[House Report 105-2]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
105th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 105-2
_______________________________________________________________________
CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS AMENDMENT
_______
February 6, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Canady of Florida, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted
the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS
[To accompany H.J. Res. 2]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the
joint resolution (H.J. Res. 2) proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States with respect to the number of
terms of office of Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, having considered the same, report without
recommendation.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 2
Hearings......................................................... 4
Committee Consideration.......................................... 4
Vote of the Committee............................................ 4
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 8
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Findings............ 8
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 9
Congressional Budget Office Estimate............................. 9
Constitutional Authority Statement............................... 9
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 10
Additional Views of Hon. Henry J. Hyde........................... 11
Additional Views of Hon. Asa Hutchinson.......................... 14
Additional Views of Hon. Martin Meehan........................... 17
Dissenting Views................................................. 19
PURPOSE AND SUMMARY
H.J. Res. 2 proposes to amend the Constitution of the
United States to limit the number of terms of office of members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Under the
proposed amendment, Senators would be limited to no more than
two full terms (12 years) and House members limited to service
for no more than six terms (12 years).
BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR THE AMENDMENT
Beginning in 1990, advocates of term limits sought to
impose limits on the number of terms that a member of the U.S.
House or Senate could serve by changing state laws, amending
state constitutions and passing state ballot initiatives. By
1995, 23 states had passed laws or ballot initiatives limiting
the terms of Members of Congress.
In 1994, Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives,
as part of their ``Contract with America'' promised to hold the
first ever House vote on term limits.\1\ On March 29, 1995, the
House voted on a number of proposals to limit the terms of
Members of Congress, but no measure received the necessary two-
thirds approval. The proposal to limit House members to six
terms (12 years) and Senators to two terms (12 years) received
the most votes (227-204). In October of 1995, the Senate failed
to approve a non-binding ``Sense of the Senate'' resolution
amendment to limit terms.
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\1\ Republicans also proposed, and the House adopted, changes to
the rules of the House which limit service of the Speaker to four
consecutive congresses (Rule I, clause 7(b)), and Committee and
Subcommittee Chairs to three consecutive congresses (House Rule X,
clause 6(c)).
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U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton
When the House last voted on this issue there was some
question as to whether states had the authority to impose term
limits or whether a constitutional amendment was necessary.
That question was answered on May 22, 1995, when the U.S.
Supreme Court in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842
(1995) invalidated an Arkansas law and the laws of the twenty-
two other states that had sought to place limits on the number
of terms that could be served by Members of the House and
Senate. Citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), the
Court ruled that because the qualifications for membership in
the House and Senate set forth in Article I of the United
States Constitution are ``fixed,'' neither Congress or the
States could impose additional requirements.\2\ Supporters of
the Arkansas law argued that it was valid exercise of state
power because it was not an absolute bar to seeking election to
the House or Senate--Members who had served for more than the
prescribed number of terms could still appear on the ballot as
write-in candidates. The Court rejected this argument finding
that the Arkansas law was an ``indirect attempt to accomplish
what the Constitution prohibits Arkansas from accomplishing
directly.'' U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1867
(1995). The Court made clear that the only way to secure limits
on the terms of Congressional service was to amend the United
States Constitution pursuant to the procedures set forth in
Article V.
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\2\ Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 provides, ``No Person shall be a
Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-five
years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he
shall be chosen.'' Likewise, Clause 3 of Section 3 sets forth the
requirements for membership in the United States Senate.
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State efforts after Thornton
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's ruling in Thornton, some
advocates of term limits have sought to pressure Members of
Congress and state legislators to utilize the procedures of
Article V of the U.S. Constitution to amend that document to
impose a six year limit on service in the House and a twelve
year limit on service in the Senate.\3\ On November 5, 1996,
voters in 14 states were asked to decide on ballot initiatives
instructing federal legislators to support an amendment
limiting House Members to three terms and Senators to two
terms.\4\ If the federal legislators failed to support such an
amendment or voted in favor of an amendment allowing for longer
terms of service, they would have printed next to their names
at the next election, ``disregarded voter instruction on term
limits.'' \5\ In most of the states, the initiative also
included language instructing state legislators to vote for
application to Congress to call a convention for proposing
amendments to the Constitution.\6\
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\3\ Similar efforts were undertaken on the state level to secure
the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution which provided for the direct election of Senators by the
people of each state. See, ``Term Limits for Members of Congress: State
Activity,'' a CRS Report for Congress by Sula P. Richardson, November
22, 1996, No. 96-152 GOV.
\4\ The states were: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Maine,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, Montana, North Dakota,
Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. The initiative was approved in the
first nine states and rejected in the last five.
\5\ Although the constitutional amendments proposed in the state
ballot initiatives all call for a limit of three terms in the House and
two terms in the Senate, none of the versions is identical. In
addition, the ``voter instruction'' to Members of Congress differs from
state to state.
\6\ In Missouri and South Dakota, the initiatives provided
instructions only for federal legislators.
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Prior to adoption of the ballot initiative in the state of
Arkansas, a lawsuit was brought challenging the initiative,
known as Amendment 9.\7\ On October 21, 1996, in Donovan v.
Priest, 326 Ark. 353, 931 S.W. 2nd 119 (1996), stay granted,
117 S. Ct. 380 (1996), petition for cert. filed sub nom.
Arkansas Term Limits v. Donovan, 65 U.S.L.W. 3473 (U.S. Jan. 7,
1997) (No. 96-919), the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down
Amendment 9, holding that it violated Article V of the United
States Constitution because it was an indirect means to propose
an amendment to the United States Constitution. Supporters of
placing the initiative on the ballot argued that it merely
served to notify legislators of the desire of the people of
their state to enact a constitutional amendment to limit the
terms of members. The Court rejected the argument that the
initiative was a ``mere advisory referendum.'' The Court
further stated:
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\7\ A lawsuit challenging the placement of a similar initiative on
the ballot was filed in Oklahoma. In In re: Initiative Petition No.
