[House Report 105-139]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



105th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 1st Session                                                    105-139
_______________________________________________________________________


 
   PROVIDING SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITIES FOR THE COMMITTEE ON 
                    GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

                                _______
                                

   June 19, 1997.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed

_______________________________________________________________________


   Mr. Solomon, from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                     MINORITY AND DISSENTING VIEWS

                       [To accompany H. Res 167]

    The Committee on Rules, to whom was referred the resolution 
(H. Res. 167) Providing special investigative authorities for 
the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, having 
considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment 
and recommend that the resolution be agreed to.

                       PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION

    The purpose of H. Res. 167 is to provide special 
investigative authorities for the Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight.

                       SUMMARY OF THE RESOLUTION

    H. Res. 167 applies to the investigation by the Committee 
on Government Reform and Oversight of political fund-raising 
improprieties and possible violations of law. The resolution 
states that information obtained under its authority shall be 
considered as taken by the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight in the District of Columbia, as well as at the 
location actually taken, and, that the information shall be 
considered as taken in executive session of the committee.
    The resolution also authorizes the chairman, after 
consultation with the ranking minority member, to order the 
taking of depositions or interrogatories anywhere within the 
United States under oath and pursuant to notice or subpoena, 
and, to designate a member or staff attorney to conduct any 
such proceeding.
    Finally, the resolution authorizes the chairman, after 
consultation with the ranking minority member, to order the 
taking of depositions and other testimony under oath anywhere 
outside the United States, and, to make application for 
issuance of letters rogatory and request, through appropriate 
channels, other means of international assistance.

                        COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

    H. Res. 167 was introduced by Rules Chairman Solomon on 
June 17 and referred to the Committee on Rules.
    On Thursday, June 12, the Committee held a Congressional 
Research Service briefing on the proposed resolution. Testimony 
was heard from: Carol Hardy Vincent, Specialist in American 
National Government, Government Division; Jay Shampansky, 
Legislative Attorney, American Law Division; Mort Rosenberg, 
Specialist in American Public Law, American Law Division.
    On Wednesday, June 18, the Committee held a hearing on H. 
Res. 167 and received testimony from: Hon. Dan Burton, Chairman 
of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and Hon. 
Henry Waxman, Ranking Minority Member of the committee.
    On Thursday, June 19, the Committee held a mark-up of the 
resolution. The Committee favorably reported H. Res. 167 by a 
9-3 vote. During the mark-up, no amendments to H. Res. 167 were 
agreed to. However, the Committee did agree to insert committee 
report language by a voice vote.

                  SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGATION TO DATE

    To date, the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight's 
investigation of political fund-raising improprieties and 
possible violations of law includes the following areas:
    The circumstances surrounding possible national security 
breaches relating to any political donors or potential 
political donors; any possible national security breaches 
resulting from political contacts with the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), the National Security Council (NSC) or any 
intelligence agency of the government; providing political 
donors access to the National Security Council, the CIA, the 
State Department and/or other government agencies; granting 
John Huang, Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie, Democratic National 
Committee (DNC) officials and/or other individuals access to 
classified and/or sensitive national security materials; 
contacts by Huang, Trie and/or other Administration officials 
with the Chinese Embassy; other issues related to the Chinese 
Embassy, the Chinese government and/or other foreign 
governments' attempts to provide funds or assistance in any 
manner to political campaigns or organizations.
    Whether United States domestic and/or foreign policy was 
affected by illegal and/or foreign donations, foreign interests 
and/or foreign governments.
    The circumstances surrounding any possible misuse of 
classified information, how and to whom such information was 
provided, and any possible political actions or economic 
espionage connected with such actions.
    The activities of John Huang including, but not limited to, 
his business and political activities in Arkansas; his 
relationship, employment or otherwise, with any Lippo related 
company and/or affiliate; his contacts with any foreign 
government officials; his contacts with the White House and/or 
any federal agency; his contacts with any present or former 
White House and/or government officials; his contacts with 
Webster Hubbell; his relationship, employment or otherwise, 
with the Commerce Department; and his relationship, employment 
or otherwise, with the DNC, including, but not limited to, his 
fund-raising activities on behalf of the DNC.
    The activities of Charlie Trie, including, but not limited 
to, his business and political activities including, but not 
limited to businesses in Arkansas, Washington, D.C., China, 
Macau, Hong Kong and/or Taiwan; his contacts and/or business 
with foreign governments; his relationship with a number of 
individuals, including, but not limited to, Ng Lap Seng, 
Antonio Pan, and Keshi Zhan; his political activities, 
contributions and fund-raising activities; his role in raising 
funds for the Presidential Legal Expense Trust; his appointment 
to the Commission on United States Pacific Trade and Investment 
Policy; all contacts with the White House and/or any federal 
agency; all contacts with any present or former White House or 
government officials; any contacts with Webster Hubbell; and 
all activities since he left the United States.
    The activities of the Riady family, including, but not 
limited to, their business and political activities in 
Arkansas, California, Indonesia, Hong Kong and China; the 
business and political activities of Lippo related companies 
and/or affiliates; the Riadys' contacts, personal or business, 
with the First Lady, the President and/or any former or current 
Administration official; political or financial contributions 
made by the Riadys and/or any Lippo related company or 
affiliate; the payment(s) to Webster Hubbell by the Riadys and/
or any Lippo affiliate including, but not limited to, Hong Kong 
China Ltd.; and all Riady and/or Lippo related contacts with 
Susan Thomases, Mark Middleton, C. Joseph Giroir, Jr., Mark 
Grobmyer, James Blair, Jim Guy Tucker and/or Betty Tucker and 
any contacts made by these individuals with foreign business 
interests, foreign officials or foreign governments.
    Matters pertaining to Webster Hubbell including all legal 
matters arising out of and/or in connection with work conducted 
while a partner at and/or during his employment by the Rose Law 
Firm; at what time and to whom information about Mr. Hubbell's 
legal problems became known; all contacts with Mr. Hubbell, his 
attorneys, representatives, intermediaries and/or agents 
regarding his legal matters; all contacts with Mr. Hubbell by 
the President, First Lady, James Blair, Mickey Kantor, Mack 
McLarty, Mark Middleton, John Emerson, Marsha Scott, Bruce 
Lindsey, William Kennedy, Bernard Nussbaum, Truman Arnold, 
James Lyons, David Kendall, Robert Barnett, and/or any 
representative of such individuals; all contacts with Mr. 
Hubbell by any past or present White House or administration 
officials; all contacts with federal agency officials; all 
contacts with Lippo related companies and/or affiliates, 
subsidiaries, employees, owners and/or business partners; all 
contacts with Democratic fund-raisers and/or donors; and any 
attempts at obstructing any investigations relating to Webster 
Hubbell, the Rose Law Firm, the First Lady and/or the 
President.
    Matters pertaining to fund-raising abuses by any political 
party or campaign from 1992 to the present; Hatch Act 
violations; possible criminal violations; and potential 
violations of Federal Election Commission regulations; 
including, but not limited to, the funneling of foreign money 
into campaigns and/or political organizations; misuse 
ofgovernment resources for political purposes; and the circumstances 
surrounding the development and use of the White House Data Base 
(WhoDB).
    The circumstances surrounding Harold Ickes' campaign 
related activities and fund-raising role at the White House and 
the DNC, knowledge of any wrongdoing or improprieties, as well 
as the role of other White House officials and DNC employees in 
campaign related activities or fund-raising; and/or any 
misappropriation of federal funds.
    Matters relating to political contributions by Young 
Brothers, Ambrous Young and/or any company related to Ambrous 
Young to the Republican National Committee, the National Policy 
Forum and/or any political entity.
    Matters pertaining to the White House obtaining hundreds of 
FBI files inappropriately and any possible misuse of those 
files; and the involvement of the White House in Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) policy and changes in INS 
policy for any political purposes; and any assistance provided 
by the INS to any questionable fund-raisers or donors or White 
House visitors.
    Any matters related directly or indirectly to the 
foregoing.
    The Government Reform and Oversight Committee anticipates 
that in the course of investigating these various matters, 
other issues invariably will arise. Last year, in the course of 
the Committee's investigation into the White House Travel 
Office matter, a document that the White House initially 
withheld under a claim of privilege was finally turned over 
which resulted in the discovery of the unprecedented abuse of 
FBI files by the White House. The discovery that the White 
House had obtained the FBI file of White House Travel Office 
Director Billy Dale seven months after he was fired by the 
White House, led to the revelation that hundreds of FBI files 
had been gathered at the White House in what FBI Director Louis 
Freeh called an ``egregious violation of privacy.'' At the time 
the Committee obtained the document leading to the FBI files 
matter, the Committee had deposition authority for the White 
House Travel Office matter. The FBI files matter was a matter 
arising out of the initial investigation and the Committee 
conducted more than several dozen depositions in the FBI files 
investigation under the deposition authority initially granted 
to the White House Travel Office matter.

