[House Report 105-308]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
105th Congress Rept. 105-308
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________
UNITED STATES-TAIWAN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION ACT
October 6, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Gilman, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted
the following
R E P O R T
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 2386]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on International Relations, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 2386) to implement the provisions of
the Taiwan Relations Act concerning the stability and security
of Taiwan and United States cooperation with Taiwan on the
development and acquisition of defensive military articles,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic
Missile Defense Cooperation Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The stability and security of Taiwan and the balance of
power in the Taiwan Strait are key elements for the continued
peace and stability of the greater Asia-Pacific region, and the
indefinite continuation of such stability and security and
balance of power is in the vital national security interest of
the United States.
(2) The People's Republic of China is currently engaged in
a comprehensive military modernization campaign that is
enhancing the power-projection capabilities of the People's
Liberation Army, including the introduction of advanced
ballistic and cruise missiles that could alter the current
balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and in the greater Asia-
Pacific region.
(3) The current lack of transparency in the People's
Republic of China military infrastructure and its associated
defense establishment and the opaqueness of the comprehensive
efforts of the People's Liberation Army to modernize its
ballistic and cruise missile programs could spark a regional
arms race that would destabilize the East Asia and Western
Pacific regions and threaten vital United States national
security interests.
(4) In March 1996, the People's Liberation Army created a
temporary, but de facto, blockade of both the international
shipping lanes of the Taiwan Strait and the international
airspace around Taiwan by conducting live-fire military
exercises which included the launch of several advanced,
nuclear-capable M-9 ballistic missiles to target areas close to
major ports in both the northern and southern areas of Taiwan.
(5) In March 1996, the locations of People's Liberation
Army military activities and M-9 missile target areas nearby to
Taiwan's two largest ports, Keelung and Kaohsiung, created a de
facto blockade of the Taiwan Strait, international waters and
airspace, interfered with United States and international
shipping and aviation, and impinged upon the national security
interests of the United States, requiring the immediate
deployment of two United States aircraft carrier battle groups
to the South China Sea.
(6) The actions of the People's Liberation Army in such
close proximity to Taiwan were deliberate attempts to disrupt
Taiwan's social and economic stability and were carried out as
attempts to intimidate the people of Taiwan during the period
leading up to Taiwan's historic first democratic presidential
election.
(7) The early development and deployment of an effective
United States theater missile defense system to the Asia-
Pacific region, and the adjustment of United States policy to
include Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and
Matsu, under the protection of such defense system, would be
prudent and appropriate responses to--
(A) the refusal by the People's Republic of China
to renounce the use of force to determine the future of
Taiwan;
(B) the nature of the military threat of the
People's Republic of China posed by the increased focus
of the People's Liberation Army on advanced missile
development; and
(C) the demonstrated intent of the Government of
the People's Republic of China to use live-fire
military exercises and ballistic missile tests against
the people and Government of Taiwan as tools of so-
called coercive diplomacy.
(8) The early deployment of a United States theater anti-
ballistic missile system in the Asia-Pacific region would
maintain a balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and deter the
People's Republic of China from resorting to military
intimidation tactics to coerce or manipulate the people and
freely-elected Government of Taiwan in the future.
(9) Taiwan's local air-defense capability provided by the
United States Modified Air Defense System (MADS) is not
adequate for the task of defending local areas of Taiwan,
including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu, from limited
ballistic missile attacks or deterring the threat and use of
force against Taiwan by the People's Liberation Army to achieve
the political goals of the core leadership of the People's
Republic of China.
(10) Taiwan has requested further United States cooperation
on missile defense, including the conduct of a joint
architecture study of the requirements for the establishment
and operation of a missile defense system for Taiwan, including
the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu.
SEC. 3. STUDY AND REPORT RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF A
THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
(a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a study of the
architecture requirements for the establishment and operation of a
theater ballistic missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region
that would have the capability to protect Taiwan from ballistic missile
attacks. The study shall include a description of appropriate measures
by which the United States would cooperate with Taiwan and provide
Taiwan with an advanced local-area ballistic missile defense system.
