[House Report 105-375]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
105th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 105-375
_______________________________________________________________________
IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS ACT OF 1997
_______
November 4, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Gilman, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted
the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 2709]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on International Relations, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 2709) to impose certain sanctions on
foreign persons who transfer items contributing to Iran's
efforts to acquire, develop, or produce ballistic missiles,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions
Act of 1997''.
SEC. 2. REPORTS ON MISSILE PROLIFERATION TO IRAN.
(a) Reports.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the President
shall, at the times specified in subsection (b), submit to the
Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report
identifying every foreign person with respect to whom there is credible
information indicating that that person, on or after August 8, 1995--
(1)(A) transferred items on the MTCR Annex, or items that the
United States proposes for addition to the MTCR Annex, that
contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or produce
ballistic missiles, or
(B) provided technical assistance or facilities which the
President deems to be of concern because of their direct
contribution to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or produce
ballistic missiles; or
(2)(A) attempted to transfer items on the MTCR Annex, or
items that the United States proposes for addition to the MTCR
Annex, that would have contributed to Iran's efforts to
acquire, develop, or produce ballistic missiles, or
(B) attempted to provide technical assistance or facilities
which the President deems to be of concern because of their
direct contribution to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or
produce ballistic missiles.
(b) Timing of Reports.--The reports under subsection (a) shall be
submitted not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, not later than 180 days after such date of enactment, not
later than 1 year after such date of enactment, and not later than the
end of each 1-year period thereafter.
(c) Exceptions for Persons Previously Identified, Sanctioned, or
Subject of Waiver.--Any foreign person who--
(1) was identified in a previous report submitted under
subsection (a) on account of a particular transfer,
transaction, or attempt,
(2) has engaged in a transfer or transaction that was the
basis for the imposition of sanctions with respect to that
person under section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act or
section 1604 of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of
1992, or
(3) may have engaged in a transfer or transaction, or made an
attempt, that was the subject of a waiver under section 4,
is not required to be identified on account of that same transfer,
transaction, or attempt in any report submitted thereafter under this
section.
SEC. 3. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.
(a) Requirement To Impose Sanctions.--
(1) Requirement to impose sanctions.--The sanctions described
in subsection (b) shall be imposed on--
(A) any foreign person identified under subsection
(a)(1) of section 2 in a report submitted under that
section, and
(B) any foreign person identified under subsection
(a)(2) of section 2 in a report submitted under that
section, if that person has been identified in that
report or a previous report as having made at least 1
other attempt described in subsection (a)(2) of that
section.
(2) Effective date of sanctions.--The sanctions shall be
effective--
(A) 30 days after the report triggering the sanction
is submitted, if the report is submitted on or before
the date required by section 2(b);
(B) 30 days after the date required by section 2(b)
for submitting the report, if the report triggering the
sanction is submitted within 30 days after that date;
and
(C) on the date that the report triggering the
sanction is submitted, if that report is submitted more
than 30 days after the date required by section 2(b).
(b) Description of Sanctions.--The sanctions referred to in
subsection (a) that are to be imposed on a foreign person described in
that subsection are the following:
(1) Arms export sanction.--For a period of not less than 2
years, the United States Government shall not sell to that
person any item on the United States Munitions List as in
effect on August 8, 1995, and shall terminate sales to that
person of any defense articles, defense services, or design and
construction services under the Arms Export Control Act.
(2) Dual use sanction.--For a period of not less than 2
years, the authorities of section 6 of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit the export
to that person of any goods or technology on the control list
established under section 5(c)(1) of that Act.
(3) United states assistance.--For a period of not less than
2 years, the United States Government shall not provide any
assistance in the form of grants, loans, credits, guarantees,
or otherwise, to that person.
