[House Report 105-508]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
105th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 105-508
_______________________________________________________________________
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999
_______
May 5, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 3694]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 3694) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 1999 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
The bill as reported............................................. 2
Purpose.......................................................... 5
Overall perspective on the intelligence budget and committee
intent......................................................... 6
Scope of committee review........................................ 6
Committee findings and recommendations........................... 7
Areas of Special Interest...................................... 9
The National Security Agency Budget, Culture, Method of
Operation.................................................. 9
National Reconnaissance Program.............................. 11
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)............... 12
Imagery Archiving............................................ 13
Automated Intelligence Data Fusion........................... 14
Imagery Server Systems....................................... 14
Defense Counterintelligence.................................. 15
Intelligence Congressional Justification Books............... 16
Joint Military Intelligence Program.............................. 16
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities..................... 28
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill as Reported.............. 33
Title I--Intelligence Activities............................. 33
Section 101--Authorization of Appropriations............. 33
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations....... 33
Section 103--Personnel Ceiling Adjustments............... 33
Section 104--Community Management Account................ 33
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System.......................................... 35
Section 201--Authorization of Appropriations............. 35
Title III--General Provisions............................... 35
Section 301--Increase in Employee Compensation and
Benefits Authorized by Law............................. 35
Section 302--Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence
Activities............................................. 35
Section 303--Application of Sanctions Laws to
Intelligence Activities................................ 35
Section 304--Sense of Congress on Intelligence Community
Contracting............................................ 36
Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency........................ 36
Section 401--Extension of CIA Voluntary Separation Pay
Act.................................................... 36
Section 402--Enhanced Protective Authority for CIA
Personnel and Family Members........................... 37
Section 403--Technical Corrections....................... 38
Title V--Department of Defense............................... 38
Section 501--Extension of Authority to Engage in
Commercial Activities as Security for Intelligence
Collection Activities.................................. 38
Committee position............................................... 39
Findings and recommendations of the Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight........................................... 39
Oversight findings............................................... 39
Fiscal year cost projections..................................... 39
Congressional Budget Office estimates............................ 39
Committee cost estimates......................................... 41
Specific Constitutional authority for Congressional enactment of
this legislation............................................... 42
Changes to existing law.......................................... 42
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community management account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Application of sanctions laws to intelligence activities.
Sec. 304. Sense of Congress on intelligence community contracting.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Extension of the CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act.
Sec. 402. Enhanced protective authority for CIA personnel and family
members.
Sec. 403. Technical amendments.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501. Extension of authority to engage in commercial activities as
security for intelligence collection activities.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1999
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1999, for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 3694 of the 105th
Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the
executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of the number authorized for fiscal year 1999 under section 102 when
the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions,
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian
personnel authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of
Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1999 the sum of $139,123,000.
Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research
and Development Committee shall remain available until September 30,
2000.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Community
Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence is
authorized 283 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1999. Personnel
serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Community
Management Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the
United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account by subsection (a), there is also authorized to be
appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal
year 1999 such additional amounts as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section
102(a).
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Community
Management Account as of September 30, 1999, there is
authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of
that date as is specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National
Security Act of 1947, during fiscal year 1999, any officer or employee
of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to
the staff of the Community Management Account from another element of
the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis,
except that any such officer, employee or member may be detailed on a
nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the
performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of
Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the
authorization in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000
shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center.
Within such amount, funds provided for research, development,
test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until
September 30, 2000, and funds provided for procurement purposes
shall remain available until September 30, 2001.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall transfer to the Attorney General of the United States
funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under
paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so
transferred for the activities of the National Drug
Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the
provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
(f) Transfer Authority for Funds for Security Requirements at
Overseas Locations.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the
authorization in subsection (a), the Director of Central
Intelligence may transfer funds to departments or other
agencies for the sole purpose of supporting certain
intelligence community security requirements at overseas
locations, as specified by the Director.
(2) Limitation.--Amounts made available for departments or
agencies under paragraph (1) shall be--
(A) transferred to the specific appropriation;
(B) allocated to the specific account in the specific
amount, as determined by the Director;
(C) merged with funds in such account that are
available for architectural and engineering support
expenses at overseas locations; and
(D) available only for the same purposes, and subject
to the same terms and conditions, as the funds
described in subparagraph (C).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1999 the sum of
$201,500,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.
SEC. 303. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441d) is
amended by striking out ``January 6, 1999'' and inserting in lieu
thereof ``January 6, 2000''.
SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING.
It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence
should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community,
whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United
States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to
the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound,
should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the
procurement of products properly designated as having been made in the
United States.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. EXTENSION OF THE CIA VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY ACT.
Section 2(f) of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation
Pay Act (Public Law 103-36, 50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended by
striking out ``September 30, 1999'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``September 30, 2001''.
SEC. 402. ENHANCED PROTECTIVE AUTHORITY FOR CIA PERSONNEL AND FAMILY
MEMBERS.
Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended by striking out ``and the protection of
Agency personnel and of defectors, their families'' and inserting in
lieu thereof ``and the protection of current and former Agency
personnel and their immediate families, and defectors and their
immediate families''.
SEC. 403. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.
(a) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section 5(a)(1) of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is
amended--
(A) by striking out ``subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section
102(a)(2)'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``paragraphs (2) and
(3) of section 102(a)'';
(B) by striking out ``(c)(5)'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``(c)(6)'';
(C) by inserting ``(3),'' after ``403(a)(2),'';
(D) by inserting ``(c)(6), (d)'' after ``403-3''; and
(E) by inserting ``(a), (g)'' after ``403-4''.
(2) Section 6 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking out
``(c)(5)'' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof
``(c)(6)''.
(b) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 201(c) of
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is
amended by striking out ``(c)(5)'' each place it appears and inserting
in lieu thereof ``(c)(6)''.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AS
SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.
Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
striking out ``December 31, 1998'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``December 31, 2001''.
Purpose
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999 for
(a) the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the U.S. Government, (b) the Community
Management Account, and (c) the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30,
1999 for the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the U.S. Government and permit the
Director of Central Intelligence to authorize personnel
ceilings in Fiscal Year 1999 for any intelligence
element up to two percent above the authorized levels,
with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget;
(3) Authorize $27 million for the National Drug
Intelligence Center in Johnstown, Pennsylvania;
(4) Extend the authority of the President to defer
the imposition of sanctions through January 6, 2000,
when to proceed without delay would seriously risk the
compromise of an intelligence source or method, or an
ongoing criminal investigation;
(5) Extend the CIA's authority to offer ``early out''
incentives to employees to enable the CIA to meet the
intelligence personnel needs of the next century;
(6) Enhance the CIA's ability to provide personal
protection to its employees and defectors and the
families of such protectees in situations presenting
specific or credible threats of physical harm; and
(7) Extend the current Department of Defense
authority to engage in commercial activities as
security for intelligence collection.
Overall Perspective on the Intelligence Budget and Committee Intent
The classified annex to this public report includes the
classified Schedule of Authorizations and its associated
language. The committee views the classified Annex as an
integral part of this legislation. The classified Annex
contains a thorough discussion of all budget issues considered
by the committee, which underlies the funding authorization
found in the Schedule of Authorizations. The committee intends
that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified
Annex to this report be conducted in accord with the guidance
and limitations set forth as associate language therein. The
classified Schedule is incorporated directly into this
legislation. The classified Annex is available for review by
all Members of the House of Representatives, subject to the
requirements of clause 13 of rule XLIII of the House.
Scope of Committee Review
U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under
the jurisdiction of the committee include the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities (TIARA) and the Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP) of the Department of Defense.
The NFIP consists of all programs of the Central
Intelligence Agency, as well as those national foreign
intelligence and/or counterintelligence programs conducted by:
(1) the Department of Defense; (2) the Defense Intelligence
Agency; (3) the National Security Agency; (4) the Departments
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (5) the Department of State;
(6) the Department of the Treasury; (7) the Department of
Energy; (8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (9) the
National Reconnaissance Office; and (10) the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency.
The Department of Defense TIARA are a diverse array of
reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a
functional part of the basic military force structure and
provide direct information support to military operations.
TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence
activities outside the General Defense Intelligence Program
that respond to the needs of military commanders for
operational support information, as well as to national
command, control, and intelligence requirements. The Committee
on National Security in the House of Representatives has joint
oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the programs
comprising TIARA.
The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated
program management of defense intelligence elements that
support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included
within JMIP are aggregations created for management efficiency
and characterized by similarity, either in intelligence
discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery
Intelligence (IMINT)), or function (e.g., satellite support,
aerial reconnaissance). The following aggregations are included
in the JMIP: (1) the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP); (2) the
Defense Imagery and Mapping Program (DIMAP); (3) the Defense
General Intelligence Applications Program (DGIAP), which itself
includes (a) the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program
(DARP), (b) the Defense Intelligence Tactical Program (DITP),
(c) the Defense Intelligence Special Technologies Program
(DISTP), (d) the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug Program
(DICP), and (e) the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program
(DSRP).
Committee Findings and Recommendations
The committee completed its review of the President's
fiscal year 1999 budget, carrying out its annual responsibility
to prepare an authorization based on close examination of
intelligence programs and proposed expenditures. The review
reflected the committee's continuing belief that intelligence
activities must be examined by function as well as by program.
Thus, the committee's review was structured across program
lines and intelligence disciplines and themes. The committee
held seven full committee budget-related hearings on budgetary
issues, including: acquisition of overhead collection systems,
SIGINT issues, IMINT issues, Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
issues, Analysis and Production, and Covert Action. A specific
hearing was also held that dealt with the Future Imagery
Architecture, and two hearings were held at which the Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) testified, in order to understand
his views and plans for the future of intelligence and the
Intelligence Community (IC). The committee also held six full-
committee briefings on areas such as commercial mapping
technology, collection management, and the status of the space
reconnaissance programs, in particular, and the status of IC
acquisition processes, in general. There were, in addition,
numerous individual briefings of Members and over 100 staff
briefings on programs, specific activities, and budget
requests.
The committee continued to place heavy emphasis on
understanding and addressing the future needs of the IC, and
the several distinct roles that it plays in national security.
For the past three years, the committee has discussed the fact
that our national security is affected by a set of issues more
broad than those emphasized for the past 50 years. Heretofore,
some of these issues have not been identified so readily with
our global interests. Throughout our continuing review, there
has been a constant theme: the threats that face our nation
demand that the IC be vigilant on both the strategic and
tactical levels and the IC must maintain a world-wide view,
with a highly flexible set of resources.
The committee is struck by what can be characterized as a
growing sense of apathy toward our national security and
intelligence. Because the threats are less obvious and
untraditional, many inside and outside of government believe
that our nation has fewer worries and is somehow safer. That we
can dramatically reduce our intelligence and defense resources,
because we are at peace, is a concept that many endorse,
especially when weighing such expenditures against those needed
domestically. Unfortunately, our nation is no less at risk now
than during the Cold War. What has changed is the nature of the
threat. The likelihood of a major nuclear confrontation has
receded. But other aspects of our security are at greater risk,
including the growing possibility that a rogue nation will
attack United States' interests, or even the United States
itself, with a nuclear device or some other weapon of mass
destruction.