(b) Report.--Not later than July 1, 1998, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the Committee on National Security of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a
report containing--
(1) the results of the study conducted under subsection
(a);
(2) the factors used to obtain such results;
(3) a description of any existing United States missile
defense system that could be transferred to Taiwan in
accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act in order to allow
Taiwan to provide for its self-defense against limited
ballistic missile attacks.
(c) Form of Report.--The report under subsection (b) shall be
submitted in both classified and unclassified form.
SEC. 4. TRANSFER OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS TO TAIWAN.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President, if requested by
the Government of Taiwan and in accordance with the results of the
study conducted under section 3, should transfer to the Government of
Taiwan appropriate defense articles or defense services under the
foreign military sales program under chapter 2 of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2761 et seq.) for the purpose of establishing
and operating a local-area ballistic missile defense system to protect
Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu, against
limited ballistic missile attacks.
SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO UNITED STATES THEATER MISSILE
DEFENSES FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
The Congress declares that it is in the national interest of the
United States that Taiwan be included in any effort at ballistic
missile defense cooperation, networking, or interoperability with
friendly and allied nations in the Asia-Pacific region.
SEC. 6. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS URGING THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THE COMMITMENT OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE TO SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN
TAIWAN.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Clinton Administration
should make clear to the leadership of the People's Republic of China,
the American people's firm commitment for security and democracy for
the people of Taiwan and that the United States fully expects that the
resolution of security issues on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will
be resolved by peaceful means.
background and purpose
H.R. 2386, the U.S.-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense
Cooperation Act, would implement provisions of the Taiwan
Relations Act to enhance the stability and security of Taiwan
and to facilitate U.S. cooperation with Taiwan in the
development and acquisition of defensive military articles; in
particular, modern air defense and anti-missile systems.
The security of Taiwan and the maintenance of a balance of
power in the Taiwan Strait are key elements for the continued
peace and stability of the greater Asia-Pacific region. The
indefinite continuation of such stability and peace in a region
of vibrant economic growth, expanding international trade and
emerging democratic societies is a vital national security
interest of the United States. Therefore, there is a basis for
cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan in support of defensive
measures that will preserve a balance of power capable of
deterring any resort to force, in particular, any attempt to
reunite Taiwan with the Chinese mainland by violent means.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is currently engaged
in a comprehensive military modernization campaign that is
enhancing the power-projection capabilities of the People's
Liberation Army (PLA). Included in this campaign is the
development and deployment of ballistic and cruise missiles
that could alter the current balance of power in the Taiwan
Strait and in the greater Asia-Pacific region. Besides
increasing the number of medium and short-range ballistic
missiles deployed in the region, the PARC is also striving to
improve its guidance systems, including terminal radar guidance
and global-positioning technologies. Long-range cruise missiles
are also under development. The nature and pace of the PRC's
missile programs could spark a regional arms race that could
destabilize the region and threaten vital United States
national security interests.
In March, 1996, the PLA created a temporary, de facto
blockade of both the international shipping lanes of the Taiwan
Strait and the international airspace around Taiwan by
conducting live-fire military exercises which included the
launch of several advanced, nuclear-capable M-9 ballistic
missiles to target zones close to major ports in both the
northern and southern areas of Taiwan. These included missile
strikes near Taiwan's two largest ports, Keehung and Kaohsiung.
This interruption of international shipping and aviation
impinged upon the national security interests of the United
States. In response, the United States deployed two aircraft
carrier battle groups to the South China Sea. Subsequently, the
U.S. provided the government of Taiwan with Patriot air defense
systems, which have a limited anti-missile capability.
The actions of the PLA in March, 1996 were deliberate
attempts to disrupt Taiwan's social and economic stability and
to intimidate the people of Taiwan during the period leading up
to Taiwan's first democratic presidential elections.
