[House Report 105-10]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



105th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 1st Session                                                     105-10
_______________________________________________________________________


 
       DISAPPROVAL OF DETERMINATION OF PRESIDENT REGARDING MEXICO
                                _______
                                

 March 10, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Gilman, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted 
                             the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                      [To accompany H.J. Res. 58]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on International Relations, to whom was 
referred the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 58) disapproving the 
certification of the President under section 490(b) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 regarding foreign assistance for 
Mexico during fiscal year 1997, having considered the same, 
report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that 
the joint resolution as amended do pass.
  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike out all after the resolving clause and insert in lieu 
thereof the following:

SECTION 1. DISAPPROVAL OF DETERMINATION OF PRESIDENT REGARDING MEXICO.

  Pursuant to subsection (d) of section 490 of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291j), Congress disapproves the determination 
of the President with respect to Mexico for fiscal year 1997 that is 
contained in the certification (transmittal no. 97-18) submitted to 
Congress by the President under subsection (b) of that section on 
February 28, 1997.

SEC. 2. WAIVER OF REQUIREMENT TO WITHHOLD ASSISTANCE FOR MEXICO.

  (a) Waiver.--Notwithstanding subsections (e) and (f) of section 490 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the requirement to withhold 
United States assistance and to vote against multilateral development 
bank assistance contained in such subsection (e) shall not apply with 
respect to Mexico until March 1, 1998, if at any time after the date of 
the enactment of this joint resolution, the President submits to 
Congress a determination and certification described in subsection (b) 
of this section.
  (b) Determination and Certification.--A determination and 
certification described in this subsection is a determination and 
certification consistent with section 490(b)(1)(B) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 that the vital national interests of the United 
States require that the assistance withheld pursuant to section 
490(e)(1) of such Act be provided for Mexico and that the United States 
not vote against multilateral development bank assistance for Mexico 
pursuant to section 490(e)(2) of such Act.

SEC. 3. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

  For purposes of section 490(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
this joint resolution shall be deemed to have been enacted within 30 
calendar days after February 28, 1997.

SEC. 4. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CONGRESS.

  (a) Consultations.--The President shall consult with the Congress on 
the status of counter-narcotics cooperation between the United States 
and each major illicit drug producing country or major drug-transit 
country.
  (b) Purpose.--
          (1) In general.--The purpose of the consultations under 
        subsection (a) shall be to facilitate improved discussion and 
        understanding between the Congress and the President on United 
        States counter-narcotics goals and objectives with regard to 
        the countries described in subsection (a), including the 
        strategy for achieving such goals and objectives.
          (2) Regular and special consultations.--In order to carry out 
        paragraph (1), the President (or senior officials designated by 
        the President who are responsible for international narcotics 
        programs and policies) shall meet with Members of Congress--
                  (A) on a quarterly basis for discussions and 
                consultations; and
                  (B) whenever time-sensitive issues arise.