364, 1996 Okla. LEXIS 144 (opinion filed December 10, 1996), the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma would not allow the initiative to be placed
on the ballot for submission to the people because it violated the
Constitutions of Oklahoma and the United States.
[The proposed Amendment 9] is an indirect attempt to
propose an amendment to the United States Constitution,
and as such violates the narrow, specific grants of
authority provided in Article V. The proposed Amendment
9 would virtually tie the hands of the individual
members of the General Assembly such that they would no
longer be part of a deliberative body acting
independently in exercising their individual best
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judgments on every issue. 326 Ark. 353 at 371.
On November 2, 1996, just three days prior to the election,
the U.S. Supreme Court suspended the order of the Arkansas
Supreme Court. A petition for certiorari is currently pending
before the United States Supreme Court.
HEARINGS
The Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution held one
day of hearings on the issue of ``Limiting Terms of Office for
Members of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives''
on January 22, 1997. Testimony was received from eleven
witnesses: U.S. Senator Fred Thompson; Representative Bill
McCollum; Representative John Dingell; Representative Tillie
Fowler; Representative Joe Barton; George Will, Nationally
Syndicated Columnist and Television Commentator; John Hibbing,
Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln;
Congressman Bill Frenzel, Guest Scholar, The Brookings
Institution; Paul Jacob, Executive Director, U.S. Term Limits;
Thomas Mann, Director, Governmental Studies Program, The
Brookings Institution; Cleta Mitchell, Director and General
Counsel, Americans Back In Charge.
COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION
On February 4, 1997, the Committee met in open session and
ordered reported the resolution H.J. Res. 2, without
recommendation, by a recorded vote of 19 to 12, a quorum being
present.
VOTE OF THE COMMITTEE
1. Mr. Frank offered an amendment to take into account
elections or service occurring prior to the amendment becoming
operative when determining eligibility for elections. The
amendment was defeated by a 13-17 rollcall vote.
Rollcall vote No. 1
AYES NAYS
Mr. Coble Mr. Hyde
Mr. Schiff Mr. McCollum
Mr. Chabot Mr. Gekas
Mr. Conyers Mr. Smith (TX)
Mr. Frank Mr. Canady
Mr. Berman Mr. Inglis
Mr. Boucher Mr. Goodlatte
Mr. Scott Mr. Buyer
Mr. Watt Mr. Bono
Ms. Lofgren Mr. Bryant
Ms. Jackson Lee Mr. Barr
Mr. Delahunt Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Wexler Mr. Hutchinson
Mr. Pease
Mr. Cannon
Mr. Nadler
Mr. Rothman
2. An amendment by Mr. Frank to limit U.S. Senators to no
more than one full term in office to Mr. Inglis' amendment to
limit U.S. Senators to no more than two full terms in office
and U.S. Representatives to no more than three full terms in
the House. The amendment was defeated by a 12-16 rollcall vote.
Rollcall vote No. 2
AYES NAYS
Mr. Coble Mr. Hyde
Mr. Schiff Mr. McCollum
Mr. Frank Mr. Gekas
Mr. Berman Mr. Smith (TX)
Mr. Nadler Mr. Canady
Mr. Scott Mr. Inglis
Mr. Watt Mr. Goodlatte
Ms. Lofgren Mr. Buyer
Ms. Jackson Lee Mr. Bono
Ms. Waters Mr. Bryant
Mr. Delahunt Mr. Chabot
Mr. Wexler Mr. Barr
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Hutchinson
Mr. Pease
Mr. Rothman
3. An amendment by Mr. Inglis to limit U.S. Senators to no
more than two full terms in office and U.S. Representatives to
no more than three full terms in the House. The amendment was
defeated by a 4-24 rollcall vote (2 voting present).
Rollcall vote No. 3
AYES NAYS PRESENT
Mr. Coble Mr. McCollum Mr. Hyde
Mr. Inglis Mr. Gekas Mr. Frank
Mr. Bono Mr. Smith (TX)
Mr. Chabot Mr. Schiff
Mr. Canady
Mr. Goodlatte
Mr. Buyer
Mr. Bryant
Mr. Barr
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Hutchinson
Mr. Pease
Mr. Conyers
Mr. Berman
Mr. Boucher
Mr. Nadler
Mr. Scott
Mr. Watt
Ms. Lofgren
Ms. Jackson Lee
Ms. Waters
Mr. Delahunt
Mr. Wexler
Mr. Rothman
4. An amendment by Mr. Scott to allow a state to enact a
term limit less than that provided in the amendment. The
amendment was defeated by a 13-15 rollcall vote.
Rollcall vote No. 4
AYES NAYS
Mr. Schiff Mr. Hyde
Mr. Inglis Mr. McCollum
Mr. Bono Mr. Gekas
Mr. Chabot Mr. Smith (TX)
Mr. Frank Mr. Canady
Mr. Berman Mr. Goodlatte
Mr. Boucher Mr. Buyer
Mr. Scott Mr. Bryant
Ms. Lofgren Mr. Barr
Ms. Jackson Lee Mr. Jenkins
Ms. Waters Mr. Hutchinson
Mr. Delahunt Mr. Pease
Mr. Wexler Mr. Nadler
Mr. Watt
Mr. Rothman
5. An amendment by Mr. Hutchinson to limit U.S.
Representatives to no more than three terms in the House and
U.S. Senators to no more than two terms in the Senate. The
amendment was defeated by a 3-25 rollcall vote (2 voting
present).
