[House Report 105-139]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
105th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 105-139
_______________________________________________________________________
PROVIDING SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITIES FOR THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
_______
June 19, 1997.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be
printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Solomon, from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY AND DISSENTING VIEWS
[To accompany H. Res 167]
The Committee on Rules, to whom was referred the resolution
(H. Res. 167) Providing special investigative authorities for
the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, having
considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment
and recommend that the resolution be agreed to.
PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION
The purpose of H. Res. 167 is to provide special
investigative authorities for the Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight.
SUMMARY OF THE RESOLUTION
H. Res. 167 applies to the investigation by the Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight of political fund-raising
improprieties and possible violations of law. The resolution
states that information obtained under its authority shall be
considered as taken by the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight in the District of Columbia, as well as at the
location actually taken, and, that the information shall be
considered as taken in executive session of the committee.
The resolution also authorizes the chairman, after
consultation with the ranking minority member, to order the
taking of depositions or interrogatories anywhere within the
United States under oath and pursuant to notice or subpoena,
and, to designate a member or staff attorney to conduct any
such proceeding.
Finally, the resolution authorizes the chairman, after
consultation with the ranking minority member, to order the
taking of depositions and other testimony under oath anywhere
outside the United States, and, to make application for
issuance of letters rogatory and request, through appropriate
channels, other means of international assistance.
COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION
H. Res. 167 was introduced by Rules Chairman Solomon on
June 17 and referred to the Committee on Rules.
On Thursday, June 12, the Committee held a Congressional
Research Service briefing on the proposed resolution. Testimony
was heard from: Carol Hardy Vincent, Specialist in American
National Government, Government Division; Jay Shampansky,
Legislative Attorney, American Law Division; Mort Rosenberg,
Specialist in American Public Law, American Law Division.
On Wednesday, June 18, the Committee held a hearing on H.
Res. 167 and received testimony from: Hon. Dan Burton, Chairman
of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and Hon.
Henry Waxman, Ranking Minority Member of the committee.
On Thursday, June 19, the Committee held a mark-up of the
resolution. The Committee favorably reported H. Res. 167 by a
9-3 vote. During the mark-up, no amendments to H. Res. 167 were
agreed to. However, the Committee did agree to insert committee
report language by a voice vote.
SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGATION TO DATE
To date, the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight's
investigation of political fund-raising improprieties and
possible violations of law includes the following areas:
The circumstances surrounding possible national security
breaches relating to any political donors or potential
political donors; any possible national security breaches
resulting from political contacts with the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), the National Security Council (NSC) or any
intelligence agency of the government; providing political
donors access to the National Security Council, the CIA, the
State Department and/or other government agencies; granting
John Huang, Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie, Democratic National
Committee (DNC) officials and/or other individuals access to
classified and/or sensitive national security materials;
contacts by Huang, Trie and/or other Administration officials
with the Chinese Embassy; other issues related to the Chinese
Embassy, the Chinese government and/or other foreign
governments' attempts to provide funds or assistance in any
manner to political campaigns or organizations.
Whether United States domestic and/or foreign policy was
affected by illegal and/or foreign donations, foreign interests
and/or foreign governments.
The circumstances surrounding any possible misuse of
classified information, how and to whom such information was
provided, and any possible political actions or economic
espionage connected with such actions.
The activities of John Huang including, but not limited to,
his business and political activities in Arkansas; his
relationship, employment or otherwise, with any Lippo related
company and/or affiliate; his contacts with any foreign
government officials; his contacts with the White House and/or
any federal agency; his contacts with any present or former
White House and/or government officials; his contacts with
Webster Hubbell; his relationship, employment or otherwise,
with the Commerce Department; and his relationship, employment
or otherwise, with the DNC, including, but not limited to, his
fund-raising activities on behalf of the DNC.
The activities of Charlie Trie, including, but not limited
to, his business and political activities including, but not
limited to businesses in Arkansas, Washington, D.C., China,
Macau, Hong Kong and/or Taiwan; his contacts and/or business
with foreign governments; his relationship with a number of
individuals, including, but not limited to, Ng Lap Seng,
Antonio Pan, and Keshi Zhan; his political activities,
contributions and fund-raising activities; his role in raising
funds for the Presidential Legal Expense Trust; his appointment
to the Commission on United States Pacific Trade and Investment
Policy; all contacts with the White House and/or any federal
agency; all contacts with any present or former White House or
government officials; any contacts with Webster Hubbell; and
all activities since he left the United States.
The activities of the Riady family, including, but not
limited to, their business and political activities in
Arkansas, California, Indonesia, Hong Kong and China; the
business and political activities of Lippo related companies
and/or affiliates; the Riadys' contacts, personal or business,
with the First Lady, the President and/or any former or current
Administration official; political or financial contributions
made by the Riadys and/or any Lippo related company or
affiliate; the payment(s) to Webster Hubbell by the Riadys and/
or any Lippo affiliate including, but not limited to, Hong Kong
China Ltd.; and all Riady and/or Lippo related contacts with
Susan Thomases, Mark Middleton, C. Joseph Giroir, Jr., Mark
Grobmyer, James Blair, Jim Guy Tucker and/or Betty Tucker and
any contacts made by these individuals with foreign business
interests, foreign officials or foreign governments.
Matters pertaining to Webster Hubbell including all legal
matters arising out of and/or in connection with work conducted
while a partner at and/or during his employment by the Rose Law
Firm; at what time and to whom information about Mr. Hubbell's
legal problems became known; all contacts with Mr. Hubbell, his
attorneys, representatives, intermediaries and/or agents
regarding his legal matters; all contacts with Mr. Hubbell by
the President, First Lady, James Blair, Mickey Kantor, Mack
McLarty, Mark Middleton, John Emerson, Marsha Scott, Bruce
Lindsey, William Kennedy, Bernard Nussbaum, Truman Arnold,
James Lyons, David Kendall, Robert Barnett, and/or any
representative of such individuals; all contacts with Mr.
Hubbell by any past or present White House or administration
officials; all contacts with federal agency officials; all
contacts with Lippo related companies and/or affiliates,
subsidiaries, employees, owners and/or business partners; all
contacts with Democratic fund-raisers and/or donors; and any
attempts at obstructing any investigations relating to Webster
Hubbell, the Rose Law Firm, the First Lady and/or the
President.
Matters pertaining to fund-raising abuses by any political
party or campaign from 1992 to the present; Hatch Act
violations; possible criminal violations; and potential
violations of Federal Election Commission regulations;
including, but not limited to, the funneling of foreign money
into campaigns and/or political organizations; misuse
ofgovernment resources for political purposes; and the circumstances
surrounding the development and use of the White House Data Base
(WhoDB).
The circumstances surrounding Harold Ickes' campaign
related activities and fund-raising role at the White House and
the DNC, knowledge of any wrongdoing or improprieties, as well
as the role of other White House officials and DNC employees in
campaign related activities or fund-raising; and/or any
misappropriation of federal funds.
Matters relating to political contributions by Young
Brothers, Ambrous Young and/or any company related to Ambrous
Young to the Republican National Committee, the National Policy
Forum and/or any political entity.
Matters pertaining to the White House obtaining hundreds of
FBI files inappropriately and any possible misuse of those
files; and the involvement of the White House in Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) policy and changes in INS
policy for any political purposes; and any assistance provided
by the INS to any questionable fund-raisers or donors or White
House visitors.
Any matters related directly or indirectly to the
foregoing.
The Government Reform and Oversight Committee anticipates
that in the course of investigating these various matters,
other issues invariably will arise. Last year, in the course of
the Committee's investigation into the White House Travel
Office matter, a document that the White House initially
withheld under a claim of privilege was finally turned over
which resulted in the discovery of the unprecedented abuse of
FBI files by the White House. The discovery that the White
House had obtained the FBI file of White House Travel Office
Director Billy Dale seven months after he was fired by the
White House, led to the revelation that hundreds of FBI files
had been gathered at the White House in what FBI Director Louis
Freeh called an ``egregious violation of privacy.'' At the time
the Committee obtained the document leading to the FBI files
matter, the Committee had deposition authority for the White
House Travel Office matter. The FBI files matter was a matter
arising out of the initial investigation and the Committee
conducted more than several dozen depositions in the FBI files
investigation under the deposition authority initially granted
to the White House Travel Office matter.
BACKGROUND ON THE INVESTIGATION
The Committee on Government Reform and Oversight is the
U.S. House of Representative's chief oversight committee. The
Committee has been compelled by substantial allegations in the
media, an accumulating body of evidence, and the ensuing public
outcry to undertake a thorough investigation of potential
campaign fundraising illegalities and potential national
security threats. As the principal investigatory body of the
House of Representatives, the Committee has a statutory
obligation to scrutinize waste, fraud and abuse in the federal
government. At this time, the Committee's investigation focuses
on the use of illegal foreign contributions to influence
American policy, but it also includes matters relating to
potential illegal or improper political fundraising, related
activities involving the White House and other federal
agencies, improper use of official resources, potential
interference with government investigations, the FBI files
matter, the INS naturalization matter, the Webster Hubbell
matter, and related matters.