SEC. 4. WAIVER ON BASIS OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--The President may waive the imposition of any
sanction that would otherwise be required under section 3 on any
foreign person 15 days after the President determines and reports to
the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
that, on the basis of information provided by that person, or otherwise
obtained by the President, the President is persuaded that the person
did not, on or after August 8, 1995--
(1)(A) transfer items on the MTCR Annex, or items that the
United States proposes for addition to the MTCR Annex, that
contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or produce
ballistic missiles, or
(B) provide technical assistance or facilities which the
President deems to be of concern because of their direct
contribution to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or produce
ballistic missiles; or
(2) attempt on more than one occasion--
(A) to transfer items on the MTCR Annex, or items
that the United States proposes for addition to the
MTCR Annex, that would have contributed to Iran's
efforts to acquire, develop, or produce ballistic
missiles, or
(B) to provide technical assistance or facilities
described in paragraph (1)(B).
(b) Written Justification.--The determination and report of the
President under subsection (a) shall include a written justification
describing in detail--
(1) the credible information indicating that the person--
(A) transferred items described in section
2(a)(1)(A), or provided technical assistance or
facilities described in section 2(a)(1)(B); or
(B) attempted to transfer items described in section
2(a)(1)(A), or attempted to provide technical
assistance or facilities described in section
2(a)(1)(B);
(2) the additional information which persuaded the President
that the person did not--
(A) transfer items described in section 2(a)(1)(A),
or provide technical assistance or facilities described
in section 2(a)(1)(B); or
(B) attempt to transfer items described in section
2(a)(1)(A), or attempt to provide technical assistance
or facilities described in section 2(a)(1)(B); and
(3) the analysis of the information supporting the
President's conclusion.
(c) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President considers it
appropriate, the determination and report of the President under
subsection (a) and the written justification under subsection (b), or
appropriate parts thereof, may be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 5. WAIVER ON BASIS OF NATIONAL SECURITY.
(a) In General.--The President may waive the imposition of any
sanction that would otherwise be required under section 3 on any
foreign person 15 days after the President determines and reports to
the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
that such waiver is essential to the national security of the United
States.
(b) Written Justification.--The determination and report of the
President under subsection (a) shall include a written justification
describing in detail the facts and circumstances supporting the
President's conclusion.
(c) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President considers it
appropriate, the written justification under subsection (b), or
appropriate parts thereof, may be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING ACTIONS BY GOVERNMENT OF
PRIMARY JURISDICTION.
As part of each report submitted under section 2, the President shall
include the following information with respect to each foreign person
identified in that report:
(1) A statement regarding whether the government of primary
jurisdiction over that person was aware of the activities that
were the basis for the identification of that person in the
report.
(2) If the government of primary jurisdiction was not aware
of the activities that were the basis for the identification of
that person in the report, an explanation of the reasons why
the United States Government did not inform that government of
those activities.
(3) If the government of primary jurisdiction was aware of
the activities that were the basis for the identification of
that person in the report, a description of the efforts, if
any, undertaken by that government to prevent those activities,
and an assessment of the effectiveness of those efforts,
including an explanation of why those efforts failed.
(4) If the government of primary jurisdiction was aware of
the activities that were the basis for the identification of
that person in the report and failed to undertake effective
efforts to prevent those activities, a description of any
sanctions that have been imposed on that government by the
United States Government because of such failure.
SEC. 7. PURCHASE OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that the
President should exercise the authority granted to him under section
504 of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and
Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5854)--
(1) to prevent the transfer of weapons-related material and
delivery systems to Iran through the purchase, barter, or other
acquisition of such material and delivery systems; and
(2) to prevent the transfer to Iran of scientific and
technical expertise with respect to such weapons-related
material and delivery systems.
(b) Availability of Amounts.--Amounts hereafter made available to
carry out chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.; relating to assistance for the independent
states of the former Soviet Union) may be used to carry out subsection
(a).
SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.
For the purposes of this Act--
(1) the terms ``foreign person'' and ``person'' mean--
(A) a natural person that is an alien;
(B) a corporation, business association, partnership,
society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity,
organization, or group, that is organized under the
laws of a foreign country or has its principal place of
business in a foreign country;
(C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a
business enterprise; and
(D) any successor or subsidiary of any entity
described in subparagraph (B) or (C);
(2) the term ``government of primary jurisdiction'' means--
(A) in the case of a natural person, the foreign
government of the country of which the person is a
citizen or national;
(B) in the case of an entity described in
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1), the foreign
government of the country in which the entity has its
principal place of business, or the foreign government
under whose laws that entity is organized; and
(C) in the case of a foreign governmental entity
described in subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1), the
foreign government of which that entity is a part; and
(3) the term ``MTCR Annex'' has the meaning given that term
in section 11B(c)(4) of the Export Administration Act of 1979
(50 U.S.C. 2410b(c)(4)).
