[House Report 105-804]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                 Union Calendar No. 450
105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - - House Report 105-804



                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                       PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE

                            ON INTELLIGENCE

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             together with


October 9, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL


                          House of Representatives,
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                   Washington, DC, October 9, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House,
U.S. Capitol, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to the Rules of the House, I am 
pleased to transmit herewith an investigative report of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, styled 
``Investigation into Iranian Arms Shipments to Bosnia.'' The 
report includes findings and conclusions, as well as minority 
and additional views.
    The Committee's report was approved by a majority of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on August 6, 1998.
            Sincerely yours,
                                            Porter J. Goss,

                                                 Union Calendar No. 450
105th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 2d Session                                                     105-804



October 9, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed


    Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with


                            [To accompany ]


    On April 5, 1996, the Los Angeles Times published an 
article, ``U.S. OKd Iran Arms for Bosnia, Officials say,'' 
alleging that in 1994, the Clinton Administration gave a 
``green light'' for Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia to transit 
Croatia. This alleged decision came despite the United Nations 
arms embargo imposed on the former Yugoslavia that the United 
States had pledged to uphold and despite the Administration's 
policy of isolating Iran internationally. On April 23, 1996, 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)\1\ 
initiated an investigation into ``those aspects of the transfer 
of arms to Bosnia that fall within the Committee's 
responsibilities to conduct oversight of the intelligence 
activities of the United States Government.'' The investigation 
did not examine the wisdom of the U.S. policy of not objecting 
to the Iranian arms flow, nor did it examine the policy's 
underlying assumptions and justifications (e.g., that the 
Bosnian Army and Federation Agreement were on the verge of 
collapse in the spring of 1994, that the shipment of small arms 
from Iran to Bosnian Muslims would affect the regional balance 
of power and possibly even the course of the war, etc.). 
Rather, the Committee's investigation focused on the following 
    \1\ Hereinafter referred to as the Committee.
     How was the ``no instructions'' instruction 
implemented and did this response constitute a change in 
     What effect did the CIA's lack of understanding of 
the ``no instructions'' policy have on events in the region and 
on relations within the U.S. embassy in Croatia?
     Did the implementation of this policy constitute a 
covert action?

Scope of the investigation

    The Committee held one classified briefing and four 
classified hearings on the issue of Iranian arms shipments to 
Bosnia. On April 25, 1996, Anthony Harrington, the Chairman of 
the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) briefed the 
Committee ``off the record'' on the Board's findings regarding 
the Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia. The following witnesses 
testified before the full Committee: Ambassador Peter 
Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador to Croatia since June 1993, 
andAmbassador Charles Redman, Special Envoy for the former Yugoslavia 
from August 1993 to September 1994 (May 30, 1996); former Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI) R. James Woolsey and former Deputy Director 
of Central Intelligence (DDCI) Admiral William Studeman (June 6, 1996); 
an Intelligence Community Representative (ICR) in Croatia and Ronald 
Neitzke, the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in Croatia from July 1992 to 
July 1995 (June 20, 1996); and Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of 
State (August 1, 1996). Committee staff also interviewed the following 
people who had knowledge of, or were involved in, the policy decisions 
made regarding the U.S. position on Iranian arms shipments into Bosnia: 
the former Chief of the Central Eurasia Division in the CIA's 
Directorate of Operations; the former and current U.S. Defense Attaches 
(DATT) in Croatia; several National Security Council staffers; the 
Chief of the DCI's Balkan Task Force; and several other CIA officials. 
In addition, Committee staff reviewed hundreds of relevant documents 
from CIA, NSA, and the State Department.
    It should be noted that the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI) and the House of Representatives Select 
Subcommittee on the United States Role in Iranian Arms 
Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia \2\--which provided Committee 
staff access to its classified report, interview memoranda, and 
deposition transcripts--also conducted investigations into this 
matter. In its final report, the Select Subcommittee requested 
that this Committee further examine the question of whether 
Ambassador Peter Galbraith engaged in activities that could be 
characterized as unauthorized covert action.
    \2\ Hereinafter referred to as the Select Subcommittee.

The President's Intelligence Oversight Board

    The Committee was briefed ``off the record'' on the results 
of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) \3\ 
investigation into limited aspects of the implementation of the 
Clinton Administration's policy regarding Iranian arms 
shipments to Bosnia. Specifically, the IOB reviewed three sets 
of events to determine if a covert action occurred: one 
involving the movement of a humanitarian convoy into Bosnia; 
the second involving comments made by U.S. officials to 
Croatian officials on April 29, 1994; the third involving 
whether Ambassador Galbraith and/or Assistant Secretary of 
State Holbrooke made an offer of arms to the Bosnian 
    \3\ The IOB, which is a standing committee of the President's 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), was created in 1976, and 
rechartered on September 13, 1993 by Executive Order 12863. In part, 
the IOB is chartered to ``prepare for the President reports of 
intelligence activities that the IOB believes may be unlawful or 
contrary to Executive Order or Presidential directive,'' ``forward to 
the Attorney General reports * * * concerning intelligence activities 
that the IOB believes may be unlawful * * *,'' and ``conduct such 
investigations as the IOB deems necessary to carry out its functions 
under this order.''
    The IOB's investigation began in November 1994 and ended in 
May 1995, when its classified report, which found implicitly 
that no illegal covert action hadbeen undertaken by U.S. 
officials, was issued to the White House. Based on the IOB report, 
White House Counsel Abner Mikva came to the same conclusion. It is 
important to note that the IOB itself did not explicitly make a ruling 
about whether a covert action occurred--the IOB made factual 
determinations upon which Mr. Mikva concluded that no covert action had 
occurred between April and November 1994.
    The IOB chairman declined to testify to the Committee for 
the record about the Board's findings and the IOB itself was 
unwilling to share its report with this or any other 
Congressional committee. As the basis for declining to testify 
in a formal hearing or to provide its report, the IOB cited the 
need to preserve the confidentiality of communications to the 
President and the need to maintain the constitutional 
separation of powers. The IOB contended that such restrictions 
on providing testimony and its reports to Congress are 
necessary to encourage candor of Board members and 
    \4\ The Committee notes, however, that the IOB did publicly 
release--at President Clinton's direction--an unclassified version of 
its original report on the Intelligence Community's activities in 
Guatemala from 1984 to 1996. It should be noted that the IOB Guatemala 
Investigation was, from its inception, undertaken with an eye toward 
public release of the maximum appropriate information. Such was not the 
case with respect to the IOB's Iran/Bosnia Investigation.
    In addition to the IOB's investigation, the Committee 
conducted its own investigation into the Iranian arms shipments 
to Bosnia for several reasons. First, given the Committee's 
responsibility for oversight of all intelligence activities, it 
was necessary to investigate allegations that an illegal covert 
action took place. Second, the majority leadership in both 
houses of Congress asked committees with relevant oversight 
responsibility to investigate the matter. Additionally, the 
initial IOB investigation did not cover events that occurred 
after November 1994. And, other witnesses, central to the 
Committee's investigation, such as Deputy Secretary of State 
Strobe Talbott, needed to be questioned as to their role in the 

The ``no instructions'' policy

    The first major component of the Committee's investigation 
focused on how the ``no instructions'' instruction was 
implemented, whether this response constituted a change in 
policy, and what effect the CIA's lack of understanding of the 
policy had on events in the region and relations within the 
U.S. embassy in Croatia.

Covert action

    The second major component of the Committee's investigation 
examined whether any U.S. official engaged in covert action. 
Covert action, as defined in section 503 of the National 
Security Act, is ``an activity or activities of the United 
States Government to influence political, economic or military 
conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the 
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged 
publicly.'' The definition of covert action excludes 
``traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine 
support to such activities.'' In addition, the National 
Security Act mandates that the President issue a finding 
authorizing a covert action and that the Congressional 
intelligence committees be kept ``fully and currently 
informed'' of all covert actions.


     The ``no instructions'' instruction constituted a 
change in U.S. policy. Indeed, several Executive branch policy 
officials testified that they viewed the ``no instructions'' 
policy as a change.
     The Clinton Administration failed to inform 
Congress about its decision to allow Iranian arms to transit 
Croatia into Bosnia. The Committee emphatically rejects out of 
hand the notion that intelligence reports made available to 
Congress concerning Iranian arms flows constituted 
notification. None of these reports mentioned U.S. acquiescence 
in these shipments. The concept that Congress can be notified 
in such a manner violates the spirit of the legislative 
oversight system. Similarly, the Committee dismisses the 
argument that press reporting of Iranian arms flows through 
Croatia to Bosnia replaces the type of notification that should 
have occurred in this case.
     Policymakers did not keep their own senior 
intelligence officials informed of U.S. policy concerning these 
arms shipments. This failure to consult and communicate led to 
significant disjunctures between policy and intelligence 
officials, particularly in Croatia.
     When the U.S. ambassador in Croatia asked the ICR 
to pass on the U.S. position on these Iranian arms shipments, 
the ICR acted properly and responsibly in refusing to carry out 
this request and informing his superiors about it. The 
Committee believes that in future situations where the official 
policy line is not clear, ICRs should consult with superiors at 
headquarters before carrying out any action that could be 
construed as a covert action.
     The ICR, who was obligated to report potential 
violations of law, acted properly in terms of the cables he 
sent about Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia. Furthermore, the 
ICR did not ``spy'' on or inappropriately characterize embassy 
personnel in his cables, as some have alleged.
     Relations between the Ambassador and the ICR 
deteriorated to a dangerously unhealthy level. Specific actions 
taken by the Ambassador vis-a-vis intelligence personnel 
seriously and dangerously limited the effectiveness of 
intelligence collection in the region.
     The Committee believes that the DCI and Secretary 
of State should develop a program to ensure that chiefs of 
mission and intelligence community representatives have a 
common understanding of the terms of the 1977 agreement 
concerning reporting from the field and that updated guidance 
explaining this agreement ought to be considered.
     The Committee found that there was no authorized 
covert action to arm the Bosnian Muslims. There was some 
discussion, analysis, and planning for a possible covert action 
that, apparently, was never undertaken. Rumors of these 
discussions and planning sessions made some individuals 
suspicious that an illicit covert action was underway.
     Based on the available evidence, the Committee 
cannot conclude that any U.S. official crossed the line into 
covert action. However, questions remain about whether any U.S. 
official exceeded the ``no instructions'' policy and actively 
facilitated a weapons shipment into Bosnia in September 1995.
           The Committee is aware that the embassy in 
        Zagreb has experienced extraordinary pressure since it 
        opened. While the performance of individual officers 
        serving at the post has often been outstanding, the 
        Committee believes more could have been accomplished 
        and much misunderstanding avoided if Washington 
        officials and the Ambassador had encouraged a more 
        cooperative environment, particularly among members of 
        the ``country team.''
         The Committee heard much contradictory 
        testimony in the course of its investigation. Although 
        some discrepancies in testimony may be due to different 
        interpretations or recollections of events, the 
        Committee is concerned that Ambassador Peter Galbraith 
        may have provided the Committee with misleading 
        testimony on three issues. The Committee is aware that, 
        based on a referral from the Select Subcommittee, the 
        Justice Department is currently conducting an inquiry 
        to determine whether the Ambassador's testimony to 
        Congress on these issues was accurate and truthful. The 
        Committee encourages a just and appropriate resolution 
        of this matter.