Serious questions of national policy and national security
abound as daily revelations disclose more troubling facts about
the unusual access that questionable individuals had to high-
ranking White House and Administration officials in private
meetings, fundraising ``coffees'' and other political events,
and official functions. According to one published report,
``[t]he FBI has obtained substantial evidence that top Chinese
officials approved plans in 1995 to buy influence with American
politicians, and that the scheme continued through the 1996
elections and is ongoing * * *'' \1\ Testifying before a Senate
subcommittee in March 1997, FBI Director Louis Freeh stated
that the FBI Task Force investigating the fundraising matter
would scrutinize as one of its top priorities whether there was
a direct threat to our national security by a deliberate plan
by a foreign government to influence our political process.
Freeh told the subcommittee, ``One of the subjects that the * *
* task force is going to be investigating are allegations with
respect to not just illegal political activities and
contributions, but also the national security aspects of that *
* * [and] whether the funding or attempted funding or planning
was originated not by individuals per se, but by a foreign
government or state sponsor or ministry.'' \2\
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\1\ Washington Post, April 25, 1997, at A1.
\2\ Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 21, 1997, at A6.
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The investigation is also following the flow of money once
it enters the United States and scrutinizing whether and to
what extent illegal actions or money influenced government
officials and official government policies or actions. In doing
so, the committee will determine whether there is a definable
pattern of illegal activity and whether there was a commonality
of purpose involved.
The activities of former Commerce Department official and
DNC fund-raiser John Huang, who raised at least $3 million for
the DNC during the 1996 election cycle, raise many potential
illegalities, including the misuse of an official government
position at the Department of Commerce, the illegal disclosure
of classified information, and questions about the true source
of the money that he raised and whether White House andDNC
officials had any knowledge or role in the systematic transfer of funds
from foreign sources to the Democratic Party.
John Huang has strong ties to the Indonesia-based Lippo
Group and worked for banks affiliated with Lippo since the
early 1980's. The Lippo Group is controlled by the Riady family
and has large investments in Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, and
Vietnam. Riady companies and the Riady family, who were
permanent residents in the United States at the time,
contributed substantially to the DNC, affiliated state parties,
and soft money venues during the 1992 election. The Riadys
subsequently returned to Indonesia following the election. Upon
leaving the Lippo Group in 1994 to work at Commerce, Huang
received a bonus package worth hundreds of thousands of
dollars.
A recently published report has implicated Huang as having
deliberately funneled political contributions to the DNC and
affiliated organizations using a number of sham corporations
and ineligible individual contributors. The report also alleges
that Huang may have been a conduit for the transfer of money
from foreign governments, including the People's Republic of
China and other foreign entities, to the DNC.\3\ Another recent
report contains the alarming information that Huang had an
unusually high number of classified briefings while he was an
official at the Commerce Department. In just eighteen months,
Huang attended 146 briefings at which he had access to
classified information. At the same time, Huang was also making
telephone calls to his old employer, the Lippo Group. Huang
also managed to obtain his top secret clearance five months
before he started his employment at Commerce and kept it for a
year after he left the department to move to the DNC.\4\ Huang
visited the White House at least 23 times between February and
October 1996 and regularly met with high level White House
officials, such as Bruce Lindsey and Harold Ickes. On four
days, June 21-24, 1994, Huang and James Riady of the Lippo
Group entered the White House on five separate occasions. At
the same time, Riady met with Webster Hubbell at least two
times during the same four days. On June 27, 1997, a Lippo
Group subsidiary, Hong Kong China Ltd., paid Hubbell
$100,000.\5\
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\3\ NY Times, June 6, 1997, at A1.
\4\ Washington Times, May 15, 1997, at A3.
\5\ NY Times, March 20, 1997.
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John Huang is a central figure in this investigation, who,
along with Webster Hubbell, Charlie Trie, the Riady family,
Mark Middleton and Pauline Kanchanalak, has chosen not to
cooperate with the investigation. By asserting his Fifth
Amendment rights, Huang forces the Committee to utilize other
means, such as document subpoenas, depositions of witnesses and
foreign discovery, to proceed with its investigation.
DNC fund-raiser Charlie Trie, who first met President
Clinton in the late 1970's or early 1980's as a Little Rock,
Arkansas restaurant owner, raised over $300,000 for the DNC,
much of which the DNC has pledged to return. Trie also tried to
contribute more than $600,000 to the President's legal defense
fund, all of which was eventually returned because of its
doubtful origins. According to published reports, Trie
``received a series of substantial wire transfers in 1995 and
1996 from a bank operated by the Chinese government.'' \6\ Trie
visited the White House at least 38 times and met with high
level officials, such as Mark Middleton. In January 1996,
President Clinton issued an executive order to increase the
size of the U.S. Pacific Trade and Policy Commission from
fifteen to up to twenty members. He thereafter added only
Charlie Trie's appointment to the Commission. The White House
released the names of the appointees, including Trie on April
17, 1996, only weeks after the Presidential Legal Expense
Trust's Executive Director Michael Cardozo informed Mrs.
Clinton and Harold Ickes of Trie's delivery of questionable
funds to the fund.
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\6\ Wall Street Journal, April 1, 1997, at A20.
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DNC contributor Ted Sioeng and his daughter contributed
more than $355,000 to the DNC since 1993. According to
published reports, Sioeng is under investigation for
``allegedly working as a [Chinese] political operative in the
United States * * * [and seeking] to acquire influence for
China through his family's political donations, including
$250,000 to the Democratic National Committee during last
year's presidential campaign.'' \7\ Sioeng is now rumored to be
in Hong Kong.
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\7\ Los Angeles Times, May 18, 1997.
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According to a recent news article, ``[i]n at least two
other cases that have come to light in recent months, the
president in 1996 continued to have dealings with large
contributors even after his aides received unfavorable reports
on them from law-enforcement and intelligence agencies.'' \8\
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\8\ Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1997.
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The White House has recently admitted that President
Clinton ordered then-chief of staff Thomas ``Mack'' McLarty
personally to investigate obtaining the Department of Energy's
support for political contributor Roger Tamraz's proposal to
build an oil pipeline through the Caucuses after Tamraz spoke
with the President at the White House on March 27, 1996.\9\
Tamraz, who is reportedly wanted for questioning in Lebanon in
connection with a possible embezzlement charge, contributed at
least $177,000 to the DNC and affiliated state parties in 1995
and 1996. Although Tamraz's access to the White House had been
opposed by White House National Security Council staff, they
had been overruled by senior White House officials, who allowed
Tamraz to visit the White House on at least six or seven
separate occasions in 1995 and 1996.
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\9\ Los Angeles Times, June 4, 1997, at A1.
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In a related matter, the Department of Justice and the CIA
Inspector General are investigating former DNC Chairman Don
Fowler's contacts with the Central Intelligence Agency
concerning Roger Tamraz. In the Tamraz case, it is alleged that
Fowler asked the CIA to vouch for Tamraz to circumvent the
objections of NSC staff director Nancy Soderberg.\10\
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\10\ Ibid, at A8.
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In another case, unfavorable information obtained by staff
on the National Security Council about a potential White House
visitor, California businessman Yogesh Gandhi, prevented him
from meeting the President at the White House. However,
``Democratic fund-raisers arranged for the meeting to take
place on May 13, 1996, at the Sheraton Carlton hotel, two
blocks [from the White House] * * * [where] Gandhi met with
President Clinton and donated $325,000 to the Democratic
National Committee.'' \11\
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\11\ Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1997.
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These are just a number of the disturbing revelations that
surface daily and raise serious concerns about how national
security or policy may have been compromised by such
questionable characters with unique access to the White House.
Other matters under investigation relate to the possible
misuse of government resources or federal funds.
The Committee is investigating the use of official White
House resources in the creation of a database, which included
political contributors. Reportedly, White House officials
merged a list of the President's social contacts with a larger
list of political contributors, despite a warning from the
White House counsel's office that the database could be used
only for official, not political, purposes.\12\ There have also
been reports published recently that DNC contributor lists were
found in official Commerce Department files.\13\
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\12\ Washington Times, May 16, 1997, at A1.
\13\ Washington Post, June 1, 1997, at A11.
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Although many instances of potential illegalities center on
the White House, there is a growing body of evidence that
points to the widespread misuse and politicization of officials
in a large number of government agencies. In one such case,
there have been reports that prominent Democratic fund-raiser
Peter Knight obtained preferential treatment for his clients in
the form of several millions of dollars in contracts with the
Department of Energy.\14\ Mr Knight, who is a personal friend
of Vice President Gore, reportedly used a contact at the
Department of Energy, Thomas Grumbly, who worked for the Vice
President in the 1980's. One of the recipients of the DOE's
largesse in this matter was a company run by a former Gore
White House staffer, William Haney.
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\14\ Washington Times, May 31, 1997, at A1.
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In another case of alleged misuse of government agencies,
the Department of Justice announced on April 28, 1997, that its
Inspector General was launching an investigation of allegations
of ``mismanagement, misconduct and illegality'' \15\ at the
Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding the operation
of the Citizenship USA program. ``The probe will delve into
charges that the program * * * was misused for political
purposes and ended up naturalizing criminals in a rush to
create as many new citizens as possible in time for last year's
elections * * * [and] will cover allegations that the office of
Vice President Gore played a key role in promoting the program
in hopes of reaping a Democratic electoral windfall.'' \16\
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\15\ Washington Post, April 29, 1997.