                    BACKGROUND ON THE INVESTIGATION

    The Committee on Government Reform and Oversight is the 
U.S. House of Representative's chief oversight committee. The 
Committee has been compelled by substantial allegations in the 
media, an accumulating body of evidence, and the ensuing public 
outcry to undertake a thorough investigation of potential 
campaign fundraising illegalities and potential national 
security threats. As the principal investigatory body of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee has a statutory 
obligation to scrutinize waste, fraud and abuse in the federal 
government. At this time, the Committee's investigation focuses 
on the use of illegal foreign contributions to influence 
American policy, but it also includes matters relating to 
potential illegal or improper political fundraising, related 
activities involving the White House and other federal 
agencies, improper use of official resources, potential 
interference with government investigations, the FBI files 
matter, the INS naturalization matter, the Webster Hubbell 
matter, and related matters.
    Serious questions of national policy and national security 
abound as daily revelations disclose more troubling facts about 
the unusual access that questionable individuals had to high-
ranking White House and Administration officials in private 
meetings, fundraising ``coffees'' and other political events, 
and official functions. According to one published report, 
``[t]he FBI has obtained substantial evidence that top Chinese 
officials approved plans in 1995 to buy influence with American 
politicians, and that the scheme continued through the 1996 
elections and is ongoing * * *'' \1\ Testifying before a Senate 
subcommittee in March 1997, FBI Director Louis Freeh stated 
that the FBI Task Force investigating the fundraising matter 
would scrutinize as one of its top priorities whether there was 
a direct threat to our national security by a deliberate plan 
by a foreign government to influence our political process. 
Freeh told the subcommittee, ``One of the subjects that the * * 
* task force is going to be investigating are allegations with 
respect to not just illegal political activities and 
contributions, but also the national security aspects of that * 
* * [and] whether the funding or attempted funding or planning 
was originated not by individuals per se, but by a foreign 
government or state sponsor or ministry.'' \2\
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    \1\ Washington Post, April 25, 1997, at A1.
    \2\ Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 21, 1997, at A6.
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    The investigation is also following the flow of money once 
it enters the United States and scrutinizing whether and to 
what extent illegal actions or money influenced government 
officials and official government policies or actions. In doing 
so, the committee will determine whether there is a definable 
pattern of illegal activity and whether there was a commonality 
of purpose involved.
    The activities of former Commerce Department official and 
DNC fund-raiser John Huang, who raised at least $3 million for 
the DNC during the 1996 election cycle, raise many potential 
illegalities, including the misuse of an official government 
position at the Department of Commerce, the illegal disclosure 
of classified information, and questions about the true source 
of the money that he raised and whether White House andDNC 
officials had any knowledge or role in the systematic transfer of funds 
from foreign sources to the Democratic Party.
    John Huang has strong ties to the Indonesia-based Lippo 
Group and worked for banks affiliated with Lippo since the 
early 1980's. The Lippo Group is controlled by the Riady family 
and has large investments in Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, and 
Vietnam. Riady companies and the Riady family, who were 
permanent residents in the United States at the time, 
contributed substantially to the DNC, affiliated state parties, 
and soft money venues during the 1992 election. The Riadys 
subsequently returned to Indonesia following the election. Upon 
leaving the Lippo Group in 1994 to work at Commerce, Huang 
received a bonus package worth hundreds of thousands of 
dollars.
    A recently published report has implicated Huang as having 
deliberately funneled political contributions to the DNC and 
affiliated organizations using a number of sham corporations 
and ineligible individual contributors. The report also alleges 
that Huang may have been a conduit for the transfer of money 
from foreign governments, including the People's Republic of 
China and other foreign entities, to the DNC.\3\ Another recent 
report contains the alarming information that Huang had an 
unusually high number of classified briefings while he was an 
official at the Commerce Department. In just eighteen months, 
Huang attended 146 briefings at which he had access to 
classified information. At the same time, Huang was also making 
telephone calls to his old employer, the Lippo Group. Huang 
also managed to obtain his top secret clearance five months 
before he started his employment at Commerce and kept it for a 
year after he left the department to move to the DNC.\4\ Huang 
visited the White House at least 23 times between February and 
October 1996 and regularly met with high level White House 
officials, such as Bruce Lindsey and Harold Ickes. On four 
days, June 21-24, 1994, Huang and James Riady of the Lippo 
Group entered the White House on five separate occasions. At 
the same time, Riady met with Webster Hubbell at least two 
times during the same four days. On June 27, 1997, a Lippo 
Group subsidiary, Hong Kong China Ltd., paid Hubbell 
$100,000.\5\
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    \3\ NY Times, June 6, 1997, at A1.
    \4\ Washington Times, May 15, 1997, at A3.
    \5\ NY Times, March 20, 1997.
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    John Huang is a central figure in this investigation, who, 
along with Webster Hubbell, Charlie Trie, the Riady family, 
Mark Middleton and Pauline Kanchanalak, has chosen not to 
cooperate with the investigation. By asserting his Fifth 
Amendment rights, Huang forces the Committee to utilize other 
means, such as document subpoenas, depositions of witnesses and 
foreign discovery, to proceed with its investigation.
    DNC fund-raiser Charlie Trie, who first met President 
Clinton in the late 1970's or early 1980's as a Little Rock, 
Arkansas restaurant owner, raised over $300,000 for the DNC, 
much of which the DNC has pledged to return. Trie also tried to 
contribute more than $600,000 to the President's legal defense 
fund, all of which was eventually returned because of its 
doubtful origins. According to published reports, Trie 
``received a series of substantial wire transfers in 1995 and 
1996 from a bank operated by the Chinese government.'' \6\ Trie 
visited the White House at least 38 times and met with high 
level officials, such as Mark Middleton. In January 1996, 
President Clinton issued an executive order to increase the 
size of the U.S. Pacific Trade and Policy Commission from 
fifteen to up to twenty members. He thereafter added only 
Charlie Trie's appointment to the Commission. The White House 
released the names of the appointees, including Trie on April 
17, 1996, only weeks after the Presidential Legal Expense 
Trust's Executive Director Michael Cardozo informed Mrs. 
Clinton and Harold Ickes of Trie's delivery of questionable 
funds to the fund.
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    \6\ Wall Street Journal, April 1, 1997, at A20.
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    DNC contributor Ted Sioeng and his daughter contributed 
more than $355,000 to the DNC since 1993. According to 
published reports, Sioeng is under investigation for 
``allegedly working as a [Chinese] political operative in the 
United States * * * [and seeking] to acquire influence for 
China through his family's political donations, including 
$250,000 to the Democratic National Committee during last 
year's presidential campaign.'' \7\ Sioeng is now rumored to be 
in Hong Kong.
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    \7\ Los Angeles Times, May 18, 1997.
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    According to a recent news article, ``[i]n at least two 
other cases that have come to light in recent months, the 
president in 1996 continued to have dealings with large 
contributors even after his aides received unfavorable reports 
on them from law-enforcement and intelligence agencies.'' \8\
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    \8\ Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1997.
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    The White House has recently admitted that President 
Clinton ordered then-chief of staff Thomas ``Mack'' McLarty 
personally to investigate obtaining the Department of Energy's 
support for political contributor Roger Tamraz's proposal to 
build an oil pipeline through the Caucuses after Tamraz spoke 
with the President at the White House on March 27, 1996.\9\ 
Tamraz, who is reportedly wanted for questioning in Lebanon in 
connection with a possible embezzlement charge, contributed at 
least $177,000 to the DNC and affiliated state parties in 1995 
and 1996. Although Tamraz's access to the White House had been 
opposed by White House National Security Council staff, they 
had been overruled by senior White House officials, who allowed 
Tamraz to visit the White House on at least six or seven 
separate occasions in 1995 and 1996.
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    \9\ Los Angeles Times, June 4, 1997, at A1.
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    In a related matter, the Department of Justice and the CIA 
Inspector General are investigating former DNC Chairman Don 
Fowler's contacts with the Central Intelligence Agency 
concerning Roger Tamraz. In the Tamraz case, it is alleged that 
Fowler asked the CIA to vouch for Tamraz to circumvent the 
objections of NSC staff director Nancy Soderberg.\10\
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    \10\ Ibid, at A8.
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    In another case, unfavorable information obtained by staff 
on the National Security Council about a potential White House 
visitor, California businessman Yogesh Gandhi, prevented him 
from meeting the President at the White House. However, 
``Democratic fund-raisers arranged for the meeting to take 
place on May 13, 1996, at the Sheraton Carlton hotel, two 
blocks [from the White House] * * * [where] Gandhi met with 
President Clinton and donated $325,000 to the Democratic 
National Committee.'' \11\
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    \11\ Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1997.
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    These are just a number of the disturbing revelations that 
surface daily and raise serious concerns about how national 
security or policy may have been compromised by such 
questionable characters with unique access to the White House.
    Other matters under investigation relate to the possible 
misuse of government resources or federal funds.
    The Committee is investigating the use of official White 
House resources in the creation of a database, which included 
political contributors. Reportedly, White House officials 
merged a list of the President's social contacts with a larger 
list of political contributors, despite a warning from the 
White House counsel's office that the database could be used 
only for official, not political, purposes.\12\ There have also 
been reports published recently that DNC contributor lists were 
found in official Commerce Department files.\13\
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    \12\ Washington Times, May 16, 1997, at A1.
    \13\ Washington Post, June 1, 1997, at A11.
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    Although many instances of potential illegalities center on 
the White House, there is a growing body of evidence that 
points to the widespread misuse and politicization of officials 
in a large number of government agencies. In one such case, 
there have been reports that prominent Democratic fund-raiser 
Peter Knight obtained preferential treatment for his clients in 
the form of several millions of dollars in contracts with the 
Department of Energy.\14\ Mr Knight, who is a personal friend 
of Vice President Gore, reportedly used a contact at the 
Department of Energy, Thomas Grumbly, who worked for the Vice 
President in the 1980's. One of the recipients of the DOE's 
largesse in this matter was a company run by a former Gore 
White House staffer, William Haney.
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    \14\ Washington Times, May 31, 1997, at A1.
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    In another case of alleged misuse of government agencies, 
the Department of Justice announced on April 28, 1997, that its 
Inspector General was launching an investigation of allegations 
of ``mismanagement, misconduct and illegality'' \15\ at the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding the operation 
of the Citizenship USA program. ``The probe will delve into 
charges that the program * * * was misused for political 
purposes and ended up naturalizing criminals in a rush to 
create as many new citizens as possible in time for last year's 
elections * * * [and] will cover allegations that the office of 
Vice President Gore played a key role in promoting the program 
in hopes of reaping a Democratic electoral windfall.'' \16\
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    \15\ Washington Post, April 29, 1997.
    \16\ Ibid.
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    The allegations connected with these individuals concern 
very serious matters relating to foreign influence over our 
government, very unusual access to the highest levels of the 
White House and the Administration by questionable people, and 
an unprecedented flow of favors and campaign cash intersecting 
at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. No doubt the facts in this 
investigation will lead us to further sources of information, 
however the Committee began its investigation where many of the 
central figures intersect: at the White House.
    The Committee already has amassed a large body of documents 
that contain troubling information regarding the conduct of 
senior government officials and donors with highly unusual 
access. Of great significance are the allegations that this 
administration may have solicited money from foreign and other 
sources to obstruct the workings of justice and protect various 
officials from further investigation and possible prosecution. 
Reported payments to Webster Hubbell of $100,000 by the Lippo 
Group \17\ raise serious questions about whether there was a 
coordination of payments by persons close to the President from 
entities in the United States and abroad, and whether these 
payments to Hubbell influenced his cooperation with the 
investigation of Whitewater and related matters. The 
interrelationships of the billionaire Riadys, John Huang, 
Webster Hubbell and other senior Administration figures is a 
central focus of the inquiry into alleged misuse of government 
resources and/or obstruction of ongoing criminal 
investigations.
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    \17\ NY Times, October 12, 1996, at A11.
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    The Fifth Amendment claims of key witnesses such as John 
Huang, Webster Hubbell, and Mark Middleton have already 
significantly hampered the progress of theinvestigation, 
necessitating much additional work. Other key witnesses such as the 
Riadys, Charlie Trie and Pauline Kanchanalak left the country after 
news reports of their involvement in the foreign contributions to the 
Democratic National Committee.
    In what may be the first of a series of related 
prosecutions in this matter, two key Democratic fund-raisers, 
Eugene and Nora Lum, pleaded guilty on June 5, 1996, to the 
felonious transfer of $50,000 to the campaign of Senator Edward 
Kennedy and another campaign using straw donors.\18\ The Lums 
each face the prospect of up to five years in prison and fines 
totaling $250,000 at their sentencing. The Lums were prominent 
fund-raisers for the DNC and were confidantes to the late 
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and fund-raiser John Huang. Mrs. 
Lum was the executive director of the Asian Pacific Advisory 
Council and in that capacity she raised more than $250,000 for 
the 1992 Clinton/Gore campaign. The Lums' daughter, Trisha, 
also pleaded guilty to serving as an illegal conduit for her 
mother for a $10,000 contribution to the DNC. The Lums 
reportedly have agreed to fully cooperate with the Justice 
Department's fundraising task force.\19\ The Committee is 
reviewing these actions as well as related actions at the 
Commerce Department and the practices of the late Commerce 
Secretary Ron Brown.
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    \18\ Washington Times, June 6, 1997, at A1.
    \19\ Washington Post, June 6, 1997.
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    On October 31, 1996, then-Chairman Clinger issued a request 
for documents to the White House regarding the activities of 
John Huang, after allegations of campaign financing 
irregularities surfaced. In January 1997, Chairman Burton 
issued a similar letter request to the White House. After 
receiving no response from the White House, Chairman Burton on 
March 4, 1997 issued a document subpoena to the White House. On 
April 10, 1997, in response to White House demands for a formal 
procedure for the handling, storage and release of documents, 
the Committee adopted a document protocol. In response to the 
taking of the Fifth Amendment by key witnesses Webster Hubbell, 
John Huang, and Mark Middleton and other witnesses, such as 
Pauline Kanchanlak and Charlie Trie, having left the country, 
the Committee issued numerous letter requests and over 100 
subpoenas to related entities and individuals.
    In the face of the White House's refusal to fully comply 
with the Committee's lawfully executed subpoenas, the Committee 
in late April issued six additional, ``targeted'' subpoenas 
covering Charlie Trie, John Huang, Webster Hubbell, Pauline 
Kanchanalak, the Riady family, and Mark Middleton. After 
substantial negotiations between the White House and the 
Committee and the scheduling of a contempt hearing by the 
Committee for May 21, 1997, the White House on May 20, 1997 
agreed to release all relevant documents in its possession by 
June 13, 1997, with the exception of 40 documents it has listed 
on a privilege log it submitted to the Committee.
    The Committee undertakes its responsibilities in this 
investigation in a grave and cautious manner. It is aware of 
the great seriousness of the potential crimes adversely 
affecting our national security that may have been committed 
and the possibility that power was abused at the highest 
levels. The Committee believes that no delay may be endured in 
investigating the possible trading of access for money and 
possible obstruction of justice. The Committee has not declared 
any entities off limits and is committed to bringing to light 
all instances of illegalities. To this end, the Committee has 
issued subpoenas and letter requests to the Republican National 
Committee and certain Republican donors and will follow the 
facts wherever they lead.
    To demonstrate the seriousness of these charges, which 
possibly involve senior officials, and the degree to which the 
public consternation has been aroused, it is useful to note a 
few newspaper editorial quotes:

          Americans are now fully aware of the disclosures and 
        allegations that the law was broken by operatives of 
        Mr. Clinton's re-election campaign. Of particular 
        interest is the allegation that money was solicited and 
        accepted from foreign sources. Every informed account 
        of the campaign, including many from insiders, says 
        that senior officials in the White House and the 
        campaign, as well as Mr. Clinton himself, were involved 
        in the most intricate details of fund-raising.\20\
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    \20\ NY Times, May 2. 1997.
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          The fund-raising disclosures have blown up into the 
        biggest political scandal in the United States since 
        Watergate. It is paralyzing the President, preoccupying 
        Congress, and fueling public cynicism about our 
        political system.\21\
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    \21\ NY Times, April 16, 1997.
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          We've commented before on the selective way in which 
        this White House dispenses--and--doesn't dispense--the 
        truth when it is in trouble. They put up a series of 
        false fronts; you knock one down only to be confronted 
        by another. Then they complain about the fact that they 
        are not believed. They're dead right about that.\22\
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    \22\ Washington Post, May 9, 1997.
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          It gets progressively easier to see why * * * [there] 
        may be the makings of an obstruction of justice case in 
        the White House treatment of Webster Hubbell. * * * 
        [T]he circumstantial case is already weighty.\23\
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    \23\ NY Times, May 6, 1997.

    These issues and many others must be fully investigated to 
ensure that our national security has not been compromised and 
government officials have not obstructed the path of justice. 
Through the congressional inquiry and hearing process, the 
Government Reform and Oversight Committee has an obligation to 
the American people to investigate the many allegations of 
wrongdoing on the part of this administration and others 
connected with these and related events.

                 BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR THE RESOLUTION

    The broad authority for the Congress to conduct 
investigations is well-established and universally recognized.

        * * * although there is no express provision of the 
        Constitution which specifically authorizes the Congress 
        to conduct investigations and take testimony for the 
        purposes of performing its legitimate functions, 
        numerous decisions of the Supreme Court have firmly 
        established that the investigatory power of Congress is 
        so essential to the legislative function as to be 
        implicit in the general vesting of legislative power in 
        Congress.'' (CRS Report 95-464; ``Investigative 
        Oversight: An Introduction to the Law, Practice and 
        Procedure of Congressional Inquiry, by Mort Rosenberg, 
        April 7, 1995)