                     The ``No Instructions'' Policy


    Peter Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, testified 
before the Committee that three U.S. officials advised him in 
late April 1994 that officials of the Croatian Government 
planned to ask him what position the U.S. would take if Croatia 
allowed Iranian arms to transit its territory en route to 
Bosnia.\5\ Based on this information, Ambassador Galbraith 
asked the State Department for guidance as to how to respond to 
the Croatian Government. On April 28, 1994, prior to meeting 
with Croatian officials later that day, Ambassador Galbraith 
was instructed by ``Washington'' to tell the Croatian 
Government that he had ``no instructions'' on the matter. 
Ambassador Galbraith, according to his own testimony, informed 
the Croatian Government that he had ``no instructions'' 
because, as he understood it, the U.S. had not yet made a 
decision on how to answer the Croatian Government's question.
    \5\ It should be noted that two of these U.S. officials testified 
before the Committee that they were not forewarned by Croatian 
officials that such a question would be posed; only the DCM testified 
that he knew in advance that the Croatian Government would pose this 
question to the Ambassador.
    On April 29, 1994, prior to another meeting with Croatian 
officials, a National Security Council (NSC) official told the 
Ambassador that his instructions were that he had ``no 
instructions.'' That evening, at a dinner meeting, Ambassador 
Galbraith again passed the ``no instructions'' message on to 
the Croatians. Ambassador Charles Redman, who also attended the 
dinner meeting, further explained to a Croatian official that 
the decision to allow Iranian arms to transit its territory was 
one for Croatia to make and that the U.S. did not want to be 
put in the position of saying ``no'' to these shipments. As 
Ambassador Galbraith summarized in his testimony, the ``no 
instructions'' policy in essence meant that the U.S. would not 
object to Croatia participating in the provision of arms to the 
Bosnians. Almost immediately after the ``no instructions'' 
message was passed on, large quantities of Iranian weapons 
began to flow through Croatia into Bosnia.

Did ``no instructions'' constitute a policy change?

    At the beginning of the Clinton Administration, stated U.S. 
policy was to continue enforcing the U.N. arms embargo against 
the former Yugoslavia, while pressing allies for a multilateral 
agreement to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. 
The ``no instructions'' policy, however, departed from the 
Administration's official public policy because, after April 
1994, the U.S. began to ignore--and some might even argue, 
encourage--violations of the U.N. embargo with respect to arms 
shipments to Bosnia.
    Based on the testimony the Committee heard, there appears 
to be a difference of opinion within the Clinton Administration 
over whether the ``no instructions'' policy indeed constituted 
a policy change. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott testified 
that the ``no instructions'' decision did not constitute a 
change in policy and that it was consistent with a ``very major 
change'' in the U.S. policy that went back to the early days of 
the Clinton Administration. According to Deputy Secretary 
Talbott, this policy consisted of ``a lift and strike [policy], 
as opposed to keeping the [arms] embargo in place, and 
cultivation of the [Bosnian] Federation.'' The Committee notes 
that although a multilateral lift and strike was indeed the 
Administration's policy goal, it was never a policy implemented 
by the U.S., or agreed to by our allies.
    Ambassador Galbraith testified that the ``no instructions'' 
policy could be viewed either as a continuation of the 
Administration's policy or as a new policy. He told the 
Committee that ``no instructions'' could be viewed as a 
continuation of policy because the Administration had not 
objected to the ``trickle'' of arms that had been coming 
through the region prior to April 1994. On the other hand, he 
testified, because this was the first time the U.S. Government 
was asked to state explicitly whether it would object to such 
arms flows, ``no instructions'' was indeed a policy shift. 
Interestingly, in a cable that he sent to the State Department 
at the time the policy was being developed, Ambassador 
Galbraith reminded his State Department superiors that the U.S. 
policy was to respect the arms embargo and to encourage other 
countries to do likewise. However, in that same cable, he urged 
modification of this U.S. policy. \6\
    \6\ Department of State cable, Zagreb 1721, dated April 29, 1994.
    In the opinion of Ronald Neitzke, the former DCM in 
Croatia, the ``no instructions'' policy was ``a profound 
[policy] change.'' To illustrate his case, he cited a September 
1992 incident in which the U.S. insisted that Croatia turn over 
to UNPROFOR the weapons and ammunition found on board an 
Iranian aircraft they had detained and report the incident to 
the U.N. He contrasted that policy to the ``no instructions'' 
guidance under which no U.S. officials were told to report 
embargo violations to the U.N. or to take action to halt such 
    The Committee believes that the ``no instructions'' 
instruction did constitute a policy change since it was the 
first time the U.S. Government made a deliberate decision 
neither to object to, nor to report, arms embargo violations to 
the U.N. In addition, the ``no instructions'' decision clearly 
led to a sigificant change in the amount of weaponry flowing to 
the Bosnian military; what had been a ``trickle of arms 
entering the region prior to April 1994, soon became a huge 
influx of weapons, primarily from Iran, that were funneled 
through Croatia into Bosnia.
    Finally, prior to the spring of 1994, the Croats had 
rejected a number of Iranian overtures to establish an arms 
route through Croatia to Bosnia; it is highly dubious that 
Croatia would have agreed to allow Iranian arms to transit its 
territory absent the U.S. ``no instructions'' policy.

Congressional notification

    Congress was deeply involved in the debate over lifting the 
arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslins, but it was never 
officially or formally informed that the Administration's 
policy toward enforcing the arms embargo had changed. Although 
some Administration officials have labeled the ``no 
instructions'' instruction as merely a diplomatic exchange with 
the Croatian Government, the policy itself had much broader 
implications that, if fully understood, could have affected the 
actions of an unwitting Congress and many other elements--
particularly defense and intelligence--of the U.S. Government.
    Deputy Secretary Talbott testified that ``Congress knew 
about the Iranian arms shipments more or less at the same time 
and in much the same detail as we did in the Executive 
branch.'' Indeed, many Members of Congress were aware, based on 
intelligence reports and newspaper accounts, that Iranian arms 
were being shipped to the Bosnians. But members of Congress 
were not informed about one crucial detail known to very few in 
the Administration--the fact that the ClintonAdministration had 
been asked its position in advance of the arms shipments and that the 
U.S. had advised the Croatian Government that it would not object to 
those arms shipments. While notification was not required by law, the 
Executive branch should have made appropriate members of Congress aware 
of the policy change. The Committee rejects out of hand the notion that 
intelligence reports or press articles constitute notification of 

Informing U.S. allies about the ``no instructions'' policy

    Ambassador Galbraith testified that the U.S. could not 
unilaterally lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims 
without angering allies and possibly straining NATO solidarity. 
At the same time, however, he testified that he told several 
foreign ambassadors that the U.S. Government was not objecting 
to the flow of Iranian arms to the Bosnians. The Committee fins 
it odd that, on the one hand, little paper trail was left 
regarding the formulation or implementation of this policy--
ostensibly to prevent the policy from ``leaking'' to our 
allies--while, on the other hand, Ambassador Galbraith claims 
he felt free to discuss this policy shift with those same 
allies, even as the Clinton Administration kept the new policy 
secret from Congress, the CIA, and the Department of Defense.
    In contrast to Ambassador Galbraith's testimony, the DCM 
testified that he never informed any allies of the ``no 
instructions'' policy, nor was he aware of Ambassador Galbraith 
doing so. Furthermore, Deputy Secretary Talbott testified that 
during 1994, U.S. allies would not have been ``happy about our 
`no instructions' position, which is one reason why we felt 
very strongly that that diplomatic exchange should remain 
completely confidential.'' In addition, based on State 
Department documents, it is clear that even Washington's 
closest allies were not informed about the ``no instructions'' 
policy. For example, a State Department background paper 
prepared in late May/early June 1994, suggested that a high 
ranking U.S. official inform a European counterpart that the 
U.S. had not ``encouraged'' the Iranian arms sales to Bosnia 
and that the Administration was ``particularly concerned'' 
about the opening the arms sales provided Iran to make 
``political inroads'' in the region.

