[House Report 105-804]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Union Calendar No. 450
105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - - House Report 105-804
INVESTIGATION INTO IRANIAN ARMS SHIPMENTS TO BOSNIA
__________
R E P O R T
of the
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
together with
MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS
October 9, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, October 9, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House,
U.S. Capitol, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to the Rules of the House, I am
pleased to transmit herewith an investigative report of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, styled
``Investigation into Iranian Arms Shipments to Bosnia.'' The
report includes findings and conclusions, as well as minority
and additional views.
The Committee's report was approved by a majority of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on August 6, 1998.
Sincerely yours,
Porter J. Goss,
Chairman.
Union Calendar No. 450
105th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 105-804
_______________________________________________________________________
INVESTIGATION INTO IRANIAN ARMS SHIPMENTS TO BOSNIA
_______
October 9, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany ]
Overview
On April 5, 1996, the Los Angeles Times published an
article, ``U.S. OKd Iran Arms for Bosnia, Officials say,''
alleging that in 1994, the Clinton Administration gave a
``green light'' for Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia to transit
Croatia. This alleged decision came despite the United Nations
arms embargo imposed on the former Yugoslavia that the United
States had pledged to uphold and despite the Administration's
policy of isolating Iran internationally. On April 23, 1996,
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)\1\
initiated an investigation into ``those aspects of the transfer
of arms to Bosnia that fall within the Committee's
responsibilities to conduct oversight of the intelligence
activities of the United States Government.'' The investigation
did not examine the wisdom of the U.S. policy of not objecting
to the Iranian arms flow, nor did it examine the policy's
underlying assumptions and justifications (e.g., that the
Bosnian Army and Federation Agreement were on the verge of
collapse in the spring of 1994, that the shipment of small arms
from Iran to Bosnian Muslims would affect the regional balance
of power and possibly even the course of the war, etc.).
Rather, the Committee's investigation focused on the following
issues:
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\1\ Hereinafter referred to as the Committee.
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How was the ``no instructions'' instruction
implemented and did this response constitute a change in
policy?
What effect did the CIA's lack of understanding of
the ``no instructions'' policy have on events in the region and
on relations within the U.S. embassy in Croatia?
Did the implementation of this policy constitute a
covert action?
Scope of the investigation
The Committee held one classified briefing and four
classified hearings on the issue of Iranian arms shipments to
Bosnia. On April 25, 1996, Anthony Harrington, the Chairman of
the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) briefed the
Committee ``off the record'' on the Board's findings regarding
the Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia. The following witnesses
testified before the full Committee: Ambassador Peter
Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador to Croatia since June 1993,
andAmbassador Charles Redman, Special Envoy for the former Yugoslavia
from August 1993 to September 1994 (May 30, 1996); former Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) R. James Woolsey and former Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence (DDCI) Admiral William Studeman (June 6, 1996);
an Intelligence Community Representative (ICR) in Croatia and Ronald
Neitzke, the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in Croatia from July 1992 to
July 1995 (June 20, 1996); and Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of
State (August 1, 1996). Committee staff also interviewed the following
people who had knowledge of, or were involved in, the policy decisions
made regarding the U.S. position on Iranian arms shipments into Bosnia:
the former Chief of the Central Eurasia Division in the CIA's
Directorate of Operations; the former and current U.S. Defense Attaches
(DATT) in Croatia; several National Security Council staffers; the
Chief of the DCI's Balkan Task Force; and several other CIA officials.
In addition, Committee staff reviewed hundreds of relevant documents
from CIA, NSA, and the State Department.
It should be noted that the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) and the House of Representatives Select
Subcommittee on the United States Role in Iranian Arms
Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia \2\--which provided Committee
staff access to its classified report, interview memoranda, and
deposition transcripts--also conducted investigations into this
matter. In its final report, the Select Subcommittee requested
that this Committee further examine the question of whether
Ambassador Peter Galbraith engaged in activities that could be
characterized as unauthorized covert action.
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\2\ Hereinafter referred to as the Select Subcommittee.
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The President's Intelligence Oversight Board
The Committee was briefed ``off the record'' on the results
of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) \3\
investigation into limited aspects of the implementation of the
Clinton Administration's policy regarding Iranian arms
shipments to Bosnia. Specifically, the IOB reviewed three sets
of events to determine if a covert action occurred: one
involving the movement of a humanitarian convoy into Bosnia;
the second involving comments made by U.S. officials to
Croatian officials on April 29, 1994; the third involving
whether Ambassador Galbraith and/or Assistant Secretary of
State Holbrooke made an offer of arms to the Bosnian
Government.
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\3\ The IOB, which is a standing committee of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), was created in 1976, and
rechartered on September 13, 1993 by Executive Order 12863. In part,
the IOB is chartered to ``prepare for the President reports of
intelligence activities that the IOB believes may be unlawful or
contrary to Executive Order or Presidential directive,'' ``forward to
the Attorney General reports * * * concerning intelligence activities
that the IOB believes may be unlawful * * *,'' and ``conduct such
investigations as the IOB deems necessary to carry out its functions
under this order.''
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The IOB's investigation began in November 1994 and ended in
May 1995, when its classified report, which found implicitly
that no illegal covert action hadbeen undertaken by U.S.
officials, was issued to the White House. Based on the IOB report,
White House Counsel Abner Mikva came to the same conclusion. It is
important to note that the IOB itself did not explicitly make a ruling
about whether a covert action occurred--the IOB made factual
determinations upon which Mr. Mikva concluded that no covert action had
occurred between April and November 1994.
The IOB chairman declined to testify to the Committee for
the record about the Board's findings and the IOB itself was
unwilling to share its report with this or any other
Congressional committee. As the basis for declining to testify
in a formal hearing or to provide its report, the IOB cited the
need to preserve the confidentiality of communications to the
President and the need to maintain the constitutional
separation of powers. The IOB contended that such restrictions
on providing testimony and its reports to Congress are
necessary to encourage candor of Board members and
witnesses.\4\
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\4\ The Committee notes, however, that the IOB did publicly
release--at President Clinton's direction--an unclassified version of
its original report on the Intelligence Community's activities in
Guatemala from 1984 to 1996. It should be noted that the IOB Guatemala
Investigation was, from its inception, undertaken with an eye toward
public release of the maximum appropriate information. Such was not the
case with respect to the IOB's Iran/Bosnia Investigation.
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In addition to the IOB's investigation, the Committee
conducted its own investigation into the Iranian arms shipments
to Bosnia for several reasons. First, given the Committee's
responsibility for oversight of all intelligence activities, it
was necessary to investigate allegations that an illegal covert
action took place. Second, the majority leadership in both
houses of Congress asked committees with relevant oversight
responsibility to investigate the matter. Additionally, the
initial IOB investigation did not cover events that occurred
after November 1994. And, other witnesses, central to the
Committee's investigation, such as Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott, needed to be questioned as to their role in the
matter.
The ``no instructions'' policy
The first major component of the Committee's investigation
focused on how the ``no instructions'' instruction was
implemented, whether this response constituted a change in
policy, and what effect the CIA's lack of understanding of the
policy had on events in the region and relations within the
U.S. embassy in Croatia.
Covert action
The second major component of the Committee's investigation
examined whether any U.S. official engaged in covert action.
Covert action, as defined in section 503 of the National
Security Act, is ``an activity or activities of the United
States Government to influence political, economic or military
conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged
publicly.'' The definition of covert action excludes
``traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine
support to such activities.'' In addition, the National
Security Act mandates that the President issue a finding
authorizing a covert action and that the Congressional
intelligence committees be kept ``fully and currently
informed'' of all covert actions.
Findings
The ``no instructions'' instruction constituted a
change in U.S. policy. Indeed, several Executive branch policy
officials testified that they viewed the ``no instructions''
policy as a change.
The Clinton Administration failed to inform
Congress about its decision to allow Iranian arms to transit
Croatia into Bosnia. The Committee emphatically rejects out of
hand the notion that intelligence reports made available to
Congress concerning Iranian arms flows constituted
notification. None of these reports mentioned U.S. acquiescence
in these shipments. The concept that Congress can be notified
in such a manner violates the spirit of the legislative
oversight system. Similarly, the Committee dismisses the
argument that press reporting of Iranian arms flows through
Croatia to Bosnia replaces the type of notification that should
have occurred in this case.
Policymakers did not keep their own senior
intelligence officials informed of U.S. policy concerning these
arms shipments. This failure to consult and communicate led to
significant disjunctures between policy and intelligence
officials, particularly in Croatia.
When the U.S. ambassador in Croatia asked the ICR
to pass on the U.S. position on these Iranian arms shipments,
the ICR acted properly and responsibly in refusing to carry out
this request and informing his superiors about it. The
Committee believes that in future situations where the official
policy line is not clear, ICRs should consult with superiors at
headquarters before carrying out any action that could be
construed as a covert action.
The ICR, who was obligated to report potential
violations of law, acted properly in terms of the cables he
sent about Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia. Furthermore, the
ICR did not ``spy'' on or inappropriately characterize embassy
personnel in his cables, as some have alleged.
Relations between the Ambassador and the ICR
deteriorated to a dangerously unhealthy level. Specific actions
taken by the Ambassador vis-a-vis intelligence personnel
seriously and dangerously limited the effectiveness of
intelligence collection in the region.
The Committee believes that the DCI and Secretary
of State should develop a program to ensure that chiefs of
mission and intelligence community representatives have a
common understanding of the terms of the 1977 agreement
concerning reporting from the field and that updated guidance
explaining this agreement ought to be considered.
The Committee found that there was no authorized
covert action to arm the Bosnian Muslims. There was some
discussion, analysis, and planning for a possible covert action
that, apparently, was never undertaken. Rumors of these
discussions and planning sessions made some individuals
suspicious that an illicit covert action was underway.
