[Senate Executive Report 105-14]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
105th Congress Exec. Rpt.
SENATE
2d Session 105-14
_______________________________________________________________________
PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND,
HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC
_______
March 6, 1998.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany Treaty Doc. 105-36]
The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession
of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which were opened
for signature at Brussels on December 16, 1997, and signed on
behalf of the United States of America and other parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon and recommends that the Senate give its
advice and consent to ratification thereof subject to seven
declarations and four conditions as set forth in this report
and the accompanying resolution of ratification.
CONTENTS
Page
I. The Future of NATO and the Enlargement of the Alliance...........2
II. Qualifications of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for
NATO Membership..................................................8
III. The Cost of NATO Enlargement....................................17
IV. NATO-Russia Relations...........................................23
V. Senate Action...................................................28
VI. Resolution of Ratification......................................37
VII. Views of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.................46
VIII.Views of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence............56
I. The Future of NATO and the Enlargement of the Alliance
United States Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was
established as an alliance of common defense among democratic
and market oriented governments in North America and Western
Europe on August 24, 1949, with the entry into force of the
North Atlantic Treaty. Original members included the United
States, Canada, and ten European countries emerging from the
destruction of World War II (Great Britain, France, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Iceland
and Italy). Subsequently, the Alliance has been enlarged on
three separate occasions--to include Greece and Turkey in 1952,
the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.
NATO has been central to peace and stability in Europe for
almost fifty years and provides the United States with an
ongoing and direct leadership role in European security
affairs.
During the Cold War, NATO served as a bulwark against the
threat of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites. The
U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee served as a deterrent to
Soviet aggression, and U.S. conventional forces stationed in
Europe, reaching over 300,000 at their peak, were evidence that
the United States would meet its commitment to collective
defense under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO members have made
significant cuts in their military forces, including a
substantial reduction in U.S. forces stationed in Europe. Since
1991, NATO has shifted from its Cold War strategy of mounting a
massive, static defense against a significant military threat
from a single direction. Instead, NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept
revised the strategy to provide mobile response to diverse and
multi-directional risks to the North Atlantic area.
According to the 1991 Strategic Concept, the primary role
of Alliance military forces is still to guarantee the security
and territorial integrity of member states. The Alliance is
also pursuing a broader, cooperative security relationship with
a total of 44 European and North American countries in the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO has established a forum
for constructive dialogue and cooperation with the Russian
Federation in the Permanent Joint Council, and NATO has forged
a relationship with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission.
Within the guidelines of its Resolution of Ratification, the
Committee supports these initiatives as a way to demonstrate
the defensive and stabilizing intentions of NATO. Nonetheless,
the core purpose of the Alliance must remain the defense of its
members. In order to fulfill this purpose, the forces of
Alliance members must remain capable of defending against a
significant military threat, and all members of the Alliance
must fully meet their military commitments.
History may judge the collapse of communism in Europe to be
largely a result of NATO's success in containing the massive,
external threat posed by the Soviet Union. During the Cold War,
however, NATO also played a second role--equally important as
the defense against communism--a role that remains relevant
today. After two World Wars in the first half of the century
into which the United States was drawn, the close relationship
among NATO members allowed countries to lay aside historical
grievances and develop democratic traditions and market
economies to the enormous benefit of themselves, their
neighbors, and the United States. Under NATO's security
umbrella, old enemies have not only been reconciled but now
stand side by side as allies; national defense polices are
coordinated; and, on a daily basis, consultation, joint
planning, joint training and cooperation reinforce the trust
and commitment to common principles that are the very essence
of the Alliance.
As Poland and Germany, and Hungary and Romania, and several
other former antagonists in Central and Eastern Europe build
constructive, friendly relations in the post-Cold War era, the
stabilizing influence of NATO membership, and potential
membership, is illustrated yet again. The defensive nature of
the Alliance, the democratic nature of its decision-making, and
membership based not upon force of arms or coercion, but the
willing choice of democratic governments, are the central
reasons that association with the Alliance, and even
membership, is a foreign policy priority for many European
nations previously denied the rights of self-determination,
freedom, and democracy. And for this reason, no country in
Europe, with the exceptions of Belarus and Russia, has objected
to the enlargement of the Alliance.
With NATO's continued importance to European stability, and
a narrow mission of defending the North Atlantic area, the
Committee supports a continued United States commitment to, and
leadership in, NATO. The Committee welcomes the strategic
rationale for NATO that was provided by Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright in testimony before the Foreign Relations
Committee on October 7, 1997. In explaining the purpose of the
Alliance, Secretary Albright stated that:
First, there are dangers of Europe's past. It is easy
to forget this, but for centuries virtually every
European nation treated virtually every other nation as
a military threat. That pattern was broken only when
NATO was born and only in the half of Europe NATO
covered. With NATO, each member's security came to
depend on cooperation with others, not competition.
That is one reason why NATO remains essential. It is
also one reason why we need a larger NATO which extends
its positive influence to Europe's other half.
A second set of dangers lies in Europe's present.
Because of the conflict in the Balkans and the former
Soviet Union, Europe has already buried more victims of
war since the Berlin Wall fell than in all the years of
the cold war. It is sobering to recall that this
violence has its roots in the same problems of
shattered states and of ethnic hatreds that tyrants
exploited to start this century's great wars.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, and most important, we must
consider the dangers of Europe's future. By this I mean
direct threats against the soil of NATO members that a
collective defense pact is designed to meet. Some are
visible on Europe's horizon, such as the threat posed
by rogue states with dangerous weapons. Others may not
seem apparent today, but they are not unthinkable.
Within this category lie questions about the future of
Russia. We want Russian democracy to endure. We are
optimistic that it will, but one should not dismiss the
possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of
its past. By engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we
give Russia every incentive to deepen its commitment to
peaceful relations with neighbors, while closing the
avenue to more destructive alternatives.
The Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement
Notwithstanding the collapse of communism in most of Europe
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and
its allies face continuing threats to their stability and
territorial integrity, including the potential for the
emergence of a hegemonic power in or around Europe, conflict
stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of
historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders.
Furthermore, emerging capabilities to use and deliver weapons
of mass destruction, as well as transnational threats such as
terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime threaten both
new and old democracies on the European continent. By providing
a defense against many of these threats, NATO membership for
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will expand the area in
Europe where peace and democracy are not only present, but
secure.
Through much of its history, Europe has seen many insecure
and small powers, a few great powers, and far too many
nationalist defense policies--a dangerous catalyst for
collusion and conflagration. Twice in this century these
dynamics have pulled the United States into conflict on the
European continent. With the enlargement of NATO, the United
States and its allies have an opportunity to build a more
stable Europe, to lock in that stability, and to replace the
dynamics of confrontation and conflict with trust and
cooperation. NATO membership will extend to Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic the institutions, practices, and
traditions of consultation, joint planning, joint training, and
joint operations that have made NATO an effective military
alliance for the last half century. This structure has proven
that vital U.S. interests in Europe can be guaranteed by a
stable architecture of security and cooperation based upon a
common commitment to the defense of democracy.
The Committee finds that the accession of Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic to NATO will make the Alliance stronger
and more cohesive. Each of the three countries is an
established democracy with a growing market economy. Each
shares the culture, history, and commitment to democracy that
unite the transatlantic community. Their militaries are firmly
under civilian control. In addition, these three countries have
proven themselves ready to bear a share of the burden in
support of American and Allied interests beyond their borders.
Each contributed forces to Operation Desert Storm, all three
are prepared to return to the Gulf if necessary, and today,
Polish, Hungarian, and Czech troops stand side by side with
U.S. forces in Bosnia.
NATO enlargement is not a reaction to any single event or
threat; rather it is a strategic opportunity for the expansion
of a zone of peace and democracy in a continent that is of
vital interest to the United States. In the view of the
Committee, this is the best way to minimize the possibility
that U.S. troops will be called upon again to fight in a major
war across the Atlantic. The invasion or military
destabilization of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic--with
or without the extension of NATO membership--would threaten the
stability of Europe, jeopardize vital United States national
security interests, and would quite likely lead to the
engagement of United States forces. NATO enlargement is a
prudent step to ensure that this does not happen.
NATO's Strategic Concept
The Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the subsequent
disarray of the Russian military have, in the view of NATO,
significantly reduced any immediate, conventional threat to
Western Europe and the United States. Consequently, in 1991,
NATO members agreed to a new Strategic Concept. The Strategic
Concept reiterates the central importance of collective defense
to the Alliance, but it also notes that, with the emergence of
independent democratic states in Central Europe, ``the
political division of Europe that was the source of the
military confrontation of the Cold War period has . . . been
overcome.''
The Committee Resolution of Ratification declares that, in
order for NATO to serve the security interests of the United
States, the core purpose of NATO must remain the collective
defense of the territory of all Alliance members. With that
focus, the Committee supports the 1991 Strategic Concept's
leaner approach to security for the post-Cold War environment,
provided that NATO's forces remain sufficient to deter and
counter any significant military threat to the territory of any
NATO member.