\16\ Ibid.
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The allegations connected with these individuals concern
very serious matters relating to foreign influence over our
government, very unusual access to the highest levels of the
White House and the Administration by questionable people, and
an unprecedented flow of favors and campaign cash intersecting
at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. No doubt the facts in this
investigation will lead us to further sources of information,
however the Committee began its investigation where many of the
central figures intersect: at the White House.
The Committee already has amassed a large body of documents
that contain troubling information regarding the conduct of
senior government officials and donors with highly unusual
access. Of great significance are the allegations that this
administration may have solicited money from foreign and other
sources to obstruct the workings of justice and protect various
officials from further investigation and possible prosecution.
Reported payments to Webster Hubbell of $100,000 by the Lippo
Group \17\ raise serious questions about whether there was a
coordination of payments by persons close to the President from
entities in the United States and abroad, and whether these
payments to Hubbell influenced his cooperation with the
investigation of Whitewater and related matters. The
interrelationships of the billionaire Riadys, John Huang,
Webster Hubbell and other senior Administration figures is a
central focus of the inquiry into alleged misuse of government
resources and/or obstruction of ongoing criminal
investigations.
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\17\ NY Times, October 12, 1996, at A11.
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The Fifth Amendment claims of key witnesses such as John
Huang, Webster Hubbell, and Mark Middleton have already
significantly hampered the progress of theinvestigation,
necessitating much additional work. Other key witnesses such as the
Riadys, Charlie Trie and Pauline Kanchanalak left the country after
news reports of their involvement in the foreign contributions to the
Democratic National Committee.
In what may be the first of a series of related
prosecutions in this matter, two key Democratic fund-raisers,
Eugene and Nora Lum, pleaded guilty on June 5, 1996, to the
felonious transfer of $50,000 to the campaign of Senator Edward
Kennedy and another campaign using straw donors.\18\ The Lums
each face the prospect of up to five years in prison and fines
totaling $250,000 at their sentencing. The Lums were prominent
fund-raisers for the DNC and were confidantes to the late
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and fund-raiser John Huang. Mrs.
Lum was the executive director of the Asian Pacific Advisory
Council and in that capacity she raised more than $250,000 for
the 1992 Clinton/Gore campaign. The Lums' daughter, Trisha,
also pleaded guilty to serving as an illegal conduit for her
mother for a $10,000 contribution to the DNC. The Lums
reportedly have agreed to fully cooperate with the Justice
Department's fundraising task force.\19\ The Committee is
reviewing these actions as well as related actions at the
Commerce Department and the practices of the late Commerce
Secretary Ron Brown.
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\18\ Washington Times, June 6, 1997, at A1.
\19\ Washington Post, June 6, 1997.
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On October 31, 1996, then-Chairman Clinger issued a request
for documents to the White House regarding the activities of
John Huang, after allegations of campaign financing
irregularities surfaced. In January 1997, Chairman Burton
issued a similar letter request to the White House. After
receiving no response from the White House, Chairman Burton on
March 4, 1997 issued a document subpoena to the White House. On
April 10, 1997, in response to White House demands for a formal
procedure for the handling, storage and release of documents,
the Committee adopted a document protocol. In response to the
taking of the Fifth Amendment by key witnesses Webster Hubbell,
John Huang, and Mark Middleton and other witnesses, such as
Pauline Kanchanlak and Charlie Trie, having left the country,
the Committee issued numerous letter requests and over 100
subpoenas to related entities and individuals.
In the face of the White House's refusal to fully comply
with the Committee's lawfully executed subpoenas, the Committee
in late April issued six additional, ``targeted'' subpoenas
covering Charlie Trie, John Huang, Webster Hubbell, Pauline
Kanchanalak, the Riady family, and Mark Middleton. After
substantial negotiations between the White House and the
Committee and the scheduling of a contempt hearing by the
Committee for May 21, 1997, the White House on May 20, 1997
agreed to release all relevant documents in its possession by
June 13, 1997, with the exception of 40 documents it has listed
on a privilege log it submitted to the Committee.
The Committee undertakes its responsibilities in this
investigation in a grave and cautious manner. It is aware of
the great seriousness of the potential crimes adversely
affecting our national security that may have been committed
and the possibility that power was abused at the highest
levels. The Committee believes that no delay may be endured in
investigating the possible trading of access for money and
possible obstruction of justice. The Committee has not declared
any entities off limits and is committed to bringing to light
all instances of illegalities. To this end, the Committee has
issued subpoenas and letter requests to the Republican National
Committee and certain Republican donors and will follow the
facts wherever they lead.
To demonstrate the seriousness of these charges, which
possibly involve senior officials, and the degree to which the
public consternation has been aroused, it is useful to note a
few newspaper editorial quotes:
Americans are now fully aware of the disclosures and
allegations that the law was broken by operatives of
Mr. Clinton's re-election campaign. Of particular
interest is the allegation that money was solicited and
accepted from foreign sources. Every informed account
of the campaign, including many from insiders, says
that senior officials in the White House and the
campaign, as well as Mr. Clinton himself, were involved
in the most intricate details of fund-raising.\20\
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\20\ NY Times, May 2. 1997.
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The fund-raising disclosures have blown up into the
biggest political scandal in the United States since
Watergate. It is paralyzing the President, preoccupying
Congress, and fueling public cynicism about our
political system.\21\
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\21\ NY Times, April 16, 1997.
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We've commented before on the selective way in which
this White House dispenses--and--doesn't dispense--the
truth when it is in trouble. They put up a series of
false fronts; you knock one down only to be confronted
by another. Then they complain about the fact that they
are not believed. They're dead right about that.\22\
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\22\ Washington Post, May 9, 1997.
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It gets progressively easier to see why * * * [there]
may be the makings of an obstruction of justice case in
the White House treatment of Webster Hubbell. * * *
[T]he circumstantial case is already weighty.\23\
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\23\ NY Times, May 6, 1997.
These issues and many others must be fully investigated to
ensure that our national security has not been compromised and
government officials have not obstructed the path of justice.
Through the congressional inquiry and hearing process, the
Government Reform and Oversight Committee has an obligation to
the American people to investigate the many allegations of
wrongdoing on the part of this administration and others
connected with these and related events.
BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR THE RESOLUTION
The broad authority for the Congress to conduct
investigations is well-established and universally recognized.
* * * although there is no express provision of the
Constitution which specifically authorizes the Congress
to conduct investigations and take testimony for the
purposes of performing its legitimate functions,
numerous decisions of the Supreme Court have firmly
established that the investigatory power of Congress is
so essential to the legislative function as to be
implicit in the general vesting of legislative power in
Congress.'' (CRS Report 95-464; ``Investigative
Oversight: An Introduction to the Law, Practice and
Procedure of Congressional Inquiry, by Mort Rosenberg,
April 7, 1995)
In furtherance of Congress' legitimate investigative
function, the standing Rules of the House provide the
committees with the general authority and tools needed to carry
out most investigations of matters that properly fall within
their jurisdiction.
The specific provisions governing committees' investigative
procedures can be found in House rule XI.
Clause 2(h)(1) establishes a minimum quorum of two members
for taking testimony or receiving evidence in a committee.
Clause 2(k) outlines procedures for the conduct of
investigative hearings designed to balance the interests of the
committee in gathering necessary testimony and evidence while
carefully safeguarding certain procedural rights of witnesses.
These procedures include: announcement by the chairman of
the subject of the investigation; provision of the committee's
rules and the relevant House rules to each witness; allowance
for witnesses to be accompanied by counsel; authority for the
chairman to appropriately punish accompanying counsel for
breaches of order, decorum or professional ethics; guidelines
for taking testimony or evidence in executive session when it
is asserted that such testimony or evidence may tend to defame,
degrade or incriminate any person; restrictions on the release
of evidence or testimony taken in executive session; discretion
for the committee to determine the pertinence of testimony and
evidence; and means for a witness to obtain a transcript of
testimony given in public or executive session.
Clause 2(m)(1)(A) authorizes committees and subcommittees
to sit and act (including holding hearings) within the United
States whether the House is in session, has recessed or has
adjourned.
Clause 2(m)(1)(B) authorizes committees and subcommittees
to require by subpoena or otherwise the production of documents
or the testimony of witnesses. It further authorizes the
chairman of the committee, or any member of the committee
designated by the chairman, to administer oaths to any witness.
Clause 2(m)(2) specifies that subpoenas necessary for the
conduct of an investigation must be authorized by a majority
vote of the committee's (or subcommittee's) members, a majority
being present. However, this rule allows a committee to adopt
written rules delegating to its chairman the authority to issue
subpoenas in connection with an ongoing investigation.
These standing rules have, for the most part, proven
sufficient to permit the House to fulfill its legitimate
investigative functions. The Rules Committee continues to
believe that these rules have proven resilient, have served the
House and the public well, and are not in need of any permanent
revision.
