[House Report 105-795]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



105th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 2d Session                                                     105-795
_______________________________________________________________________


 
INVESTIGATORY POWERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY WITH RESPECT TO 
                        ITS IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY
                                _______
                                

   October 7, 1998.--Referred to the House calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Hyde, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                    ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS

                       [To accompany H. Res. 581]

    The Committee on the Judiciary, having had under 
consideration H. Res. 581, authorizing and directing the 
Committee on the Judiciary to investigate whether sufficient 
grounds exist for the impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, 
President of the United States, reports the same to the House 
with a recommendation that the resolution be adopted.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
The Resolution...................................................     2
Purpose and Summary..............................................     3
 Referral from the Independent Counsel...........................     4
Counsel's Review and Report on the Referral from the Independent 
  Counsel........................................................     7
    Introduction.................................................     7
    Concepts of Constitutional Government........................     7
    The Independent Counsel's Referral...........................     8
    Staff Review of the Referral.................................     8
    Monica Lewinsky's Credibility................................    10
    Staff Focus..................................................    10
Potential Felonies Committed by the President....................    11
    I............................................................    11
    II...........................................................    15
    III..........................................................    16
    IV...........................................................    16
    V............................................................    17
    VI...........................................................    17
    VII..........................................................    18
    VIII.........................................................    19
    IX...........................................................    19
    X............................................................    20
    XI...........................................................    20
    XII..........................................................    21
    XIII.........................................................    22
    XIV..........................................................    22
    XV...........................................................    23
Committee Consideration..........................................    24
    Need for the Resolution......................................    24
    President's Procedural Rights................................    25
    Issues Relating to Defining Standards for Impeachment........    26
    Issues Relating to the Scope of the Inquiry..................    27
    Issues Relating to Time Limits/Deadlines.....................    27
    Issues Relating to the Public Printing of Certain Materials..    28
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion.......................    33
    Resolved Clause..............................................    33
    Section Two..................................................    33
Votes of the Committee...........................................    34
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    36
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Findings............    37
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................    37
Committee Cost Estimate..........................................    37
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................    37
Additional and Dissenting Views..................................    38

                             The Resolution
    The resolution is as follows:
    Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary, acting as a 
whole or by any subcommittee thereof appointed by the chairman 
for the purposes hereof and in accordance with the rules of the 
committee, is authorized and directed to investigate fully and 
completely whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of 
Representatives to exercise its constitutional power to impeach 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States of 
America. The committee shall report to the House of 
Representatives such resolutions, articles of impeachment, or 
other recommendations as it deems proper.
    Sec. 2. (a) For the purpose of making such investigation, 
the committee is authorized to require--
          (1) by subpoena or otherwise--
                  (A) the attendance and testimony of any 
                person (including at a taking of a deposition 
                by counsel for the committee); and
                  (B) the production of such things; and
          (2) by interrogatory, the furnishing of such 
        information;
as it deems necessary to such investigation.
    (b) Such authority of the committee may be exercised--
          (1) by the chairman and the ranking minority member 
        acting jointly, or, if either declines to act, by the 
        other acting alone, except that in the event either so 
        declines, either shall have the right to refer to the 
        committee for decision the question whether such 
        authority shall be so exercised and the committee shall 
        be convened promptly to render that decision; or
          (2) by the committee acting as a whole or by 
        subcommittee.
Subpoenas and interrogatories so authorized may be issued over 
the signature of the chairman, or ranking minority member, or 
any member designated by either of them, and may be served by 
any person designated by the chairman, or ranking minority 
member, or any member designated by either of them. The 
chairman, or ranking minority member, or any member designated 
by either of them (or, with respect to any deposition, answer 
to interrogatory, or affidavit, any person authorized by law to 
administer oaths) may administer oaths to any witness. For the 
purposes of this section, ``things'' includes, without 
limitation, books, records, correspondence, logs, journals, 
memorandums, papers, documents, writings, drawings, graphs, 
charts, photographs, reproductions, recordings, tapes, 
transcripts, printouts, data compilations from which 
information can be obtained (translated if necessary, through 
detection devices into reasonably usable form), tangible 
objects, and other things of any kind.

                          PURPOSE AND SUMMARY
    The purpose of this resolution, which was adopted by the 
Committee on the Judiciary after thoughtful and considerable 
debate, is to authorize the Committee to investigate whether 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, has 
committed offenses requiring the House of Representatives to 
exercise its constitutional responsibility of impeachment. This 
resolution provides the parameters for a fair, thorough and 
independent review of the facts.
    The scope of the inquiry authorized by this resolution will 
permit consideration of any matter necessary to the Committee's 
inquiry into the existence or nonexistence of sufficient 
grounds for impeachment. The authorization in this resolution 
is wholly consistent with historical precedent, including the 
Watergate impeachment investigation conducted by the Committee 
on the Judiciary.
    This resolution empowers the Committee to require the 
production of documents and other records and the attendance 
and testimony of such witnesses as it deems necessary, by 
subpoena or otherwise. It authorizes the Committee to take such 
testimony at hearings or by deposition. Depositions may be 
taken by counsel to the Committee, without a member of the 
Committee being present, thus expediting the presentation of 
information to the Committee. This resolution further 
authorizes the Committee to require the furnishing of 
information in response to interrogatories propounded by the 
Committee. Like the deposition authority, the authority to 
compel answers to written interrogatories is intended to permit 
the Committee to conduct a thorough investigation under as 
expeditious a schedule as possible. Interrogatories should 
prove particularly useful in providing a basis for the 
efficient exercise of the Committee's subpoena power, by 
enabling it to secure inventories and lists of documents, 
materials, records and the names of potential witnesses.
    The Committee's investigative authority is intended to be 
fully co-extensive with the power of the House in an 
impeachment investigation with respect to the persons who may 
be required to respond, the methods by which response may be 
required, and the types of information and materials required 
to be furnished and produced.
    It is the intention of the Committee that its investigation 
will be conducted in all respects on a fair, impartial and 
bipartisan or nonpartisan basis. In this spirit, the power to 
authorize subpoenas and other compulsory process is committed 
by this resolution in the first instance to the Chairman and 
the Ranking Minority Member acting jointly. If either declines 
to act, the other may act alone, subject to the right of either 
to refer the question to the Committee for decision prior to 
issuance, and a meeting of the Committee will be convened 
promptly to consider the question. Thus, meetings will not be 
required to authorize issuance of process, so long as neither 
the Chairman nor the Ranking Minority Member refers the matter 
to the Committee. In the alternative, the Committee possesses 
the independent authority to authorize subpoenas and other 
process, should it be felt that action of the whole Committee 
is preferable under the circumstances. Thus, maximum 
flexibility and bipartisanship are reconciled in this 
resolution.
    After careful consideration, the Committee determined not 
to establish a deadline for its final action. The Committee 
concluded that it is not now possible to predict the course and 
duration of its inquiry and that establishment of dates would 
be artificial and unrealistic and thusmisleading. The Committee 
was anxious to avoid an arbitrary deadline that might ultimately 
operate as an unnecessary hindrance to an early and just conclusion to 
its inquiry.

                 REFERRAL FROM THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
    The Constitution provides that the President ``* * * shall 
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' 
(Article II, section 4), and that the ``House of 
Representatives * * * shall have the sole Power of 
Impeachment'' (Article I, section 2, clause 5). To that end, an 
independent counsel must advise the House of Representatives of 
any ``substantial and credible information which * * * may 
constitute grounds for an impeachment.'' 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(c). 
The Independent Counsel statute was first enacted in 1978 as 
Title IV of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, and has been 
reauthorized three times since. Most recently it was supported 
by Attorney General Janet Reno \1\ and signed into law by 
President Clinton on June 30, 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ During the reauthorization process of the Independent Counsel 
Act, Attorney General Reno testified as follows:

        In 1975, after his firing triggered the Constitutional 
      crisis that led to the first version of this Act, Watergate 
      special prosecutor Archibald Cox testified that an 
      independent counsel was needed in certain limited cases and 
      he said, ``The pressure, the divided loyalty, are too much 
      for any man, and as honorable and conscientious as any 
      individual might be, the public could never feel entirely 
      easy about the vigor and thoroughness with which the 
      investigation was pursued. Some outside person is 
      absolutely essential.'' Now, nearly two decades later, I 
      could not state it any better.
        It is neither fair nor valid to criticize the Act for 
      what politics has wrought, nor to expect the Act to solve 
      all our crises. The Iran-Contra investigation, far from 
      providing support for doing away with the Act, proves its 
      necessity. I believe that this investigation could not have 
      been conducted under the supervision of the Attorney 
      General and concluded with any public confidence in its 
      thoroughness or impartiality.
        The reason that I support the concept of an independent 
      counsel with statutory independence is that there is an 
      inherent conflict whenever senior Executive Branch 
      officials are to be investigated by the Department and its 
      appointed head, the Attorney General. The Attorney General 
      serves at the pleasure of the President. Recognition of 
      this conflict does not belittle or demean the impressive 
      professionalism of the Department's career prosecutors, and 
      permit me to say again, I have been so impressed with the 
      lawyers in the Department of Justice at every level. They 
      are non-political, they are splendid lawyers, and they have 
      enjoyed the opportunity to work with your staff on this 
      legislation.
          * * * * * * *
        It is absolutely essential for the public to have 
      confidence in the system and you cannot do that when there 
      is conflict or an appearance of conflict in the person who 
      is, in effect, the chief prosecutor. There is an inherent 
      conflict here, and I think that that is why this Act is so 
      important.
        It is worth noting that only a few matters that have been 
      investigated by independent counsels over the last decade 
      resulted in convictions. Far more covered individuals 
      accused of wrongdoing have been cleared at the close of an 
      independent counsel's investigation. This role of declining 
      to prosecute a Government official is, I suggest, as 
      important a part as any process in the prosecution. The 
      credibility and public confidence engendered by the fact 
      that an independent and impartial outsider has examined the 
      evidence and concluded that prosecution is not warranted 
      serves to clear a public official's name in a way that no 
      Justice Department investigation ever could.
        It is telling that on occasion covered individuals, 
      including former Attorney General Edwin Meese, have called 
      for an appointment of an independent counsel to investigate 
      the allegations against them. I doubt the public would have 
      accepted with confidence the decision not to prosecute had 
      each of those individuals been cleared not by an impartial 
      outside prosecutor but by the Attorney General and his 
      Justice Department.
        The Independent Counsel Act was designed to avoid even 
      the appearance of impropriety in the consideration of 
      allegations of misconduct by high-level Executive Branch 
      officials and to prevent, as I have said, the actual or 
      perceived conflicts of interest. The Act thus served as a 
      vehicle to further the public's perception of fairness and 
      thoroughness in such matters, and to avert even the most 
      subtle influences that may appear in an investigation of 
      highly-placed Executive officials.

The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1993: Hearings on S.24 
Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 
(S. Hrg. 103-437) at 11-12 (Testimony of Attorney General Reno).
    On September 9, 1998, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr 
wrote to Speaker Gingrich and Minority Leader Gephardt 
notifying them of his transmission to the House of a referral 
prepared pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(c). In response, the 
House Sergeant-at-Arms was directed to take control of the 
materials until the House decided how to proceed. During that 
time, 36 boxes of materials delivered to the House were 
safeguarded by the Sergeant-at-Arms and no person had access to 
the materials. Two days later, on September 11, 1998, the House 
passed H. Res. 525 by a vote of 363-63. H. Res. 525 conferred 
jurisdiction over the Independent Counsel's referral to the 
Committee on the Judiciary and directed the Committee to, among 
other things, ``determine whether sufficient grounds exist to 
recommend to the House that an impeachment inquiry be 
commenced.''
    Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(c), the Office of 
Independent Counsel (OIC) submitted what it believed to be 
substantial and credible information that President Clinton 
obstructed justice during the Jones v. Clinton sexual 
harassment lawsuit by lying under oath and concealing evidence 
of his relationship with a young White House intern and federal 
employee, Monica Lewinsky. After a federal criminal 
investigation of the President's actions began in January 1998, 
the President allegedly lied under oath to the grand jury and 
obstructed justice during the grand jury investigation. The 
Independent Counsel also alleged substantial and credible 
information that the President's actions with respect to Monica 
Lewinsky constitute an abuse of authority inconsistent with the 
President's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. 
Specifically, the Independent Counsel alleged that there is 
substantial and credible information supporting the following 
eleven possible grounds for impeachment:
    1. President Clinton lied under oath in his civil case when 
he denied a sexual affair, a sexual relationship, or sexual 
relations with Monica Lewinsky.
    2. President Clinton lied under oath to the grand jury 
about his sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    3. In his civil deposition, to support his false statement 
about the sexual relationship, President Clinton also lied 
under oath about being alone with Ms. Lewinsky and about the 
many gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky and him.
    4. President Clinton lied under oath in his civil 
deposition about his discussions with Ms. Lewinsky concerning 
her involvement in the Jones case.
    5. During the Jones case, the President obstructed justice 
and had an understanding with Ms. Lewinsky to jointly conceal 
the truth about their relationship by concealing gifts 
subpoenaed by Ms. Jones's attorneys.
    6. During the Jones case, the President obstructed justice 
and had an understanding with Ms. Lewinsky to jointly conceal 
the truth of their relationship from the judicial process by a 
scheme that included the following means: (i) both the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky understood that they would lie under 
oath in the Jones case about their sexual relationship; (ii) 
the President suggested to Ms. Lewinsky that she prepare an 
affidavit that, for the President's purposes, would memorialize 
her testimony under oath and could be used to prevent 
questioning of both of them about their relationship; (iii) Ms. 
Lewinsky signed and filed the false affidavit; (iv) the 
President used Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit at his deposition 
in an attempt to head off questions about Ms. Lewinsky; and (v) 
when that failed, the President lied under oath at his civil 
deposition about the relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    7. President Clinton endeavored to obstruct justice by 
helping Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job in New York at a time when 
she would have been a witness harmful to him were she to tell 
the truth in the Jones case.
    8. President Clinton lied under oath in his civil 
deposition about his discussions with Vernon Jordan concerning 
Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in the Jones case.
    9. The President improperly tampered with a potential 
witness by attempting to corruptly influence the testimony of 
his personal secretary, Betty Currie, in the days after his 
civil deposition.
    10. President Clinton endeavored to obstruct justice during 
the grand jury investigation by refusing to testify for seven 
months and lying to senior White House aides with knowledge 
that they would relay the President's false statements to the 
grand jury--and did thereby deceive, obstruct, and impede the 
grand jury.
    11. President Clinton abused his constitutional authority 
by (i) lying to the public and the Congress in January 1998 
about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; (ii) promising at 
that time to cooperate fully with the grand jury investigation; 
(iii) later refusing six invitations to testify voluntarily to 
the grand jury; (iv) invoking Executive Privilege; (v) lying to 
the grand jury in August 1998; and (vi) lying again to the 
public and Congress on August 17, 1998--all as part of an 
effort to hinder, impede, and deflect possible inquiry by the 
Congress of the United States. 2
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr in 
Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United States Code, 
Section 595(c), H. Doc. 105-310, 2nd Sess, 105th Cong., 129-130 (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee was in no way bound by these allegations and 
reviewed the material in an independent, fair, and thorough 
manner.