Two specific incidents occurred recently that have shown
light on how much at risk, and how ill-prepared, we are. First
is the most recent confrontation with Iraq. Yet again, the
United States faced a dilemma in how to deal with Saddam
Hussein, a dictator possessing weapons of mass destruction and
a demonstrated will to use them, who has consistently
threatened stability of a critically important, strategic
region. The real issues in this situation could be boiled down
to two--did we have a policy, and did we have the intelligence
that would not only support a policy decision and its
implementation, but would also provide the information
necessary to develop options? Regarding the latter, the answer
was a resounding ``no.''
The second incident is related to our nation's
vulnerability to technological attack. In February 1998,
Department of Defense computer systems fell victim to
systematic, coordinated attacks by individuals who, luckily,
appeared to be driven by the challenge of conducting such
attacks rather than by malicious intent. Regardless of intent,
the attack again demonstrates that information technology has
become this nation's strength as well as its Achilles' heel.
Consequently, high priority must be placed on developing our
abilities to warn, detect and defend against such attacks, as
well as to be positioned to conduct such attacks when
necessary. The committee stresses that this is a national
security issue that encompasses the entirety of our nation's
infrastructure, not just that of Defense or of the government.
Likewise, this issue must be faced in terms of threat and
attack, not just in terms of law enforcement. At the end of the
day, we must be vigilant in ensuring that the IC is positioned
to address this new challenge.
Our intelligence capabilities have dwindled since the
breakup of the Soviet Union, and we have failed to build new
capabilities that will become increasingly critical. This is
especially true in the areas of espionage, covert action, and
in our toughest SIGINT activities. We, as a nation, cannot
continue this course. The world is such that individuals and
groups will continue to disrupt our foreign policy objectives
and threaten our national security. The only thing that will
change will be that their resources will increase and their
capabilities will grow ever more fearsome. We must be prepared,
by having the intelligence resources we need, well before a
crisis occurs, and preferably in a fashion that might allow us
to preempt it. We can do no less.
As a result of these demands, the committee evaluated the
budget submission with an eye toward looking at future needs
and capabilities. Specifically, five major themes came out of
this evaluation:
We must invest in a recapitalization and
modernization of our SIGINT capabilities;
We must invest in re-establishing and rebuilding our
clandestine espionage or HUMINT infrastructure;
We must continue to invest in all-source analysis,
establishing a ``global,'' strategic outlook that will
allow for proper indications and warning for the
policymakers and key decision makers throughout
government;
We must rebuild covert action capabilities; and,
We must invest in advanced research and development
in all programs within the IC.
Likewise, the committee's review brought to light some
fundamental questions that are partially addressed in this
budget, and will be specifically pursued over the next year.
These include:
Will the growing cost of the National Reconnaissance
Program (NRP) continue unabated, and how is this affecting the
other programs within the NFIP?
Are we placing the proper requirements on the development
of our future overhead systems? In essence, are we structuring
it only to monitor and surveil known targets, or do we want to
develop systems that focus on reconnaissance and uncovering
truly secret information?
Is financial management within the IC, specifically within
the NRP and the National Imagery and Mapping Program, rigorous
enough that the DCI can make needed tradeoffs?
Is the balance of investment between overhead systems and
other methods of collection correct, given the types of
information that is needed for national security and foreign
policy planning?
Are we properly emphasizing and investing in areas such as
processing, analysis and distribution, the activities that make
useful the massive amounts of data that is anticipated with new
technical collection systems?
Is the IC approaching information operations in a fashion
that properly positions us to face the future challenges?
Are we investing properly in the right types of research
and fully exploiting commercially available technologies?
These are questions that must be addressed. They will be
the focus of the committee's future oversight and actions.
Areas of Special Interest
the national security agency budget, culture, method of operation
The committee has concluded that very large changes in the
National Security Agency's culture and method of operations
need to take place, including changes in its budget
methodology. NSA should be given credit for many changes
already introduced, but the committee believes that the results
have not gone far enough, and that NSA will not meet its
Unified Cryptologic Architecture (UCA) goals without tackling
head-on some very fundamental internal obstacles.
Additions to the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP)
budget are being used as leverage to effect some of the
internal reforms urgently needed. This is being done in several
ways. First, the committee is funding and mandating external
management reviews. Second, the committee is attempting to
infuse fresh thought, needed expertise (especially in systems
engineering), and greater fairness by insisting that
significant portions of certain categories be contracted out
and that outside proposals and expertise be solicited, notably
in systems engineering, advanced research and development, and
in development activities conducted by the Advanced Technology
Centers. Third, fences have been placed on portions of the
budget, with the prospect that a considerable amount of money
could be reprogrammed for other IC needs if NSA does not
develop detailed strategic and business planning.
These steps are taken partially because the committee has
been frustrated in attempts to start needed reforms during
fiscal year 1998. Outside management reviews, budget cuts and
adds to reduce acquisition cycle time, plus cuts to lower the
budget percentage allocated to support, were initiated in the
fiscal year 1998 authorization process, but all have met
resistance and have been deflected from their intended purpose.
Subsequently, the committee also found unreceptiveness to
development of cost effectiveness analyses that could direct
the agency's and SIGINT community's investment priorities. It
also found that fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 1999
investments of money and personnel in categories critical to
the future, continue to be minimized, at best, and that NSA
often cannot track allocations for critical functions that
cross the old program and bureaucratic lines, much less enforce
implementation of DIRNSA policy priorities.
Therefore, the committee concludes that a far more radical
revision of the budget process than presently contemplated is
necessary. Just as the military must train the way it will
fight, NSA must budget according to the critical categories of
a new and completely different architecture and mode of
operations. Further, the old budget categories have provided
little insight into and fulfillment of the old architecture.
Most difficult of all, NSA must develop a new culture in
which all team together on a new architecture, rather than
bubbling up disparate ideas and programs from across NSA and
expending much of its energy on probable duplication. This
challenge cannot be minimized, because much of NSA's past
strength has come from its localized creativity and quick-
reactioncapability, which enabled it to rise when necessary to
overcome the stultifying effect that the bureaucracy of such a large
organization can have.
It has often been said, by both Congress and the
administration, that the IC neglects processing and the entire
``downstream'' area in favor of more exotic and interesting
collection programs, and that this trend has worsened in recent
years. The committee requests that, after receiving this bill,
the Community Management Staff (CMS) organize an effort to
provide statistics on trends for investment in collection as
opposed to processing or downstream areas. Even if comparable
data cannot be found to document the balance over the past ten
years, we should establish a 1997 baseline, if practicable, and
keep track thereafter. Eventually, we may be able to establish
some rule of thumb for the amount of downstream investment
required to use efficiently our investments in collection,
although this could be subject to changing technology and the
effect on costs at either end. The CMS is asked to explore this
possible system for tracking SIGINT investment, in conjunction
with NSA, which has thought about potential methodologies. CMS
participation appears necessary because much SIGINT collection
and processing crosses program boundaries and accumulation of
the data would require access to information outside NSA, as
well as the presence of an objective arbiter.
For the same reasons, CMS is also asked to undertake
immediately the establishment of meaningful metrics to evaluate
henceforth the cost effectiveness of various SIGINT collection
programs. NSA has resisted this on grounds that meaningful
metrics cannot be found, but the committee believes they must
be found and that NSA and other community programs must be run
more like a corporation that systematically evaluates the
productivity of various lines of operation, terminates or
downgrades some accordingly, and switches available dollars to
those that produce the most return or have the greatest
promise. Such data is needed across the IC to determine where
our funds should be placed, and should have been developed to
help guide the UCA deliberations. It can still have a major
impact on UCA implementation plans. There are many other
potential uses, including for decisions on the elimination of
legacy systems within NSA and for DCI and DoD consideration of
cross-program trades.
Finally, the committee has requested that an independent
panel assess community-wide Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)
planning and budgeting.
National Reconnaissance Program
For several years, the committee has been concerned with
the increasing costs of several major National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO) programs and the NRP's growing share of the NFIP
budget. Not seeing any relief from the tight fiscal
environment, the committee has sought to find technological
innovations and managerial reforms in the NRP that could reduce
costs. This goal lay behind the committee's push to shift to
larger numbers of smaller satellites, which the committee
thought also would provide better performance against hard
targets, reduce satellite vulnerability, and help to counter
foreign denial and deception practices.
The committee had hoped that acquisition reform and a shift
in strategy to smaller satellites would control if not reduce
costs in the near-term, and enable the DCI to increase
investment elsewhere in the NFIP and the NRO to invest new
technologies, in support of new or higher priority missions,
like counter-proliferation. So far, however, this hope has not
been fulfilled, but the committee still believes that this
strategy, if properly enforced, will produce results in time.
The committee is now exploring also the benefits of cost caps,
believing with the DCI that they may help to discipline the
acquisition system.
The committee, in summary, is not satisfied that all
appropriate measures have been taken to reduce or control costs
in the NRP or to adequately measure the cost-effectiveness of
all overhead collection activities. The committee believes that
the DCI needs to exercise much more knowledgeable and diligent
oversight of NRO programs, with an eye to freeing up funds for
investment elsewhere, wherever possible. This oversight must
extend from requirements tradeoffs, to cost estimating, to
acquisition oversight. The DCI also needs to acquire the
expertise necessary to make tradeoffs across the major NFIP
programs. The DCI can no longer afford to rely on the major
program managers to police their organizations and budgets. The
committee has recommended additional funds for the DCI to
accelerate the development of these capabilities.
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
The committee is very concerned about incidents which cause
it to question the adequacy of financial management at NIMA.
Although the committee appreciates the extra information given
in the CBJB addenda and found the data to be helpful in
tracking general costs, it has been almost impossible to get
consistent budget information from NIMA on detailed questions.
There have been numerous instances over the past few months
where NIMA has provided conflicting data on major programs and
has been unable to reconcile the different numbers. Committee
inquiries aside, these are basic questions that NIMA must be
able to answer internally in order to function.
Of further concern, the committee learned the evening
before the committee mark that NIMA is facing a shortfall in
fiscal year 1999 in its civilian pay, similar to that faced
last year. Although the committee understands the difficulty in
forecasting civilian pay, most agencies' problems occur during
a fiscal year when promotions or new hiring outpaces attrition.
The committee does not understand why NIMA is already
forecasting a shortfall for fiscal year 1999, especially since
the agency lost hundreds of employees in fiscal year 1998.
The committee is also concerned about the internal
reallocation of funds that NIMA has implemented, thus far, in
fiscal year 1998. Although the committee understands that NIMA
took its share of unallocated cuts, this does not fully explain
the movement of money between programs, nor why reprogramming
requests were not received. Further, the apparent ambiguity
associated with these actions, the apparent fungibility of the
accounts, and the fact that, on occasion, NIMA had difficulty
explaining such actions, draws into question whether the
management at NIMA has the ability or desire to force analytic
rigor over the budget process.
The committee is concerned that NIMA either simply does not
want to tell Congress of its dealings, or it simply doesn't
know how money is being spent and managed. Neither optionis
good. Generally, the committee is skeptical regarding whether NIMA has
the ability to forecast, manage, and execute its budget.
Two factors weigh in NIMA's favor, however. First, the new
Director of NIMA has indicated his understanding that changes,
and some difficult decisions, must be made. He has also
indicated his willingness and desire to work with the committee
to take on these challenges. Second, the committee is aware of
the DCI's budget task force on NIMA (within the Community
Management Staff) and strongly supports this effort. The
committee encourages the Director of NIMA to fully utilize the
task force resources to provide concrete steps in getting NIMA
on track. Put simply, NIMA must make significant changes in the
way it executes and manages its budget, and relates this
information to Congress, in order to establish any credibility.
