
resources'' he wanted to protect from the mine.\29\ The PDEIS
states that the Project's impact in this area would be
``minor.'' \30\ [Emphasis added.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996).
\30\ PDEIS 4-118 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. President Clinton also mentioned the ``spectacular array
of unusual and diverse soils'' and ``cryptobiotic crusts'' that
he wanted to protect from the mine.\31\ Again, the PDEIS states
clearly that the Project's impact on soils would be ``minor to
moderate over the short term, minor over the long term,'' and
the impact on cryptobiotic soils in the Smoky Mountain area
would be ``minor over both the short and long terms.'' \32\ The
impact on soils due to mining-related subsidence were
determined to be ``negligible to minor over the short term and
negligible over the long term.'' \33\ [Emphasis added.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996).
\32\ PDEIS 4-21,22 (1995).
\33\ PDEIS 4-21 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. President Clinton's concerns for the ``many different
vegetative communities and numerous types of endemic plants''
were also exaggerated and overblown. The agencies concluded
that ``impacts to vegetative productivity and community
stability in the proposed Warm Springs Project area with
mining-related activities would be minor over the short term
and negligible to minor over the long term.'' \34\ [Emphasis
added.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ PDEIS 4-24 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. The same holds true for President Clinton's concerns
over wildlife. The agencies concluded that ``the impacts to
wildlife habitat and productivity in the Smoky Mountain area
with Project-related activities would be minor over the short
term and negligible over the long term.'' \35\ [Emphasis
added.] President Clinton had no credible reason to ``protect''
Utah's wildlife with a 1.7 million acre land lockup.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ PDEIS 4-30 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ``protection'' of the above resources was cited by the
President as the rationale for the Utah Monument's designation.
Given that the underlying rationale was false, no environmental
or safety justification for the Utah Monument designation
exists. The Clinton-Gore Monument was constructed on a very
flimsy foundation.
There were no major anticipated impacts associated with the
Warm Springs Project because Andalex, together with the agency
scientists and managers on the ground worked with concerned
parties at the local, state, and federal level to identify
potential problems and create solutions before a final decision
had to be made. This is a model the Administration should have
followed when considering the Utah Monument designation.
For example, the initial plan was to locate the mine's
surface facilities on the upper benches of Spring Point and
Smoky Mountain so that they would be closer to the actual mine
site. The agencies and Andalex realized, however, that locating
the facilities there would cause impacts to visual resources
and require more surface disturbance through road building.
They modified the plan and came up with a better solution,
thereby reducing the impacts of the Project.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ PDEIS 2-3 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Instead of building the surface facilities on top of Smoky
Mountain which would have had a significant impact on the
visual resources of the area, the agencies and Andalex agreed
to locate the facilities in a 400-foot deep, enclosed part of
Smoky Hollow Canyon. According to the PDEIS, because of ``the
deep, confined nature of this canyon site, the proposed
facility complex would not be visible from the WSA's \37\ or
any other sensitive viewpoints outside Smoky Hollow.'' \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Wilderness Study Areas.
\38\ PDEIS 4-104 1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, the initial alignment of the Benchtop Road was
more convenient to the mine but had the potential of causing
impacts to areas with cultural and wetland values. Andalex and
the Agencies worked together to solve the problem--the route
was adjusted and the magnitude of the impacts dropped.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ PDEIS 2-4 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Due to these and similar changes, the agencies were able to
accurately predict that:
Construction and operation of the proposed Project
would have no direct, physical impact on any of the
wilderness study areas (WSAs) or the potential
designation of wilderness areas in the Smoky Mountain
area.\40\ [Emphasis added.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ PDEIS 4-11 (1995) (emphasis added).
The conclusion of the federal scientists and managers who
studied the Project for seven years is in direct opposition to
what President Clinton told the American people.
In addition to solving problems before they arose through
changing the Project's design, the agencies and Andalex agreed
to a series of proactive measures that would have ensured the
avoidance of future problems.
As a condition of permit approval, Andalex agreed to
conduct ``intensive field inventories'' for the presence or
absence of endangered plant species two years prior to any
disturbance.\41\ Similar conditions were agreed to for the
protection of the desert tortoise, the Mexican spotted owl, and
the peregrine falcon.\42\ Alternate routes for roads and
methods of coal transport were considered at length and only
those with minimal impacts were included in the final analysis.
Andalex agreed to the changes up front. Although there were
less costly and more convenient ways to mine the coal in their
leases, the company participated in the process in an effort to
plan a safe project with minimal impacts. While lengthy and
expensive, the PDEIS is testimony to the success of that
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ PDEIS 2-2 (1995).