Background and Purpose
H.R. 2709, the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of
1997, is intended to provide additional leverage to the
Administration to address ongoing assistance by Russian
institutes, research facilities, and other business entities
for Iran's medium and long range missile program by closing
loopholes in existing sanctions laws that have been used in the
past to avoid sanctioning firms that have transferred missile
goods or technology to Iran.
The Committee believes that one of our most important
national security objectives in the area of non-proliferation
is to prevent Iran from obtaining and in some instances, from
improving, its weapons of mass destruction capabilities. Most
critical, in the short-term, is the prospect of Iran enhancing
its ballistic missile capability. Iranian acquisition of
ballistic missiles with a range of 1,300 kilometers or more
poses an unacceptable threat to American forces in the Middle
East as well as to our allies throughout the Persian Gulf
region.
The Committee notes that Russian entities have already
provided Iran with missile components and critical know-how and
technological support. The question facing the Administration
and the Congress is whether we can halt further assistance.
Time is short and the U.S. has but a few months to prevent Iran
from achieving a significant advance in its missile program.
The Committee notes that, according to open sources, early
this year U.S. and Israeli intelligence reports revealed a
technology transfer between Russia and Iran involving
construction of a delivery system for the Russian SS-4 and
Iranian Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 long-range missiles. Successive
reports detailed contracts signed between numerous Russian
entities and Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO) to
help produce liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, a wind tunnel
for missile development and related technologies.
The Committee notes, again according to open sources, the
following entities have been involved in missile technology
transfers to Iran:
Defense Industries Organization (DIO), an Iranian
agency charged with development, production and
procurement of military technology;
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), part of the
DIO responsible for development and production of
ballistic missiles and related technology;
Inor, a Russian scientific and production center
implicated in transfer to SHIG of materials used in
missile construction;
Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute,
implicated in collaboration with SHIG on wind tunnel
construction;
Russian State Corporation for Export and Import on
Armament and Military Equipment (Rosvoorouzhenie);
Bauman Institute, a leading Russian scientific
research center;
NPO Trud, a Russian rocket motor manufacturer;
Polyus, a leading Russian developer of laser
technology; and
Russian Space Agency, headed by Yuri Koptev.
The Committee believes that an incremental approach to this
issue or reliance on friendly persuasion does not appear to be
achieving any demonstrable results. Dialogue cannot substitute
for more forceful and immediate action, including the
imposition of sanctions on those entities engaging in missile
cooperation with Iran.
At present, the Administration appears unable or unwilling
to sanction the Russian entities that are providing essential
missile components and technical assistance to extend the range
of Iran's Scud missiles to 1,300 kilometers.
The Committee fully supports the ongoing discussions
between the U.S. and the Russian government and believes we
must continue talking at the highest levels to put an immediate
end to this assistance. However, we see no meaningful prospects
for enforcement action by the Russian government at the local
and regional level that would turn non-proliferation rhetoric
into reality.
With Russia's cash-strapped technical institutes and
research facilities eager to sell to Iranian weapons
purchasers, Russia's effective adherence to the obligations of
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is open to serious
question. In testimony before the full Committee in early
October, a State Department official all but acknowledged that
there is little likelihood the Administration will impose
sanctions on these entities before the Iranian missile program
becomes fully operational.
It is clear that the Congress has a fundamental
disagreement with the Administration over the utility of
sanctions legislation. The Committee makes two points in that
regard:
First, with respect to concerns about the Congress imposing
unilateral sanctions, the Committee notes that the Congress
will not hesitate to take such action when an Administration's
policy is demonstrably ineffective in protecting America's
vital interests.