   COUNSEL'S REVIEW AND REPORT ON THE REFERRAL FROM THE INDEPENDENT 
                                COUNSEL
Introduction
    Pursuant to H. Res. 525, the Committee was obligated to 
``determine whether sufficient grounds exist to recommend to 
the House that an impeachment inquiry be commenced.'' In order 
to fulfill that important obligation, the Chairman and Ranking 
Minority Member directed the majority and minority chief 
investigative counsels to advise the Committee regarding the 
information referred by the Independent Counsel. The Committee 
received their orally delivered reports on October 5, 1998. The 
following summarizes the report delivered by the Committee's 
Chief Investigative Counsel, David Schippers.
Concepts of Constitutional Government
    The President of the United States enjoys a singular and 
appropriately lofty position in our system of government. But 
that position by its very nature involves equally unique and 
onerous responsibilities, among which are included affirmative 
obligations that apply to no other citizen.
    Specifically, the Constitution of the United States imposes 
upon the President the explicit and affirmative duty to ``take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . .'' U.S. Const., 
Article II, Section 3. Moreover, before entering upon the 
duties of his office, the President is constitutionally 
commanded to take the following oath:

          I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will 
        faithfully execute the Office of President of the 
        United States, and will to the best of my ability, 
        preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
        United States.

U.S. Const., Article II, Section 1.
    The President is the chief law enforcement officer of the 
United States. Although he is neither above nor below the law, 
he is, by virtue of his office, held to a higher standard than 
any other American. Furthermore, as Chief Executive Officer and 
Commander in Chief, he is the repository of a special trust.
    Second, many defendants who face legal action, whether it 
be civil or criminal, may honestly believe that the case 
against them is unwarranted and factually deficient. It is not, 
however, in the discretion of the litigant to decide that any 
tactics are justified to defeat the lawsuit in that situation. 
Rather, it is incumbent upon that individual to testify fully 
and truthfully during the truth seeking phase. It is then the 
function of the system of law to expose the frivolous cases. 
The litigant may not with impunity mislead, deceive or lie 
under oath in order to prevail in the lawsuit or for other 
personal gain. Any other result would be subversive of the 
American Rule of Law.
    The principle that every witness in every case must tell 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, is the 
foundation of the American system of justice which is the envy 
of every civilized nation. The sanctity of the oath taken by a 
witness is the most essential bulwark of the truth seeking 
function of a trial, the American method of ascertaining the 
facts. If lying under oath is tolerated and, when exposed, is 
not visited with immediate and substantial adverse 
consequences, the integrity of this country's entire judicial 
process is fatally compromised and that process will inevitably 
collapse. The subject matter of the underlying case, whether 
civil or criminal, and the circumstances under which the 
testimony is given are of no significance whatever. It is the 
oath itself that is sacred and must be enforced.
The Independent Counsel's Referral
    The Independent Counsel Act provides in relevant part: ``An 
independent counsel shall advise the House of Representatives 
of any substantial and credible information . . . that may 
constitute grounds for an impeachment.'' 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(c). 
In compliance with the statutory mandate, the Office of 
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr informed the House of 
Representatives on September 9, 1998, that it was prepared to 
submit a referral under the statute. On that day, the 
Independent Counsel's Office delivered to the House the 
following material:
          a Referral consisting of an Introduction, a Narrative 
        of Relevant Events and an Identification and Analysis 
        of the Substantial and Credible Information that may 
        support grounds for impeachment of William Jefferson 
        Clinton;
          an Appendix, in six three-ring binders totaling in 
        excess of 2500 pages, of the most relevant testimony 
        and other material cited in the Referral; and
          seventeen transmittal boxes containing grand jury 
        transcripts, deposition transcripts, FBI reports, 
        reports of interviews, and thousands of pages of 
        incidental back-up documents.
Pursuant to H. Res. 525, with the exception of the Referral 
which was ordered printed as a document of the House, all of 
this material was turned over to the Committee on the Judiciary 
to be held in Executive Session until September 28, 1998. The 
resolution provided that all materials would be released to the 
public at that time, except those which were withheld by prior 
action of the Committee.
Staff Review of the Referral
    The majority and minority staffs were instructed by the 
Committee to review the Referral, together with all of the 
other evidence and testimony that was submitted, for the 
purpose of determining whether there actually existed 
``substantial and credible'' evidence that President Clinton 
may have committed acts that may constitute grounds to justify 
conducting an impeachment inquiry.
    Because of the narrow scope of that directive, the 
investigation and analysis was necessarily circumscribed by 
information delivered with the Referral together with some 
information and analysis furnished by the counsel for the 
President.3 For that reason, staff did not seek to 
procure any additional evidence or testimony from any other 
source. Particularly, the staff did not seek to obtain or 
review the material that remained in the possession of the OIC. 
In two telephone conversations with the OIC, Mr. Lowell, the 
Minority Chief Investigative Counsel, and Mr. Schippers were 
assured that the retained material was deemed unnecessary to 
comply with the statutory requirement under Section 595(c). 
Though the Office of Independent Counsel offered to make 
available to the Committee all of that material, the staff did 
not deem it necessary or even proper to go beyond the 
submission itself. However, at the suggestion of the Minority 
Chief Investigative Counsel, the material remaining in the 
possession of the OIC was reviewed by members of both staffs at 
the OIC. The material was, as anticipated, irrelevant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ See Preliminary Memorandum of the President of the United 
States Concerning Referral of the Office of Independent Counsel and 
Initial Response of the President of the United States to Referral of 
the Office of Independent Counsel, 2nd Sess., 105th Cong., H. Doc. 105-
317 (September 28, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To support the Referral, the House has been furnished with 
grand jury transcripts, FBI interview memoranda, transcripts of 
depositions, other interview memoranda, statements, audio 
recordings, and, where available, video recordings of all 
persons named in the Referral. In addition, the House was 
provided with a copy of every document cited and a mass of 
documentary and other evidence produced by witnesses, the White 
House, the President, the Secret Service and the Department of 
Defense.
    The report delivered by the Chief Investigative Counsel was 
confined solely to that Referral and supporting evidence and 
testimony supplied to the House and then to this Committee, 
supplemented only by the information provided by the 
President's Counsel. Although the original submission contained 
a transcript of the President's deposition testimony, no video 
tape was included. Pursuant to a request by Chairman Hyde, a 
video tape of the entire deposition was later provided to the 
Committee by District Judge Susan Webber Wright.
    Apart from the thorough review of President Clinton's 
deposition and grand jury testimony, the following functions 
were performed in preparation for the report delivered by Chief 
Investigative Counsel Schippers:
    1. All grand jury transcripts and memoranda of interview of 
Ms. Currie, Mr. Jordan, Ms. Lewinsky, the Secret Service 
Agents, and Ms. Tripp were independently reviewed, compared and 
analyzed by at least three members of the staff; and those of 
Ms. Currie, Mr. Jordan, Ms. Lewinsky, Ms. Tripp and both 
appearances of the President by Mr. Schippers personally.
    2. All of the remaining grand jury transcripts, deposition 
transcripts and memoranda of the others interviewed were 
likewise reviewed, compared and analyzed. This involved more 
than 250 separate documents, some consisting of hundreds of 
pages. In this regard, the staff was instructed to seek any 
information that might cast doubt upon the legal or factual 
conclusions of the Independent Counsel.
    3. The entire Appendix, consisting of in excess of two 
thousand pages, was systematically reviewed and analyzed 
against the statements contained in the Referral.
    4. Chief Investigative Counsel Schippers personally read 
the entire Evidence Reference and Legal Reference that 
accompanied the Referral. He analyzed the legal precepts and 
theories, and read at least the relevant portions of each case 
cited.
    5. In addition to other members of the staff, Mr. Schippers 
personally read and analyzed the eleven specific allegations 
made by the Independent Counsel, and reviewed the evidentiary 
basis for those allegations. Each footnote supporting the 
charges was checked to insure that it did, in fact, support the 
underlying evidentiary proposition. In cases where inferences 
were drawn in the body of the Referral, the validity of those 
inferences was tested under acceptable principles of federal 
trial practice.
    6. Each of the literally thousands of back-up documents was 
reviewed in order to insure that no relevant evidence had been 
overlooked.
    7. Meetings of the entire staff were conducted on virtually 
a daily basis for the purpose of coordinating efforts and to 
synthesize the divergent material into a coherent report.
    Having completed all of the tasks assigned, the staff was 
prepared to report their findings to the Members of the 
Committee. The report presented to the Committee represented a 
distillation and consensus of the staff's efforts and 
conclusions for the Committee's guidance and consideration.
Monica Lewinsky's Credibility
    Monica Lewinsky's credibility may be subject to some 
skepticism. At an appropriate stage of the proceedings, that 
credibility will, of necessity, be assessed together with the 
credibility of all witnesses in the light of all the other 
evidence. Ms. Lewinsky admitted to having lied on occasion to 
Linda Tripp and to having executed and caused to be filed a 
false affidavit inthe Paula Jones case.
    On the other hand, Ms. Lewinsky obtained a grant of 
immunity for her testimony before the grand jury and, 
therefore, had no reason to lie thereafter. Furthermore, the 
witness' account of the relevant events could well have been 
much more damaging. For the most part, though, the record 
reflects that she was an embarrassed and reluctant witness who 
actually downplayed her White House encounters. In testifying, 
Ms. Lewinsky demonstrated a remarkable memory, supported by her 
personal diary, concerning dates and events. Finally, the 
record includes ample corroboration of her testimony by 
independent and disinterested witnesses, by documentary 
evidence, and, in part, by the grand jury testimony of the 
President himself. Consequently, for the limited purpose of 
this report, staff suggest that Monica Lewinsky's testimony is 
both substantial and credible.
Staff Focus
    It has been the considered judgment of the staff that the 
Committee's main focus should be on those alleged acts and 
omissions by the President which affect the rule of law, and 
the structure and integrity of our court system. This 
recommendation, however, in no way should be construed to 
prejudice any of the Committee's future deliberations. Members 
of this Committee are appropriately free to emphasize or de-
emphasize particular issues, facts, or conclusions. Deplorable 
as the numerous sexual encounters related in the evidence may 
be, the staff chose to emphasize the consequences of those acts 
as they affect the administration of justice and the unique 
role the President occupies in carrying out his oath faithfully 
to execute the laws of the nation.
    The prurient aspect of the Referral is, at best, merely 
peripheral to the central issues. The assertions of 
Presidential misconduct cited in the Referral, though arising 
initially out of sexual indiscretions, are completely distinct 
and involve allegations of an ongoing series of deliberate and 
direct assaults by Mr. Clinton upon the justice system of the 
United States, and upon the Judicial Branch of our government, 
which holds a place in the constitutional framework of checks 
and balances equal to that of the Executive and the Legislative 
branches.
    As a result of the research and review of the Referral and 
supporting documentation, the staff report concluded that there 
exists substantial and credible evidence of fifteen separate 
events directly involving President William Jefferson Clinton 
that could constitute felonies which, in turn, may constitute 
grounds to proceed with an impeachment inquiry.
    Nothing contained in the report is intended to constitute 
an accusation against the President or anyone else, nor should 
it be construed as such. What follows is nothing more than a 
litany of the crimes that might have been committed based upon 
the substantial and credible evidence provided by the 
Independent Counsel, and reviewed, tested and analyzed by the 
staff.
             potential felonies committed by the president
I
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have been part of a conspiracy with Monica 
Lewinsky and others to obstruct justice and the due 
administration of justice by:
          (A) Providing false and misleading testimony under 
        oath in a civil deposition and before the grand jury;
          (B) Withholding evidence and causing evidence to be 
        withheld and concealed; and
          (C) Tampering with prospective witnesses in a civil 
        lawsuit and before a federal grand jury.
    The President and Ms. Lewinsky had developed a ``cover 
story'' to conceal their activities. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, at pp. 
54-55, 234). On December 6, 1997, the President learned that 
Ms. Lewinsky's name had appeared on the Jones v. Clinton 
witness list. (Clinton GJ, p. 84). He informed Ms. Lewinsky of 
that fact on December 17, 1997, and the two agreed that they 
would employ the same cover story in the Jones case. (M.L. 8/6/
98 GJ, pp. 122-123; M.L. 2/1/98 Proffer). The President at that 
time suggested that an affidavit might be enough to prevent Ms. 
Lewinsky from testifying. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, pp. 122-123). On 
December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed to give a 
deposition in the Jones case. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, p. 128).
    Thereafter, the record tends to establish that the 
following events took place:
    (1) In the second week of December, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky told 
Ms. Tripp that she would lie if called to testify and tried to 
convince Ms. Tripp to do the same. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, p. 127).
    (2) Ms. Lewinsky attempted on several occasions to get Ms. 
Tripp to contact the White House before giving testimony in the 
Jones case. (Tripp 7/16/98 GJ, p. 75; M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, p. 71).
    (3) Ms. Lewinsky participated in preparing a false and 
intentionally misleading affidavit to be filed in the Jones 
case. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, pp. 200-203).
    (4) Ms. Lewinsky provided a copy of the draft affidavit to 
a third party for approval and discussed changes calculated to 
mislead. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, pp. 200-202).
    (5) Ms. Lewinsky and the President talked by phone on 
January 6, 1998, and agreed that she would give false and 
misleading answers to questions about her job at the Pentagon. 
(M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, p. 197).
    (6) On January 7, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky signed the false and 
misleading affidavit. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, p. 203). Conspirators 
intended to use the affidavit to avoid Ms. Lewinsky's giving a 
deposition. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, pp. 122-123; M.L. 2/1/98 Proffer).
    (7) After Ms. Lewinsky's name surfaced, conspirators began 
to employ code names in their contacts. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, pp. 
215-217).
    (8) On December 28, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky and the President 
met at the White House and discussed the subpoena she had 
received. Ms. Lewinsky suggested that she conceal the gifts 
received from the President. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, p. 152).
    (9) Shortly thereafter, the President's personal secretary, 
Betty Currie, picked up a box of the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky. 
(Currie 5/6/98 GJ, pp. 107-108; M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, pp. 154-156).
    (10) Betty Currie hid the box of gifts under her bed at 
home. (Currie 5/6/98 GJ, pp. 107-108; Currie 1/27/98 GJ, pp. 
57-58).
    (11) The President gave false answers to questions 
contained in Interrogatories in the Jones case. (V2-DC-53; V2-
DC-104).
    (12) On December 31, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky, at the suggestion 
of a third party, deleted 50 draft notes to the President. 
(M.L. 8/1/98 OIC Interview, p. 13). She had already been 
subpoenaed in the Jones case.
    (13) On January 17, 1998, the President's attorney produced 
Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit at the President's deposition 
and the President adopted it as true.
    (14) On January 17, 1998, in his deposition, the President 
gave false and misleading testimony under oath concerning his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky about the gifts she had given 
him and several other matters. (Clinton Dep., pp. 49-84; M.L. 
7/27/98 OIC Interview, pp. 12-15).
    (15) The President, on January 18, 1998, and thereafter, 
coached his personal secretary, Betty Currie, to give a false 
and misleading account of the Lewinsky relationship if called 
to testify. (Currie 1/27/98 GJ, pp. 71-74, 81).
    (16) The President narrated elaborate detailed false 
accounts of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky to 
prospective witnesses with the intention that those false 
accounts would be repeated in testimony. (Currie 1/27/98 GJ, 
pp. 71-74, 81; Podesta 6/16/98 GJ, pp. 88-92; Blumenthal 6/4/98 
GJ, pp. 49-51; Blumenthal 6/25/98 GJ, p. 8; Bowles 4/2/98 GJ, 
pp. 83-84; Ickes 6/10/98 GJ, p. 73; Ickes 8/5/98 GJ, p. 88).
    (17) On August 17, 1998, the President gave false and 
misleading testimony under oath to a federal grand jury on the 
following points: his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, his 
testimony in the January 17, 1998 deposition, his conversations 
with various individuals and his knowledge of Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit and its falsity.
    The following facts illustrate some of the details 
concerning the events immediately before and after the 
President's deposition on January 17, 1998.
    These facts appear in the Record:
    On January 7, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky signed the false 
Affidavit, and it was furnished to Mr. Clinton's civil lawyer. 
The President reviewed it, so he knew that she had denied their 
relationship when the deposition began.
    During the questioning, however, it became more and more 
apparent to the President that Ms. Jones' attorneys possessed a 
lot more specific detail than the President anticipated. When 
the President returned to the White House, the following calls 
were made:

                            January 17, 1998

                                Saturday
    4:00 p.m. (approx.)--THE PRESIDENT finishes testifying 
under oath in Jones v. Clinton, et al.
    5:19 p.m.--Vernon Jordan places a call to the White House 
from a cellular phone.
    5:38 p.m.--THE PRESIDENT telephones Vernon Jordan at home.
    7:02 p.m.--THE PRESIDENT telephones Betty Currie at home 
but does not speak with her.
    7:02 p.m.--THE PRESIDENT places a call to Mr. Jordan's 
office.
    7:13 p.m.--THE PRESIDENT contacts Betty Currie at home and 
asks her to meet with him on Sunday.

                            January 18, 1998

                                 Sunday
    6:11 a.m.--THE PRESIDENT learns about the existence of the 
Tripp tapes.
    11:49 a.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones the White House.
    12:30 p.m. (approx.)--Vernon Jordan has lunch with Bruce 
Lindsey. Lindsey informs Jordan about the existence of the 
Tripp tapes.
    12:50 p.m.--THE PRESIDENT telephones Vernon Jordan at home.
    1:11 p.m.--THE PRESIDENT telephones Betty Currie at home.
    2:15 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones the White House on his 
cellular phone.
    2:55 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones THE PRESIDENT.
    5:00 p.m.--THE PRESIDENT meets with Betty Currie. He tells 
her that he was questioned at his deposition about Monica 
Lewinsky, and he suggests that Ms. Currie could ``see and hear 
everything'' that occurred when Ms. Lewinsky visited with him.
    5:12 p.m.--Betty Currie pages Monica Lewinsky with the 
message ``Please call Kay at home.''
    6:22 p.m.--Betty Currie pages Monica Lewinsky with the 
message ``Please call Kay at home.''
    7:06 p.m.--Betty Currie pages Monica Lewinsky with the 
message ``Please call Kay at home.''
    7:19 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Cheryl Mills at the 
White House Counsel's Office.
    8:28 p.m.--Betty Currie pages Monica Lewinsky with the 
message ``Call Kay.''
    10:09 p.m.--Monica Lewinsky telephones Betty Currie at 
home.
    11:02 p.m.--THE PRESIDENT telephones Betty Currie at home.