                         background and purpose

    Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2291j) (hereinafter referred to as ``section 490'') 
requires the imposition of sanctions on any ``major illicit 
drug producing country or major drug transit country'' that is 
not certified by the President by March 1st of each year as 
having ``cooperated fully with the United States'' in anti-drug 
matters during the preceding year. Mexico has been determined 
by the Secretary of State to be a ``major'' drug producing/
transit country, and, accordingly, is subject to sanctions 
unless it is certified each year pursuant to this procedure.
    The sanctions required to be imposed on a country that is 
not certified pursuant to section 490 are: (1) bilateral U.S. 
assistance to that country is to be withheld, and (2) the 
United States is to vote against loans to that country in 
multilateral development banks. Section 490 further provides 
that the requirement to impose sanctions on a particular 
country may be waived if, by March 1st of each year, the 
President certifies that it is in the ``vital national 
interests of the United States'' to not impose the sanctions.
    Section 490 permits Congress to disapprove presidential 
certifications made under this section if it enacts a joint 
resolution to that effect within 30 calendar days after receipt 
of the certification. The effect of enactment of such a 
disapproval resolution is to impose sanctions on the country in 
question notwithstanding the President's certification.
    On February 28, 1997, the President determined and 
certified to Congress (transmittal no. 97-18) that Mexico, 
being a major drug producing and transit country, had 
``cooperated fully with the United States'' in its anti-drug 
efforts during the previous year.
    By enacting H.J. Res. 58, as reported, Congress would 
disapprove the determination of the President with respect to 
Mexico for fiscal year 1997--with the effect of giving Mexico a 
``failing grade'' in its anti-drug cooperation in the previous 
year. Under section 490, once Mexico is ``decertified'' it 
would be subject to sanctions (i.e. withholding of U.S. 
assistance and mandatory U.S. opposition to multilateral 
development bank assistance). However, H.J. Res. 58, as 
reported, provides the President authority to prevent such 
sanctions from taking effect if he determines and certifies to 
Congress that the ``vital national interests'' of the United 
States require that these sanctions not be imposed. The 
resolution, as reported, also requires the President to consult 
on at least a quarterly basis with the Congress on the 
objectives and strategies of U.S. anti-drug efforts with all 
major producing and transit countries.
    The Committee takes the extraordinary step of seeking to 
``decertify'' Mexico precisely because that country's full 
cooperation is singularly and absolutely indispensable to U.S. 
anti-drug efforts.
    However, the recent revelation that Mexico's senior law 
enforcement official (General Jose de Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo) 
has been taking bribes from and conspiring with the head of one 
of that country's most powerful drug cartels (Amado Carrillo 
Fuentes) for as long as seven years demonstrates that the 
effectiveness of U.S.-Mexican counternarcotics cooperation has 
been thoroughly undermined. The Gutierrez Rebollo scandal, 
although extraordinary, is hardly an isolated example of 
corruption in Mexico's law enforcement. Indeed, the fact that 
his American counterparts were unaware of Gutierrez' history--
and did not know for two weeks that he had been arrested--leads 
the Committee to conclude that U.S. officials lack the barest 
facts upon which to judge Mexico's cooperation.
    The Committee notes that the standard for ``certification'' 
set by section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is 
deliberately high: that a ``country has cooperated fully''. The 
mere appearance of cooperation is no substitute for the real 
thing. Taking into account the widespread corruption 
(highlighted by the recent Gutierrez revelation); the impunity 
with which several massive cartels are able to operate; the 
complicity of many in law enforcement agencies and the courts; 
and the lack of action in apprehension and/or extradition of 
drug kingpins, the Committee regrettably concludes that Mexico 
has fallen far short of meeting the standard of full 
cooperation.
    The Committee weighed many troubling facts when considering 
H.J. Res. 58, including:
    Gen. Gutierrez was well briefed on U.S. anti-drug efforts. 
He had access to the most sensitive intelligence collected by 
Mexican authorities about the drug syndicates operating in the 
country. He was familiar with law enforcement operations 
designed to bring them to justice. Members of Gutierrez' staff 
have been relieved of their responsibilities, casting doubt on 
key U.S. interlocutors. U.S. and Mexican officials assume that 
all ongoing operations may have been compromised.
    Seven hours after the President's ``certification'' of 
Mexico was made public, Mexico's attorney general issued a 
statement that law enforcement officials had allowed Humberto 
Garcia Abrego, a reputed money launderer and brother of 
convicted drug kingpin Juan Garcia Abrego, to walk free from 
police custody. Indeed, it is apparent that several Mexican 
officials deliberately freed Humberto Garcia Abrego and that 
their superiors deliberately withheld news of his release from 
their U.S. counterparts. This single episode is a poignant 
example of the widespread corruption that exists in Mexican law 
enforcement.
    Thomas Constantine, Administrator of the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), told a congressional 
committee on February 25, 1997, that ``Historically, corruption 
has been a central problem in DEA's relationship with Mexican 
counterparts. In short, there is not one single law enforcement 
institution in Mexico with whom DEA has an entirely trusting 
relationship.'' According to press reports, Constantine has 
asserted that the damage done by the Gutierrez betrayal appears 
to be worse than that done by the U.S. spy Aldrich Ames.
    Efforts to combat widespread corruption and bring criminals 
to justice have been ineffective. In January 1997, agents of 
Mexico's Federal Judicial Police may have warned Amado Carrillo 
Fuentes of an impending raid, allowing him to escape. The 
Mexican government takes credit for firing 1,200 officials for 
corruption, but not one of these individuals has been 
successfully prosecuted. U.S. extradition documents cite 
evidence in a single case that the attorney general and 90 
percent of the police, prosecutors and judges in Tijuana and 
the State of Baja California are on the payroll of the 
Arellano-Felix cartel. Although the U.S. Department of Justice 
has submitted provisional warrants for the arrest of Mexican 
drug kingpins, only one--Juan Garcia Abrego, a dual national--
has been sent to the United States to face justice. In 
addition, drug-related arrests in Mexico are down dramatically 
in the last four years (11,283 in 1996 compared to 27,577 in 
1992).
    According to the DEA, 70 percent of the cocaine entering 
the United States transits Mexican territory. Mexican cartels 
have filled the void created by the collapse of the Cali cartel 
by setting up their own coca supply sources in Bolivia and 
Peru. Despite an apparently increased level of production and 
transit, Mexico's cocaine seizures in 1996 are less than half 
what they were in 1991 (23.8 metric tons in 1996 compared to 
50.3 metric tons in 1991).
    Finally, a new deadly threat has emerged in just the last 
several years. Mexico's criminal syndicates have used their 
decades of experience smuggling cocaine, heroin, and marijuana 
to open a new front against the United States: the production 
and trafficking of methamphetamine. The DEA reported in 
February 1996 that ``criminal organizations from Mexico, 
deepening their involvement in methamphetamine production and 
distribution in the United States, have radically reshaped the 
trade. With access to wholesale supplies of precursor chemicals 
on international markets * * * these groups can manufacture 
unprecedented quantities of high-purity methamphetamine in 
large labs both in Mexico and across the border in 
California.''
    The failure of the Administration's international narcotics 
strategy is evidenced by the chaos in the anti-drug efforts in 
Mexico that has continued since the President's decision. 
Moreover, a double-standard is clearly apparent in light of the 
decertification of Colombia despite the outstanding efforts of 
the honest and courageous Colombian National Police. These 
factors further justify a reversal of the ill-advised and 
unjustified certification of Mexico.