Rollcall vote No. 5
AYES NAYS PRESENT
Mr. Inglis Mr. Hyde Mr. Frank
Mr. Chabot Mr. McCollum Ms. Lofgren
Mr. Hutchinson Mr. Gekas
Mr. Coble
Mr. Smith (TX)
Mr. Schiff
Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Canady
Mr. Goodlatte
Mr. Buyer
Mr. Bono
Mr. Bryant
Mr. Barr
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Pease
Mr. Schumer
Mr. Boucher
Mr. Nadler
Mr. Scott
Mr. Watt
Ms. Jackson Lee
Ms. Waters
Mr. Delahunt
Mr. Wexler
Mr. Rothman
6. An amendment by Mr. Nadler to allow members of the House
or Senate who have served twelve consecutive years to again be
eligible for election or appointment if they sit out at least
one full term. The amendment was defeated by a 11-19 rollcall
vote.
Rollcall vote No. 6
AYES NAYS
Mr. Smith Mr. Hyde
Mr. Goodlatte Mr. McCollum
Mr. Frank Mr. Gekas
Mr. Schumer Mr. Coble
Mr. Boucher Mr. Schiff
Mr. Nadler Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Scott Mr. Canady
Ms. Lofgren Mr. Inglis
Ms. Jackson Lee Mr. Buyer
Mr. Delahunt Mr. Bono
Mr. Wexler Mr. Bryant
Mr. Chabot
Mr. Barr
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Hutchinson
Mr. Pease
Mr. Cannon
Mr. Watt
Mr. Rothman
7. An amendment by Ms. Jackson Lee to allow states to
prescribe the maximum number of terms to which a person may be
elected or appointed to the Senate or elected to the House. The
amendment was defeated by a 7-22 rollcall vote.
Rollcall vote No. 7
AYES NAYS
Mr. Frank Mr. Hyde
Mr. Schumer Mr. McCollum
Mr. Nadler Mr. Gekas
Mr. Scott Mr. Coble
Ms. Lofgren Mr. Smith (TX)
Ms. Jackson Lee Mr. Schiff
Mr. Delahunt Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Canady
Mr. Inglis
Mr. Goodlatte
Mr. Buyer
Mr. Bono
Mr. Bryant
Mr. Chabot
Mr. Barr
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Hutchinson
Mr. Pease
Mr. Cannon
Mr. Watt
Mr. Wexler
Mr. Rothman
8. Motion to Report H.J. Res. 2 without recommendation. The
motion was agreed to by a 19-12 rollcall vote.
Rollcall vote No. 8
AYES NAYS
Mr. Hyde Mr. Hutchinson
Mr. McCollum Mr. Frank
Mr. Gekas Mr. Schumer
Mr. Coble Mr. Berman
Mr. Smith (TX) Mr. Boucher
Mr. Schiff Mr. Nadler
Mr. Gallegly Mr. Scott
Mr. Canady Mr. Watt
Mr. Inglis Ms. Lofgren
Mr. Goodlatte Ms. Jackson Lee
Mr. Buyer Mr. Delahunt
Mr. Bono Mr. Rothman
Mr. Bryant
Mr. Chabot
Mr. Barr
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Pease
Mr. Cannon
Mr. Wexler
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports
that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based
on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
No findings or recommendations of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight were received as referred to in
clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives.
NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES
Clause 2(l)(3)(B) of House Rule XI is inapplicable because
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or
increased tax expenditures.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(C) of Rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets
forth, with respect to the resolution, H.J. Res. 2, the
following estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, February 5, 1997.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.J. Res. 2, a joint
resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to limit
Congressional terms.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is mark
Grabowicz.
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neill, Director.
Enclosure.
congressional budget office cost estimate
H.J. Res. 2--A joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to
limit congressional terms
H.J. Res. 2 would propose amending the Constitution to
limit the service of Members of Congress to no more than twelve
years. The amendment would apply only to service occurring
after it takes effect. The legislatures of three-fourths of the
states would be required to ratify the proposed amendment
within seven years for the amendment to become effective.
CBO estimates that enacting this resolution would have no
significant impact on the federal budget. H.J. Res. 2 would not
affect direct spending or receipts, so there would be no pay-
as-you-go scoring under section 252 of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. This legislation
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in the Unfunded Reform Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-4)
and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal
governments.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz.
This estimate was approved by Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule XI, clause 2(l)(4) of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for
this legislation in Article V of the Constitution which
provides that the Congress has authority to propose amendments
to the Constitution.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 1
Section 1 sets forth the limitations on eligibility for
service for members of the United States Senate and House of
Representatives. A person who has been elected to the Senate
for two full terms shall not thereafter be eligible for
election or appointment to the Senate. In addition, a person
who has been elected for six full, terms to the House of
Representatives shall not thereafter be eligible for election.
Section 2
For the purpose of considering elections which count toward
the relevant limit, Section 2 provides that a person who has
served as a Senator for more than three years of a term to
which some other person was elected shall be eligible for
election to the Senate more than once and that no person who
has served as a Representative for more than one year shall be
eligible for election to the House more than five times. This
section will ensure that no member will be permitted to serve
beyond the 12-year limit in the House or the Senate because the
member is serving the remainder of a term (either through
election in the House or election or appointment in the
Senate).
Section 3
This section sets a seven-year limit on ratification of the
amendment from the time it is submitted to the states by the
Congress. Pursuant to Article V of the United States
Constitution, the amendment must be ratified by three-fourths
of the state legislatures.
Section 4
This section makes clear that elections or service
occurring prior to ratification by three-fourths of the states
shall not be counted when determining eligibility for election.
Although the amendment, if ratified by three-fourths of the
states, will apply to sitting members of Congress, elections
and service of those members prior to the date the amendment
takes effect will not count in determining future eligibility
for election.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. HENRY J. HYDE
For the second time in two years, I have voted to report
the House Joint Resolution on term limits from committee
without recommendation. I believe the issue of term limitations
for members of the United States Congress should be the subject
of vigorous debate on the House floor because of its far-
reaching implications. However, I again repeat my opposition to
an idea which was rejected by some of the wisest men in our
nation's history--the framers of the United States
Constitution.