Informing the CIA

    Not only were Congress and U.S. allies not informed about 
the ``no instructions'' policy, it is clear that the CIA was 
not fully and adequately informed of the true meaning and 
implications of this policy. In fact, it was precisely because 
the CIA was left out of the loop that the Agency became 
concerned that Clinton Administration officials might be 
undertaking an illegal covert action. In addition, much of the 
intelligence reporting during that time offered significant 
circumstantial evidence that U.S. officials may have used the 
``no instructions'' policy to engage in activities to encourage 
or facilitate Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia.
    CIA headquarters first became aware that a policy shift 
might have occurred after receiving several cable messages in 
late April and early May 1994. At a May 5, 1994, meeting, then-
DCI James Woolsey raised the issue of Iranian arms shipments to 
Bosnia. According to Deputy Secretary Talbott, who was also at 
the meeting, he ``basically reviewed the `no instructions' 
decision'' with DCI Woosley and is ``puzzled by how Jim 
[Woolsey] could have come out of the meeting * * * without a 
full understanding of what posture we had taken and the fact 
that that posture was our position. It was the only position we 
were going to have on that.'' Talbott also testified that he 
has ``no recollection that there was any discussion of keeping 
the CIA out of this.''
    DCI Woolsey, for his part, testified that, based on his 
memory and notes from the May 5 meeting, he ``was not told that 
there had been a late April policy decision by the President. * 
* * I was told that that [`no instructions'] was a long-term 
policy to continue to iterate * * *  simply that as of May 5th, 
he [Galbraith] had been told to say that he had `no 
instructions.' '' Woolsey added, ``I do not believe, and * * * 
my memorandum for the record does not reflect, that I was 
briefed * * * on Any April 27th Decision. If that is Mr. 
Talbott's recollection, then that is hisrecollection, but it is 
not mine. * * * That would have, I believe, gotten my attention.''
    Deputy Secretary Talbott, according to Woolsey, said that 
Ambassador Galbraith had been told clearly that he should tell 
the Croatians only that he had ``no instructions'' and that 
``he should not * * * hint he had any wiggle room.'' Based on 
his discussion with Deputy Secretary Talbott at the May 5 
meeting. Woolsey concluded that the State Department and 
National Security Council had not yet decided exactly what to 
do about this issue and hence had issued the instructions of 
``no instructions'' until a final policy was formulated. Former 
DDCI Studeman supported Woolsey's testimony, saying that if 
``Strobe Talbott had intended to provide Jim [Woolsey] with a 
policy in a clear and unambiguous sense in the context of this 
meeting in May, it clearly failed to connect.'' Woolsey's 
recollections also are corroborated by the testimony before the 
Select Subcommittee on then-CIA Deputy Director for 
Intelligence Douglas MacEachin who was present at the meeting 
as a note-taker, as well as by MacEachin's nearly 
contemporaneous memorandum that described the meeting.
    Although Woolsey testified that several months passed 
before he was specifically informed by U.S. policymakers that 
the ``no instructions'' policy meant the U.S. was not objecting 
to Iranian arms shipments, he testified, ``It was pretty clear 
that somebody had decided to indicate to the Croatian 
Government that it was all right for the shipments to go 
through. So we began to assume by late May, early June [1994], 
that this was what, in fact, was occurring.'' Woolsey further 
testified that the first time he was officially told that ``no 
instructions'' was the standing policy and that it meant the 
U.S. would look the other way as Iranian weapons flowed to the 
Bosnians, was in an October 5, 1994 meeting with National 
Security Advisor Anthony Lake. Admiral Studeman testified that 
he found himself frustrated throughout this period because the 
CIA was ``outside the policy cage trying to stare into it 
without a lot of response coming back from the Administration 
when we attempted to pulse them about what the policy was.'' He 
added that ``I can recall over the course of the summer [1994] 
* * * as little tidbits came in about the Iranians and about 
the events * * * trying to go back to * * * Tony Lake * * * 
[or] the Secretary of State, trying to explore this issue more 
fulsomely without success.''
    The Committee's thorough review of numerous cables from the 
summer of 1994 further substantiates CIA claims that the Agency 
was left in the dark as to the true nature of U.S. policy 
toward enforcing the arms embargo against the former 
Yugoslavia.\7\ (The details of these cables remain classified.) 
Even though the CIA quickly ascertained from various 
intelligence sources that a policy change obviously had 
occurred, the Agency appears to have been stonewalled 
repeatedly in its efforts to get a straight answer about the 
true nature of U.S. policy. It should be noted that in addition 
to the CIA, other key U.S. officials were not fully informed 
about the change in U.S. policy towards enforcing the arms 
embargo. The former Director of Policy and Planning for the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Ambassadors 
to NATO, Bosnia, and Serbia all testified before the Select 
Subcommittee that they believed the policy in effect at the 
time was to obey the embargo against the former Yugoslavia, 
and, most definitely, they were unaware of a decision to give 
Iran a ``green light'' to ship arms into the region.
    \7\ This is not to say the Agency was unaware of Ambassador 
Galbraith's efforts to change the policy; indeed, a few CIA officials 
were privy to an April 29, 1994 cable from Galbraith to the Department 
of State in which he advocated a modified U.S. policy. See Department 
of State cable, Zagreb 1721, dated April 29, 1994.

CIA suspicions raised about a covert action

    The lack of clarity surrounding the ``no instructions'' 
policy, combined with intelligence reports from various sources 
that suggested active U.S. involvement in encouraging or even 
facilitating arms shipments to Bosnia, contributed to CIA 
suspicions about a possible U.S.-sponsored covert action to arm 
the Bosnian Muslims. (The details of these reports remain 
classified.) From September to November 1994, there were 
approximately ten intelligence reports, cables or memoranda 
about alleged U.S. plans to provide the Bosnian Muslims, the 
Federation Army and/or the Croatian Government with monetary 
assistance andarms. CIA suspicions subsided in October 1994, 
once Administration officials informed DCI Woolsey that the U.S. was 
``looking the other way'' at Iranian arms shipments and assured the 
Agency that the U.S. was not involved in any covert deals to arm the 
Bosnian Muslims. However, CIA concerns about a possible illegal covert 
action were heightened again in September 1995 (see section on 
``Iranian Weapons'').

Central Intelligence Agency actions

    Based on a thorough review of cables, the Committee does 
not believe that any ICR improperly reported on U.S. policy or 
personnel matters and the ICR certainly did not ``spy'' on 
embassy personnel, as some have alleged. Given the utter lack 
of candor from policymakers and the circumstantial evidence 
suggesting that U.S. officials may have gone beyond the ``no 
instructions'' policy and were engaging in activities to 
encourage or facilitate Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia, CIA 
officials acted properly in probing and reporting facts 
indicating possible illegal activities by Administration 
    DCI Woolsey testified extensively on the actions of CIA 
officials during this time. He stated that CIA representatives 
know that

        their main job is to collect intelligence, and that if 
        they are asked to influence events abroad by carrying a 
        message by political, economic, military [means] * * * 
        anything that could be construed as covert action, they 
        are not to do so without a finding. So the * * * 
        [ICR's] reaction when he was asked [by the Ambassador] 
        to * * * carry a message as an intelligence officer was 
        quite correct in coming back to us to get instructions.

As noted in Woolsey's testimony before the Select Subcommittee, 
the history of Iran-Contra played a major role in the CIA's 
response and guidance in this particular case. Given the 
lessons of Iran-Contra, it is therefore understandable that the 
CIA would urge intelligence officials at all levels to exercise 
extreme caution when dealing with such a situation.
    The Committee believes that had the ICR communicated to any 
foreign official what was, at the time, a policy that was 
publicly denied by the Administration and that foreign official 
then took action (such as facilitating arms shipments) based on 
that communication, the CIA could have been reasonably accused 
of covertly influencing--without a Presidential finding--the 
``political, economic or military'' conditions in the region. 
Furthermore, based on that communication, it is conceivable 
that paid assets could have taken action involving arms 
shipments--which almost certainly would have influenced 
``political, economic or military'' condiitons--a possible 
violation of Section 504(c) of the National Security Act.\8\ 
Although the IOB does not agree that an ICR passing on a 
message, in and of itself, would constitute a covert action, 
there is agreement between the Committee, the IOB, and DCI 
Woolsey that all ICRs should seek guidance from CIA 
headquarters before undertaking any action that could be 
construed as a covert action.
    \8\ Section 504(c) of the National Security Act states that ``No 
funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any department, 
agency, or entity of the United States Government may be expended or 
may be directed to be expended, for any covert action * * * unless and 
until a Presidential finding * * * has been signed. * * *''
    Woolsey testified that he complimented the ICR for his 
actions in a November 1994 meeting, but added ``a footnote'' 
that ``we didn't want to get into policy debates with the State 
Department.'' Woolsey further testified, however, that the ICR 
did not improperly stray into policy areas because part of his 
job is to provide input into the implications of a 
hypothetical, proposed or actual covert action. Given the 
conflicting signals (i.e., the ICR believed there had been no 
policy change, while Ambassador Galbraith maintained that the 
U.S. was not objecting to the flow of Iranian arms through 
Croatia to Bosnia), the ICR and other CIA officials acted 
properly in continually seeking to clarify U.S. policy and 
receive accurate guidance.
    Woolsey further testified that officials at CIA wanted to 
``make absolutely sure that * * * [there was a] record that, if 
at some later time, anybody ever suggested that there was a 
covert action going on * * * [that] the CIA * * * was [not] 
involved in it.'' Woolsey also dismissed press allegations that 
the ICR reported improperly or ``spied'' on the Ambassador or 
other officials. In particular, he noted that many of the 
cables written by the ICR did not--unlike State 
Departmentcables--constitute official reports that might be widely 
disseminated or used in making policy decisions. Rather, these cables 
were more in the nature of informal communications that provided 
atmospherics and background information to a select group of people in 
the Intelligence Community. The Committee has confirmed that these 
cables were in an ``eyes only,'' highly restricted channel, 
traditionally used to allow ICRs to discuss issues and seek guidance 
from immediate supervisors ``off the record.'' Even so, the Agency is 
required to make sure these communications are retrievable when needed. 
Such a channel has obvious utility for intelligence officers who are 
under almost constant scrutiny within the Agency and from overseers in 
the Executive and Legislative branches.

State Department--Central Intelligence Agency relations

    After April 1996, relations between the Ambassador and one 
intelligence element of his country team deteriorated so 
significantly that high-level Washington officials were 
required to address the problems that had arisen. Specifically, 
the Ambassador took actions to try to sow suspicions in the 
embassy about U.S. intelligence personnel and to limit the 
ability of intelligence personnel to carry out their duties. 
The Committee is aware that individual and institutional 
relations between the two entities have improved; nonetheless, 
the Committee will continue to monitor these relations closely 
because the work being done there is too valuable to fall 
victim to bureaucratic or personal vindictiveness. The 
Committee urges the Department and the agency concerned to 
develop a rigorous program of training and concrete guidance 
for its highest ranking personnel to ensure their complete and 
mutual understanding of the responsibilities, capabilities, 
authorities and missions of each party. Both the Department and 
this agency should present a united front to the world and work 
as a team to ensure that U.S. national security and foreign 
policy goals are met.

Was There an Unauthorized Convert Action?