There have been times, however, when the complexity and
broad scope of a pending investigation have prompted the House
to grant standing committees or select committees special
authorities to assist in the orderly conduct of those
investigations. The Rules Committee believes that this type of
case-by-case approach has been effective in maintaining the
primacy of the standing rules of the House while allowing for
the necessary flexibility to respond to special circumstances
involving major investigations.
Specifically, since 1974 there have been at least 10 major
investigations undertaken in the House where the membership
determined that the standing rules did not provide sufficient
flexibility or authority to ensure completion of a thorough and
complete inquiry. In those cases the House has adopted a
special resolution, brought forward under the original
jurisdiction of the Rules Committee, granting special
authorities to a standing committee or, in certain cases,
establishing a temporary select committee or subcommittee for
the purpose of conducting the investigation.
These resolutions have been carefully drawn to ensure that
the investigatory panel has the authority to conduct a
comprehensive investigation while the basic principles of the
standing rules of the House, including protection of the rights
of witnesses, are upheld. [see Appendix A in this report for
the text of these resolutions]
Regarding the handling of information obtained under the
authority granted by aspecial resolution, the House has
frequently provided that such material is considered to be taken in
executive session. The purpose of this designation is to ensure that
the witness protection afforded under clause 2(k)(7), which requires
approval by the committee to release evidence or testimony received in
executive session, is maintained.
Perhaps the most common ``special authority'' granted by
the House to assist the conduct of investigations is the
authority to allow a single member of the committee or staff
designated by the chairman to take depositions. Members who
have participated in major congressional investigations are
well aware that depositions of key witnesses in such complex
cases can last for hours or even extend beyond a single day.
Given the many demands on members' time, it has at times proven
extremely difficult to meet the two-member quorum requirement
by clause 2(h)(1) of rule XI.
In these cases the House has acknowledged the reality of
scheduling conflicts, recognizing that frequent interruptions
and distractions would undoubtedly impact upon the quality of
the investigative proceedings. Because it is in the best
interests of the House and the nation to ensure that major
investigations are thorough and are not unduly prolonged, the
House has in such clearly defined cases approved a resolution
granting a committee or select committee the authority to allow
a single member or designated staff to take depositions.
The Committee on Rules is generally reluctant to depart
from the two-Member quorum requirement for committees to
receive evidence. The Rules Committee believes that the rule
assigns the proper responsibility to receive evidence to the
Members of the House and notes that the rule was also designed
to protect witnesses in a congressional inquiry. Nevertheless,
due to the magnitude and severity of the revelations from the
executive branch, and the need to bolster the ability of the
Government Reform and Oversight Committee to properly
investigate this matter, the Rules Committee is compelled to
report to the House a resolution granting staff deposition
authority.
The House has also, on occasion, recognized the need to
provide standing or select committees undertaking major
investigations the specific authority to seek testimony and
evidence beyond the borders of the United States. In at least
six major investigations since 1975, the House has concluded
that the need for gathering evidentiary information from abroad
justified granting special authorities to the committees
charged with conducting those investigations. This special
authority, which is generally constrained by the level of
international cooperation that can be secured in each specific
case, allows the committee to employ existing channels (through
the courts and other diplomatic means) for seeking to interview
individuals in foreign countries or gain access to foreign-held
information.
According to Mort Rosenberg, a CRS Specialist in American
Public Law:
In the end, the degree of legal formality and
difficulty encountered by the committee if it seeks to
hold hearings in a foreign country or to have
depositions taken or written interrogatories answered,
will depend on the nature and sensitivity of the
inquiry sought to be conducted which, in turn, will
often determine the extent of international comity that
will be accorded.
In the recent past, standing committees and select
committees whose investigations necessitated access to
individuals or information in a foreign country have been
granted additional authority by the House to take depositions
and other testimony outside the United States, to make
application for the issuance of letters rogatory and request
other means of international assistance.
This type of authority has proven necessary in cases where
individuals whose testimony is relevant to an investigation are
not present within the United States and have been, in some
cases, unwilling to cooperate voluntarily with the
investigation. In addition, there have been cases where a
committee has sought access to records and other documentary
evidence that could not be gathered within the United States.
According to Mort Rosenberg, a CRS Specialist in American
Public Law:
The authority to obtain letters rogatory and to seek
international assistance in obtaining evidence from
foreign countries serves two important congressional
purposes. It provides the committee with necessary
authority to utilize formal judicial and international
treaty processes; and it gives legitimacy to less
formal ventures to obtain needed information.
The term ``letter rogatory'' is a letter of request from a
court in the United States seeking judicial action by a foreign
court, including taking evidence or serving a subpoena or other
legal notice to someone who is subject to that foreign court's
jurisdiction.
As Mort Rosenberg explained:
Even though letters of request may often be sent
directly from court to court, some foreign governments
require that these requests be submitted through
diplomatic channels. Under 28 U.S.C.A. Section
1781(a)(2), the transmission of such requests through
the State Department (i.e., diplomatic) channels is
authorized * * *. The diplomatic route involves the
transmission of the request from the U.S. court to the
Department of State to the U.S. embassy to the Foreign
Ministry which will execute the request * * *. An
example of one instance of an application for
international judicial assistance is the paperwork
prepared by the House Select Committee on
Assassinations to question persons in Portugalabout the
King assassination.
House rules grant committees the ability to carry out their
investigative responsibilities under the rules and, in clause
2(m)(1)(B) authorize committees ``to sit and act at such times
and places within the United States, whether the House is in
session, has recessed, or has adjourned * * *'' A House
resolution is necessary to grant the Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight the ability to obtain evidence anywhere
outside the United States.
The Committee on Rules is concerned at the allegations of
campaign finance improprieties in this case, and it is truly
alarmed at the possibility that American national security may
have been severely compromised in this affair. The Committee
believes that any House resolution granting special
investigative authorities to the Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight should acknowledge the international aspects of
this scandal. Press reports indicate that potential witnesses
may have left the United States, and the media has also
reported that certain campaign contributions may have
originated overseas. The Rules Committee believes that the
Government Reform and Oversight Committee would be hampered in
its ability to gather evidence if the authority to employ
standard international evidence-gathering techniques were not
included in the resolution.
In the investigation into the White House Travel Office
matter in the 104th Congress, the Government Reform and
Oversight Committee adopted a committee rule specifying the
procedures to be employed if the House granted staff deposition
authority to the Committee. This committee rule addressed the
procedures for taking depositions, provisions for notice,
transcription of depositions, the rights of the minority to
participate in depositions, and witness protections.
The Committee on Rules recommended, in the 105th Congress,
that the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight adopt a
committee rule setting forth procedures for this investigation
in advance, if the House grants the Committee special
investigative authorities.
On June 18, the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight adopted committee rules 20 and 21 by a vote of 22-17.
[The text of committee rules 20 and 21 are contained in
Appendix B.]
In addition to the specific procedures for taking
depositions adopted recently, the rules of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight for the 105th Congress address
various investigative abilities of the committee, and are
entirely consistent with precedents.
In the 103rd Congress, the rules of the (then) Committee on
Government Operations delegated the power to authorize and
issue subpoenas as provided in House rules directly to the
chairman of the Committee. In the 104th Congress, the Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight adopted a committee rule
which also delegated the power to authorize and issue subpoenas
as provided in House rules directly to the chairman of the
Committee. That committee rule was limited by a further
committee rule later in the 2nd session of the 104th Congress.
Similarly, in the 105th Congress, the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight adopted a committee rule which
delegated the power to authorize and issue subpoenas as
provided in House rules directly to the chairman of the
Committee. This rule was adopted along with the committee's
rules at the committee's organizational meeting on February 12,
1997 by a voice vote. The Committee then established further
procedures relating to the issuance of subpoenas in its
Protocol for Documents adopted on April 10, 1997 by a vote of
21-16.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE RESOLUTION
Section 1 applies the authorities granted by H. Res. 167 to
the investigation by the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight into political fundraising improprieties and possible
violations of law. The application of the resolution contained
in Sec. 1 is identical to the application of the investigation
contained in the Government Reform and Oversight Committee's
Protocol for Documents, adopted by the Committee on April 10,
1997 by a vote of 21-16.
Section 2 considers information obtained under authority of
the resolution as taken by the Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight in the District of Columbia, as well as at the
location actually taken; and, considers information obtained
under authority of the resolution as taken in executive
session. The Committee on Rules intends that such information,
taken in executive session, should not be released or used in
public sessions without the consent of the committee, as
provided in clause 2(k)(7) of House rule XI.
The resolution states clearly that information sought
through depositions or interrogatories shall be considered as
taken in executive session. As such, questions put at
depositions and in interrogatories are propounded with the full
authority of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.
Failure of a deponent or of a personto whom interrogatories are
propounded to answer such questions is subject to sanction under 2
U.S.C. Sec. 192. Pursuant to this statute, the issue of pertinency of
any question is left for ultimate resolution of the courts in the event
a default in responding to interrogatories or a refusal to answer in
the course of a deposition is certified for prosecution, but should
also be first decided by the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight consistent with clause 2(k)(8) of Rule XI as part of any
statement of fact provided for in 2 U.S.C. Sec.194.