Based on the available evidence, the Committee
cannot conclude that any U.S. official crossed the line into
covert action. However, questions remain about whether any U.S.
official exceeded the ``no instructions'' policy and actively
facilitated a weapons shipment into Bosnia in September 1995.
The Committee is aware that the embassy in
Zagreb has experienced extraordinary pressure since it
opened. While the performance of individual officers
serving at the post has often been outstanding, the
Committee believes more could have been accomplished
and much misunderstanding avoided if Washington
officials and the Ambassador had encouraged a more
cooperative environment, particularly among members of
the ``country team.''
The Committee heard much contradictory
testimony in the course of its investigation. Although
some discrepancies in testimony may be due to different
interpretations or recollections of events, the
Committee is concerned that Ambassador Peter Galbraith
may have provided the Committee with misleading
testimony on three issues. The Committee is aware that,
based on a referral from the Select Subcommittee, the
Justice Department is currently conducting an inquiry
to determine whether the Ambassador's testimony to
Congress on these issues was accurate and truthful. The
Committee encourages a just and appropriate resolution
of this matter.
The ``No Instructions'' Policy
Background
Peter Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, testified
before the Committee that three U.S. officials advised him in
late April 1994 that officials of the Croatian Government
planned to ask him what position the U.S. would take if Croatia
allowed Iranian arms to transit its territory en route to
Bosnia.\5\ Based on this information, Ambassador Galbraith
asked the State Department for guidance as to how to respond to
the Croatian Government. On April 28, 1994, prior to meeting
with Croatian officials later that day, Ambassador Galbraith
was instructed by ``Washington'' to tell the Croatian
Government that he had ``no instructions'' on the matter.
Ambassador Galbraith, according to his own testimony, informed
the Croatian Government that he had ``no instructions''
because, as he understood it, the U.S. had not yet made a
decision on how to answer the Croatian Government's question.
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\5\ It should be noted that two of these U.S. officials testified
before the Committee that they were not forewarned by Croatian
officials that such a question would be posed; only the DCM testified
that he knew in advance that the Croatian Government would pose this
question to the Ambassador.
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On April 29, 1994, prior to another meeting with Croatian
officials, a National Security Council (NSC) official told the
Ambassador that his instructions were that he had ``no
instructions.'' That evening, at a dinner meeting, Ambassador
Galbraith again passed the ``no instructions'' message on to
the Croatians. Ambassador Charles Redman, who also attended the
dinner meeting, further explained to a Croatian official that
the decision to allow Iranian arms to transit its territory was
one for Croatia to make and that the U.S. did not want to be
put in the position of saying ``no'' to these shipments. As
Ambassador Galbraith summarized in his testimony, the ``no
instructions'' policy in essence meant that the U.S. would not
object to Croatia participating in the provision of arms to the
Bosnians. Almost immediately after the ``no instructions''
message was passed on, large quantities of Iranian weapons
began to flow through Croatia into Bosnia.
Did ``no instructions'' constitute a policy change?
At the beginning of the Clinton Administration, stated U.S.
policy was to continue enforcing the U.N. arms embargo against
the former Yugoslavia, while pressing allies for a multilateral
agreement to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims.
The ``no instructions'' policy, however, departed from the
Administration's official public policy because, after April
1994, the U.S. began to ignore--and some might even argue,
encourage--violations of the U.N. embargo with respect to arms
shipments to Bosnia.
Based on the testimony the Committee heard, there appears
to be a difference of opinion within the Clinton Administration
over whether the ``no instructions'' policy indeed constituted
a policy change. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott testified
that the ``no instructions'' decision did not constitute a
change in policy and that it was consistent with a ``very major
change'' in the U.S. policy that went back to the early days of
the Clinton Administration. According to Deputy Secretary
Talbott, this policy consisted of ``a lift and strike [policy],
as opposed to keeping the [arms] embargo in place, and
cultivation of the [Bosnian] Federation.'' The Committee notes
that although a multilateral lift and strike was indeed the
Administration's policy goal, it was never a policy implemented
by the U.S., or agreed to by our allies.
Ambassador Galbraith testified that the ``no instructions''
policy could be viewed either as a continuation of the
Administration's policy or as a new policy. He told the
Committee that ``no instructions'' could be viewed as a
continuation of policy because the Administration had not
objected to the ``trickle'' of arms that had been coming
through the region prior to April 1994. On the other hand, he
testified, because this was the first time the U.S. Government
was asked to state explicitly whether it would object to such
arms flows, ``no instructions'' was indeed a policy shift.
Interestingly, in a cable that he sent to the State Department
at the time the policy was being developed, Ambassador
Galbraith reminded his State Department superiors that the U.S.
policy was to respect the arms embargo and to encourage other
countries to do likewise. However, in that same cable, he urged
modification of this U.S. policy. \6\
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\6\ Department of State cable, Zagreb 1721, dated April 29, 1994.
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In the opinion of Ronald Neitzke, the former DCM in
Croatia, the ``no instructions'' policy was ``a profound
[policy] change.'' To illustrate his case, he cited a September
1992 incident in which the U.S. insisted that Croatia turn over
to UNPROFOR the weapons and ammunition found on board an
Iranian aircraft they had detained and report the incident to
the U.N. He contrasted that policy to the ``no instructions''
guidance under which no U.S. officials were told to report
embargo violations to the U.N. or to take action to halt such
shipments.
The Committee believes that the ``no instructions''
instruction did constitute a policy change since it was the
first time the U.S. Government made a deliberate decision
neither to object to, nor to report, arms embargo violations to
the U.N. In addition, the ``no instructions'' decision clearly
led to a sigificant change in the amount of weaponry flowing to
the Bosnian military; what had been a ``trickle of arms
entering the region prior to April 1994, soon became a huge
influx of weapons, primarily from Iran, that were funneled
through Croatia into Bosnia.
Finally, prior to the spring of 1994, the Croats had
rejected a number of Iranian overtures to establish an arms
route through Croatia to Bosnia; it is highly dubious that
Croatia would have agreed to allow Iranian arms to transit its
territory absent the U.S. ``no instructions'' policy.
Congressional notification
Congress was deeply involved in the debate over lifting the
arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslins, but it was never
officially or formally informed that the Administration's
policy toward enforcing the arms embargo had changed. Although
some Administration officials have labeled the ``no
instructions'' instruction as merely a diplomatic exchange with
the Croatian Government, the policy itself had much broader
implications that, if fully understood, could have affected the
actions of an unwitting Congress and many other elements--
particularly defense and intelligence--of the U.S. Government.
Deputy Secretary Talbott testified that ``Congress knew
about the Iranian arms shipments more or less at the same time
and in much the same detail as we did in the Executive
branch.'' Indeed, many Members of Congress were aware, based on
intelligence reports and newspaper accounts, that Iranian arms
were being shipped to the Bosnians. But members of Congress
were not informed about one crucial detail known to very few in
the Administration--the fact that the ClintonAdministration had
been asked its position in advance of the arms shipments and that the
U.S. had advised the Croatian Government that it would not object to
those arms shipments. While notification was not required by law, the
Executive branch should have made appropriate members of Congress aware
of the policy change. The Committee rejects out of hand the notion that
intelligence reports or press articles constitute notification of
Congress.
Informing U.S. allies about the ``no instructions'' policy
Ambassador Galbraith testified that the U.S. could not
unilaterally lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims
without angering allies and possibly straining NATO solidarity.
At the same time, however, he testified that he told several
foreign ambassadors that the U.S. Government was not objecting
to the flow of Iranian arms to the Bosnians. The Committee fins
it odd that, on the one hand, little paper trail was left
regarding the formulation or implementation of this policy--
ostensibly to prevent the policy from ``leaking'' to our
allies--while, on the other hand, Ambassador Galbraith claims
he felt free to discuss this policy shift with those same
allies, even as the Clinton Administration kept the new policy
secret from Congress, the CIA, and the Department of Defense.
In contrast to Ambassador Galbraith's testimony, the DCM
testified that he never informed any allies of the ``no
instructions'' policy, nor was he aware of Ambassador Galbraith
doing so. Furthermore, Deputy Secretary Talbott testified that
during 1994, U.S. allies would not have been ``happy about our
`no instructions' position, which is one reason why we felt
very strongly that that diplomatic exchange should remain
completely confidential.'' In addition, based on State
Department documents, it is clear that even Washington's
closest allies were not informed about the ``no instructions''
policy. For example, a State Department background paper
prepared in late May/early June 1994, suggested that a high
ranking U.S. official inform a European counterpart that the
U.S. had not ``encouraged'' the Iranian arms sales to Bosnia
and that the Administration was ``particularly concerned''
about the opening the arms sales provided Iran to make
``political inroads'' in the region.
Informing the CIA
Not only were Congress and U.S. allies not informed about
the ``no instructions'' policy, it is clear that the CIA was
not fully and adequately informed of the true meaning and
implications of this policy. In fact, it was precisely because
the CIA was left out of the loop that the Agency became
concerned that Clinton Administration officials might be
undertaking an illegal covert action. In addition, much of the
intelligence reporting during that time offered significant
circumstantial evidence that U.S. officials may have used the
``no instructions'' policy to engage in activities to encourage
or facilitate Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia.
CIA headquarters first became aware that a policy shift
might have occurred after receiving several cable messages in
late April and early May 1994. At a May 5, 1994, meeting, then-
DCI James Woolsey raised the issue of Iranian arms shipments to
Bosnia. According to Deputy Secretary Talbott, who was also at
the meeting, he ``basically reviewed the `no instructions'
decision'' with DCI Woosley and is ``puzzled by how Jim
[Woolsey] could have come out of the meeting * * * without a
full understanding of what posture we had taken and the fact
that that posture was our position. It was the only position we
were going to have on that.'' Talbott also testified that he
has ``no recollection that there was any discussion of keeping
the CIA out of this.''