                            January 19, 1998

                     Monday--Martin Luther King Day
    7:02 a.m.--Betty Currie pages Monica Lewinsky with the 
message ``Please call Kay at home at 8:00 this morning.''
    8:08 a.m.--Betty Currie pages Monica Lewinsky with the 
message ``Please call Kay.''
    8:33 a.m.--Betty Currie pages Monica Lewinsky with the 
message ``Please call Kay at home.''
    8:37 a.m.--Betty Currie pages Monica Lewinsky with the 
message ``Please call Kay at home. It's a social call. Thank 
you.''
    8:41 a.m.--Betty Currie pages Monica Lewinsky with the 
message ``Kay is at home. Please call.''
    8:43 a.m.--Betty Currie telephones the President from home.
    8:44 a.m.--Betty Currie pages Monica Lewinsky with the 
message ``Please call Kate re: family emergency.''
    8:50 a.m.--THE PRESIDENT telephones Betty Currie at home.
    8:51 a.m.--Betty Currie pages Monica Lewinsky with the 
message ``Msg. From Kay. Please call, have good news.''
    8:56 a.m.--THE PRESIDENT telephones Vernon Jordan at home.
    10:29 a.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones the White House from 
his office.
    10:35 a.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Nancy Hernreich at the 
White House.
    10:36 a.m.--Vernon Jordan pages Monica Lewinsky with the 
message, ``Please call Mr. Jordan at [number redacted].''
    10:44 a.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Erskine Bowles at the 
White House.
    10:53 a.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Monica Lewinsky's 
attorney, Frank Carter.
    10:58 a.m.--THE PRESIDENT telephones Vernon Jordan at his 
office.
    11:04 a.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Bruce Lindsey at the 
White House.
    11:16 a.m.--Vernon Jordan pages Monica Lewinsky with the 
message ``Please call Mr. Jordan at [number redacted].''
    11:17 a.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Bruce Lindsey at the 
White House.
    12:31 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones the White House from a 
cellular phone.
    1:45 p.m.--THE PRESIDENT telephones Betty Currie at home.
    2:29 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones the White House from a 
cellular phone.
    2:44 p.m.--Vernon Jordan enters the White House. He meets 
with THE PRESIDENT, Erskine Bowles, Bruce Lindsey, Cheryl 
Mills, Charles Ruff, Rahm Emanuel and others.
    2:46 p.m.--Frank Carter pages Monica Lewinsky with message, 
``Please call Frank Carter at [number redacted].''
    4:51 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Betty Currie at home.
    4:53 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Frank Carter at home.
    4:54 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Frank Carter at his 
office. Mr. Carter informs Mr. Jordan that Monica Lewinsky has 
replaced Mr. Carter with a new attorney.
    4:58 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Bruce Lindsey at the 
White House Counsel's Office.
    4:59 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Cheryl Mills at the 
White House Counsel's Office.
    5:00 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Bruce Lindsey at the 
White House Counsel's Office.
    5:00 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Charles Ruff at the 
White House Counsel's Office.
    5:05 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Bruce Lindsey at the 
White House Counsel's Office.
    5:05 p.m.--Vernon Jordan again telephones Bruce Lindsey at 
the White House Counsel's Office.
    5:09 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Cheryl Mills at the 
White House Counsel's Office.
    5:14 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Frank Carter at his 
office.
    5:22 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Bruce Lindsey at the 
White House Counsel's Office.
    5:22 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Bruce Lindsey at the 
White House Counsel's Office.
    5:55 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Betty Currie at home.
    5:56 p.m.--THE PRESIDENT telephones Vernon Jordan at his 
office.
    6:04 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Betty Currie at home.
    6:26 p.m.--Vernon Jordan telephones Stephen Goodin, an aide 
to THE PRESIDENT.
II
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have aided, abetted, counseled, and procured 
Monica Lewinsky to file and caused to be filed a false 
affidavit in thecase of Jones v. Clinton, et al., in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1623 and 2.
    The record tends to establish the following:
    In a telephone conversation with Ms. Lewinsky on December 
17, 1997, the President told her that her name was on the 
witness list in the Jones case. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, p. 123). The 
President then suggested that she might submit an affidavit to 
avoid testimony. (Id.). Both the President and Ms. Lewinsky 
knew that the affidavit would need to be false in order to 
accomplish that result. In that conversation, the President 
also suggested ``You know, you can always say you were coming 
to see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.'' (M.L. 8/6/
98 GJ, p. 123). Ms. Lewinsky knew exactly what he meant because 
it was the same ``cover story'' that they had agreed upon 
earlier. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, p. 124).
    Thereafter, Ms. Lewinsky discussed the affidavit with and 
furnished a copy to a confidant of the President for approval. 
(M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, pp. 200-202). Ms. Lewinsky signed the false 
affidavit and caused her attorney to provide it to the 
President's lawyer for use in the Jones case.
III
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have aided, abetted, counseled, and procured 
Monica Lewinsky in obstruction of justice when she executed and 
caused to be filed a false affidavit in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton, et al., with knowledge of the pending proceedings and 
with the intent to influence, obstruct or impede that 
proceeding in the due administration of justice, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1503 and 2.
    The record tends to establish that the President not only 
aided and abetted Monica Lewinsky in preparing, signing and 
causing to be filed a false affidavit, he also aided and 
abetted her in using that false affidavit to obstruct justice.
    Both Ms. Lewinsky and the President knew that her false 
affidavit would be used to mislead the Plaintiff's attorneys 
and the court. Specifically, they intended that the affidavit 
would be sufficient to avoid Ms. Lewinsky being required to 
give a deposition in the Jones case. Moreover, the natural and 
probable effect of the false statement was interference with 
the due administration of justice. If the court and the Jones 
attorneys were convinced by the affidavit, there would be no 
deposition of Ms. Lewinsky, and the Plaintiff's attorneys would 
be denied the ability to learn about material facts and to 
decide whether to introduce evidence of those facts.
    Mr. Clinton caused his attorney to employ the knowingly 
false affidavit not only to avoid Ms. Lewinsky's deposition, 
but to preclude the attorneys from interrogating the President 
about the same subject. (Clinton Dep., p. 54).
IV
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have engaged in misprision of Monica Lewinsky's 
felonies of submitting a false affidavit and of obstructing the 
due administration of justice both by taking affirmative steps 
to conceal those felonies, and by failing to disclose the 
felonies though under a constitutional and statutory duty to do 
so, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4.
    The record tends to establish the following:
    Monica Lewinsky admitted to the commission of two felonies: 
Signing a false affidavit under oath (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, pp. 204-
205); and endeavoring to obstruct justice by using the false 
affidavit to mislead the court and the lawyers in the Jones 
case so that she would not be deposed and be required to give 
evidence concerning her activities with the President. (M.L. 8/
6/98 GJ, pp. 122-123; M.L. 2/1/98 Proffer). In addition, the 
President was fully aware that those felonies had been 
committed when he gave his deposition testimony on January 17, 
1998. (Clinton Dep., p. 54).
    Nonetheless, Mr. Clinton took affirmative steps to conceal 
these felonies, including allowing his attorney, in his 
presence, to use the affidavit and to suggest that it was true. 
(Clinton Dep., p. 54). More importantly, the President himself, 
while being questioned by his own counsel referring to one of 
the clearly false paragraphs in Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, 
stated, ``That is absolutely true.'' (Clinton Dep., p. 203).
    More importantly, the President is the chief law 
enforcement officer of the United States. He is under a 
Constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed. When confronted with direct knowledge of the 
commission of a felony, he is required by his office, as is 
every other law enforcement officer, agent or attorney, to 
bring to the attention of the appropriate authorities the fact 
of the felony and the identity of the perpetrator. If he did 
not do so, the President could be guilty of misprision of 
felony.
V
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have testified falsely under oath in his 
deposition in Jones v. Clinton, et al. on January 17, 1998 
regarding his relationship with Monica Lewinsky, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1621 and 1623.
    The record tends to establish the following:
    There are three instances where credible evidence exists 
that the President may have testified falsely about this 
relationship:
          (1) when he denied a ``sexual relationship'' in sworn 
        Answers to Interrogatories (V2-DC-53 and V2-DC-104);
          (2) when he denied having an ``extramarital sexual 
        affair'' in his deposition (Clinton Dep., p. 78); and
          (3) when he denied having ``sexual relations'' or 
        ``an affair'' with Monica Lewinsky in hisdeposition. 
(Clinton Dep., p. 78).
    When the President denied a sexual relationship he was not 
bound by the definition the court had provided. There is 
substantial evidence obtained from Ms. Lewinsky, the 
President's grand jury testimony, and DNA test results that Ms. 
Lewinsky performed sexual acts with the President on numerous 
occasions. Those terms, given their common meaning, could 
reasonably be construed to include oral sex. The President also 
denied having sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky (Clinton Dep., 
p. 78), as the court defined the term. (Clinton Dep., Ex. 1). 
In the context of the lawsuit and the wording of that 
definition, there is substantial evidence that the President's 
explanation given to the grand jury is an afterthought and is 
unreasonably narrow under the circumstances. Consequently, 
there is substantial evidence that the President's denial under 
oath in his deposition of a ``sexual relationship,'' a ``sexual 
affair'' or ``sexual relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky was not 
true.
VI
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have given false testimony under oath before the 
federal grand jury on August 17, 1998, concerning his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. Sec. 1621 and 1623.
    The record tends to establish the following:
    During his grand jury testimony, the President admitted 
only to ``inappropriate intimate contact'' with Monica 
Lewinsky. (Clinton GJ, p. 10). He did not admit to any specific 
acts. He categorically denied ever touching Ms. Lewinsky on the 
breasts or genitalia for the purpose of giving her sexual 
gratification. There is, however, substantial contradictory 
evidence from Ms. Lewinsky. She testified at length and with 
specificity that the President kissed and fondled her breasts 
on numerous occasions during their encounters, and at times 
there was also direct genital contact. (M.L. 8/26/98 Dep., pp. 
30-38, 50-53). Moreover, her testimony is corroborated by 
several of her friends. (Davis 3/17/98 GJ, p. 20; Erbland 2/12/
98 GJ, p. 29, 45; Ungvari 3/19/98 GJ, pp. 23-24; Bleiler 1/28/
98 OIC Interview, p. 3).
    The President described himself as a non-reciprocating 
recipient of Ms. Lewinsky's services. (Clinton GJ, p. 151). 
Therefore, he suggested that he did not engage in ``sexual 
relations'' within the definition given him at the Jones case 
deposition. (Id). He also testified that his interpretation of 
the word ``cause'' in the definition meant the use of force or 
contact with the intent to arouse or gratify. (Clinton GJ, pp. 
17-18). The inference drawn by the Independent Counsel that the 
President's explanation was merely an afterthought, calculated 
to explain away testimony that had been proved false by Ms. 
Lewinsky's evidence, appears credible under the circumstances.
VII
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have given false testimony under oath in his 
deposition given in Jones v. Clinton, et al. on January 17, 
1998, regarding his statement that he could not recall being 
alone with Monica Lewinsky and regarding his minimizing the 
number of gifts that they had exchanged in violation of 18 
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1621 and 1623.
    The record tends to establish the following:
    President Clinton testified at his deposition that he had 
``no specific recollection'' of being alone with Ms. Lewinsky 
in any room at the White House. (Clinton Dep., p. 59). There is 
ample evidence from other sources to the contrary. They 
include: Betty Currie (1/27/98 GJ, pp. 32-33; 5/6/98 GJ, p. 98; 
7/22/98 GJ, pp. 25-26); Monica Lewinsky (M.L. 2/1/98 Proffer; 
M.L. 8/26/98 GJ); several Secret Service Agents and White House 
logs. Moreover, the President testified in the grand jury that 
he was ``alone'' with Ms. Lewinsky in 1996 and 1997 and that he 
had a ``specific recollection'' of certain instances when he 
was alone with her. (Clinton GJ, pp. 30-32). He admitted to the 
grand jury that he was alone with her on December 28, 1997, 
only three weeks prior to his deposition testimony. (Clinton 
GJ, p. 34).
    The President was also asked at this deposition whether he 
had ever given gifts to Ms. Lewinsky. He responded, ``I don't 
recall.'' He then asked the Jones attorney if he knew what they 
were. After the attorney named specific gifts, the President 
finally remembered giving Ms. Lewinsky something from the Black 
Dog. (Clinton Dep., p. 75). That testimony was given less than 
three weeks after Ms. Currie had picked up a box of the 
President's gifts and hid them under her bed. (Currie 1/27/98 
GJ, pp. 57-58; Currie 5/6/98 GJ, pp. 107-108).
    In his grand jury testimony nearly seven months later, he 
admitted giving Ms. Lewinsky Christmas gifts on December 28, 
1997 (Clinton GJ, p. 33) and ``on other occasions.'' (Clinton 
GJ, p. 36). When confronted with his lack of memory at his 
deposition, the President responded that his statement ``I 
don't recall'' referred to the identity of specific gifts, not 
whether or not he actually gave her gifts. (Clinton GJ, p. 52).
    The President also testified at his deposition that Ms. 
Lewinsky gave him gifts ``once or twice.'' (Clinton Dep., pp. 
76-77). Ms. Lewinsky says that she gave a substantial number of 
gifts to the President. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, pp. 27-28, Ex. M.L.-
7). This is corroborated by gifts turned over by Ms. Lewinsky 
to the Independent Counsel and by a letter to the Independent 
Counsel from the President's attorney. Thus, there is 
substantial and credible evidence that the President may have 
testified falsely about being alone with Monica Lewinsky and 
the gifts he gave to her.
VIII
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have testified falselyunder oath in his 
deposition given in Jones v. Clinton on January 17, 1998, concerning 
conversations with Monica Lewinsky about her involvement in the Jones 
case, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1621 and 1623.
    The record tends to reflect the following:
    The President was asked at his deposition if he ever talked 
to Ms. Lewinsky about the possibility that she would testify in 
the Jones case. He answered, ``I'm not sure.'' He then related 
a conversation with Ms. Lewinsky where he joked about how the 
Jones attorneys would probably subpoena every female witness 
with whom he has ever spoken. (Clinton Dep., p. 70). He was 
also asked whether Ms. Lewinsky told him that she had been 
subpoenaed. The answer was, ``No, I don't know if she had 
been.'' (Clinton Dep., p. 68).
    There is substantial evidence--much from the President's 
own grand jury testimony--that those statements are false. The 
President testified before the grand jury that he spoke with 
Ms. Lewinsky at the White House on December 28, 1997, about the 
``prospect that she might have to give testimony.'' (Clinton 
GJ, p. 33). He also later testified that Vernon Jordan told him 
on December 19, 1997, that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. 
(Clinton GJ, p. 42). Mr. Jordan also recalled telling the same 
thing to the President twice on December 19, 1997, once over 
the telephone and once in person. (Jordan 5/5/98 GJ, p. 145; 
Jordan 3/3/98 GJ, pp. 167-170). Despite his deposition 
testimony, the President admitted that he knew Ms. Lewinsky had 
been subpoenaed when he met her on December 28, 1997. (Clinton 
GJ, p. 36). There is substantial and credible evidence that his 
statement that he was ``not sure'' if he spoke with Ms. 
Lewinsky about her testimony is false.
IX
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have endeavored to obstruct justice by engaging 
in a pattern of activity calculated to conceal evidence from 
the judicial proceedings in Jones v. Clinton, et al., regarding 
his relationship with Monica Lewinsky, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 1503.
    The record tends to establish that on Sunday, December 28, 
1997, the President gave Ms. Lewinsky Christmas gifts in the 
Oval Office during a visit arranged by Ms. Currie. (M.L. 8/6/98 
GJ, pp. 149-150). According to Ms. Lewinsky, when she suggested 
that the gifts he had given her should be concealed because 
they were the subject of a subpoena, the President stated, ``I 
don't know'' or ``Let me think about that.'' (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, 
p. 152).
    Ms. Lewinsky testified that Ms. Currie contacted her at 
home several hours later and stated, ``I understand you have 
something to give me'' or ``the President said you have 
something to give me.'' (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, pp. 154-155). Later 
that same day, Ms. Currie picked up a box of gifts from Ms. 
Lewinsky's home. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, pp. 156-158; Currie 5/6/98 
GJ, pp. 107-108).
    The evidence indicates that the President may have 
instructed Ms. Currie to conceal evidence. The President has 
denied giving that instruction, and he contended under oath 
that he advised Ms. Lewinsky to provide all of the gifts to the 
Jones attorneys pursuant to the subpoena. (Clinton GJ, pp. 44-
45). In contrast, Ms. Lewinsky testified that the President 
never challenged her suggestion that the gifts should be 
concealed. (M.L. 8/26/98 Dep., pp. 58-59).
X
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have endeavored to obstruct justice in the case 
of Jones v. Clinton, et al., by agreeing with Monica Lewinsky 
on a cover story about their relationship, by causing a false 
affidavit to be filed by Ms. Lewinsky and by giving false and 
misleading testimony in the deposition given on January 17, 
1998, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503.
    The record tends to establish that the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky agreed on false explanations for her private visits to 
the Oval Office. Ms. Lewinsky testified that when the President 
contacted her and told her that she was on the Jones witness 
list, he advised her that she could always repeat these cover 
stories, and he suggested that she file an affidavit. (M.L. 8/
6/98 GJ, p. 123). After this conversation, Ms. Lewinsky filed a 
false affidavit. The President learned of Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit prior to his deposition in the Jones case. (Jordan 5/
5/98 GJ, pp. 24-25).
    Subsequently, during his deposition, the President stated 
that he never had a sexual relationship or affair with Ms. 
Lewinsky. He further stated that the paragraph in Ms. 
Lewinsky's affidavit denying a sexual relationship with the 
President was ``absolutely true,'' even though his attorney had 
argued that the affidavit covered ``sex of any kind in any 
manner, shape or form.'' (Clinton Dep., pp. 54, 104).
XI
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have endeavored to obstruct justice by helping 
Monica Lewinsky to obtain a job in New York City at a time when 
she would have given evidence adverse to Mr. Clinton if she 
told the truth in the case of Jones v. Clinton, et al., in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1503 and 1512.
    The record tends to establish the following:
    In October, 1997, the President and Ms. Lewinsky discussed 
the possibility of Vernon Jordan assisting Ms. Lewinsky in 
finding a job in New York. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, pp. 103-104). On 
November 5, 1997, Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky discussed 
employment possibilities, and Mr. Jordan told her that she came 
``highly recommended.'' (M.L. 7/31/98 Int., p. 15; e-mail from 
Lewinsky to Catherine Davis, 11/6/97).
    However, no significant action was taken on Ms. Lewinsky's 
behalf until December, when the Jones attorneys identified Ms. 
Lewinsky as a witness. Within days, after Mr. Jordan again met 
with Ms. Lewinsky, he contacted a number of people in the 
private sector who could help Ms. Lewinsky find work in New 
York. (Jordan 3/3/98 GJ, pp. 48-49).
    Additional evidence indicates that on the day Ms. Lewinsky 
signed a false affidavit denying a sexual relationship with the 
President, Mr. Jordan contacted the President and discussed the 
affidavit. (Jordan 5/5/98 GJ, pp. 223-225). The next day, Ms. 
Lewinsky interviewed with MacAndrews & Forbes, an interview 
arranged with Mr. Jordan's assistance. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, pp. 
205-206). When Ms. Lewinsky told Mr. Jordan that the interview 
went poorly, Mr. Jordan contacted the CEO of MacAndrews & 
Forbes. (Perelman 4/23/98 Dep., p. 10; Telephone Calls, Table 
37, Call 6). The following day, Ms. Lewinsky was offered the 
job, and Mr. Jordan contacted the White House with the message 
``mission accomplished.'' (Jordan 5/28/98 GJ, p. 39).
    In sum, Mr. Jordan secured a job for Ms. Lewinsky with a 
phone call placed on the day after Ms. Lewinsky signed a false 
affidavit protecting the President. Evidence indicates that 
this timing was not coincidental.
XII
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have testified falsely under oath in his 
deposition given in Jones v. Clinton, et al. on January 17, 
1998, concerning his conversations with Vernon Jordan about Ms. 
Lewinsky, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1621 and 1623.
    The record tends to establish that Mr. Jordan and the 
President discussed Ms. Lewinsky on various occasions from the 
time she was served until she fired Mr. Carter and hired Mr. 
Ginsburg. This is contrary to the President's deposition 
testimony. The President was asked in his deposition whether 
anyone besides his attorney told him that Ms. Lewinsky had been 
served. ``I don't think so,'' he responded. He then said that 
Bruce Lindsey was the first person who told him. (Clinton Dep., 
pp. 68-69). In the Grand Jury, the President was specifically 
asked if Mr. Jordan informed him that Ms. Lewinsky was under 
subpoena. ``No sir,'' he answered. (Clinton GJ, p. 40). Later 
in that testimony, when confronted with a specific date (the 
evening of December 19, 1997), the President admitted that he 
spoke with Mr. Jordan about the subpoena. (Clinton GJ, p. 42; 
Jordan 5/5/98 GJ, p. 145; Jordan 3/3/98 GJ, pp. 167-170). Both 
the President and Mr. Jordan testified in the Grand Jury that 
Mr. Jordan informed the President on January 7 that Ms. 
Lewinsky had signed the affidavit. (Clinton GJ, p. 74; Jordan 
5/5/98 GJ, 222-228). Ms. Lewinsky said she too informed the 
President of the subpoena. (M.L. 8/20/98 GJ, p. 66).
    The President was also asked during his deposition if 
anyone reported to him within the past two weeks (from January 
17, 1998) that they had a conversation with Monica Lewinsky 
concerning the lawsuit. The President said, ``I don't think 
so.'' (Clinton Dep., p. 72). As noted, Mr. Jordan told the 
President on January 7, 1998, that Ms. Lewinsky signed the 
affidavit. (Jordan 5/5/98 GJ, pp. 222-228). In addition, the 
President was asked if he had a conversation with Mr. Jordan 
where Ms. Lewinsky's name was mentioned. He said yes, that Mr. 
Jordan mentioned that she asked for advice about moving to New 
York. Actually, the President had conversations with Mr. Jordan 
concerning three general subjects: Choosing an attorney to 
represent Ms. Lewinsky after she had been subpoenaed (Jordan 5/
28/98 GJ, p. 4); Ms. Lewinsky's subpoena and the contents of 
her executed Affidavit (Jordan 5/5/98 GJ, pp. 142-145; Jordan 
3/3/98 GJ, pp. 167-172; Jordan 3/5/98 GJ, pp. 24-25, 223, 225); 
and Vernon Jordan's success in procuring a New York job for Ms. 
Lewinsky. (Jordan 5/28/98 GJ, p. 39).
XIII
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have endeavored to obstruct justice and engage in 
witness tampering in attempting to coach and influence the 
testimony of Betty Currie before the grand jury, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512.
    The record tends to establish the following:
    According to Ms. Currie, the President contacted her on the 
day he was deposed in the Jones case and asked her to meet him 
the following day. (Currie 1/27/98 GJ, pp. 65-66). The next 
day, Ms. Currie met with the President, and he asked her 
whether she agreed with a series of possibly false statements, 
including, ``We were never really alone,'' ``You could always 
see and hear everything,'' and ``Monica came on to me and I 
never touched her, right?'' (Currie 1/27/98 GJ, pp. 71-74). Ms. 
Currie stated that the President's tone and demeanor indicated 
that he wanted her to agree with these statements. (Currie 1/
27/98 GJ, pp. 73-74). According to Ms. Currie, the President 
called her into the Oval Office several days later and 
reiterated his previous statements using the same tone and 
demeanor. (Currie 1/27/98 GJ, p. 81). Ms. Currie later stated 
that she felt she was free to disagree with the President. 
(Currie 7/22/98 GJ, p. 23).
    The President testified concerning those statements before 
the grand jury, and he did not deny that he made them. (Clinton 
8/17/98 GJ, pp. 133-139). Rather, the President testified that 
in some of the statements he was referring only to meetings 
with Ms. Lewinsky in 1997, and that he intended the word 
``alone'' to mean the entire Oval Office Complex. (Clinton 8/
17/98 GJ, pp. 133-139).
XIV
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have engaged in witness tampering by coaching 
prospective witnesses and by narrating elaborate detailed false 
accountsof his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky as if those 
stories were true, intending that the witnesses believe the story and 
testify to it before a grand jury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512.
    The record tends to establish the following:
    John Podesta, the President's Deputy Chief of Staff, 
testified that the President told him that he did not have sex 
with Ms. Lewinsky ``in any way whatsoever'' and ``that they had 
not had oral sex.'' (Podesta 6/16/98 GJ, p. 92). Mr. Podesta 
repeated these statements to the grand jury. (Podesta 6/23/98 
GJ, p. 80).
    Sidney Blumenthal, an Assistant to the President, said that 
the President told him more detailed stories. He testified that 
the President told him that Ms. Lewinsky, who the President 
claimed had a reputation as a stalker, came at him, made sexual 
demands of him, and threatened him, but he rebuffed her. 
(Blumenthal 6/4/98 GJ, pp. 46-51). Mr. Blumenthal further 
testified that the President told him that he could recall 
placing only one call to Ms. Lewinsky. (Blumenthal 6/25/98 GJ, 
p. 27). Mr. Blumenthal mentioned to the President that there 
were press reports that he, the President, had made telephone 
calls to Ms. Lewinsky, and also left voice mail messages. The 
President then told Mr. Blumenthal that he remembered calling 
Ms. Lewinsky after Betty Currie's brother died. (Blumenthal 6/
4/98 GJ, p. 50).
XV
    There is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President may have given false testimony under oath before the 
federal grand jury on August 17, 1998 concerning his knowledge 
of the contents of Monica Lewinsky's affidavit and his 
knowledge of remarks made in his presence by his counsel in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1621 and 1623.
    The record tends to establish the following:
    During the deposition, the President's attorney attempted 
to thwart questions pertaining to Ms. Lewinsky by citing her 
affidavit and asserting to the court that the affidavit 
represents that there ``is absolutely no sex of any kind, 
manner, shape or form, with President Clinton.'' (Clinton Dep., 
p. 54). At several points in his grand jury testimony, the 
President maintained that he cannot be held responsible for 
this representation made by his lawyer because he was not 
paying attention to the interchange between his lawyer and the 
court. (Clinton GJ, pp. 25-26, 30, 59). The videotape of the 
deposition shows the President apparently listening intently to 
the interchange. In addition, Mr. Clinton's counsel represented 
to the court that the President was fully aware of the 
affidavit and its contents. (Clinton Dep., p. 54).
    The President's own attorney asked him during the 
deposition whether Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit denying a sexual 
relationship was ``true and accurate.'' The President was 
unequivocal; he said, ``This is absolutely true.'' (Clinton 
Dep., p. 204). Ms. Lewinsky later said the affidavit contained 
false and misleading statements. (M.L. 8/6/98 GJ, pp. 204-205). 
The President explained to the grand jury that Ms. Lewinsky may 
have believed that her affidavit was true if she believed 
``sexual relationship'' meant intercourse. (Clinton GJ, pp. 22-
23). However, counsel did not ask the President if Ms. Lewinsky 
thought it was true; he asked the President if it was, in fact, 
a true statement. The President was bound by the court's 
definition at that point, and under his own interpretation of 
that definition, Ms. Lewinsky engaged in sexual relations. An 
affidavit denying this, by the President's own interpretation 
of the definition, is false.