\42\ PDEIS 2-2 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of the conditions agreed to by Andalex there
may have been more protection of the area's unique resources,
not less, if the Project were approved. For example, with
disapproval of the Project ``[n]o information surveys on the
primrose or the biscuitroot [both endangered plants] would be
obtained from proposed surveys in the Project area.'' \43\ The
same goes for proposed wildlife resource environmental
education programs, baseline studies on raptor nests, and
Mexican spotted owl inventories.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ PDEIS 4-127 (1995).
\44\ PDEIS 4-128, 9 (1995)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PDEIS also notes that with disapproval of the Project
``[f]ossil resource discoveries and scientific data that could
potentially be gained from mining-related survey and mitigation
activities would not occur.'' \45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ PDEIS 4-123 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PDEIS shows conclusively that the proposed mine was not
the ecological threat that President Clinton alleged when he
designated the Utah Monument. This conclusion was reached not
only by Resources Committee staff, but also by Dave
Alberswerth, a Clinton Administration political appointee in
the Department of Interior, who noted in an April 9, 1996,
memorandum that the two alternatives ``appear to indicate no
significant difference in environmental impacts for the area of
either permitting or not permitting the proposed Smoky Hollow
Project.'' \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Memorandum from Dave Alberswerth to A. Strasvogel dated Apr.
9, 1996. Attachment 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Socioeconomic Consequences of the Warm Springs Project
In addition to misinforming the American people by
exaggerating any potentially negative impacts of the Warm
Springs Project, President Clinton failed to mention the value
of the project to southern Utah and northern Arizona
communities. The PDEIS states that ``[a]t full production over
the life of the Project, the combined direct and secondary
employment would create a total of 822 to 832 jobs * * * in
Kane, Coconino, and Washington Counties.'' \47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ PDEIS 4-61 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The direct jobs would have paid an annual wage of about
$35,000, ``considerably above prevailing wages in the region,''
and the secondary jobs would ``benefit the region's economy and
the residents by expanding the economic opportunities available
and increasing the volume of business activity.'' \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ PDEIS 4-61, 65 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The secondary impacts of the Project on the region were
also discussed at length in the PDEIS. It was estimated that
purchases of locally available goods and services by the mine
and trucking firm would be $7.4 million annually.\49\ At full
production, ``an additional $7.7 million in annual earnings
would be realized by workers filling secondary jobs supported
by the proposed project.'' \50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ PDEIS 4-65 (1995).
\50\ PDEIS 4-65 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the PDEIS, the ``combined direct and secondary
wage and salary earnings associated with the proposed Project
are projected at about $23.5 million annually.'' \51\ These
earnings would have been a significant increase in the affected
communities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ PDEIS 4-65 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the agencies noted, ``the Project-related wages and
salaries represent a substantial potential benefit to residents
of the three Utah counties and Coconino County, Arizona, where
the projected increase is equivalent to about 1.7 percent of
the wages and salaries paid in 1992.'' \52\ The effects might
have been even greater in Kane County where ``the proposed
Project could generate up to a 50 percent increase in annual
wage and salary payments in Kane County compared with those in
1992.'' \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ PDEIS 4-65 (1995).
\53\ PDEIS 4-65 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These and other positive impacts would ``benefit the local
economies in Kane and Coconino Counties by increasing the
economic diversification of the region, by creating higher
wages and year-round employment, and by generating additional
support for local businesses.'' \54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ PDEIS 4-67 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Project was anticipated to have similarly beneficial
impacts on state and federal government fiscal resources. A
Utah study concluded that ``the net fiscal impact of the
proposed Project would be positive over the life of the
Project, with indirect revenues accruing to the State projected
to average about $2.25 million per year.'' \55\ Direct revenues
from the Project accruing to the State of Utah, including sales
and use taxes, mineral lease royalties, and State land
payments, were estimated to average about $3.3 million
annually.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ PDEIS 4-72 (1995).
\56\ PDEIS 4-73 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the most significant benefits that would have
accrued to the State of Utah was the royalty revenue derived
from the development of Utah's State Trust Lands. Such
royalties are deposited in a permanent trust fund and the
income is used to support children's education in the State.