    The Committee found that there was no regular, properly 
authorized covert action to arm the Bosnian Muslims. There was 
some discussion, analysis, and planning for a possible covert 
action that, apparently, was never undertaken. However, 
questions remain regarding whether any U.S. officials exceeded 
the ``no instructions'' policy and actively directed or 
facilitated weapons shipments into the region, thereby crossing 
the line into covert action. In particular, the Committee is 
concerned about an arms shipment that transited Croatia in 
September 1995. Based on the available evidence, the committee 
is unable to reconcile contradictory information or to 
determine with reasonable certainty that any U.S. officials 
directed or facilitated the release of this specific weapons 
shipment from Croatia to Bosnia. If any U.S. official did 
facilitate this shipment or directed the Croatian Government to 
do so, then the U.S. certainly went beyond traditional 
diplomatic activity and may have engaged in an unauthorized 
covert action.

Iranian weapons

    In September 1995, Croatian officials detained a shipment 
containing three Iranian surface-to-surface rockets bound for 
Bosnia. Croatian officials, who expressed concern about whether 
the rockets were fitted with chemical warheads, allegedly 
threatened to cut off the flow of Iranian arms to the Bosnians. 
In September 1995, Ambassador Galbraith reportedly instructed 
that all requests for guidance regarding cutting off the 
Iranian arms flow should be directed to him. He also allegedly 
stated that it was U.S. policy to do and say nothing to inhibit 
the flow of arms and that it was the intent of this policy to 
facilitate the delivery of arms. After it was determined that 
the rockets did not have chemical warheads, the Croatians 
released the rockets to the Bosnians, despite their alleged 
threats to cut off the arms pipeline. Curiously, information 
review by the Committee establishes that all three rockets 
were, in fact, released by the Croatians. The Croatians, 
however, consistently siphoned off portions, anywhere from one-
third to one-half, of each Iranian weapons shipment 
transshipped through Croatia. The conduct of Croatian officials 
relating to this surface-to-surface rocket shipment is 
therefore wholly inconsistent with what had come to be the 
normal pattern involving the Iranian weapons pipeline through 
Croatia intended for the Bosnian Muslims. In his testimony, 
Ambassador Galbraith denied having urged the Croats to release 
the rocket shipment, despite allegations to the contrary made 
available to the Committee.\9\
    \9\ There is testimonial and documentary evidence, which the 
Committee reviewed, that could establish, if corroborated, that 
Ambassador Galbraith pressured Croatian officials to release the rocket 
shipment to Bosnia. There is additional information, which is 
supportive of this theory, though not in and of itself conclusive, that 
the U.S. Government may have, in fact, ``coordinated'' the release of 
this rocket shipment.
    This particular weapons shipment is of great concern to the 
Committee for several reasons: First, this incident was not 
initially investigated by the IOB because it occurred after the 
IOB's original report was completed.\10\ Second, in this case, 
stark discrepancies in testimony cannot be attributed simply to 
differing recollections. Third, the ``no instructions'' policy, 
as explained by Administration officials, contained no 
provision allowing U.S. officials to encourage or facilitate 
weapons shipments through the region. If, in fact, any U.S. 
official directed the Croatian Government to release the 
shipment to the Bosnians or facilitated its release, then the 
U.S. certainly went beyond traditional diplomatic activities 
and may have engaged in an illegal covert action.
    \10\ The IOB did, however, subsequently conduct an inquiry into 
this issue. The Committee was informed that the IOB reached the 
following conclusions, with respect to these surface-to-surface 

        1. The Board does not believe allegations that U.S. officials 
        pressured Croatia to release these weapons to Bosnia in Autumn 
        of 1995;
        2. This determination aside, the Board would not consider a 
        U.S. ``request'' that Croatia release the weapons--absent a 
        quid pro quo, or any direct U.S. Government involvement in the 
        transshipment--to constitute a ``covert action'' within the 
        meaning of section 503 of the National Security Act, as 
        illuminated by the legislative history surrounding President 
        Bush's veto of an attempt to make ``requests'' a part of the 
        statutory definition;
        3. The Board finds that the activity undertaken by U.S. 
        personnel, of which the Board was aware with respect to this 
        particular weapons shipment, was not a ``covert action'' within 
        the meaning of section 503 of the National Security Act. Nor 
        does the Board consider this activity to be an ``intelligence 
        activity'' required by section 502 of the National Security Act 
        to be reported to the oversight committees of Congress--though 
        this issue is inherently vague; and,
        4. The Board believes that this activity did not amount to a 
        violation of an Executive Order subject to criminal penalties 
        under the ``United Nations Participation Act'' (22 U.S.C. 
        Sec. 287(c)). See Executive Order 12846.
    Given the discrepancies between the denials of the 
Ambassador and the ICR's accounts of what he was told, the only 
way to resolve whether U.S. officials actively facilitated the 
movement of these rockets may be to obtain sworn testimony from 
Croatian and Bosnian officials involved in the transfer. 
Unfortunately, the Committee currently lacks the authority to 
subpoena foreign officials and furthermore, the Committee does 
not believe efforts to depose these officials would be 

                          Misleading Testimony

    The Committee is concerned that Ambassador Galbraith may 
have provided the Committee with inaccurate information on 
three issues: whether he kept a written record; how often he 
met with a Croatian Muslim religious leader who has suspected 
ties to Iranian intelligence; and how many Iranian rockets were 
in the aforementioned shipment detained in Croatia in September 
1995. Given these concerns and the available evidence, the 
Committee anticipates an appropriates resolution of the ongoing 
Justice Department criminal inquiry into this matter.

Written record

    Other than writing a single memorandum for the record about 
his relaying the ``no instructions'' policy to the Croatian 
Government, Ambassador Galbraith testified to the Committee 
that he ``didn't keep a record'' of ``in-house'' meetings at 
the time that the ``no instructions;; policy was executed. In 
addition, he did not volunteer the fact that he kept his own 
``record'' of events that, at least in part, was relevant to 
the Committee's inquiry \11\; however, subsequent to his 
testifying before the Committee, staff learned that the 
Ambassador did keep an informal, yet classified, record of his 
thoughts and perusals on certain events. According to Ronald 
Neitzke, the DCM in Croatia and Charlotte Stottman, Ambassador 
Galbraith's former secretary in Croatia, Ambassador Galbraith 
began keeping the ``Record'' on a daily basis in November 1993. 
(It should be noted that ambassador Galbraith testified to the 
Select Subcommittee that he did not began keeping this 
``Record'' until November 12, 1994.\12\ According to Ambassador 
Galbraith's testimony to the Select Subcommittee, he kept this 
record until late 1995. Only thirteen excerpts from the 
record--dating from September 1994 to October 1995--were made 
available for Committee staff to review. Unfortunately, none of 
these excerpts was from the crucial spring 1994 period when the 
``no instructions'' policy was implemented or from the autumn 
1995 period when the Croatians detained and later released the 
shipment of Iranian surface-to-surface rockets. Given the 
Committee's limited access to the ``Record,'' the Committee is 
constrained to rely on Ambassador Galbraith's testimony to the 
Select Subcommittee as to the timing, contents, and relevance 
of the remaining portions of the ``Record.''
    \11\ Ambassador Galbraith did not to respond to the following 
comment made by Congressman Goss during a Committee hearing: ``* * * as 
the Ambassador have every opportunity to keep the record * * * and have 
the obligation to keep the record straight. For whatever reason you 
accepted not have a record of this. * * *''
    \12\ Coincidentally, November 12, 1994 is the date on which the 
Nunn-Mitchell Act, making it unlawful to spend U.S. Government funds to 
support the U.N. arms embargo against Bosnia, went into effect.

Meetings with a Croatian cleric

    Testimony obtained about Ambassador Galbraith's dealing and 
relationship with a leading Croatian Muslim cleric raises 
questions about the truthfulness and completeness of the 
ambassador's testimony to the Committee on this subject. This 
cleric's role in running the Iranian arms pipeline through 
Croatia to Bosnia and his ties to Iranian officials is well 
documented in numerous intelligence reports. However, in 
testimony before the Committee, Ambassador Galbraith said that 
he was not aware of the cleric's ties to Iranian intelligence 
and is ``not convinced that that was the case,'' despite the 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
    When questioned about this knowledge of and relations with 
this individual, Ambassador Galbraith testified to the 
Committee that ``the only occasion in that time period that I 
ever met with him'' was at a March 1994 feast at a local mosque 
in Zagreb, and, even then, he was unsure of the cleric's being 
present. According to testimony obtained by the Select 
Subcommittee, however, Ambassador Galbraith met with the cleric 
on several occasions. First, Ambassador Galbraith met with him 
in the cleric's office in late summer 1993, a meeting in which 
at least one other U.S. Embassy official was present. In 
addition, Ambassador Galbraith's former secretary testified 
that the Ambassador met in his embassy office with the cleric 
on more than one occasion.\13\ Finally, according to the Select 
Subcommittee's investigation, the ambassador kept a copy of the 
cleric's business card in his rolodex in the U.S. Embassy.
    \13\ Ms. Stottman herself has since called into question the 
clarity of her recollection on this issue. She has stated, however, to 
Congressional investigators that while meetings between the Ambassador 
and the cleric may not have occurred in the embassy, she does recall 
that the Ambassador indeed met with the cleric several times to discuss 
human rights issues, which were the focus of considerable 
Administration attention at the time.

How many Iranian rockets?

    In addition to conflicting testimony about possible U.S. 
pressure on Croatia to release a shipment of three Iranian 
surface-to-surface rockets, the Committee also heard 
conflicting testimony about the number of rockets, in the 
shipment. Ambassador Galbraith testified that he was told by a 
Croatian official in the spring of 1996, several months after 
the shipment was detained, that there was a fourth rocket in 
the shipment that the Croatian Government did not forward to 
Bosnia. This testimony directly contradicts information from 
intelligence reports and the accounts of eyewitnesses, both of 
which the Ambassador had access. According to a U.S. official, 
the crates containing the three rockets and their warheads 
filled to capacity the entire aircraft in which they were 
shipped. According to eyewitnesses, no additional rocket 
possibly could have fit on the plane. It is unclear whether 
Ambassador Galbraith was simply misled by the Croatian official 
regarding the number of rockets in the shipment or whether the 
claim that Croatia kept a ``fourth'' rocket for itself was 
meant to divert attention from the question of why Croatia 
released this shipment to the Bosnians.\14\
    \14\ Ambassador Galbraith made no mention of a ``fourth'' rocket in 
his subsequent testimony to the Select Subcommittee.