The U.S. Constitution provides that Members of the House of
Representatives shall be ``chosen every second year'' 1
and that Members of the Senate shall be ``elected by the people
thereof, for six years. * * *'' 2 As a practical matter,
each time voters go to the polls, they decide whether they
should limit the term of their elected representatives. We
already have term limits--they are called elections. The nation
found this to be truer than ever before in the 1994 general
election when, without arbitrary limits built into the
Constitution, membership turnover was vastly accelerated and 40
years of one-party rule came to an end in the House of
Representatives.
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1 U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 1.
2 U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
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The average length of service for House Members in the
105th Congress is only 8 years, and the median length of
service for House Members is 4 years. Just as striking are the
figures for the Senate in the 105th Congress. The average
length of service for Senators is 10 years, and the median
length of service in the Senate is 8 years. I submit that these
figures weaken the argument for term limits. The 8 and 10 year
averages for the House and Senate fall below the artificial
term limits that proponents advocate--12 years for the House
and 12 years for the Senate. Additionally, since half of the
House Members have served for 4 or fewer years, and half of the
Senators have served 8 or fewer years, can anyone really say
that Members of Congress have been around too long?
As Professor Charles Kesler has noted, term limits act as a
diversion to the real problems currently facing Members of
Congress, which include the need to continue reconsidering the
scope and power of the federal government, and opposing the
extension of centralized administration over more and more of
American life. 3
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3 Charles Kesler, ``Bad Housekeeping: The Case Against
Congressional Term Limitations'', Policy Review (Summer, 1990).
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In my view, term limits is a device for restraining the
electorate rather than restraining the Congress. This sentiment
was best expressed by Robert R. Livingston during the New York
debates on adoption of the Federal Constitution with respect to
the issue of ``rotation in office'':
The people are the best judges who ought to represent
them. To dictate and control them, to tell them whom
they shall not elect, is to abridge their natural
rights. This rotation is an absurd species of
ostracism--a mode of proscribing eminent merit, and
banishing from stations of trust those who have filled
them with the greatest faithfulness. Besides, it takes
away the strongest stimulus of public virtue--the hope
of honors and rewards. The acquisitions of abilities is
hardly worth the trouble, unless one is to enjoy the
satisfaction of employing them for the good of one's
country. We all know that experience is indispensably
necessary to good government. Shall we, then, drive
experience into obscurity? I repeat that this is an
absolute abridgement of the people's rights. 4
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4 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution 292-293 (J.Elliot ed., 1988) (speech of R.
Livingston).
Indeed, although the principle of ``rotation in office''
was a part of the Articles of Confederation, it was
subsequently rejected by the members of the Constitutional
Convention. 5
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5 Art. of Confed. art. V, cl. 2. The Committee of the Whole of
the Constitutional Convention considered the question of term limits
for the legislature on June 12, 1787. See, Max Farrand, ed., ``The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787'' (1911; New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1966), vol. 1, p. 210.
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In what other life occupations does the American public
demand amateurs? When the drill in the dentist's hand begins
whirring, I want someone who has years of experience. Why
should the American people have imposed upon them a system of
government that demands amateurs? Such a system would only
force good people, serving their country, out of the Congress,
depriving the nation of experience and talent, and of critical
individual and institutional memory in negotiating issues such
as war and peace. I believe that the complexity of today's
modern world calls for ``professionalism'' and expertise in the
realm of government no less than in other spheres of our
society. Do we really want to disqualify all those who can
bring sound judgment born of years of experience to the
increasingly demanding tasks of elected office?
While it is still too early to draw definitive conclusions
from the experience of the 20 states whose state legislators
are now term limited, several trends have emerged. It seems
that term limits may increase turnover, strengthen executives,
shift power from lower to upper chambers (which tend to have
longer terms), heighten partisan conflict, and increase the
power and influence of lobbyists, unelected staff members, and
the permanent bureaucracy.
Members who are term limited in their final term or next to
last final term may not always be responsive to their
constituents needs or exercise their best judgment on their
constituents' behalf. After 6 or 12 years in Congress, members
may not have employment to which they can return. No longer do
we live in an age where citizen legislators can return home as
gentlemen farmers after a brief stint in the Congress. The
search for post-employment may not serve the best interests of
the voters. Indeed, in reference to term limits, Hamilton
maintained that:
no government, founded on this feeble principle, can
operate well, for when a man knows he must quit his
station, let his merit be what it may, he will turn his
attentions chiefly to his own emolument: nay, he will
feel temptations, which few other situations furnish,
to perpetuate his power by unconstitutional
usurpations. 6
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\6\ 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution 320 (J. Elliot ed., 1988) (Speech of A.
Hamilton).
A term limits amendment cannot repeal human nature.
Let us continue to have an open, honest, and vigorous
debate on a term limits amendment to the Constitution. But make
no mistake. Term limits would, in my view, serve to further
weaken the first branch of our federal government by making
government not more accountable as the proponents of term
limits envision, but producing a government which is much less
accountable.
I pose one simple question to the supporters of arbitrary
term limits. What is the difference between telling a person
for whom he must vote as opposed to telling a person for whom
he cannot vote? In each of these situations, the ``system''
distrusts the voter to make an independent decision to elect
the right person to represent his district and govern the
country. To that end, term limits represent a cynical and
radical distrust of democracy. I vehemently disagree with this
distrust of the American people. For the sake of our
representative democracy, term limits should be rejected. My
advice to those who support term limits is simple: trust the
people.
Henry Hyde.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE ASA HUTCHINSON
I voted against H.J. Res. 2, not because I am opposed to
term limits, but because this particular resolution does not
comply with the term limit instructions approved by a vote of
the people of Arkansas.