                        COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION
    On October 5, 1998, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered reported the resolution printed herein by a vote of 21 
to 16, a quorum being present.
Need for the Resolution
    Because the issue of impeachment is of such overwhelming 
importance, the Committee decided that it must receive 
authorization from the full House before proceeding on any 
further course of action. Because impeachment is delegated 
solely to the House of Representatives by the Constitution, the 
full House of Representatives should be involved in critical 
decision making regarding various stages of impeachment. With 
the passage of H. Res. 525, the full House has already directed 
the release of the Referral from the Independent Counsel, set 
the parameters for public release of other related materials, 
and directed the Committee to review the Referral and 
accompanying materials in order to make a recommendation to the 
House.
    Also, a resolution authorizing an impeachment inquiry into 
the conduct of a president is consistent with past practice. 
According to Hind's Precedents, the ``impeachment of President 
Johnson was set in motion by a resolution authorizing a general 
investigation as to the execution of the laws.'' When the first 
attempt to impeach President Johnson failed, the House 
``referred to the Committee on Reconstruction the evidence 
taken by the Judiciary Committee in the first attempt to 
impeach President Johnson.'' 3 Hind's Precedents, Sec. 2408.
    The impeachment investigation of President Nixon was 
explicitly authorized by the full House. During debate of H. 
Res. 803 in 1974, Congressman Rodino, then chairman of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, stated:

          We have reached the point when it is important that 
        the House explicitly confirm our responsibility under 
        the Constitution.
          We are asking the House * * * to authorize and direct 
        the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate the 
        conduct of the President of the United States * * *.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          Such a resolution has always been passed by the 
        House. The Committee has voted unanimously to recommend 
        that the House of Representatives adopt this 
        resolution. It is a necessary step if we are to meet 
        our obligations * * *.

    Furthermore, numerous other impeachment inquiries were 
authorized by the House directly, or by providing investigative 
authorities, such as deposition authority, to the Committee on 
the Judiciary.
    In addition to the historical precedent regarding 
impeachment investigations of presidents, the House directed 
the Committee on the Judiciary ``to determine whether 
sufficient grounds exist to recommend to the House that an 
impeachment inquiry be commenced.'' H. Res. 525 contemplates 
that the House would consider the Committee's recommendation 
before the Committee proceeded further.
    Rules Committee Chairman Solomon, the sponsor of H. Res. 
525, indicated that the House would have to act to authorize an 
impeachment investigation. During floor debate, he stated:

          If this communication from Independent Counsel Starr 
        should form the basis for future proceedings, it is 
        important to note that Members will need to cast 
        public, to cast recorded, and extremely profound votes 
        in the coming weeks and months.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          Mr. Speaker, I want to point out, again, just to 
        clarify, this resolution does not authorize or direct 
        an impeachment inquiry. * * * It is not the beginning 
        of an impeachment process in the House of 
        Representatives. It merely provides the appropriate 
        parameters for the Committee on the Judiciary, the 
        historical proper place to examine these matters, to 
        review this communication and make a recommendation to 
        the House as to whether we should commence an 
        impeachment inquiry. That is what this resolution 
        before us today does.4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ 144 Cong. Rec. H7588 (daily ed. September 11, 1998) (statement 
of Rep. Solomon).

    During debate on H. Res. 525, Congressman Sensenbrenner 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
noted the following:

          The resolution charges the Committee on the Judiciary 
        with the awesome responsibility of reviewing the full 
        referral by Mr. Starr to determine if there are 
        sufficient grounds to recommend to the House that an 
        impeachment inquiry be commenced.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          After evaluating Mr. Starr's evidence, the Committee 
        on the Judiciary has two choices. Either it will find 
        that there is no substantial evidence of impeachable 
        activity by the President or it will recommend 
        commencing a formal impeachment inquiry.5
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Id. at 7600 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President's Procedural Rights
    Prior to the October 5, Committee meeting, some raised 
concerns about ``procedural fairness'' and encouraged the 
Committee to adopt rules, similar to those adopted by the 
Committee in 1974, which would provide the President with 
certain procedural rights. After voting on the Hyde resolution, 
the Committee adopted, by voice vote, a number of protections 
for the President. The President and his counsel shall be 
invited to attend all executive session and open committee 
hearings. The President's counsel may cross examine witnesses. 
The President's counsel may make objections regarding the 
pertinency of evidence. The President's counsel shall be 
invited to suggest that the Committee receive additional 
evidence. Lastly, the President or the President's counsel 
shall be invited to respond to the evidence adduced by the 
Committee at an appropriate time. The provisions will ensure 
that the impeachment inquiry is fair to the President.
Issues Relating to Defining Standards for Impeachment
    The minority and the White House have demanded that the 
Committee needs to adopt standards of impeachment before it 
proceeds. Standards, however, already exist. They are found in 
Article Two, Section Four of the Constitution and include 
``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.''
    Our founding fathers did not adopt these words without 
debate or forethought. These words are not arbitrary or 
capricious. They have meaning to which facts must be applied. 
Indeed, the meaning of these words have been applied in the 
House of Representatives numerous times, four of which occurred 
in the past 25 years. Impeachment precedents, like court 
precedents, can be helpful to the Committee as it proceeds and 
will help inform the judgment of all Members of the House. It 
would be presumptuous of this Committee to state as fact the 
manner in which all Members should judge the evidence. All 
Members, after a consideration of the facts and the law of 
impeachment, must exercise their constitutional responsibility 
as they deem appropriate.
    Both The New York Times and The Washington Post recently 
editorialized that the Committee need not decide in advance 
what constitutes an impeachable offense. According toThe New 
York Times,

          The natural contours of an impeachment inquiry 
        accommodate two converging avenues of work, one dealing 
        with the evidence, the other with the constitutional 
        question of what constitutes an impeachable offense. 
        The Judiciary Committee has wisely chosen to consider 
        these in tandem, with the expectation that each inquiry 
        will inform the other.6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\  Editorial, The New York Times, October 4, 1998.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Washington Post observed the following:

          Some Democrats also want the panel to decide in 
        advance what constitutes an impeachable offense, and 
        only then begin an inquiry into the President's 
        behavior if the two seem to match up. Judiciary 
        Chairman Hyde is correct to resist that as well. It's 
        true that in eventually deciding whether the 
        President's conduct constituted an impeachable offense, 
        the committee will have to decide, if only implicitly, 
        how serious such an offense must be. But that kind of 
        judgment is all but impossible to make in the abstract, 
        outside the context of facts that are still emerging 
        and that almost daily paint President Clinton's 
        behavior in slightly different hues.7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\  Editorial, The Washington Post, October 2, 1998.

    Notwithstanding the assertion made by some Members, neither 
the House nor the Committee ever adopted a standard for 
impeachment in 1974. Proponents of the argument that standards 
were set in 1974 rely on a staff report prepared for the use of 
the Rodino Committee. However, the report explicitly stated 
that this ``memorandum offers no fixed standards for 
determining whether grounds for impeachment exist. The framers 
did not write a fixed standard. Instead they adopted from 
English history a standard sufficiently general and flexible to 
meet future circumstances and events, the nature and character 
of which they could not foresee.'' 8 Therefore, one 
could conclude that impeachable offenses cannot be defined in 
advance of full investigation of the facts. The report also 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
stated that

    \8\ Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment, Report by 
the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, 2nd Sess., 93rd Cong., House 
Committee Print, 2, (Feb. 22, 1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Delicate issues of constitutional law are involved. 
        Those issues cannot be defined in detail in advance of 
        full investigation of the facts. The Supreme Court of 
        the United States does not reach out, in the abstract, 
        to rule on the constitutionality of statutes or of 
        conduct. Cases must be brought and adjudicated on 
        particular facts in terms of the Constitution. 
        Similarly, the House does not engage in abstract, 
        advisory or hypothetical debates about the precise 
        nature of conduct that calls for the exercise of its 
        constitutional powers; rather, must await full 
        development of the facts and understanding of the 
        events to which those facts relate.9
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\  Id.

Furthermore, in the foreword to the report, Chairman Rodino 
explicitly stated that ``the views and conclusions contained in 
the report are staff views and do not necessarily reflect those 
of the committee or any of its members.'' 10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Id. at Foreword.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issues Relating to Scope of the Inquiry
    Some members proposed to limit the scope of the Committee's 
inquiry. The Rodino Committee's impeachment inquiry was not 
limited. Likewise, this inquiry should not be limited. In fact, 
the language authorizing the inquiry tracks the language used 
to authorize the Nixon impeachment inquiry. The charge of the 
Committee under the proposed resolution will be to determine 
whether the President has committed impeachable offenses. 
Chairman Hyde repeated his public statement that he would not 
troll for new issues to investigate. The inquiry will not be a 
fishing expedition. However, if information is brought to the 
Committee's attention that makes substantial and credible 
allegations that impeachable offenses may have been committed, 
then the Committee will have to deal with them. Judge Starr 
noted in the Referral that other issues may be forthcoming. The 
grand jury continues to meet and many parts of his 
investigation are ongoing. No one knows whether Judge Starr or 
any other source will send the Committee additional 
information. However, the Committee should be prepared for any 
eventuality.
Issues Relating to Time Limits/Deadlines
    During debate on the proposed resolution and amendments 
thereto, the minority sought to impose time limits and 
deadlines on the inquiry. Chairman Hyde disagreed that such a 
deadline is necessary, but did agree that the Committee should 
act expeditiously and fairly. He reiterated his public 
statement that it is his hope that the Committee will complete 
the inquiry by the end of December--which he has referred to as 
his ``New Year's Resolution.'' He also noted, however, that 
achieving this goal will only be possible if Committee 
Democrats and the White House fullycooperate with the inquiry. 
Many felt that an absolute deadline would do nothing more than 
discourage cooperation and encourage delay and obstruction.
    A time deadline could force the Committee to rush to 
judgment. The Committee should not be stampeded into making 
hasty decisions, determinations, or conclusions. Time limits or 
arbitrary subject matter limits will prevent this Committee 
from proceeding in an orderly and regular fashion. Courts of 
law do not have such constraints imposed on them when 
individuals go to trial, and neither should the Committee as it 
embarks on one of the most solemn and grave responsibilities 
imposed on the House by the Constitution. Moreover, the 
Committee should not invite anyone, through the imposition of 
an arbitrary time table, to obstruct, impede, or delay the 
Committee's proceedings.
    In 1974, when the Committee considered H. Res. 803, Rep. 
McCloy offered an amendment requiring the Committee to submit 
its final report by April 30, 1974, thus limiting the inquiry 
to roughly 3 months. The amendment was rejected by a vote of 15 
Ayes and 23 Nays.
    Based on the time-limited investigation conducted by the 
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee into fund-raising abuses 
in the 1996 presidential campaign, The Washington Post recently 
observed that ``experience suggests a time limit could 
encourage delaying tactics . . . .'' 11 It is 
important to discourage delaying tactics by avoiding the 
imposition of the arbitrary deadline suggested by my Democratic 
colleagues. It is important to remember that the Rodino 
Committee explicitly rejected the adoption of a deadline when 
such an amendment was offered. That process lasted a total of 
nineteen months, and complemented a one and one-half year 
investigation conducted by the 1974 Ervin Committee in the 
Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Editorial, The Washington Post, October 2, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When judging the speed with which the Committee moves to 
conclude the inquiry, Members of the House and the public 
should remain mindful of another important fact. On January 21 
of this year when the Lewinsky story broke, the President and 
various White House surrogates denied, delayed, and distracted 
the American people instead of coming clean early on in the 
process. The Committee is now asked to hastily fulfill our 
constitutional responsibility. The process should be concluded 
as quickly as possible. The Committee should not consume one 
minute more than is necessary to do a professional and 
competent job, but we should not take one minute less to do the 
same. The American people deserve professionalism, competence, 
the considered judgment of the Committee. Anything less would 
be a disservice to the nation.
Issues Relating to the Public Printing of Certain Materials
    Since the transmission by the OIC of the Referral on 
September 9, 1998, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(c) (1994), 
accompanied by grand jury material, to the House of 
Representatives, and the subsequent publication and 
dissemination of the narrative of the Referral and portions of 
the grand jury material by the Committee on the Judiciary, 
questions have been raised as to legal authority of the 
Independent Counsel to transmit such materials and that of the 
House to publically disseminate it. The House of 
Representatives and the Committee have been criticized for 
causing some of the material to be printed as a House document. 
The following is a brief explanation of the legal bases of 
these actions.
    Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(c), an independent counsel is 
directed ``to advise the House of Representatives of any 
substantial and credible information which such independent 
counsel receives, in carrying out the independent counsel's 
responsibilities under this chapter, that may constitute 
grounds for an impeachment.'' The provision does not define the 
form in which an independent counsel is to ``advise'' the 
House, and there has been no prior experience under that 
provision. However, it hardly stretches the imagination that 
advice of such importance and magnitude was intended to be in 
written form and would be accompanied by materials supporting 
such momentous allegations. Under the only other analogous 
statutory investigative and reporting mechanism of which we are 
aware that might lead to an impeachment proceeding, the 
Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability 
Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 372(c) (1994), a certified written 
determination that impeachment of a judge may be warranted and 
a record of the proceedings conducted by a judicial council is 
to be forwarded by the Judicial Conference to the House of 
Representatives. 28 U.S.C. 372(c)(8)(A). Thus a written report 
accompanied by supporting evidence is certainly an appropriate 
advisement vehicle.
    Independent counsels traditionally conduct their 
investigations through grand juries.12 As a 
consequence, the strict limitations of Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 6(e)(2), providing that matters occurring before a 
grand jury are to be kept secret, are triggered. The interests 
underlying the principle of grand jury secrecy were enunciated 
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 
356 U.S. 677, 681 n. 6 (1958):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\  See 28 U.S.C. 594(a)(1) (authorizing the conduct of 
proceedings before grand juries).