Section 3 authorizes the chairman of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, after consultation with the
ranking minority member of the committee, to order the taking
of depositions or interrogatories anywhere within the United
States, under oath and pursuant to notice or subpoena; and, to
designate a member of the committee or an attorney on the staff
of the committee to conduct any such proceeding. The authority
granted by the resolution will allow the Committee to take
sworn testimony quickly and confidentially. The authorities
contained in the resolution are necessary tools to enable the
Committee to effectively conduct its investigation,
acknowledging the domestic and international nature of the
scandal in question.
Section 4 authorizes the chairman of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, after consultation with the
ranking minority member of the committee, to order the taking
of depositions and other testimony under oath anywhere outside
the United States; and, to make application for issuance of
letters rogatory, and to request, through appropriate channels,
other means of international assistance, as appropriate. The
Rules Committee understands the assessment made by CRS that
``letters of request are honored on the basis of comity between
the courts addressed'' and recognizes that cooperation and
assistance from the Department of State and foreign governments
will be integral to securing the necessary evidence and
testimony from beyond the borders of the United States. It is
the expectation of the Rules Committee that the legitimate
inquiry being conducted on behalf of the American public will
be given all possible assistance as it works to get to the
bottom of the very serious charges that form the basis of this
investigation.
MATTERS REQUIRED UNDER THE RULES OF THE HOUSE
Committee votes
Pursuant to clause 2(l)(2)(B) of House rule XI the results
of each rollcall vote on an amendment or motion to report,
together with the names of those voting for and against, are
printed below:
Rules Committee Rollcall No. 34
Date: June 19, 1997.
Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight.
Motion by: Mr. Moakley.
Summary of motion: To amend the resolution to replace
``consultation'' with requirement for ``concurrence'' with the
minority or a vote of the committee.
Results: Rejected, 3-9.
Vote by Members:
Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay; Diaz-
Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay; Myrick--Nay;
Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea; Solomon--Nay.
Rules Committee Rollcall No. 35
Date: June 19, 1997.
Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight.
Motion by: Mr. Moakley.
Summary of motion: Strike the sections of the report
entitled, ``Summary of the Investigation to Date'' and
``Background on the Investigation''.
Results: Rejected, 3-9.
Vote by Members:
Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay; Diaz-
Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay; Myrick--Nay;
Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea; Solomon--Nay.
Rules Committee Rollcall No. 36
Date: June 19, 1997.
Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight.
Motion by: Mr. Moakley.
Summary of motion: To amend the resolution to prohibit
subpoena for any witness already deposed by the Senate unless
the committee votes to issue the subpoena.
Results: Rejected, 3-9.
Vote by Members:
Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay; Diaz-
Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay; Myrick--Nay;
Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea; Solomon--Nay.
Rules Committee Rollcall No. 37
Date: June 19, 1997.
Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight.
Motion by: Mr. Moakley.
Summary of motion: To amend the resolution to limit
deposition rounds to one hour for each side.
Results: Rejected, 3-9.
Vote by Members:
Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay; Diaz-
Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay; Myrick--Nay;
Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea; Solomon--Nay.
Rules Committee Rollcall No. 38
Date: June 19, 1997.
Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight.
Motion by: Mr. Frost.
Summary of motion: To amend the resolution to clarify the
scope of the investigation by adding after ``possible
violations of the law'' ``as they relate to such fundraising
activities''.
Results: Rejected, 3-9.
Vote by Members:
Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay; Diaz-
Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay; Myrick--Nay;
Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea; Solomon--Nay.
Rules Committee Rollcall No. 39
Date: June 19, 1997.
Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight.
Motion by: Mrs. Slaughter.
Summary of motion: To amend the resolution to strengthen
due process by requiring that a copy of 18 USC 1001 be provided
to individuals before they are asked to respond to a request
for information.
Results: Rejected, 3-9.
Vote by Members:
Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay; Diaz-
Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay; Myrick--Nay;
Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea; Solomon--Nay.
Rules Committee Rollcall No. 40
Date: June 19, 1997.
Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight.
Motion by: Mrs. Slaughter.
Summary of motion: To amend the resolution to: (a) require
notice to minority of all interviews; (b) require all testimony
and information obtained from such interviews to be provided to
both sides; (c) require all staff travel requests be provided
to the minority along with a statement of purpose for the trip
and names of individuals to be interviewed.
Results: Rejected 3-9.
Vote by Members: Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay;
Pryce--Nay; Diaz-Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay;
Myrick--Nay; Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea;
Solomon--Nay.
Rules Committee Rollcall No. 41
Date: June 19, 1997.
Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight.
Motion by: Mrs. Slaughter.
Summary of motion: To amend the resolution to require the
committee database to be made available to the minority.
Results: Rejected 3-9.
Vote by Members: Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay;
Pryce--Nay; Diaz-Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay;
Myrick--Nay; Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea;
Solomon--Nay.
Rules Committee Rollcall No. 42
Date: June 19, 1997.
Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight.
Motion by: Mr. Dreier.
Summary of motion: To order H. Res. 167 reported.
Results: Adopted 9-3.
Vote by Members: Dreier--Yea; Goss--Yea; Linder--Yea;
Pryce--Yea; Diaz-Balart--Yea; McInnis--Yea; Hastings--Yea;
Myrick--Yea; Moakley--Nay; Frost--Nay; Slaughter--Nay;
Solomon--Yea.
Congressional Budget Office estimates
Clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI requires each committee to
include a cost estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office, pursuant to section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, if the cost estimate is
timely submitted. No cost estimate was received from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office.
Oversight findings
Clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI requires each committee report
to contain oversight findings and recommendations required
pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X. The Committee has no
oversight findings.
Oversight findings and recommendations of the Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight
Clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI requires each committee report
to contain a summary of the oversight findings and
recommendations made by the Government Reform and Oversight
Committee pursuant to clause 4(c)(2) of rule X, whenever such
findings have been timely submitted. The Committee on Rules has
received no such findings or recommendations from the Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight.
Views of committee members
Clause 2(l)(5) of rule XI requires each committee to afford
a two day opportunity for members of the committee to file
additional, minority, or dissenting views and to include the
views in its report. Although this requirement does not apply
to the Committee, the Committee always makes the maximum effort
to provide its members with such an opportunity. The following
views were submitted:
BURTON INVESTIGATION MINORITY VIEWS
If we had any hopes that the investigation in the
Government Reform Committee would be on the level and include a
thorough investigation of fundraising improprieties by both
political parties, those hopes were dashed when we read this
report. The first 12 pages of the report focus totally on
allegations of wrongdoing on the part of Democratic fundraising
activities. Not one specific instance cited any alleged
offenses of the Republican fundraising efforts, of which there
are a number.
We oppose the granting of this special investigative
authority contained in H. Res. 167. Not because we want to
forestall or disrupt any legitimate investigation, but because
we feel the authority provided in this resolution is
unnecessary, will be used to abuse the process, and will
guarantee neither the protection of individual rights nor the
rights of the minority party in this proceeding.
Prior to the 104th Congress, only the Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct for ethics matters and the
Judiciary Committee for impeachment proceedings were given this
special type of subpoena power for deposing of witnesses. No
other standing committees were granted this extraordinary
power. In the 104th Congress, the Rules Committee passed a
resolution, regarding the White House Travel Office, which was
similar to, but more modest in its scope that H. Res. 167. At
that time, we expressed our concern that the resolution granted
far too much unilateral authority to the Chairman of the
Government Reform Committee. Furthermore, the 104th resolution
was done at a time when there appeared to be a reasonable
degree of cooperation and communication between the Chairman
and Ranking Minority Member. Throughout that hearing and mark-
up process, we were constantly assured by our majority as well
as the majority on the Government Reform Committee that every
effort would be made to guarantee the rights of the minority in
the investigative process and to include the minority in all
aspects of the investigation. However, even in this situation
where the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member had a relatively
civil working relationship, the rules were not always followed
and there were abuses by the majority party of the powers
granted in that rather rare House Resolution. We have many
reservations about this process.
The scope of the resolution is unclear. It is an
improvement over the initial resolution drafted by the
Republicans on the Government Reform Committee, which had
virtually no limits on its scope and could have been used for
essentially any investigation done by that committee. H. Res.
167 was modified to contain some limitations, but not enough.
the resolution applies to investigations by the Committee ``of
political fundraising improprieties and possible violations of
law.'' It is unclear if ``possible violations of law'' applies
only to political fundraising improprieties, or if it could be
expanded beyond that arena. During the RulesCommittee markup,
we offered an amendment to clarify that the ``possible violations of
law'' were pertaining only to political fundraising activities.
Unfortunately the amendment was defeated.
The resolution also allows the Chairman, after consulting
with the Ranking Minority Member, to take depositions anywhere
in the world and authorizes a variety of mechanisms to obtain
international assistance in gathering information. This
authority has been granted in other major congressional
investigations, and we do not necessarily object to its
inclusion in this resolution. We would add a note of caution,
however, that the conduct of the Government Reform Committee in
this investigation has been marked by partisanship, harassment
of some witnesses, misrepresentation and misleading statements,
information leaks by staff, and disregard for the right of the
minority to participate in this process. This does not instill
our confidence that international working relationships can be
achieved, or that the example of previous congressional
investigations will be followed. In a recent briefing on this
issue, CRS experts stressed that the ability to gain access to
and information from foreign sources depends almost totally
upon the willingness of the host country to allow it. This
requires comity and clarity. We urge the Committee to engage in
the kind of cooperative, bipartisan working arrangements which
have enabled other congressional investigations to succeed.