Furthermore, the imposition of these sanctions would be
used to bring Russia, a member of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), back into conformity with its norms and
standards.
Second, the Committee believes that the Administration will
continue to see legislation of this type until it can make a
credible case to the Congress that current non-proliferation
sanctions laws are being implemented vigorously.
In short, the Committee is not satisfied that the
Administration has made it absolutely clear to Russia that
halting missile cooperation with Iran is vital to our interests
and that U.S. assistance, particularly in the area of space
cooperation, may be jeopardized if such cooperation does not
end immediately.
The bill requires the President to submit a report to
Congress 30 days after the date of enactment, and periodically
thereafter, identifying those entities where there is credible
evidence they have transferred key missile components or
technology to Iran. Thirty days after this report is required
to be submitted, three sanctions (denying munitions licenses,
dual use licenses and U.S. foreign assistance to these
entities) would be imposed for a period of at least two years
on the entities identified in the report.
It gives the Administration ample flexibility in the final
determination to impose these sanctions but it closes the
loopholes in existing sanctions laws that have been used to
avoid sanctioning firms that have transferred key missile
components to Iran.
In the 1980s the world stood by as Saddam Hussein built up
his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction that we have yet to
fully identify and destroy. The Committee strongly believes
that the U.S. cannot afford to do the same with Iran as it uses
its petrodollars to purchase weapons systems that will threaten
its neighbors and endanger our forces throughout the Persian
Gulf Region.
committee action
On September 25, 1997, the full Committee held a closed
briefing with Dr. Gordon Oehler, Director of the Non-
Proliferation Center at the Central Intelligence Agency. On
October 23, 1997, the full Committee held a second closed
briefing with Ambassador Frank Wisner, Special Presidential
Envoy, Department of State, Mr. John McLaughlin, Deputy
Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, and
other officials.
On October 9, 1997, the full Committee marked up related
legislation, H. Con. Res. 121, a concurrent resolution
expressing the sense of the Congress regarding proliferation of
missile technology from Russia to Iran. During the full
Committee debate on the measure, testimony was taken from
Congresswoman Jane Harman, the sponsor of the resolution, and
several State Department witnesses including Mr. Michael
Klosson, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative
Affairs, Mr. James P. Timbie, Senior Advisor to the Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
Affairs, and Ms. Robin Frank, Legal Affairs, Department of
State.
After concluding consideration of the resolution, the
Committee adopted the resolution and agreed to a motion to
consider the resolution under suspension of the rules by voice
vote, a quorum being present.
On October 24, 1997, the full Committee marked up H.R.
2709. During the full Committee debate, testimony was taken
from two State Department officials, Mr. Michael Klosson, a
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs,
and Mr. Robert J. Einhorn, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Politico-Military Affairs.
The full Committee considered the bill as original text for
the purpose of amendment and took the following preliminary
action, all by voice vote: Adopting the Ackerman amendment,
expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should
use the authority of section 504 of the FREEDOM Act and
authorizing funds made available under that Act for such
purpose. Adopting the Berman amendment, limiting goods and
technology or technical assistance and facilities transferred
to Iran's ballistic missile program to those items on the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex.
After concluding consideration of the bill, the full
Committee ordered the bill reported to the House by voice vote,
a quorum being present.
rollcall votes
Clause 2(l)(2)(B) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires the Committee to list the recorded
votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments
thereto. No roll-call votes were held on the motion to report
the legislation or on amendments to the legislation.
committee oversight findings
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports
the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Findings
No findings or recommendations of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight were received as referred to in
clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
The Committee adopts the cost estimate of the Congressional
Budget Office, set out below, as its submission of any required
information on new budget authority, new spending authority,
new credit authority, or an increase or decrease in the
national debt required by clause 2(l)(3)(B) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives.
federal mandates statement
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act.
advisory committee statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
applicability to the legislative branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
constitutional authority statement
In compliance with clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee cites the
following specific powers granted to the Congress in the
Constitution as authority for enactment of H.R. 2709 as
reported by the Committee: Article I, section 8, clause 3
(relating to the regulation of commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states); and Article I, section 8, clause
18 (relating to making all laws necessary and proper for
carrying into execution powers vested by the Constitution in
the government of the United States).
congressional budget office cost estimate
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth
with respect to H.R. 2709 as reported by the Committee the
following estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the Budget
Act of 1974:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, November 4, 1997.
Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2709, the Iran
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Joseph C.
Whitehill.
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neill, Director.
Enclosure.
congressional budget office cost estimate
H.R. 2709--Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997
H.R. 2709 would require the President to report to the
Congress and to impose sanctions upon foreign persons who have
contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or produce
ballistic missiles. Persons identified in the report would be
ineligible for export licenses for arms or controlled goods and
technology, and for foreign aid. In addition, section 7 of the
bill would authorize the use of appropriated funds to acquire
weapons-related material, delivery systems, or technology to
prevent their transfer to Iran.
Based on information from the Department of State (DOS),
CBO estimates that the additional reporting requirements would
cost less than $500,000 annually, assuming appropriation of the
necessary funds. CBO estimates that section 7 of the bill would
have no budgetary impact because current law already allows DOS
to take the measures authorized by that section and enactment
of H.R. 2709 would not increase spending on such activities.
Because the bill would not affect direct spending or receipts,
pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply.
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) excludes
from application of that act legislative provisions that are
necessary for the national security. CBO has determined that
the provisions of H.R. 2709 either fit within this exclusion or
do not contain private-sector or intergovernmental mandates as
defined by UMRA.
The estimate was prepared by Joseph C. Whitehill. The
estimate was approved by Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
Section-by-Section Analysis
section 1. short title
Provides that the Act may be cited as the ``Iran Missile
Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997''.
section 2. reports on missile proliferation to iran
Requires the President to submit periodic reports on
missile proliferation to Iran to the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate. Such reports are required to
be submitted not later than 30 days after the date of
enactment, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment,
not later that one year after the date of enactment, and not
later than the end of each one-year period thereafter.
Each such report must identify every foreign person with
respect to whom there is credible information that that person,
on or after August 8, 1995--
(1) transferred items on the MTCR Annex, or items
that the United States proposes for addition to the
MTCR Annex, that contributed to Iran's efforts to
acquire, develop or produce ballistic missiles;
(2) provided technical assistance or facilities which
the President deems to be of concern to the United
States because of their direct contribution to Iran's
efforts to acquire, develop or produce ballistic
missiles;
(3) attempted to transfer items on the MTCR Annex, or
items that the United States proposes for addition to
the MTCR Annex, that would have contributed to Iran's
efforts to acquire, develop or produce ballistic
missiles; or
(4) attempted to provide technical assistance or
facilities which the President deems to be of concern
to the United States because of their direct
contribution to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop or
produce ballistic missiles.
The Committee included technical assistance or facilities
that the President ``deems to be of concern to the United
States'' in order to make clear that range of transfers or
attempted transfers subject to this legislation is not limited
to technical assistance, facilities, and other items listed on
the MTCR Annex.
The only foreign persons otherwise required to be
identified in a report under this sectionwho need not be so
identified are any foreign persons who--
(1) were identified in a previous report submitted
under this section;
(2) were sanctioned previously under section 73 of
the Arms Export Control Act or section 1604 of the
Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992; or
(3) were not necessarily identified in a previous
report submitted under this section but were the
subject of a waiver on the basis of additional
information exercised pursuant to section 4 of this
Act.
The exception to the requirement to identify foreign
persons otherwise required to be identified under this section
extends only to the same transfer, transaction, or attempt that
gave rise to the exception. Credible information regarding any
additional transfer, transaction, or attempt by that same
foreign person gives rise to a new and separate requirement to
identify that foreign person in a report under this section,
which is overcome only if that additional transfer,
transaction, or attempt falls into one of the exceptions
categories.