    In furtherance of Congress' legitimate investigative 
function, the standing Rules of the House provide the 
committees with the general authority and tools needed to carry 
out most investigations of matters that properly fall within 
their jurisdiction.
    The specific provisions governing committees' investigative 
procedures can be found in House rule XI.
    Clause 2(h)(1) establishes a minimum quorum of two members 
for taking testimony or receiving evidence in a committee.
    Clause 2(k) outlines procedures for the conduct of 
investigative hearings designed to balance the interests of the 
committee in gathering necessary testimony and evidence while 
carefully safeguarding certain procedural rights of witnesses.
    These procedures include: announcement by the chairman of 
the subject of the investigation; provision of the committee's 
rules and the relevant House rules to each witness; allowance 
for witnesses to be accompanied by counsel; authority for the 
chairman to appropriately punish accompanying counsel for 
breaches of order, decorum or professional ethics; guidelines 
for taking testimony or evidence in executive session when it 
is asserted that such testimony or evidence may tend to defame, 
degrade or incriminate any person; restrictions on the release 
of evidence or testimony taken in executive session; discretion 
for the committee to determine the pertinence of testimony and 
evidence; and means for a witness to obtain a transcript of 
testimony given in public or executive session.
    Clause 2(m)(1)(A) authorizes committees and subcommittees 
to sit and act (including holding hearings) within the United 
States whether the House is in session, has recessed or has 
adjourned.
    Clause 2(m)(1)(B) authorizes committees and subcommittees 
to require by subpoena or otherwise the production of documents 
or the testimony of witnesses. It further authorizes the 
chairman of the committee, or any member of the committee 
designated by the chairman, to administer oaths to any witness.
    Clause 2(m)(2) specifies that subpoenas necessary for the 
conduct of an investigation must be authorized by a majority 
vote of the committee's (or subcommittee's) members, a majority 
being present. However, this rule allows a committee to adopt 
written rules delegating to its chairman the authority to issue 
subpoenas in connection with an ongoing investigation.
     These standing rules have, for the most part, proven 
sufficient to permit the House to fulfill its legitimate 
investigative functions. The Rules Committee continues to 
believe that these rules have proven resilient, have served the 
House and the public well, and are not in need of any permanent 
revision.
    There have been times, however, when the complexity and 
broad scope of a pending investigation have prompted the House 
to grant standing committees or select committees special 
authorities to assist in the orderly conduct of those 
investigations. The Rules Committee believes that this type of 
case-by-case approach has been effective in maintaining the 
primacy of the standing rules of the House while allowing for 
the necessary flexibility to respond to special circumstances 
involving major investigations.
    Specifically, since 1974 there have been at least 10 major 
investigations undertaken in the House where the membership 
determined that the standing rules did not provide sufficient 
flexibility or authority to ensure completion of a thorough and 
complete inquiry. In those cases the House has adopted a 
special resolution, brought forward under the original 
jurisdiction of the Rules Committee, granting special 
authorities to a standing committee or, in certain cases, 
establishing a temporary select committee or subcommittee for 
the purpose of conducting the investigation.
    These resolutions have been carefully drawn to ensure that 
the investigatory panel has the authority to conduct a 
comprehensive investigation while the basic principles of the 
standing rules of the House, including protection of the rights 
of witnesses, are upheld. [see Appendix A in this report for 
the text of these resolutions]
    Regarding the handling of information obtained under the 
authority granted by aspecial resolution, the House has 
frequently provided that such material is considered to be taken in 
executive session. The purpose of this designation is to ensure that 
the witness protection afforded under clause 2(k)(7), which requires 
approval by the committee to release evidence or testimony received in 
executive session, is maintained.
    Perhaps the most common ``special authority'' granted by 
the House to assist the conduct of investigations is the 
authority to allow a single member of the committee or staff 
designated by the chairman to take depositions. Members who 
have participated in major congressional investigations are 
well aware that depositions of key witnesses in such complex 
cases can last for hours or even extend beyond a single day. 
Given the many demands on members' time, it has at times proven 
extremely difficult to meet the two-member quorum requirement 
by clause 2(h)(1) of rule XI.
    In these cases the House has acknowledged the reality of 
scheduling conflicts, recognizing that frequent interruptions 
and distractions would undoubtedly impact upon the quality of 
the investigative proceedings. Because it is in the best 
interests of the House and the nation to ensure that major 
investigations are thorough and are not unduly prolonged, the 
House has in such clearly defined cases approved a resolution 
granting a committee or select committee the authority to allow 
a single member or designated staff to take depositions.
    The Committee on Rules is generally reluctant to depart 
from the two-Member quorum requirement for committees to 
receive evidence. The Rules Committee believes that the rule 
assigns the proper responsibility to receive evidence to the 
Members of the House and notes that the rule was also designed 
to protect witnesses in a congressional inquiry. Nevertheless, 
due to the magnitude and severity of the revelations from the 
executive branch, and the need to bolster the ability of the 
Government Reform and Oversight Committee to properly 
investigate this matter, the Rules Committee is compelled to 
report to the House a resolution granting staff deposition 
authority.
    The House has also, on occasion, recognized the need to 
provide standing or select committees undertaking major 
investigations the specific authority to seek testimony and 
evidence beyond the borders of the United States. In at least 
six major investigations since 1975, the House has concluded 
that the need for gathering evidentiary information from abroad 
justified granting special authorities to the committees 
charged with conducting those investigations. This special 
authority, which is generally constrained by the level of 
international cooperation that can be secured in each specific 
case, allows the committee to employ existing channels (through 
the courts and other diplomatic means) for seeking to interview 
individuals in foreign countries or gain access to foreign-held 
information.
    According to Mort Rosenberg, a CRS Specialist in American 
Public Law:

          In the end, the degree of legal formality and 
        difficulty encountered by the committee if it seeks to 
        hold hearings in a foreign country or to have 
        depositions taken or written interrogatories answered, 
        will depend on the nature and sensitivity of the 
        inquiry sought to be conducted which, in turn, will 
        often determine the extent of international comity that 
        will be accorded.

    In the recent past, standing committees and select 
committees whose investigations necessitated access to 
individuals or information in a foreign country have been 
granted additional authority by the House to take depositions 
and other testimony outside the United States, to make 
application for the issuance of letters rogatory and request 
other means of international assistance.
    This type of authority has proven necessary in cases where 
individuals whose testimony is relevant to an investigation are 
not present within the United States and have been, in some 
cases, unwilling to cooperate voluntarily with the 
investigation. In addition, there have been cases where a 
committee has sought access to records and other documentary 
evidence that could not be gathered within the United States.
    According to Mort Rosenberg, a CRS Specialist in American 
Public Law:

          The authority to obtain letters rogatory and to seek 
        international assistance in obtaining evidence from 
        foreign countries serves two important congressional 
        purposes. It provides the committee with necessary 
        authority to utilize formal judicial and international 
        treaty processes; and it gives legitimacy to less 
        formal ventures to obtain needed information.

    The term ``letter rogatory'' is a letter of request from a 
court in the United States seeking judicial action by a foreign 
court, including taking evidence or serving a subpoena or other 
legal notice to someone who is subject to that foreign court's 
jurisdiction.
    As Mort Rosenberg explained:

          Even though letters of request may often be sent 
        directly from court to court, some foreign governments 
        require that these requests be submitted through 
        diplomatic channels. Under 28 U.S.C.A. Section 
        1781(a)(2), the transmission of such requests through 
        the State Department (i.e., diplomatic) channels is 
        authorized * * *. The diplomatic route involves the 
        transmission of the request from the U.S. court to the 
        Department of State to the U.S. embassy to the Foreign 
        Ministry which will execute the request * * *. An 
        example of one instance of an application for 
        international judicial assistance is the paperwork 
        prepared by the House Select Committee on 
        Assassinations to question persons in Portugalabout the 
King assassination.

    House rules grant committees the ability to carry out their 
investigative responsibilities under the rules and, in clause 
2(m)(1)(B) authorize committees ``to sit and act at such times 
and places within the United States, whether the House is in 
session, has recessed, or has adjourned * * *'' A House 
resolution is necessary to grant the Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight the ability to obtain evidence anywhere 
outside the United States.
    The Committee on Rules is concerned at the allegations of 
campaign finance improprieties in this case, and it is truly 
alarmed at the possibility that American national security may 
have been severely compromised in this affair. The Committee 
believes that any House resolution granting special 
investigative authorities to the Committee on Government Reform 
and Oversight should acknowledge the international aspects of 
this scandal. Press reports indicate that potential witnesses 
may have left the United States, and the media has also 
reported that certain campaign contributions may have 
originated overseas. The Rules Committee believes that the 
Government Reform and Oversight Committee would be hampered in 
its ability to gather evidence if the authority to employ 
standard international evidence-gathering techniques were not 
included in the resolution.
    In the investigation into the White House Travel Office 
matter in the 104th Congress, the Government Reform and 
Oversight Committee adopted a committee rule specifying the 
procedures to be employed if the House granted staff deposition 
authority to the Committee. This committee rule addressed the 
procedures for taking depositions, provisions for notice, 
transcription of depositions, the rights of the minority to 
participate in depositions, and witness protections.
    The Committee on Rules recommended, in the 105th Congress, 
that the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight adopt a 
committee rule setting forth procedures for this investigation 
in advance, if the House grants the Committee special 
investigative authorities.
    On June 18, the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight adopted committee rules 20 and 21 by a vote of 22-17. 
[The text of committee rules 20 and 21 are contained in 
Appendix B.]
    In addition to the specific procedures for taking 
depositions adopted recently, the rules of the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight for the 105th Congress address 
various investigative abilities of the committee, and are 
entirely consistent with precedents.
    In the 103rd Congress, the rules of the (then) Committee on 
Government Operations delegated the power to authorize and 
issue subpoenas as provided in House rules directly to the 
chairman of the Committee. In the 104th Congress, the Committee 
on Government Reform and Oversight adopted a committee rule 
which also delegated the power to authorize and issue subpoenas 
as provided in House rules directly to the chairman of the 
Committee. That committee rule was limited by a further 
committee rule later in the 2nd session of the 104th Congress.
    Similarly, in the 105th Congress, the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight adopted a committee rule which 
delegated the power to authorize and issue subpoenas as 
provided in House rules directly to the chairman of the 
Committee. This rule was adopted along with the committee's 
rules at the committee's organizational meeting on February 12, 
1997 by a voice vote. The Committee then established further 
procedures relating to the issuance of subpoenas in its 
Protocol for Documents adopted on April 10, 1997 by a vote of 
21-16.

             SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE RESOLUTION

    Section 1 applies the authorities granted by H. Res. 167 to 
the investigation by the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight into political fundraising improprieties and possible 
violations of law. The application of the resolution contained 
in Sec. 1 is identical to the application of the investigation 
contained in the Government Reform and Oversight Committee's 
Protocol for Documents, adopted by the Committee on April 10, 
1997 by a vote of 21-16.
    Section 2 considers information obtained under authority of 
the resolution as taken by the Committee on Government Reform 
and Oversight in the District of Columbia, as well as at the 
location actually taken; and, considers information obtained 
under authority of the resolution as taken in executive 
session. The Committee on Rules intends that such information, 
taken in executive session, should not be released or used in 
public sessions without the consent of the committee, as 
provided in clause 2(k)(7) of House rule XI.
    The resolution states clearly that information sought 
through depositions or interrogatories shall be considered as 
taken in executive session. As such, questions put at 
depositions and in interrogatories are propounded with the full 
authority of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. 
Failure of a deponent or of a personto whom interrogatories are 
propounded to answer such questions is subject to sanction under 2 
U.S.C. Sec. 192. Pursuant to this statute, the issue of pertinency of 
any question is left for ultimate resolution of the courts in the event 
a default in responding to interrogatories or a refusal to answer in 
the course of a deposition is certified for prosecution, but should 
also be first decided by the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight consistent with clause 2(k)(8) of Rule XI as part of any 
statement of fact provided for in 2 U.S.C. Sec.194.
    Section 3 authorizes the chairman of the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, after consultation with the 
ranking minority member of the committee, to order the taking 
of depositions or interrogatories anywhere within the United 
States, under oath and pursuant to notice or subpoena; and, to 
designate a member of the committee or an attorney on the staff 
of the committee to conduct any such proceeding. The authority 
granted by the resolution will allow the Committee to take 
sworn testimony quickly and confidentially. The authorities 
contained in the resolution are necessary tools to enable the 
Committee to effectively conduct its investigation, 
acknowledging the domestic and international nature of the 
scandal in question.
    Section 4 authorizes the chairman of the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, after consultation with the 
ranking minority member of the committee, to order the taking 
of depositions and other testimony under oath anywhere outside 
the United States; and, to make application for issuance of 
letters rogatory, and to request, through appropriate channels, 
other means of international assistance, as appropriate. The 
Rules Committee understands the assessment made by CRS that 
``letters of request are honored on the basis of comity between 
the courts addressed'' and recognizes that cooperation and 
assistance from the Department of State and foreign governments 
will be integral to securing the necessary evidence and 
testimony from beyond the borders of the United States. It is 
the expectation of the Rules Committee that the legitimate 
inquiry being conducted on behalf of the American public will 
be given all possible assistance as it works to get to the 
bottom of the very serious charges that form the basis of this 
investigation.