Because these royalties are invested and managed in a permanent
fund, the Project would have continued to benefit children even
after it had ceased operations.\57\ Thus, President Clinton's
decision to sweep the PDEIS under the rug was to pull the rug
out from under Utah's school children.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ PDEIS 4-76 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The mine would have also returned substantial revenues to
the federal treasury from sources such as personal and
corporate income taxes and excise taxes, as well as the mining-
specific revenues. At full production these revenues would
include: ``$1.75 million annually from the retained share of
mineral royalties, $2.15 million in payments into the Federal
Black Lung Program, and $375,000 for the Abandoned Mine Land
Reclamation (AML) Fund. Federal highway user's revenues would
exceed $1.24 million annually at full production.'' \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ PDEIS 4-74 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The effect of the Project on local governments was also
expected to be positive. According to the PDEIS, [n]et revenues
to local governmental units, after accounting for projected
increases in public service expenditures, were estimated at
$1.8 million annually.'' \59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ PDEIS 4-68 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All of these benefits would have accrued to an area already
hit hard by the Clinton Administration's efforts to shut down
Western resource development. The three Utah counties that
would have benefitted most from the Warm Springs Project (Iron,
Washington, and Kane) each suffer from subpar incomes (ranging
from 26 to 41 percent below National averages) and limited
growth.
According to the PDEIS, the cause of these difficulties can
be traced to ``losses of mining and timbering jobs, and the
heavy dependency on tourism-related employment'' which is
``characterized by lower paying, seasonal and/or part-time
jobs.'' \60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ PDEIS 3-60 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Towns like Kanab and Fredonia have had to struggle after
major employers such as Energy Fuels and Kaibab Forest Products
were forced to cut back or shut down due to Clinton
Administration policies. Fredonia's logging and mining
employment base, for example, ``has declined since 1990 by more
than 300 jobs and ceased to exist in February 1995.'' \61\ The
Project would have benefitted these communities immensely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ PDEIS 3-74 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Instead President Clinton chose to ignore their needs in
his effort to appease the political whims of false
environmentalism and partisan political gain.
Abuse of the NEPA Process
The Warm Springs Project case illustrates not only an abuse
of the Antiquities Act, it also provides an example of how the
Clinton-Gore Administration uses NEPA as both a sword and a
shield, abusing and manipulating the process to achieve its
political ends.
The decision to ``rope in the Kapairowits'' was made in CEQ
on or around March 27, 1996. Within a week, on April 3, 1996,
top staff at BLM were suddenly very interested in the Warm
Springs Project PDEIS. An e-mail message from Willie Taylor,
Director of the Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance
(OEPC),\62\ to Terry Martin and Vijai Rai (also of OEPC)
expresses this interest:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ OEPC is an office within the U.S. Department of Interior.
I talked to Brooks \63\ this afternoon and he was
interested in the status of an EIS for coal mining on
the Kaparowitz ((?) I know the place, but I am not sure
how to spell it!) Plateau. We know that it is at the
PDEIS stage, but need to know how far along they are. I
believe that this is a delegated EIS (between BLM &
OSM, but in the AS/LM \64\). Without ``raising any
alarms,'' please check on the status (delegated vs.
non-delegated and time frame for the DEIS) of this EIS
and then let's get together to discuss tomorrow (Brooks
needs the information tomorrow).\65\ [Emphasis added.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ Brooks Yeager, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and
International Affairs, Department of Interior.
\64\ Bob Armstrong, Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals
Management (AS/LM), Department of Interior. The AS/LM oversees the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Minerals Management Service (MMS),
and the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM).
\65\ E-mail message from Willie Taylor to Terry Martin & Vijai Rai
dated Apr. 3, 1996, 4:59 PM (emphasis added). Attachment 5.
Due to the fact that the Warm Springs Project EIS was
delegated and that it had been progressing for seven years
without any involvement from Washington, D.C., it would have
''raised alarms'' if OEPC sought to become involved. So OEPC,
under the direction of Brooks Yeager, created the false
appearance of being ``invited'' in as a consultant by the
Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals--by writing its own
invitation. In an e-mail message from Willie Taylor to Brooks
Yeager dated April 4, 1996, Taylor describes the invitation
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
they have written:
Below is a forwarded message with the information you
requested. Vijai drafted the document. While it is
longer than the paragraph you requested, I suggest that
if you wish to rewrite it you maintain the essential
element for this Office [OEPC]: (1) potential for
controversy (a logical reason for our participation)
and (2) that some mechanism be kept to get any comments
made by this Office fully addressed (since the EIS will
continue to be delegated). [Emphasis added.]