Imagery Archiving
The committee believes there is a need for a long-term,
cohesive strategy for preserving the Nation's investment in
space and airborne reconnaissance imagery (including all
formats: film-based, electro-optic, infrared, radar and video).
Currently, the responsibility of archiving imagery belongs to
various organizations, including the NIMA, the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National Archives. Each
maintains literally millions of images in various formats.
The committee is concerned that these archiving efforts are
disjointed and do not provide an indefinite, cost-effective
retention solution. Although much of the value associated with
investments in imagery relates to short-term, national defense
requirements, the future value to scientific and domestic
requirements cannot be adequately estimated. The life
expectancy of archived imagery, however, is dependent on the
various storage media; some of these media may not survive even
for longer-term national defense use. The committee believes
recent technological developments in the commercial sector can
provide economical and extremely long-life mass imagery
storage. These technologies also provide an opportunity for
developing and instituting a cohesive long-term strategy for
archiving imagery.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense and the DCI
to develop, and report to the congressional defense and
intelligence committees not later than February 28, 1999, a
cohesive and coordinated set of practices and procedures for
storing and archiving all imagery--both U.S. reconnaissance
and, to the extent necessary, commercially-procured imagery.
This report will include a recommendation for consolidating
these responsibilities under a single organization. Further,
the report will include the new processes and technologies
necessary for maintaining imagery ``on-line'' for national and
military use and the processes for subsequently archiving all
U.S. government imagery indefinitely and at the lowest cost.
The committee recommends that the Administration investigate
the latest data storage technologies that are capable of
indefinitely maintaining data quality to determine whether
their application will decrease archival costs by allowing,
among other things, higher density storage, longer-term
(hundreds of years) storage between restorations, and less
stringent storage-environment requirements.
Automated Intelligence Data Fusion
The committee is disturbed by the number of requests in the
Congressional Justification Books (CJBs) that are justified by
the development and fielding of data ``fusion'' algorithms,
systems, and processes. Although the committee fully supports
the need to assist human analytical processes with automated
capabilities, the committee believes there is no intelligence
community leadership coordinating these various developments
and activities to ensure that the proper fusion efforts are
being undertaken and that there are no, or at least minimal,
duplications of effort.
Further, the committee notes that the very notion of data
fusion is enigmatic to the point that ``correlation'' and
``fusion'' become interchangeable, and the very definitions
preclude a holistic view of the issue. There have been no
agreed goals regarding what fusion is to provide, what it is to
accomplish or what products it is to create. Simply put, there
is no way the Congress can fully understand the issues of
intelligence data fusion because the IC does not seem to
understand it.
The committee believes that community-wide emphasis is
necessary to address the many issues surrounding ``fusion.''
Therefore, the committee requests that the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence for Community Management (DDCI/CM) and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence)(ASD(C\3\I)) provide the
intelligence committees with a long-term strategy and plan for
coordinating and developing the various intelligence data
fusion efforts. The committee believes that this plan should
include the establishment of community-wide definitions,
required products and services of fusion developments, a highly
visible insight as to the numerous projects to promote
interoperability and coordination of developments, and a
detailed funding plan for community-wide fusion needs. The
committee requests this plan be provided no later than April
15, 1999.
Imagery Server Systems
In response to a critical need for imagery dissemination,
the Office of Special Technologies, ASD (C\3\I), sponsored a
U.S. Pacific Command project to put digitized imagery on a
server-based network. This project became known as the Demand
Driven Direct Digital Dissemination System, or 5D. This system
was meant as an interim solution, to eventually be incorporated
into NIMA's Imagery Product Archive/Imagery Product Library
(IPA/IPL) server system.
The committee understands that, despite expectations, the
5D imagery server system will not be replaced soon by NIMA's
libraries program. The reasons for this are numerous, and range
from slow software development for the IPA and the initial
version of the IPL, to obsolete 5D hardware that cannot run the
new IPL software. This latter issue is particularly problematic
since it means that replacement of 5D systems requires new
hardware procurement that is not funded in NIMA's current
Libraries budget. In fact, there are many 5D terminals not
included in the IPL systems currently funded in NIMA's budget.
The committee notes that NIMA will soon field the national-
level Library and expects that 5D users will want to be able to
interface with it immediately. As stated before, this may not
be possible with current 5D hardware. The committee believes
that 5D systems should be replaced as soon as possible, but
that current users cannot afford a lapse in image product
availability. Finally, the committee notes that NIMA funds the
maintenance of the 5D but that the ASD(C\3\I) sponsors the
system, and that both have informed the committee that there
are limited funds available to keep 5D fully functional. These
problems must be solved.
The committee requests that ASD(C\3\I) and the Director of
NIMA provide the committee a report on the background, status,
direction, and cost of both the 5D and IPL systems. Further,
the committee requests that during the preparation of the
fiscal year 2000 budget request, a plan be prepared for
correcting the funding and system fielding problems outlined
above.
DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
For several years, the committee has raised concerns about
downsizing Department of Defense Counterintelligence (CI)
personnel and funding at the same time that Defense CI is being
asked to take on additional responsibilities and cope with an
unprecedented increase in operations tempo. For example, the
FCIP has been challenged to improve its counterterrorism and
force protection capabilities. The revised DoD CI strategic
plan suggests that future FCIP budgets may reflect further
shifts in resources to support military commanders in these
areas. At the same time, the FCIP must continue its traditional
counterespionage activities, provide protection to U.S.
military acquisition activities, better analyze and detect
anomalies that might detect espionage activities and, most
recently, develop a computer intrusion investigations
capability and training regimen. The downsizing of CI seems to
take place almost absent analysis of the importance of the CI
contribution, for example, to the intelligence effort
supporting deployed commanders. Feedback from recent
deployments indicates that CI and HUMINT have been preeminent
intelligence disciplines and, in fact, have been described by
G2s and commanders as the disciplines of choice within the
Defense Department. Yet, in the competition for funding within
the Defense Department and across the National Foreign
Intelligence Program, the FCIP's resource needs, in the
committee's opinion, are frequently shortchanged.
The program elements that fund counterintelligence within
the Defense Department are complex and spread across the
Department. In addition to the FCIP, CI programs can be found
in the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities budget.
Dispersed CI funding has value in that tactical CI elements
maintain close operational relationships with their assigned
units, both in terms of presence and resources. Totally
centralized management of CI might diminish these operational
relationships and the responsiveness of the elements to unique
Service requirements. However, the limited authority that the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) focal point for CI has
to oversee and evaluate the various CI programs within the
Department has made it difficult to develop or sustain a
comprehensive CI capability for Defense. This is particularly
evident in the apparently limited ability of OSD to influence
resource allocation decisions concerning the Department's
aggregate CI capabilities.
The committee understands that efforts are underway to
centralize and improve OSD's focus on significant CI activities
government-wide which have an impact on the Department. This is
a step in the right direction. Yet, there may be need for more
to be done. For example, many have been concerned that limited
procurement dollars in the FCIP and other CI programs can make
even modest equipment acquisition or modernization programs
almost impossible. Repeatedly, Congress has had to increase
funding lines so that reasonable levels of modernization or
equipment purchases could occur. The intelligence committees
have acted to repair shortages in funding for operational and
investigative activities in the last few FCIP budget
submissions, and they have expressed concern about the impact
of continued manpower downsizing on the CI program.
INTELLIGENCE CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION BOOKS
In the committee report on H.R. 1119 (H. Rept. 105-132),
the committee directed that the Congressional Justification
Books (CJB) and the Congressional Budget Justification Books
(CBJB) accompanying the intelligence budget request must
contain all direct costs of a program, including the costs of
operating and maintaining the systems or project. The committee
notes the very good progress the Intelligence Community made in
this respect with the fiscal year 1999 CBJBs, but that the
materials received were still not complete with the information
required. For example, in the CJBs, the operations and
maintenance costs of some intelligence aircraft systems show
the direct operating costs, but do not reflect the direct depot
maintenance costs. Numerous service systems show procurement
costs, but do not reflect the operations costs for fielded
systems nor the personnel required to man them. In the CBJBs,
there were large gaps in necessary budget crosswalks from past
years to the current year. In fact, some of the fiscal year
1999 CBJBs had less budget information on programs than was
available in the fiscal year 1998 CBJB. At best, these gaps
make understanding the total costs of a program difficult; at
worst, this is suggestive of an attempt to hide total program
costs.
The committee directs, beginning with the fiscal year 2000
budget request that the Secretary of Defense and the Director
of Central Intelligence include all associated costs of an
intelligence program or project within the justification
materials. The committee will monitor progress carefully over
the next year and will consider stronger measures as necessary.
Joint Military Intelligence Program
ES-3A,-$3.2 million
The budget request contained $3.2 million in research and
development, Defense-Wide, for continued upgrade of the SIGINT
systems on the ES-3A aircraft.
The committee has been informed that the Navy has decided
to terminate this aircraft. The committee, therefore,
recommends no funding for the requested upgrades.
Tactical Control and Analysis Center, Transfer $800,000
The budget request included $800,000 in research and
development, Defense-Wide, for continued development of the
Marine Corps Tactical Control and Analysis Center (TCAC).
The committee believes the development of an analytical
center for Marine Corps tactical operations is more
appropriately a Marine Corps responsibility rather than a
National Security Agency, Defense Cryptologic Program activity.
Therefore, the committee recommends the budget request in
research and development, Marine Corps, line 170.
Information production, -$10.0 million
The committee understands that NIMA is testing and
evaluating COTS applications as part of the USIGS migration and
firmly approves of this approach. However, it also appears that
NIMA continues to do a substantial amount of proprietary
development. Therefore, the committee authorizes a reduction to
this account by $10.0 million and recommends that NIMA decrease
its development of proprietary applications.
Information production: Product generation, -$15.0 million
Information production: Product outsourcing, +$15.0 million
Information production: Integrated product cells, +$5.0 million
The budget request contains $740.6 million for National
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) operations, including $391.5
million for geospatial information production.
The committee is very supportive of NIMA's efforts to
outsource the acquisition of a global feature foundation
database. Because of this, the committee believes that NIMA
should not wait to develop the most manpower intensive of the
production functions--NIMA's standard products--within the
private sector. The committee authorizes an additional $15
million to the geospatial information production request to be
used to begin demonstrations with industry similar to the
process whereby NIMA-qualified contractors produce its feature
foundation data.
The committee has also been impressed with the efficiencies
gained in NIMA's integrated production cells, now called NIMA
Production Cells. NIMA is only projecting an increase of about
five new cells per year over the FYDP. The committee authorizes
an additional $5.0 million over the budget request, to allow
NIMA to acquire more cells in fiscal year 1999.
As indicated above, the committee is interested in seeing
NIMA's efficiencies increase through the use of more modern
technologies and outsourcing. NIMA faces a funding shortfall in
its civilian pay accounts and also must modernize its
infrastructure to effectively produce products in a timely
fashion. NIMA can no longer afford a disproportionate portion
of its budget going to civilian pay and maintenance of legacy
systems. NIMA must move more of its funds to investment. By
outsourcing, NIMA will be able to leverage leading-edge
commercial imaging and mapping technologies and production
capabilities. To further encourage NIMA to address this issue
in the near term, the committee decreases the overall amount
requested in operations and maintenance by $15.0 million. This
decrease may be applied as NIMA judges most appropriate, except
that no reductions should be made to the funds authorized and
appropriated for outsourcing or for NIMA Production Cells, and
no more than half of the decrease may be applied to personnel.