     The Clinton Administration's ``no instructions'' 
policy was a departure from its publicly stated policy which 
supported enforcing the U.N. arms embargo against the former 
Yugoslavia, while pressing allies for a multilateral agreement 
to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslim.
     The manner in which the ``no instructions'' policy 
was formulated and implemented led to confusion and significant 
disjunctures within the Administration. Not only was the CIA 
left out of the policy loop, Congress was not informed that 
U.S. policy had changed and that, as a result, the U.S. would 
``look the other way'' as Iranian arms shipments flowed through 
Croatia en route to Bosnia.
     The Committee concludes that the CIA, on matters 
of serious concern to national security, must be fully and 
currently informed of U.S. policy. It may be urgued whether or 
not the CIA was intentionally kept out of the policy loop, but 
the fact that the CIA was not adequately informed about this 
issue and serious implications. Because the CIA did not have a 
complete understanding of U.S. policy, it may have wasted 
valuable time and resources when it could have been working on 
higher priority issues. Although the CIA need not be consulted 
on all policy matters, in cases where intelligence 
professionals and their assts may be putting themselves at 
considerable risk, the CIA must have a thorough understanding 
of U.S. policy.
     The Committee commends the CIA for its actions and 
vigilance in dealing with the possibility that a covert action 
was being planned or undertaken. The Committee believes that in 
future situations where the official policy line is not clear, 
ICRs must consult with superiors before carrying out any action 
that could be construed as a covert action. At the same time, 
the White House, State Department, and all senior U.S. 
policymakers have an obligation to provide clear guidance to 
all U.S. officials overseas regarding official U.S. policy. 
That obligation was not satisfied in this matter.
     The Committee concludes that relations between 
State Department and CIA officials deteriorated to a 
dangerously unhealthy level. The Committee wishes to emphasize 
that both the DCI and Secretary of State must ensure that their 
personnel work together toward common policy goals as a 
cohesive them.
     The Committee finds that there was no authorized 
convert action to arm the Bosnian Muslims. Based on available 
information, the Committee cannot conclusively state that any 
U.S. official carried out an illicit or unauthorized convert 
action to arm or facilitate the arming of the Bosnian Muslims. 
However, questions remain about whether any U.S. official 
exceeded the ``no instructions'' policy and actively 
facilitated a weapons shipment into Bosnia in September 1995. 
If any U.S. official directed or facilitated this or any other 
weapons shipment, then an illegal covert may have occurred.
     Finally, the Committee has serious concerns about 
the forthrightness of Ambassador Galbraith's sworn testimony 
before the Congress on three issues. The Select Subcommittee 
referred this issue to the Department of Justice; the Committee 
expects that the Attorney General will reach an appropriate and 
just conclusion on that matter.

                             MINORITY VIEWS

    Based on the facts developed during the Committee's inquiry 
into the matter of the shipment of Iranian arms into Bosnia, we 
believe that the following conclusions are inescapable: (1) the 
United States government undertook no covert action to ship 
weapons to Bosnia or Croatia; (2) No U.S. official directed, 
controlled or facilitated the shipment of Iranian arms to 
Bosnia or Croatia; (3) No U.S. official violated U.S. law 
relating to covert action, intelligence activities, or 
notifications to Congress; (4) No discrepancies justifying a 
criminal investigation exist in the testimony of the witnesses 
who appeared before the Committee; and (5) Nothing in the 
Committee's inquiry contradicts the findings of the 1995 and 
1996 investigations of the President's Intelligence Oversight 
    The focus of this investigation was on those aspects of the 
transfer of arms to Bosnia which fall within the Committee's 
responsibilities to conduct oversight of the intelligence 
activities of the United States Government. We note that six 
current members of the Committee, three Democrats and three 
Republicans, were not members of the Committee during the 104th 
Congress when all hearings pursuant to this investigation were 
conducted. The Committee was particularly concerned whether a 
covert action was conducted without the proper presidential 
finding and notification to Congress. We note that the Majority 
has not concluded that such a covert action took place. The 
Majority appropriately does not argue that the relaying of the 
``no instructions'' message by Ambassadors Galbraith and Redman 
to the Government of Croatia, on April 28 and 29, 1994, was a 
covert action. The Majority does not find a covert action in 
the discussions surrounding the so-called ``Holbrooke 
initiative.'' The Majority does not find that any law was 
broken in the failure to inform Congress of the ``no 
instructions'' diplomatic exchange. We agree with these 
results: the Majority's report would have been much improved if 
these implicit judgments had been given more emphasis.
    We can not, however, endorse the Majority's report. It 
contains numerous errors of fact and interpretation. In the 
section on Congressional Notification, for instance, the 
Majority asserts that ``the U.S. had advised the Croatian 
Government that it would not object to * * * arms shipments.'' 
this is simply inaccurate. U.S. government officials did not so 
advise; U.S. government officials advised they had no 
instructions on the question of arms shipments. Furthermore, 
the report throughout confuses the isolated policy decision 
that led to the ``no instructions'' response with the entire 
U.S. government policy toward the crisis in the 
formerYugoslavia. Finally, the report levels repeated attacks on 
Ambassador Galbraith which are unsubstantiated by facts and therefore 
unfair. The following amplifies our major concerns.

                       no covert action occurred

    As noted, the main purpose of the Committee's investigation 
was to determine whether a covert action occurred. The Majority 
states it ``cannot conclude that any U.S. official crossed the 
line into covert action'' based on available evidence. 
Nevertheless, the Majority claims ``questions remain'' 
concerning whether any U.S. official ``actively directed or 
facilitated a weapons shipment into Bosnia in September 1995.'' 
However, these supposed ``questions'' are not based on any 
evidence. The Majority's report does not point to any specific 
actions which, had they occurred, would constitute a covert 
action under a proper interpretation of the law.
    A ``covert action'' is defined in statute (50 U.S.C. 413b) 
as ``an activity or activities of the United States Government 
to influence political, economic, or military conditions 
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States 
will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.'' The law, 
however, makes express exceptions for traditional diplomatic 
activities, routine support to diplomatic activities, 
activities intended primarily to acquire intelligence, and 
certain other specific activities.
    The Majority is most concerned over whether any U.S. 
official, in particular former Ambassador to Croatia Peter 
Galbraith, ``facilitated'' or ``directed'' a particular 
shipment of weapons bound for Bosnia in September 1995 and 
whether that action constituted an ``unauthorized'' covert 
action. The fact of the matter is that the Committee received 
no firsthand testimony that any U.S. official (including 
Ambassador Galbraith) ``facilitated,'' ``directed,'' or 
``pressured'' anyone with respect to the release of the weapons 
held by the Croatians in September 1995.
    Ambassador Galbraith explicitly denied under oath to the 
Committee that he urged that the weapons be released to the 
Bosnians. The U.S. government had good reason not to want the 
weapons released. The Majority attempts to impeach the 
Ambassador's testimony with reference to ``allegations to the 
contrary.'' These allegations are derived from (1) a cable 
written by an intelligence community representative (ICR) in 
September 1995 who reported that he was told by one Croatian 
government official that the release of these weapons was 
``coordinated'' with the U.S. Government (no names provided); 
and (2) the same ICR's testimony to another committee of the 
Congress that shortly before his Congressional testimony, and 
after the issue was widely reported in the press, he had been 
informed by a second Croatian government official that 
Ambassador Galbraith had ``pressured'' the Croatians into 
releasing this weapons shipment.
    The ICR's contemporaneous cable of September 1995 does not 
imply there was facilitation, direction, or pressure, and does 
not mention the Ambassador. The later ``allocation'' reported 
by the ICR in his testimony before the Congress should be 
deeply suspicious both for its timing and its source. The New 
York Times has reported that certain members of the Croatian 
government despised the Ambassador for this championing of 
human rights. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that 
this second Croatian government official intended to harm the 
Ambassador through the ICR's testimony.
    Furthermore, there are no ``stark discrepancies in 
testimony'' as the Majority report asserts. The ICR himself 
testified before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
that he knew of no U.S. involvement in the delivery of these 
weapons. The weight given these ``allocations'' by the Majority 
is misplaced. There is no other ``evidence'' before the 
Committee on this question. We accept the explicit denial of 
the Ambassador.
    The Majority states that this particular weapons shipment 
is of ``great concern'' to the Committee for several reasons, 
first among them because it was not part of the investigation 
conducted by the Intelligence Oversight Board which was 
completed in 1995. Our conclusion that no covert action 
occurred with respect to the September 1995 weapons shipment is 
consistent with the findings of the investigation completed by 
the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) in 1996. We 
have been informed that the IOB did not find that any U.S. 
officials conducted a covert action with respect to these 
    A second issue relating to covert actions is raised by the 
Majority's report. The Majority argues that had the ICR 
communicated U.S. policy to a foreign official, and the foreign 
official took action, the ICR's organization ``could have been 
reasonably accused of covert influencing--without a 
Presidential finding--the `political, economic or military' 
conditions in the region.'' However, the definition of covert 
action, as previously stated, applies to an activity or 
activities where the role of the U.S. government is not 
apparent or acknowledged publicly. If the ICR acting as a U.S. 
official had conveyed U.S. views to a foreign official on the 
question of whether the Croatians should be involved in the 
transit of arms to Bosnia, the ICR's organization could not 
have been accused of conducting a covert action under a correct 
reading of the law. A statement of U.S. views by a U.S. 
official to a foreign official is not a covert action--it is 
traditional diplomacy, an activity explicitly excepted from the 
definition of covert action. While we agree with the Majority 
that ICRs should contact their headquarters whenever they are 
asked to do anything that appears illegal or improper, we 
believe they should be given proper guidance in return. In this 
case, neither the law on covert action nor U.S. policy was 
accurately explained to the ICR by his organization in the 
spring of 1994. The conveying of a message by an ICR to 
officials in a foreign government is one option available to 
the President in the conduct of foreign policy. It is not in 
and of itself a covert action.