The ``credible information'' requirement of this section is
intended to be a very low evidentiary standard. For purposes of
this Act, ``credible information'' is information that is
sufficiently believable as to raise a serious question in the
mind of a reasonable person as to whether a foreign person may
have transferred or attempted to transfer missile goods,
technology, technical assistance, or facilities of the type
described in subsection (a) of this section. ``Credible
information'' is information that, by itself, may not be
sufficient to permit a reasonable person to conclude with
confidence that a foreign person has transferred or attempted
to transfer missile goods, technology, technical assistance, or
facilities subject to this Act.
The Committee adopts this very low evidentiary standard
because of its dissatisfaction with the way the evidentiary
standard contained in other counter-proliferation laws has been
applied. These laws, including the missile technology
proliferation sanctions of section 73 of the Arms Export
Control Act and the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act,
essentially contain a ``preponderance of the evidence''
standard. Under these laws, sanctions for proscribed transfers
need not be imposed until the President determines that such a
transfer in fact occurred. In practice, however, the Executive
branch generally has delayed imposing sanctions until all doubt
about whether a transfer occurred has been erased. In effect,
the Executive branch has elevated the evidentiary standard of
these laws to a requirement of ``proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.'' The Committee believes that this practice has
undermined the effectiveness of our non-proliferation laws by
blunting their intended deterrent effect. Accordingly, in order
to ensure the effectiveness of this Act, the Committee has
adopted a lower evidentiary standard.
Section 3. Imposition of Sanctions
Sanctions are required to be imposed on any foreign person
who has been identified in a report under section 2 as having--
(1) transferred items on the MTCR Annex, or items
that the United States proposes for addition to the
MTCR Annex, that contributed to Iran's efforts to
acquire, develop or produce ballistic missiles; or
(2) provided technical assistance or facilities which
the President deems to be of concern to the United
States because of their direct contribution to Iran's
efforts to acquire, develop or produce ballistic
missiles.
In addition, sanctions are required to be imposed on any
foreign person who, on the basis of information contained in
one or more reports under section 2, has been identified as
having on more than one occasion--
(1) attempted to transfer items on the MTCR Annex, or
items that the United States proposes for addition to
the MTCR Annex, that would have contributed to Iran's
efforts to acquire, develop or produce ballistic
missiles; or
(2) attempted to provide technical assistance or
facilities which the President deems to be of concern
to the United States because of their direct
contribution to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop or
produce ballistic missiles.
Three sanctions must be imposed for a period of not less
than two years on any foreign person required to be sanctioned
under this Act. These sanctions are to take effect 30 days
after the report identifying the foreign person was submitted
or required to be submitted. The sanctions are--
(1) prohibition of sales to that foreign person of
items on the United States Munitions List as in effect
on August 8, 1995, and termination of sales of defense
articles, defense services, and design and construction
services under the Arms Export Control Act;
(2) prohibition of exports to that foreign person of
dual use items listed on the control list established
under section 5(c)(1) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979; and
(3) prohibition on the provision to that foreign
person of United States assistance in the form of
grants, loans, credits, guarantees, or otherwise.
Section 4. Waiver on Basis of Additional Information
The President may waive the imposition of any sanction
otherwise required to be imposed under section 3 if, on the
basis of additional information provided by the foreign person
in question or otherwise available to the President, the
President determines and reports that he is persuaded that the
foreign person did not carry out the act that would be the
basis for imposition of sanctions pursuant to section 3.
The President's determination and report must be submitted
to the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate at least 15 days before the waiver takes effect. The
determination and report mustbe accompanied by a written
justification describing in detail, among other matters, the credible
information that otherwise would give rise to the requirement to impose
sanctions, the additional information which persuaded the President
that the credible information was misleading or incorrect, and the
President's analysis of the information. The President's determination,
report, and written justification may, to the extent considered
appropriate by the President, be submitted in classified form.
The President is not required to wait until after a foreign
person has been identified in a periodic report pursuant to
section 2 before exercising the waiver provided by this
section. This fact, along with the President's ability to
exercise the waiver in classified form and the provision of
section 2 exempting foreign persons subject to a waiver under
this section from the requirement that they be identified in a
report under that section, means that the President need not
apply sections 2 and 3 with respect to foreign persons that he
finds to be innocent of wrongdoing.