             MATTERS REQUIRED UNDER THE RULES OF THE HOUSE

Committee votes

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(2)(B) of House rule XI the results 
of each rollcall vote on an amendment or motion to report, 
together with the names of those voting for and against, are 
printed below:

Rules Committee Rollcall No. 34

    Date: June 19, 1997.
    Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative 
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight.
    Motion by: Mr. Moakley.
    Summary of motion: To amend the resolution to replace 
``consultation'' with requirement for ``concurrence'' with the 
minority or a vote of the committee.
    Results: Rejected, 3-9.
    Vote by Members:
    Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay; Diaz-
Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay; Myrick--Nay; 
Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea; Solomon--Nay.

Rules Committee Rollcall No. 35

    Date: June 19, 1997.
    Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative 
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight.
    Motion by: Mr. Moakley.
    Summary of motion: Strike the sections of the report 
entitled, ``Summary of the Investigation to Date'' and 
``Background on the Investigation''.
    Results: Rejected, 3-9.
    Vote by Members:
    Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay; Diaz-
Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay; Myrick--Nay; 
Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea; Solomon--Nay.

Rules Committee Rollcall No. 36

    Date: June 19, 1997.
    Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative 
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight.
    Motion by: Mr. Moakley.
    Summary of motion: To amend the resolution to prohibit 
subpoena for any witness already deposed by the Senate unless 
the committee votes to issue the subpoena.
    Results: Rejected, 3-9.
    Vote by Members:
    Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay; Diaz-
Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay; Myrick--Nay; 
Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea; Solomon--Nay.

Rules Committee Rollcall No. 37

    Date: June 19, 1997.
    Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative 
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight.
    Motion by: Mr. Moakley.
    Summary of motion: To amend the resolution to limit 
deposition rounds to one hour for each side.
    Results: Rejected, 3-9.
    Vote by Members:
    Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay; Diaz-
Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay; Myrick--Nay; 
Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea; Solomon--Nay.

Rules Committee Rollcall No. 38

    Date: June 19, 1997.
    Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative 
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight.
    Motion by: Mr. Frost.
    Summary of motion: To amend the resolution to clarify the 
scope of the investigation by adding after ``possible 
violations of the law'' ``as they relate to such fundraising 
activities''.
    Results: Rejected, 3-9.
    Vote by Members:
    Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay; Diaz-
Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay; Myrick--Nay; 
Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea; Solomon--Nay.

Rules Committee Rollcall No. 39

    Date: June 19, 1997.
    Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative 
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight.
    Motion by: Mrs. Slaughter.
    Summary of motion: To amend the resolution to strengthen 
due process by requiring that a copy of 18 USC 1001 be provided 
to individuals before they are asked to respond to a request 
for information.
    Results: Rejected, 3-9.
    Vote by Members:
    Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay; Diaz-
Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay; Myrick--Nay; 
Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea; Solomon--Nay.

Rules Committee Rollcall No. 40

    Date: June 19, 1997.
    Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative 
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight.
    Motion by: Mrs. Slaughter.
    Summary of motion: To amend the resolution to: (a) require 
notice to minority of all interviews; (b) require all testimony 
and information obtained from such interviews to be provided to 
both sides; (c) require all staff travel requests be provided 
to the minority along with a statement of purpose for the trip 
and names of individuals to be interviewed.
    Results: Rejected 3-9.
    Vote by Members: Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay; 
Pryce--Nay; Diaz-Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay; 
Myrick--Nay; Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea; 
Solomon--Nay.

Rules Committee Rollcall No. 41

    Date: June 19, 1997.
    Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative 
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight.
    Motion by: Mrs. Slaughter.
    Summary of motion: To amend the resolution to require the 
committee database to be made available to the minority.
    Results: Rejected 3-9.
    Vote by Members: Dreier--Nay; Goss--Nay; Linder--Nay; 
Pryce--Nay; Diaz-Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Hastings--Nay; 
Myrick--Nay; Moakley--Yea; Frost--Yea; Slaughter--Yea; 
Solomon--Nay.

Rules Committee Rollcall No. 42

    Date: June 19, 1997.
    Measure: H. Res. 167, Providing special investigative 
authorities to the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight.
    Motion by: Mr. Dreier.
    Summary of motion: To order H. Res. 167 reported.
    Results: Adopted 9-3.
    Vote by Members: Dreier--Yea; Goss--Yea; Linder--Yea; 
Pryce--Yea; Diaz-Balart--Yea; McInnis--Yea; Hastings--Yea; 
Myrick--Yea; Moakley--Nay; Frost--Nay; Slaughter--Nay; 
Solomon--Yea.

Congressional Budget Office estimates

    Clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI requires each committee to 
include a cost estimate prepared by the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office, pursuant to section 403 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, if the cost estimate is 
timely submitted. No cost estimate was received from the 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office.

Oversight findings

    Clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI requires each committee report 
to contain oversight findings and recommendations required 
pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X. The Committee has no 
oversight findings.

Oversight findings and recommendations of the Committee on Government 
        Reform and Oversight

    Clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI requires each committee report 
to contain a summary of the oversight findings and 
recommendations made by the Government Reform and Oversight 
Committee pursuant to clause 4(c)(2) of rule X, whenever such 
findings have been timely submitted. The Committee on Rules has 
received no such findings or recommendations from the Committee 
on Government Reform and Oversight.

Views of committee members

    Clause 2(l)(5) of rule XI requires each committee to afford 
a two day opportunity for members of the committee to file 
additional, minority, or dissenting views and to include the 
views in its report. Although this requirement does not apply 
to the Committee, the Committee always makes the maximum effort 
to provide its members with such an opportunity. The following 
views were submitted:
                  BURTON INVESTIGATION MINORITY VIEWS