                   keeping congress and cia informed

    The Majority argues that Congress and the CIA were not 
fully and adequately informed by the Clinton Administration 
that after April 1994 the United States was ignoring 
``violations of the U.N. arms embargo with respect to arms 
shipments to Bosnia.'' But the fact that the United States 
Government was taking no action to block arms going to Bosnia 
was precisely what was known to anyone following the issues in 
the Balkans--even to Washington Post readers who never received 
an intelligence briefing. No U.S. action to enforce the embargo 
on Bosnia was something that many in Congress advocated, and 
effectively became law with the enactment of the Nunn-Mitchell 
amendment in November 1994. It might have made good sense for 
the Administration to have notified appropriate members of the 
Congress of the diplomatic exchange between the U.S. 
ambassadors and the Government of Croatia, but no notification 
was required by law.
    The CIA, on the other hand, was informed of the diplomatic 
exchange. The Majority tries to make the case that the CIA was 
``left in the dark,''was ``out of the loop,'' and 
``stonewalled,'' but the facts do not bear this out. CIA 
personnel, at the highest level and in the field, were told 
more than once about the ``no instructions'' instruction. The 
intelligence community had advance notice the Croatian 
government was preparing to allow the transshipment of arms to 
Bosnia and was seeking U.S. views on the issue. Ambassador 
Galbraith's cable of April 29, 1994, asking for more explicit 
guidance on his instructions was received and read at CIA 
headquarters. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott at the 
May 5, 1994 meeting with former Director of Central 
Intelligence R. James Woolsey made clear the Ambassador was 
authorized by Washington to say he had ``no instructions.'' 
(Unfortunately, the CIA's message to the field concerning the 
meeting was garbled and mishandled.) The former chief of the 
Central Eurasian Division told Committee staff that after the 
Woolsey-Talbott May 5, 1994, meeting, senior officials at CIA 
understood the implications of the ``no instructions'' 
instruction with respect to the shipment of arms from Iran. He 
explained that they did not like the diplomatic response to the 
Croatian government, precisely because they believed they 
understood the implications of the policy.
    While the Majority report makes much of former DCI 
Woolsey's testimony that he was not aware a policy decision had 
been made, he did testify it because clear to CIA that the 
United States government was not objecting to arms shipments to 
the Bosnians and was not taking action to stop them. He further 
testified he never expressed dissatisfaction to Deputy 
Secretary Talbott over what he had been told at their meeting. 
The Majority report confuses the concerns of Mr. Woolsey in May 
1994 with the concerns he had in October 1994. Mr. Woolsey 
didnot testify that his October 5, 1994, meeting with Anthony Lake, the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, was ``the 
first time he was officially told that `no instructions' was the 
standing policy and that the U.S. would look the other way as Iranian 
weapons flowed to the Bosnians.'' Instead he testified that he and Mr. 
Lake discussed the status and legal implications of the so-called 
Holbrooke initiative and other proposals under consideration at the 
time (never undertaken) for providing arms to the Bosnian Muslims.
    The intelligence community representative in the field was 
told by a State Department official that the ``no 
instructions'' response was an officially authorized response 
to the Government of Croatia. He chose not to believe what he 
was told. This appears to be in large measure a result of the 
inaccurate and uncoordinated guidance he received from his 
organization. This poor guidance led the ICR to collect 
information from the deputy chief of mission on the activities 
and statements of the Ambassador and other U.S. officials, and 
send the information back to his headquarters. The ICR was a 
relatively inexperienced officer assigned to a region in the 
midst of war and humanitarian crisis. He testified that during 
this period he was ``seeking guidance'' on whether he should 
change his mission priorities. His concerns did not receive the 
attention they deserved from his headquarters. Senior personnel 
at his organization should have better supported him in 
resolving his concerns and addressing the suspicion and 
mistrust that was present in the field.

              majority attack on ambassador is unjustified

    The Majority claims that it is ``concerned'' Ambassador 
Galbraith may have ``provided the Committee inaccurate 
information'' on: (1) whether he ``kept a written record;'' (2) 
how often he met with a Croatian Muslim leader who ``has 
suspected ties to Iranian intelligence;'' and (3) how many 
rockets were in a certain shipment of arms to the Bosnians. 
This section of the report is baffling. The Majority is 
criticizing the Ambassador for the allegedly inaccurate answers 
he gave to questions he was never asked. Furthermore, the 
Majority is trying to impeach the testimony of the Ambassador 
by using the statements of a witness who has never appeared 
before the Committee and who has in other settings given three 
different accounts of a key point. The Majority's attack on the 
Ambassador's testimony is unjustified.\1\
    \1\ The Majority states the Justice Department is conducting a 
criminal inquiry concerning the accuracy and truthfulness of the 
Ambassador's testimony. This inquiry is based on a referral from the 
Majority members of the Select Subcommittee to Investigate the United 
States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia (the 
``Select Subcommittee''). The referral, made in November 1996, 
requested that the Justice Department review the actions and testimony 
of 8 executive branch officials and one former senator for violations 
of law on a variety of theories. More than a year later, no criminal 
proceedings have been initiated by the Justice Department based on this 
    With respect to the information Ambassador Galbraith 
provided to the Committee concerning whether he kept a written 
record, Ambassador Galbraith was never asked at the Committee 
hearing whether he kept a diary or journal or made notes while 
serving as Ambassador. He was never asked about documents in 
general he might have written concerning Bosnia and Croatia. As 
the Majority report concede, if the Ambassador had disclosed to 
the Committee that he kept ``his own `record' of events that, 
at least in part, was relevant to the Committee's inquiry,'' he 
would have had to volunteer that in information.
    Ambassador Galbraith was asked at the Committee's hearing 
whether he made a record of the events surrounding receipt of 
the ``no instructions'' instruction. The Amdassador testified 
(as the Majority acknowledges) that he made a memorandum for 
the record on May 6, 1994 on the discussions leading up to his 
receipt of the ``no instructions'' instructions and his 
implementation of those instructions.
    Ambassador Galbraith did keep notes on his diplomatic 
contacts which were dictated to his secretary for a limited 
period of time from approximately the fall of 1994 to November 
1995. Excerpts from this so-called ``record'' pertaining to the 
Committee's investigation were appropriately made available to 
the Committee by the Department of State in response to the 
Committee's request for written materials relevant to the full 
scope of the Committee's inquiry. The excerpts provided to the 
Committee show the Ambassador dealing with the implications of 
the so-called ``Holbrooke initiative'' and accurately conveying 
U.S. policy neither to oppose nor support third-party arms 
transfers to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Again, the Ambassador did not 
mislead or provide inaccurate information to the Committee 
concerning this material because the Ambassador was never asked 
about it.
    The Majority appears to be attacking the Ambassador's 
veracity on when the ``record'' was initiated and what it 
contained. Again, the Ambassador was never questioned on this 
subject by the Committee and neither was Ronald Neitzke, the 
deputy chief of mission to Croatia, when he appeared before the 
Committee. The Majority report claims Mr. Neitzke and Charlotte 
Stottman, Ambassador Galbraith's secretary in 1993 and 1994, 
have said the ``record'' began in 1993 but there is no record 
testimony of Mr. Neitzke on this question before the Select 
Subcommittee and Ms. Stottman, as discussed in the next 
section, is an unreliable witness. Furthermore, the fact that 
no excerpt exists which addresses the release of weapons by the 
Croatians in autumn 1995 supports the Ambassador's testimony 
that the did not urge that they be released. Contrary to the 
Majority's strange statement that the Committee is 
``constrained to rely on Ambassador Galbraith's testimony to 
the Select Subcommittee'' concerning those portions of the 
``record'' not provided to the Committee, the entire ``record'' 
was made available to the chief counsels of the Select 
    The Majority's second issue concerning allegedly misleading 
testimony is equally flimsy. The Majority asserts ``[t]estimony 
obtained about Ambassador Galbraith's dealings and relationship 
with a leading Croatian Muslim cleric raises questions about 
the truthfulness and completeness of the Ambassador's testimony 
to the Committee on this subject.'' Again, to make this charge, 
the Majority twists the Ambassador's testimony and relies on 
testimony not given before the Intelligence Committee.
    Ambassador Galbraith was asked in his appearance before the 
Intelligence Committee whether he was the U.S. official 
identified as having met with a certain Croatian cleric during 
a particular time period with relevance to a specific document. 
Ambassador Galbraith testified, ``I believe that I was the U.S. 
official identified.'' He further testified:

          As ambassador I made a series of courtesy calls * * * 
        [with] religious leaders * * * in the context in which 
        I met [him] I am not even sure I would have known he 
        was in that room. I did not ask him to buy arms for the 
        Bosnian Muslims * * * that, frankly, is the only time I 
        recall meeting [the cleric].'' (Emphasis added.)