Under the Strategic Concept, the allies agreed to move away
from a positional forward defense and to develop forces to
counter ``diverse and multi-directional risks.'' Such forces
would ``require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an
assured capability for augmentation when necessary. . . . This
ability to build up by reinforcement, by mobilizing reserves,
or by reconstituting forces, must be in proportion to potential
threats. . . .'' The Committee supports the Strategic Concept's
realistic force adjustments to meet new threats to the
territory of NATO. Nonetheless, the Committee considers some
positional forces to have continued importance as an element of
static defense, especially in fulfilling the military
requirements of defending the new members. The Committee
Resolution of Ratification declares that as NATO develops
forces with enhanced flexibility and mobility, it must continue
to pursue defense planning, command structures, and force goals
first and foremost to meet the requirements of Article 5 of the
North Atlantic Treaty.
The Committee recognizes that, under Article 4 of the North
Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance may address instability outside
NATO's borders if that instability could lead to a more direct
threat to NATO members. The Committee Resolution of
Ratification makes clear that this mission should not be
elevated, and it requires such activities to be undertaken only
on a case-by-case basis and only when a threat arises both to
the security and to the interests of the Alliance. Any attempt
to make this mission the primary purpose of the Alliance, or
any expansion of this concept, or expansive use of it, would be
a matter of great concern to the Committee.
No consensus exists in the Committee in support of a
broader mission for NATO. While NATO has been successful in
maintaining support for the narrow mission of the territorial
defense of its members, some members of the Committee are
deeply concerned about proposals to allow NATO forces to defend
interests outside the North Atlantic area, such as in Africa or
the Middle East; to use NATO forces increasingly for operations
other than war (peacekeeping, crisis management, etc.); to
require that NATO gain approval of non-NATO countries, the
United Nations, or the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe in order to act; and for a new mission
for the Alliance to respond preemptively to emerging
capabilities to use weapons of mass destruction among non-NATO
countries.
The Committee strongly advises the Executive Branch to
consult extensively with the Senate before undertaking any
interpretation, reinterpretation, expansion, or revision of
NATO's Strategic Concept. Because NATO will undertake
negotiations to review the Strategic Concept in 1998, the
Committee Resolution of Ratification requires close
consultation on this matter including specific requirements for
briefings of the Committee.
Finally, the Committee finds that the Strategic Concept and
burdensharing are inextricably linked. Because the United
States is the leading military power in NATO and has force
projection capabilities far superior to those of its allies,
the costs associated with a mission to respond to diverse and
multi-directional risks falls disproportionately upon the
United States military. Active development of the Combined
Joint Task Force concept, in which European forces would
undertake some NATO missions on their own, with support from
the United States, also will reduce the burden on the U.S.
military. However, differences exist among Alliance members
over the extent and purpose of such missions, and there is some
question of how well the European allies can accomplish such
new missions on their own, with only limited U.S. involvement.
The current disparities between the United States and its
NATO allies in transport, logistics, communications, and
intelligence capabilities (made apparent in the Persian Gulf
War and in the on-going Bosnia operations) indicate that NATO
is moving toward a two-tiered Alliance in which the United
States and its NATO allies have vast differences in
capabilities. The Committee notes that in a February 1997
report to Congress on the rationale, benefits, costs, and
implications of NATO enlargement, the Department of Defense
concluded that in order to prevent such disparities the current
allies would have to spend some $8-10 billion for force
modernization by the year 2010. The Committee Resolution of
Ratification requires a specific and detailed report on
progress by members of the Alliance to meet their commitments
in fulfilling force goals.
Future NATO Enlargement
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that NATO
members, by unanimous agreement, may invite the accession to
the North Atlantic Treaty of any other European state in a
position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty
and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.
The Committee emphasizes, however, that in the process of
considering the qualifications and purpose for the admission of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO, the
Committee did not state a view on when, or whether, the United
States should invite any additional countries to join NATO. The
Committee Resolution of Ratification declares that only Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic have been invited by NATO
members to join the Alliance. No other agreement or document,
including the July 8, 1997 Madrid Summit Declaration of NATO,
or the January 16, 1998 Baltic Charter, should be construed
otherwise.
It is the Committee's understanding that the United States
will not support the invitation to NATO membership to any
further candidates unless the Senate is first consulted, unless
any proposed candidate can fulfill the obligations and
responsibilities of membership, and unless their inclusion
would serve the overall political and strategic interests of
the United States. The Executive Branch has stated its
understanding of the need for consultation with the Senate. On
March 3, 1998, in a written answer to a question for the
record, Secretary of State Albright stated:
We understand fully the Senate's constitutional
responsibility to advise and consent to the
ratification of any Treaty into which the United States
enters. As we have done in the past, as well as on this
occasion, we will keep the Senate and the Foreign
Relations Committee fully informed of significant
developments with regard to possible future rounds of
NATO enlargement and seek its advice on important
decisions. We would of course be required to obtain the
Senate's advice and consent to any future amendments to
the Washington Treaty that enlarge NATO.
The Committee Resolution of Ratification reiterates that no
action or agreement other than a consensus decision by the full
membership of NATO, approved by the national procedures of each
NATO member, including, in the case of the United States, the
requirements of Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the
Constitution of the United States (regarding the advice and
consent of the Senate to the making of treaties), will
constitute a security commitment pursuant to the North Atlantic
Treaty.
Senate Advice on NATO Enlargement
NATO members preliminarily endorsed the expansion of the
Alliance at a January 1994 NATO summit, setting in motion a
process to expand NATO for the fourth time since 1949.
Admission of new members is governed by Article 10 of the North
Atlantic Treaty, which states: ``The parties may, by unanimous
agreement, invite any other European State in a position to
further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the
security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.''
In the view of the Committee, the Executive Branch has
consulted and sought the advice of the Senate, consistent with
the requirements of Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the
Constitution of the United States, as the membership of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO has been proposed and
considered. Indeed, this consultation is a model of how the two
branches should cooperate in exericising their treaty-making
power.
As is evident in the Senate Action portion of this report,
the Clinton Administration and the Senate have been in constant
dialogue on this policy for four years. The Senate debated and
approved legislation in support of NATO enlargement in 1994,
1995, and 1996. On July 25, 1996, by an 81-16 vote, the Senate
approved legislation stating that ``The admission to NATO of
emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe which are
found to be in a position to further the principles of the
North Atlantic Treaty would contribute to international peace
and contribute to the security of the region.'' Throughout 1996
and 1997 the Executive Branch worked closely with the Foreign
Relations Committee as this policy was pursued in NATO.
On April 22, 1997, by agreement of the Senate Majority and
Minority Leaders, the 28-member Senate NATO Observer Group was
established to permit close interaction between the Executive
Branch and the Senate during the negotiations on NATO
enlargement. The Observer Group includes in its membership the
Chairman and Ranking members of the Committees on Foreign
Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations, as well as other
interested Senators. Special procedures were established
between the Observer Group and the Executive Branch by which
documents or agreements in negotiation were discussed with the
Senate prior to completion.
The President invited Senate delegations to accompany him
to the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in Paris on May
27, 1997, and the NATO summit in Madrid on July 8-9, 1997.
Prior to the NATO summit, the President met with Senators to
seek advice on which countries in Central and Eastern Europe
should be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty.
Accession negotiations with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic began in September 1997, and NATO foreign ministers
signed the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty to admit
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic on December 16, 1997.
The President transmitted the protocols to the Senate on
February 11, 1998 for Senate action.
II. Qualifications of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for NATO
Membership
Countries in Central and Eastern Europe first gained
institutional access to NATO in late 1991 through the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a forum which included all
former Warsaw Pact members. At the January 1994 NATO summit,
the Alliance launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a U.S.
initiative designed to develop military cooperation among NATO
members and interested countries in Europe. Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic were early signatories to the PfP
framework agreement.
Since 1994, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have
actively participated in PfP military exercises, which have
provided their militaries the opportunity to work with NATO
military headquarters, and alongside NATO allies, in the field,
and have contributed to increasing the interoperability between
prospective new members and the Alliance. After visiting
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic last fall, NATO
assessment teams concluded that the PfP program directly
contributed to the preparation of these countries for NATO
membership.
Of the three prospective members, Poland brings the largest
military establishment to NATO. The Hungarian and Czech armed
forces, however, are equal or greater in size than those of
several current NATO members, including Denmark, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal. Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic have demonstrated the ability to meld battalion-
sized or smaller units into NATO operations through
participation in operations in Bosnia, training exercises under
the PfP program, or participation in the U.S.-led coalition
during the Persian Gulf War. In anticipation of NATO
membership, they have made significant progress in adopting the
NATO unit structure. In addition, ground force units deployed
in accordance with the former Warsaw Pact's offensive doctrine
are being re-located to reflect NATO's defensive posture.