DCI Woolsey, for his part, testified that, based on his
memory and notes from the May 5 meeting, he ``was not told that
there had been a late April policy decision by the President. *
* * I was told that that [`no instructions'] was a long-term
policy to continue to iterate * * * simply that as of May 5th,
he [Galbraith] had been told to say that he had `no
instructions.' '' Woolsey added, ``I do not believe, and * * *
my memorandum for the record does not reflect, that I was
briefed * * * on Any April 27th Decision. If that is Mr.
Talbott's recollection, then that is hisrecollection, but it is
not mine. * * * That would have, I believe, gotten my attention.''
Deputy Secretary Talbott, according to Woolsey, said that
Ambassador Galbraith had been told clearly that he should tell
the Croatians only that he had ``no instructions'' and that
``he should not * * * hint he had any wiggle room.'' Based on
his discussion with Deputy Secretary Talbott at the May 5
meeting. Woolsey concluded that the State Department and
National Security Council had not yet decided exactly what to
do about this issue and hence had issued the instructions of
``no instructions'' until a final policy was formulated. Former
DDCI Studeman supported Woolsey's testimony, saying that if
``Strobe Talbott had intended to provide Jim [Woolsey] with a
policy in a clear and unambiguous sense in the context of this
meeting in May, it clearly failed to connect.'' Woolsey's
recollections also are corroborated by the testimony before the
Select Subcommittee on then-CIA Deputy Director for
Intelligence Douglas MacEachin who was present at the meeting
as a note-taker, as well as by MacEachin's nearly
contemporaneous memorandum that described the meeting.
Although Woolsey testified that several months passed
before he was specifically informed by U.S. policymakers that
the ``no instructions'' policy meant the U.S. was not objecting
to Iranian arms shipments, he testified, ``It was pretty clear
that somebody had decided to indicate to the Croatian
Government that it was all right for the shipments to go
through. So we began to assume by late May, early June [1994],
that this was what, in fact, was occurring.'' Woolsey further
testified that the first time he was officially told that ``no
instructions'' was the standing policy and that it meant the
U.S. would look the other way as Iranian weapons flowed to the
Bosnians, was in an October 5, 1994 meeting with National
Security Advisor Anthony Lake. Admiral Studeman testified that
he found himself frustrated throughout this period because the
CIA was ``outside the policy cage trying to stare into it
without a lot of response coming back from the Administration
when we attempted to pulse them about what the policy was.'' He
added that ``I can recall over the course of the summer [1994]
* * * as little tidbits came in about the Iranians and about
the events * * * trying to go back to * * * Tony Lake * * *
[or] the Secretary of State, trying to explore this issue more
fulsomely without success.''
The Committee's thorough review of numerous cables from the
summer of 1994 further substantiates CIA claims that the Agency
was left in the dark as to the true nature of U.S. policy
toward enforcing the arms embargo against the former
Yugoslavia.\7\ (The details of these cables remain classified.)
Even though the CIA quickly ascertained from various
intelligence sources that a policy change obviously had
occurred, the Agency appears to have been stonewalled
repeatedly in its efforts to get a straight answer about the
true nature of U.S. policy. It should be noted that in addition
to the CIA, other key U.S. officials were not fully informed
about the change in U.S. policy towards enforcing the arms
embargo. The former Director of Policy and Planning for the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Ambassadors
to NATO, Bosnia, and Serbia all testified before the Select
Subcommittee that they believed the policy in effect at the
time was to obey the embargo against the former Yugoslavia,
and, most definitely, they were unaware of a decision to give
Iran a ``green light'' to ship arms into the region.
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\7\ This is not to say the Agency was unaware of Ambassador
Galbraith's efforts to change the policy; indeed, a few CIA officials
were privy to an April 29, 1994 cable from Galbraith to the Department
of State in which he advocated a modified U.S. policy. See Department
of State cable, Zagreb 1721, dated April 29, 1994.
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CIA suspicions raised about a covert action
The lack of clarity surrounding the ``no instructions''
policy, combined with intelligence reports from various sources
that suggested active U.S. involvement in encouraging or even
facilitating arms shipments to Bosnia, contributed to CIA
suspicions about a possible U.S.-sponsored covert action to arm
the Bosnian Muslims. (The details of these reports remain
classified.) From September to November 1994, there were
approximately ten intelligence reports, cables or memoranda
about alleged U.S. plans to provide the Bosnian Muslims, the
Federation Army and/or the Croatian Government with monetary
assistance andarms. CIA suspicions subsided in October 1994,
once Administration officials informed DCI Woolsey that the U.S. was
``looking the other way'' at Iranian arms shipments and assured the
Agency that the U.S. was not involved in any covert deals to arm the
Bosnian Muslims. However, CIA concerns about a possible illegal covert
action were heightened again in September 1995 (see section on
``Iranian Weapons'').
Central Intelligence Agency actions
Based on a thorough review of cables, the Committee does
not believe that any ICR improperly reported on U.S. policy or
personnel matters and the ICR certainly did not ``spy'' on
embassy personnel, as some have alleged. Given the utter lack
of candor from policymakers and the circumstantial evidence
suggesting that U.S. officials may have gone beyond the ``no
instructions'' policy and were engaging in activities to
encourage or facilitate Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia, CIA
officials acted properly in probing and reporting facts
indicating possible illegal activities by Administration
officials.
DCI Woolsey testified extensively on the actions of CIA
officials during this time. He stated that CIA representatives
know that
their main job is to collect intelligence, and that if
they are asked to influence events abroad by carrying a
message by political, economic, military [means] * * *
anything that could be construed as covert action, they
are not to do so without a finding. So the * * *
[ICR's] reaction when he was asked [by the Ambassador]
to * * * carry a message as an intelligence officer was
quite correct in coming back to us to get instructions.
As noted in Woolsey's testimony before the Select Subcommittee,
the history of Iran-Contra played a major role in the CIA's
response and guidance in this particular case. Given the
lessons of Iran-Contra, it is therefore understandable that the
CIA would urge intelligence officials at all levels to exercise
extreme caution when dealing with such a situation.
The Committee believes that had the ICR communicated to any
foreign official what was, at the time, a policy that was
publicly denied by the Administration and that foreign official
then took action (such as facilitating arms shipments) based on
that communication, the CIA could have been reasonably accused
of covertly influencing--without a Presidential finding--the
``political, economic or military'' conditions in the region.
Furthermore, based on that communication, it is conceivable
that paid assets could have taken action involving arms
shipments--which almost certainly would have influenced
``political, economic or military'' condiitons--a possible
violation of Section 504(c) of the National Security Act.\8\
Although the IOB does not agree that an ICR passing on a
message, in and of itself, would constitute a covert action,
there is agreement between the Committee, the IOB, and DCI
Woolsey that all ICRs should seek guidance from CIA
headquarters before undertaking any action that could be
construed as a covert action.
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\8\ Section 504(c) of the National Security Act states that ``No
funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any department,
agency, or entity of the United States Government may be expended or
may be directed to be expended, for any covert action * * * unless and
until a Presidential finding * * * has been signed. * * *''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Woolsey testified that he complimented the ICR for his
actions in a November 1994 meeting, but added ``a footnote''
that ``we didn't want to get into policy debates with the State
Department.'' Woolsey further testified, however, that the ICR
did not improperly stray into policy areas because part of his
job is to provide input into the implications of a
hypothetical, proposed or actual covert action. Given the
conflicting signals (i.e., the ICR believed there had been no
policy change, while Ambassador Galbraith maintained that the
U.S. was not objecting to the flow of Iranian arms through
Croatia to Bosnia), the ICR and other CIA officials acted
properly in continually seeking to clarify U.S. policy and
receive accurate guidance.
Woolsey further testified that officials at CIA wanted to
``make absolutely sure that * * * [there was a] record that, if
at some later time, anybody ever suggested that there was a
covert action going on * * * [that] the CIA * * * was [not]
involved in it.'' Woolsey also dismissed press allegations that
the ICR reported improperly or ``spied'' on the Ambassador or
other officials. In particular, he noted that many of the
cables written by the ICR did not--unlike State
Departmentcables--constitute official reports that might be widely
disseminated or used in making policy decisions. Rather, these cables
were more in the nature of informal communications that provided
atmospherics and background information to a select group of people in
the Intelligence Community. The Committee has confirmed that these
cables were in an ``eyes only,'' highly restricted channel,
traditionally used to allow ICRs to discuss issues and seek guidance
from immediate supervisors ``off the record.'' Even so, the Agency is
required to make sure these communications are retrievable when needed.
Such a channel has obvious utility for intelligence officers who are
under almost constant scrutiny within the Agency and from overseers in
the Executive and Legislative branches.
State Department--Central Intelligence Agency relations
After April 1996, relations between the Ambassador and one
intelligence element of his country team deteriorated so
significantly that high-level Washington officials were
required to address the problems that had arisen. Specifically,
the Ambassador took actions to try to sow suspicions in the
embassy about U.S. intelligence personnel and to limit the
ability of intelligence personnel to carry out their duties.
The Committee is aware that individual and institutional
relations between the two entities have improved; nonetheless,
the Committee will continue to monitor these relations closely
because the work being done there is too valuable to fall
victim to bureaucratic or personal vindictiveness. The
Committee urges the Department and the agency concerned to
develop a rigorous program of training and concrete guidance
for its highest ranking personnel to ensure their complete and
mutual understanding of the responsibilities, capabilities,
authorities and missions of each party. Both the Department and
this agency should present a united front to the world and work
as a team to ensure that U.S. national security and foreign
policy goals are met.