Ambassador Galbraith was not definitive in his testimony to 
this Committee concerning the number of times he met with this 
cleric. He was emphatic, however, that he did not ask the 
cleric to buy arms. The Majority has no evidence to contradict 
the Ambassador's assertion that he did not ask the cleric to 
purchase arms. Furthermore, there was no testimony obtained in 
hearings before the Intelligence Committee concerning the 
Ambassador's ``dealings'' with the cleric as the Majority 
implies. The Majority is relying on testimony taken by the 
Select Subcommittee on the narrow question of whether one or 
more meetings between the Ambassador and cleric took place. The 
Ambassador's former secretary, Charlotte Stottman, testified 
the Ambassador met the cleric more than once in his office. 
However, if testimony has been given elsewhere, the Committee 
has little basis for judging the testimony reliable or 
credible. Indeed, as the Majority notes, Charlotte Stottman 
disavowed her testimony. She contacted the chairman and ranking 
member of the Select Subcommittee by letter to explain that 
when she was questioned by the Select Subcommittee about the 
cleric she mistook his name for that of a torture victim under 
threat of execution whose release Ambassador Galbraith had 
secured. The Majority is aware of Ms. Stottman's letter, but 
indicates Ms. Stottman has since changed her story again, 
apparently in a telephone conversation with the Committee's 
chief counsel. Ms. Stottman's testimony is not reliable and 
should not serve as the basis for insinuations that the 
Ambassador had a ``relationship'' and ``dealings'' with the 
cleric. Perhaps the Majority should be concerned Ms. Stottman 
has provided inaccurate information, not the Ambassador.
    Finally, it is unbelievable that the Majority dwells on a 
discrepancy in the testimony of the witnesses concerning the 
number of weapons in an arms shipment to the Bosnians. 
Ambassador Galbraith never claimed to have seen the weapons 
shipment, and would therefore not have first-hand knowledge of 
the number of weapons it contained. It is clear from the 
testimony that his point was simply that one weapon in the 
shipment might not have gone on to Bosnia. Indeed, experts on 
the war beieves Croatians received a percentage of every 
weapons shipment that transited the country and the ICR 
testified before the Committee that one weapon was initially 
held back. The Majority report speculates the Ambassador might 
have been trying to ``divert attention from the question of why 
Croatia released this shipment to the Bosnians.'' The idea that 
anyone would purposefully provide inaccurate information on a 
minor, easily verified point to divert the attention of a 
congressional committee strains credulity. The Majority report 
goes beyond common sense in its attempt to assemble derogatory 

                          State/CIA relations

    The Majority should have made a good faith effort in this 
investigation to weigh the views and perspectives of officials 
from across the U.S. government. Instead, the report twists and 
distorts the testimony of witnesses from the Department of 
State and ignores the implications of significant information 
from officials of the Department of Defense concerning the 
Ambassador's appropriate responsiveness to issues of concern to 
the Department. It is extraordinary for a committee of Congress 
to charge a U.S. Ambassador with taking actions that 
``seriously and dangerously limited the effectiveness of 
intelligence collection''--it is shameful for this Committee to 
have done so with no bill of particulars, and no opportunity 
for the Ambassador or the Department of State to respond.
    In its 1997 report on Guatemala, the Committee endorsed the 
``primary of the ambassador at post'' under the law. In this 
investigation, however, the Majority never analyzes whether any 
actions allegedly taken by the Ambassador exceeded his 
legitimate statutory authorities as a chief of mission or 
whether those actions had any discernible effect on the 
intelligence collection effort in the region. The case has 
simply not been made that the effectiveness of intelligence was 
``seriously and dangerously'' limited, and the accusation of 
vindictiveness is ironic at best.
    Furthermore, although the Majority asserts ``relations 
between the Ambassador and the ICR deteriorated to a 
dangerously unhealthy level,'' the ICR testified to the 
Committee in June 1996: ``I never had a sense of personal 
animosity from the Ambassador, and I don't feel it towards the 
Ambassador, nor did I feel it at the time.'' Both defense 
attaches who served under Ambassador Galbraith, Lt. Col. 
Richard Herrick and Lt. Col. John Salder, whose 
responsibilities included overt intelligence activities, 
assured Committee staff that they and the Department of Defense 
found the Ambassador to be extremely responsive to U.S. defense 
needsand utterly appropriate in his working relationship with 
them and the Department. Indeed, one said he ``thank[ed] his lucky 
star'' for the opportunity to work with the Ambassador. The first key 
finding of the July 1997 Report of Inspection of Embassy Zagreb, 
Croatia, by the Inspector General of the Department of State was that 
``Embassy Zagreb, led by an exceptionally activitist, innovative and 
articulate Ambassador, has produced an impressive string of policy 
achievements over the past few years. These have directly contributed 
to peace and saved lives.''
    In order to represent U.S. interests most effectively, an 
ambassador or chief of mission should have close working 
relationships with officials of all government agencies serving 
in-country, including those representing the intelligence 
community. Close working relationships are built on 
professionalism, competency, and trust. Trust can be eroded 
when officials from one agency of the government traffic in 
unsubstantied information concerning co-workers or superiors 
from other agencies. Trust can also be eroded when officials of 
one agency place in jeopardy the operational equities of 
another entity and will not acknowledge mistakes were made.
    In this case, cables of an intelligence community 
representative contained unproven speculation about an 
ambassador, unfortunate characterizations of a deputy chief of 
mission, and second-hand information about the actions and 
views of other U.S. officials. These cables were not informal 
e-mail: they are official U.S. government records, permanently 
held by the ICR's organization. The cables were criticized at 
least four times within the ICR's own organization at the time 
they were sent, but the Majority finds that an ICR providing 
``atmospherics'' and ``background information'' to a ``select 
group of people'' in private-channel cables has ``obvious 
utility.'' We have the time of ICRs could be better utilized 
collecting foreign intelligence.
    The Majority uses the testimony of former DCI Woolsey to 
buttress its position that the ICR's cables were appropriate. 
However, Mr. Woolsey's comments as rendered by the Majority are 
inconsistent on the function and purpose of these kinds of 
cables. Equally important, Mr. Woolsey testified he had not 
read all the cables. Furthermore, according to a memorandum for 
the record prepared by the ICR following the November 1994 
meeting referred to by the Majority, it was Mr. Woolsey and his 
executive assistant who first cautioned the ICR against spying 
on the State Department.
    In short, Ambassador Galbraith's concerns about this kind 
of reporting were legitimate institutional concerns and should 
have received more balanced treatment in the Majority report. 
We completely agree with the Majority that there should be a 
common understanding of the 1997 memorandum of understanding 
between the State Department and the intelligence community and 
stress that the guidance on reporting from the field reiterated 
in 1996 should be strictly enforced.
    Furthermore, Ambassador Galbraith during his tenure also 
raised legitimate institutional issues about country clearances 
and the host-country contacts of U.S. government officials. 
State Department officials and officials of one intelligence 
agency, in particular, overseas should present a united front 
to the world and work together to ensure U.S. national security 
and foreign policy goals are met. Again, we strongly agree with 
the Majority that building better, more professional 
relationships overseas is in the best interests of the entire 
U.S. government, we emphasize, however, that this requires 
cooperation from all concerned.
    Finally, if nothing else, the Committee should have looked 
at how legal advice is provided to intelligence community 
representatives and whether requests for guidance on policy and 
mission priorities are handled in a timely manner with proper 

                    the intelligence oversight board

    We want to express our appreciation for the work done by 
the members of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board 
(IOB). The IOB, comprised of highly respected, private citizens 
who have had distinguished careers in intelligence, national 
security, business and the law, performs an important and 
valuable service to the United States. The members serve as a 
fact-finding body for the President on intelligence issues 
involving multiple departments and jurisdictions of the 
Executive Branch. They investigate with all the powers and 
authority of the Office of the President and are required by 
executive order to report to the Attorney General any 
information concerning intelligence activities that they 
believe to be unlawful. The IOB did not make such a referral in 
this case.
    The oversight function of the IOB worked as it was supposed 
to in this case. The IOB and the congressional intelligence 
committees serve different purposes and functions. One cannot 
substitute for, or replace, the other. We believe the Chairman 
of the IOB, Anthony Harrington, went out of his way to ensure 
the Committee understood the careful investigation he led on 
this matter and we are grateful for his efforts and those of 
the Board's members and staff.

                                   Norm Dicks.
                                   Julian C. Dixon.
                                   David Skaggs.
                                   Nancy Pelosi.
                                   Jane Harman.
                                   Ike Skelton,
                                           [Except for the sixteenth 
                                               through twenty-third 
                                   Sanford D. Bishop, Jr.

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

    As noted in the Committee Report and its Minority Views, 
there is significant agreement on several issues. The 
differences of opinion center on specific and discrete issues, 
a few of which are particularly deserving of additional 
comments. These are:
          1. that there was a change in the policy of the 
        United States regarding the U.N. arms embargo on the 
        former Yugoslavia, specifically Croatia and Bosnia, as 
        well as with respect to the U.S. policy toward Iran;
          2. that it was a deliberate decision of the Clinton 
        Administration not to advise Congress of the policy 
        change made by the President of the United States 
        relating to the shipment of Iranian weapons through 
        Croatia and Bosnia;
          3. that the credibility of Ambassador Galbraith, with 
        respect to his testimony before the Committee, was 
        highly questionable; and
          4. that the actions and guidance provided by the CIA 
        were appropriate.
1. There was a change in U.S. policy
    The Minority attempts to minimize the Iranian ``green 
light'' decision by identifying it as an ``isolated policy 
decision.'' It was, in fact, a decision of significant 
importance that flew in the face of major, well-known, and 
long-standing U.S. foreign policies. Specifically, the decision 
was a reversal of the U.S. policy to support and enforce the 
U.N. embargo of weapons shipments to the former Yugoslavia, as 
well as the U.S. policy to isolate the terrorist-sponsoring 
regime of Iran.
    Prior to the President's decision not to object \1\ to 
Iranian weapons shipments through Croatia to Bosnia, it was the 
U.S. policy, publicly stated and consistently enforced, to 
abide by the United Nations Security Council resolution 
regarding the arms embargo against the nations that formerly 
comprised Yugoslavia, and to encourage other nations to do the 
same. The Committee based this finding on its review of State 
Department cables, statements of Ambassador Galbraith, public 
statements of State Department officials, other official State 
Department documents, and on the testimony of several other 
high ranking United States government officials, who were 
responsible for carrying out the policy in the Balkans 
    \1\ Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 51 n. (Random House 1998).
    \2\ Department of State cable, State 82580, March 22, 1993; 
Department of State cable, Zagreb 1721, April 1994; Department of 
Defense cable A, April 25, 1994 (see classified appendix for cable 
specification); statement of State Department spokesman David Johnson, 
May 13, 1994, Reuters World Service; State Department Daily Press 
Guidance of June 24, 1994, June 27, 1994, and August 3, 1994; statement 
of State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelley, November 7, 1994, as 
reflected in Department of State cable, State 300842; Department of 
State cable, State 092370, April 14, 1995; National Security Council 
Daily Guidance Update, February 2, 1996; Select Subcommittee Deposition 
of Col. Richard Herrick (U.S. Army) (then Defense Attache Zagreb), 
August 20, 1996, at pp. 12-24; Select Subcommittee deposition of 
General Wesley Clark (then J-5, Director of Strategic Plans and Policy 
for Joint Staff), September 4, 1996, at pp. 3-8; Select Subcommittee 
Deposition of then U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter, September 20, 
1996, at pp. 5-8.
    The President's policy decision, made on Air Force One and 
delivered by ambassadors Galbraith and Holbrooke on April 29, 
1994, effectively gave an official U.S. ``green light'' to an 
Iranian plan to violate the U.N. embargo. No amount of lawyerly 
parsing of diplomatic language of what was said, or not said, 
can avoid this conclusion.
    Second, the President's decision was an important--indeed, 
a unique--exception to the oft-stated policy of the United 
States to isolate Iran diplomatically, economically, 
politically, and militarily. It cannot be seriously denied 
that, as a result of the ``green light'' to Iran, Iran 
effectively advanced its bilateral and multilateral economic, 
political, diplomatic, and military interests in a particularly 
vulnerable and combustible region of Central Europe. Again, the 
only conclusion that can be reached is that this decision 
dramatically turned on its head the United States' previous 
policy of isolating and containing Iran on the world stage.