In accordance with direction from NATO, Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic have made interoperability of air
traffic control and air defense their first modernization
priority. This would facilitate rapid reinforcement in the
event of a crisis. None of the countries is expected, nor has
NATO indicated an immediate need, to begin ``big ticket''
modernization programs before 2000. In examining the equipment
inherited from Warsaw Pact days, NATO advance teams found that
some existing equipment is either adequate or in need only of
minor modification. As an immediate priority, the three
countries are focusing on personnel reform, training and the
adoption of NATO doctrine, and interoperability. Personnel
reform in each country, including reducing overall force
levels, increasing the ratio of junior to senior officers,
strengthening the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps, and
increasing of the ratio of professionals to conscripts, is well
underway.
After being invited to join NATO at the Madrid summit in
July 1997, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic announced
their intention to intensify defense cooperation in preparation
for joining the Alliance. Further, the Chairmen of the Foreign
Relations and Defense Committees in each country plan to meet
regularly to discuss the steps each country is taking to
fulfill commitments on enlargement related issues.
In considering the qualifications of the three countries,
the Committee has examined the degree to which each has
satisfied the ``Perry Principles,'' five principles that former
Secretary of Defense William Perry enunciated in a June 1996,
speech at NATO's Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) in
Norfolk, Virginia. These principles are: commitment to
democratic reform; commitment to a free market economy; good
neighborly relations; civilian control of the military; and
military capability to operate effectively with the Alliance.
An evaluation of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic on
each of these criteria follows.
Poland
Democratic Reform
Poland's democratic political institutions have operated
smoothly since 1989. Poland has held seven free and fair
elections and has had two democratic changes of government
since the collapse of communism, demonstrating the vitality of
its democratic system. In 1997, Poland adopted a new
constitution, approved in a popular referendum, that codifies
the division of powers among the President, the Council of
Ministers, and the parliament. The government has been a strong
supporter of human rights and civil liberties. The judiciary is
independent, and freedom of the press is upheld.
Free Market Economy
Poland was the first formerly communist country in Eastern
Europe to launch drastic economic reforms in 1990. Early
reforms focused on price and trade liberalization, small-scale
privatization, currency convertibility, and structural reforms.
As a result, Poland was the first country to emerge from
economic decline and currently has one of the fastest growing
economies in Europe. Poland's gross domestic product (GDP) has
grown steadily since 1993, with growth rates exceeding 5% in
each of the last four years. The basic tenets of economic
reform have been sustained through numerous changes of
government. Private sector activity, especially new
enterprises, has grown rapidly and currently accounts for about
two-thirds of GDP and about 60% of the work force.
Poland's current account deficit may prove to be
problematic, and privatization of large-scale industries and
pension reform need addressing. However, the government is
taking steps to bring the budget deficit down, and has
successfully tackled inflation, reducing it to 13% in 1997 from
20% in 1996. Growth in 1997 was a robust 7%.
Good Neighborly Relations
For the first time in its history, Poland has good
relations with all seven of the states on its borders. In
December 1997, Poland launched a multinational mechanized
infantry corps with Germany and Denmark, which will be based in
Poland. In May 1997, Poland and Ukraine concluded a declaration
of reconciliation that, among other things, established a joint
battalion. Poland is also establishing a joint battalion with
Lithuania, which is expected to reach operational capacity
later this year. The Polish government is actively cooperating
on defense matters with the Baltic states, and is working with
Russia to strengthen economic ties. Poland has even maintained
a stable relationship with Belarus, a country led by an
authoritarian leader.
Civilian Control of the Military
The new Polish constitution, approved in April 1997,
codifies civilian control over, and parliamentary oversight of,
the military. The government is establishing the appropriate
structures to ensure that these principles are effectively
implemented. The 1996 National Defense Law subordinates the
Chief of the General Staff to the Minister of Defense and
shifts supervision of financial planning, administration,
personnel, and military intelligence from the General Staff to
the Defense Ministry. Both of these changes were confirmed in
the Constitution. In addition, the Defense Committee of the
Sejm, the lower house of parliament, is taking an active role
in overseeing the Polish military. In 1997 it examined military
personnel and procurement decisions, reviewed and amended the
budget, and pressed the government for increased defense
expenditures.
Military Capabilities
U.S. officials have judged Poland to have the most capable
armed forces in Eastern Europe. Relatively large (Army-152,000;
Air Force-56,000; Navy-14,000), well-trained and disciplined,
the armed forces are progressing smoothly with unit structure
reorganization and redeployment from Warsaw Pact dispositions.
Polish officers and non-commissioned officers are participating
in NATO and U.S. military English language training programs.
Poland's participation in multinational operations in Bosnia
and Haiti, as well as its participation in over 50 Partnership
for Peace exercises, has demonstrated its ability to carry out
battalion-sized operations in conjunction with NATO forces. In
the PfP exercises, Poland has emphasized military training and
tactical exercises. It should be noted, however, that the
operations in Bosnia and Haiti have not involved combat and do
not reflect the demands of a large-unit, high-intensity
conflict.
A U.S. Air Force team conducting an ongoing assessment of
Poland's military capabilities has reported that Poland has
made substantial progress in laying the groundwork for
achieving NATO interoperability. Ports, airfields, rail and
road networks, and other infrastructure are currently capable
of receiving NATO reinforcements. Poland is already installing
NATO-compatible Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) systems in
its aircraft and is upgrading its air defense network with
NATO-compatible radar.
Equipment modernization is the largest challenge facing the
Polish military. As a result of NATO requirements, the early
focus has been on upgrading air traffic control and air defense
communications. Additional large-scale procurement programs are
not expected to begin prior to 2000. Priority areas for
modernization include ground attack aircraft, fighter aircraft,
attack helicopters, main battle tanks (T-72 upgrade), and
armored fighting vehicles.
The Polish Ministry of Defense has developed a
comprehensive 15-year plan to modernize the military and make
it interoperable with NATO. To pay for this program, Poland
intends to increase annual defense spending at a rate pegged to
the growth of its GDP. In 1996, Poland's defense budget was
$3.1 billion, approximately 2.4% of GDP, which is comparable to
most (and higher than half of) other NATO countries. The
Ministry of Defense estimates that defense spending after 2000
may reach 2.7% to 3.0% of GDP.
Poland has declared a willingness to commit all of its
operational forces to NATO. One-third will be designated
specifically as ``NATO-Assigned,'' which are already in part
capable of joint operations within NATO. The other two-thirds
of Polish forces will be ``NATO-Earmarked,'' which means they
could be put under NATO operational command or control when
needed.
Hungary
Democratic Reform
Hungary is a stable parliamentary democracy. Hungary
adopted a new constitution in December 1990, and is currently
working on its revision. The country has had two complete
democratic changes of government since 1989 in fully free and
fair elections. It has stable governmental institutions and an
independent judiciary. Hungary is committed to upholding the
principles of human rights, freedom of expression, and the rule
of law. On November 16, 1997, the government held a binding
referendum on the question of NATO membership. 85% of voters
supported Hungary's inclusion into NATO.
Free Market Economy
Hungary's approach to economic transformation from a
command economy built upon its longstanding experience with
gradual reforms under communism. After 1989, Hungary adopted
price and trade liberalization and institutional and legal
changes. In March 1995, the government embarked on an extensive
economic stabilization program designed to redress Hungary's
budget and current account deficits and to accelerate
structural reform. The austerity program, while unpopular, did
much to reverse the imbalances and restore international
confidence in the Hungarian economy. The economy experienced
modest growth in 1994 and 1995, but declined to 1% growth in
1996, largely as a result of the austerity program. In 1997,
however, the economy rebounded and the GDP grew by a healthy
4%. Overall, the private sector produces approximately 80% of
GDP in Hungary.
Hungary had a heavy foreign debt burden, but as a result of
the austerity program it has been able to service its debt
obligations. Inflation rates are problematic, and the Hungarian
government is taking steps to address the issue. The government
has also privatized almost all of the banking,
telecommunications, and energy sectors. Hungary has attracted
almost one-third of all foreign direct investment in Central
and Eastern Europe.
Good Neighborly Relations
A high priority for Hungarian foreign policy has been
improving relations with neighboring countries that have large
ethnic Hungarian populations. Hungary ratified treaties on
Understanding, Cooperation, and Good-Neighborliness with
Slovakia (March 1995) and Romania (September 1996), which
include provisions on ethnic minority rights and the
inviolability of frontiers. Military-to-military relations with
Romania are solid, and the two countries are actively planning
to set up a joint battalion. In addition, Hungary is
participating in a joint Hungarian-Italian-Slovenian brigade.
Hungary and Austria already have established a battalion that
is participating in the United Nations peacekeeping operation
in Cyprus.