                            committee action

    H.J. Res. 58 was introduced on March 3, 1997, by 
Representative E. Clay Shaw, Jr. (for himself, Mr. Mica, Mr. 
Bachus, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Watts of Oklahoma, Mr. Traficant, Mr. 
Foley, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. McCollum, Mr. English of Pennsylvania, 
and Mr. LaTourette) and referred to the Committee on 
International Relations.
    On March 6, 1997, the Committee held a mark-up of H.J. Res. 
58. The following representatives of the Executive branch 
agencies were available to answer questions posed by members of 
the Committee:
          Ambassador Robert Gelbard, Assistant Secretary of 
        State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement;
          Ambassador Jeffrey Davidow, Assistant Secretary of 
        State for Inter-American Affairs;
          Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary of State for 
        Legislative Affairs;
          James E. Milford, Acting Deputy Administrator, Drug 
        Enforcement Administration.

                             rollcall votes

    Clause 2(l)(2)(B) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires the Committee to list the recorded 
votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments 
thereto. The Committee's only vote in this regard is set out 
below:
    Rollcall Vote on Favorably Reporting H.J. Res. 58, 
disapproving the certification of the President under section 
490(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act regarding foreign 
assistance for Mexico during FY97 (3/6/97):
    The following members voted ``aye'': Mr. Gilman, Mr. 
Goodling, Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Smith, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. 
Ballenger, Mr. Kim, Mr. Chabot, Mr. Sanford, Mr. Campbell, Mr. 
Fox, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Moran, Mr. Brady, Mr. Hamilton, 
Mr. Gejdenson, Mr. Payne, Mr. Andrews, Mr. Menendez, Mr. Brown, 
Ms. Danner, Mr. Capps, Mr. Wexler, Mr. Kucinich, Mr. Rothman, 
and Mr. Clement.
    The following members voted ``no'': Mr. Burton, Mr. 
Rohrabacher, Mr. Martinez, Ms. McKinney, and Mr. Sherman.

27 Members voted ``aye.'' 5 Members voted ``no.'

                      committee oversight findings

    In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports 
the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

         committee on government reform and oversight findings

    No findings or recommendations of the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight were received as referred to in 
clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives.

               new budget authority and tax expenditures

    The Committee adopts the cost estimate of the Congressional 
Budget Office, set out below, as its submission of any required 
information on new budget authority, new spending authority, 
new credit authority, or an increase or decrease in the 
national debt required by clause 2(l)(3)(B) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives.

                       federal mandates statement

    The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal 
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act.

                      advisory committee statement

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this 
legislation.

                applicability to the legislative branch

    The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to 
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public 
services or accommodations within the meaning of section 
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.

                   constitutional authority statement

    In compliance with clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee cites the 
following specific powers granted to the Congress in the 
Constitution as authority for enactment of H.J. Res. 58 as 
reported by the Committee: Article I, section 8, clause 3 
(relating to the regulation of commerce with foreign nations 
and among the several states); and Article I, section 8, clause 
18 (relating to making all laws necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution powers vested by the Constitution in 
the government of the United States).

               congressional budget office cost estimate

    In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth 
with respect to H.J. Res. 58 as reported by the Committee the 
following estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of 
the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the Budget 
Act of 1974:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, March 7, 1997.
Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of 
        Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.J. Res. 58, as 
ordered reported by the House Committee on International 
Relations on March 6, 1997.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Joseph C. 
Whitehill.
            Sincerely,
                                         June E. O'Neill, Director.
    Enclosure.