As we discussed, any review by this Office at this
point is likely to be resented by the bureaus and has
the potential to significantly increase the time
required for the completion of the PDEIS. As such, if
AS/LM sends out a memo like the one we have discussed,
he needs to make it clear to his people (in staff
meetings, not just through the memo) that we have been
invited into this process.\66\ [Emphasis added.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ E-mail message from Willie Taylor to Brooks Yeager dated Apr.
4, 1996, 2:03 PM (emphasis added). Attachment 6.
Of course, OEPC was not actually invited into the process.
They sought involvement because Clinton Administration
officials in the Department of Interior knew that the
designation of the Utah Monument was in the works and they
wanted to ensure that the PDEIS for the Warm Springs Project
indeed presented the threat they hoped it did. They used the
pretext of controversy (``a logical reason for our
participation'') as a means to cover their true intention. Once
again, as detailed in the earlier staff report, the
Administration needed to create a phony paper trail to justify
their actions.
OEPC's involvement was improper not simply because it
fabricated a paper trail and disguised their motives, it was
improper because it was a violation of due process. The
decision to approve or deny the permits necessary for the Warm
Springs Project (the whole reason an EIS was required) rested
with the Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals (AS/LM)
Armstrong. If the AS/LM had denied the permits, the applicant
(Andalex) could then appeal the decision to DOI's Office of
Hearing and Appeals. Jurisdiction over the appeal is also
retained by the Secretary of Interior under title 43 Code of
Federal Regulations part 4.5. The Office of Hearing and Appeals
is organizationally under OEPC, as is the AS/LM.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ Please refer to the DOI organizational chart, Attachment 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The inappropriateness of OEPC's effort to ensure that its
comments were addressed and incorporated in the predecisional
PDEIS lies in the fact that if OEPC is eventually asked to
contribute its analysis to an appeal of its own decision they
will be unable to offer an unbiased review. Their involvement
in effect denies applicants the ability to make meaningful
administrative appeals and therefore denies their rights to due
process--a Constitutionally protected right.
Once Administration officials gained access to the PDEIS,
they were disappointed by what they saw. In an April 9, 1996,
memorandum Dave Alberswerth \68\ expressed his feelings: ``it
strains credulity to base a `go' or `no go' decision on an
analysis of two alternatives which appear to indicate no
significant difference in environmental impacts for the area of
either permitting or not permitting the proposed Smokey Hollow
Project.'' \69\ [emphasis added]. He appears to be saying that
there should be an alternative that does have significant
impacts for the area. Alberswerth proposes such an alternative
in his memo: ``In the minds of many, the potential future
development activities that could utilize or improve upon the
infrastructure created by this project is the most significant
issue with the proposal.'' \70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ In 1996, the Special Assistant to Bob Armstrong (AS/LM).
\69\ Memorandum from Dave Alberswerth to A. Strasvogel dated Apr.
4, 1996 (emphasis added). Attachment 4.
\70\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OEPC's involvement also appears to have been largely an
effort to ``dirty up'' an EIS that presented no significant
impacts, and therefore no threat, to the environment. Andalex
had proposed mining only 100 to 120 million tons of coal over
the life of the project. OEPC wanted to include an alternative
that would have Andalex mining significantly more coal than
Andalex planned. The result of such an alternative would be
greater and more significant impacts, especially in the
transport of the coal (e.g., more trucks hauling coal). A
permit based on an EIS that contained such an alternative would
be much easier to deny than the one reflecting Andalex's actual
plans that presented minor impacts.
OEPC sent the Utah EIS team its recommendations in a June
6, 1996, memorandum. The suggestions were not taken well. The
people on the ground who had been working on the Project for
seven years recognized the recommendations for what they were:
an effort by Washington to kill the mine. In a June 21, 1996,
e-mail message to Willie Taylor, Vijai Rai described their
reaction: ``[a]s expected, the field personnel are very
unhappy. They feel that I was not given all the information
that should have been reviewed by me as part of the review
process. They feel that had I looked at all the information,
some of my recommendations may have been different.''\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ E-mail message from Vijai Rai to Willie Taylor dated June 21,
1996. Attachment 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The dispute over whether to add another (more
environmentally harmful) alternative to the PDEIS was never
finally resolved. OEPC, led by Vijai Rai, was attempting to
have it included (over the opposition of the Utah EIS team)
almost until the time of the Utah Monument designation.