Was There an Unauthorized Convert Action?
The Committee found that there was no regular, properly
authorized covert action to arm the Bosnian Muslims. There was
some discussion, analysis, and planning for a possible covert
action that, apparently, was never undertaken. However,
questions remain regarding whether any U.S. officials exceeded
the ``no instructions'' policy and actively directed or
facilitated weapons shipments into the region, thereby crossing
the line into covert action. In particular, the Committee is
concerned about an arms shipment that transited Croatia in
September 1995. Based on the available evidence, the committee
is unable to reconcile contradictory information or to
determine with reasonable certainty that any U.S. officials
directed or facilitated the release of this specific weapons
shipment from Croatia to Bosnia. If any U.S. official did
facilitate this shipment or directed the Croatian Government to
do so, then the U.S. certainly went beyond traditional
diplomatic activity and may have engaged in an unauthorized
covert action.
Iranian weapons
In September 1995, Croatian officials detained a shipment
containing three Iranian surface-to-surface rockets bound for
Bosnia. Croatian officials, who expressed concern about whether
the rockets were fitted with chemical warheads, allegedly
threatened to cut off the flow of Iranian arms to the Bosnians.
In September 1995, Ambassador Galbraith reportedly instructed
that all requests for guidance regarding cutting off the
Iranian arms flow should be directed to him. He also allegedly
stated that it was U.S. policy to do and say nothing to inhibit
the flow of arms and that it was the intent of this policy to
facilitate the delivery of arms. After it was determined that
the rockets did not have chemical warheads, the Croatians
released the rockets to the Bosnians, despite their alleged
threats to cut off the arms pipeline. Curiously, information
review by the Committee establishes that all three rockets
were, in fact, released by the Croatians. The Croatians,
however, consistently siphoned off portions, anywhere from one-
third to one-half, of each Iranian weapons shipment
transshipped through Croatia. The conduct of Croatian officials
relating to this surface-to-surface rocket shipment is
therefore wholly inconsistent with what had come to be the
normal pattern involving the Iranian weapons pipeline through
Croatia intended for the Bosnian Muslims. In his testimony,
Ambassador Galbraith denied having urged the Croats to release
the rocket shipment, despite allegations to the contrary made
available to the Committee.\9\
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\9\ There is testimonial and documentary evidence, which the
Committee reviewed, that could establish, if corroborated, that
Ambassador Galbraith pressured Croatian officials to release the rocket
shipment to Bosnia. There is additional information, which is
supportive of this theory, though not in and of itself conclusive, that
the U.S. Government may have, in fact, ``coordinated'' the release of
this rocket shipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This particular weapons shipment is of great concern to the
Committee for several reasons: First, this incident was not
initially investigated by the IOB because it occurred after the
IOB's original report was completed.\10\ Second, in this case,
stark discrepancies in testimony cannot be attributed simply to
differing recollections. Third, the ``no instructions'' policy,
as explained by Administration officials, contained no
provision allowing U.S. officials to encourage or facilitate
weapons shipments through the region. If, in fact, any U.S.
official directed the Croatian Government to release the
shipment to the Bosnians or facilitated its release, then the
U.S. certainly went beyond traditional diplomatic activities
and may have engaged in an illegal covert action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ The IOB did, however, subsequently conduct an inquiry into
this issue. The Committee was informed that the IOB reached the
following conclusions, with respect to these surface-to-surface
rockets:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. The Board does not believe allegations that U.S. officials
pressured Croatia to release these weapons to Bosnia in Autumn
of 1995;
2. This determination aside, the Board would not consider a
U.S. ``request'' that Croatia release the weapons--absent a
quid pro quo, or any direct U.S. Government involvement in the
transshipment--to constitute a ``covert action'' within the
meaning of section 503 of the National Security Act, as
illuminated by the legislative history surrounding President
Bush's veto of an attempt to make ``requests'' a part of the
statutory definition;
3. The Board finds that the activity undertaken by U.S.
personnel, of which the Board was aware with respect to this
particular weapons shipment, was not a ``covert action'' within
the meaning of section 503 of the National Security Act. Nor
does the Board consider this activity to be an ``intelligence
activity'' required by section 502 of the National Security Act
to be reported to the oversight committees of Congress--though
this issue is inherently vague; and,
4. The Board believes that this activity did not amount to a
violation of an Executive Order subject to criminal penalties
under the ``United Nations Participation Act'' (22 U.S.C.
Sec. 287(c)). See Executive Order 12846.
Given the discrepancies between the denials of the
Ambassador and the ICR's accounts of what he was told, the only
way to resolve whether U.S. officials actively facilitated the
movement of these rockets may be to obtain sworn testimony from
Croatian and Bosnian officials involved in the transfer.
Unfortunately, the Committee currently lacks the authority to
subpoena foreign officials and furthermore, the Committee does
not believe efforts to depose these officials would be
fruitful.
Misleading Testimony
The Committee is concerned that Ambassador Galbraith may
have provided the Committee with inaccurate information on
three issues: whether he kept a written record; how often he
met with a Croatian Muslim religious leader who has suspected
ties to Iranian intelligence; and how many Iranian rockets were
in the aforementioned shipment detained in Croatia in September
1995. Given these concerns and the available evidence, the
Committee anticipates an appropriates resolution of the ongoing
Justice Department criminal inquiry into this matter.
Written record
Other than writing a single memorandum for the record about
his relaying the ``no instructions'' policy to the Croatian
Government, Ambassador Galbraith testified to the Committee
that he ``didn't keep a record'' of ``in-house'' meetings at
the time that the ``no instructions;; policy was executed. In
addition, he did not volunteer the fact that he kept his own
``record'' of events that, at least in part, was relevant to
the Committee's inquiry \11\; however, subsequent to his
testifying before the Committee, staff learned that the
Ambassador did keep an informal, yet classified, record of his
thoughts and perusals on certain events. According to Ronald
Neitzke, the DCM in Croatia and Charlotte Stottman, Ambassador
Galbraith's former secretary in Croatia, Ambassador Galbraith
began keeping the ``Record'' on a daily basis in November 1993.
(It should be noted that ambassador Galbraith testified to the
Select Subcommittee that he did not began keeping this
``Record'' until November 12, 1994.\12\ According to Ambassador
Galbraith's testimony to the Select Subcommittee, he kept this
record until late 1995. Only thirteen excerpts from the
record--dating from September 1994 to October 1995--were made
available for Committee staff to review. Unfortunately, none of
these excerpts was from the crucial spring 1994 period when the
``no instructions'' policy was implemented or from the autumn
1995 period when the Croatians detained and later released the
shipment of Iranian surface-to-surface rockets. Given the
Committee's limited access to the ``Record,'' the Committee is
constrained to rely on Ambassador Galbraith's testimony to the
Select Subcommittee as to the timing, contents, and relevance
of the remaining portions of the ``Record.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Ambassador Galbraith did not to respond to the following
comment made by Congressman Goss during a Committee hearing: ``* * * as
the Ambassador have every opportunity to keep the record * * * and have
the obligation to keep the record straight. For whatever reason you
accepted not have a record of this. * * *''
\12\ Coincidentally, November 12, 1994 is the date on which the
Nunn-Mitchell Act, making it unlawful to spend U.S. Government funds to
support the U.N. arms embargo against Bosnia, went into effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meetings with a Croatian cleric
Testimony obtained about Ambassador Galbraith's dealing and
relationship with a leading Croatian Muslim cleric raises
questions about the truthfulness and completeness of the
ambassador's testimony to the Committee on this subject. This
cleric's role in running the Iranian arms pipeline through
Croatia to Bosnia and his ties to Iranian officials is well
documented in numerous intelligence reports. However, in
testimony before the Committee, Ambassador Galbraith said that
he was not aware of the cleric's ties to Iranian intelligence
and is ``not convinced that that was the case,'' despite the
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
When questioned about this knowledge of and relations with
this individual, Ambassador Galbraith testified to the
Committee that ``the only occasion in that time period that I
ever met with him'' was at a March 1994 feast at a local mosque
in Zagreb, and, even then, he was unsure of the cleric's being
present. According to testimony obtained by the Select
Subcommittee, however, Ambassador Galbraith met with the cleric
on several occasions. First, Ambassador Galbraith met with him
in the cleric's office in late summer 1993, a meeting in which
at least one other U.S. Embassy official was present. In
addition, Ambassador Galbraith's former secretary testified
that the Ambassador met in his embassy office with the cleric
on more than one occasion.\13\ Finally, according to the Select
Subcommittee's investigation, the ambassador kept a copy of the
cleric's business card in his rolodex in the U.S. Embassy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Ms. Stottman herself has since called into question the
clarity of her recollection on this issue. She has stated, however, to
Congressional investigators that while meetings between the Ambassador
and the cleric may not have occurred in the embassy, she does recall
that the Ambassador indeed met with the cleric several times to discuss
human rights issues, which were the focus of considerable
Administration attention at the time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
How many Iranian rockets?
In addition to conflicting testimony about possible U.S.
pressure on Croatia to release a shipment of three Iranian
surface-to-surface rockets, the Committee also heard
conflicting testimony about the number of rockets, in the
shipment. Ambassador Galbraith testified that he was told by a
Croatian official in the spring of 1996, several months after
the shipment was detained, that there was a fourth rocket in
the shipment that the Croatian Government did not forward to
Bosnia. This testimony directly contradicts information from
intelligence reports and the accounts of eyewitnesses, both of
which the Ambassador had access. According to a U.S. official,
the crates containing the three rockets and their warheads
filled to capacity the entire aircraft in which they were
shipped. According to eyewitnesses, no additional rocket
possibly could have fit on the plane. It is unclear whether
Ambassador Galbraith was simply misled by the Croatian official
regarding the number of rockets in the shipment or whether the
claim that Croatia kept a ``fourth'' rocket for itself was
meant to divert attention from the question of why Croatia
released this shipment to the Bosnians.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Ambassador Galbraith made no mention of a ``fourth'' rocket in
his subsequent testimony to the Select Subcommittee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusions
The Clinton Administration's ``no instructions''
policy was a departure from its publicly stated policy which
supported enforcing the U.N. arms embargo against the former
Yugoslavia, while pressing allies for a multilateral agreement
to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslim.