The committee will evaluate any potential impacts this
reduction may have on NIMA as it prepares for conference. NIMA
is encouraged to develop options and impact assessments for
this purpose.
Information Applications & Systems/National Technology Alliance (NTA),
+$5.0 million
The committee continues to believe that NIMA must pursue
commercial alternatives to its legacy systems. The National
Technology Alliance (NTA) has developed an alternative approach
to the Defense Dissemination System (DDS) and the Enhanced
Processing Segment (EPS) in response to the Navy's concern over
high operations and maintenance costs for the DDS system.
Therefore, the committee authorizes $5.0 million within the US
Imagery and Geospatial Information System line for the NTA to
demonstrate this capability with the Navy. The committee
requests a progress report on this activity by January 31,
1999, including an evaluation by the Navy's N6 organization and
NIMA.
Sustaining capabilities, -$14.0 million
The committee does not understand why the Joint Military
Intelligence Program (JMIP) portion of sustaining capabilities
is only reduced by $4.2 million between fiscal years 1998 and
1999. NIMA lost the lease on the old DMA headquarters building
when it consolidated at the Bethesda facility. Also, the
Philadelphia distribution center is being closed as well as
other Washington, DC facilities as described in the
Congressional Justification Book. Further, the committee is
confused as to why this activity has increased its personnel by
65 people (all in the civilian workforce) during this same
period, when NIMA lost about 800 people in fiscal year 1998.
The committee assumes that, with less people in the workforce,
corporate affairs, and management and administration would also
need less personnel and should see a corresponding reduction,
not an increase. Finally, the committee assumes, with the
implementation of the Peoplesoft software that automates many
of the functions of the human resources (HR) area, NIMA would
be able to downsize its HR department. Given all of this, the
committee would expect to see a larger reduction in the O&M of
NIMA's sustaining capabilities segment and, therefore,
recommend a reduction to this account of $14.0 million.
Geospatial database integration and display, no budgetary change
In two studies, NIMA has concluded that the commercial
sector has already developed innovative, high quality,
affordable software products to integrate and display NIMA's
digital geospatial databases. However, the services and defense
agencies continue to invest substantial funds in government-
developed, custom products that cost the government more than
they should, inhibit achieving a common operating picture, and
complicate training. The committee is particularly concerned
that the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is funding a
custom software development program for the Joint Mapping Tool
Kit (JMTK) module of the Global Command and Control System
(GCCS), even though commercial products already exist that can
meet the need and even though NIMA, the functional manager with
expertise in this area, has recommended against this
acquisition strategy.
The committee notes that NIMA is trying again to convince
DISA of the wisdom of a commercial procurement. The committee
recommends that no funds authorized and appropriated to NIMA be
made available for the JMTK module for GCCS until the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence certifies that DISA will procure this module
commercially, or reports to the Congressional intelligence and
defense committees as to why a commercial procurement does not
make sense. The committee requests that the Assistant Secretary
also establish a defense-wide policy for acquiring geospatial
database integration, display, and visualization capabilities.
As part of this policy review, the Assistant Secretary should
examine individual service and defense agency acquisition
programs to ensure that they are cost-effective, and not
duplicative.
In addition, although NIMA is itself utilizing commercial
visualization tools internally, the committee is concerned that
NIMA is not aggressively taking steps to ensure that such
database integration and display capabilities are available for
procurement, or licensing, by its customers, apart from the
JMTK module in GCCS. These capabilities, after all, are a
central part of NIMA's mission and provide a primary means by
which NIMA's customers can understand and exploit the
underlying data and products that NIMA provides. The committee
notes that the recent Defense Science Board study of DoD
mapping urged that NIMA rapidly develop or acquire such
capabilities. The committee recommends that NIMA begin to
acquire the ability to make these products available to its
customers in fiscal year 1999 from within available resources,
and develop a plan to expand and sustain this effort in fiscal
year 2000 and beyond.
Geospatial database production, no budgetary change
The mapping strategy of the Defense Mapping Agency had been
to meet as many of its customers' requirements for detailed,
comprehensive mapping products in as many areas of the world as
possible. Since resources were quite limited, however, this
strategy meant that only a small portion of overall
requirements could be met, and large parts of the world were
not mapped at all or the products that were available were
terribly out of date.
NIMA's strategy is to try to produce a minimal set of
mapping data for the world, or most of it, and enhance that
data as rapidly as need arises. This strategy requires NIMA's
customers to accept less detail and comprehensiveness in some
geographic areas--presumably high priority ones--in exchange
for a higher overall readiness level in much larger geographic
areas.
The key issues facing NIMA as it tries to implement this
strategy are these:
Will NIMA require additional funding up front to create the
foundation level data base, or can it generate the necessary
resources through internal reforms, competitive outsourcing,
process modernization, and shifts in priorities?
Once created, is this data base inexpensive to keep
current, since it is less detailed than the standard products
NIMA produces today and since much of it is automated? In other
words, would the investment needed to create the data base
above NIMA's planned budgets truly be a non-recurring expense?
If additional funding is required, will the Defense
Department agree that the requirement competes favorably with
other defense priorities?
If not, could less than global coverage for the foundation
level data base be acceptable? Alternatively, is it acceptable
for NIMA to achieve the desired level of geographic coverage
for its foundation level data base over a longer period of
time, without causing the data base to become stale?
At what pace will NIMA's customers allow it to cut back on
the production of standard products now to shift resources to
building the foundation level data base? How far can NIMA go in
the near-term in shifting resources to this function, given
that NIMA will have to retain the ability to surge to enhance
the foundation data base to support ongoing operations,
potential major and minor contingencies, and other crises
(since the commercial sector does not yet possess much capacity
for this function)?
How much efficiency will NIMA gain by modernizing its
production processes under the so-called ``USIGS Migration''
program? Can these gains be realized in time to help with the
near-term creation of the foundation level data base?
How much will NIMA be able to reduce the time required to
enhance the foundation data base to support crises, through
equipment and process modernization and through outsourcing?
Will it be enough to support the overall strategy?
The answers to these questions will determine the pace by
which NIMA can competitively procure a foundation level data
base. The committee believes that these issues must be
addressed as part of the preparation of the fiscal year 2000
Future Years Defense Program budget. The committee requests the
DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense assign these issues to
the Intelligence Program Review Group and Expanded Defense
Resources Board, or some other suitable forum, for resolution.
In any event, the committee requests the NIMADirector to
prepare answers to these questions and report to the Congressional
intelligence and defense committees by March 1, 1999.
Endurance unmanned aerial vehicle, No budgetary change
The budget request contained $178.7 million in PE 35205D8Z
for endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, and included $40.6
million for the Dark Star stealthy high altitude endurance
(HAE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), $90.1 million for Global
Hawk HAE UAV, and $48.0 million for the common ground segment.
The committee is aware that Global Hawk has made its first
flight, but that continuing problems with the Dark Star
development has prevented its continued flight test. The
committee is concerned by continuing delays in the Dark Star
testing, reportedly caused by a lack of redundancy of the
aircraft's systems and a continuing series of hardware and
software failures. Further, the committee is aware that there
has been a tendency to describe existing advanced concept
technology demonstration (ACTD) aircraft such as Dark Star and
Global Hawk as systems that may, in part, replace manned
reconnaissance aircraft. Though noting that ACTD aircraft may
form the basis for a future capability, the committee has been
informed by operational users that the new HAE UAVs must
undergo a thorough user evaluation to determine military
utility. Such demonstration aircraft are not, nor were they
designed to be, operational aircraft. Potential users note that
subsequent to evaluation, the ACTD aircraft design must be
modified, as necessary, based on information gathered, to meet
an operational requirement. Based on service requirements, they
then must be procured using the established acquisition
process. Predator, the first ACTD UAV to transition to
production has followed this process. The committee reminds the
Secretary of Defense that the ACTD program is not to be used to
circumvent established acquisition procedures.
The committee strongly supports continued development of
HAE UAVs as potential replacements for manned reconnaissance
aircraft, and recommends $178.7 million only for HAE UAV and
common ground segment development.
Joint signals intelligence avionics family, No budgetary change
The budget request contained $80.4 million in PE 35206D8Z
for the joint signals intelligence avionics family (JSAF).
The committee continues to be concerned by problems with
JSAF developments. While the committee is encouraged by
progress in design of the low band subsystem (LBSS), it is
concerned by schedule delays and cost increases that have
forced reduction of system performance to remain within budget.
Further, the committee remains doubtful that the high band
subsystem (HBSS) development can successfully meet its cost and
performance goals. The committee's concerns are heightened by
the fact that the JSAF development is the only planned upgrade
for future airborne SIGINT reconnaissance. If JSAF fails to
provide the needed capabilities, users ranging from theater
tactical forces to national policy makers will be severely
impacted.
Executive Order 12333 charges the Director of the National
Security Agency (NSA) to conduct ``research and development to
meet the needs of the United States for signals intelligence *
* *''. To ensure proper joint oversight of JSAF development,
the committee recommends the budget request be authorized in PE
35885G, the Defense Cryptologic Program. The committee believes
this will allow the Air Force, as the executive agent for JSAF,
to continue to execute the program, while providing joint
oversight by NSA.
Tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, Funding transfers
The budget request contained $75.6 million in PE 35204A and
$37.2 million in PE 35204D8Z for tactical unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV).
The committee notes that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology recently provided the Congressional
defense and intelligence committees with the Department's plan
to implement legislative direction included in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85)
for reorganization of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance
Office (DARO) and commends the Department for its prompt
response. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85) contained further direction that the
Department of Defense review commercial solutions for the
various UAV requirements. The committee notes that the Navy is
now conducting a three-phase competitive demonstration of
vertical takeoff or landing (VTOL) UAVs to meet the Navy and
Marine Corps VTAL UAV requirements. The committee continues to
support this approach and urges the Navy to continue the
multiple-participant competitive demonstration through the
shipboard phase prior to final selection using the funds
provided.
The committee notes the proposed plan for transfer of DARO
funding included in the fiscal year 1999 request to appropriate
service accounts and recommends the following adjustments:
$49.6 million in PE 35204A for Army tactical UAV, a decrease of
$26.0 million; $18.0 million in PE 35204N for VTOL UAV; $37.2
million in PE 35204N for ongoing common tactical control system
development previously managed by the Joint Program Office; and
$8.0 million in PE 35204M for the Marine Corps' close range
tactical UAV.
Defense airborne reconnaissance program management,-$4.7 million
The budget request contained $15.7 million for Defense
Airborne Reconnaissance Program (DARP) integration and support
in PE 35209D8Z.
The committee notes that, subsequent to development of this
year's budget request, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance
Office (DARO) has been eliminated and its functions absorbed
within the reorganized office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and within the military
services. The committee supports actions that adhere to the
Department's stated objective of maintaining a very small cadre
oversight organizations within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), focused solely on policy level guidance to
ensure reconnaissancesystem interoperability and architectural
compliance. The Department has indicated that it plans to request
reprogramming authority to shift DARO funding for DARP integration and
support from PE 35209D8Z to program elements within the Air Force and
other DoD agencies, as well as Defense-wide operations and maintenance.