H. Res. 167 does not contain any time limitation or an
expiration date. It is extremely rare for a grant of authority
of this nature to be without some type of sunset provision. The
resolution from the 104th Congress did not have a cut-off date
in the resolution but did have one in the special Government
Reform Committee rules enacted for implementation of the
resolution. We believe that a time limit should at the very
least be addressed in the Committee rules. If additional time
is needed, the House can, as it has in the past on numerous
occasions, approve an extension. We offered an amendment with a
generous and reasonable cut-off date of December 31, 1997 which
happens to be the date that the supplemental funding for the
fundraising investigation expires. The amendment was not
approved.
We have very grave concerns regarding the role of the
minority throughout this process. The Republican majority on
the Government Reform and Oversight Committee has trampled on
the rights of its minority members since its organization at
the beginning of this Congress. Subpoenas have been issued
unilaterally by the Chairman with no consultation and little or
no advance notice to the Ranking Minority Member. Little or no
notice has been given of witness interviews, including
committee authorized and funded staff travel both inside and
outside the country for those interviews. The minority has not
been allowed to participate in any of the interviews. Protests
over this behavior have gone unacknowledged. Numerous
correspondence sent by the Ranking Minority Member asking for
clarification of these activities and others regarding this
investigation has gone unanswered.
Nothing in this resolution in any way includes or
guarantees viable minority participation in the investigation.
Government Reform Committee rules adopted on June 17, 1997
include modest minority protections in some instances, but fail
to provide the minority with rights in the more substantive
areas. It is particularly disconcerting that the committee
rules provide that the Chairman ``upon consultation'' with the
ranking minority member ``may order the taking of
interrogatories or depositions, under oath and pursuant to
notice or subpoena,'' in effect, giving total, unilateral
authority to the Chairman. At the very least the chair should
be required instead to ``concur'' with the Ranking Minority
Member or by approval of the committee in this instance. The
minority is not seeking for veto authority over any particular
subpoena, but simply an opportunity to present to the committee
their views and have an opportunity for consideration of those
views. The committee rules from the 104th Congress, under
Chairman Clinger, required concurrence. We are at a loss as to
why this prerequisite was not retained and was, in fact,
replaced with a much weaker requirement.
This was not the only change that was made in the committee
rules that was used to administer the resolution from the 104th
Congress. Another substantial change from the 104th special
committee rules is the manner in which witnesses are questioned
in the deposition. Previously the rounds of questioning of
deposed witnesses would alternate every hour (i.e. 1 hour by
the majority and 1 hour by the minority) until all parties
gathered the necessary information. The rules for H. Res. 167
provide that questioning of witnesses will be done in rounds
with the majority acting, first, asking questions until
finished. Only then would the minority member or designated
staff attorney be allowed to question the witness. Conceivably
the majority could question a witness for several hours before
allowing the minority to ask even a single question. Current
committee practice alternates between the majority and the
minority. This practice should occur in staff depositions as
well. We think H. Res. 167 should follow the rules utilized in
the last Congress.
We are distressed that in the previous resolution, there
were problems with minority rights at witness depositions. In
at least one instance, when the majority staff decided to cut
off a deposition and ordered the court reporter to stop, the
minority staff did not want to stop and requested that the
court reporter continue, the majority staff prevailed. There is
nothing in either the resolution or the accompanying committee
rules that would protect the minority's right in this
situation. We would hope that such blatant abuse of the power
of the majority would not be tolerated.
We are deeply, deeply concerned that individual rights may
be compromised and, at worst, abused in this investigation by
way of this resolution. Neither the resolution or the
accompanying rules provide necessary safeguards to protect
those who will be subject to the measure. We think it is
extremely perilous to allow staff, in a closed session, to have
virtually unlimited questioning of a witness with little orno
rights given to the individual being deposed. There is ample
opportunity for staff to intimidate and harass witnesses. These
interrogative sessions are not trials or courts of law. People
approaching these staff depositions should not be deprived of the
protections that are generally available to those giving statements
under oath.
We also believe that witnesses have the right to have
counsel and anyone else of their choosing at a deposition and
should not be limited in that right as they are in the
resolution's committee rules. Another point with regard to
individual rights that is too often overlooked or ignored when
a committee becomes overzealous in utilizing its investigative
powers is the cost of legal counsel for the witnesses. Because
of the accusatory manner most witnesses desire to be
accompanied by counsel at any interview taking place, whether
under oath or not. Additionally, recent changes to title 18,
section 1001 of the U.S. Code make it illegal for anyone to in
any way mislead Congress, subjecting the violator to a fine
and/or imprisonment of up to five years, making representation
by counsel a necessity in an investigative setting. While we
would not suggest that pertinent witnesses be bypassed because
of the potential cost of counsel, we urge the committee to
consider the financial burden that may be placed on potential
witnesses, particularly if that person testimony is likely to
have little or no relevance to the investigation at hand.
Investigations are not fishing expeditions, and subjecting
dozens of witnesses to such a process is unfair, unprincipled,
and not a practice in which the committee should be engaging.
We are still concerned over clarifying language in the
report regarding contempt against a subpoenaed individual who
refuses to be interviewed but is willing to testify before the
committee at a regular meeting. Absent clarifying language,
there is a danger of challenging long-standing practices of the
House which holds that there are no grounds for a contempt
citation if a witness refuses to appear before or to answer
questions in a staff deposition provided that the witness
responds fully at a duly called hearing of the committee with a
quorum of members present. As in the resolution in the 104th
Congress in which we consulted with the House Parliamentarian,
we offered the following language and requested that it be
included in the report:
The procedure used in this resolution which
authorizes the deposition of witnesses by staff is
meant to augment and not replace the current
information gathering function of a committee hearing.
Nothing in this resolution is intended to change the
long-standing precedent that there are no grounds for a
contempt citation if a witness refuses to appear before
or to answer questions in a staff deposition provided
that the witness responds fully at a duly called
hearing of the committee with a quorum of members
present.
The committee instead adopted language that guarantees a
committee vote on the issue of pertinency of any question. We
recognize that this does follow the long-standing practices of
the House and would require a vote in the committee and in the
House before any contempt citation could be issued. However, we
hope that the majority staff of the Committee on Government
Reform will exercise this power fairly and will not use this
authority to ``bully'' witnesses in interrogations.
In conclusion, we cannot support this resolution for these
and other reasons. While we clearly recognize and fully support
the right of Congress through its committee structure to
conduct investigations, we are deeply concerned that under the
proposed resolution and accompanying committee rules there is
far too much unilateral power given to the Chairman and far too
much unchecked authority that can be designated to the staff.
We also simply were not given an adequate explanation of why
this authority is needed. There is a real danger that this type
of resolution is now becoming a routine tool to circumvent the
traditional committee process. It should be used rarely, only
when warranted by extraordinary circumstances. The regular
hearing route coupled with informal staff interviews should be
more than adequate for this particular investigation, as it is
for the other standing committees of the House. We should not
be in the habit of making this type of resolution a routine
occurrence. Clearly, in a democracy the power rests with the
majority. However, with that power comes a responsibility to be
painstakingly fair to all sides involved. Without this fairness
you cannot have a credible investigation that produces anything
of value. We do not support this measure and hope that the full
House in its wisdom will share our concerns and reject this
unwise resolution.
Joe Moakley.
Tony P. Hall.
Martin Frost.
Louise McIntosh Slaughter.
DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY
I am filing these views to emphasize my strong opposition
to the action taken by the Rules Committee in reporting this
resolution. This does not mean that I object to the underlying
investigation. I believe it is important to investigate
allegations of campaign finance abuse by both political
parties. We have before us an opportunity to identify and
terminate the kind of wrongdoing which corrupts the American
political system and further erodes the confidence of the
American people. The fact there has never been an investigation
of this magnitude into campaign finance practices gives us the
opportunity us to accomplish something of real value.
Unfortunately, I fear this opportunity is being squandered in
unending, unfocused, duplicative interrogation that costs the
public money and could subject many individuals--with little or
no connection to the instances under investigation--to lengthy,
expensive legal proceedings.
The partisan tone of this committee report reflects the
partisan nature of the investigation being conducted by the
Government Reform Committee. If we were really serious about
conducting an effective investigation, we would be doing
everything in our power to ensure the credibility and
thoroughness of this investigation. That means creating
procedures that make it as easy as possible for individuals to
come forward with pertinent information and talk frankly with
the investigators for the Government Reform Committee. It means
putting in place a carefully crafted, fair institutional
process so that we protect the ability of our committees to use
their prerogatives in the future. Both these principles,
combined, would bring the greatest possible access to witnesses
and the underlying documents which would form the foundation of
any report that might be produced.