On November 5, 1996, the voters of Arkansas overwhelmingly
approved a ballot initiative setting forth the exact text of a
proposed constitutional amendment limiting Members of the
United States House of Representatives to three two-year terms
(for a total of six years of service) and Members of the Senate
to two six-year terms (for a total of twelve years of service).
Under this initiative, a Member of Congress is instructed to
support the exact provisions spelled out in the initiative and
to vote against any other inconsistent proposal. Out of respect
for the voters of Arkansas, I voted against H.J. Res. 2.
During the committee mark up I offered the exact text of
the Arkansas voter initiative as set forth in subsection (e) of
the petition. Unfortunately, the amendment did not pass.
However, I think it is important to point out the differences
between the Arkansas term limits proposal and the various
versions offered during committee consideration--all of which I
opposed.
H.J. Res. 2
H.J. Res. 2 sets uniform terms of twelve years for both the
House and the Senate. This resolution violates Arkansas law as
the Arkansas amendment limits members of the House to six years
of service. I voted against the resolution.
Retroactivity
An amendment offered by Congressman Barney Frank would have
retroactively applied the term limit set forth in H.J. Res. 2.
I voted against the amendment as the Arkansas law is not fully
retroactive. Under the law, those serving at the time the
amendment is ratified who have already served six years may
serve for an additional four years.
Six year tenure for Senators
An amendment offered by Congressman Barney Frank would have
reduced the term of service for Members of the Senate from
twelve years to six years. I voted against the amendment as
Arkansas law calls for a twelve year term of service for U.S.
Senators.
Inglis Substitute
An amendment offered by Congressman Bob Inglis would have
set limits of three terms for Members of the House and two
terms for Members of the Senate. While the general concept of
the Inglis amendment is in accordance with the Arkansas ballot
initiative, the wording is very different. For example, the
Inglis proposal applies only prospectively. In other words, it
is not retroactive. While the Arkansas law is not fully
retroactive, it does limit the service of members who have
already served three terms. Under the law, those serving at the
time the amendment is ratified who have already served six
years may serve for only four additional years. Under the
Inglis proposal, these members could serve another six years.
Allowing States to set their own limits within certain parameters
An amendment offered by Congressman Bobby Scott would have
allowed states to set their own term limits within a twelve
year range. In other words, states would be able to set a limit
of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten,
eleven, or twelve years. I voted against this proposal since
the Arkansas law specifically calls for a six year limit in the
House and a twelve year limit in the Senate.
Breaks in service
An amendment offered by Congressman Jerrold Nadler would
have allowed term-limited members to return to congressional
service for an additional twelve years after a break in
service. I voted against this amendment since the Arkansas law
calls for a six year term in the House and provides that term-
limited members who leave Congress and return again may serve
only two additional terms.
Allowing States to set their own limits
An amendment offered by Congresswoman Jackson-Lee would
have allowed states to set their own term limits. I voted
against this amendment since it is in direct violation of
Arkansas law, which calls for a six year term for Members of
the House and a twelve year limit for Members of the Senate.
I am a long supporter of term limits and have been an
active defender of a state's right to enact term limits for its
elected officials. In 1993, I argued for the constitutionality
of the 1992 Arkansas term limits law at the state court level
and in 1995, I was a litigant before the United States Supreme
Court.
I had hoped that as a new Member of Congress I would have
been able to vote in favor of all term limits proposals.
However, I am committed to the version of term limits approved
by the voters of Arkansas and consistent with their request, I
will continue to oppose any term limit amendment that does not
reflect the exact language of the Arkansas law.
For the record, I am including the text of the version of
the term limits amendment which I offered at the full
committee, which is hereto attached.
Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the
following:
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all
intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified
by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:
``Congressional Term Limits Amendment
``Section A. No person shall serve in the office of United
States Representative for more than three terms, but upon
ratification of the Congressional Term Limits Amendment no
person who has held the office of United States Representative
or who then holds the office shall serve for more than two
additional terms.
``Section B. No person shall serve in the office of United
States Senator for more than two terms, but upon ratification
of the Congressional Term Limits Amendment no person who has
held the office of United States Senator or who then holds the
office shall serve more than one additional term.
``Section C. This article shall have no time limit within
which it must be ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths
of the several states.''.
Asa Hutchinson.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. MARTIN MEEHAN
I am writing separately to emphasize that although I
support term limits, I do not believe that term limits alone
will address certain fundamental problems afflicting our
political system today.
I support term limits because of my frustration with our
current political discourse. For fear of alienating a
supposedly immature electorate, many of our most dedicated and
intelligent public servants will not dare to discuss issues of
pressing national importance, such as how we shall deal with
burgeoning Social Security costs due to the impending
retirement of the ``baby boomers.'' In turn, the electorate,
which is in fact quite willing to grapple with difficult
issues, becomes increasingly disgusted with political debate
consisting almost entirely of dueling ``sound bites'' and thus
stays home from the polls in record numbers. By setting a fixed
end-point to Congressional careers, term limits would encourage
members of Congress to reflect early on in their tenure about
the legislative legacies they wish to leave, rather than merely
about doing what it supposedly takes to get reelected.
Hopefully, that sort of reflection would result in a greater
willingness to tackle entitlement reform, among other touchy
but important issues. Similarly, I support term limits because
they would deal a crushing and permanent blow to the seniority
system in the House and Senate, which allocates committee
leadership positions on the basis of one's length of service in
Congress. I believe that the public would be better served were
leadership assignments based on merit rather than seniority.