The committee supports this transfer of funding, and,
therefore recommends $7.0 million in Operations & Maintenance,
Defense-wide, $1.0 million in PE 35208F, $1.0 million in PE
35208BQ, $1.0 million in 35208G, and $1.0 million in PE 35208L,
a total decrease of $4.7 million.
F-18 reconnaissance capable, -$1.0 million, transfer $42.4 million
The budget request included $43.4 million for developing
the Super Hornet Advanced Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP).
The committee continues to fully support the development of
a podded tactical reconnaissance capability for use by fighter
aircraft and has supported the concept that a podded
reconnaissance capability should not be focused strictly on the
E/F-18 aircraft. The Navy has agreed with this broader concept
and has decided to change the name SHARP to the Shared
Reconnaissance Pod to reflect the change in approach.
Due to this decision, the committee believes the funds
should be more appropriately reflected in the Joint Military
Intelligence Program, within the Navy's Manned Reconnaissance
line. Therefore, the committee recommends $42.4 million in P.E.
35207N for this purpose.
Advanced synthetic aperture radar system improvement program, +$8.0
million
The budget request contained $5.0 million in PE 35207D8Z
for the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS)
Improvement Program (AIP) for the U-2 aircraft. As a result of
the termination of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
sent a letter to the Congress recommending specific
redistribution of Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program
funding in fiscal year 1999. Included in this recommendation
was an additional $2.5 million for AIP research and
development. Further, the Air Force has requested a transfer of
AIP procurement funding into the research and development
account.
The AIP program will dramatically increase the U-2's radar
system with significantly improved synthetic aperture radar
imagery, a highly capable moving target indicator tracking
capability, and integral onboard processing functions.
Unfortunately, the AIP has suffered cost growth and has a
fiscal year 1999 shortfall of over $18.0 million. Some of this
growth is due to contractor overruns and schedule slips caused
by late deliveries of commercial processors. Some of this
growth is due to a decision to postpone certain Global Hawk
High Altitude Unmanned Aerial Vehicle radar developments that
were cost sharing with AIP. This growth has forced the Air
Force to make decisions to slip the AIP, thereby further
increasing costs. In order to deliver the AIP when required,
the Air Force has stated a need to reprogram funding from
procurement to research and development in fiscal year 1999.
However, such a step would have a significant procurement
funding impact in fiscal year 2000.
The committee recommends an authorization of $13.0 million,
an increase of $8.0 million for AIP development.
Electro-optic framing technologies, +$8.0 million
The budget request contained $5.4 million in PE 35207D8Z
for electro-optic (EO) framing technology.
The committee continues to support the state-of-the-art EO
framing with on-chip forward motion compensation (FMC). This
technology is proving itself in operationally deployed systems.
The committee recommends $13.4 million, an increase of $8.0
million in PE 35206N for the purposes of furthering the EO with
on-chip FMC technologies. Specifically, these additional funds
are to be used for continued development of the ultra-high
resolution focal plane array and conformance with JPEG 2000
compression standards. These developments should produce form/
fit operational insertions into currently deployed CA-260
framing cameras. Further, these funds are to be used to develop
infra-red EO framing technologies and image intensified EO
framing sensors with FMC for operational insertion into
existing Air National Guard tactical reconnaissance aircraft
and other aircraft as appropriate.
Unmanned aerial vehicle systems integration laboratory, No budgetary
change
The budget request contained $5.0 million in PE 35204D8Z
for the U.S. Army's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Systems
Integration Laboratory (SIL), and included $3.0 million for
continued development of the Multiple UAV Simulation
Environment (MUSE).
The committee supports the SIL's joint UAV developmental
work and it is concerned that the reorganization of Defense
Airborne Reconnaissance Program will leave the SIL without a
sponsor, thereby possibly losing a valuable joint UAV
integration organization and jeopardizing continued evolution
and improvement of the MUSE tool. While SIL is clearly a
service organization, it provides joint support that may well
be overseen directly by the new Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (DASD) for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.
Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) to
provide the congressional defense and intelligence committees a
plan, which includes a funding profile, for the continued
operation of the SIL, no later than March 31, 1999.
Multi-function self aligned gate technology, +$4.0 million
The budget request contained $32.1 million for continued
development of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) tactical
control system (TCS).
The committee notes that the TCS will provide
interoperability and commonality for mission planning, command
and control, communications, and data dissemination for the
current and future family of tactical and medium altitude
endurance UAVS. The multi-function self aligned gate (MSAG)
technology developed as part of the TCS development has been
successfully demonstrated and is now ready for larger scale
testing. The committee supports MSAG and recommends $36.1
million, an increase of $4.0 million for fabrication and
testing of prototype MSAG active array antennae for TCS UAVS.
Finally, the committee is aware that after the field tests
of the AAA in fiscal year 1998, there are no plans to continue
to develop, produce or test this technology. The committee
believes this technology has the potential for many
applications, including use as highly reliable satellite
communications antennas with no mechanical parts. Therefore,
committee requests the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence) to provide the
defense and intelligence committees a plan for moving forward
with, and possibly fielding, this technology. This plan should
include a spend plan for the fiscal year 1999 funding,
potential users--including National Foreign Intelligence
Program users--and schedule. The committee requests the plan be
provided no later than 31 January 1999.
Integrated imagery planning, No budgetary change
The committee believes that the numerous, but separate,
Department of Defense and Intelligence Community (IC) imagery
programs should be closely coordinated and integrated to
maximize their collective capabilities. Better planning of
visible and multi-spectral imagery, synthetic aperture radar
(SAR), moving target indicator (MTI) radar, and video
collection could improve support to military operations and
save resources.
Moving target indicator (MTI) radar provides a real-time
acquisition and can provide continuous tracking capability, but
has limited abilities for target identification. Electro-optic
(EO) and SAR imagery, in contrast, are excellent for target
classification and identification, but are exploited by humans
and do not provide a continuous tracking capability. It would
appear that the two types of imagery are highly complementary,
and that their individual strengths offset their individual
deficiencies. For example, if proper MTI coverage of an area
could be maintained, EO or SAR imagery, even with significant
latencies, could be used to identify immediate targets without
additional imaging. Logically, the need for repeatedly imaging
those targets with high resolution sensors might be reduced, as
would associated communications requirements. Unfortunately,
these complementary types of imagery have been managed, and
moreover, tasked, in isolation.
DoD is, for example, acquiring a host of unrelated MTI
capable systems. With few exceptions, these systems are not
interoperable. If adequate numbers of systems could be fielded
and their data streams integrated, however, overall performance
could be far greater than the sum of their parts, improving the
chances for continuous and precise tracking. Similarly, the DoD
and IC are operating and acquiring a host of imagery systems.
Although the products may be interoperable in many cases, there
is reason for concern that we have not yet determined the right
relationship and balance between these systems to best combine
their total capabilities.
Finally, every imagery requirements analysis has concluded
that two foot resolution is necessary for imagery analysts
conducting wide-area search. Many sensors do not meet this
standard--particularly those being planned for the unmanned
aerial vehicles. Meeting such requirements, and absorbing the
costs associated, may not be necessary if the various forms of
``imagery'' can be combined into a holistic information effort.
The committee believes that there is a compelling need to
carefully examine ways to integrate imagery and MTI systems to
not only make requirements, cost and capability tradeoffs
across programs, but, moreover, to take fullest advantage of
the totality of all our information capabilities. This will
require better mission planning and tasking, more robust
connectivity between sensors, fusion developments, and analysis
interactions. Further, it will require a removal of stovepiped
management processes.
The committee directs DoD and the IC to conduct a study on
the issues discussed above, using the study of MTI technical
issues and requirements mandated by Congress last year as a
model. The committee expects the technical assessment portion
of the study to be led jointly by ASD(C3I) in coordination and
the Community Management Staff, with appropriate participation
of NIMA, NRO, DARPA, the services, and the joint staff. The
committee directs that this study be completed and the results
conveyed to the congressional defense and intelligence
committees no later than March 1, 1999.
Defense imagery program, Funding transfers
The budget request included $29.4 million in research and
development, defense-wide, line 150 for the Common Imagery
Ground/Surface Station (CIGSS) and $1.9 million for development
of the standards for the Distributed Common Ground Station
(DCGS). The committee believes there is a need for the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to create from within
existing resources a management structure analogous to the
National Security Agency's Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP).
The DCP is responsible for coordinating and providing funding
for advanced research and development of signals intelligence
capabilities that have applicability across all services. This
structure requires close coordination with the services as they
develop, field, and evolve tactical systems, with the service
needs driving the leading edge developments. The committee
believes that, just as the Director, NSA is responsible for
coordinating research and development to meet the tactical
needs of the U.S. Cryptologic System, so should the Director,
NIMA for the U.S. Imagery System.
Therefore, the committee recommends these funding requests
be authorized in research and development, defense-wide, line
138A. Further, the committee directs NIMA to create a
management structure to provide a Defense Imagery Program
within the Defense Imagery andMapping Agency Program of the
Joint Military Intelligence Program. No additional billets are
authorized for this management.
Integrated architecture plan, +$3.0 million
The budget request contained $6.1 million for the Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Integrated Architecture Plan (CIAP).
CIAP has been strongly endorsed by the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence as well as the commanders-in-chief of the nine
unified commands. The CIAP developments have included the
highly successful C4ISR Architecture Framework for the
Department of Defense, the Command C4ISR Architectures for the
regional Commanders in Chief, and the initiation of the C4ISR
Architectures for the Warfighter (CAW) effort at selected
unified commands. The committee believes this later effort
should be extended to all nine unified commands.
The committee believes these architectural developments
will provide a cohesive and more cost effective strategy for
developing and procuring the proper intelligence support
systems for the users. The committee recommends $9.1 million
for the continuation of these efforts and extension of the CAW
to all unified commands.
Joint reserve intelligence program, +$3.0 million
The budget request contained $9.4 million in operations and
maintenance, defense-wide, for continued reserve component man
days for the conduct of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program
(JRIP).
The committee is favorably impressed by the intelligence
production mission load the JRIP has been able to accommodate
in support of the active forces. This has been particularly
true of the JRIP support to the European Joint Analysis Center
(JAC) from the Fort Sheridan, Illinois, Joint Reserve
Intelligence Center. This world-wide support has included
direct personnel support via temporary duty assignments as well
as support from the continental United States via virtual
connectivity whereby reservists can drill with their gaining
units without having to leave their home area. Further, this
support, in excess of 34,000 man days, has provided the active
components with critical intelligence augmentation to conduct
collection operations, process backlogs, and produce targeting
materials, final reports and studies--all without having to use
the presidential selected reserve call-up authority.
The committee believes this program should be expanded and
its benefits maximized to the extent possible. The committee
recommends $12.6 million, an increase of $3 million for these
purposes.
Joint inter-agency task force west, -$3.5 million
The budget request included $4.2 million for operating an
all-source intelligence analysis cell for the Joint Inter-
Agency Task Force (JIATF) West. This cell is focused on
coordinating tactical and operational intelligence support to
U.S. Embassy Country Teams performing counter-drug operations
in the Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia areas.