Civilian Control of the Military
Hungary has enshrined civilian control of the military in
its legislative and constitutional mechanisms. The Defense
Ministry is granted oversight of the military, and the
parliament is granted oversight of the Defense Ministry. The
1993 Defense Law specifies that the Minister of Defense is
superior to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Services.
Additionally, Hungary's constitution gives the parliament
control of the military budget, structure, deployment,
fielding, stationing, and senior leadership.
Military Capabilities
The Hungarian armed forces total about 60,000 personnel
(Army-45,000; Air Force-15,000). Unit restructuring in
accordance with NATO brigade/corps organization, is well
underway. The officers and NCOs of the designated ``NATO
Brigade'' are undergoing military and English-language training
sponsored by current NATO members. Downsizing has resulted in a
smaller, more capable force. Hungary has successfully
restructured the General Staff and Service Staffs along NATO
lines.
Hungary currently has a battalion participating in NATO's
Bosnia operation and hosts a major NATO logistics facility in
southern Hungary in support of those operations. To facilitate
the U.S. presence in Bosnia, Hungary has brought into force a
bilateral supplement to the NATO-PfP Status of Forces
Agreement, granting additional privileges and immunities to
U.S. forces and contractors. Over 80,000 U.S. military
personnel have rotated in and/or out of Bosnia through the
Hungarian air base at Taszar. Hungarian armed forces have also
participated in over 50 Partnership for Peace exercises with
NATO. Hungary was the first country to include a PfP line item
in its defense budget.
Hungary has assigned immediate and rapid reaction forces to
NATO, which at this time only are partially able to conduct
joint operations, but are working toward this goal. Hungary has
integrated a system of defense planning compatible with the
NATO system and incorporated NATO command, control and
communications procedures into training. Other recent
modernization efforts have focused on meeting NATO air traffic
control and air defense communications standards. Top
priorities include the U.S.-sponsored Regional Airspace
Initiative, the development of the NATO brigade, and building a
peacekeeping capability. Nonetheless, tight defense budgets
have led Hungary to continue procuring some military equipment
from Russia as part of a debt-forgiveness program.
After a six-year decline, Hungarian defense spending
increased in 1997 to approximately 1.8% of its GDP. Hungary has
pledged that it will increase defense spending by .1% of GDP
each year over the next five years. Priority modernization
efforts will include fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, and
armored fighting vehicles. The Hungarian government voted in
its 1998 budget for a special appropriation to fund increased
NATO interoperability. Hungary has also formulated a plan
called Force 2000 to prepare it for admission to NATO. Its
goals are to downsize the armed forces, standardize structures
to NATO requirements, professionalize and increase volunteer
personnel, and improve the quality of life for the military
force.
Czech Republic
Democratic Reform
The Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy. The
state's democratic institutions and charter of fundamental
rights are established in the constitution. The constitution,
which entered into force on January 1, 1993, provides for an
independent judiciary and guarantees internationally recognized
human rights. Since 1989, first Czechoslovakia, then the Czech
Republic, have held three fully free and fair elections.
Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the
press are protected. President Vaclav Havel, himself a former
political prisoner of the communist regime, is a world-renowned
advocate of human rights and social justice.
After the resignation of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus in
late November 1997, due to bribery and campaign election
scandals, President Havel appointed a caretaker government.
This government survived a vote of no confidence in January
1998 and will govern until parliamentary elections are held in
mid-June 1998. Despite the change in government, overall
stability and commitment to democratic principles remain
unchanged.
Free Market Economy
The Czech Republic's transformation from a centrally
planned economy has progressed steadily since 1991. Early
elements of the reform program included price liberalization,
tight monetary and fiscal policies, and privatization of state
enterprises. Industry remains the largest productive sector,
with services, including tourism, growing rapidly. In April and
May 1997, the government imposed harsh austerity measures
designed to redress economic imbalances and spur economic
growth. The reforms included large budget cuts, a currency
devaluation, stronger regulatory mechanisms, and swifter large
privatization. Nearly 80% of the economy is in private hands,
and real GDP has been rising since 1994. Inflation is below 10%
and unemployment is low.
Though the Czech economy grew by about 4% in 1996, growth
during 1997 dropped to 1.7% due to a widening of the current
account deficit and the devaluation of the Czech crown. In
addition, severe floods in the summer of 1997 caused billions
of dollars in damages. Even so, the Czech economy showed
positive signs in late 1997 and is expected to rebound in 1998.
Good Neighborly Relations
The Czech Republic has excellent relations with its
neighbors. Relations between the Czech and German governments
are particularly strong, though some tensions persist between
segments of their populations. On January 21, 1997, Germany and
the Czech Republic signed a formal reconciliation pact that
addressed animosity between the two countries that has been
present since World War II. Germany is the leading foreign
investor in the Czech Republic. Austria and the Czech Republic
have stable governmental and economic relations. With regard to
Slovakia, although some issues still remain unresolved after
the break-up of Czechoslovakia, the two countries have
fundamentally sound relations.
Civilian Control of the Military
Under the Czech constitution, the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the military. The Minister of Defense is
a civilian, and the Czech parliament is increasingly active in
defense and military issues. The government currently is
working on a law that will formally legislate the
constitutional mandate of civilian control of the military.
Military Capabilities
The Czech Republic has the smallest military of the three
NATO invitees, with about 56,000 personnel (Army-38,000; Air
Force-14,000; logistics corps-4,000). As with Poland and
Hungary, unit restructuring and redeployment is ongoing, select
officers and NCOs are being trained in NATO schools, and
modernization programs have focused on air traffic control and
air defense communications. The Czechs have a battalion serving
in Bosnia, and they contributed troops to the U.N. mission in
Croatia. A Czech chemical warfare defense unit joined the U.S.-
led coalition in the Persian Gulf War. To date, Czech troops
have participated in 27 Partnership for Peace exercises.
The Czechs have incorporated NATO command, control, and
communications procedures into their military training regimen,
and have adopted a modernization strategy with an emphasis on
communication, intelligence, and English language skills. In a
widely praised initiative, the Czechs anticipated the NATO
requirement for secure and non-secure digital communications
programs, and applied NATO standards to the national programs
it is pursuing on its own. Czech airfields and rail and road
networks are capable currently of receiving some NATO troops
and materiel, and the Czech military is working on enhancing
its infrastructure to be NATO compatible.
Priority needs for the Czech armed forces over the next
several years include light attack aircraft, fighter aircraft,
attack helicopters, air-to-air and air defense missiles,
upgrading Soviet era T-72 tanks to NATO standard, and command
and control communications.
In March 1997, the Czech Republic adopted a new national
defense strategy, including programs to improve the mobility,
compatibility, and interoperability of the armed forces over
the next decade. Implementation of the concept began on July 1,
1997, and is scheduled to be completed by the end of 1998.
Defense spending in 1997 was approximately 1.7% of GDP, and
the government's draft budget for 1998 includes an increase in
the military budget, despite deep cuts in other spending; 1998
levels are expected to reach 1.88% of GDP. The Czech Republic
has pledged to increase defense spending by .1% of GDP each
year for the next three years. About 20% of the defense budget
likely will be devoted to modernization. Czech officials have
stated that they are willing to commit up to 90% of Czech
operational forces to NATO in times of crisis.
Additional Issues
The Committee finds that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic are meeting the requirements laid out in the ``Perry
Principles.'' Some issues, however, have come to the attention
of the Committee where a deeper and continuing commitment to
these principles is necessary, not only in order to qualify for
NATO membership, but to complete a process of transformation
from the communist era.
The Committee is concerned about the inability of some
American citizens to receive fair and appropriate compensation
for their property in the Czech Republic that was confiscated
by the Nazi or communist regimes.
In 1928, the United States entered into a bilateral treaty
with Czechoslovakia that stated that if a citizen of one
country became a citizen of the other country the individual
automatically would lose his or her primary citizenship. The
terms of the treaty were not applicable in periods of
hostilities. The Czech government interpreted this ``time of
war'' provision to include the period of 1938-1958.
During 1990-91, the Czech government enacted a series of
laws limiting restitution and compensation for individuals
whose property had been confiscated under Nazi and communist
rule (1938-1989) if they were citizens and residents of the
Czech Republic.
In 1994, the Czech Supreme Court ruled that the permanent
residency requirement was unconstitutional and required the
government to allow for the filing of claims by all individuals
who still had their Czech citizenship, regardless of where they
lived. Czechs in France, Germany, and elsewhere were eligible
to pursue their claims, but American citizens were told they
were no longer Czech citizens under the terms of the 1928
treaty. American citizens who had fled the Czech Republic
during the ``time of war'' period were not affected due to the
treaty terms, but those who became American citizens after 1958
are unable to pursue their claims.