H.J. Res. 58--Joint resolution disapproving the certification of the 
        President under section 490(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
        1961 regarding foreign assistance for Mexico during fiscal year 
        1997

    CBO estimates that the resolution would have no significant 
impact on the budget of the federal government. H.J. Res. 58 
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as 
defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Public Law 
104-4) and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal 
governments.
    H.J. Res. 58 would overturn the President's determination 
that Mexico is cooperating fully with the United States or is 
taking steps on its own to achieve full compliance with the 
goals and objectives of the 1988 United Nations Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances. The resolution, however, would permit the President 
to waive the sanctions required by law against Mexico should he 
determine and certify that it is in the vital national 
interests of the United States to do so.
    Since the President has determined that Mexico is 
cooperating with the United States, CBO assumes that the 
President would waive any sanctions against Mexico if the 
resolution is enacted.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Joseph C. 
Whitehill. The estimate was approved by Paul N. Van de Water, 
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

                jurisdictional issues and other matters

    The following letter was received from the Chairman of the 
House Committee on Banking and Financial Services.

                          House of Representatives,
               Committee on Banking and Financial Services,
                                    Washington, DC, March 10, 1997.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker, The Capitol,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: I am writing concerning House Joint 
Resolution 58, as amended by the Committee on International 
Relations, legislation disapproving the certification of the 
President under section 490(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (FAA) regarding foreign assistance for Mexico during 
fiscal year 1997. The legislation falls under the jurisdiction 
of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services under Rule X 
of the Rules of the House of Representatives relating to 
international finance.
    House Joint Resolution 58 expresses Congressional 
disapproval of the President's certification to Congress that 
the Government of Mexico has ``fully cooperated'' with U.S. 
anti-narcotics efforts during the last fiscal year. Section 490 
of the FAA permits Congress to disapprove presidential 
certifications made under this section by the enactment of a 
joint resolution. H.J. Res. 58 disapproves of the President's 
certification but provides that the resulting de-certification 
may be waived if the President determines and certifies to 
Congress that the ``vital national interest'' of the United 
States so require.
    De-certification of Mexico would invoke Section 490(a) of 
the FAA, which requires the withholding of fifty percent of 
U.S. assistance allocated to a country in the event that the 
President has determined it is a major illicit drug-producing 
country or a major drug-transit country. Under section 
481(e)(4)(D) of the FAA, foreign assistance is defined to 
include financing provided by the Export-Import Bank of the 
United States. Section 490(a) of the FAA also requires the 
Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the U.S. Executive 
Director of each multilateral development bank to vote against 
any loan or utilization of the funds of their respective 
institution to or for any major illicit drug producing country 
or major drug-transit country. These provisions fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Banking Committee relating to international 
finance.
    In this regard, on January 16, 1997, the Government of 
Mexico prepaid in full all $13.5 billion of its outstanding 
obligations under the February 21, 1995 agreements providing 
U.S. emergency economic support funds, more than three years 
ahead of schedule. In addition to full repayment of principal, 
Mexico paid $1.4 billion in interest, representing a profit of 
$580 million to the American taxpayer and a corresponding 
reduction in the U.S. budget deficit.
    As of December 1996, outstanding loans, credits, and 
guarantees provided to the Government of Mexico by other U.S. 
agencies include: (1) approximately $2.2 billion outstanding in 
total actual exposure (including loans, guarantees, insurance, 
rescheduled loans, and collections for non-payment) to the 
Government of Mexico and its parastatals by the Export-Import 
Bank; (2) $2.4 billion in guarantees outstanding through the 
Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation on 
obligations due from Mexican banks to U.S. banks or exporters; 
and (3) $11.4 million in loans outstanding to the Government of 
Mexico from the U.S. Agency for International Development.
    Understanding that the resolution may be scheduled for 
consideration by the House later this week, I request that the 
Banking Committee be discharged from any consideration of H.J. 
Res. 58 without prejudice.
            Sincerely,
                                          James A. Leach, Chairman.
                                ------                                

    The following materials are included for the interest of 
Members:

                                  House of Representatives,
                                     Washington, DC, March 5, 1997.
Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: We understand that on March 6, the 
Committee on International Relations intends to mark up 
legislation pertaining to the President's recent certification 
that Mexico is cooperating fully with the United States in 
anti-narcotics efforts. We opposed this certification, and are 
writing to request that you include language that requires the 
Administration to report to Congress regularly on its plan of 
action for anti-drug cooperation between the United States and 
Mexico for each year. We want to work with you in putting 
together a package which we believe can gain substantial 
bipartisan support.
    Drug trafficking is a serious problem that the United 
States and Mexico share; fighting it therefore requires a 
shared effort and shared responsibilities. Mexico is a friend 
and ally of the United States, and we commend the well-
intentioned efforts of the Mexican people who are committed to 
fighting the drug trade. However, despite our close 
relationship with our neighbor, we disagree with the 
certification of Mexico as an ally in our war on drugs. The 
clear evidence of failures throughout the Mexican system 
responsible for fighting this war--the government, military and 
police--demands that the United States change what we are doing 
and try something else.
    Mexican prosecutors, police chiefs and politicians who 
challenge the drug cartels are being assassinated. The vast 
majority of marijuana, cocaine and psychotropic drugs in the 
United States come through Mexico. We've got to send a message 
that what we're doing just isn't working. The status quo is 
unacceptable. Recent events make it clear that certifying 
Mexico at this time is the wrong signal to send to the drug 
kingpins. It says business as usual can continue.
    In the light of the above, we urged the President last week 
to decertify Mexico but to waive sanctions as long as this 
waiver is accompanied by comprehensive bilateral anti-narcotics 
efforts that include measurable targets for reducing the flow 
of drugs into the United States. As your committee considers 
legislation to this effect, we request that you include a 
requirement that the Administration report to Congress through 
regular consultations--similar to the peacekeeping 
consultations currently required by law--on its bilateral 
efforts with Mexico and other governments in the region to 
achieve tangible progress in the fight against drugs. Such 
consultations should include information on the 
Administration's annual plan to action for anti-drug 
cooperation with Mexico, as well as the specific objectives and 
measurable targets to be sought each year.
    We believe that close consultation with Congress on the 
Administration's specific plans to address the drug problem 
confronting the United States and Mexico is essential, and 
would help us and our Mexican partners take the tough steps 
necessary to stem the hemorrhage of drugs into our country. The 
American people are interested in results, not more empty 
promises.
    As you know, the fight against drugs requires resources. 
Consequently, we should also encourage the Administration to 
define what steps and resources are necessary to fight an 
effective battle against the druglords and cartels.
    We appreciate your consideration of our views as to what 
should be included in legislation pertaining to the Mexico 
anti-drug certification. Achieving closer consultation on the 
Administration's anti-drug plan of action will ensure regular 
review of the progress we are making and enables us to increase 
our effectiveness--in conjunction with the Mexican Government--
in reducing the drug trade and protecting our children. We look 
forward to working with your committee as we address this 
serious issue.
            Sincerely,
                                   Richard A. Gephardt,
                                           Democratic Leader.
                                   David E. Bonior,
                                           Democratic Whip.
                                ------                                


                 [Presidential Determination No. 97-18]

                                           The White House,
                                 Washington, DC, February 28, 1997.
Subject: Certification for major narcotics producing and transit 
        countries.

                 Memorandum for the Secretary of State

    By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 
490(b)(1)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 
(``the Act''), I hereby determine and certify that the 
following major drug producing and/or major drug transit 
countries/dependent territories have cooperated fully with the 
United States, or taken adequate steps on their own, to achieve 
full compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Aruba, The Bahamas, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Cambodia, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Laos, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela, 
and Vietnam.
    By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 
490(b)(1)(B) of the Act, I hereby determine that it is in the 
vital national interests of the United States to certify the 
following major illicit drug producing and/or transit 
countries: Belize, Lebanon, and Pakistan.
    Analysis of the relevant U.S. vital national interests, as 
required under section 490(b)(3) of the Act, is attached. I 
have determined that the following major illicit drug producing 
and/or major transit countries do not meet the standards set 
forth in section 490(b) for certification: Afghanistan, Burma, 
Colombia, Iran, Nigeria, and Syria.
    In making these determinations, I have considered the 
factors set forth in section 490 of the Act, based on the 
information contained in the International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report of 1997. Because the performance of each of 
these countries/dependent territories has differed, I have 
attached an explanatory statement for each of the countries/
dependent territories subject to this determination.
    You are hereby authorized and directed to report this 
determination to the Congress immediately and to publish it in 
the Federal Register.

                                                William J. Clinton.
    Attachment.