          (1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment 
        may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom 
        to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent 
        persons subject to indictment or their friends from 
        importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent 
        subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses 
        who may testify before [the] grand jury and later 
        appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to 
        encourage free and untrammeled disclosure by persons 
        who have information with respect to the commission of 
        crimes; (5) to protect [the] innocent accused who is 
        exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been 
        under investigation, and from the expense of standing 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        trial where there was no probability of guilt.

    The prohibition on disclosure, however, is not absolute and 
may be overcome by a showing of ``particularized need.'' 
13 The Douglas Oil standard applies to both 
governmental bodies and private litigants, but it has been 
recognized by the Supreme Court that the interests that 
underlie the policy of grand jury secrecy are affected to a 
lesser extent when disclosure to a governmental body is 
requested.14
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Shops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 
222 (1979).
    \14\ United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 445 
(1983) (``Nothing in Douglas Oil, however, requires a district court to 
pretend that there are no differences between governmental bodies and 
private parties.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 (e)(3)(c)(i) 
authorizes a court to make disclosures ``preliminarily to or in 
connection with a judicial proceeding.'' Consistently, and 
without any exception the Committee is aware of, the courts 
have held that a House investigation preliminary to impeachment 
is a judicial proceeding within the scope of the exception to 
the Rule. Indeed, courts have held that investigations 
conducted by committees of judicial councils pursuant to the 
Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability 
Act, supra, are within the exception and granted access to 
grand jury material.15
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ See, e.g., In re Report and Recommendations of June 5, 1992 
Grand Jury Transmission of Evidence to House of Representatives, 370 F. 
Supp. 1219, 1228-1230 (D.D.C. 1974), mandamus denied sub nom Haldeman 
v. Sirica, 501 F. 2d 714, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1974)(granting access to House 
Judiciary Committee in President Nixon impeachment); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings of Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Miami), 669 F. Supp. 1072, 1075-76 
(S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd 833 F. 2d 1438, 1444-45 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(granting access to House Committee on the Judiciary in Judge Hastings 
impeachment); In re petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 
735 F. 2d 1261 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984) (granting 
access to grand jury materials to investigating committee of Judicial 
Council in preliminary investigation of Judge Hastings under 28 U.S.C. 
372(c)). See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 
(1880)(dicta)(supporting conclusion that power to impeach includes 
power to obtain evidence).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, in at least three instances the House has 
directly requested and received grand jury materials in 
impeachment proceedings. In 1811, a grand jury in Baldwin 
County in the Mississippi territory forwarded to the House a 
presentment specifying charges against Washington District 
Superior Court Judge Harry Toulmin for possible impeachment 
action.16 In 1944, the House Committee on the 
Judiciary received grand jury material pertinent to its 
investigation into allegations of impeachable offenses 
committed by Judges Albert W. Johnson and Albert L. 
Watson.17 Finally, in 1989, the House Judiciary 
Committee petitioned and received grand jury material pertinent 
to impeachable offenses committed by Judge Walter L. 
Nixon.18
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ 3 Hind's Precedents of the House of Representatives, section 
2488 at 985, 986 (1907).
    \17\ Conduct of Albert W. Johnson and Albert L. Watson, United 
States District Judges, Middle District of Pennsylvania: Hearings 
before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary to 
Investigate the Official Conduct of United States District Court Judges 
Albert W. Johnson and Albert L. Watson, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
    \18\ Nixon v. United States, Civ. No. H 88-0052 (G) (S.D. Miss., 
Hattiesburg Div.), referenced in Impeachment of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., 
H. Rept. 101-36, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); See also Judge Walter 
L. Nixon, Jr. Impeachment Inquiry: Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The case law with respect to what a congressional committee 
may do with 6(e) material released by a court, while sparse, is 
unequivocal: a committee is free to do with it as it will, as 
long as it complies with the rules of the House with respect to 
dissemination. The courts have conceded that they are powerless 
to place restrictions on the use of the material once it is in 
hands of a committee. Thus Judge Sirica, having ruled that the 
recommendation of the grand jury and the request of Chairman 
Rodino of the House Committee on the Judiciary should be 
honored, noted that ``the Court relinquishes its own control of 
the matter,'' but took the opportunity to admonish the 
Committee to ``receive, consider and utilize the Report with 
due regard for avoiding unnecessary interference with the 
Court's ability to conduct fair trials of persons under 
indictment.'' 19
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ 370 F. Supp. at 1231.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The courts in dealing with the Hastings materials 
elaborated the rationale for plenary congressional control more 
fully. In the district court, Judge Hastings asked that the 
court delay releasing the grand jury materials until the House 
Committee on the Judiciary had modified its procedures to 
``permit disclosure only to the extent necessary for the 
Committee to perform its legitimate functions.'' 20 
The court refused to impose the condition, stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ 669 F. Supp. at 1078 (Hastings had conceded that the court had 
no power to limit the Committee's power to disclose after it had 
received the records).

          . . . Ancillary to the sole power of impeachment 
        vested in the House by the Constitution is the power to 
        disclose the evidence that it receives as it sees fit. 
        Again, recognition of the doctrine of separation of 
        powers precluded the judiciary from imposing 
        restrictions on the exercise of the impeachment power. 
        The court cannot review or amend the voluntary 
        restriction that the Committee has placed on 
        disclosure. Nor can the court indirectly compel the 
        Committee to amend its confidentiality procedures by 
        withholding disclosure. The same principles that deny a 
        court the power to enjoin a congressional subpoena 
        duces tecum when Congress is engaged in a legitimate 
        function apply here. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 501-03, 
        95 S. Ct. at 1820-21.
          In any event, limiting disclosure to the Committee 
        would be inappropriate. All members of the House are 
        entitled to examine the record in exercising the power 
        of impeachment. . . .21
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Id.

    The appeals court affirmed the district court's ruling that 
it would not delay Committee access to force it to adopt 
stricter confidentiality procedures, commenting that ``even 
assuming that the court could withhold disclosure until 
procedures were adopted which limited access, Congress would be 
free to amend or abandon the procedures at any time.'' 
22 The court then concluded with a succinct 
statement of the law in this area:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ 833 F. 2d at 1445.

          We do not read the District Court opinion either to 
        have imposed or not imposed confidentiality strictures 
        upon the Committee. Judge Butzner's order expressly 
        declined to place limitations upon the Committee. Judge 
        King's order, which Judge Butzner refused to stay, 
        merely took note that the Committee had advised the 
        court that it intended to ``receive the requested grand 
        jury materials in executive session in accordance with 
        the confidentiality procedures agreement.'' What we 
        must decide is simply whether to disclose the materials 
        to the Judiciary Committee; what the Committee does 
        after disclosure is outside of our jurisdiction. The 
        reason for this conclusion is basic; as stated above, 
        the sole power of impeachment is vested in the House. 
        The Speech and Debate Clause prevents us from 
        questioning. The Speech and Debate Clause is applicable 
        because impeachment is viewed as a legislative activity 
        in the sense that it is one of the ``other matters 
        which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction 
        of either House.'' Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 
        606, 625, 92 S. Ct. 2614, 2627, 33 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1972) 
        (defining legislative activity). 23
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Id. See also, In re North, 16 F. 3d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(Special panel holds that final report of Iran-Contra independent 
counsel that contained 6(e) material did not preclude release of the 
report where the material had already lost its protected character by 
previous disclosure).

    In the instant situation the transmission of the 6(e) 
material was properly authorized by a court and the release of 
certain grand jury materials by your Committee has been 
authorized by the House. More particularly, on July 2, 1998, 
Independent Counsel Starr made an ``Ex Parte Motion for 
Approval of Disclosure of Matters Before a Grand Jury'' 
24 to the Special Division for Appointing of 
Independent Counsels of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia in order to comply with his obligation 
under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(c), which was granted by the panel on 
July 7. The Independent Counsel delivered his Referral together 
with 36 sealed boxes containing two complete copies of the 
Referral and supporting materials to the Sergeant of Arms of 
the House. The Independent Counsel advised that ``[t]he 
contents of the Referral may not be publically disclosed unless 
and until authorized by the House of Representatives. Many of 
the supporting documents contain information of a personal 
nature that I respectfully urge the House to treat as 
confidential.'' On September 11, 1998, the House adopted H. 
Res. 525, 144 Cong. Rec. H 7607, which directed that the House 
Judiciary Committee review the Independent Counsel's 
transmittal. It ordered that the 445 pages comprising an 
introduction, a narrative, and statement of grounds, be printed 
as a House document. The balance of the material was deemed to 
be received by the Committee in executive session and was to be 
released by September 28, 1998, unless otherwise determined by 
the Committee. The released material was ordered to be printed 
as a House document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(D) explicitly 
authorizes ex parte proceedings when the government is the party 
seeking release of grand jury materials. In such circumstances there is 
no obligation to provide notice to any other interested party. In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings of Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Miami), supra, 669 F. 
Supp. At 1070.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In sum, then, it would appear that the transmission of 
grand jury materials by the Independent Counsel was in 
conformity with the requirements of Rule 6(e) and that 
subsequent public release of some of the materials was within 
the constitutional prerogative of the House to ``determine the 
Rules of its proceedings.'' Art I, sec. 5, cl. 2.

                      SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Resolved Clause
    The resolved clause of the resolution authorizes and 
directs the Committee on the Judiciary, acting as a whole or by 
any subcommittee thereof appointed by the Chairman, to 
investigate fully and completely whether sufficient grounds 
exist for the House ofRepresentatives to exercise its 
constitutional power to impeach William Jefferson Clinton, President of 
the United States. Except for the name of the President, the Resolved 
clause is the same as the Resolved clause in H. Res. 803, 2d Sess., 93d 
Cong., (1974), which authorizes the impeachment of Richard M. Nixon.
Section Two
    This resolution empowers the Committee to require the 
attendance and testimony of such witnesses as it deems 
necessary, by subpoena or otherwise. It authorizes the 
Committee to take such testimony at hearings or by deposition. 
Depositions may be taken before counsel to the Committee, 
without a member of the Committee being present, thus 
expediting the presentation of information to the Committee. 
This resolution further authorizes the Committee to require the 
furnishing of information in response to interrogatories 
propounded by the Committee. Like the deposition authority, the 
authority to compel answers to written interrogatories is 
intended to permit the Committee to conduct a thorough 
investigation under as expeditious a schedule as possible. 
Interrogatories should prove particularly useful in providing a 
basis for the efficient exercise of the Committee's subpoena 
power, by enabling it to secure inventories and lists of 
documents, materials, and things and the names of potential 
witnesses. Like the Resolved clause, section two of the Hyde 
resolution is the same, word-for-word as section two of H. Res. 
803.
    The Committee's investigative authority is intended to be 
fully co-extensive with the power of the House in an 
impeachment investigation--with respect to the persons who may 
be required to respond, the methods by which response may be 
required, and the types of information and materials required 
to be furnished and produced.
    The power to authorize subpoenas and other compulsory 
process is committed by this resolution in the first instance 
to the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member acting jointly. 
If either declines to act, the other may act alone, subject to 
the right of either to refer the question to the Committee for 
decision prior to issuance, and a meeting of the Committee will 
be convened promptly to consider the question. Thus, meetings 
will not be required to authorize issuance of process, so long 
as neither the Chairman nor the Ranking Minority Member refers 
the matter to the Committee. In the alternative, the Committee 
possesses the independent authority to authorize subpoenas and 
other process, should it be felt that action of the whole 
Committee is preferable under the circumstances. Thus, maximum 
flexibility and bipartisanship are reconciled in this 
resolution.