The Czech law that applies to compensation is not
discriminatory by nature, but its compensation rules are
impeding the ability of American citizens to receive fair and
adequate compensation for their property. The Committee
strongly urges the Government of the Czech Republic--as part of
its continuing effort to build a sound civil society based upon
the principle of justice--to work closely with those whose
property was unjustly confiscated either by Nazi or communist
regimes
Additionally, the Committee emphasizes the importance of a
full accounting of all United States prisoners of war (POWs)
and the missing in action during the Cold War period. Relations
between the U.S. government and the communist governments in
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were hostile throughout
this period. The Committee notes that the U.S. government has
pursued reports that the Soviet Union used Central European
countries for transshipment or detention of American POWs
during the Cold War. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
have fully cooperated with the U.S. government on this issue.
In Poland, senior officials have agreed to conduct a
thorough search of their archives and other files and make all
relevant information on missing American soldiers available to
the United States. The Polish National Security Bureau,
Ministry of Defense, Military Intelligence Service, Office of
State Security, and Central Archives are all fully cooperating
in this search. Additionally, the Polish government has
facilitated meetings between the U.S. government and Polish
non-governmental organizations that may have information on
this subject.
Hungarian officials have provided the United States with
full access to Hungarian archives to search for any relevant
information or any potential witnesses with regard to American
prisoners of war or the missing in action from the Vietnam and
Korean wars.
The Czech Republic has searched the State Central Archives,
as well as the archives of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Ministry of Health, Ministry
of Education, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and the Military Historical Archives. To date, neither U.S. nor
Czech officials have discovered any information relevant to
American prisoners of war or the missing in action. The Czech
Republic has opened the archives of the communist-era secret
services and is attempting to identify all Czechoslovak
personnel who were stationed in China, Korea, or Vietnam during
the wars.
The Committee appreciates the cooperation afforded to the
U.S. government by Polish, Hungarian, and Czech officials in
the effort to determine the fate of all American prisoners of
war or the mission in action. The Committee encourages Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic to continue full and complete
cooperation in helping the United States fully resolve all
outstanding issues relating to prisoners of war and the missing
in action.
The Committee also notes the necessity for countries in
Europe fully to account for, and fairly to compensate,
surviving victims of the Holocaust or their beneficiaries. Such
accounting and compensation must include payment of pre-war
insurance claims and the return of, or remuneration for,
property seized by the Nazis and later confiscated by the
communist regimes in the region.
The Committee strongly encourages Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, and all other countries in Europe promptly to
take steps to resolve fully the issue of rightful ownership of
assets.
III. The Cost of NATO Enlargement
An important issue reviewed by the Committee during its
examination of enlargement was the matter of the financial
cost. Several cost estimates have been prepared over the past
few years. The Committee has reviewed the Department of Defense
estimate of February 1997, the NATO cost estimate of December
1997, and the General Accounting Office (GAO) March 6, 1998
report on the NATO cost estimate. It also heard testimony from
the authors of a 1996 Congressional Budget Office study and a
1996 RAND corporation study.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that cost estimates
are just that: estimates. Estimates are based on certain
assumptions--assumptions that may later prove unwarranted
because of the passage of time and/or changed circumstances.
Estimates are also based on uncertainties--uncertainties
inherent in predictions about the future. The Committee can be
reasonably certain about the accuracy of cost estimates for
1999, but is less certain about the accuracy of estimates for
costs to be incurred in 2009. It is with these cautionary
thoughts in mind that the Committee reviewed the current
estimates of the costs of NATO enlargement.
Critical Assumptions
The Committee's evaluation was based upon comparison of the
full range of private sector and U.S. government studies. It
draws most heavily, however, upon the February 1997 cost study
by the U.S. Department of Defense and the subsequent survey by
NATO of military requirements and costs, completed in December
1997. As noted above, every cost estimate is based upon
assumptions. The Committee's evaluation of the costs of NATO
enlargement is premised upon four critical assumptions that are
explicit in both the Pentagon and NATO studies.
First, NATO will continue to face, for the indefinite
future, the current strategic environment. There is no
immediate threat of large-scale conventional aggression in
Europe. Any reemergence of a significant conventional threat
would take several years to develop, providing the Alliance
with ample warning time. This assumption is crucial to the
relatively modest cost estimates put forward by both NATO and
the Pentagon.
That said, were a conventional threat to emerge, the cost
to NATO would be substantial, regardless of whether or not
enlargement had occurred. Indeed, in such a situation,
enlargement might actually reduce some costs to the United
States by enabling NATO to meet a renewed threat more
effectively. In this worst-case scenario, some burdens that
otherwise would likely have been shouldered by the United
States would instead be borne by the new, front-line states.
The addition of three new NATO members would dramatically
increase the manpower, military capabilities, and strategic
depth of the Alliance.
Second, this evaluation assumes that NATO will not station
substantial new forces on the territories of the new members;
rather, Article 5 guarantees will be extended through the
commitment rapidly to deploy forces in the event of a crisis.
This assumption flows logically from the previous one. Were the
threat environment to change, prompting a military requirement
for the forward stationing of NATO forces, obviously the costs
to the United States would prove far higher. Likewise this
would be the case with or without enlargement.
Third, standard burdensharing rules will apply to the costs
of NATO enlargement. These include the requirements that new
members pay for their own national forces, and that all members
share the costs of infrastructure improvements according to the
common budgets' formulae.
Fourth, U.S. military modernization requirements are
national initiatives that will not be commonly-funded through
NATO. The United States Armed Forces in Europe already possess
all of the military capabilities necessary to fulfill the
Article 5 commitment to the new NATO invitees required of the
United States. For example, the air units within U.S. Air
Forces Europe (USAFE) that are earmarked for air power
projection from the territory of member states (in the event of
a crisis) are already fully capable of performing this mission.
Thus, NATO enlargement should not require any new U.S.
modernization expenditures, whether common-funded or not,
beyond those which the United States already intends to
undertake.
Relevant Costs
In general, the costs of NATO enlargement fit into one of
two categories: 1) the cost for each of the current NATO
members, and the new members, to meet fully their individual
obligations to support the collective defense of the alliance,
and; 2) what each of the sixteen current allies, plus the three
new members, must pay to support common costs of the Alliance.
The latter category includes everything from the construction
of co-located airfields and a secure communications
architecture, to the purchase of desks and chairs for NATO
headquarters.
The costs that each of the three new members must pay to
meet fully their individual obligations to support the
collective defense of the Alliance are not germane to the
Committee's evaluation. The United States will likely continue
to provide some assistance to these countries--as it does with
other NATO allies--probably in the form of Foreign Military
Financing, defense loan guarantees, and excess defense
articles. Nevertheless, military modernization by Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic is the responsibility solely of
those countries. The United States will not underwrite that
process.
Further, only those costs that represent expenditures above
and beyond what normally would be incurred are relevant.
Accordingly, because the United States will incur little or no
additional cost in meeting its collective defense obligations,
the principal expense to the United States for NATO enlargement
will be the cost, over the next decade, related to
infrastructure improvements on the territory of the three new
members.
NATO's Common Budgets
All sixteen members of NATO make annual contributions to
the common costs of the Alliance, which comprise three
accounts: 1) Civil Budget; 2) Military Budget; and 3) the
Security Investment Program. The Civil Budget provides for,
among other things, the operating expenses of NATO's civilian
headquarters, the International Secretariat, NATO science and
defense research activities, and some Partnership for Peace
programs. The Military Budget funds the international military
headquarters, the airborne early warning aircraft operations,
the NATO petroleum pipeline, and the NATO Maintenance and
Supply Agency. The Security Investment Program, formerly called
the Infrastructure Fund, supports a broad range of projects
recommended by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) in accordance with
a specified planning cycle that generally requires about two
years to execute. Typical project areas include the mobility
and deployability of NATO forces, NATO command and control,
allied reconnaissance and intelligence, and maintaining
logistics and training facilities.
The total and individual contributions for the NATO common
costs are determined through Alliance-wide negotiation.
Enlargement is expected to result in some increases within the
Civil and Military Budgets. These will be necessary to
accommodate additional headquarters personnel from the new
members. The Security Investment Program, however, will contain
the most significant increases, because this account
traditionally is used to fund precisely the types of projects
most needed by the new members--namely, infrastructure
improvements.
In what seems to be an effort to reduce costs, some of
NATO's European members have recommended that dramatic
increases in this account should not occur, urging instead that
some currently planned projects should be put aside in favor of
the NATO priority of enlargement. Apparently, some officials at
NATO still intend to pursue this approach. The General
Accounting Office found in its March 6, 1998 report on the NATO
cost estimate that ``according to officials at NATO, some of
the costs of enlargement may be absorbed in existing budgets,
for example, through the reprioritization of existing
projects.'' It may indeed be appropriate to fund a portion of
enlargement costs by reconfiguring various programmatic
priorities. The Committee, however, notes that maintaining a
robust, effective Alliance will not be without expense, and
expects that NATO will proceed with all projects necessary for
the common defense. Current allies must be held to their
commitments made at the Madrid Summit to provide the resources
necessary for enlargement without diluting the importance of
other priorities. Paying for NATO enlargement should not impede
the effectiveness of the Alliance adequately to perform its
core mission of collective defense.