The committee notes that JIATF-West is attached to PACOM,
but appears to have little command support. Further, the Drug
Enforcement Agency, the Crime and Narcotics Center, and other
JIATFs have indicated to the committee that this cell offers
little value for the funds expended and has not produced any
actionable tactical intelligence or strategic analysis.
Therefore the committee recommends an authorization of $700,000
for this intelligence function, and recommends an evaluation to
terminate it altogether.
Defense support program office training and exercise, -$7.8 million
The budget request contained $7.8 million for Defense
Support Program Office (DSPO) training and exercise support.
The Secretary of Defense has informed the committee that
the DSPO is being abolished and its functions consolidated
within the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The committee
understands that the National Military and Operations Support
Office within the NRO is also charged with, and funded for,
training and exercise support. Therefore, the committee
believes the DSPO training and exercise support funding is no
longer required and recommends no authorization for this
purpose.
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
Tactical exploitation of national capabilities, -$4.6 million
The budget request contained $44.7 million in PE 64766A for
Army tactical exploitation of national capabilities (TENCAP).
The committee notes that the amount requested represents
nearly a $26.0 million increase from the level approved for
fiscal year 1998. The committee is concerned that the Army may
be using the TENCAP program as a means for bypassing the
``normal'' acquisition process allowing it to procure and
operate combat systems associated with space sensors. The
committee is supportive of TENCAP efforts for short-term, high-
pay concepts and initiatives that improve the use of national
space sensors and systems. The committee will not, however,
support TENCAP funded development and production of entire
weapons systems. Therefore, the committee directs that future
TENCAP requests be limited to space exploitation initiatives
and projects that are of short-duration and high payoff.
The committee recommends $40.1 million for the Army's
TENCAP program in fiscal year 1999, a reduction of 4.6 million
in PE 64766A.
Ground based common sensor (GBCS), -$9.7 million
The budget request contained $25.4 million for the GBCS-
Light system, of which $1.5 million is for the Common Module
Electronics Intelligence System (CMES).
The committee notes that $1.5 million for CMES procurement
is requested twice. Consequently, the committee recommends a
reduction of $1.5 million.
Additionally, the committee notes that the GBCS-L system
has had numerous technical difficulties and experienced a
fielding delay as a result of a two-year slip in initial
operational test and evaluation (IOT&E). This delay has
resulted in the Department twice having used GBCS as a source
of funds for reprogramming requests.
Just as the committee was marking up the fiscal year 1999
request, it learned that, due to continuing integration
problems, the GBCS-L IOT&E will not be conducted again in
fiscal year 1998. This third and latest slip is very disturbing
and signals to the committee that there are more problems with
this system than the Army is admitting. As a result of the
program's past and current performance, it believes that all of
the requested funding will not be executable in fiscal year
1999 and it recommends a reduction of $9.7 million for GBCS-L
hardware. Finally, the committee notes that the Department of
Defense has requested nearly $500 million for this relatively
small and low complexity program. This committee finds this
cost excessive for the capability required, and therefore
requests the Secretary of Defense to conduct an Inspector
General audit of the GBCS program; its costs, its technical
approach, and management.
All source analysis system (ASAS), +$2.0 million
The budget request contained $28.1 million in PE 64321A for
the ASAS intelligence support system.
The committee recommends $30.1 million, an increase of $2.0
million in PE 64321A, to continue the development of situation
display fusion algorithms, to transfer these algorithms to the
other service intelligence support systems, and to achieve ASAS
Block II interoperability with the Defense Intelligence
Agency's Modernized Integrated Data Base.
Distributed surveillance system, +$6.7 million
The budget request contained $42.0 million in PE 64784N for
advanced deployable system (ADS) engineering and manufacturing
development.
The committee recommends $48.7 million, including an
increase of $6.7 million to continue the planned introduction
of automation and data fusion capability for the ADS
demonstration system.
Navy joint surveillance and target attack radar system (JSTARS), +$3.0
million
The budget request included no funding for completing the
developments for integrating a capability on U.S. Navy surface
vessels to receive processed JSTARS MTI data over UHF satellite
communications and Link 16.
In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1998, Congress provided $5.0 million for the Navy to begin
integrating the Link 16 data into the Joint Maritime Command
and Control System (JMCIS) and the Global Command and Control
System (GCCS). The committee has learned that the Link 16
integration into GCCS will satisfy many DoD data dissemination
requirements, including the JSTARS. Therefore, the committee
recommends an additional $3 million for these purposes within
the Navy's JMCIS line.
Also, as noted elsewhere in this report, the committee is
convinced that the Navy will require access to the full range
of JSTARS' capabilities to support Navy targeting requirements.
Such full access will require a wide-band data link capability
between the aircraft and the surface vessels. The wide-band
Common Data Link (CDL) is DoD's standard, high-rate data link
that will be installed on nearly thirty Navy aircraft carriers,
amphibious, and command ships early in the next decade. The
committee believes that it would be illogical for the Navy to
install another expensive, unique data link such as the low
data rate Secure Common Data Link (SCDL), currently employed on
the JSTARS, on its major combatants. Instead, the committee
believes it is necessary to add as soon as possible a data
broadcast capability based on the CDL standard to the JSTARS
fleet. Also as noted elsewhere, the Navy clearly needs a CDL
capability on the P-3 fleet to take full advantage of the range
of radar, SIGINT, and imagery capabilities planned or
programmed for the various elements of that fleet.
If the Navy's requirement for CDL-compatible wide-band
airborne data links turns out to be the recently demonstrated
Tactical CDL (TCDL), the committee believes it would be wise
for the Navy to consider modifying its currently planned CDL
installations, to be compatible with both the CDL and TCDL,
before or as they are installed. The committee will be
reluctant to approve purchase of TCDL ground stations without
first receiving a solid Navy commitment to modify all of its
shipboard CDL systems to be compatible with both.
Based on the above, the committee directs the Secretary of
the Navy to report to the congressional defense and
intelligence committees, by March 1, 1999, on the Navy's
requirements and plans for CDL/TCDL-compatible data links.
Fleet air reconnaissance, -$5.2 million
The budget request contained $5.2 million for ES-3A
modification kits.
The Navy has informed the committee that it intends to
terminate the ES-3 program in fiscal year 2000. Based on this
decision, the committee sees no need for modifying these
aircraft prior to their removal from the fleet. The committee,
therefore, recommends no funding for these modifications.
Marine Corps electronic warfare support system, Fence $16.4 million
The budget request contained $16.4 million for acquiring
two Marine Corps Electronic Warfare Support Systems (MEWSS).
The committee directs that none of the authorized and
appropriated funding be obligated or expended until completion
of a successful initial operational test and evaluation
(IOT&E). The committee understands the development and IOT&E of
the MEWSS is directly tied to the Army' Ground-Based Common
Sensor (GBCS) system. The committee believes, however, that
IOT&E success or failure, and, therefore, subsequent
procurement decisions, should be based on the individual system
merits based on their operational concepts. Therefore, the
committee does not see a specific need to make a successful
IOT&E of MEWSS contingent on a successful IOT&E of GBCS.
Marine Corps tactical intelligence equipment, +$1.0 million
The budget request contained no funds for purchasing and
evaluating commercial imagery display tools, or modern printer
technologies.
The committee is aware of the highly successful Marine
Corps use of the Remote Replication System (RRS). The RRS
allows the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to deploy with
automated equipment that provides the capability to ``reach
back'' to National Imagery and Mapping Agency data bases and
``pull forward'' data in order to construct mapping and imagery
products. The committee believes this concept has the potential
to reduce drastically the paper products with which the MEF
currently deploys. Despite the success of the RRS concept,
however, the committee understands that there has been little
attention paid to providing modern display and printing
technologies. Therefore, the committee recommends $1.0 million
in procurement, Marine Corps, for purchasing and evaluating
commercial imagery manipulation tools, state-of-the-art display
devices, and high quality large format printers for field use.
Air Force/NRO partnership, -$2.6 million
The budget request contained $17.6 million in research and
development, Air Force, for the joint Air Force, National
Reconnaissance Office, and Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency advanced space technology demonstrator.
The partnership funding for this demonstration is an equal
share of one third each. The fiscal year 1999 Air Force request
exceeds its share. Therefore, the committee recommends an
authorization of $15 million, or a reduction of $2.6 million.
Joint tactical terminal, +$8.0 million
The budget request contained $6.5 million in other
procurement, Army, and $4.2 million in other procurement, Air
Force, for the Joint Tactical Terminal intelligence broadcast
transceivers.
These radios are an integral part of the Integrated
Broadcast Service that the committee fully supports. The
committee is concerned that, because of contract protests that
have resulted in delays in final contract award, the fielding
of these radios has slipped, leaving operational users without
the ability to receive tactical intelligence data broadcasts.
In order to correct this problem, the committee recommends
$11.5 million and $7.2 million, an increase of $5.0 million for
the Army and $3.0 million for the Air Force, respectively, for
accelerating the purchase and fielding of these radios.
``Senior Scout,'' No budgetary change
The budget request contained $14.3 million in operations
and maintenance, Air National Guard, partially for the
continued operation of the Senior Scout tactical reconnaissance
system. Senior Scout is a C-130-employed, roll-on/roll-off,
reconnaissance capability operated by the Air National Guard.
It provides an airborne reconnaissance collection capability
that is complementary to other airborne collection systems
operated by the active component.
The committee perceives a lack of direction and support for
Senior Scout, noting that on several occasions, the Air Force
has nearly terminated the program, that the system has not been
well supported in terms of upgrades or sensor improvements, and
that it has certainly not maintained technological pace with
the RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft or other similar reconnaissance
platforms. Consequently, the committee does not believe
continuing the Senior Scout to be either cost or mission
effective. The committee believes, however, that the Air
National Guard linguists currently operating the Senior Scout
are vital to the overall nationalreconnaissance effort. The
committee perceives a critical need to retain these Guard
reconnaissance personnel and training them on more modern equipment.
In fiscal year 1997, Congress authorized and appropriated
funding for two additional RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft. The
committee has learned that the Air Force is having difficulty
fully manning these aircraft. The committee believes that since
the Guard personnel are currently tasked to supplement active
component RC-135 operations, providing at least one of these
aircraft on a rotational basis to the Air National Guard would
both resolve the manpower problem and take greater advantage of
an available resource.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide the congressional defense and intelligence
committees a plan for phasing out the Senior Scout
reconnaissance system and replacing it with an RC-135
alternative no later than October 1, 1999.
``Pacer Coin,'' -$2.4 million
The budget request contained $2.4 million in aircraft
spares and repair parts for the transfer of mission equipment
from retiring Pacer Coin aircraft to the non-dedicated, follow-
on C-130 reconnaissance aircraft. The committee notes that a
fiscal year 1998 reprogramming action stated that all funds for
the C-130 follow-on program were included in that request.
Furthermore, the committee does not agree that $2.4 million
of procurement funding is required to transfer equipment from
one aircraft to another. Therefore, the committee recommends no
funding for this purpose.
Joint surveillance and target attack system, Fence $40.2 million
The budget request included $123.8 million in research and
development for the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack System
(JSTARS), including $5.6 million for studies and miscellaneous
efforts. The committee recommends a total of $118.2 million for
these purposes.