                    Statement of Explanation--Mexico

    The Government of Mexico's (GOM) 1996 counter-drug effort 
produced encouraging results and notable progress in bilateral 
cooperation. President Zedillo has declared the major drug 
trafficking organizations, and the corruption they foster 
within governmental structures, to be Mexico's principal 
national security threat. He has intensified the country's 
counter-drug effort, in keeping with international human rights 
norms, both through legal reforms and operationally, through 
the expanded participation of the nation's military services.
    Drug seizures and arrests increased in 1996. Mexican 
authorities seized 23.8 mt of cocaine, 383 kgs of heroin, 1015 
mt of marijuana, 171.7 kgs of methamphetamine and 6.7 mt of 
ephedrine (its chemical precursor), and destroyed 20 drug labs. 
Police arrested 11,283 suspects on drug-related charges. 
Authorities arrested several major traffickers: Juan Garcia 
Abrego, Gulf cartel leader and one of the FBI's ``Ten Most 
Wanted'' fugitives; Jose Luis Pereira Salas, linked to the Cali 
and Juarez cartels; and Manuel Rodriguez Lopez, linked to the 
Castrillon maritime smuggling organization.
    The Mexican Congress passed two critical pieces of 
legislation which have armed the GOM with a whole new arsenal 
of weapons to use to combat money laundering, chemical 
diversion and organized crime. The GOM established organized 
crime task forces in key locations in northern and western 
Mexico in cooperation with U.S. law enforcement. In an effort 
to confront widespread corruption within the nation's law 
enforcement agencies, former Attorney General Lozano dismissed 
over 1250 federal police officers and technical personnel for 
corruption or incompetence, although some have been rehired, 
and the GOM indicted two former senior GOM officials and a 
current Undersecretary of Tourism. He also sought to expand 
cooperation with the United States and other governments.
    The United States and Mexico established the High-Level 
Contact Group on Narcotics Control (HLCG) to explore joint 
solutions to the shared drug threat and to coordinate bilateral 
anti-drug efforts. The HLCG met three times during 1996 and its 
technical working groups met throughout the year. Under the 
aegis of the HLCG, the two governments developed a joint 
assessment of the narcotics threat posed to both countries 
which will be used as the basis for a joint counter-drug 
strategy.
    U.S.-Mexican bilateral cooperation on drug law enforcement 
continued to improve in 1996, particularly in the areas of 
money laundering, mutual legal assistance, and criminal 
investigations. The USG provided training, technical, and 
material support to personnel of the Office of the Mexican 
Attorney General (PGR), the National Institute to Combat Drugs 
(INCD), the Mexican Treasury, and the Mexican armed forces. The 
Government of Mexico established the important precedent of 
extraditing Mexican nationals to the United States under the 
provision of Mexico's extradition law permitting this in 
``exceptional circumstances.'' This paves the way for further 
advances in bringing fugitives to justice. Both governments 
returned record numbers of fugitives in 1996.
    Even with positive results, and good cooperation with the 
U.S. and other governments, the problems which Mexico faces 
remain daunting. The Zedillo Administration has taken important 
beginning steps against the major drug cartels in Mexico, and 
towards more effective cooperation with the United States and 
other international partners, but the strongest groups, such as 
the Juarez and Tijuana cartels, have yet to be effectively 
confronted. The level of narcotics corruption is very serious, 
reaching into the very senior levels of Mexico's drug law 
enforcement forces, as witnessed by the February 1997 arrest of 
the recently-appointed national counternarcotics coordinator. 
President Zedillo acted courageously to remove him as soon as 
the internal Mexican investigation revealed the problem, but 
this has been a set-back for Mexico's anti-drug effort, and for 
bilateral cooperation.
    Mexican police, military personnel, prosecutors, and the 
courts need additional resources, training and other support to 
perform the important and dangerous tasks ahead of them. 
Progress in establishing controls on money laundering and 
chemical diversion must be further enhanced and implemented. 
New capabilities need to be institutionalized. Above all, the 
GOM will have to take system-wide action against corruption and 
other abuses of official authority through enhanced screening 
of personnel in sensitive positions and putting into place 
ongoing integrity controls.
    While there are still serious problems, and a number of 
areas in which the USG would like to see further progress, the 
two governments have agreed on the parameters of a joint 
approach to combat the narcotics threat, and are at work on 
developing this strategy. The drug issue will remain one of the 
top issues in the bilateral agenda and will be one of the main 
issues discussed during President Clinton's planned visit to 
Mexico in April.

                      section-by-section analysis

Section 1. Disapproval of determination of President regarding Mexico

    Section 1 would disapprove the President's certification 
pursuant to section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 229j), transmitted to Congress on February 28, 1997, 
(transmittal no. 97-18), that Mexico had ``cooperated fully 
with the United States'' in anti-drug efforts the previous 
year. Section 490 provides that enactment of this section 
within 30 calendar days after receipt of the President's 
certification will have the effect of withholding bilateral 
U.S. assistance to Mexico and requiring the U.S. 
representatives to multilateral development banks to vote 
against any loan or other utilization of funds of such 
institutions to or for Mexico.