Of course, it is imperative that a constitutional amendment
limiting Congressional terms include service in Congress prior
to the amendment's adoption in determining a legislator's
eligibility for future service. We cannot realistically expect
a term limits amendment which ``grandfathers'' the prior
service of current members, many of whom claim to support term
limits, to restore the public's faith in Congress. The public
would instead view this undeserved exemption as an unparalled
instance of hypocrisy on the part of an institution whose
opinion polls are already in the cellar. Indeed, I do not
understand how the permanent demise of the seniority system
would be furthered by allowing long-serving members to retain
their leadership positions for another twelve years beyond the
amount of time it would take three-fourths of the states to
ratify a term limits amendment.
Furthermore, I do not believe that term limits alone will
suffice to make every election cycle more competitive. For the
ten years during which they would be eligible to run for
reelection under H.J. Res. 2, incumbents would still be magnets
for lobbyist dollars, because only they could cast meaningful
votes on the future of programs dear to organized
constituencies. Incumbents would also continue to dominate
media coverage, not only because they are usually able to raise
more money than challengers to pay for campaign commercials,
but also because their actions as legislators will inevitably
be the subject of nightly news programs and daily newspaper
stories throughout their tenures. And term limits would do
nothing to eliminate the franking privilege available to
members of Congress, which enables them to communicate their
opinions to constituents in an unchallenged format. Only
comprehensive campaign reform can address the problem of
incumbent advantage, the phenomenon which is most responsible
for the public's poor opinion of our current political system.
Thus, proponents of term limits should not consider their work
done upon voting for a term limits constitutional amendment.
They should instead join with many term limits opponents in
working diligently towards comprehensive bipartisan campaign
reform, which alone can restore the good name of American
democracy.
Martin Meehan.
DISSENTING VIEWS
It is with great disappointment that we start the 105th
Congress with this ill-conceived constitutional amendment to
limit congressional terms. It does nothing to create more jobs,
nothing to increase our citizens' standards of living, and
nothing to reduce our trade deficit.
We do not believe that voters should be denied the right to
elect the people they believe best represent their interests
and values. Instead, we continue to have faith in the
fundamental good judgment of American voters, who already have
the power to impose term limits--Members of the House must face
reelection every two years, and Senators must seek reelection
every six years. For these and other reasons set forth below,
we dissent from H.J. Res. 2.
term limits are antidemocratic
Most fundamentally, by denying voters the opportunity to
vote for the person they believe is most qualified to serve as
their Congressman or Senator, term limits undercut the very
foundation of our democracy--majority rule. There is little
difference between forcing citizens to vote for a particular
candidate for office and denying them the ability to vote for
that same person.
As an historical matter we believe this issue was properly
decided in the earliest days of this Republic. The Articles of
Confederation required that legislative representatives rotate
out of office after serving three one-year terms within any six
year period.1 Since rotation was part of the Articles of
Confederation, the Founders debated it at the Constitutional
Convention as a corollary to term length.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Art. of Confed. art. V, cl. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rotation, argued the Anti-Federalists, would provide
members with a more intimate knowledge of their country and
constituency, as well as prevent the abuses of corruption and
encourage a greater number of people to hold public office. The
Federalists countered that reelection--for both the president
and the legislature--was an incentive to be responsive to the
needs of the constituents, and their views favoring purer
democracy and acknowledging the benefits of experience
ultimately prevailed. New York Delegate Robert Livingston
stated during the constitutional debates ``[w]e all know that
experience is indispensably necessary to good government. Shall
we, then, drive experience into obscurity? I repeat that this
[mandatory office rotation] is an absolute abridgment of the
people's rights.'' 2 And Alexander Hamilton wrote that
term limits ``would be a diminution of the inducements to good
behavior * * * [and deprive] the community of the advantages of
the experience * * * gained in office.'' 3 Now is not the
time to second guess these wise and far-sighted judgments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at
Philadelphia in 1787 at 293 (speech of R. Livingston) (J. Elliot ed.,
William Hein & Co., 1996) (1891).
\3\ Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay, The Federalist
464-65 (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1966).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Term limits are unnecessary
Term limits are completely unnecessary in the current
political environment. Recent congressional turnover has been
staggeringly high. The 102d Congress (1990) saw 44 new
Congressional Representatives elected, or a 10% turnover rate;
the 103d Congress (1992) saw 110 new Congressional
Representatives elected, or a 25% turnover rate; the 104th
Congress (1994) saw 86 new Congressional Representatives
elected, or a 20% turnover rate; and the 105th Congress (1996)
saw 74 new Congressional Representatives elected, or a 17%
turnover rate.4 Overall, of the 435 House Members serving
in the 105th Congress, 315 will have served 10 years or less,
and of the 100 Senators, 63 will have served less than two full
terms.5 Congress has been almost completely remade within
the span of a decade; Members elected only four years ago now
rank among the top half of the House by seniority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See Letter from Pat Richardson, Analyst in American National
Government, Government Division, to the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
entitled ``Incumbency and Turnover in the U.S. House of
Representatives,'' Jan. 31, 1997.
\5\ Erika Niedowski, Defeats and retirements do work of term
limits, The Hill, Dec. 4, 1996, at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In his testimony before the Constitution Subcommittee,
Congressional Scholar Thomas Mann of the Brookings Institution
reiterated this point:
Incumbent reelection rates and margins of victory in
1992, 1994, and 1996 were low enough to encourage
future challengers and put fear in the hearts of
members of the Senate and House who seek reelection.
The two major parties are now more competitive at the
presidential and congressional levels than at any other
time in recent decades. No longer do we speak of one-
party dominance of either branch of government.6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Hearing on Limiting Terms of Office for Members of the U.S.
Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.,
1st Sess (1995) (statement of Thomas E. Mann, Director of Governmental
Studies, The Brookings Institution at 2) [hereinafter, 1997 House
Judiciary Hearings].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If term limits are to be adopted, they should apply immediately--to
sitting Members
The Judiciary Committee rejected along party lines an
amendment offered by Mr. Frank which would have made H.J. Res.