Both the NATO headquarters and the Department of Defense
have provided statistical breakdowns of U.S. and allied
contributions to the common costs and of comparative national
defense spending. The U.S. share for each element of the Common
Costs is: Civil Budget--24.3%; Military Budget--24.1%; Security
Investment Program--23.8% (see Table 1). The U.S. total
contribution to NATO common costs over the last several years
and projected for 1998 are: 1993--$318 million; 1994--$342
million; 1995--$407 million; 1996--$453 million; 1997--$489
million; 1998 (est.)--$493 million (see Table 2).
Obviously, when the new members are included in the
calculus, a slight reduction in each member's percentage share
of common funded costs will occur. During accession
negotiations, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic agreed to
the percentage share they will pay to the common NATO budgets
upon accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. Poland will pay
2.48%, Hungary will pay 0.65%, and the Czech Republic will pay
0.9%. Consequently, the Committee assumes that the U.S. share
of common costs will decline. The Committee Resolution of
Ratification contains a condition requiring the President,
prior to the deposit of the instrument of ratification, to
certify that the U.S. percentage of common costs will not
increase as a result of enlargement.
Estimating the Costs of Enlargement
The Committee has examined the various cost studies on NATO
enlargement prepared to date. The estimates vary widely, in
large part due to differing assumptions, differing threat
assessments, and varying degrees of recognition of the
distinction between costs unique to NATO enlargement and costs
that will be incurred by NATO members regardless of whether
NATO enlarges.
In February 1997, at the direction of Congress, the
Department of Defense prepared an estimate of the costs of NATO
enlargement. The Pentagon study considered both direct
enlargement costs as well as two other categories: (1) the cost
to current members of meeting their military commitments; and,
(2) the cost to new members of developing their military
forces. Combining these three categories, the Pentagon estimate
totaled $27-35 billion over the next ten years, with $9-12
billion attributed directly to enlargement costs. Of this,
approximately 60 percent ($5.5-7 billion) would be eligible for
funding from NATO's common budgets. Notably, the Pentagon
compiled this estimate with four, rather than three, new
members in mind. Adjusted to account for this fact, the
Pentagon's proper illustrative figure totals $4.9-6.2 billion
in common costs. Thus, according to the Department of Defense
the U.S. financial obligation would total $1.2-1.6 billion over
the next ten years (averaging $120-160 million per year).
In December 1997, NATO completed two studies that focused
exclusively on the cost to NATO's common-funded budgets of
enlarging the Alliance to include Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic. NATO first identified the military requirements
of incorporating these three new members into the Alliance.
Teams of experts were then dispatched to each country to
evaluate facilities, infrastructure, and current capabilities
to meet NATO's projected military requirements. With this
information, NATO then developed a cost estimate for bringing
the current capabilities into line with NATO requirements. The
NATO studies concluded that the cost of enlargement will total
$1.5 billion over the next ten years. Thus, according to NATO,
the additional U.S. payment to the common-funded budgets will
average approximately $40 million per year over ten years.
The Pentagon and NATO used similar assumptions and military
requirements in preparing their cost estimates. They arrived,
however, at markedly different conclusions, which vary with
respect to the cost of enlargement to the United States by as
much as $122.5 million per year. Aside from minor pricing
differences, there are three reasons for this discrepancy.
First, the earlier Pentagon study was illustrative, and did
not have the benefit of site surveys from which to compile its
assessment. The NATO survey teams dispatched to the countries
found, in many cases, that the necessary infrastructure was in
far better condition than expected. In particular, the road and
rail conditions in all three countries were judged to be
adequate for NATO reinforcement purposes, whereas previously
the Pentagon had expected that significant improvements would
be required. According to the Pentagon, the common
infrastructure costs for NATO enlargement could still grow or
diminish for a number of reasons. These include changes as
details of the NATO implementation plan are finalized (e.g. as
specific airfields are chosen as reception facilities for
reinforcing air squadrons), as detailed engineering surveys are
completed, or in the event that the criteria for common-funded
eligibility are reconsidered.
A second reason for the difference in the estimates between
the two studies is that NATO was more strict in determining
whether improvements would be eligible for common funding. For
example, whereas the Pentagon assumed that off-loading
capabilities at various facilities would be commonly-funded,
NATO determined that each country deploying reinforcements to
the new invitees would bear responsibility for deploying off-
loading equipment. Most of these assumptions seem reasonable.
Although NATO certainly has the ability to make exceptions to
its common-funding eligibility criteria, the Committee expects
a detailed explanation of any proposal by NATO to make eligible
for common funding any of the projects that it had previously
determined to be ineligible.
The final reason for the cost discrepancies between the
NATO and Pentagon studies is that, in general, the Pentagon
sets higher standards for military infrastructure than does
NATO. Because of this differential, NATO planners recommended
fewer necessary infrastructure improvements for the three new
members than the Department of Defense. For example, NATO did
not include in its estimate the need to upgrade two additional
airfields and associated facilities, and more generally called
for fewer road, rail and port facility upgrades. Moreover, NATO
planners did not include in the estimate all of the
expenditures on staging areas or brigade- size training
facilities that U.S. military planners previously had
anticipated. According to the Pentagon, this differential
accounted for $500-700 million of the gap between the two
studies.
The Committee notes, as did the Senate Armed Services
Committee, that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have testified that the military
requirements underpinning NATO's cost estimate are valid and
sound. General Shelton stated before the Foreign Relations
Committee on February 24, 1998, that the ``five month [NATO
study] is thorough and militarily sound and is sufficiently
detailed to serve as the basis for accurate cost estimates.''
The Committee finds that if the requirements contained in the
NATO study are met fully, NATO would be able to meet all
foreseeable contingencies, given the current threat
environment.
GAO has concluded that ``the approach used by NATO in
determining its estimated direct enlargement cost of $1.5
billion for commonly funded requirements is reasonable.'' The
GAO report also noted: ``Because NATO officials used a
conservative interpretation of the over-and-above principle,
NATO's cost estimate for the commonly funded military
requirements may be lower than the cost actually incurred. For
example, the NATO study did not include the cost of repaving
runways, although NATO staff acknowledged that the runways,
while up to national standards were not up to NATO standards.''
Regardless of the exact amount, these estimates for the
cost of enlargement represent only a small fraction of the
costs that will be necessary to ensure that NATO remains a
viable alliance in the next century. All members in the
Alliance must continue to expend resources necessary to meet
the force goals. With NATO membership comes responsibility. The
Committee again stresses the importance of all current and
future allies to meet their commitments to the common defense.
Anything less will result in a hollow strategic commitment.
Table 1.--NATO Common Cost: Budget Cost Sharing Formula in Percentages of the total NATO Common Budget
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Security
Budget Investment Civil Budget
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States................................................... 24.12 23.2708 23.35
Belgium......................................................... 2.85 4.1260 2.76
Canada.......................................................... 5.6 2.75 5.60
Denmark......................................................... 1.68 3.33 1.59
France.......................................................... 16.50 12.9044 16.50
Germany......................................................... 15.54 22.3974 15.54
Greece.......................................................... 0.38 1.00 0.38
Iceland......................................................... 0.04 0.000 0.05
Italy........................................................... 5.91 7.745 5.75
Luxembourg...................................................... 0.08 0.1973 0.08
Netherlands..................................................... 2.84 4.58 2.75
Norway.......................................................... 1.16 2.83 1.11
Portugal........................................................ 0.63 0.345 0.63
Spain........................................................... 3.50 3.2816 3.50
Turkey.......................................................... 1.59 1.04 1.59
United Kingdom.................................................. 17.58 10.1925 18.82
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2.--U.S. Contributions to NATO Common Costs
(in $ millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY1998
FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 (est.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Investment..................... 60 140 119 161 172 176
Military Budget......................... 216 161 248 249 273 273
Civilian Budget......................... 42 41 40 43 44 44
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................... 318 342 407 453 489 493
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. NATO-Russia Relations
The Committee does not find NATO enlargement and the
development of a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship to be
mutually exclusive. NATO enlargement and cooperative NATO-
Russian relations both have immense value for the United States
and for the nations of Europe, if they are pursued properly.
They are complementary and reinforcing objectives. The
challenge for the United States, and for NATO, is to do both
correctly. Toward this end, the Committee Resolution of
Ratification supports NATO's policy to develop a new and
constructive relationship with the Russian Federation as the
Russian Federation pursues democratization, market reforms, and
peaceful relations with its neighbors.