Section 2. Waiver of requirement to withhold assistance for Mexico

    Section 2 permits the President to waive the imposition of 
sanctions otherwise required to be imposed on Mexico as a 
result of enactment of section 1 if he certifies that doing so 
is required by the ``vital national interests of the United 
States.'' The intent of this section is to provide the 
President similar authority to that accorded under section 
490(b)(1)(B) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2291j(b)(1)(B)). This ``vital national interests'' waiver is 
nearly identical to the alternative certification under section 
490(b)(1)(B) that the President could have made on February 
28th in lieu of certifying that Mexico had ``cooperated fully'' 
with U.S. anti-drug efforts. The Committee intends that this 
waiver authority be used, in particular but not exclusively, to 
ensure that the provision of any and all forms of United States 
anti-drug assistance to Mexico (including training, supplies 
and other related support for the police and armed forces) will 
not be interrupted as a result of enactment of section 1 of 
this resolution.
    Section 3 provides that the resolution shall be deemed to 
have been enacted within 30 calendar days after February 28, 
1997. This ensures that the resolution will be legally 
effective even if it is enacted after the 30-day period 
provided by section 490(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291j(d)) has expired. The Committee decided 
that this rule of construction is necessary because a planned 
congressional recess during the 30-day period following 
February 28, 1997, may preclude final congressional action on 
resolution prior to expiration of that period.
    Section 4 requires the President to consult with Congress 
on the status of counter-narcotics cooperation between the 
United States and each major illicit drug producing country or 
major drug-transit country. Such consultation is to be carried 
out by the President (or by senior officials designated by the 
President who are responsible for international narcotics 
programs and policies) no less often than once each quarter, 
and more frequently whenever time-sensitive issues arise. It is 
the intent of the Committee that the Committee on International 
Relations will have the lead role within the House of 
Representatives organizing the consultations pursuant to this 
section, and that the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of 
the Committee will be among those Members of Congress 
consulted. The consultation procedure is intended to encourage 
the Executive Branch to discuss with Members of Congress, on a 
regular basis, U.S. international counternarcotics strategy.
           ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF THE HONORABLE LEE H. HAMILTON

    I supported H.J. Res. 58 because I agreed with the sponsors 
that Mexico's counter-narcotics record did not reach the level 
of full cooperation on counter-narcotics that the law requires. 
I am compelled, however, to submit additional views because I 
do not believe that the Committee report adequately addresses 
this legislative action in the context of the entire U.S.-
Mexico relationship, including Mexico's unprecedented degree of 
cooperation with the United States on counter-narcotics issues.

       the president's dilemma: the u.s. relationship with mexico

    Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 sets a 
high standard for certifying a major illicit drug producing or 
transit country: cooperating fully with the United States, or 
taking adequate steps on its own, to comply with counter-
narcotics objectives in the 1988 UN Convention or bilateral 
agreements over the last year.
    The President had three choices. First, he could find 
Mexico had fully cooperated or had taken adequate steps on its 
own to comply with international counter narcotics agreements. 
Second, he could have decertified, putting the U.S. 
relationship with Mexico at risk and threatening future full 
cooperation on counter-narcotics initiatives. Third, the 
President could have decertified but exercised the vital 
national interest waiver that the law provides. These latter 
two options posed difficulties for the President because they 
raised concerns about how international diplomatic and 
financial interests would interpret and react to the decision.
    It is clear to me that the current situation with Mexico 
illustrates that the law itself simply does not work. It is a 
blunt instrument that provides the President only limited and 
inflexible options that may conflict with broader U.S. 
interests.
    The United States and Mexico have a relationship that goes 
beyond narcotics issues. We share a 2000 mile border, and 
Mexico is our third largest trading partner. The peso crisis in 
late 1994 underscored to many of us how much the U.S. and 
Mexico are tied together. Mexican cooperation on a wide range 
of issues, including fighting drugs, is critical to the United 
States. The President had to weigh the best way to get this 
critical cooperation from Mexico, given the breadth of issues 
in our relationship and Mexican opposition to the certification 
statute. The President faced a very difficult decision.
    On February 28, 1997, the President certified that Mexico 
met the law's tough standard. Many of us disagree with that 
judgment. Given the high standard of the law and the very mixed 
record of Mexico in cooperating, I do not believe it is 
possible to find ``full cooperation'' or ``adequate steps.'' At 
the same time, we want to avoid the imposition of sanctions on 
Mexico. We do not want to undermine United States relations 
with Mexico. We also cannot ignore the law. Many Members, like 
me, support H.J.Res. 58 because it reflects that middle ground.

                          the positive record

    At the highest levels of the Mexican government there is a 
recognition of the seriousness of the problem and a strong 
desire to attack it. In the past year, President Zedillo and 
the Mexican government took important steps forward in 
narcotics control. Narcotics seizures increased from 1995 
levels. The Government of Mexico established important tools to 
fight narcotics trafficking. A new body of laws has been 
enacted--permitting asset forfeiture, criminalizing money 
laundering, and improving controls of precursor chemicals. 
Organized crime task forces were set up in northern and western 
Mexico. Finally, Mexico worked more closely than ever with the 
United States, establishing a High Level Contact Group on 
Narcotics to increase the necessary cooperation.

         mexico does not meet the full certification standard.