The manner in which the ``no instructions'' policy
was formulated and implemented led to confusion and significant
disjunctures within the Administration. Not only was the CIA
left out of the policy loop, Congress was not informed that
U.S. policy had changed and that, as a result, the U.S. would
``look the other way'' as Iranian arms shipments flowed through
Croatia en route to Bosnia.
The Committee concludes that the CIA, on matters
of serious concern to national security, must be fully and
currently informed of U.S. policy. It may be urgued whether or
not the CIA was intentionally kept out of the policy loop, but
the fact that the CIA was not adequately informed about this
issue and serious implications. Because the CIA did not have a
complete understanding of U.S. policy, it may have wasted
valuable time and resources when it could have been working on
higher priority issues. Although the CIA need not be consulted
on all policy matters, in cases where intelligence
professionals and their assts may be putting themselves at
considerable risk, the CIA must have a thorough understanding
of U.S. policy.
The Committee commends the CIA for its actions and
vigilance in dealing with the possibility that a covert action
was being planned or undertaken. The Committee believes that in
future situations where the official policy line is not clear,
ICRs must consult with superiors before carrying out any action
that could be construed as a covert action. At the same time,
the White House, State Department, and all senior U.S.
policymakers have an obligation to provide clear guidance to
all U.S. officials overseas regarding official U.S. policy.
That obligation was not satisfied in this matter.
The Committee concludes that relations between
State Department and CIA officials deteriorated to a
dangerously unhealthy level. The Committee wishes to emphasize
that both the DCI and Secretary of State must ensure that their
personnel work together toward common policy goals as a
cohesive them.
The Committee finds that there was no authorized
convert action to arm the Bosnian Muslims. Based on available
information, the Committee cannot conclusively state that any
U.S. official carried out an illicit or unauthorized convert
action to arm or facilitate the arming of the Bosnian Muslims.
However, questions remain about whether any U.S. official
exceeded the ``no instructions'' policy and actively
facilitated a weapons shipment into Bosnia in September 1995.
If any U.S. official directed or facilitated this or any other
weapons shipment, then an illegal covert may have occurred.
Finally, the Committee has serious concerns about
the forthrightness of Ambassador Galbraith's sworn testimony
before the Congress on three issues. The Select Subcommittee
referred this issue to the Department of Justice; the Committee
expects that the Attorney General will reach an appropriate and
just conclusion on that matter.
MINORITY VIEWS
Based on the facts developed during the Committee's inquiry
into the matter of the shipment of Iranian arms into Bosnia, we
believe that the following conclusions are inescapable: (1) the
United States government undertook no covert action to ship
weapons to Bosnia or Croatia; (2) No U.S. official directed,
controlled or facilitated the shipment of Iranian arms to
Bosnia or Croatia; (3) No U.S. official violated U.S. law
relating to covert action, intelligence activities, or
notifications to Congress; (4) No discrepancies justifying a
criminal investigation exist in the testimony of the witnesses
who appeared before the Committee; and (5) Nothing in the
Committee's inquiry contradicts the findings of the 1995 and
1996 investigations of the President's Intelligence Oversight
Board.
The focus of this investigation was on those aspects of the
transfer of arms to Bosnia which fall within the Committee's
responsibilities to conduct oversight of the intelligence
activities of the United States Government. We note that six
current members of the Committee, three Democrats and three
Republicans, were not members of the Committee during the 104th
Congress when all hearings pursuant to this investigation were
conducted. The Committee was particularly concerned whether a
covert action was conducted without the proper presidential
finding and notification to Congress. We note that the Majority
has not concluded that such a covert action took place. The
Majority appropriately does not argue that the relaying of the
``no instructions'' message by Ambassadors Galbraith and Redman
to the Government of Croatia, on April 28 and 29, 1994, was a
covert action. The Majority does not find a covert action in
the discussions surrounding the so-called ``Holbrooke
initiative.'' The Majority does not find that any law was
broken in the failure to inform Congress of the ``no
instructions'' diplomatic exchange. We agree with these
results: the Majority's report would have been much improved if
these implicit judgments had been given more emphasis.
We can not, however, endorse the Majority's report. It
contains numerous errors of fact and interpretation. In the
section on Congressional Notification, for instance, the
Majority asserts that ``the U.S. had advised the Croatian
Government that it would not object to * * * arms shipments.''
this is simply inaccurate. U.S. government officials did not so
advise; U.S. government officials advised they had no
instructions on the question of arms shipments. Furthermore,
the report throughout confuses the isolated policy decision
that led to the ``no instructions'' response with the entire
U.S. government policy toward the crisis in the
formerYugoslavia. Finally, the report levels repeated attacks on
Ambassador Galbraith which are unsubstantiated by facts and therefore
unfair. The following amplifies our major concerns.
no covert action occurred
As noted, the main purpose of the Committee's investigation
was to determine whether a covert action occurred. The Majority
states it ``cannot conclude that any U.S. official crossed the
line into covert action'' based on available evidence.
Nevertheless, the Majority claims ``questions remain''
concerning whether any U.S. official ``actively directed or
facilitated a weapons shipment into Bosnia in September 1995.''
However, these supposed ``questions'' are not based on any
evidence. The Majority's report does not point to any specific
actions which, had they occurred, would constitute a covert
action under a proper interpretation of the law.
A ``covert action'' is defined in statute (50 U.S.C. 413b)
as ``an activity or activities of the United States Government
to influence political, economic, or military conditions
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States
will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.'' The law,
however, makes express exceptions for traditional diplomatic
activities, routine support to diplomatic activities,
activities intended primarily to acquire intelligence, and
certain other specific activities.
The Majority is most concerned over whether any U.S.
official, in particular former Ambassador to Croatia Peter
Galbraith, ``facilitated'' or ``directed'' a particular
shipment of weapons bound for Bosnia in September 1995 and
whether that action constituted an ``unauthorized'' covert
action. The fact of the matter is that the Committee received
no firsthand testimony that any U.S. official (including
Ambassador Galbraith) ``facilitated,'' ``directed,'' or
``pressured'' anyone with respect to the release of the weapons
held by the Croatians in September 1995.
Ambassador Galbraith explicitly denied under oath to the
Committee that he urged that the weapons be released to the
Bosnians. The U.S. government had good reason not to want the
weapons released. The Majority attempts to impeach the
Ambassador's testimony with reference to ``allegations to the
contrary.'' These allegations are derived from (1) a cable
written by an intelligence community representative (ICR) in
September 1995 who reported that he was told by one Croatian
government official that the release of these weapons was
``coordinated'' with the U.S. Government (no names provided);
and (2) the same ICR's testimony to another committee of the
Congress that shortly before his Congressional testimony, and
after the issue was widely reported in the press, he had been
informed by a second Croatian government official that
Ambassador Galbraith had ``pressured'' the Croatians into
releasing this weapons shipment.
The ICR's contemporaneous cable of September 1995 does not
imply there was facilitation, direction, or pressure, and does
not mention the Ambassador. The later ``allocation'' reported
by the ICR in his testimony before the Congress should be
deeply suspicious both for its timing and its source. The New
York Times has reported that certain members of the Croatian
government despised the Ambassador for this championing of
human rights. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that
this second Croatian government official intended to harm the
Ambassador through the ICR's testimony.
Furthermore, there are no ``stark discrepancies in
testimony'' as the Majority report asserts. The ICR himself
testified before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
that he knew of no U.S. involvement in the delivery of these
weapons. The weight given these ``allocations'' by the Majority
is misplaced. There is no other ``evidence'' before the
Committee on this question. We accept the explicit denial of
the Ambassador.
The Majority states that this particular weapons shipment
is of ``great concern'' to the Committee for several reasons,
first among them because it was not part of the investigation
conducted by the Intelligence Oversight Board which was
completed in 1995. Our conclusion that no covert action
occurred with respect to the September 1995 weapons shipment is
consistent with the findings of the investigation completed by
the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) in 1996. We
have been informed that the IOB did not find that any U.S.
officials conducted a covert action with respect to these
weapons.
A second issue relating to covert actions is raised by the
Majority's report. The Majority argues that had the ICR
communicated U.S. policy to a foreign official, and the foreign
official took action, the ICR's organization ``could have been
reasonably accused of covert influencing--without a
Presidential finding--the `political, economic or military'
conditions in the region.'' However, the definition of covert
action, as previously stated, applies to an activity or
activities where the role of the U.S. government is not
apparent or acknowledged publicly. If the ICR acting as a U.S.
official had conveyed U.S. views to a foreign official on the
question of whether the Croatians should be involved in the
transit of arms to Bosnia, the ICR's organization could not
have been accused of conducting a covert action under a correct
reading of the law. A statement of U.S. views by a U.S.
official to a foreign official is not a covert action--it is
traditional diplomacy, an activity explicitly excepted from the
definition of covert action. While we agree with the Majority
that ICRs should contact their headquarters whenever they are
asked to do anything that appears illegal or improper, we
believe they should be given proper guidance in return. In this
case, neither the law on covert action nor U.S. policy was
accurately explained to the ICR by his organization in the
spring of 1994. The conveying of a message by an ICR to
officials in a foreign government is one option available to
the President in the conduct of foreign policy. It is not in
and of itself a covert action.
keeping congress and cia informed
The Majority argues that Congress and the CIA were not
fully and adequately informed by the Clinton Administration
that after April 1994 the United States was ignoring
``violations of the U.N. arms embargo with respect to arms
shipments to Bosnia.'' But the fact that the United States
Government was taking no action to block arms going to Bosnia
was precisely what was known to anyone following the issues in
the Balkans--even to Washington Post readers who never received
an intelligence briefing. No U.S. action to enforce the embargo
on Bosnia was something that many in Congress advocated, and
effectively became law with the enactment of the Nunn-Mitchell
amendment in November 1994. It might have made good sense for
the Administration to have notified appropriate members of the
Congress of the diplomatic exchange between the U.S.
ambassadors and the Government of Croatia, but no notification
was required by law.