The committee is concerned by the extraordinary costs of
the JSTARS program. The committee understands each aircraft
must undergo a forty-one month, $110 million, refurbishment
effort to restore the old 707-based airframes to flying
condition before the aircraft begins its modification to JSTARS
configuration. This is more than triple what the aircraft cost
new, and is more expensive than purchasing a new 757 aircraft.
Further, current projections show that the JSTARS latest
improvement program will cost the U.S. taxpayer well in excess
of a billion dollars to upgrade only a limited number of the
thirteen JSTARS aircraft. While the committee may fully support
necessary upgrades to this important system, there needs to be
a significant effort to curb costs.
Therefore, the committee requests the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide a report of audit on the costs of the JSTARS
aircraft: the basic airframe costs, the modification costs, and
the costs of the upgrade programs. This audit should be
provided to the defense and intelligence committees no later
than 31 March 1999.
Finally, the committee has been asked in the President's
budget request to authorize the full request of the radar
technology improvement program. The Department of Defense has
not agreed to brief Members of the committee on all aspects of
this upgrade, or even on how the requested funding will be
spent. Therefore, the committee directs that no funding for the
RTIP upgrade be obligated or expended until the committee is
fully briefed on this program.
Special operations intelligence systems, +$5.0 million
The budget request contained $1.8 million in PE 1160405BB
for the special operations systems development.
The committee notes that the special operations forces
intelligence vehicle (SOF IV) is an evolutionary ongoing effort
that requires additional funding to complete development. The
committee recommends $6.8 million, an increase of $5.0 million
for SOF IV in PE 1160405BB.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill as Reported
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999
Title I: Intelligence activities
Section 101--Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists those elements of the United States
Government for whose intelligence and intelligence-related
activities the Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal year
1999.
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has been listed
in section 101 of past Intelligence Authorization Acts. The
DEA, however, does not receive appropriations authorized by
this legislation. Thus, the committee does not include DEA in
section 101.
The fact that DEA is no longer included, however, should
not be understood by either the DEA or any element of the
intelligence community as a reason to reduce the level of
cooperation that currently exists between the DEA and the
various elements of the community. The committee expects and
demands a continuation of the very beneficial working
relationship that has developed between the community and the
DEA. The committee recognizes the efficacy of the DEA's
partnership with the intelligence community on the extremely
serious national security issue of international drug
trafficking. It is the committee's expectation, in spite of the
removal of the DEA from section 101 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, that this partnership
will remain solid and continue to develop in the best interests
of the people of the United States.
The committee similarly insists upon a continuation of the
level of close communication between the committee and the DEA,
with respect to notification of developments, successes,
failures, or compromises of the foreign counternarcotics
activities of the United States. The committee will not
countenance any attenuation of its ability to ensure that the
intelligence community is working together with law
enforcement, where necessary and appropriate, to advance our
national security interests.
Section 102--Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 incorporates by reference the classified
Schedule of Authorizations. That schedule sets forth the
specific amounts authorized to be appropriated for specific
intelligence and intelligence-related activities and personnel
ceilings for fiscal year 1999 for those United States
government elements listed in section 101. The details of the
Schedule are explained in the classified annex to this report.
The Schedule of Authorizations correlates to the President's
budget request, which was submitted to Congress, and remains,
in classified form.
Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central
Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), in fiscal year 1999, to exceed
the personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the
intelligence community under section 102 by an amount not to
exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings otherwise
applicable under section 102. The Director may exercise this
authority only when necessary to the performance of important
intelligence functions. Any exercise of this authority must be
reported to the two intelligence committees of the Congress.
The committee emphasizes that the authority conferred by
section 103 is not intended to permit the wholesale raising of
personnel strength in any intelligence component. Rather, the
section provides the Director of Central Intelligence with
flexibility to adjust personnel levels temporarily for
contingencies, and for overages caused by an imbalance between
hiring of new employees and attrition of current employees. The
committee does not expect the Director of Central Intelligence
to allow heads of intelligence components to plan to exceed
levels set in the Schedule of Authorizations, except for the
satisfaction of clearly identified hiring needs that are
consistent with the authorization of personnel strengths in
this legislation. In no case is this authority to be used to
provide for positions otherwise denied by Congress.
Section 104--Community management account
Section 104 details the amount and composition of the
Community Management Account (CMA) of the Director of Central
Intelligence.
Subsection (a) of section 104 authorizes appropriations in
the amount of $139,123,000 for fiscal year 1999 for the
staffing and administration of various components under the
CMA. Subsection (a) also authorizes funds identified for the
Advanced Research and Development Committee and the
Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program to remain
available for two years.
Subsection (b) authorizes a total of 283 full-time
personnel for elements within the CMA for fiscal year 1999 and
provides that such personnel may be permanent employees of the
CMA element or detailed from other elements of the United
States Government.
Subsection (c) explicitly authorizes the classified portion
of the CMA.
Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed on a
reimbursable basis, with certain exceptions.
Subsection (e) authorizes $27,000,000 of the amount
authorized for the CMA under subsection (a) to be made
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) in
Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Subsection (e) requires the Director
of Central Intelligence to transfer the $27,000,000 to the
Department of Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the
authority of the Attorney General, and subject to section
103(d)(1) of the National Security Act.
Subsection (f) earmarks funds that are allocated for the
CMA under subsection (a) and authorizes those funds to be made
immediately available to the Department of State for the
express purpose of supporting intelligence community
requirements related to the security of overseas facilities.
This subsection authorizes a one-time-only immediate transfer
of funds by the Director of Central Intelligence from the CMA's
Center for Security Evaluation to the Department of State to
ensure that architectural and engineering services related to
several overseas locations in fiscal year 1999 can begin
immediately. These funds shall only be available for the same
purposes, and subject to the same terms and conditions, as the
funds in the appropriation accounts to which these funds will
be transferred.
The committee understands that an agreement among the
departments or agencies affected has been reached with respect
to the specific amounts and locations involved.
Title II: Central Intelligence Agency retirement and disability system
Section 201--Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$201,500,000 for fiscal year 1999 for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
Title III: General provisions
Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law
Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by this
Act for salary, pay, retirement and other benefits for federal
employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental
amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation
or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302--Restriction on conduct of intelligence
activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations within the Act does not constitute authority for
the conduct of any intelligence activity that is precluded by
the Constitution or other laws of the United States.
Section 303--Extension of application of sanctions laws to
intelligence activities
Section 303 amends section 905 of the National Security Act
of 1947, which authorizes the President to delay the imposition
of an economic, cultural, diplomatic, or other sanction upon a
foreign government based on his determination that proceeding
with such sanction could compromise an ongoing criminal
investigation or an intelligence source or method. Section 905
was first enacted as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1996. This authority has been extended every
year since for one year intervals.
Section 303 extends this authority until January 6, 2000.
The committee finds that there is a continuing need for this
authority because the immediate imposition of sanctions,
without some delay, could, in particular cases, seriously
jeopardize a criminal investigation or sources and methods of
intelligence collection.
The committee reaffirms, without restating here, the
position asserted in its report accompanying the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Rpt. No. 105-135, part
I), with respect to this section.
Section 304--Sense of Congress regarding intelligence
community contracting
Section 304 expresses the sense of Congress that the DCI
should continue to direct elements of the intelligence
community to award contracts in a manner that would maximize
the procurement of products produced in the United States, when
such action is compatible with the national security interests
of the United States, consistent with operational and security
concerns, and fiscally sound.
Title IV: Central Intelligence Agency
Section 401--Extension of the CIA Voluntary Separation of
Pay Act provisions
Section 401 amends section 2(f) of the Central Intelligence
Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (P.L. 103-36)(50 U.S.C.
Sec. 403-4 note) to extend the Agency's authority to offer
``early-out'' incentives until September 30, 2001. Without this
amendment, the Agency's authority to offer such incentives
would expire on September 30, 1999.
Although, CIA's ``early out'' incentive has been an
effective workforce reduction tool, the Agency must continue to
address skills mix issues, and ensure that personnel reductions
are not undertaken simply for the sake of reduction. The net
impact of the six CIA early-out exercises thus far, along with
normal attrition and reduced hiring, has been a significant
drop in the Agency's on-duty strength since the separation
incentive program began in fiscal year 1993. The committee is
concerned that such reductions could result in gaps of
coverage, especially in critical areas.
The committee acknowledges that the CIA has worked hard
over the past decade to streamline and refocus its workforce to
address critical, cutting-edge national security issues. The
Agency should be commended for its efforts to reengineer its
business processes, hire personnel with new and vital skills,
expand the capabilities and experiences within the Agency
workforce, and acquire new technologies to meet the demands of
today's collection requirements.
Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay authority should only be
used for specific, targeted populations and is intended to help
the CIA achieve its skill mix goals without resorting to
involuntary separations in certain occupational categories.
The committee believes that without this continued
authority separation rates would decline. This would limit the
Agency's ability to keep pace with rapidly expanding
technologies and the dynamic geopolitical realities that we
face. The ability to adapt to such dynamic changes is central
to the Agency's mission.
Section 402--Enhanced protective authority for CIA
personnel and family members
Section 402 of the Act amends section 5(a)(4) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (``CIA Act''). This
provision will enable the Agency to use firearms to protect
current and former Agency personnel and their immediate
families, as well as defectors and their immediate families,
who are in the United States. This authority is granted for
those situations when the Director of Central Intelligence
determines such protection is necessary for the performance of
the authorized functions of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Current Section 5(a)(4) of the CIA Act permits the CIA to
use firearms within the United States to protect only certain
categories of individuals limited to Agency personnel,
defectors, and the families of defectors, and other persons in
the United States under Agency auspices. This provision does
not limit or amend any aspect of this authority.
Protection may sometimes be appropriate for former Agency
personnel because the distinction between former and current
CIA personnel will be of little consequence to terrorists
seeking to harm CIA. In addition, prudence dictates that if
former or current CIA personnel are threatened with harm, the
protection provided to them should, in appropriate
circumstances, be extended to their immediate families as well.
The committee intends that the authority provided by this
amendment will be used only when the Director determines that
there are specific and credible threats to the protectees while
in the United States and that those threats arise from the
protectee's affiliation with the CIA. The committee expects
that the Director will advise the intelligence committees when
this authority is exercised.
Similarly, the committee believes the Agency must advise
the Attorney General when such specific and credible threats
against a protected individual occurs. In this way, the United
States government's prosecutorial rights that could result from
such criminal activity will be protected.
The committee does not anticipate that the authority
provided by section 402 will be used to provide protectees with
armed security protection when threatened with harm that arises
for reasons unrelated to an individual's current or former
affiliation with CIA (e.g., domestic violence or general threat
of criminal violence in the area of a CIA employee's residence
in the United States).
In the wake of the 1993 assassination of CIA employees, the
CIA discussed the protection issue with local jurisdictions.
These local law enforcement agencies indicated that they did
not have the resources, training, or charter to provide such
protection. More recently during and after the trial of Mir
Aimal Kasi, the need for this enhanced authority was
established. The immediate families of those killed or injured
provided a target for threats, causing additional anguish for
them.
The committee notes that this additional grant of
protective authority is not without precedent. The United
States Marshals Service (USMS) provides protection to the
families of certain personnel under certain circumstances. The
USMS has the authority to provide protection to any USMS
employee, officer, or witness or anyone involved in judicial
process who is deemed by the USMS Director to be under threat.
Such examples include federal judges, prosecutors, witnesses,
jurors, and any of their family members against whom a threat
has been directed.