                         VOTE OF THE COMMITTEE
    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(2)(B) of House rule XI, the results 
of each rollcall vote on an amendment or motion to report, 
together with the names of those voting for and against, are 
printed herein. The following rollcall votes occurred during 
Committee deliberations on the Hyde resolution (October 5, 
1998).
    1. An amendment in the nature of a substitute by Mr. 
Boucher and others to the Hyde resolution to establish time 
limits to conduct the impeachment inquiry and to divide the 
process of an impeachment inquiry in two phases. The first 
phase would have involved holding hearings on the 
constitutional standard for impeachment, comparing the 
allegations to the constitutional standard for impeachment, and 
determining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
allegations. The amendment in the nature of a substitute would 
have also provided an option for alternative sanctions, if 
warranted. The second phase would have provided for a formal 
impeachment inquiry. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 16 
Ayes to 21 Nays as follows:
                             rollcall no. 1
    Subject: An Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered 
by Mr. Boucher to the Hyde Resolution. Defeated by a vote of 16 
ayes to 21 nays.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Ayes         Nays       Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. SENSENBRENNER................  ...........            X
MR. MCCOLLUM.....................  ...........            X
MR. GEKAS........................  ...........            X
MR. COBLE........................  ...........            X
MR. SMITH........................  ...........            X
MR. GALLEGLY.....................  ...........            X
MR. CANADY.......................  ...........            X
MR. INGLIS.......................  ...........            X
MR. GOODLATTE....................  ...........            X
MR. BUYER........................  ...........            X
MR. BRYANT.......................  ...........            X
MR. CHABOT.......................  ...........            X
MR. BARR.........................  ...........            X
MR. JENKINS......................  ...........            X
MR. HUTCHINSON...................  ...........            X
MR. PEASE........................  ...........            X
MR. CANNON.......................  ...........            X
MR. ROGAN........................  ...........            X
MR. GRAHAM.......................  ...........            X
MS. BONO.........................  ...........            X
MR. CONYERS......................            X  ...........
MR. FRANK........................            X  ...........
MR. SCHUMER......................            X  ...........
MR. BERMAN.......................            X  ...........
MR. BOUCHER......................            X  ...........
MR. NADLER.......................            X  ...........
MR. SCOTT........................            X  ...........
MR. WATT.........................            X  ...........
MS. LOFGREN......................            X  ...........
MS. JACKSON-LEE..................            X  ...........
MS. WATERS.......................            X  ...........
MR. MEEHAN.......................            X  ...........
MR. DELAHUNT.....................            X  ...........
MR. WEXLER.......................            X  ...........
MR. ROTHMAN......................            X  ...........
MR. BARRETT (WI).................            X  ...........
MR. HYDE, CHAIRMAN...............  ...........            X
                                  --------------------------
      TOTAL......................           16           21
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. An amendment by Mr. Berman to the Hyde resolution which 
would have authorized and directed the Committee to review the 
constitutional standards for impeachment and determine if the 
facts stated in the narrative portion of the Referral, if 
assumed to be true, would constitute grounds for impeachment. 
If the Committee determined the facts would constitute grounds 
for impeachment, then the Committee would have been authorized 
to investigate whether ``sufficient grounds exist for the House 
of Representatives to exercise its constitutional power to 
impeach the President.'' The amendment was defeated by a vote 
of 16 Ayes to 21 Nays as follows:
                             rollcall no. 2
    Subject: Amendment offered by Mr. Berman to the Hyde 
Resolution. Defeated by a vote of 16 ayes to 21 nays.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Ayes         Nays       Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. SENSENBRENNER................  ...........            X
MR. MCCOLLUM.....................  ...........            X
MR. GEKAS........................  ...........            X
MR. COBLE........................  ...........            X
MR. SMITH........................  ...........            X
MR. GALLEGLY.....................  ...........            X
MR. CANADY.......................  ...........            X
MR. INGLIS.......................  ...........            X
MR. GOODLATTE....................  ...........            X
MR. BUYER........................  ...........            X
MR. BRYANT.......................  ...........            X
MR. CHABOT.......................  ...........            X
MR. BARR.........................  ...........            X
MR. JENKINS......................  ...........            X
MR. HUTCHINSON...................  ...........            X
MR. PEASE........................  ...........            X
MR. CANNON.......................  ...........            X
MR. ROGAN........................  ...........            X
MR. GRAHAM.......................  ...........            X
MS. BONO.........................  ...........            X
MR. CONYERS......................            X  ...........
MR. FRANK........................            X  ...........
MR. SCHUMER......................            X  ...........
MR. BERMAN.......................            X  ...........
MR. BOUCHER......................            X  ...........
MR. NADLER.......................            X  ...........
MR. SCOTT........................            X  ...........
MR. WATT.........................            X  ...........
MS. LOFGREN......................            X  ...........
MS. JACKSON-LEE..................            X  ...........
MS. WATERS.......................            X  ...........
MR. MEEHAN.......................            X  ...........
MR. DELAHUNT.....................            X  ...........
MR. WEXLER.......................            X  ...........
MR. ROTHMAN......................            X  ...........
MR. BARRETT (WI).................            X  ...........
MR. HYDE, CHAIRMAN...............  ...........            X
                                  --------------------------
      TOTAL......................           16           21
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. Hyde motion to favorably report the Hyde resolution, 
authorizing and directing the Committee on the Judiciary to 
investigate fully and completely whether sufficient grounds 
exist for the House of Representatives to exercise its 
constitutional power to impeach William Jefferson Clinton, the 
President of the United States. The resolution was adopted by a 
vote of 21 Ayes to 16 Nays.
                             rollcall no. 3
    Subject: Motion to favorably report the Hyde resolution 
authorizing the Judiciary Committee to conduct an inquiry into 
whether sufficient grounds exist to impeach the President of 
the United States. Adopted by a vote of 21 ayes to 16 nays.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Ayes         Nays       Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. SENSENBRENNER................            X  ...........
MR. MCCOLLUM.....................            X  ...........
MR. GEKAS........................            X  ...........
MR. COBLE........................            X  ...........
MR. SMITH........................            X  ...........
MR. GALLEGLY.....................            X  ...........
MR. CANADY.......................            X  ...........
MR. INGLIS.......................            X  ...........
MR. GOODLATTE....................            X  ...........
MR. BUYER........................            X  ...........
MR. BRYANT.......................            X  ...........
MR. CHABOT.......................            X  ...........
MR. BARR.........................            X  ...........
MR. JENKINS......................            X  ...........
MR. HUTCHINSON...................            X  ...........
MR. PEASE........................            X  ...........
MR. CANNON.......................            X  ...........
MR. ROGAN........................            X  ...........
MR. GRAHAM.......................            X  ...........
MRS. BONO........................            X  ...........
MR. CONYERS......................  ...........            X
MR. FRANK........................  ...........            X
MR. SCHUMER......................  ...........            X
MR. BERMAN.......................  ...........            X
MR. BOUCHER......................  ...........            X
MR. NADLER.......................  ...........            X
MR. SCOTT........................  ...........            X
MR. WATT.........................  ...........            X
MS. LOFGREN......................  ...........            X
MS. JACKSON-LEE..................  ...........            X
MS. WATERS.......................  ...........            X
MR. MEEHAN.......................  ...........            X
MR. DELAHUNT.....................  ...........            X
MR. WEXLER.......................  ...........            X
MR. ROTHMAN......................  ...........            X
MR. BARRETT (WI).................  ...........            X
MR. HYDE, CHAIRMAN...............            X
                                  --------------------------
      TOTAL......................           21           16
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
    In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports 
that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based 
on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
    Clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI requires each Committee report 
to contain a summary of the oversight findings and 
recommendations made by the Government Reform and Oversight 
Committee pursuant to clause 4(c)(2) of rule X, whenever such 
findings have been timely submitted. The Committee on the 
Judiciary has received no such findings or recommendations from 
the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

               NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES
    Clause 2(l)(3)(B) of House rule XI is inapplicable because 
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or 
increased tax expenditures.

                        COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE
    In compliance with clause 7(a) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee believes that the 
resolution will have no budget effect.

                   CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT
    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for this 
Resolution in Article I, section 2, clause 5 of the 
Constitution.

          ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES T. CANADY

    The President's lawyers have argued that even if all the 
charges made against the President by the Independent Counsel 
are true, the President's conduct does not rise to the level of 
``high crimes and misdemeanors'' for which the President can be 
impeached. These views are submitted as a brief response to 
that argument.
    While it is important that we not rush to judgment 
concerning the President's guilt, it should be obvious that if 
the charges against the President are ultimately substantiated, 
the President has violated his oath of office and breached his 
constitutional duty to ``take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.'' Perjury, obstruction of justice and the other 
offenses charged against the President are indeed serious 
matters.
    Although Congress has never adopted a fixed definition of 
``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' there is much in the 
background and history of the impeachment process that 
contradicts the position advanced by the President's lawyers. 
Here I refer to two reports prepared in 1974 on the background 
and history of impeachment.
    There has been a great deal of comment on the report on 
``Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment'' 
prepared in February 1974 by the staff of the Nixon impeachment 
inquiry. Those who assert that the charges against the 
President do not rise to the level of ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' have pulled some phrases from that report out of 
context to support their position. In fact, the general 
principles concerning grounds for impeachment set forth in that 
report indicate that conduct involving perjury and obstruction 
of justice would be impeachable. Please consider this key 
language from the staff report describing the type of conduct 
which gives rise to impeachment:

          The emphasis has been on the significant effects of 
        the conduct--undermining the integrity of office, 
        disregard of constitutional duties and oath of office, 
        arrogation of power, abuse of the governmental process, 
        adverse impact on the system of government. (emphasis 
        added)

    Perjury and obstruction of justice clearly ``undermine the 
integrity of office.'' Their unavoidable consequence is to 
erode respect for the office of the President. Such offenses 
also clearly are in ``disregard of [the President's] 
constitutional duties and oath of office.'' Thus, the 
principles contained in the Nixon impeachment inquiry staff 
report--a report cited time and again by the President's 
lawyers and his other defenders--actually support the 
conclusion that the charges against the President constitute 
``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
    The thoughtful report on ``The Law of Presidential 
Impeachment'' prepared by the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York in January of 1974 also places a great deal of 
emphasis on the impact of presidential misconduct on the 
integrity of office:

          It is our conclusion, in summary, that the grounds 
        for impeachment are not limited to or synonymous with 
        crimes . . . . Rather, we believe that acts which 
        undermine the integrity of government are appropriate 
        grounds whether or not they happen to constitute 
        offenses under the general criminal law. In our view, 
        the essential nexus to damaging the integrity of 
        government may be found in acts which constitute 
        corruption in, or flagrant abuse of the powers of, 
        official position. It may also be found in acts which, 
        without directly affecting governmental processes, 
        undermine that degree of public confidence in the 
        probity of executive and judicial officers that is 
        essential to the effectiveness of government in a free 
        society. What specific acts meet this test will vary 
        with circumstances, including the particular position 
        in government held by the person charged. At the heart 
        of the matter is the determination--committed by the 
        Constitution to the sound judgement of the two Houses 
        of Congress--that the officeholder has demonstrated by 
        his actions that he is unfit to continue in the office 
        in question. (emphasis added)

    The commission of perjury and obstruction of justice by a 
President are acts which without doubt ``undermine that degree 
of public confidence in the probity of the [the President] that 
is essential to the effectiveness of government in a free 
society.'' Such acts inevitably subvert the respect for law 
which is essential to the well-being of our constitutional 
system.
    Finally, it is important to understand that the 
significance of the offenses charged against the President is 
not diminished by the fact that they do not directly involve 
the President's official conduct. Although the President's 
lawyers have argued that the underlying conduct of the 
President which gave rise to the alleged perjury and 
obstruction of justice was a private matter which should not be 
the subject of an impeachment inquiry, elsewhere they have 
claimed:

          Any conduct by the individual holding the Office of 
        the President, whether it is characterized as private 
        or official, can have substantial impact on a 
        President's official duties.

    Perjury and obstruction of justice--even regarding a 
private matter--are offenses that have a substantial impact on 
the President's official duties because they are so clearly at 
odds with his preeminent duty to ``take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.''
    In light of the historic principles regarding impeachment, 
the charges against the President--charges which are supported 
by substantial evidence--demand that the House proceed with an 
impeachment inquiry as recommended by the House Judiciary 
Committee.

                                                 Charles T. Canady.

                     ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. BERMAN

    I am not enthusiastic about setting interim or final 
deadlines for an impeachment inquiry. Although it appears that 
most of the facts in the Lewinsky matter have already been 
gathered by the Independent Counsel, it is unrealistic to 
determine in advance how long a thorough examination of all 
evidence--both inculpatory and exculpatory--might take.
    It is also unnecessary to set a deadline since any 
resolution of inquiry adopted by the House will automatically 
expire at the end of the 105th Congress, and will have to be 
renewed by the 106th Congress. Chairman Hyde has stated that 
his goal is to complete an inquiry by the end of this year, and 
I take the Chairman at his word.
    The amendment I proposed did not include a deadline or 
timetable. Instead, it required the Committee to assume, for 
the sake of argument, that the facts stated in the narrative 
portion of the Starr report are true. Operating under that 
assumption, the Committee would determine whether the 
President's conduct--as described in the narrative--constitutes 
grounds for impeachment. If the answer was no, then there would 
be no need for a prolonged investigation, and we could spare 
our children from exposure to sexually explicit hearings. 
Regrettably, my compromise amendment was rejected by the 
Republican majority.

                                                  Howard L. Berman.

        DISSENTING VIEWS TO HYDE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY RESOLUTION

    We strongly oppose the Republican resolution of impeachment 
inquiry. Although we would support a fair, orderly and 
expeditious review into whether any of the allegations in the 
Referral by the Office of Independent Counsel (``OIC'') rise to 
the level of impeachable offenses, we cannot support the 
Republican proposal. That resolution would permit an 
investigation of unlimited scope and indefinite duration. It is 
not difficult to envision this investigation turning into a 
taxpayer-funded fishing expedition that will delve into 
irrelevant and embarrassing aspects of the President's and the 
First Lady's personal lives and rehash previous failed 
investigations by the Republicans. Such an unlimited and 
unfocused inquiry is irresponsible, and serves neither the 
interests of justice or the American people.
    We have a number of serious concerns with the resolution of 
impeachment inquiry proposed by the Republicans. First, the 
resolution is totally open-ended. There is no limitation on the 
scope of the impeachment inquiry, which could go well beyond 
the eleven possible grounds for impeachment submitted by the 
OIC or the fifteen possible grounds laid out by The Majority 
Counsel. The Republican leadership has already threatened to 
broaden the inquiry to include Whitewater and investigations 
into FBI personnel files, the firing of White House travel 
employees and campaign finance.
    The Republican resolution is also arbitrary. It makes no 
threshold attempt to decide whether any of the allegations made 
in the OIC Referral would, if proven, constitute grounds for 
impeachment. Under the Republican resolution, the Nation could 
be plunged into months, if not years, of hearings and debate 
over highly specific and salacious details concerning sexual 
improprieties. We believe that it is far more sensible for the 
Committee to first determine which allegations, if any, 
constitute impeachable offenses. Then, and only then, would it 
be appropriate to consider whether the actual facts support the 
allegations .
    Finally, the Republican resolution provides no timetable or 
end-point. The public rightly wants to resolve this matter in a 
fair and expeditious manner. If the process requires the 
Committee to consider a particular factual issue, we believe we 
can do so quickly. Because of the Independent Counsel's prior 
investigatory work, the vast majority of the facts are already 
known, and our own investigatory phase should be far less 
significant than previous congressional inquiries. There are 
only a small handful of witnesses who are critical, and all of 
them, except the President, have already testified before the 
grand jury on several occasions. By and large their accounts 
are not significantly at odds, and any differences could be 
resolved in short order.
    Because of these concerns, Democratic Members offered two 
reasonable and fair alternatives to the Republican inquiry. The 
first was a substitute amendment offered by Mr. Boucher, Mr. 
Nadler, Mr. Scott, Ms. Lofgren, and Ms. Waters. The Boucher, et 
al., amendment would: (1) limit the inquiry to the matters 
raised in the OIC's Referral; (2) allow a full debate regarding 
standards of impeachment and whether the facts alleged rise to 
that standard before formal inquiry proceedings take place; and 
(3) provide for an orderly process with a fixed deadline of 
November 25, 1998. In the event the Committee is unable to 
complete its work within this time frame, the substitute would 
allow the Committee to request an extension of time from the 
full House.
    As Mr. Boucher explained when offering the amendment:

          The public interest requires a fair, thorough and 
        deliberate inquiry by the Judiciary Committee of the 
        allegations arising from the referral of the 
        Independent Counsel. But the public interest also 
        requires an appropriate boundary on the scope of that 
        inquiry * * *. The country has already undergone a 
        substantial trauma. If this Committee carries its work 
        beyond the time that is reasonably needed for a 
        complete resolution of the matter now before us, the 
        injury to the Nation will only deepen. We should be 
        thorough, but we should be prompt.