The enlargement of NATO, a purely defensive alliance
comprised of democratic nations, does not threaten any country
in Europe. In the view of the Committee, all of Europe benefits
from the existence of NATO, including Russia. The Committee
finds that admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
into NATO will multiply this benefit, not only by securing
three countries that have fully embraced democracy and free
markets, but also by calling upon those countries to lead in
the defense of democracy and stability in Central and Eastern
Europe. In appreciation of this fact, democracies throughout
Europe--including those that are not seeking NATO membership--
have endorsed NATO's plans to extend its membership to Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In fact, with the exception of
Belarus and Russia, every country in Europe has either
expressed explicit support for, or remained neutral on, the
issue of NATO enlargement.
The Committee notes a tendency among opponents of NATO
enlargement to lay every problem in the U.S.-Russia
relationship--and every example of Russian misbehavior--at the
doorstep of NATO enlargement. However, even a leading critic of
NATO enlargement, Ambassador Jonathan Dean, observed in his
October 9, 1997, testimony before the Committee that ``the
souring of Russian political opinion toward relations with the
United States did take place earlier and has been a constant.''
In the view of the Committee, the proposed NATO membership of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is unrelated to the
brutal massacre of civilians in Chechnya, the ongoing transfers
of Russian technology and weapons to rogue states, and
differing U.S. and Russian views over the appropriate response
to the situation in Iraq.
An emotional element of the Russian opposition to NATO
enlargement is the misperception that NATO is for the first
time approaching Russia's borders. In fact, a far more accurate
description of enlargement is an effort to draw Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic closer to Western Europe. An
enlarged NATO may indeed approach the borders of Ukraine and
Belarus, but these countries are not, it should be emphasized,
Russian territory. Hungary and the Czech Republic share no
border with Russia, and both are geographically closer to
France than they are to Russia. The only piece of Russian
territory that Poland borders is the tiny exclave of
Kaliningrad. All three countries are geographically west of the
Russia-Norway border, a border that Russia has shared with NATO
since 1949.
Norway, in fact, is an excellent example of the
relationship that can and should develop between new NATO
members and Russia. An original NATO member, Norway has shared
a border with Russia (and before that the Soviet Union) without
threatening Russia. In fact, Norway has no foreign forces on
its territory, has no nuclear weapons on its territory, and has
no substantial, forward-deployed conventional forces. It is
covered by NATO's Article 5 security guarantee, including the
nuclear guarantee, yet it maintains good relations with Russia.
Norway even provides foreign aid to Russia.
A far more disturbing element found in the opposition of
some Russian leaders is the notion that NATO, by enlarging, is
encroaching upon Russia's legitimate space. The Committee
rejects the suggestion that any sovereign state in Europe is
within any other country's sphere of influence. That chapter of
history was decisively rejected with the collapse of the Soviet
empire, and any effort to return to those policies would
guarantee instability and turmoil for Central and Eastern
Europe. As Secretary of State Albright said in testimony before
the Foreign Relations Committee on October 7, 1997, ``We often
call them `former communist countries,' and that is true in the
same sense that America is a `former British colony.' Yes, the
Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians were on the other side of the
Iron Curtain during the Cold War. But we were surely on the
same side in the ways that truly count . . . We should also
think about what would happen if we were to turn them away.
That would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War membership and
preserving the old Iron Curtain at its eastern frontier. It
would mean locking out a whole group of otherwise qualified
democracies simply because they were once, against their will,
members of the Warsaw Pact.''
Some critics argue that enlargement would irrevocably
damage U.S.-Russian relations. These critics contend, for
example, that enlargement is the reason that the Russian Duma
has failed to approve the START II Treaty. In fact, shortly
after START II was signed by the Russian government--and even
before NATO enlargement was contemplated--Russian nationalists
and communists urged rejection of the Treaty because they
believed cuts in strategic weaponry disadvantaged Russia.
Subsequently, key members of the Russian Duma indicated that
the START II Treaty would not be approved unless the United
States agreed to uphold all elements of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. It was only later that members of the Duma
linked NATO enlargement to the fate of the START II Treaty.
Most recently, the Deputy Speaker of the Duma declared that
START II would never be approved if the United States were to
use force against Iraq. As Undersecretary of State Thomas
Pickering, the United States Ambassador to Russia from 1993 to
1996, stated in his appearance before the Committee ``The
difficulty, I think, is that in the Russian Duma on START II,
you have a parliamentary body that is dominated by communists
who clearly do not believe that START II, for political
reasons, is something they want to ratify and gratify President
Yeltsin's reform government. As a result, they search for any
set of arguments.''
Critics of enlargement also argue that it would humiliate
Russia and, hence, would serve as an inducement to nationalists
to overturn Russian reformers' efforts to work constructively
with the West in such areas as arms control, non-proliferation,
and conflict prevention. Yet, since the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, practical experience in Europe has shown that
Russia engages best in Europe when it works with NATO. The
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the CFE
Flank Document were the result of NATO-Russia accord. An
objective analysis of Russian involvement with NATO in the
Implementation Force and Stabilization Force in the former
Yugoslavia demonstrates a far better pattern of cooperation
than did the pattern of Russian behavior, in the same region,
under the UNPROFOR mission of the United Nations.
In testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on
October 29, 1997, Mr. Dimitri Simes, in responding to the
charge that NATO enlargement could move Russian public opinion
in a nationalist/extremist direction observed that the Russian
leadership ``engaged in terrible atrocities in Chechnya
against, among others, many Russian civilians. They are not
paying wages and pensions to their people at the time when
people can easily observe the huge mansions of the new elite
and the private jets of Russia's new tycoons. None of this
moves Russian politics in a nationalist or reactionary
direction. But somehow an obstruction like NATO enlargement is
supposed to have a mystical, destructive impact on Russian
politics. It is very difficult for me to believe.'' Similarly,
in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on October
29, 1997, Undersecretary of State Pickering stated that the
Russian public ``does not consider NATO to be the key threat to
their future. They are far more concerned about other issues,
from wages and pensions to corruption and crime.''
To provide a forum for confidence building and information
exchange, NATO and Russia formalized consultative procedures in
a document called the Founding Act, which was signed on May 27,
1997. The Founding Act established a Permanent Joint Council
(PJC) for NATO-Russia consultations. The Committee Resolution
of Ratification reiterates the outlines and limits on those
consultations as explained by Secretary of State Albright on
October 7, 1997 in an appearance before the Foreign Relations
Committee. Secretary Albright said that:
The Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council
created as a result do not provide Russia any role in
decisions the alliance takes on internal matters, the
way NATO organizes itself, conducts its business, or
plans, prepares for and conducts those missions which
affect only its members, such as collective defense, as
stated under Article 5.
The Permanent Joint Council will not be a forum in
which NATO's basic strategy doctrine and readiness are
negotiated with Russia, nor will NATO use the Permanent
Joint Council as a substitute for formal arms control
negotiations such as the Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty.
Consistent with our past approach to relations with
Russia, NATO will continue to explain to Russia its
general policy on a full range of issues, including its
basic military doctrine and defense policies. Such
explanation will not extend to a level of detail that
could in any way compromise the effectiveness of NATO's
military forces. Such explanations will only be
offered--and I state this very emphatically--after NATO
has first set its policies on issues affecting internal
matters. NATO has not and will not discuss these issues
with Russia prior to making decisions within the North
Atlantic Council.
In testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on
October 29, 1997, Jack Matlock, the last U.S. Ambassador to the
Soviet Union, who opposes NATO enlargement, agreed with the
Founding Act and ``the advantages of the relationship that the
administration has negotiated with Russia . . .'' The Committee
strongly urges the Executive Branch to pursue a broader
dialogue with Russia in fora other than NATO as well. The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the
bilateral relationship offer opportunities for resolving
disputes among Russia, European countries, and the United
States.
The Committee notes that in the course of negotiations with
NATO, the Russian government has received a political
commitment that, under current circumstances, NATO will not
deploy permanently stationed forces from other member states in
Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic. NATO formally declared
on March 14, 1997, that ``in the current and foreseeable
security environment the alliance will carry out its collective
defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary
interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement
rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial
combat forces.'' The Committee further notes that NATO has made
a political commitment that, under current circumstances, NATO
would not deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of Poland,
Hungary, or the Czech Republic. NATO stated on December 10,
1996, that its members have ``no intention, no plan, and no
reason'' to deploy nuclear weapons in new member states. The
Committee Resolution of Ratification endorses these political
commitments, both of which were repeated in the text of the
NATO-Russia Founding Act, but notes that they are not legally
binding and do not in any way preclude any future decisions by
NATO to preserve the security of Alliance members.
In the view of the Committee, two treaties currently under
consideration by Russia and the United States--the START II
Treaty and the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE)--could offer important, legally binding
assurances to both Russia and the members of NATO with regard
to the threat from conventional and nuclear armaments. The
Committee urges the Russian Federation to ratify START II and
to work constructively with the United States to reach
agreement on CFE adaptation.