The early development and deployment of an effective U.S.
theater missile defense system to the Asia-Pacific region, and
the adjustment of U.S. policy to include Taiwan (including the
Matsu, Kinmen and Penghu islands) under the protection of such
a defense system, would be prudent and appropriate. Such an
early deployment would maintain the balance of power in the
Taiwan Strait and deter the People's Republic of China from
resorting to military intimidation tactics or other uses of
force. The PRC has refused to renounce the use of force to
determine the future of Taiwan. Furthermore, the rapid
modernization and expansion of the PLA require that a policy of
deterrence be adopted to counter these emerging capabilities.
Taiwan's current local air defense system, provided by the
U.S., is not adequate to this task. Taiwan has requested
further U.S. cooperation on missile defense, including the
conduct of a joint architecture study of the requirements for
the establishment and operation of a missile defense system.
H.R. 2386 calls on the Secretary of Defense to carry out such a
study of the architecture requirements, and to include a
description of appropriate measures by which the U.S. could
cooperate with Taiwan and provide Taiwan with an advanced
local-area ballistic missile defense system.
H.R. 2386 also expresses the sense of the Congress that the
President, if requested by the government of Taiwan and if
consistent with the aforementioned study, should transfer to
the government of Taiwan appropriate defense articles and
defense systems for the purpose of establishing and operating a
local-area ballistic missile system. Furthermore, the bill
declares that it is in the national interest of the United
States that Taiwan be included in any effort to establish a
ballistic missile defense system for the Asia-Pacific region in
cooperation with other friendly nations and allies.
committee action
H.R. 2386, the U.S.-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense
Cooperation Act, was introduced September 3, 1997. It was
referred to the Committee on International Relations and, in
addition, to the Committee on National Security. The
introduction of this bill culminated several months of work on
the subject of how to respond to various provocations by the
government of the People's Republic of China in ways that
prudently address specific problems without adding to regional
tensions of imposing hardships on the common people of China.
On September 30, 1997, the International Relations
Committee considered and marked up the measure, adopting it by
voice vote as amended, a quorum being present. Three amendments
were adopted. One amendment, adopted by voice vote, struck
Section 3 of the bill, which made explicit that the Taiwan
Relations Act take precedence over any provisions of the Joint
Communique of the U.S. and China issued in Shanghai on August
17, 1982. The consensus of the committee was that such a
statement was not necessary. The Taiwan Relations Act already
clearly provides the legal framework for the transfer of
defensive articles and for cooperation between the U.S. and
Taiwan.
Indeed, according to Susan Shirk, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia, who represented the Clinton
Administration's position in testimony at the mark-up session,
such cooperation is already underway and consistent with U.S.
policy in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. is currently
holding seminars with Taiwan on air and missile defense issues.
Furthermore, Taiwan has purchased the first three of eight
ordered batteries of PAC-II Modified Air DefenseSystems which
have an anti-ballistic missile defense capability.
In addition, the Committee adopted, by voice vote, an
amendment by Representative Rohrabacher, adding language
expressing the Sense of the Congress urging that the President
to make clear to the People's Republic of China the commitment
of the American people to security and democracy in Taiwan.
Just prior to reporting the bill, the Committee adopted, by
unanimous consent, a Gilman amendment in the nature of a
substitute consisting of the text of the bill as it had been
amended through that point.
committee oversight findings
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports
the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.
committee on government reform and oversight findings
No findings or recommendations of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight were received as referred to in
clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives.
new budget authority and tax expenditures
The Committee adopts the cost estimate of the Congressional
Budget Office, set out below, as its submission of any required
information on new budget authority, new spending authority,
new credit authority, or an increase or decrease in the
national debt required by clause 2(l)(3)(B) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives.
federal mandates statement
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act.
advisory committee statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
applicability to the legislative branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
constitutional authority statement
In compliance with clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee cites the
following specific powers granted to the Congress in the
Constitution as authority for enactment of H.R. 2386 as
reported by the Committee: Article I, section 8, clause 3
(relating to the regulation of commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states); and Article I, section 8, clause
18 (relating to making all laws necessary and proper for
carrying into execution powers vested by the Constitution in
the government of the United States).
congressional budget office cost estimate
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth
with respect to H.R. 2386 as reported by the Committee the
following estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the Budget
Act of 1974:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, October 6, 1997.
Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2386, the United
States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Joseph C.
Whitehill.
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neill, Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 2386--United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense
Cooperation Act
The bill would require the Department of Defense to conduct
a study of the architecture requirements for establishing and
operating a theater defense system capable of protecting Taiwan
from ballistic missile attack.
Based on information from the Department of Defense, CBO
estimates that the architecture study would cost less than
$500,000, assuming the appropriation of the necessary funds.
Because the bill would not affect direct spending or receipts,
pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply.
The bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal
governments.
The estimate was prepared by Joseph C. Whitehill. The
estimate was approved by Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
jurisdictional issues and other matters
This legislation has been referred in addition to the
Committee on National Security.
Committee on National Security,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, September 26, 1997.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
The Speaker, The Capitol,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: I write with respect to H.R. 2188, a bill
concerning the tariff treatment of commercial activities
undertaken by communist Chinese military organizations, and
H.R. 2386, the United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile
Defense Cooperation Act. Both of these bills have been referred
to the Committee on National Security, in addition to other
committees.
The Committee on National Security has reviewed H.R. 2188
and H.R. 2386 and, in order to expedite consideration of these
measures in the House, waives its right to take up both pieces
of legislation. I therefore ask that the committee be
discharged from further consideration.
The Committee on National Security wishes to make clear
that the foregoing waiver should not be construed as a waiver
of the committee's jurisdiction with respect to any of the
legislative provisions in H.R. 2188 and H.R. 2386 that fall
within its jurisdiction. The committee also wishes to preserve
its prerogatives concerning any House-Senate conference on
these bills and any Senate amendments thereto, including the
appointment of conferees with respect to the provisions of the
bills which fall within this committee's jurisdiction.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
With warm personal regards, I am
Sincerely,
Floyd D. Spence, Chairman.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short title
Provides that the Act may be cited as the ``United States-
Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act''.
Section 2. Findings
Sets forth relevant findings of Congress, including that
the indefinite continuation of stability, security, and the
balance of power in the Taiwan Strait is in the vital national
security interest of the United States; that the People's
Republic of China is introducing missiles that could alter the
balance of power in the Taiwan Strait; that in March 1996 the
People's Liberation Army used ballistic missile firings to
create a de facto blockade of the Taiwan Strait; that the
United States should develop an effective theater missile
defense system and place Taiwan (including the Penghu Islands,
Kinmen, and Matsu) under the protection of such a system; and
that Taiwan has requested further United States cooperation on
missile defense, including the conduct of a joint architecture
study for a missile defense system for Taiwan.
Section 3. Study and report relating to establishment and operation of
a theater ballistic missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific
region
Directs the Secretary of Defense to carry out a study of
the architecture requirements for a theater missile defense
system that could protect Taiwan. Not later than July 1, 1998,
the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress the results of the study and a
description of any existing United States ballistic missile
defense system that could be transferred to Taiwan in
accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
Section 4. Transfer of ballistic missile defense systems to Taiwan
Expresses the sense of Congress that the President, if
requested by Taiwan and in accordance with the results of the
study under section 3, should transfer to Taiwan appropriate
defense articles or defense services under the foreign military
sales program for the purpose of operating a local-area
ballistic missile defense system to protect Taiwan.
Section 5. Statement of policy relating to United States theater
missile defenses for the Asia-Pacific region
Declares it to be in the national interest of the United
States to include Taiwan in any effort at ballistic missile
defense cooperation, networking, or interoperability in the
Asia-Pacific region.