On September 16, 1996, two days before the designation,
Vijai Rai received an e-mail from Willie Taylor letting him
know that he would no longer need to argue OEPC's case. ``I
just spoke to Dave Alberswerth about the subject review. He
wanted me to know that he thought you had done exactly what was
asked and that you had done a good job.''\72\ Exactly what was
asked, apparently, was to make every attempt to dirty up the
EIS to make the Project appear more threatening than it was.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ e-mail message from Willie Taylor to Vijai Rai dated September
16, 1996. Attachment 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Soon after receiving his commendation, Vijai Rai wrote a
handwritten note to ``Geoff'' \73\ which explained another
reason for including a third, more harmful, alternative in the
EIS:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Probably Geoff Webb, a Department of Interior political
appointee.
I do wish to reiterate to you once again that the
PDEIS should evaluate in depth the environmental and
economic issues related to higher annual coal
production. If the detailed analysis were to conclude
that higher annual coal production is not feasible
within the life-of-mine (40 years) Andalex's claims, if
any, under taking [sic] will be based on a relatively
small coal mine. In my view, if the mine plan and/or
the permit were not approved, Andalex is likely to sue
the Govt. based on the value of all the coal under its
leases. I believe that the public and the Government
will come out better if we were to do the full analysis
up front.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ Handwritten note from ``Vijai'' to ``Geoff'' dated Sept. 16,
1996: Attachment 9.
Vijai Rai's comments highlight the overall goal of OEPC's
last-minute involvement in the Warm Springs Project EIS to kill
the Project, not to make it better, and to prepare a litigation
weapon, not an EIS. Through manipulating the environmental
review, the Clinton Administration was attempting to depress
the value of a private company's holdings to improve its own
position later in court. Such a manipulation of the NEPA
process, using it as both a shield and a sword, is an abuse of
both the letter and spirit of the law.
It is ironic that in this case Andalex had more respect for
the NEPA process than the Clinton Administration. Chapter 5 of
the PDEIS contains the following example:
A variety of Federal, State, and local agencies,
interest groups, and private individuals have been
contacted by Andalex since the permitting process for
the Smoky Hollow Mine began. Between 1988 and 1996,
company representatives contacted over 2,500 people and
held more than 500 meetings to provide their
explanation of the proposed Project and resolve as many
issues and concerns as early in the process as
possible. Although these contacts were not made by the
Agencies as part of the formal scoping process for the
EIS, they did afford the interested public additional
opportunities to become familiar with the various
components that would eventually make up the Warm
Springs Project. As a result of these initial contacts
by Andalex, many of these groups and individuals were
more active in their participation during the formal
EIS scoping activities conducted by the Agencies.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ PDEIS 5-6 (1995).
Andalex, according to the federal agencies themselves, was
committed to involving the public in an open process from very
early on in the Project. This commitment is exactly what CEQ
Chair Kathleen McGinty was speaking of when she testified to
the importance of NEPA before the Senate Energy and Natural
Resources Committee within days of the Utah Monument
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
designation (September 26, 1996):
In many ways, NEPA anticipated today's call for
enhanced local involvement and responsibility,
sustainable development and government accountability.
By bringing the public into the agency decision-making
process, NEPA is like no other statute and is an
extraordinary tribute to the American people to build
on shared values * * *
[NEPA] gives greater voice to communities. It
provides the Federal Government an opportunity for
collaborative decision-making with state and local
governments and the public.\76\ [Emphasis added.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ Quoted in Staff of House Comm. on Resources, Behind Closed
Doors: The Abuse of Trust and Discretion in the Establishment of the
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument. H.R. Rep. No. 105-D, 105th
Cong., Ist Sess. at 8 (Comm. Print 1997).
Of course, when the Utah Monument was designated by
President Clinton, there was no effort to comply with NEPA.
There was no effort to involve the public. In fact, as the
earlier staff report shows, there was a calculated effort to
evade NEPA and hide the decision from the public.
What did affected communities think of the Utah Monument?
What effects will it have on the local and state economies? On
the environment? No one knows because the analysis for the Utah
Monument designation, required under NEPA, was never done.
Andalex and the agencies, by contrast, spent $8 million and
seven years involving the public and assessing the impacts of
the Project. It is clear what the ecological and socioeconomic
impacts of the decision would have been. It is clear that the
Project, in spite of the Clinton Administration's best efforts,
was not the ``threat'' that the President said it was.
Just as it had done when making the decision to designate
the Grand Staircase-Escalante Monument, the Administration
decided that the EIS on Andalex would say what the
Administration needed it to say to justify the Utah Monument.
And, as before, the Clinton Administration fabricated a paper
trail to rationalize their actions. For the Clinton
Administration, the ends of political expediency justified the
means of abusing the process and the rights of the people of
Utah.