Mr. Solomon has tried, to his credit, to bring a more
workable process to this resolution. The rules no longer
include authority sought by the Chairman of the Committee on
Government Reform, Mr. Burton, authorizing staff to rifle
through the tax records of prospective witnesses. That is an
improvement; however, I must oppose the granting of the special
investigative authorities contained in H. Res. 167. It still is
not enough. I believe the authority provided in this resolution
is unnecessary, increases the partisanship already apparent in
this process, and fails to protect the rights of individuals as
well as the rights of the minority in the proceedings.
The resolution gives the Chairman of the Government Reform
Committee extraordinary power to unilaterally issue subpoenas
for deposition, and denies the minority even minimal procedural
protections. It is important to note here that no Member in the
history of this institution--until now--has actually issued a
deposition subpoena unilaterally. Chairman Burton already has
issued 156 unilateral subpoenas for documents in the
fundraising investigation. He asserted in yesterday's hearings
that he intended to seek depositions from ``hundreds and
hundreds'' of witnesses. Yet it is not clear that there is
anything he needs to do that he has not been able to do so far.
He has received a substantial response to his subpoenas for
documents without this resolution. His staff has conducted
interviews, though the exact number is not known because the
minority has not been consulted. The investigative staff has
not yet begun to seek interviews with employees at the White
House, but witnesses generally seem willing to come forward to
talk. The Committee minority has indicated they would support
any effort to subpoena key witnesses to the investigation, if
necessary. So why is this extraordinary unilateral power
needed?
I am especially concerned about these new authorities
because of the way the minority has been treated throughout
this process. Nothing in this resolution in any way includes or
guarantees viable minority participation in the investigation.
My specific concerns are expressed in greater detail in
separate minority views in this committee report. For these and
other reasons, I cannot support this resolution. I fear we are
being sucked into an investigation with no shape and no end
under the direction of a Committee seeking extraordinary
authorities with no demonstrated need.
I wonder who is looking out for the rights of the
individual. I believe the individual witnesses deserve a fair
process with adequate protection for his or her rights. And I
believe we need a credible outcome. This will require a fair
process with a well-defined scope, true consultation with the
minority, and behavior that doesn't trample on the rights of
individuals along the way. Recent history tells us that other
major congressional investigations--October Surprise, Iran-
Contra and even Bosnia--accomplished these goals when the
majority and minority operated jointly in the course of the
investigation. Both sides were able to work side-by-side and
keep the investigation honest. Without this kind of cooperation
and fairness, we cannot hope to have a credible investigation
that produces anything of value.
Joe Moakley.
APPENDIX A
Excerpts From Resolutions Which Have Granted Staff Deposition Authority
and International Evidence Gathering Mechanisms
Bosnia Select Subcommittee (H. Res. 416, 104th Congress)
Staff deposition authority:
(e)(1) The chairman of the select subcommittee, for
purposes of its investigation, may, upon consultation
with the ranking minority party member of the select
subcommittee, authorize the taking of affidavits and
depositions pursuant to notice or subpoena, by a member
of the select subcommittee or of the staff of the
Committee on International Relations designated by the
chairman of the select subcommittee, or require the
furnishing of information by interrogatory, under oath
administered by a person otherwise authorized by law to
administer oaths.
White House Travel Office Matter (H. Res. 369, 104th Congress)
Staff deposition authority:
(a) The Chairman of the Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight, for the purposes of the
committee's investigation and study of the White House
Travel Office matter, may, upon consultation with the
ranking minority member of the committee, authorize the
taking of affidavits, and of depositions pursuant to
notice or subpoena, by a member or staff of the
committee designated by the chairman, or require the
furnishing of information by interrogatory, under oath
administered by a person otherwise authorized by law to
administer oaths.
(b) Deposition and affidavit testimony, and
information received by interrogatory, shall be deemed
to have been taken in executive session of the
committee in Washington, District of Columbia. All
deposition and affidavit testimony and information
received by interrogatory shall be considered nonpublic
until received by the committee, except that all such
testimony and information shall, unless otherwise
directed by the committee, be available for use by
members of the committee in open session of the
committee.
Senate Whitewater Investigation (S. Res. 120, 104th Congress)
Staff deposition authority:
Sec. 5(b)(7) * * * All depositions shall be conducted
jointly by majority and minority staff of the special
committee. A witness at a deposition shall be examined
upon oath administered by a member of the special
committee or an individual authorized by local law to
administer oaths, and a complete transcription or
electronic recording of the deposition shall be made.
Questions shall be propounded first by majority staff
of the special committee and then by minority staff of
the special committee. Any subsequent round of
questioning shall proceed in the same order. Objections
by the witness as to the form of questions shall be
noted for the record. If a witness objects to a
question and refuses to answer on the basis of
relevance or privilege, the special committee staff may
proceed with the deposition, or may, at that time or at
a subsequent time, seek a ruling on the objection from
the chairman. If the chairman overrules the objection,
the chairman may order and direct the witness to answer
the question, but the special committee shall not
initiate procedures leading to civil or criminal
enforcement unless the witness refuses to answer after
having been ordered and directed to answer.
Sec. 5(b)(8) Delegations To Staff.--To issue
commissions and to notice depositions for staff members
to examine witnesses and to receive evidence under oath
administered by an individual authorized by local law
to administer oaths. The special committee, or the
chairman with the concurrence of the ranking member,
may delegate to designated staff members of the special
committee the power to issue deposition notices
authorized pursuant to this paragraph.
International evidence-gathering mechanisms:
Sec. 5(b)(1) Subpoena Powers.--To issue subpoenas or
orders for the attendance of witnesses or for the
production of documentary or physical evidence before
the special committee. A subpoena or order may be
authorized by the special committee or by the chairman
with the agreement of the ranking member, and may be
issued by the chairman or any other member of the
special committee designated by the chairman, and may
be served by any person designated by the chairman or
the authorized member anywhere within or outside of the
borders of the United States to the full extent
permitted by law.
Sec. 5(b)(7) Depositions.--To take depositions and
other testimony under oath anywhere within the United
States, to issue orders that require witnesses to
answer written interrogatories under oath, and to make
application for the issuance of letters rogatory.
October Surprise Task Force (H. Res. 258, 102nd Congress)
Staff deposition authority:
(6) Unless otherwise determined by the Task Force,
the chairman, upon consultation with the ranking
Republican member, or the Task Force, may authorize the
taking of affidavits, and of depositions pursuant to
notice or subpoena, by a Member or by designated staff,
under oath administered by a Member or a person
otherwise authorized by law to administer oaths.
Deposition and affidavit testimony shall be deemed to
have been taken in Washington, DC, before the Task
Force once filed there with the clerk of the Task Force
for the Task Force's use. Depositions shall be deemed
to be taken in Executive Session.
International evidence-gathering mechanisms:
(3) The Task Force is authorized to sit and act
during the present Congress at such times and places
within the United States, including any Commonwealth or
possession thereof, or in any other country, whether
the House is in session, or has adjourned; * * * and to
obtain evidence in other appropriate countries with the
cooperation of their governments and by letters
rogatory, commissions, field depositions and other
appropriate mechanisms. * * * The Task Force may
request investigations, reports, and other assistance
from any agency of the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of the federal government.
Judge Nixon Impeachment Proceedings (H. Res. 562, 100th Congress)
Staff deposition authority:
Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary or its
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, in
connection with the inquiry into the conduct of United
States District Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., may
authorize the taking of affidavits and of depositions
by counsel to such committee pursuant to notice or
subpoena.
Judge Hastings Impeachment Proceedings (H. Res. 320, 100th Congress)
Staff deposition authority:
Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary or its
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, in connection with
the inquiry into the conduct of the United States
District Judge Alcee L. Hastings, may authorize the
taking of affidavits and of depositions by counsel to
such committee pursuant to notice or subpoena.
Iran-Contra Committee--Senate (S. Res. 23, 100th Congress)
Staff deposition authority:
Sec. 5(d)(6) To issue commissions and to notice
depositions for staff members to examine witnesses and
to receive evidence under oath administered by an
individual authorized by local law to administer oaths.
The select committee, acting through the chairman, may
authorize and issue, and may delegate to designated
staff members the power to authorize and issue,
commissions and deposition notices.
International evidence-gathering mechanisms:
Sec. 5(b) The select committee is authorized to issue
subpoenas for obtaining testimony and for the
production of documentary or physical evidence. A
subpoena may be authorized and issued by the select
committee, acting through the chairman or any other
member designated by the chairman, and may be served by
any person designated by such chairman or other member
anywhere within or without the borders of the United
States to the full extent permitted by law. The
chairman of the select committee, or any other member
thereof, is authorized to administer oaths to any
witness appearing before the committee.
Sec. 5(d)(5) To take depositions and other testimony
under oath anywhere within the United States or in any
other country, to issue orders by the chairman or any
other member designated by the chairman which require
witnesses to answer written interrogatories under oath,
to make application for issuance of letters rogatory,
and to request, through appropriate channels, other
means of international assistance, as appropriate.