Section 6. Sense of the Congress urging the President to make clear to
the People's Republic of China the commitment of the American
people to security and democracy in Taiwan
Expresses the sense of Congress that the Clinton
Administration should make clear to the leadership of the
People's Republic of China the American people's firm
commitment for security and democracy for the people of Taiwan,
and that the United States fully expects that security issues
on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will be resolved by peaceful
means.
DISSENTING VIEWS
This resolution mandates a Department of Defense study of
the architecture requirements for the establishment and
operation of a theater ballistic missile defense (BMD) system
that would include Taiwan, and declares, as a sense of the
Congress, that the President, if requested by the government of
Taiwan, should make a BMD system available to Taiwan.
This resolution is flawed both substantively and
procedurally. While this bill was improved through the
amendment process, it retains its core serious substantive
problems:
First, it is illogical for the bill to mandate a study and
Presidential report concerning the establishment of a theater
BMD system that includes Taiwan, while urging the President,
without waiting for the results of the study, to make such a
system available to Taiwan.
Second, inasmuch as China regards Taiwan as an integral
part of the People's Republic of China, the offer to Taiwan of
some of the world's most advanced weaponry appears deliberately
designed to provoke China.
Third, Taiwan does not need this technology, and may not
even want it. The U.S. Department of Defense already has an
ongoing BMD program with Taiwan and has sold Taiwan a Patriot
derivative (PAC-3) that is comparable to a system that is so
advanced that it has been introduced into the U.S. Army only in
the past year. Moreover, senior Taiwanese military leaders are
reluctant to commit substantial financial resources for
unproved BMD technology.
In short, this bill is simultaneously provocative and
unnecessary. It carries risk, with no prospect for benefit. It
will reduce rather than enhance the security of our friends on
Taiwan.
Procedurally, the process followed by the Committee in
marking up this resolution was most unfortunate.
First, the process did not reflect the way a responsible
committee should operate. Members and staff were not given
adequate notice to study this resolution, even though it deals
with serious issues that could have a major adverse impact on
the upcoming summit meeting with the Chinese president. The
usual requirement of one week's notice for a mark up was
reduced to barely more than 24 hours. No unusual or emergency
circumstances exist that warranted waiving the customary one-
week rule. No committee hearings have been held on this
resolution, nor were any senior Administration officials
permitted to testify on the policy implications of this
resolution prior to the mark up.
Second, this resolution is badly timed. It does not enhance
the ability of the President to advance U.S. non-proliferation
goals at the upcoming U.S.-China summit, the first official
U.S.-China summit in over eight years. It is counterproductive
for the Committee--on the basis of hasty deliberation and
inadequate consultation with the Executive branch--to condemn
Chinese actions and criticize Administration policy, since this
approach is unlikely to persuade the Chinese that the Congress
is serious about its commitment to nonproliferation. Adoption
of this resolution will make the President's job more difficult
as he attempts to persuade the Chinese to halt the transfer to
Iran of dangerous weapons. The Congress should be working with
the President to help make the summit successful, not passing
bills to put obstacles in his way, and to create the impression
that the Congress is moving in one direction and the President
the other in China policy.
Finally, the cumulative impact of five resolutions on China
marked up and voted out of Committee as a package--plus others
that are circulating and may come to the Floor simultaneously
with these five--is likely to be harmful to U.S. foreign policy
interests. Congress of course has every right to express its
views on these important issues. Nonetheless, when this many
resolutions each with a strongly anti Chinese tilt suddenly
come forward simultaneously, and only weeks before a summit
meeting, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that
considerations other than foreign policy are also at work here.
The Chinese-American relationship will not advance if it
becomes a game board for the purpose of scoring points of
perceived domestic political advantage.
Lee H. Hamilton.
Gary L. Ackerman.
Amo Houghton.
Bob Clement.