    The Boucher, et al., substitute was defeated on a straight 
party line vote.
    Mr. Berman next offered an alternative addressing the scope 
of the inquiry that required the Committee to assume, for the 
sake of argument, that the facts in the narrative portion of 
the Starr report are true. Using that assumption, the Committee 
would then determine whether the President's conduct would 
constitute grounds for impeachment. If the answer were yes, 
then the Committee could proceed with a careful examination of 
all factual evidence. However, if the answer was no, then there 
would be no need for an impeachment inquiry.1 The 
amendment would allow each Member to decide if the specific 
facts alleged by the OIC met whatever standard he or she 
believes is appropriate for impeachment. The Berman amendment 
is similar to the summary judgement standard that is routinely 
applied in courts throughout this country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Indeed it is worth noting that on a jury of twelve prominent 
constitutional law professors, all but two believe that from a 
constitutional standpoint, President Clinton should not be impeached 
for the things the OIC claims he did. Harvey Beckman, Top Profs: ``Not 
Enough to Impeach,'' National Law Journal, Oct. 5, 1998, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Adoption of the Berman amendment would allow the Committee 
to avoid, to the maximum degree possible, a highly public and 
embarrassing debate over intimate physical details. As Mr. 
Berman stated:

          [The amendment] is for the sake of the children of 
        America. If we can resolve this question without going 
        through that [damaging] process [of probing into 
        intimate details], if we can accept the Starr narrative 
        as true, and that means we are not talking about 
        exculpatory evidence * * * and then deciding whether or 
        not, based on a sense of the Constitution and what 
        those standards really mean, whether this constitutes 
        grounds for impeachment, then, if there is no other way 
        and no other alternative, we have to go through that 
        process. But we are making an effort to do this the 
        right way.

The Berman amendment was also rejected along a party-line vote 
of 16-21.
    Throughout the course of the debate over the Boucher and 
Berman amendments, the Majority sought to argue that Democratic 
positions were inconsistent with the precedent set in 1974 when 
the House approved the Watergate impeachment 
inquiry.2 We strongly disagree with this contention. 
First, we believe it is disingenuous to claim full adherence to 
the Watergate precedent when the Republicans have already 
violated many of the principles of fairness and confidentiality 
observed in Watergate. For example, the OIC Report was released 
without granting the President any advance opportunity to 
respond. By contrast, in Watergate, the Judiciary Committee 
received charges of alleged misconduct by President Nixon in 
closed-door hearings for seven weeks with the President's 
lawyer in the same room, and these materials were not released 
to the public until the conclusion of this evidentiary 
presentation, well after the White House had full knowledge of 
their contents and an opportunity to respond. In addition, this 
Committee has released thousands of pages of confidential grand 
jury transcripts and FBI interview records without giving any 
party or their attorneys a chance to review or even to suggest 
proposed redactions. The Majority has also released a videotape 
of the President's August 17, 1998 testimony to the public, an 
act without precedent in the Nation's history, let alone in the 
Watergate proceedings. By comparison, the grand jury 
information submitted by Special Prosecutor Jaworski to the 
Committee during the Watergate investigation was kept strictly 
confidential in executive session and it remains under seal to 
this date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ H. Res. 805, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, the critical distinction between the present matter 
and Watergate, and indeed all other impeachment proceedings 
(presidential and judicial), is that the OIC Report constitutes 
the first referral made to Congress under the Independent 
Counsel statute. Independent Counsel Starr has already 
completed most of the investigatory work performed in Watergate 
and other impeachments, and the Committee should be in a 
position to conduct any remaining inquiries in a short and 
orderly manner. This is because we already have in our 
possession a more than 400-page report along with more than 
60,000 pages of supporting materials resulting from a seven-
month investigation. By the same token, it would seem 
completely inappropriate to use the fact of the OIC Referral as 
an excuse to launch a renewed inquiry into campaign finance and 
other wholly unrelated topics, as the Republican resolution 
would allow us to do.
    In addition, with regard to the actual charges involved, 
there is no credible comparison between Watergate and the OIC 
Referral. Watergate involved the wholesale corruption of our 
political system. The abuses included wiretapping of private 
citizens as well as the misuse of the FBI, CIA and 
IRS.3 The wrongdoing involved in Watergate was so 
broad and comprehensive that it defied limitations on 
congressional inquiry. Today, we start the process four years 
and $40 million into the Independent Counsel's inquiry and have 
already received numerous specific factual allegations 
purporting to constitute grounds for impeachment. There is no 
legitimate reason for us to go beyond the OIC Referral at this 
point, notwithstanding Speaker Gingrich's demands to the 
contrary.4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ See, Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United 
States, Report of the Judiciary Committee (Feb. 1974).
    \4\ See, e.g., Deborah Orin, ``Starr's Report Likely to be Very 
Sex-plicit; Expect Starr Sex-plicit,'' N.Y. Post., Aug. 24, 1998 at 16 
(``House Speaker Newt Gingrich said Congress shouldn't act based on a 
`single human mistake' and should look at Starr's reports on 
Whitewater,'' Travelgate and Filegate.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, it bears emphasis that the Democratic proposals 
are entirely consistent with the Watergate precedent, in that 
they would force the Judiciary Committee to come to terms with 
the seriousness of the charges as a constitutional matter 
before proceeding into the factual phase. Indeed, in the 
Watergate matter, the Committee compiled original documents 
regarding the constitutional grounds for impeachment in October 
of 1973, and then in February of 1974, the bipartisan staff 
prepared a comprehensive report entitled ``Constitutional 
Grounds for Presidential Impeachment.'' 5 The 1974 
report served as the compass for the entire impeachment 
inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment, Report by 
the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, House Comm. on the Judiciary 
(Feb. 1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At our hearings, Chairman Hyde posed the question, ``based 
on what we now know, do we have a duty to look further, or to 
look away?'' Our answer is that if we do look further, we must 
do so in a fair, reasonable and expeditious manner. If we are 
to go down the treacherous and polarizing path of an 
impeachment inquiry, it is imperative that we first grapple 
with the threshold question of whether the allegations charged 
by Mr. Starr and the Republicans would, if proven, rise to the 
level of ``treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' as required by the Constitution. It is also 
imperative that this matter be handled expeditiously and 
fairly. The Republican resolution does not provide these 
safeguards, and we urge its rejection.

                                   John Conyers, Jr.
                                   Barney Frank.
                                   Charles E. Schumer.
                                   Howard L. Berman.
                                   Rick Boucher.
                                   Jerrold Nadler.
                                   Bobby Scott.
                                   Melvin L. Watt.
                                   Zoe Lofgren.
                                   Sheila Jackson Lee.
                                   Maxine Waters.
                                   Marty Meehan.
                                   William D. Delahunt.
                                   Robert Wexler.
                                   Steven R. Rothman.
                                   Thomas M. Barrett.

 DISSENTING VIEWS OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    I oppose the resolution of inquiry as reported by the 
Judiciary Committee. I do so based on the concerns expressed in 
the Minority's dissenting views, and for the additional reasons 
set forth below.

                                   I

    On September 9, 1998, Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr 
referred information to the House that he alleged may 
constitute grounds for impeaching the President. In the 30 days 
that have elapsed since our receipt of that referral, neither 
the Judiciary Committee nor any other congressional committee 
has conducted even a preliminary independent review of the 
allegations it contains.
    In the absence of such a review, we have no basis for 
knowing whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant an 
inquiry--other than the assertion of the Independent Counsel 
himself that his information is ``substantial and credible'' 
and ``may constitute grounds for impeachment.''
    I believe that our failure to conduct so much as a cursory 
examination before launching an impeachment proceeding is an 
abdication of our responsibility under Article II of the 
Constitution of the United States. By delegating that 
responsibility to the Independent Counsel, we sanction an 
encroachment upon the Executive Branch that could upset the 
delicate equilibrium among the three branches of government 
that is our chief protection against tyranny. In so doing, we 
fulfill the prophecy of Justice Scalia, whose dissent in 
Morrison v. Olson (487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988)) foretold with 
uncanny accuracy the situation that confronts us.

                                   II

    The danger perceived by Justice Scalia flows from the 
nature of the prosecutorial function itself. He quoted a famous 
passage from an address by Justice Jackson, which described the 
enormous power that comes with ``prosecutorial discretion'':

          What every prosecutor is practically required to do 
        is to select the cases * * * in which the offense is 
        most flagrant, the public harm, the greatest, and the 
        proof the most certain. * * * If the prosecutor is 
        obliged to choose his case, it follows that he can 
        choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous 
        power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that 
        he thinks he should get, rather than cases that need to 
        be prosecuted. With the law books filled with a great 
        assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance 
        of finding at least a technical violation of some act 
        on the part of almost anyone. In such a case, it is not 
        a question of discovering the commission of a crime and 
        then looking for the man who has committed it, it is a 
        question of picking the man and then searching the law 
        books, or putting investigators to work, to pin some 
        offense on him. It is in this realm--in which the 
        prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or 
        desires to embarrass, or selects some group of 
        unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that 
        the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies. 
        It is here that law enforcement becomes personal, and 
        the real crime becomes that of being unpopular with the 
        predominant or governing group, being attached to the 
        wrong political views, or being personally obnoxious to 
        or in the way of the prosecutor himself. Morrison, 487 
        U.S. 654, 728 (Scalia, J., dissenting), quoting Robert 
        Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address Delivered at 
        the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys 
        (April 1, 1940).

    The tendency toward prosecutorial abuse is held in check 
through the mechanism of political accountability. When federal 
prosecutors overreach, ultimate responsibility rests with the 
president who appointed them. But the Independent Counsel is 
subject to no such contraints. He is appointed, not by the 
president or any other elected official, but by a panel of 
judges with life tenure. If the judges select a prosecutor who 
is antagonistic to the administration, ``there is no remedy for 
that, not even a political one.'' 487 U.S. 654, 730 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). Nor is there a political remedy (short of 
removal for cause) when the Independent Counsel perpetuates an 
investigation that should be brought to an end:

          What would normally be regarded as a technical 
        violation (there are no rules defining such things), 
        may in his or her small world assume the proportions of 
        an indictable offense. What would normally be regarded 
        as an investigation that has reached the level of 
        pursuing such picayune matters that it should be 
        concluded, may to him or her be an investigation that 
        ought to go on for another year. 487 U.S. 654, 732 
        (Scalia, J., dissenting).

    Under the Independent Counsel Act, there is no political 
remedy at any point--unless and until the Independent Counsel 
refers allegations of impeachable offenses to the House of 
Representatives under section 595 (c). At that point, the 
statute gives way to the ultimate political remedy: the 
impeachment power entrusted to the House of Representatives 
under Article II of the Constitution.

                                  III

    Section 595 (c) of the Independent Counsel Act provides 
that:

          An independent counsel shall advise the House of 
        Representatives of any substantial and credible 
        information which such independent counsel receives, in 
        carrying out the independent counsel's responsibilities 
        under this chapter, that may constitute grounds for an 
        impeachment. 28 U.S.C. 595 (c).

    The statute is silent as to what the House is to do once it 
receives this information. But under Article II, it is the 
House--and not the Independent Counsel--which is charged with 
the determination of whether and how to conduct an impeachment 
inquiry. He is not our agent, and we cannot allow his judgments 
to be substituted for our own. Nor can we delegate to him our 
constitutional responsibilities.
    Never in our history--until today--has the House sought to 
proceed with a presidential impeachment inquiry based solely on 
the raw allegations of a single prosecutor. The dangers of our 
doing so have been ably described by Judge Bork, who has 
written that:

          It is time we abandoned the myth of the need for an 
        independent counsel and faced the reality of what that 
        institution has too often become. We must also face 
        another reality. A culture of irresponsibility has 
        grown up around the independent-counsel law. Congress, 
        the press, and regular prosecutors have found it too 
        easy to wait for the appointment of an independent 
        counsel and then to rely upon him rather than pursue 
        their own constitutional and ethical obligations. 
        Robert H. Bork, Poetic Injustice, National Review, 
        February 23, 1998, at 45, 46 (emphasis added).

    We must not fall prey to that temptation. For when 
impeachment is contemplated, the only check against overzealous 
prosecution is the House of Representatives. That is why--
whatever the merits of the specific allegations contained in 
the Starr referral--we cannot simply take them on faith. Before 
we embark on impeachment proceedings that will further 
traumatize the nation and distract us from the people's 
business, we have a duty to determine for ourselves whether 
there is ``probable cause'' that warrants a full-blown inquiry. 
And we have not done that.

                                   IV
    What will happen if we fail in this duty? We will turn the 
Independent Counsel Act into a political weapon with an 
automatic trigger--a weapon aimed at every future president.
    In Morrison, Justice Scalia predicted that the Act would 
lead to encroachments upon the Executive Branch that could 
destabilize the constitutional separation of powers among the 
three branches of government. He cited the debilitating effects 
upon the presidency of a sustained and virtually unlimited 
investigation, the leverage it would give to the Congress in 
intergovernmental disputes, and the other negative pressures 
that would be brought to bear upon the decision making process.
    Whether these ill-effects warrant the abolition or 
modification of the Independent Counsel Act is a matter which 
the House will consider in due course. For the present, we 
should at least do nothing to exacerbate the problem. Most of 
all, we must be sure we do not carry it to its logical 
conclusion by approving an impeachment inquiry based solely on 
the Independent Counsel's allegations. If all a president's 
political adversaries must do to launch an impeachment 
proceeding is secure the appointment of an Independent Counsel 
and await his referral, we could do permanent injury to the 
presidency and our system of government itself.

                                   V
    If the House approves this resolution, it will not be the 
first time in the course of this unfortunate episode that it 
has abdicated its responsibility to ensure due process and 
conduct an independent review. It did so when it rushed to 
release Mr. Starr's narrative within hours of its receipt, 
before either the Judiciary Committee or the President's 
counsel had any opportunity to examine it. It also did so when 
the committee released 7,000 pages of secret grand jury 
testimony and other documents hand-picked by the Independent 
Counsel--putting at risk the rights of the accused, 
jeopardizing future prosecutions, and subverting the grand jury 
system itself by allowing it to be misused for political 
purposes.
    These actions stand in stark contrast to the process used 
during the last impeachment inquiry undertaken by the House--
the Watergate investigation of 1974. In that year, the 
Judiciary Committee spent weeks behind closed doors, poring 
over evidence gathered from a wide variety of sources--
including the Ervin Committee and Judge Sirica's grand jury 
report, as well as the report of the Watergate Special 
Prosecutor. All before a single document was released. 
Witnesses were examined and cross-examined by the President's 
own counsel. Confidential material, including secret grand jury 
testimony, was never made public. In fact, nearly a generation 
later it remains under seal. The Rodino committee managed to 
transcend partisanship at a critical moment in our national 
life, and set a standard of fairness that earned it the lasting 
respect of the American people.
    Today the Majority makes much of the claim that their 
resolution adopts the language that was used during the 
Watergate hearings. While it may be the same language, it is 
not the same process. Too much damage has been done in the 
weeks leading up to this vote for the Majority to claim with 
credibility that it is honoring the Watergate precedent. But it 
is not too late for us to learn from the mistakes of the last 
three weeks. If we adopt a fair, thoughtful, focused and 
bipartisan process, I am confident that the American people 
will honor our efforts and embrace our conclusions, whatever 
they may be.
                                               William D. Delahunt.