Iran-Contra Committee--House (H. Res. 12, 100th Congress)
Staff deposition authority:
(6) Unless otherwise determined by the select
committee the chairman, upon consultation with the
ranking minority member, or the select committee, may
authorize the taking of affidavits, and of depositions
pursuant to notice of subpoena, by a Member or by
designated staff, under oath administered by a Member
or a person otherwise authorized by law to administer
oaths. Deposition and affidavit testimony shall be
deemed to have been taken in Washington, DC, before the
select committee once filed there with the clerk of the
committee for the committee's use. Unless otherwise
directed by the committee, all depositions, affidavits,
and other materials received in the investigation shall
be considered nonpublic until received by the select
committee, except that all such material shall, unless
otherwise directed by the committee, be available for
use by the Members of the select committee in open
session.
International evidence-gathering mechanisms:
(3) The select committee is authorized to sit and act
during the present Congressat such times and places
within the United States, including any Commonwealth or possession
thereof, or in any other country, whether the House is in session, has
recessed, or has adjourned; * * *
ABSCAM Investigation (H. Res. 67, 97th Congress)
Single Member testimony authority:
Sec. 4 (a) For the purpose of conducting any inquiry
or investigation pursuant to this resolution, the
committee is authorized to compel--(1) by subpoena or
otherwise--(A) the attendance and testimony of any
person--(i) at a hearing; or (ii) at the taking of a
deposition by one or more members of the committee * *
*
International evidence-gathering mechanisms:
Sec. 4(e) In connection with any inquiry or
investigation pursuant to this resolution, the
committee may request the Secretary of State to
transmit a letter rogatory or request to a foreign
tribunal, officer, or agency.
Sec. 5 For the purpose of conducting any inquiry or
investigation pursuant to this resolution, the
committee is authorized to sit and act, without regard
to clause 2(m) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, at such times and places within or
without the United States, whether the House is
meeting, has recessed, or has adjourned, and to hold
such hearings as it deems necessary.
Koreagate Investigation (H. Res. 752, 95th Congress)
Staff deposition authority:
Resolved, That, in addition to any authority the
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct may have
under H. Res. 252, such committee is authorized to
require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of
and testimony of any person at the taking of a
deposition by any member of the committee or by any
attorney employed or retained by such committee for the
purpose of conducting any inquiry or investigation
pursuant to such a resolution: Provided, That any
objection to any question posed by such attorney shall
be ruled on, and, if the objection is overruled, the
person shall be directed to answer, only by a member of
such committee.
Koreagate Investigation (H. Res. 252, 95th Congress)
International evidence-gathering mechanisms:
Sec. 4(c) Subpoenas and interrogatories authorized
under this section may be issued over the signature of
the chairman, or ranking minority member, or any member
designated by either of them. A subpoena may be served
by any person designated by the chairman, or ranking
minority member, or any member designated by either of
them and may be served either within or without the
United States on any national or resident of the United
States or any other person subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States.
Sec. 4(d) In connection with any inquiry or
investigation pursuant to this resolution, the
committee may request the Secretary of State to
transmit a letter rogatory or request to a foreign
tribunal, officer, or agency.
Sec. 5 For the purpose of conducting any inquiry or
investigation pursuant to this resolution, the
committee is authorized to sit and act, without regard
to clause 2(m) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, during the present Congress at such
times and places within or without the United States,
whether the House is meeting, has recessed, or has
adjourned, and to hold such hearings as it deems
necessary.
House Assassinations Inquiry (H. Res. 222, 95th Congress)
Staff deposition authority and international evidence-
gathering mechanisms:
* * * For the purpose of carrying out this resolution
the select committee, or any subcommittee thereof
authorized by the select committee to hold hearings, is
authorized to sit and act during the present Congress
at such times and places within the United States,
including any Commonwealth or possession thereof, or in
any other country, whether the House is in session, has
recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, and
to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance
and testimony of such witnesses and the production of
such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers,
documents, tangible objects, and other things of any
kind as it deems necessary; to take testimony on oath
anywhere within the United States or in any other
country and to authorize designated counsel for the
select committee to obtain statements from any witness
who is placed under oath by an authority who is
authorized to administer oaths in accordance with the
applicable laws of the United States or any state; * *
*
President Nixon Impeachment Proceedings (H. Res. 803, 93rd Congress)
Staff deposition authority:
Sec. 2(a) For the purpose of making such investigation, the
committee is authorized to require--
(1) by subpoena or otherwise--
(A) the attendance and testimony of any
person (including at a taking of a deposition
by counsel for the committee); and
(B) the production of such things; and
(2) by interrogatory, the furnishing of such
information; as it deems necessary to such
investigation.
International evidence-gathering mechanisms:
Sec. 3 For the purpose of making such investigation,
the committee, and any subcommittee thereof, are
authorized to sit and act, without regard to clause 31
of rule XI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, during the present Congress at such
times and places within or without the United States,
whether the House is meeting, has recessed, or has
adjourned, and to hold such hearings, as it deems
necessary.
APPENDIX B
Final New Committee Rules Passed by the Government Reform and Oversight
Committee on June 18, 1997
Rule 20.--Interrogatories and depositions
The chairman, upon consultation with the ranking minority
member, may order the taking of interrogatories or depositions,
under oath and pursuant to notice or subpoena. Such
authorization may occur on a case-by-case basis, or by
instructions to take a series of interrogatories or
depositions. Notices for the taking of depositions shall
specify the date, time, and place of examination. Answers to
interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing under oath
and depositions shall be taken under oath administered by a
member or a person otherwise authorized by law to administer
oaths. Consultation with the ranking minority member shall
include three business day's written notice before any
deposition is taken. All members shall also receive three
business day's written notice that a deposition has been
scheduled.
The committee shall not initiate contempt proceedings based
on the failure of a witness to appear at a deposition unless
the deposition notice was accompanied by a committee subpoena
issued by the chairman.
Witnesses may be accompanied at a deposition by counsel to
advise them of their rights. No one may be present at
depositions except members, committee staff designated by the
chairman or ranking minority member, an official reported, the
witness, and the witness's counsel. Observers or counsel for
other persons or for agencies under investigation may not
attend.
A deposition shall be conducted by any member or committee
staff attorney designated by the chairman or ranking minority
member. When depositions are conducted by committee staff
attorneys, there shall be no more than two committee staff
attorneys of the committee permitted to question a witness per
round. One of the committee staff attorneys shall be designated
by the chairman and the other shall be designated by the
ranking minority member. Other committee staff members
designated by the chairman or the ranking minority member may
attend, but are not permitted to pose questions to the witness.
Questions in the deposition will be propounded in rounds. A
round shall include as much time as in necessary to ask all
pending questions. In each round, a member or committee staff
attorney designated by the chairman shall ask questions first,
and the member or committee staff attorney designated by the
ranking minority member shall ask question second.
An objection by the witness as to the form of a question
shall be noted for the record. If a witness objects to a
question and refuses to answer, the member or committee staff
attorney may proceed with the deposition, or may obtain, at
that time or a subsequent time, a ruling on the objection by
telephone or otherwise from the chairman or a member designated
chairman. The committee shall not initiate procedures leading
to contempt proceedings based on a refusal to answer a question
at a deposition unless the witness refuses to testify after an
objection of the witness has been overruled and after the
witness has been ordered by the chairman or a member designated
by the chairman to answer the question. Overruled objections
shall be preserved for committee consideration within the
meaning of clause 2(k)(8) of House Rule 11.
Committee staff shall insure the testimony is either
transcribed or electronically recorded, or both. If a witness's
testimony is transcribed, the witness or the witness's counsel
shall be afforded an opportunity to review a copy. No later
than five days thereafter the witness may submit suggested
changes to the chairman. Committee staff may make any
typographical and technical changes requested by the witness.
Substantive changes, modifications, clarifications, or
amendments to the deposition transcript submitted by the
witness must be accompanied by a letter requesting the changes
and a statement of the witness's reasons for each proposed
change. A letter requesting any substantive changes,
modifications, clarifications, or amendments must be signed by
the witness. Any substantive changes, modifications,
clarifications, or amendments shall be included as an appendix
to the transcript conditioned upon the witness signing the
transcript.
The individual administering the oath, if other than a
member, shall certify on the transit that the witness was duly
sworn. The transcriber shall certify that the transcript is a
true record of the testimony and the transcript shall be filed,
together with any electronic recording, with the clerk of the
committee in Washington, D.C. Interrogatories and depositions
shall be considered to have been taken in Washington, D.C. as
well as at the location actually taken once filed there with
the clerk of the committee for the committee's use. The
chairman and the ranking minority member shall be provided with
a copy of the transcripts of the deposition at the same time.
All depositions and interrogatories received pursuant to
this rule shall be considered as taken in executive session.
A witness shall not be required to testify unless the
witness has been provided with a copy of the committee's rules.
This rule is applicable to the committee's investigation of
political fundrasing improprieties and possible violations of
law, and is effective upon adoption of a resolution, in the
House of Representatives, providing the committee with special
investigative authorities.
Rule 21.--Letters rogatory and international government assistance
The chairman, after consultation with the ranking minority
member, may obtain testimony and evidence in other countries
through letters rogatory and other means of international
government cooperation and assistance. The rule is applicable
to the committee's investigation of political fundraising
improprieties and possible violations of law, and is effective
upon adoption of a resolution, in the House of Representatives,
providing the committee with special investigative authorities.