It is the Committee's expectation that the President will
utilize these provisions of the Act to develop a process for
judging the guilt or innocence of foreign persons about whom
there emerges credible information suggesting that they may
have transferred or attempted to transfer missile goods,
technology, technical assistance, or facilities subject to the
Act. This process should begin as soon as credible information
suggesting that there may have been such a transfer or
attempted transfer is obtained. As part of this process, the
Executive branch should seek to obtain additional information
from all sources. The President will then evaluate all relevant
information and decide whether the evidence taken as a whole
supports a determination by the President that no transfer or
attempted transfer occurred. Only if the President is unable to
conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that no transfer or
attempted transfer occurred will sanctions actually be imposed.
Section 5. Waiver on Basis of National Security
The President may waive the imposition of any sanction
otherwise required to be imposed under section 3 if the
President determines and reports that such waiver is essential
to the national security of the United States.
The President's determination and report must be submitted
to the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate at least 15 days before the waiver takes effect. The
determination and report must be accompanied by a written
justification describing in detail the facts and circumstances
supporting the President's conclusion. The written
justification accompanying the determination and report may, to
the extent considered appropriate by the President, be
submitted in classified form.
The Committee anticipates that, in virtually every case in
which the waiver provided by this section is exercised, the
national security justification for the waiver will be related
to the Act's objective of preventing the proliferation of
missile technology to Iran. Thus, in a typical case, the
President might report that he has obtained reliable and
credible assurances that the foreign person in question will
refrain from future missile transfers to Iran, but only if the
sanctions otherwise required to be imposed by this Act are
suspended or not imposed.
Section 6. Additional Information Regarding Actions by Government of
Primary Jurisdiction
As part of each report submitted under section 2, the
President is required to provide additional information with
respect to each foreign person identified in that report. This
additional information relates to the knowledge and actions, or
lack thereof, of the government of primary jurisdiction over
that foreign person with respect to the activities that were
the basis for the identification of that foreign person in the
report. If the government of primary jurisdiction had knowledge
of the activities and failed to undertake effective efforts to
prevent them, the President is required to describe the
sanctions that have been imposed on that government by the
United States because of such failure.
Section 7. Purchase of Weapons Technology
Expresses the sense of Congress that the President should
use his authority under section 504 of the Freedom for Russia
and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act
of 1992 to prevent the transfer to Iran of weapons-related
material, delivery systems, and related scientific and
technical expertise through purchase, barter, or other
acquisition of such items. Amounts hereafter made available to
carry out chapter 11 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 may
be used to carry out this section.
Section 8. Definitions
Provides definitions of the terms ``foreign person'',
``person'', ``government of primary jurisdiction'', and ``MTCR
Annex'' for purposes of this Act.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS ON H.R. 2709, THE IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS
ACT OF 1997
The Chairman of the Committee deserves commendation for his
efforts to focus attention on the issue of missile technology
transfers to Iran. This issue is of grave importance to peace
and stability in the Middle East, the security of key U.S.
partners and allies--including Israel and Turkey--and the
security of U.S. forces stationed in the Gulf region.
We believe that Congress and the Executive branch share the
same policy goal: to stop the transfer of missile technology to
Iran. The question before us is the most effective way to
achieve that shared goal.
It is our belief that achievement of this goal requires the
President to initiate a high-level diplomatic effort with those
countries that provide missile technology to Iran. The role of
Congress should be to strengthen the President's hand in his
negotiations with Russia, or any other government, to stop such
transfers. Legislation can play a helpful role in support of
diplomacy, but such legislation needs to be shaped through
careful consultation with the Executive branch.
Missile technology transfers to Iran have become a
contentious issue between the Committee and the Executive
branch, in part because the consultation process has been weak.
The Committee has had difficulty in getting detailed, timely
information from the Executive branch on this issue. The
Committee requested in early September an opportunity to meet
with Ambassador Wisner, the President's envoy who is conducting
negotiations with Russia on this topic. The Committee benefited
greatly from its meeting with Ambassador Wisner, but he was not
available until the day before the Committee's mark-up of H.R.