    If we had any hopes that the investigation in the 
Government Reform Committee would be on the level and include a 
thorough investigation of fundraising improprieties by both 
political parties, those hopes were dashed when we read this 
report. The first 12 pages of the report focus totally on 
allegations of wrongdoing on the part of Democratic fundraising 
activities. Not one specific instance cited any alleged 
offenses of the Republican fundraising efforts, of which there 
are a number.
    We oppose the granting of this special investigative 
authority contained in H. Res. 167. Not because we want to 
forestall or disrupt any legitimate investigation, but because 
we feel the authority provided in this resolution is 
unnecessary, will be used to abuse the process, and will 
guarantee neither the protection of individual rights nor the 
rights of the minority party in this proceeding.
    Prior to the 104th Congress, only the Committee on 
Standards of Official Conduct for ethics matters and the 
Judiciary Committee for impeachment proceedings were given this 
special type of subpoena power for deposing of witnesses. No 
other standing committees were granted this extraordinary 
power. In the 104th Congress, the Rules Committee passed a 
resolution, regarding the White House Travel Office, which was 
similar to, but more modest in its scope that H. Res. 167. At 
that time, we expressed our concern that the resolution granted 
far too much unilateral authority to the Chairman of the 
Government Reform Committee. Furthermore, the 104th resolution 
was done at a time when there appeared to be a reasonable 
degree of cooperation and communication between the Chairman 
and Ranking Minority Member. Throughout that hearing and mark-
up process, we were constantly assured by our majority as well 
as the majority on the Government Reform Committee that every 
effort would be made to guarantee the rights of the minority in 
the investigative process and to include the minority in all 
aspects of the investigation. However, even in this situation 
where the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member had a relatively 
civil working relationship, the rules were not always followed 
and there were abuses by the majority party of the powers 
granted in that rather rare House Resolution. We have many 
reservations about this process.
    The scope of the resolution is unclear. It is an 
improvement over the initial resolution drafted by the 
Republicans on the Government Reform Committee, which had 
virtually no limits on its scope and could have been used for 
essentially any investigation done by that committee. H. Res. 
167 was modified to contain some limitations, but not enough. 
the resolution applies to investigations by the Committee ``of 
political fundraising improprieties and possible violations of 
law.'' It is unclear if ``possible violations of law'' applies 
only to political fundraising improprieties, or if it could be 
expanded beyond that arena. During the RulesCommittee markup, 
we offered an amendment to clarify that the ``possible violations of 
law'' were pertaining only to political fundraising activities. 
Unfortunately the amendment was defeated.
    The resolution also allows the Chairman, after consulting 
with the Ranking Minority Member, to take depositions anywhere 
in the world and authorizes a variety of mechanisms to obtain 
international assistance in gathering information. This 
authority has been granted in other major congressional 
investigations, and we do not necessarily object to its 
inclusion in this resolution. We would add a note of caution, 
however, that the conduct of the Government Reform Committee in 
this investigation has been marked by partisanship, harassment 
of some witnesses, misrepresentation and misleading statements, 
information leaks by staff, and disregard for the right of the 
minority to participate in this process. This does not instill 
our confidence that international working relationships can be 
achieved, or that the example of previous congressional 
investigations will be followed. In a recent briefing on this 
issue, CRS experts stressed that the ability to gain access to 
and information from foreign sources depends almost totally 
upon the willingness of the host country to allow it. This 
requires comity and clarity. We urge the Committee to engage in 
the kind of cooperative, bipartisan working arrangements which 
have enabled other congressional investigations to succeed.
    H. Res. 167 does not contain any time limitation or an 
expiration date. It is extremely rare for a grant of authority 
of this nature to be without some type of sunset provision. The 
resolution from the 104th Congress did not have a cut-off date 
in the resolution but did have one in the special Government 
Reform Committee rules enacted for implementation of the 
resolution. We believe that a time limit should at the very 
least be addressed in the Committee rules. If additional time 
is needed, the House can, as it has in the past on numerous 
occasions, approve an extension. We offered an amendment with a 
generous and reasonable cut-off date of December 31, 1997 which 
happens to be the date that the supplemental funding for the 
fundraising investigation expires. The amendment was not 
approved.
    We have very grave concerns regarding the role of the 
minority throughout this process. The Republican majority on 
the Government Reform and Oversight Committee has trampled on 
the rights of its minority members since its organization at 
the beginning of this Congress. Subpoenas have been issued 
unilaterally by the Chairman with no consultation and little or 
no advance notice to the Ranking Minority Member. Little or no 
notice has been given of witness interviews, including 
committee authorized and funded staff travel both inside and 
outside the country for those interviews. The minority has not 
been allowed to participate in any of the interviews. Protests 
over this behavior have gone unacknowledged. Numerous 
correspondence sent by the Ranking Minority Member asking for 
clarification of these activities and others regarding this 
investigation has gone unanswered.
    Nothing in this resolution in any way includes or 
guarantees viable minority participation in the investigation. 
Government Reform Committee rules adopted on June 17, 1997 
include modest minority protections in some instances, but fail 
to provide the minority with rights in the more substantive 
areas. It is particularly disconcerting that the committee 
rules provide that the Chairman ``upon consultation'' with the 
ranking minority member ``may order the taking of 
interrogatories or depositions, under oath and pursuant to 
notice or subpoena,'' in effect, giving total, unilateral 
authority to the Chairman. At the very least the chair should 
be required instead to ``concur'' with the Ranking Minority 
Member or by approval of the committee in this instance. The 
minority is not seeking for veto authority over any particular 
subpoena, but simply an opportunity to present to the committee 
their views and have an opportunity for consideration of those 
views. The committee rules from the 104th Congress, under 
Chairman Clinger, required concurrence. We are at a loss as to 
why this prerequisite was not retained and was, in fact, 
replaced with a much weaker requirement.
    This was not the only change that was made in the committee 
rules that was used to administer the resolution from the 104th 
Congress. Another substantial change from the 104th special 
committee rules is the manner in which witnesses are questioned 
in the deposition. Previously the rounds of questioning of 
deposed witnesses would alternate every hour (i.e. 1 hour by 
the majority and 1 hour by the minority) until all parties 
gathered the necessary information. The rules for H. Res. 167 
provide that questioning of witnesses will be done in rounds 
with the majority acting, first, asking questions until 
finished. Only then would the minority member or designated 
staff attorney be allowed to question the witness. Conceivably 
the majority could question a witness for several hours before 
allowing the minority to ask even a single question. Current 
committee practice alternates between the majority and the 
minority. This practice should occur in staff depositions as 
well. We think H. Res. 167 should follow the rules utilized in 
the last Congress.
    We are distressed that in the previous resolution, there 
were problems with minority rights at witness depositions. In 
at least one instance, when the majority staff decided to cut 
off a deposition and ordered the court reporter to stop, the 
minority staff did not want to stop and requested that the 
court reporter continue, the majority staff prevailed. There is 
nothing in either the resolution or the accompanying committee 
rules that would protect the minority's right in this 
situation. We would hope that such blatant abuse of the power 
of the majority would not be tolerated.
    We are deeply, deeply concerned that individual rights may 
be compromised and, at worst, abused in this investigation by 
way of this resolution. Neither the resolution or the 
accompanying rules provide necessary safeguards to protect 
those who will be subject to the measure. We think it is 
extremely perilous to allow staff, in a closed session, to have 
virtually unlimited questioning of a witness with little orno 
rights given to the individual being deposed. There is ample 
opportunity for staff to intimidate and harass witnesses. These 
interrogative sessions are not trials or courts of law. People 
approaching these staff depositions should not be deprived of the 
protections that are generally available to those giving statements 
under oath.
    We also believe that witnesses have the right to have 
counsel and anyone else of their choosing at a deposition and 
should not be limited in that right as they are in the 
resolution's committee rules. Another point with regard to 
individual rights that is too often overlooked or ignored when 
a committee becomes overzealous in utilizing its investigative 
powers is the cost of legal counsel for the witnesses. Because 
of the accusatory manner most witnesses desire to be 
accompanied by counsel at any interview taking place, whether 
under oath or not. Additionally, recent changes to title 18, 
section 1001 of the U.S. Code make it illegal for anyone to in 
any way mislead Congress, subjecting the violator to a fine 
and/or imprisonment of up to five years, making representation 
by counsel a necessity in an investigative setting. While we 
would not suggest that pertinent witnesses be bypassed because 
of the potential cost of counsel, we urge the committee to 
consider the financial burden that may be placed on potential 
witnesses, particularly if that person testimony is likely to 
have little or no relevance to the investigation at hand. 
Investigations are not fishing expeditions, and subjecting 
dozens of witnesses to such a process is unfair, unprincipled, 
and not a practice in which the committee should be engaging.
    We are still concerned over clarifying language in the 
report regarding contempt against a subpoenaed individual who 
refuses to be interviewed but is willing to testify before the 
committee at a regular meeting. Absent clarifying language, 
there is a danger of challenging long-standing practices of the 
House which holds that there are no grounds for a contempt 
citation if a witness refuses to appear before or to answer 
questions in a staff deposition provided that the witness 
responds fully at a duly called hearing of the committee with a 
quorum of members present. As in the resolution in the 104th 
Congress in which we consulted with the House Parliamentarian, 
we offered the following language and requested that it be 
included in the report:

          The procedure used in this resolution which 
        authorizes the deposition of witnesses by staff is 
        meant to augment and not replace the current 
        information gathering function of a committee hearing. 
        Nothing in this resolution is intended to change the 
        long-standing precedent that there are no grounds for a 
        contempt citation if a witness refuses to appear before 
        or to answer questions in a staff deposition provided 
        that the witness responds fully at a duly called 
        hearing of the committee with a quorum of members 
        present.

The committee instead adopted language that guarantees a 
committee vote on the issue of pertinency of any question. We 
recognize that this does follow the long-standing practices of 
the House and would require a vote in the committee and in the 
House before any contempt citation could be issued. However, we 
hope that the majority staff of the Committee on Government 
Reform will exercise this power fairly and will not use this 
authority to ``bully'' witnesses in interrogations.
    In conclusion, we cannot support this resolution for these 
and other reasons. While we clearly recognize and fully support 
the right of Congress through its committee structure to 
conduct investigations, we are deeply concerned that under the 
proposed resolution and accompanying committee rules there is 
far too much unilateral power given to the Chairman and far too 
much unchecked authority that can be designated to the staff. 
We also simply were not given an adequate explanation of why 
this authority is needed. There is a real danger that this type 
of resolution is now becoming a routine tool to circumvent the 
traditional committee process. It should be used rarely, only 
when warranted by extraordinary circumstances. The regular 
hearing route coupled with informal staff interviews should be 
more than adequate for this particular investigation, as it is 
for the other standing committees of the House. We should not 
be in the habit of making this type of resolution a routine 
occurrence. Clearly, in a democracy the power rests with the 
majority. However, with that power comes a responsibility to be 
painstakingly fair to all sides involved. Without this fairness 
you cannot have a credible investigation that produces anything 
of value. We do not support this measure and hope that the full 
House in its wisdom will share our concerns and reject this 
unwise resolution.

                                   Joe Moakley.
                                   Tony P. Hall.
                                   Martin Frost.
                                   Louise McIntosh Slaughter.
              DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY

    I am filing these views to emphasize my strong opposition 
to the action taken by the Rules Committee in reporting this 
resolution. This does not mean that I object to the underlying 
investigation. I believe it is important to investigate 
allegations of campaign finance abuse by both political 
parties. We have before us an opportunity to identify and 
terminate the kind of wrongdoing which corrupts the American 
political system and further erodes the confidence of the 
American people. The fact there has never been an investigation 
of this magnitude into campaign finance practices gives us the 
opportunity us to accomplish something of real value. 
Unfortunately, I fear this opportunity is being squandered in 
unending, unfocused, duplicative interrogation that costs the 
public money and could subject many individuals--with little or 
no connection to the instances under investigation--to lengthy, 
expensive legal proceedings.
    The partisan tone of this committee report reflects the 
partisan nature of the investigation being conducted by the 
Government Reform Committee. If we were really serious about 
conducting an effective investigation, we would be doing 
everything in our power to ensure the credibility and 
thoroughness of this investigation. That means creating 
procedures that make it as easy as possible for individuals to 
come forward with pertinent information and talk frankly with 
the investigators for the Government Reform Committee. It means 
putting in place a carefully crafted, fair institutional 
process so that we protect the ability of our committees to use 
their prerogatives in the future. Both these principles, 
combined, would bring the greatest possible access to witnesses 
and the underlying documents which would form the foundation of 
any report that might be produced.
    Mr. Solomon has tried, to his credit, to bring a more 
workable process to this resolution. The rules no longer 
include authority sought by the Chairman of the Committee on 
Government Reform, Mr. Burton, authorizing staff to rifle 
through the tax records of prospective witnesses. That is an 
improvement; however, I must oppose the granting of the special 
investigative authorities contained in H. Res. 167. It still is 
not enough. I believe the authority provided in this resolution 
is unnecessary, increases the partisanship already apparent in 
this process, and fails to protect the rights of individuals as 
well as the rights of the minority in the proceedings.
    The resolution gives the Chairman of the Government Reform 
Committee extraordinary power to unilaterally issue subpoenas 
for deposition, and denies the minority even minimal procedural 
protections. It is important to note here that no Member in the 
history of this institution--until now--has actually issued a 
deposition subpoena unilaterally. Chairman Burton already has 
issued 156 unilateral subpoenas for documents in the 
fundraising investigation. He asserted in yesterday's hearings 
that he intended to seek depositions from ``hundreds and 
hundreds'' of witnesses. Yet it is not clear that there is 
anything he needs to do that he has not been able to do so far. 
He has received a substantial response to his subpoenas for 
documents without this resolution. His staff has conducted 
interviews, though the exact number is not known because the 
minority has not been consulted. The investigative staff has 
not yet begun to seek interviews with employees at the White 
House, but witnesses generally seem willing to come forward to 
talk. The Committee minority has indicated they would support 
any effort to subpoena key witnesses to the investigation, if 
necessary. So why is this extraordinary unilateral power 
needed?
    I am especially concerned about these new authorities 
because of the way the minority has been treated throughout 
this process. Nothing in this resolution in any way includes or 
guarantees viable minority participation in the investigation. 
My specific concerns are expressed in greater detail in 
separate minority views in this committee report. For these and 
other reasons, I cannot support this resolution. I fear we are 
being sucked into an investigation with no shape and no end 
under the direction of a Committee seeking extraordinary 
authorities with no demonstrated need.
    I wonder who is looking out for the rights of the 
individual. I believe the individual witnesses deserve a fair 
process with adequate protection for his or her rights. And I 
believe we need a credible outcome. This will require a fair 
process with a well-defined scope, true consultation with the 
minority, and behavior that doesn't trample on the rights of 
individuals along the way. Recent history tells us that other 
major congressional investigations--October Surprise, Iran-
Contra and even Bosnia--accomplished these goals when the 
majority and minority operated jointly in the course of the 
investigation. Both sides were able to work side-by-side and 
keep the investigation honest. Without this kind of cooperation 
and fairness, we cannot hope to have a credible investigation 
that produces anything of value.

                                                       Joe Moakley.
                               APPENDIX A

Excerpts From Resolutions Which Have Granted Staff Deposition Authority 
            and International Evidence Gathering Mechanisms

Bosnia Select Subcommittee (H. Res. 416, 104th Congress)
    Staff deposition authority:

          (e)(1) The chairman of the select subcommittee, for 
        purposes of its investigation, may, upon consultation 
        with the ranking minority party member of the select 
        subcommittee, authorize the taking of affidavits and 
        depositions pursuant to notice or subpoena, by a member 
        of the select subcommittee or of the staff of the 
        Committee on International Relations designated by the 
        chairman of the select subcommittee, or require the 
        furnishing of information by interrogatory, under oath 
        administered by a person otherwise authorized by law to 
        administer oaths.
White House Travel Office Matter (H. Res. 369, 104th Congress)
    Staff deposition authority:

          (a) The Chairman of the Committee on Government 
        Reform and Oversight, for the purposes of the 
        committee's investigation and study of the White House 
        Travel Office matter, may, upon consultation with the 
        ranking minority member of the committee, authorize the 
        taking of affidavits, and of depositions pursuant to 
        notice or subpoena, by a member or staff of the 
        committee designated by the chairman, or require the 
        furnishing of information by interrogatory, under oath 
        administered by a person otherwise authorized by law to 
        administer oaths.
          (b) Deposition and affidavit testimony, and 
        information received by interrogatory, shall be deemed 
        to have been taken in executive session of the 
        committee in Washington, District of Columbia. All 
        deposition and affidavit testimony and information 
        received by interrogatory shall be considered nonpublic 
        until received by the committee, except that all such 
        testimony and information shall, unless otherwise 
        directed by the committee, be available for use by 
        members of the committee in open session of the 
        committee.
Senate Whitewater Investigation (S. Res. 120, 104th Congress)
    Staff deposition authority:

          Sec. 5(b)(7) * * * All depositions shall be conducted 
        jointly by majority and minority staff of the special 
        committee. A witness at a deposition shall be examined 
        upon oath administered by a member of the special 
        committee or an individual authorized by local law to 
        administer oaths, and a complete transcription or 
        electronic recording of the deposition shall be made. 
        Questions shall be propounded first by majority staff 
        of the special committee and then by minority staff of 
        the special committee. Any subsequent round of 
        questioning shall proceed in the same order. Objections 
        by the witness as to the form of questions shall be 
        noted for the record. If a witness objects to a 
        question and refuses to answer on the basis of 
        relevance or privilege, the special committee staff may 
        proceed with the deposition, or may, at that time or at 
        a subsequent time, seek a ruling on the objection from 
        the chairman. If the chairman overrules the objection, 
        the chairman may order and direct the witness to answer 
        the question, but the special committee shall not 
        initiate procedures leading to civil or criminal 
        enforcement unless the witness refuses to answer after 
        having been ordered and directed to answer.
          Sec. 5(b)(8) Delegations To Staff.--To issue 
        commissions and to notice depositions for staff members 
        to examine witnesses and to receive evidence under oath 
        administered by an individual authorized by local law 
        to administer oaths. The special committee, or the 
        chairman with the concurrence of the ranking member, 
        may delegate to designated staff members of the special 
        committee the power to issue deposition notices 
        authorized pursuant to this paragraph.

    International evidence-gathering mechanisms:

          Sec. 5(b)(1) Subpoena Powers.--To issue subpoenas or 
        orders for the attendance of witnesses or for the 
        production of documentary or physical evidence before 
        the special committee. A subpoena or order may be 
        authorized by the special committee or by the chairman 
        with the agreement of the ranking member, and may be 
        issued by the chairman or any other member of the 
        special committee designated by the chairman, and may 
        be served by any person designated by the chairman or 
        the authorized member anywhere within or outside of the 
        borders of the United States to the full extent 
        permitted by law.
          Sec. 5(b)(7) Depositions.--To take depositions and 
        other testimony under oath anywhere within the United 
        States, to issue orders that require witnesses to 
        answer written interrogatories under oath, and to make 
        application for the issuance of letters rogatory.
October Surprise Task Force (H. Res. 258, 102nd Congress)
    Staff deposition authority:

          (6) Unless otherwise determined by the Task Force, 
        the chairman, upon consultation with the ranking 
        Republican member, or the Task Force, may authorize the 
        taking of affidavits, and of depositions pursuant to 
        notice or subpoena, by a Member or by designated staff, 
        under oath administered by a Member or a person 
        otherwise authorized by law to administer oaths. 
        Deposition and affidavit testimony shall be deemed to 
        have been taken in Washington, DC, before the Task 
        Force once filed there with the clerk of the Task Force 
        for the Task Force's use. Depositions shall be deemed 
        to be taken in Executive Session.

    International evidence-gathering mechanisms:

          (3) The Task Force is authorized to sit and act 
        during the present Congress at such times and places 
        within the United States, including any Commonwealth or 
        possession thereof, or in any other country, whether 
        the House is in session, or has adjourned; * * * and to 
        obtain evidence in other appropriate countries with the 
        cooperation of their governments and by letters 
        rogatory, commissions, field depositions and other 
        appropriate mechanisms. * * * The Task Force may 
        request investigations, reports, and other assistance 
        from any agency of the executive, legislative, and 
        judicial branches of the federal government.

Judge Nixon Impeachment Proceedings (H. Res. 562, 100th Congress)

    Staff deposition authority:

          Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary or its 
        Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, in 
        connection with the inquiry into the conduct of United 
        States District Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., may 
        authorize the taking of affidavits and of depositions 
        by counsel to such committee pursuant to notice or 
        subpoena.

Judge Hastings Impeachment Proceedings (H. Res. 320, 100th Congress)

    Staff deposition authority:

          Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary or its 
        Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, in connection with 
        the inquiry into the conduct of the United States 
        District Judge Alcee L. Hastings, may authorize the 
        taking of affidavits and of depositions by counsel to 
        such committee pursuant to notice or subpoena.

Iran-Contra Committee--Senate (S. Res. 23, 100th Congress)

    Staff deposition authority:

          Sec. 5(d)(6) To issue commissions and to notice 
        depositions for staff members to examine witnesses and 
        to receive evidence under oath administered by an 
        individual authorized by local law to administer oaths. 
        The select committee, acting through the chairman, may 
        authorize and issue, and may delegate to designated 
        staff members the power to authorize and issue, 
        commissions and deposition notices.

    International evidence-gathering mechanisms:

          Sec. 5(b) The select committee is authorized to issue 
        subpoenas for obtaining testimony and for the 
        production of documentary or physical evidence. A 
        subpoena may be authorized and issued by the select 
        committee, acting through the chairman or any other 
        member designated by the chairman, and may be served by 
        any person designated by such chairman or other member 
        anywhere within or without the borders of the United 
        States to the full extent permitted by law. The 
        chairman of the select committee, or any other member 
        thereof, is authorized to administer oaths to any 
        witness appearing before the committee.
          Sec. 5(d)(5) To take depositions and other testimony 
        under oath anywhere within the United States or in any 
        other country, to issue orders by the chairman or any 
        other member designated by the chairman which require 
        witnesses to answer written interrogatories under oath, 
        to make application for issuance of letters rogatory, 
        and to request, through appropriate channels, other 
        means of international assistance, as appropriate.

Iran-Contra Committee--House (H. Res. 12, 100th Congress)

    Staff deposition authority:

          (6) Unless otherwise determined by the select 
        committee the chairman, upon consultation with the 
        ranking minority member, or the select committee, may 
        authorize the taking of affidavits, and of depositions 
        pursuant to notice of subpoena, by a Member or by 
        designated staff, under oath administered by a Member 
        or a person otherwise authorized by law to administer 
        oaths. Deposition and affidavit testimony shall be 
        deemed to have been taken in Washington, DC, before the 
        select committee once filed there with the clerk of the 
        committee for the committee's use. Unless otherwise 
        directed by the committee, all depositions, affidavits, 
        and other materials received in the investigation shall 
        be considered nonpublic until received by the select 
        committee, except that all such material shall, unless 
        otherwise directed by the committee, be available for 
        use by the Members of the select committee in open 
        session.