2. Congressional notification

    The Minority does not believe there was a problem with 
congressional notification of the significant covert changes 
the Clinton Administration made to its policies regarding the 
U.N. arms embargo and Iran. Yet, no Member of Congress was ever 
notified by any officer of the Clinton Administration about the 
President's decision. This was intentional.
    Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Ambassador 
Richard Holbrooke \3\ admitted that the Administration 
purposefully kept Congress in the dark on the role of the 
United States in the Iranian weapons shipments. Indeed, 
Ambassador Holbrooke, noting his opinion that Congress should 
have been informed, testified that his proposal to so notify 
Congress was ``turned down flatly'' by the Administration.\4\
    \3\ Ambassador Holbrooke has been identified by President Clinton 
as his nominee for U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. At the time 
of this writing,that nomination has not been submitted to the Senate by 
the White House for confirmation. Ambassador Holbrooke, if confirmed, 
will succeed Bill Richardson, who vacated that position upon 
confirmation as Secretary of Energy.
    \4\ Select Subcommittee Deposition of Richard Holbrooke, September 
27, 1996, at pp. 10-11. See also Select Subcommittee Deposition of 
Strobe Talbott, September 5, 1996, at pp. 46, 47-52.
    Although Congress was kept in the dark, there were, during 
the period in question, various newspapers that reported the 
fact of the Iranian weapons shipments.\5\ Some of those news 
accounts included allegations that the United States was aware 
of the arms shipments, and had condoned the same. The Minority 
apparently argues that these articles somehow constitute 
congressional notification. Yet, Administration sources 
consistently denied that the U.S. was either aware of these 
shipments in advance, condoned the shipments, or was otherwise 
turning a ``blind eye.'' \6\ These denials, it turns out, were 
    \5\ See The Washington Post, ``U.S. is Allowing Iran to Arm Bosnian 
Muslims,'' April 14, 1994; New York Times, ``U.S. Looks Away as Iran 
Arms Bosnia,'' April 15, 1994; The Washington Post, ``Iran Ships 
Explosives to Bosnian Muslims, Embargo-Busting Cargo Also Aids 
Croatia,'' May 13 1994, pp. A1, A43; New York Times, ``Iran Said to 
Violate Embargo,'' May 14, 1994; Reuters, ``Iran Ships Material for 
Arms to Bosnians Report,'' May 14, 1994; The Washington Times, 
``Iranians Move into Bosnia to Terrorize Serbs,'' June 2, 1994, pp. A1, 
A13; The Washington Times, ``Iranian Weapons Sent Via Croatia, Aid to 
Muslims Get U.S. `Wink,' '' June 24, 1994, pp. A1, A13.
    \6\ See, e.g., The Washington Times, ``Iranian Weapons Sent Via 
Croatia, Aid to Muslims Gets U.S. `Wink,' '' June 24, 1994, pp. A1, A13 
(`` `There is no support for what Iran is doing,' according to a senior 
U.S. official.''). See also statement of State Department spokesman 
David Johnson, May 13, 1994 (``It is the policy of the U.S. to respect 
the U.N. arms embargo on the nations that formerly comprised 
Yugoslavia. It is important that all U.N. Security Council resolutions 
be fully observed.''), as requested by Reuters World Service; 
Department of State cable, State 300842, November 7, 1994 (recapping 
statement of State Department Spokeswoman Christine Shelley at a press 
briefing, ``We're certainly not contributing to it, and we certainly 
are not turning a blind eye.''); Department of State cable, State 
092370, April 14, 1995 (``It is the policy of the United States to 
respect the UN arms embargo on the nations that formerly comprised 
Yugoslavia.  * * * The United States has on many occasions made known 
its strong objection to the behavior of the Government of Iran. We are 
actively involved in international efforts to isolate Iran and prevent 
it from engaging in illegal and dangerous weapons transfers.''); 
National Security Council, Daily Guidance Update, February 2, 1996 
(``The US did not cooperate, coordinate or consult with any other 
government regarding the provision of arms to the Bosnians. * * * We 
have always made clear that we were abiding by the arms embargo and 
that we expected other countries to do so as well.'').
    The Committee's report, however, does not share the 
Minority's view that news leaks, falsely denied by the 
Administration, serve in lieu of official congressional 

3. Ambassador Galbraith's testimony

    The Minority does not share the Committee's concern about 
Ambassador Galbraith's truthfulness in testifying before 
Congress.\7\ It also refuses to accept the possibility that 
Ambassador Galbraith omitted material facts when he testified 
before the Committee.
    \7\ Significantly, Mr. Ike Skelton (D-Missouri), who is a member of 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and also the 
Ranking Democrat of the House Committee on National Security, joined 
the Majority in the adoption of the Committee's findings and supporting 
paragraphs relating to the questionable credibility of Ambassador 
Galbraith before Congress on these matters.
    Ambassador Galbraith kept a written record of his actions 
and musings on his job during his tenure as the U.S. Ambassador 
in Zagreb, Croatia. Indeed, the record was typically dictated 
verbatim by the Ambassador to his secretary at the end of each 
working day. She typed it on government time and on government 
equipment. The Ambassador kept it stored in a government safe 
in his office. He typically referred to this document as ``The 
    ``The Record'' was, certainly, of relevance to the 
Committee's investigation, and especially so at the time of his 
testimony before the Committee. For example, one entry 
discusses a dinner meeting between the Ambassador and a high 
level Croatian government official. At that meeting, the two 
joked, knowingly with each other, about arming Bosnian Muslims 
with Iranian weapons that would be shipped through Croatia.
    Congress learned about ``The Record'' from the two 
different sources, the Ambassador's secretary and the 
Ambassador's Deputy Chief of Mission, Ron Neitzke. According to 
both witnesses, the Ambassador began ``The Record'' almost as 
soon as he began his tenure as Chief of Mission in Zagreb. 
Curiously, however, during his appearance before the Committee, 
the Ambassador stated that he did not ``keep a record'' of 
``in-house'' meetings at the time the ``no instructions'' 
policy was executed. He did not disclose the existence of ``The 
Record,'' even when he was criticized for failing to keep a 
written contemporaneous record of events.
    The Ambassador's justification for failing to mention ``The 
Record'' is that the document was ``personal,'' despite its 
provenance, and that it bore official classification by the 
State Department. This explanation appears disingenuous, at 
    These circumstances, and the Ambassador's verbal 
gymnastics, left the Committee concerned about his motivation 
and led to questions regarding his truthfulness with Congress, 
generally. This doubt is at play, for example, where the 
Committee has sought, without any definitive success,\8\ 
exculpatory evidence to support Ambassador Galbraith's self-
serving denials of deeper involvement in the Iranian weapons 
transfers, particularly those involving the rocket shipment in 
September 1995.
    \8\ There were various witnesses questioned by other committees and 
subcommittees in the House and Senate that supported some, but 
importantly not all, of Ambassador Galbraith's version of events. In 
some instances, various witnesses' statements were consistent with the 
Ambassador's yet inconsistent on material points with each other. 
Importantly, Ambassador Galbraith displayed a strikingly detailed and 
prophetic knowledge of the Croatian/Iranian plan. He had specific 
knowledge that the Croatians would take a portion of the Iranian 
weapons for themselves and that the weapons would be shipped via 
Iranian 747s.

4. CIA actions were not misguided

    The Minority complains mightily about the CIA's actions and 
the guidance it provided the Intelligence Community 
Representative (``ICR'') for Croatia. The Minority contends 
that the legal advice provided the ICR was faulty; that CIA 
officials should not have advised the ICR that the Ambassador 
was close to violating the covert action laws; and, that the 
ICR should have simply ignored his superior's admonitions. The 
Minority also faults the ICR for maintaining a written record 
of events as they transpired, claiming that those records 
occasionally improperly characterized the situation in Zagreb 
at the time. The Minority asserts that these records are proof 
of poor judgment on the part of the ICR. Not once, however, 
does the Minority assert that the facts put forth by the ICR in 
these records are false.
    Curiously, it is also the Minority that finds no fault 
whatsoever with the actions, guidance, or advice of State 
Department and National Security Council officers during the 
development of the policy that allowed Iran, Croatia, and 
Bosnia to flout the United Nations embargo. After all, it was 
State Department and NSC officers who failed to advise the 
President that Ambassador Galbraith had significant prior 
knowledge of the specifics of the Iranian weapons shipments. It 
was these same State Department and NSC officers who 
specifically directed Ambassadors Galbraith and Redman not to 
put anything in writing about this policy, or about their 
diplomatic exchange with President Tudjman. It was these same 
State Department and NSC officers who deliberately refused to 
advise Congress of the policy change, and who led the Director 
of Central Intelligence to believe that there was no policy 
change whatsoever.
    The CIA's caution and concern throughout the ``green 
light'' policy's implementation are understandable. In the 
past, the CIA has on numerous occasions been taken to task, 
particularly by Congress, over accusations that it has acted 
without proper authorization. During the Iran/Contra Affair, 
for example, the CIA was badly damaged by the actions of its 
officers, who acted without written guidance. Under such 
circumstances, and with such a history, it is quite remarkable 
for Members of Congress to complain of the CIA's caution, of 
its continuous seeking of guidance from policymakers, of its 
insistence on documentation of instruction, and of its care to 
make a contemporaneous record of events. If it was the CIA, 
rather than the State Department, that failed to keep records, 
or--more tragically--had executed a policy that was 
intentionally undocumented, one need not imagine the resulting 

                                                       Porter Goss.