The CIA, on the other hand, was informed of the diplomatic
exchange. The Majority tries to make the case that the CIA was
``left in the dark,''was ``out of the loop,'' and
``stonewalled,'' but the facts do not bear this out. CIA
personnel, at the highest level and in the field, were told
more than once about the ``no instructions'' instruction. The
intelligence community had advance notice the Croatian
government was preparing to allow the transshipment of arms to
Bosnia and was seeking U.S. views on the issue. Ambassador
Galbraith's cable of April 29, 1994, asking for more explicit
guidance on his instructions was received and read at CIA
headquarters. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott at the
May 5, 1994 meeting with former Director of Central
Intelligence R. James Woolsey made clear the Ambassador was
authorized by Washington to say he had ``no instructions.''
(Unfortunately, the CIA's message to the field concerning the
meeting was garbled and mishandled.) The former chief of the
Central Eurasian Division told Committee staff that after the
Woolsey-Talbott May 5, 1994, meeting, senior officials at CIA
understood the implications of the ``no instructions''
instruction with respect to the shipment of arms from Iran. He
explained that they did not like the diplomatic response to the
Croatian government, precisely because they believed they
understood the implications of the policy.
While the Majority report makes much of former DCI
Woolsey's testimony that he was not aware a policy decision had
been made, he did testify it because clear to CIA that the
United States government was not objecting to arms shipments to
the Bosnians and was not taking action to stop them. He further
testified he never expressed dissatisfaction to Deputy
Secretary Talbott over what he had been told at their meeting.
The Majority report confuses the concerns of Mr. Woolsey in May
1994 with the concerns he had in October 1994. Mr. Woolsey
didnot testify that his October 5, 1994, meeting with Anthony Lake, the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, was ``the
first time he was officially told that `no instructions' was the
standing policy and that the U.S. would look the other way as Iranian
weapons flowed to the Bosnians.'' Instead he testified that he and Mr.
Lake discussed the status and legal implications of the so-called
Holbrooke initiative and other proposals under consideration at the
time (never undertaken) for providing arms to the Bosnian Muslims.
The intelligence community representative in the field was
told by a State Department official that the ``no
instructions'' response was an officially authorized response
to the Government of Croatia. He chose not to believe what he
was told. This appears to be in large measure a result of the
inaccurate and uncoordinated guidance he received from his
organization. This poor guidance led the ICR to collect
information from the deputy chief of mission on the activities
and statements of the Ambassador and other U.S. officials, and
send the information back to his headquarters. The ICR was a
relatively inexperienced officer assigned to a region in the
midst of war and humanitarian crisis. He testified that during
this period he was ``seeking guidance'' on whether he should
change his mission priorities. His concerns did not receive the
attention they deserved from his headquarters. Senior personnel
at his organization should have better supported him in
resolving his concerns and addressing the suspicion and
mistrust that was present in the field.
majority attack on ambassador is unjustified
The Majority claims that it is ``concerned'' Ambassador
Galbraith may have ``provided the Committee inaccurate
information'' on: (1) whether he ``kept a written record;'' (2)
how often he met with a Croatian Muslim leader who ``has
suspected ties to Iranian intelligence;'' and (3) how many
rockets were in a certain shipment of arms to the Bosnians.
This section of the report is baffling. The Majority is
criticizing the Ambassador for the allegedly inaccurate answers
he gave to questions he was never asked. Furthermore, the
Majority is trying to impeach the testimony of the Ambassador
by using the statements of a witness who has never appeared
before the Committee and who has in other settings given three
different accounts of a key point. The Majority's attack on the
Ambassador's testimony is unjustified.\1\
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\1\ The Majority states the Justice Department is conducting a
criminal inquiry concerning the accuracy and truthfulness of the
Ambassador's testimony. This inquiry is based on a referral from the
Majority members of the Select Subcommittee to Investigate the United
States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia (the
``Select Subcommittee''). The referral, made in November 1996,
requested that the Justice Department review the actions and testimony
of 8 executive branch officials and one former senator for violations
of law on a variety of theories. More than a year later, no criminal
proceedings have been initiated by the Justice Department based on this
referral.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the information Ambassador Galbraith
provided to the Committee concerning whether he kept a written
record, Ambassador Galbraith was never asked at the Committee
hearing whether he kept a diary or journal or made notes while
serving as Ambassador. He was never asked about documents in
general he might have written concerning Bosnia and Croatia. As
the Majority report concede, if the Ambassador had disclosed to
the Committee that he kept ``his own `record' of events that,
at least in part, was relevant to the Committee's inquiry,'' he
would have had to volunteer that in information.
Ambassador Galbraith was asked at the Committee's hearing
whether he made a record of the events surrounding receipt of
the ``no instructions'' instruction. The Amdassador testified
(as the Majority acknowledges) that he made a memorandum for
the record on May 6, 1994 on the discussions leading up to his
receipt of the ``no instructions'' instructions and his
implementation of those instructions.
Ambassador Galbraith did keep notes on his diplomatic
contacts which were dictated to his secretary for a limited
period of time from approximately the fall of 1994 to November
1995. Excerpts from this so-called ``record'' pertaining to the
Committee's investigation were appropriately made available to
the Committee by the Department of State in response to the
Committee's request for written materials relevant to the full
scope of the Committee's inquiry. The excerpts provided to the
Committee show the Ambassador dealing with the implications of
the so-called ``Holbrooke initiative'' and accurately conveying
U.S. policy neither to oppose nor support third-party arms
transfers to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Again, the Ambassador did not
mislead or provide inaccurate information to the Committee
concerning this material because the Ambassador was never asked
about it.
The Majority appears to be attacking the Ambassador's
veracity on when the ``record'' was initiated and what it
contained. Again, the Ambassador was never questioned on this
subject by the Committee and neither was Ronald Neitzke, the
deputy chief of mission to Croatia, when he appeared before the
Committee. The Majority report claims Mr. Neitzke and Charlotte
Stottman, Ambassador Galbraith's secretary in 1993 and 1994,
have said the ``record'' began in 1993 but there is no record
testimony of Mr. Neitzke on this question before the Select
Subcommittee and Ms. Stottman, as discussed in the next
section, is an unreliable witness. Furthermore, the fact that
no excerpt exists which addresses the release of weapons by the
Croatians in autumn 1995 supports the Ambassador's testimony
that the did not urge that they be released. Contrary to the
Majority's strange statement that the Committee is
``constrained to rely on Ambassador Galbraith's testimony to
the Select Subcommittee'' concerning those portions of the
``record'' not provided to the Committee, the entire ``record''
was made available to the chief counsels of the Select
Subcommittee.
The Majority's second issue concerning allegedly misleading
testimony is equally flimsy. The Majority asserts ``[t]estimony
obtained about Ambassador Galbraith's dealings and relationship
with a leading Croatian Muslim cleric raises questions about
the truthfulness and completeness of the Ambassador's testimony
to the Committee on this subject.'' Again, to make this charge,
the Majority twists the Ambassador's testimony and relies on
testimony not given before the Intelligence Committee.
Ambassador Galbraith was asked in his appearance before the
Intelligence Committee whether he was the U.S. official
identified as having met with a certain Croatian cleric during
a particular time period with relevance to a specific document.
Ambassador Galbraith testified, ``I believe that I was the U.S.
official identified.'' He further testified:
As ambassador I made a series of courtesy calls * * *
[with] religious leaders * * * in the context in which
I met [him] I am not even sure I would have known he
was in that room. I did not ask him to buy arms for the
Bosnian Muslims * * * that, frankly, is the only time I
recall meeting [the cleric].'' (Emphasis added.)
Ambassador Galbraith was not definitive in his testimony to
this Committee concerning the number of times he met with this
cleric. He was emphatic, however, that he did not ask the
cleric to buy arms. The Majority has no evidence to contradict
the Ambassador's assertion that he did not ask the cleric to
purchase arms. Furthermore, there was no testimony obtained in
hearings before the Intelligence Committee concerning the
Ambassador's ``dealings'' with the cleric as the Majority
implies. The Majority is relying on testimony taken by the
Select Subcommittee on the narrow question of whether one or
more meetings between the Ambassador and cleric took place. The
Ambassador's former secretary, Charlotte Stottman, testified
the Ambassador met the cleric more than once in his office.
However, if testimony has been given elsewhere, the Committee
has little basis for judging the testimony reliable or
credible. Indeed, as the Majority notes, Charlotte Stottman
disavowed her testimony. She contacted the chairman and ranking
member of the Select Subcommittee by letter to explain that
when she was questioned by the Select Subcommittee about the
cleric she mistook his name for that of a torture victim under
threat of execution whose release Ambassador Galbraith had
secured. The Majority is aware of Ms. Stottman's letter, but
indicates Ms. Stottman has since changed her story again,
apparently in a telephone conversation with the Committee's
chief counsel. Ms. Stottman's testimony is not reliable and
should not serve as the basis for insinuations that the
Ambassador had a ``relationship'' and ``dealings'' with the
cleric. Perhaps the Majority should be concerned Ms. Stottman
has provided inaccurate information, not the Ambassador.