    International evidence-gathering mechanisms:

          (3) The select committee is authorized to sit and act 
        during the present Congressat such times and places 
within the United States, including any Commonwealth or possession 
thereof, or in any other country, whether the House is in session, has 
recessed, or has adjourned; * * *

ABSCAM Investigation (H. Res. 67, 97th Congress)

    Single Member testimony authority:

          Sec. 4 (a) For the purpose of conducting any inquiry 
        or investigation pursuant to this resolution, the 
        committee is authorized to compel--(1) by subpoena or 
        otherwise--(A) the attendance and testimony of any 
        person--(i) at a hearing; or (ii) at the taking of a 
        deposition by one or more members of the committee * * 
        *

    International evidence-gathering mechanisms:

          Sec. 4(e) In connection with any inquiry or 
        investigation pursuant to this resolution, the 
        committee may request the Secretary of State to 
        transmit a letter rogatory or request to a foreign 
        tribunal, officer, or agency.
          Sec. 5 For the purpose of conducting any inquiry or 
        investigation pursuant to this resolution, the 
        committee is authorized to sit and act, without regard 
        to clause 2(m) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of 
        Representatives, at such times and places within or 
        without the United States, whether the House is 
        meeting, has recessed, or has adjourned, and to hold 
        such hearings as it deems necessary.

Koreagate Investigation (H. Res. 752, 95th Congress)

    Staff deposition authority:

          Resolved, That, in addition to any authority the 
        Committee on Standards of Official Conduct may have 
        under H. Res. 252, such committee is authorized to 
        require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of 
        and testimony of any person at the taking of a 
        deposition by any member of the committee or by any 
        attorney employed or retained by such committee for the 
        purpose of conducting any inquiry or investigation 
        pursuant to such a resolution: Provided, That any 
        objection to any question posed by such attorney shall 
        be ruled on, and, if the objection is overruled, the 
        person shall be directed to answer, only by a member of 
        such committee.

Koreagate Investigation (H. Res. 252, 95th Congress)

    International evidence-gathering mechanisms:

          Sec. 4(c) Subpoenas and interrogatories authorized 
        under this section may be issued over the signature of 
        the chairman, or ranking minority member, or any member 
        designated by either of them. A subpoena may be served 
        by any person designated by the chairman, or ranking 
        minority member, or any member designated by either of 
        them and may be served either within or without the 
        United States on any national or resident of the United 
        States or any other person subject to the jurisdiction 
        of the United States.
          Sec. 4(d) In connection with any inquiry or 
        investigation pursuant to this resolution, the 
        committee may request the Secretary of State to 
        transmit a letter rogatory or request to a foreign 
        tribunal, officer, or agency.
          Sec. 5 For the purpose of conducting any inquiry or 
        investigation pursuant to this resolution, the 
        committee is authorized to sit and act, without regard 
        to clause 2(m) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of 
        Representatives, during the present Congress at such 
        times and places within or without the United States, 
        whether the House is meeting, has recessed, or has 
        adjourned, and to hold such hearings as it deems 
        necessary.

House Assassinations Inquiry (H. Res. 222, 95th Congress)

    Staff deposition authority and international evidence-
gathering mechanisms:

        * * * For the purpose of carrying out this resolution 
        the select committee, or any subcommittee thereof 
        authorized by the select committee to hold hearings, is 
        authorized to sit and act during the present Congress 
        at such times and places within the United States, 
        including any Commonwealth or possession thereof, or in 
        any other country, whether the House is in session, has 
        recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, and 
        to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance 
        and testimony of such witnesses and the production of 
        such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, 
        documents, tangible objects, and other things of any 
        kind as it deems necessary; to take testimony on oath 
        anywhere within the United States or in any other 
        country and to authorize designated counsel for the 
        select committee to obtain statements from any witness 
        who is placed under oath by an authority who is 
        authorized to administer oaths in accordance with the 
        applicable laws of the United States or any state; * * 
        *

President Nixon Impeachment Proceedings (H. Res. 803, 93rd Congress)

    Staff deposition authority:

    Sec. 2(a) For the purpose of making such investigation, the 
committee is authorized to require--
          (1) by subpoena or otherwise--
                  (A) the attendance and testimony of any 
                person (including at a taking of a deposition 
                by counsel for the committee); and
                  (B) the production of such things; and
          (2) by interrogatory, the furnishing of such 
        information; as it deems necessary to such 
        investigation.

    International evidence-gathering mechanisms:

          Sec. 3 For the purpose of making such investigation, 
        the committee, and any subcommittee thereof, are 
        authorized to sit and act, without regard to clause 31 
        of rule XI of the Rules of the House of 
        Representatives, during the present Congress at such 
        times and places within or without the United States, 
        whether the House is meeting, has recessed, or has 
        adjourned, and to hold such hearings, as it deems 
        necessary.
                               APPENDIX B

Final New Committee Rules Passed by the Government Reform and Oversight 
                       Committee on June 18, 1997

Rule 20.--Interrogatories and depositions
    The chairman, upon consultation with the ranking minority 
member, may order the taking of interrogatories or depositions, 
under oath and pursuant to notice or subpoena. Such 
authorization may occur on a case-by-case basis, or by 
instructions to take a series of interrogatories or 
depositions. Notices for the taking of depositions shall 
specify the date, time, and place of examination. Answers to 
interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing under oath 
and depositions shall be taken under oath administered by a 
member or a person otherwise authorized by law to administer 
oaths. Consultation with the ranking minority member shall 
include three business day's written notice before any 
deposition is taken. All members shall also receive three 
business day's written notice that a deposition has been 
scheduled.
    The committee shall not initiate contempt proceedings based 
on the failure of a witness to appear at a deposition unless 
the deposition notice was accompanied by a committee subpoena 
issued by the chairman.
    Witnesses may be accompanied at a deposition by counsel to 
advise them of their rights. No one may be present at 
depositions except members, committee staff designated by the 
chairman or ranking minority member, an official reported, the 
witness, and the witness's counsel. Observers or counsel for 
other persons or for agencies under investigation may not 
attend.
    A deposition shall be conducted by any member or committee 
staff attorney designated by the chairman or ranking minority 
member. When depositions are conducted by committee staff 
attorneys, there shall be no more than two committee staff 
attorneys of the committee permitted to question a witness per 
round. One of the committee staff attorneys shall be designated 
by the chairman and the other shall be designated by the 
ranking minority member. Other committee staff members 
designated by the chairman or the ranking minority member may 
attend, but are not permitted to pose questions to the witness.
    Questions in the deposition will be propounded in rounds. A 
round shall include as much time as in necessary to ask all 
pending questions. In each round, a member or committee staff 
attorney designated by the chairman shall ask questions first, 
and the member or committee staff attorney designated by the 
ranking minority member shall ask question second.
    An objection by the witness as to the form of a question 
shall be noted for the record. If a witness objects to a 
question and refuses to answer, the member or committee staff 
attorney may proceed with the deposition, or may obtain, at 
that time or a subsequent time, a ruling on the objection by 
telephone or otherwise from the chairman or a member designated 
chairman. The committee shall not initiate procedures leading 
to contempt proceedings based on a refusal to answer a question 
at a deposition unless the witness refuses to testify after an 
objection of the witness has been overruled and after the 
witness has been ordered by the chairman or a member designated 
by the chairman to answer the question. Overruled objections 
shall be preserved for committee consideration within the 
meaning of clause 2(k)(8) of House Rule 11.
    Committee staff shall insure the testimony is either 
transcribed or electronically recorded, or both. If a witness's 
testimony is transcribed, the witness or the witness's counsel 
shall be afforded an opportunity to review a copy. No later 
than five days thereafter the witness may submit suggested 
changes to the chairman. Committee staff may make any 
typographical and technical changes requested by the witness. 
Substantive changes, modifications, clarifications, or 
amendments to the deposition transcript submitted by the 
witness must be accompanied by a letter requesting the changes 
and a statement of the witness's reasons for each proposed 
change. A letter requesting any substantive changes, 
modifications, clarifications, or amendments must be signed by 
the witness. Any substantive changes, modifications, 
clarifications, or amendments shall be included as an appendix 
to the transcript conditioned upon the witness signing the 
transcript.
    The individual administering the oath, if other than a 
member, shall certify on the transit that the witness was duly 
sworn. The transcriber shall certify that the transcript is a 
true record of the testimony and the transcript shall be filed, 
together with any electronic recording, with the clerk of the 
committee in Washington, D.C. Interrogatories and depositions 
shall be considered to have been taken in Washington, D.C. as 
well as at the location actually taken once filed there with 
the clerk of the committee for the committee's use. The 
chairman and the ranking minority member shall be provided with 
a copy of the transcripts of the deposition at the same time.
    All depositions and interrogatories received pursuant to 
this rule shall be considered as taken in executive session.
    A witness shall not be required to testify unless the 
witness has been provided with a copy of the committee's rules.
    This rule is applicable to the committee's investigation of 
political fundrasing improprieties and possible violations of 
law, and is effective upon adoption of a resolution, in the 
House of Representatives, providing the committee with special 
investigative authorities.

Rule 21.--Letters rogatory and international government assistance

    The chairman, after consultation with the ranking minority 
member, may obtain testimony and evidence in other countries 
through letters rogatory and other means of international 
government cooperation and assistance. The rule is applicable 
to the committee's investigation of political fundraising 
improprieties and possible violations of law, and is effective 
upon adoption of a resolution, in the House of Representatives, 
providing the committee with special investigative authorities.