    But the statute calls for full cooperation or adequate 
steps, and until it is repealed, we must follow its 
requirements. Mexico's record over the past year does not meet 
the standards the law sets out.
    The Government of Mexico has not fully cooperated with the 
United States. Mexico has not extradited a single Mexican 
national on drug charges, despite at least 52 U.S. drug-related 
extradition requests. According to the State Department report, 
the ``Government of Mexico failure to provide either the 
financial resources or immunities and other protection for U.S. 
law enforcement personnel, has undermined the ability of 
[bilateral task forces] to fulfill their mission [to dismantle 
cartels].''
    In terms of the mechanics of the working relationship on 
counternarcotics issues, U.S. ships and airplanes must wait 
thirty days to receive refueling and overflight permission from 
the Mexican government. This delay impedes U.S. 
counternarcotics efforts. U.S. law enforcement agents are not 
allowed by the Government of Mexico to carry their weapons 
across the border with Mexico when they are pursuing cases. 
Unlike many other countries in the hemisphere, Mexico has not 
signed a maritime agreement with the United States. Such an 
agreement would allow U.S. agents to intercept suspected drug 
traffickers in Mexican waters. The United States and Mexico 
need to reach a better understanding on these sensitive but 
critical aspects of cooperation.
    Mexico also has not ``taken adequate steps on its own'' as 
required by the statute. In recent weeks, the United States has 
been presented with evidence of high level corruption in 
Mexico. The arrest of General Gutierrez, the top Mexican drug 
official, for ties to narcotic activity, causes serious 
concern. I am pleased that the Government of Mexico arrested 
him, but the evidence of his alleged illicit activities may go 
back to at least 1993. There are many other examples of 
official corruption that have been detailed by U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration officials in Mexico, and that 
corruption is limiting U.S. agents effectiveness in Mexico.
    The Government of Mexico has not dismantled any major drug 
trafficking organizations. Its arrest record is mixed. In fact, 
on the day of the U.S. certification decision, Mexican 
authorities released an individual wanted in Mexico on drug 
charges. And despite approval in 1996 of important legislation 
relating to asset forfeiture, new investigative tools, and 
money laundering, implementation of these laws has been 
lacking.

                       a national interest waiver

    I want the Congress to send two messages with this 
resolution. The Congress is disapproving full certification 
because we simply cannot find that the standards of the statute 
have been met. But we favor the use of a national interest 
waiver. We want no penalties to attach to the disapproval of 
certification. The United States national interest here is 
clear: we want to reduce the flow of drugs and we want a stable 
and cooperative Mexico. It is my view that a national interest 
waiver is more likely to elicit further cooperation from Mexico 
than would imposition of sanctions.
    It is worth noting that the United States has disagreements 
with all of our major allies and friends--we have disputes with 
the Europeans, with the Canadians, and with the Japanese. Just 
as we must work to ensure that particular disagreements on 
particular issues do not undermine our overall relationships 
the European community, or Canada, or Japan, so we must work to 
make sure this decision on this issue does not have that effect 
with Mexico.

                        the consultation section

    The President had a tough call to make, but the lack of 
adequate consultation between the Executive Branch and the 
Congress on this subject contributed to Congress'' negative 
reaction to the President's decision to certify.
    This resolution seeks to remedy that situation by requiring 
the Executive to meet with Members of Congress quarterly to 
discuss narcotics control objectives. The International 
Relations Committee, charged with oversight related to the 
certification statute, should take the lead for Congress in 
these consultations. This consultation procedure will encourage 
the Executive Branch to discuss with Members of Congress, on a 
regular basis, details about agreements between the United 
States and other governments related to the fight against 
drugs.
    The consultation language would require regular discussion 
between the Executive Branch and Congress on the status of 
counter-narcotics cooperation between the United States and 
each major illicit drug producing or drug transit country. It 
provides a mechanism for airing difficult issues and tough 
choices with the Congress. The mechanism is an attempt to find 
a way the Executive and the Congress can work together to 
better achieve the goals and objectives we all share with 
respect to United States counter-narcotics strategy.

                               conclusion

    I have taken this opportunity to submit additional views 
and written in this detail, because I want to be sure that my 
colleagues, the President, and the Government of Mexico 
understand that I did not reach this position easily. I 
understand and can appreciate why and how others might come out 
differently.

                                           Lee H. Hamilton,
                                         Ranking Democratic Member.

                                
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