2 applicable to Members of the House and Senate immediately
upon ratification by the states. With the defeat of the Frank
amendment, current Members might not be affected for nineteen
years--up to seven years for ratification and another twelve
years before the limits apply. We believe that if term limits
are deemed an appropriate measure, they should apply to current
lawmakers immediately upon ratification--there is no credible
excuse for delay. As Chairman Hyde so eloquently pointed out
during last Congress' floor debate:
[I]t is a little amusing to see the stickers that have
been worn by so many of my colleagues. It says ``term
limits, yes.'' It does not say ``term limits now.'' * *
* I am [also] remind of the famous prayer of Saint
Augustine who said, ``Dear God, make me pure, but not
now.'' 7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ 141 Cong. Rec. H3905 (daily ed. March 29, 1995).
To illustrate the impact of failing to make the amendment
immediately applicable, if H.J. Res. 2 was to be approved,
Speaker Gingrich would still be permitted to serve an
additional 10 terms, allowing him a total of 40 years of
service, and Majority Leader Armey would be allowed an
aggregate total of 34 years of service--tenures which are
hardly consistent with the goals of term limits.
The Committee's rejection of this fundamentally fair notion
of immediate applicability lays bare its true goals: pandering
to that part of the electorate which calls for term limits,
without allowing that solution to have any likely impact on a
single sitting Member. It is indeed ironic that those who claim
to strongly support the concept of term limits find it so
essential to provide for an ``orderly transition period'' when
their own careers are at stake, even if this deprives the
public of the perceived value of ``citizen legislatures'' for
many additional years. As conservative columnist Robert E.
Novak recently wrote, ``[l]ike their Democratic counterparts,
who frankly and honestly oppose limits, the Republicans are
professional politicians who enjoy the good life of
Washington.'' 8 When 94 year old South Carolina Senator
Strom Thurmond--serving his eighth six-year term in the
Senate--can claim to be a proponent of term limits,9 we
know we have a serious credibility gap within the Republican
party on this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Robert E. Novak, ``Term-Limits Hypocrites'', The Washington
Post, Jan. 30, 1997, at A19.
\9\ See 141 Cong. Rec. S1529 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1995)(voting
against motion to table sense of the Senate resolution endorsing term
limits); 142 Cong. Rec. S3879 (daily ed. April 23, 1996)(voting in
favor of motion to cut off debate on term limits constitutional
amendment).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The lack of consistency of many term limits supporters was
further exposed during the amendment process at the Judiciary
Committee. Among other things, Republicans were given the
opportunity to support substitute amendments supported by U.S.
Term Limits providing for (1) a maximum of six years in the
House and 12 years in the Senate, (2) 12 years in the House and
Senate unless the state in question adopts a shorter limit, and
(3) allowing each state to decide the appropriate term limit.
Yet in all cases, the amendments were soundly defeated by the
Republican Majority.
Term limits remove critical leadership abilities
An in-depth study comparing senior Members to their more
junior counterparts over the years shows that rather than being
more subject to special interest lobbies, long-time Members are
more productive: ``None of these comparisons shows the
professional legislators are more corrupt, parochial, or
influenced by interest groups than their amateur counterparts.
Instead careful study of Congress * * * suggests that greater
professionalism is a necessary offshoot of the growth and
specialization of the modern world.'' 10 Every other
profession in this nation values experience, tenure, and the
wisdom that can come with terms of service. Term limits would
eliminate these desirable characteristics and make Congress an
institution where inexperience is more valued than knowledge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Thomas E. Mann, ``Congressional Term Limits: A Bad Idea Whose
time Should Never Come'', The Politics of Law and Term Limits, Cato
Institute, 1994, cited in, Term Limits for Members of the U.S. House
and Senate, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 119-120 (1995)
[hereinafter, 1995 House Judiciary Hearings].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perhaps even more dangerously, instead of a legislature
more sensitive to the needs of the voters, under term limits we
could end up with Representatives and Senators who are more
interested in finding a job after their term expires than
responding to the long-term needs of their constituents. As the
League of Women Voters has testified:
Elected representatives with a built-in cut-off date
are less likely to be swayed by their constituents'
interests and more likely to respond to the special
interests who might provide them with a job--or at
least a hand in finding one--after their term is over.
And for many, congressional service will become merely
a stepping stone to another office. From day one, term-
limited legislators would make decisions--would be
forced to make decisions--not necessarily with their
constituents' interest in mind but with an eye to their
own interest for the future. Instead of having ``career
politicians'' who are committed to the institutions in
which they serve and the constituents they represent,
we have career politicians with an overriding
commitment to, you guessed it, their careers.11
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Id. at 146 (statement of Becky Cain, President, League of
Women Voters of the United States).
A term-limited environment is also more likely to
discourage ordinary Americans from running for Congress, since
most individuals are less likely to jeopardize their careers to
run for elective office for only a few terms.12 As
political scientist Morris Fiorina has observed, ``[a]mateur
political settings advantage the independently wealthy,
professionals with private practices, independent business
people, and others with similar financial and career
flexibility.'' 13 Similarly, Syracuse University Professor
Linda Fowler has concluded that patterns of recruitment and
forced retirements under term limits will increase the
influence of special interests in the legislature.14
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Former Constitution Subcommittee Chair Don Edwards has written
that term limits ``would establish a Congress of lame ducks, rich
people who could afford to spend a few years away from their life's
work, corporation executives sent by their employers for business
purposes, and men and women with a single passionately held goal.''
Letter to New York Times, December 17, 1990.
\13\ Morris. P. Fiorina, ``Divided Government in the States'' in
The Politics of Divided Government, at 192-93, 1991.
14 1995 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 10, at 121.
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Term limits would result in undesirable transfers of power to unelected
bureaucrats and lobbyists
Under term limits, congressional staffers and corporate and
foreign lobbyists would play a far more significant role.