Finally, it is unbelievable that the Majority dwells on a
discrepancy in the testimony of the witnesses concerning the
number of weapons in an arms shipment to the Bosnians.
Ambassador Galbraith never claimed to have seen the weapons
shipment, and would therefore not have first-hand knowledge of
the number of weapons it contained. It is clear from the
testimony that his point was simply that one weapon in the
shipment might not have gone on to Bosnia. Indeed, experts on
the war beieves Croatians received a percentage of every
weapons shipment that transited the country and the ICR
testified before the Committee that one weapon was initially
held back. The Majority report speculates the Ambassador might
have been trying to ``divert attention from the question of why
Croatia released this shipment to the Bosnians.'' The idea that
anyone would purposefully provide inaccurate information on a
minor, easily verified point to divert the attention of a
congressional committee strains credulity. The Majority report
goes beyond common sense in its attempt to assemble derogatory
information.
State/CIA relations
The Majority should have made a good faith effort in this
investigation to weigh the views and perspectives of officials
from across the U.S. government. Instead, the report twists and
distorts the testimony of witnesses from the Department of
State and ignores the implications of significant information
from officials of the Department of Defense concerning the
Ambassador's appropriate responsiveness to issues of concern to
the Department. It is extraordinary for a committee of Congress
to charge a U.S. Ambassador with taking actions that
``seriously and dangerously limited the effectiveness of
intelligence collection''--it is shameful for this Committee to
have done so with no bill of particulars, and no opportunity
for the Ambassador or the Department of State to respond.
In its 1997 report on Guatemala, the Committee endorsed the
``primary of the ambassador at post'' under the law. In this
investigation, however, the Majority never analyzes whether any
actions allegedly taken by the Ambassador exceeded his
legitimate statutory authorities as a chief of mission or
whether those actions had any discernible effect on the
intelligence collection effort in the region. The case has
simply not been made that the effectiveness of intelligence was
``seriously and dangerously'' limited, and the accusation of
vindictiveness is ironic at best.
Furthermore, although the Majority asserts ``relations
between the Ambassador and the ICR deteriorated to a
dangerously unhealthy level,'' the ICR testified to the
Committee in June 1996: ``I never had a sense of personal
animosity from the Ambassador, and I don't feel it towards the
Ambassador, nor did I feel it at the time.'' Both defense
attaches who served under Ambassador Galbraith, Lt. Col.
Richard Herrick and Lt. Col. John Salder, whose
responsibilities included overt intelligence activities,
assured Committee staff that they and the Department of Defense
found the Ambassador to be extremely responsive to U.S. defense
needsand utterly appropriate in his working relationship with
them and the Department. Indeed, one said he ``thank[ed] his lucky
star'' for the opportunity to work with the Ambassador. The first key
finding of the July 1997 Report of Inspection of Embassy Zagreb,
Croatia, by the Inspector General of the Department of State was that
``Embassy Zagreb, led by an exceptionally activitist, innovative and
articulate Ambassador, has produced an impressive string of policy
achievements over the past few years. These have directly contributed
to peace and saved lives.''
In order to represent U.S. interests most effectively, an
ambassador or chief of mission should have close working
relationships with officials of all government agencies serving
in-country, including those representing the intelligence
community. Close working relationships are built on
professionalism, competency, and trust. Trust can be eroded
when officials from one agency of the government traffic in
unsubstantied information concerning co-workers or superiors
from other agencies. Trust can also be eroded when officials of
one agency place in jeopardy the operational equities of
another entity and will not acknowledge mistakes were made.
In this case, cables of an intelligence community
representative contained unproven speculation about an
ambassador, unfortunate characterizations of a deputy chief of
mission, and second-hand information about the actions and
views of other U.S. officials. These cables were not informal
e-mail: they are official U.S. government records, permanently
held by the ICR's organization. The cables were criticized at
least four times within the ICR's own organization at the time
they were sent, but the Majority finds that an ICR providing
``atmospherics'' and ``background information'' to a ``select
group of people'' in private-channel cables has ``obvious
utility.'' We have the time of ICRs could be better utilized
collecting foreign intelligence.
The Majority uses the testimony of former DCI Woolsey to
buttress its position that the ICR's cables were appropriate.
However, Mr. Woolsey's comments as rendered by the Majority are
inconsistent on the function and purpose of these kinds of
cables. Equally important, Mr. Woolsey testified he had not
read all the cables. Furthermore, according to a memorandum for
the record prepared by the ICR following the November 1994
meeting referred to by the Majority, it was Mr. Woolsey and his
executive assistant who first cautioned the ICR against spying
on the State Department.
In short, Ambassador Galbraith's concerns about this kind
of reporting were legitimate institutional concerns and should
have received more balanced treatment in the Majority report.
We completely agree with the Majority that there should be a
common understanding of the 1997 memorandum of understanding
between the State Department and the intelligence community and
stress that the guidance on reporting from the field reiterated
in 1996 should be strictly enforced.
Furthermore, Ambassador Galbraith during his tenure also
raised legitimate institutional issues about country clearances
and the host-country contacts of U.S. government officials.
State Department officials and officials of one intelligence
agency, in particular, overseas should present a united front
to the world and work together to ensure U.S. national security
and foreign policy goals are met. Again, we strongly agree with
the Majority that building better, more professional
relationships overseas is in the best interests of the entire
U.S. government, we emphasize, however, that this requires
cooperation from all concerned.
Finally, if nothing else, the Committee should have looked
at how legal advice is provided to intelligence community
representatives and whether requests for guidance on policy and
mission priorities are handled in a timely manner with proper
coordination.
the intelligence oversight board
We want to express our appreciation for the work done by
the members of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board
(IOB). The IOB, comprised of highly respected, private citizens
who have had distinguished careers in intelligence, national
security, business and the law, performs an important and
valuable service to the United States. The members serve as a
fact-finding body for the President on intelligence issues
involving multiple departments and jurisdictions of the
Executive Branch. They investigate with all the powers and
authority of the Office of the President and are required by
executive order to report to the Attorney General any
information concerning intelligence activities that they
believe to be unlawful. The IOB did not make such a referral in
this case.
The oversight function of the IOB worked as it was supposed
to in this case. The IOB and the congressional intelligence
committees serve different purposes and functions. One cannot
substitute for, or replace, the other. We believe the Chairman
of the IOB, Anthony Harrington, went out of his way to ensure
the Committee understood the careful investigation he led on
this matter and we are grateful for his efforts and those of
the Board's members and staff.
Norm Dicks.
Julian C. Dixon.
David Skaggs.
Nancy Pelosi.
Jane Harman.
Ike Skelton,
[Except for the sixteenth
through twenty-third
paragraphs].
Sanford D. Bishop, Jr.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
As noted in the Committee Report and its Minority Views,
there is significant agreement on several issues. The
differences of opinion center on specific and discrete issues,
a few of which are particularly deserving of additional
comments. These are:
1. that there was a change in the policy of the
United States regarding the U.N. arms embargo on the
former Yugoslavia, specifically Croatia and Bosnia, as
well as with respect to the U.S. policy toward Iran;
2. that it was a deliberate decision of the Clinton
Administration not to advise Congress of the policy
change made by the President of the United States
relating to the shipment of Iranian weapons through
Croatia and Bosnia;
3. that the credibility of Ambassador Galbraith, with
respect to his testimony before the Committee, was
highly questionable; and
4. that the actions and guidance provided by the CIA
were appropriate.
1. There was a change in U.S. policy
The Minority attempts to minimize the Iranian ``green
light'' decision by identifying it as an ``isolated policy
decision.'' It was, in fact, a decision of significant
importance that flew in the face of major, well-known, and
long-standing U.S. foreign policies. Specifically, the decision
was a reversal of the U.S. policy to support and enforce the
U.N. embargo of weapons shipments to the former Yugoslavia, as
well as the U.S. policy to isolate the terrorist-sponsoring
regime of Iran.
Prior to the President's decision not to object \1\ to
Iranian weapons shipments through Croatia to Bosnia, it was the
U.S. policy, publicly stated and consistently enforced, to
abide by the United Nations Security Council resolution
regarding the arms embargo against the nations that formerly
comprised Yugoslavia, and to encourage other nations to do the
same. The Committee based this finding on its review of State
Department cables, statements of Ambassador Galbraith, public
statements of State Department officials, other official State
Department documents, and on the testimony of several other
high ranking United States government officials, who were
responsible for carrying out the policy in the Balkans
themselves.\2\
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\1\ Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 51 n. (Random House 1998).
\2\ Department of State cable, State 82580, March 22, 1993;
Department of State cable, Zagreb 1721, April 1994; Department of
Defense cable A, April 25, 1994 (see classified appendix for cable
specification); statement of State Department spokesman David Johnson,
May 13, 1994, Reuters World Service; State Department Daily Press
Guidance of June 24, 1994, June 27, 1994, and August 3, 1994; statement
of State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelley, November 7, 1994, as
reflected in Department of State cable, State 300842; Department of
State cable, State 092370, April 14, 1995; National Security Council
Daily Guidance Update, February 2, 1996; Select Subcommittee Deposition
of Col. Richard Herrick (U.S. Army) (then Defense Attache Zagreb),
August 20, 1996, at pp. 12-24; Select Subcommittee deposition of
General Wesley Clark (then J-5, Director of Strategic Plans and Policy
for Joint Staff), September 4, 1996, at pp. 3-8; Select Subcommittee
Deposition of then U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter, September 20,
1996, at pp. 5-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The President's policy decision, made on Air Force One and
delivered by ambassadors Galbraith and Holbrooke on April 29,
1994, effectively gave an official U.S. ``green light'' to an
Iranian plan to violate the U.N. embargo. No amount of lawyerly
parsing of diplomatic language of what was said, or not said,
can avoid this conclusion.