2709.
Members of the Committee also seek to meet with the Vice
President on this issue. Because of his involvement in the
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, the vice President is the senior
official most knowledgeable about the question of U.S. policy
on Russian missile transfers to Iran. We believe that many of
the Committee members' questions--particularly with regard to
how high a priority the United States attaches to a resolution
of this issue--can be best addressed by the Vice President, and
we look forward to the earliest possible meeting with him. We
believe that, through the involvement of the vice President,
many of the problem areas identified by the Executive branch
with H.R. 2709 can be addressed.
In her letter of October 24, 1997 to the Ranking Democratic
Member, the Secretary of State commented on a draft of the Iran
Missile Proliferation Act of 1997 as follows: ``If presented to
the President in its current form, the Secretary of State and
the President's National Security Advisor would recommend that
he veto this bill.''
changes to the bill
Prior to and during mark-up, a number of improvements in
H.R. 2709 took place:
We commend the Chairman for adding a waiver to
sanctions that would be imposed by this bill. That
waiver allows the President to waive sanctions if he
determines and reports to Congress that such waiver is
``essential to the national security of the United
States.''
The Committee adopted Mr. Berman's excellent
amendment, limiting the scope of sanctioned activities
to those involving the transfer or attempted transfer
of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) annex items
or related items; or technical assistance or facilities
that contribute directly to Iran's missile programs;
The Committee adopted Mr. Ackerman's excellent
amendment, expressing the sense of Congress that the
President should exercise existing authorities and
available funds to prevent the transfer of weapons-
related material and delivery systems to Iran through
the purchase, barter or other acquisition of such
material and delivery systems. In relative terms,
because the amount of funds involved in Iran's
purchases of missile technology are not large, Mr.
Ackerman and other members of the Committee expressed
the view that an approach other than sanctions may be a
more useful way to achieve U.S. policy goals.
problems remain
Still, it is clear that several problems with H.R. 2709
remain:
The bill establishes too low a threshold for the
imposition of sanctions. The bill allows little
flexibility for the Executive to exercise judgment in
evaluating the vast amount of information it receives
about missile transfers to Iran. It is required to
report, and impose sanctions, based on ``credible
information'' about transfers or attempted transfers of
goods or technology that contribute to Iran's missile
program. Credible information is not a defined term,
and is subject to the broadest interpretation. One
report, or one phone call, could initiate a requirement
to report and impose sanctions.
The bill does not allow enough time between the
requirement to report and the requirement to sanction.
Sanctions would have to be imposed no later than 30
days after the date of the required report. In many
cases, sanctions could be imposed erroneously,
needlessly damaging U.S. credibility with other
governments in our efforts to prevent Iran from
obtaining missile technology.
The bill has no requirement that actions subject to
sanction be taken ``knowingly.'' Sanctions would be
imposed on entities unaware that items are going to
Iran or will be used in missiles. Such a provision is
fundamentally unfair and will undermine U.S.
credibility and the willingness of foreign entities to
cooperate with the United States.
The bill's waiver provision, while a step forward,
could be improved further.
The bill retroactive in its application.
The bill applies sanctions on the U.S. subsidiaries
of foreign firms that are sanctioned.
The bill's reporting requirements, even if
interpreted not to require the public release of
sensitive information, could dissuade foreign
governments or persons from cooperating with the United
States to prevent Iran from obtaining missile
technology.
Not each of us agree with every problem in the list as
outlined above. But each of us believe that the bill needs
substantial improvement.
Even at this late date, we do not have a full understanding
of the bill's impact if it were enacted into law. For this
reason, we believe that further consultation with the Executive
branch is necessary.
Through such consultation, and through further work by the
Committee, we believe that this bill can be improved so that it
will strengthen, not undermine, the President's ability to
achieve the goals all of us share--to stop Iran's missile
program.
Lee H. Hamilton.
Sam Gejdenson.
Bob Clement.
Tom Lantos.
Gary L. Ackerman.
Eni F.H. Faleomavaega.
Pat Danner.
Howard L. Berman.