Inexperienced Members would also be susceptible to the
manipulation and influence of the more experienced Executive
Branch. As the League of Women Voters has testified:
Term limits would weaken the legislative branch of
government--and strengthen an already powerful
Presidency, upsetting the constitutional balance of
powers. Congress must be able to form its own judgments
on national issues, to come to consensus independently
of the executive branch's policies, if necessary. A
Congress of amateurs, however, would by its very nature
be more pliable and deferential--and the institution
would be robbed of its historic role of restraining the
power of the Executive, who controls the entire federal
bureaucracy. As a result, the branch of government
closest to the people would become a less effective
advocate for its constituents.15
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ 1995 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 10, at 146. These
concerns are also borne out by studies showing the high degrees of
experience held by Executive Branch staff. A 1989 study showed that 70
percent of career executives in the Executive Branch have been with
their agencies for 10 years, and 50 percent for 15 years. (Leadership
for America, Rebuilding the Public Service, Task Force Reports to The
National Commission on the Public Service, Paul A. Volcker, Chairman,
1989, at 163.) A 1993 study showed that the ``typical Federal civilian
employee'' had a length of service of 14.9 years average, for full time
permanent employees. (Office of Personnel Mngmt., Federal Civilian
Workforce Statistics, Employment and Trends as of November 1993, at 78
(1993)).
The experience in states which have adopted term limits for
their own state legislators show that concern about transfer of
power to unaccountable bureaucrats and lobbyists is indeed a
serious problem. Thomas Mann recently testified: ``What we see
thus far [in the states] suggests that term limits may increase
turnover, strengthen executives, shift power from upper to
lower chambers (which tend to have longer terms), heighten
partisan conflict, and increase reliance on experts, including
staff and lobbyists.'' 16 A recent analysis by Peter
Schrag concerning the effect of legislative term limits in
California concludes, ``California's recent experience may
signal what we can expect: gridlock, bitter partisan hostility,
and greater reliance on special interests for the expertise
required to write complex legislation.'' 17
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ 1997 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of
Thomas E. Mann at 3).
\17\ Peter Schrag, ``The Populist Road to Hell, Term Limits in
California'', The American Prospect, Winter, 1996, at 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Term limits supporters have contradictory goals
Term limits supporters claim mutually exclusive goals:
limits will make legislators closer to the people and limits
will make legislators more distant. Supporters of term limits
contend that we could cure Congress' ills by filling it with
Members who are ``citizen legislators'' and want to undertake
the job as a civic duty for a short time rather than as a
career. Supporters complain the current professional legislator
means that you ``no longer work, shop, commute or send your
children to school among your constituents.'' 18
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Term Limits for Members of the U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. 41 (1993-94) (statement of David Mason, Director, U.S.
Congress Assessment Project, The Heritage Foundation) [hereinafter,
1993-94 House Judiciary Hearings].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Then, in contradiction to that premise, term limit
supporters take a completely opposite tack. Prominent term
limits supporter George Will argues term limits are ``not to
make Congress closer to the people, but to establish a
constitutional distance for a more deliberative process, all of
which would restore to Congress its proper stature.'' 19
Taken together, the two viewpoints underscore the intellectual
inconsistency of the term limits movement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ George F. Will, Speech to Cato Institute, Dec. 1, 1993,
reprinted in, 1993-94 House Judiciary Hearings, id., at 215.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Term limits provide an excuse for failure to act on campaign finance
reform
Not only are term limits themselves a dangerous proposal,
they offer the opponents of real and meaningful campaign
finance reform an easy excuse for inaction. Fred Werthheimer,
President of Common Cause, identified this fundamental
disconnect:
We recognize that there is widespread popular support
for term limits and that it stems in part from the view
that Members of Congress have become remote from
average citizens, dependent on and obligated to special
interests and their political money and locked into
office by a campaign finance system that provides
extraordinary and unfair financial advantages for
incumbents over their challengers. We believe that the
way to address these underlying problems, however, is
through fundamental political reform that curbs the
undue influence of campaign contributions over
government decisions, creates the opportunity for
challengers to run competitive campaigns against
incumbents and makes Members of Congress accountable to
their constituents, not to monied interests.20
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ 1995 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 10, at 154.
Of course, the lack of interest in campaign finance reform
can hardly be unexpected from a Republican party which by many
analyses maintained their narrow control in the House
principally by virtue of a massive fundraising
advantage.21 The truth is, if the Majority was serious
about removing entrenched law-makers, it would move campaign
finance reform, not term limits, as the first major legislation
to be considered in the 105th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Last November, the ten highest congressional races won by
Republicans turned on a total of 9,700 votes. The average Republican
fundraising advantage in those ten races was $372,000 over their
Democratic opponents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
H.J. Res. 2 trivializes the Constitution and belittles
those who would serve their country by serving in the United
States Congress. The voters of Texas and Illinois knew what
they were doing when they reelected Democratic Rep. Sam Rayburn
and Republican Senator Everett Dirksen term after term; the
citizens of Florida were right to repeatedly return Rep. Claude
Pepper to office; and the voters of Michigan are fully
justified in continuing to elect John Dingell, the current dean
of the House. Their wise counsel and well-reasoned judgments
have helped steer this country through many dangerous crises.
At the same time, when they are so inclined, voters have
shown no fear in throwing out less popular Members, be they
freshmen or long-time veterans. We don't need to amend the
Constitution to limit terms--there can be no better judge of
whether a legislator deserves to remain in office than the
voters themselves.
John Conyers, Jr.
Bobby Scott.
Steven R. Rothman.
Barney Frank.
Jerrold Nadler.
Melvin L. Watt.
Rick Boucher.
Zoe Lofgren.
Maxine Waters.
Howard L. Berman.
Shelia Jackson Lee.
William Delahunt.