Second, the President's decision was an important--indeed,
a unique--exception to the oft-stated policy of the United
States to isolate Iran diplomatically, economically,
politically, and militarily. It cannot be seriously denied
that, as a result of the ``green light'' to Iran, Iran
effectively advanced its bilateral and multilateral economic,
political, diplomatic, and military interests in a particularly
vulnerable and combustible region of Central Europe. Again, the
only conclusion that can be reached is that this decision
dramatically turned on its head the United States' previous
policy of isolating and containing Iran on the world stage.
2. Congressional notification
The Minority does not believe there was a problem with
congressional notification of the significant covert changes
the Clinton Administration made to its policies regarding the
U.N. arms embargo and Iran. Yet, no Member of Congress was ever
notified by any officer of the Clinton Administration about the
President's decision. This was intentional.
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Ambassador
Richard Holbrooke \3\ admitted that the Administration
purposefully kept Congress in the dark on the role of the
United States in the Iranian weapons shipments. Indeed,
Ambassador Holbrooke, noting his opinion that Congress should
have been informed, testified that his proposal to so notify
Congress was ``turned down flatly'' by the Administration.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ambassador Holbrooke has been identified by President Clinton
as his nominee for U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. At the time
of this writing,that nomination has not been submitted to the Senate by
the White House for confirmation. Ambassador Holbrooke, if confirmed,
will succeed Bill Richardson, who vacated that position upon
confirmation as Secretary of Energy.
\4\ Select Subcommittee Deposition of Richard Holbrooke, September
27, 1996, at pp. 10-11. See also Select Subcommittee Deposition of
Strobe Talbott, September 5, 1996, at pp. 46, 47-52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although Congress was kept in the dark, there were, during
the period in question, various newspapers that reported the
fact of the Iranian weapons shipments.\5\ Some of those news
accounts included allegations that the United States was aware
of the arms shipments, and had condoned the same. The Minority
apparently argues that these articles somehow constitute
congressional notification. Yet, Administration sources
consistently denied that the U.S. was either aware of these
shipments in advance, condoned the shipments, or was otherwise
turning a ``blind eye.'' \6\ These denials, it turns out, were
false.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See The Washington Post, ``U.S. is Allowing Iran to Arm Bosnian
Muslims,'' April 14, 1994; New York Times, ``U.S. Looks Away as Iran
Arms Bosnia,'' April 15, 1994; The Washington Post, ``Iran Ships
Explosives to Bosnian Muslims, Embargo-Busting Cargo Also Aids
Croatia,'' May 13 1994, pp. A1, A43; New York Times, ``Iran Said to
Violate Embargo,'' May 14, 1994; Reuters, ``Iran Ships Material for
Arms to Bosnians Report,'' May 14, 1994; The Washington Times,
``Iranians Move into Bosnia to Terrorize Serbs,'' June 2, 1994, pp. A1,
A13; The Washington Times, ``Iranian Weapons Sent Via Croatia, Aid to
Muslims Get U.S. `Wink,' '' June 24, 1994, pp. A1, A13.
\6\ See, e.g., The Washington Times, ``Iranian Weapons Sent Via
Croatia, Aid to Muslims Gets U.S. `Wink,' '' June 24, 1994, pp. A1, A13
(`` `There is no support for what Iran is doing,' according to a senior
U.S. official.''). See also statement of State Department spokesman
David Johnson, May 13, 1994 (``It is the policy of the U.S. to respect
the U.N. arms embargo on the nations that formerly comprised
Yugoslavia. It is important that all U.N. Security Council resolutions
be fully observed.''), as requested by Reuters World Service;
Department of State cable, State 300842, November 7, 1994 (recapping
statement of State Department Spokeswoman Christine Shelley at a press
briefing, ``We're certainly not contributing to it, and we certainly
are not turning a blind eye.''); Department of State cable, State
092370, April 14, 1995 (``It is the policy of the United States to
respect the UN arms embargo on the nations that formerly comprised
Yugoslavia. * * * The United States has on many occasions made known
its strong objection to the behavior of the Government of Iran. We are
actively involved in international efforts to isolate Iran and prevent
it from engaging in illegal and dangerous weapons transfers.'');
National Security Council, Daily Guidance Update, February 2, 1996
(``The US did not cooperate, coordinate or consult with any other
government regarding the provision of arms to the Bosnians. * * * We
have always made clear that we were abiding by the arms embargo and
that we expected other countries to do so as well.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee's report, however, does not share the
Minority's view that news leaks, falsely denied by the
Administration, serve in lieu of official congressional
notification.
3. Ambassador Galbraith's testimony
The Minority does not share the Committee's concern about
Ambassador Galbraith's truthfulness in testifying before
Congress.\7\ It also refuses to accept the possibility that
Ambassador Galbraith omitted material facts when he testified
before the Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Significantly, Mr. Ike Skelton (D-Missouri), who is a member of
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and also the
Ranking Democrat of the House Committee on National Security, joined
the Majority in the adoption of the Committee's findings and supporting
paragraphs relating to the questionable credibility of Ambassador
Galbraith before Congress on these matters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Galbraith kept a written record of his actions
and musings on his job during his tenure as the U.S. Ambassador
in Zagreb, Croatia. Indeed, the record was typically dictated
verbatim by the Ambassador to his secretary at the end of each
working day. She typed it on government time and on government
equipment. The Ambassador kept it stored in a government safe
in his office. He typically referred to this document as ``The
Record.''
``The Record'' was, certainly, of relevance to the
Committee's investigation, and especially so at the time of his
testimony before the Committee. For example, one entry
discusses a dinner meeting between the Ambassador and a high
level Croatian government official. At that meeting, the two
joked, knowingly with each other, about arming Bosnian Muslims
with Iranian weapons that would be shipped through Croatia.
Congress learned about ``The Record'' from the two
different sources, the Ambassador's secretary and the
Ambassador's Deputy Chief of Mission, Ron Neitzke. According to
both witnesses, the Ambassador began ``The Record'' almost as
soon as he began his tenure as Chief of Mission in Zagreb.
Curiously, however, during his appearance before the Committee,
the Ambassador stated that he did not ``keep a record'' of
``in-house'' meetings at the time the ``no instructions''
policy was executed. He did not disclose the existence of ``The
Record,'' even when he was criticized for failing to keep a
written contemporaneous record of events.
The Ambassador's justification for failing to mention ``The
Record'' is that the document was ``personal,'' despite its
provenance, and that it bore official classification by the
State Department. This explanation appears disingenuous, at
best.
These circumstances, and the Ambassador's verbal
gymnastics, left the Committee concerned about his motivation
and led to questions regarding his truthfulness with Congress,
generally. This doubt is at play, for example, where the
Committee has sought, without any definitive success,\8\
exculpatory evidence to support Ambassador Galbraith's self-
serving denials of deeper involvement in the Iranian weapons
transfers, particularly those involving the rocket shipment in
September 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ There were various witnesses questioned by other committees and
subcommittees in the House and Senate that supported some, but
importantly not all, of Ambassador Galbraith's version of events. In
some instances, various witnesses' statements were consistent with the
Ambassador's yet inconsistent on material points with each other.
Importantly, Ambassador Galbraith displayed a strikingly detailed and
prophetic knowledge of the Croatian/Iranian plan. He had specific
knowledge that the Croatians would take a portion of the Iranian
weapons for themselves and that the weapons would be shipped via
Iranian 747s.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. CIA actions were not misguided
The Minority complains mightily about the CIA's actions and
the guidance it provided the Intelligence Community
Representative (``ICR'') for Croatia. The Minority contends
that the legal advice provided the ICR was faulty; that CIA
officials should not have advised the ICR that the Ambassador
was close to violating the covert action laws; and, that the
ICR should have simply ignored his superior's admonitions. The
Minority also faults the ICR for maintaining a written record
of events as they transpired, claiming that those records
occasionally improperly characterized the situation in Zagreb
at the time. The Minority asserts that these records are proof
of poor judgment on the part of the ICR. Not once, however,
does the Minority assert that the facts put forth by the ICR in
these records are false.
Curiously, it is also the Minority that finds no fault
whatsoever with the actions, guidance, or advice of State
Department and National Security Council officers during the
development of the policy that allowed Iran, Croatia, and
Bosnia to flout the United Nations embargo. After all, it was
State Department and NSC officers who failed to advise the
President that Ambassador Galbraith had significant prior
knowledge of the specifics of the Iranian weapons shipments. It
was these same State Department and NSC officers who
specifically directed Ambassadors Galbraith and Redman not to
put anything in writing about this policy, or about their
diplomatic exchange with President Tudjman. It was these same
State Department and NSC officers who deliberately refused to
advise Congress of the policy change, and who led the Director
of Central Intelligence to believe that there was no policy
change whatsoever.
The CIA's caution and concern throughout the ``green
light'' policy's implementation are understandable. In the
past, the CIA has on numerous occasions been taken to task,
particularly by Congress, over accusations that it has acted
without proper authorization. During the Iran/Contra Affair,
for example, the CIA was badly damaged by the actions of its
officers, who acted without written guidance. Under such
circumstances, and with such a history, it is quite remarkable
for Members of Congress to complain of the CIA's caution, of
its continuous seeking of guidance from policymakers, of its
insistence on documentation of instruction, and of its care to
make a contemporaneous record of events. If it was the CIA,
rather than the State Department, that failed to keep records,
or--more tragically--had executed a policy that was
intentionally undocumented, one need not imagine the resulting
outcry.
Porter Goss.