The committee understands that the CIA is a target or
recipient of a large volume of unsolicited calls, letters, and
visits by potentially hostile individuals. Many of these
contacts are the work of disturbed individuals, some of whom
make threats and then ``close the gap'', actually appearing at
the CIA Headquarters compound (or other Agency facilities).
Implicit in this kind of potential threat is the chance that
hostile or aggressive behavior may be directed against the
families of CIA personnel.
The amendment made by section 402 would not extend or
expand, in any way, the carefully limited law enforcement
authority and jurisdiction provided to the Agency in section 15
of the CIA Act. Simply put, it authorizes the Agency to protect
Agency employees, current and former, and their families, in
the United States, in the same manner as they are authorized to
protect defectors in the United States.
Section 403--Technical corrections
Section 403 makes technical corrections to section 5(a)(1)
and section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Act of
1949 and section 201(c) of the CIA Retirement Act. The cross-
reference in section 5(a)(1) of the CIA Act to subparagraphs
(B) and (C) of section 102(a)(2) of the National Security Act
is no longer current or accurate, and should cite instead to
subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) of section 102. Section 805(a) of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L.
No. 104-293) changed what had been sections 102(a)(2) (B) and
(C) of the National Security Act to sections 102(a)(2) and
(a)(3) of that Act. Similarly, the cross-references in section
5(a)(1) and section 6 of the CIA Act to ``subsection (c)(5) of
section 103'' and to ``section 103(c)(5) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5))'', respectively,
are no longer current or accurate. The cross-reference in
section 201(c) of the CIA Retirement Act to that same provision
of the National Security Act is also outdated. Section
807(a)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 changed what had been section 103(c)(5) of the National
Security Act (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)) to section 103(c)(6) (50
U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6)). Section 401 of the present legislation
simply updates the cross-references in section 5(a)(1) and
section 6 of the CIA Act and section 201(c) of the CIA
Retirement Act to the pertinent provision of the National
Security Act.
Title V: Department of Defense
Section 501-- Extension of authority to engage in
commercial activities as security for intelligence
collection activities
Section 501 amends section 431(a) of title 10 to continue
current Department of Defense authority to engage in commercial
activities as security for intelligence collection activities
beyond December 31, 1999, which is the date on which the
current statutory authorization expires. The Committee has
extended this provision for an additional three years through
and until December 31, 2002.
Committee Position
On April 29, 1998, in open session, a quorum being present,
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, by a recorded
vote of 12 ayes to 0 noes, approved the bill, H.R. 3694, as
amended by an amendment in the nature of a substitute. By that
vote, the committee ordered the bill, as amended, reported
favorably to the House. On that vote, the Members present
recorded their votes as follows:
Mr. Goss (Chairman)--aye; Mr. Shuster--aye; Mr. McCollum--
aye; Mr. Castle--aye; Mr. Boehlert--aye; Mr. Bass--aye; Mr.
Gibbons--aye; Mr. Dicks--aye; Mr. Skaggs--aye; Ms. Harman--aye;
Mr. Skelton--aye; Mr. Bishop--aye.
Findings and Recommendations of the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight
With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the House
of Representatives, the committee has not received a report
from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
pertaining to the subject of this bill.
Oversight Findings
With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the committee held seven full-
committee hearings, as well as six full-committee briefings, on
the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R. 3694. Testimony
was taken from the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, the Deputy Directors for Operations and
Intelligence, numerous program managers, and various other
knowledgeable witnesses on the activities and plans of the
intelligence community covered by the provisions and
authorizations, both classified and unclassified, of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. The bill,
as reported by the committee, reflects conclusions reached by
the committee in light of that oversight activity.
Fiscal Year Cost Projections
The committee has attempted, pursuant to clause 7(a) of
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, to
ascertain the outlays that will occur in fiscal year 1999 and
the five years following if the amounts authorized are
appropriated. These estimates are contained in the classified
annex and are in accordance with those of the executive branch.
Congressional Budget Office Estimates
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(B) and (C) of rule XI of
the Rules of the House of Representatives, and pursuant to
sections 308 and 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974,
the committee submits the following estimate prepared by the
Congressional Budget Office:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, May 5, 1998.
Hon. Porter J. Goss,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3694, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Dawn Sauter.
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neill, Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 3694--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999
Summary: H.R. 3694 would authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 1999 for intelligence activities of the United
States government, the Community Management Account, and the
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
(CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that enacting
H.R. 3694 would result in additional spending of $139 million
over the 1999-2003 period, assuming appropriation of the
authorized amounts. CBO believes that section 401 of the bill,
which would extend the authority of the CIA to offer incentive
payments to employees who voluntarily retire or resign, would
increase direct spending by $1 million or more in at least one
year during the 2000-2003 period. However, CBO cannot give a
precise estimate of the increase in spending because data to
support a cost estimate are classified. Because the bill would
raise direct spending, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply.
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) excludes
from application of the act legislative provisions that are
necessary for the national security. CBO has determined that
all of the provisions of this bill either fit within that
exclusion or do not contain intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined by UMRA.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of the unclassified portions of H.R. 3694 is
shown in the following table. CBO is unable to obtain the
necessary information to estimate the costs for the entire bill
because parts are classified at a level above clearances held
by CBO employees. The costs of this legislation fall within
budget function 050 (national defense).
The bill would authorize appropriations of $139 million for
the Community Management Account. In addition, the bill would
authorize $202 million for CIARDS to cover retirement costs
attributable to military service and various unfunded
liabilities. The payment to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and
the authorization under this bill would be the same as assumed
in the CBO baseline.
CBO believes that section 401 of the bill would increase
direct spending by $1 million or more in at least one year
during the 2000-2003 period. Section 401 would extend the
authority of the CIA to offer incentive payments to employees
who voluntarily retire or resign. Under current law this
authority expires on September 30, 1999. Section 401 would
extend this authority starting in fiscal year 2000 until
September 30, 2001. This extension would induce some employees
to retire earlier than under current law, thereby increasing
federal outlays for retirement benefits. CBO cannot give a
precise estimate of the increase in spending because data to
support a cost estimate are classified.
[By fiscal year, in millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Spending under current law for the community management
account:
Budget authority...................................... 94 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated outlays..................................... 104 36 7 2 0 0
Proposed changes:
Authorization level................................... 0 139 0 0 0 0
Estimated outlays..................................... 0 86 42 8 3 0
Spending under H.R. 3694 for the community management
account:
Authorization level \1\............................... 94 139 0 0 0 0
Estimated outlays..................................... 104 122 49 10 3 0
CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING
Estimated budget authority................................ 0 0 (\2\) (\2\) (\2\) (\2\)
Estimated outlays......................................... 0 0 (\2\) (\2\) (\2\) (\2\)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 1998 level is the amount appropriated for that year.
\2\ CBO believes that H.R. 3694 would increase direct spending by $1 million or more in at least one year over
the 2000-2003 period. However, CBO cannot give a precise estimate because data to support a cost estimate are
classified.
For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R. 3694 will be enacted by October 1, 1998, and that the
full amounts authorized will be appropriated for fiscal year 1999.
Outlays are estimated according to historical spending patterns for
intelligence programs.
Pay-as-you-go considerations: Section 401 of the bill would
affect direct spending, and therefore the bill would be subject
to pay-as-you-go procedures. The estimated pay-as-you-go impact
would be $1 million or more in at least one year over the 2000-
2003 period.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) excludes from application of
the act legislative provisions that are necessary for the
national security. CBO has determined that all of the
provisions of this bill either fit within that exclusion or do
not contain intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined by UMRA.
Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Dawn Sauter; Impact on
State, local and tribal governments: Teri Gullo; Impact on the
private sector: Bill Thomas.
Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
Committee Cost Estimates
The committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional
Budget Office.
Specific Constitutional Authority for Congressional Enactment of This
Legislation
The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States government are carried out to support the
national security interests of the United States, to support
and assist the armed forces of the United States, and to
support the President in the execution of the foreign policy of
the United States. Article I, section 8, of the Constitution of
the United States provides, in pertinent part, that ``Congress
shall have power * * * to pay the debts and provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the United States; * * *
``; ``to raise and support Armies, * * * ``; ``to provide and
maintain a Navy; * * * `` and ``to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution * * * all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.''
Therefore, pursuant to such authority, Congress is empowered to
enact this legislation.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the
bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed
to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is
printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed
is shown in roman):
SECTION 905 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
application
Sec. 905. This title shall cease to be effective on [January
6, 1999] January 6, 2000.
----------
SECTION 2 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY
ACT
SEC. 2. SEPARATION PAY.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f) Termination.--No amount shall be payable under this
section based on any separation occurring after [September 30,
1999] September 30, 2001.
* * * * * * *
----------
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
general authorities
Sec. 5. (a) In the performance of its functions, the Central
Intelligence Agency is authorized to--
(1) Transfer to and receive from other Government
agencies such sums as may be approved by the Office of
Management and Budget, for the performance of any of
the functions or activities authorized under
[subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section 102(a)(2)]
paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections
[(c)(5)] (c)(6) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a)
and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-
3(c)(6), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405), and any other
Government agency is authorized to transfer to or
receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any
provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers
between appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency
in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for
the purposes and under the authority of this Actwithout
regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred;
* * * * * * *
(4) Authorize personnel designated by the Director to
carry firearms to the extent necessary for the
performance of the Agency's authorized functions,
except that, within the United States, such authority
shall be limited to the purposes of protection of
classified materials and information, the training of
Agency personnel and other authorized persons in the
use of firearms, the protection of Agency installations
and property, [and the protection of Agency personnel
and of defectors, their families] and the protection of
current and former Agency personnel and their immediate
families, and defectors and their immediate families,
and other persons in the United States under Agency
auspices;
* * * * * * *
Sec. 6. In the interests of the security of the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States and in order
further to implement section 103[(c)(5)] (c)(6) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3[(c)(5)] (c)(6)) that the
Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure, the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of
sections 1 and 2, chapter 795 of the Act of August 28, 1935 (49
Stat. 956, 957; 5 U.S.C. 654), and the provisions of any other
laws which require the publication or disclosure of the
organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or
numbers of personnel employed by the Agency: Provided, That in
furtherance of this section, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget shall make no reports to the Congress in
connection with the Agency under section 607, title VI, chapter
212 of the Act of June 30, 1945, as amended (5 U.S.C. 947(b)).
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 201 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT
SEC. 201. THE CIARDS SYSTEM.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Finality of Decisions of DCI.--In the interests of the
security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United
States and in order further to implement section 103[(c)(5)]
(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
3[(c)(5)] (c)(6)) that the Director of Central Intelligence
shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure, and notwithstanding the
provisions of chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code, or any
other provision of law (except section 305(b) of this Act), any
determination by the Director authorized by this Act shall be
final and conclusive and shall not be subject to review by any
court.
----------
SECTION 413 OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
Sec. 431. Authority to engage in commercial activities as security for
intelligence collection activities
(a) Authority.--The Secretary of Defense, subject to the
provisions of this subchapter, may authorize the conduct of
those commercial activities necessary to provide security for
authorized intelligence collection activities abroad undertaken
by the Department of Defense. No commercial activity may be
initiated pursuant to this subchapter after [December 31, 1998]
December 31, 2001.
* * * * * * *