The CFE Treaty, which was ratified by the United States in
1991, has created a more balanced and stable military situation
in Europe through transparent conventional armaments
reductions. The CFE Treaty establishes regional and national
limits on certain categories of military equipment, including
tanks, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, fixed-wing
aircraft, and attack helicopters among the members of NATO and
former members of the Warsaw Pact (as well as their successor
states). This Treaty has already led to the destruction of over
53,000 pieces of treaty limited equipment. Negotiations on
adaptation of the CFE Treaty are underway in order to update
the Treaty and make it relevant to the post-Cold War security
environment in Europe. Negotiations are moving slowly, and no
final agreement on CFE adaptation is likely until late 1999.
The Committee supports a serious effort to adapt the CFE
Treaty so as to further increase the stability of Europe. At
the same time, the Committee would view unfavorably any
proposal that would have the effect of creating a second-class
status for some NATO members. The Committee welcomes the close
consultation between NATO and representatives of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic during the adaptation
negotiations.
The START II Treaty, which was approved by the United
States Senate in 1995, is pending approval in the Russian Duma.
This arms control agreement requires the United States and
Russia to reduce nuclear weapons holdings to 3,000-3,500
warheads each. At the Helsinki summit in March 1997, the United
States and Russia committed to begin negotiations on a START
III Treaty, with further reductions to a range of 2,000-2,500
each, once START II enters into force. While a START III Treaty
is far from a foregone conclusion--with many complicated issues
dividing the two sides and an internal U.S. debate over how low
the United States can take its level of strategic nuclear
weapons and still retain effective deterrence--it is through
these negotiations that the Russian government can gain real
assurances of a reduced strategic nuclear threat.
The enlargement of NATO would secure its members against
domination by larger powers. Likewise, the development of a
constructive relationship between NATO and Russia, as endorsed
in the Committee Resolution of Ratification, may provide an
avenue for Russia to contribute to the security and stability
of Europe. The Committee notes that these goals are fully
consistent with the effort the Alliance and Moscow are
undertaking together to forge a historic new partnership
through the NATO-Russia Founding Act--an agreement designed to
ensure that Russia is constructively and legitimately engaged
in European affairs.
V. Senate Action
On December 16, 1997, in Brussels, Belgium, Secretary
Albright, on behalf of the United States, signed the Protocols
to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The Protocols were transmitted
to the Senate on February 11, 1998 and referred on the same day
to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
The Committee held two public hearings in 1994 in
conjunction with the Committee on Armed Services, two public
hearings in 1995, seven public hearings in 1997, and one public
hearing in 1998 on various issues relating to the enlargement
of NATO. Both Administration and private sector witnesses
appeared at these hearings.
February 1, 1994
The Future of NATO
The Honorable Frank Wisner, Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy
The Honorable Stephen Oxman, Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs
The Honorable Robert Hunter, U.S. Ambassador to NATO
Lt. Gen. Daniel Christman, U.S. Representative to the NATO
Military Committee
February 23, 1994
The Future of NATO: The NATO Summit and Beyond
The Honorable James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense
The Honorable Max M. Kampelman, former U.S. Ambassador to the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
General John Galvin, USA (Ret.)
April 27, 1995
NATO's Future: Problems, Threats, and U.S. Interests
The Honorable Robert B. Zoellick, Federal National Mortgage
Association
Dr. Arnold Horelick, The RAND Corporation
The Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Center for Strategic and
International Studies
General William Odom, USA (Ret.), The Hudson Institute
May 3, 1995
Paths and Impediments to NATO Enlargement: Interests and Perceptions of
Allies, Applicants, and Russia
Dr. Ronald Asmus, The RAND Corporation
The Honorable Richard R. Burt, International Equity Partners
The Honorable Paula J. Dobriansky, Hunton & Williams
Mr. Dimitri K. Simes, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom
The Honorable Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Columbia University
October 7, 1997
The Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement
The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State
October 9, 1997
The Pros and Cons of NATO Enlargement
The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr., United States Senator
The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski, Center for Strategic and
International Studies
The Honorable Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, American Enterprise
Institute
Dr. Michael Mandelbaum, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University
Ambassador Jonathan Dean, Union of Concerned Scientists
October 22, 1997
Qualifications of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for NATO
Membership (Testimony Submitted for the Record)
The Honorable Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs
The Honorable Franklin D. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Center for Strategic and International
Studies
Dr. Stephen F. Larrabee, RAND
Dr. John S. Micgiel, Columbia University
October 28, 1997
Costs, Benefits, Burdensharing, and Military Implications of NATO
Enlargement
The Honorable Walter Slocombe, Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy
Dr. Richard Kugler, National Defense University
Dr. Ivan Eland, CATO Institute
The Honorable Stephen Hadley, Shea and Gardner
October 30, 1997
NATO-Russia Relationship Part I
The Honorable Henry Kissinger, Kissinger and Associates
October 30, 1997
NATO-Russia Relationship Part II
The Honorable Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Institute for Advanced Study
Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA (Ret.), Hudson Institute
Mr. Dimitri K. Simes, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom
November 5, 1997
Public Views on NATO Enlargement
Mr. Jan Nowak, Central and Eastern European Coalition
Mr. Edward J. Moskal, Polish American Congress
Mr. Frank Koszorus, Jr., Hungarian American Coalition
Mr. Bob Doubek, American Friends of the Czech Republic
Mr. Mati Koiva, Joint Baltic American National Committee, Inc.,
and Estonian American National Council
Mr. Charles Ciccolella, American Legion
Admiral Jack Shanahan, USN (Ret.), Center for Defense
Information
Colonel Herb Harmon, USMCR, Reserve Officers Association of the
United States
Mr. Daniel Plesch, British American Security Information
Council
Mr. David C. Acheson, The Atlantic Council of the United States
Mr. John T. Joyce, International Union of Bricklayers and
Allied Craftworkers
Mr. David Harris, American Jewish Committee
Mr. Adrian Karatnycky, Freedom House
Dr. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, University of Pennsylvania
Dr. Paula Stern, The Stern Group
February 24, 1998
Administration Views on the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of
1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State
The Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense
General Henry H. Shelton, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
In addition to Foreign Relations Committee action, since
1995 the Senate Appropriations, Armed Services, and Budget
Committees have held several hearings on NATO enlargement.
On April 22, 1997, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and
Minority Leader Tom Daschle created the Senate NATO Observer
Group to provide a focal point for addressing NATO issues that
cut across committee jurisdictions and to help educate Senators
on the issues involved in any decision to enlarge NATO. Twenty-
eight Senators serve on the Observer Group:
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
Senator Jeff Bingaman Senator Trent Lott
Senator Robert C. Byrd Senator John McCain
Senator Dan Coats Senator Mitch McConnell
Senator Paul Coverdell Senator Barbara A. Mikulski
Senator Tom Daschle Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
Senator Byron L. Dorgan Senator Paul S. Sarbanes
Senator Chuck Hagel Senator Gordon Smith
Senator Jesse Helms Senator Olympia J. Snowe
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison Senator William V. Roth, Jr.
Senator Daniel K. Inouye Senator Ted Stevens
Senator Robert J. Kerrey Senator Strom Thurmond
Senator Patrick J. Leahy Senator John W. Warner
Senator Carl Levin Senator Paul Wellstone
Senator Roth was appointed Chairman, and Senator Biden was
appointed Co-Chairman. The Observer Group held numerous
meetings with Administration, NATO officials, and foreign
officials. These meetings are listed below.
May 13, 1997
Chairmen's Meeting with Czech President Vaclav Havel
May 14, 1997
Meeting with Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
May 15, 1997
Meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott regarding
the NATO-Russia Founding Act
May 27, 1997
Observer Group delegation joined President Clinton's delegation
in Paris for the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding
Act
June 6, 1997
Meeting with U.S. Permanent Representative to the North
Atlantic Council Robert Hunter
June 11, 1997
Meeting with the President at the White House
June 25, 1997
Meeting with Secretary of Defense William Cohen
July 6/7, 1997
Observer Group delegation visit to Prague, Czech Republic
July 8, 1997
Observer Group delegation joined President Clinton's delegation
at the NATO summit in Madrid
July 8, 1997
Observer Group delegation lunch with the Presidents of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic
July 9, 1997
Observer Group delegation breakfast with Polish President
Aleksander Kwasniewski in Madrid
July 25, 1997
Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana
September 18, 1997
Meeting with NATO Chiefs of Defense
September 30, 1997
Meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic
February 10, 1998
Meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic
February 11, 1998
Meeting with Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov (jointly with
the Foreign Relations Committee)
February 26, 1998
Meeting with the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, General
Klaus Naumann
At a markup on March 3, 1998, the Committee considered a
Resolution of Ratification including seven declarations and
four conditions. The resolution was agreed to by the Committee
by a roll call vote of 16-2. Those members voting in the
affirmative were Senators Helms, Lugar, Coverdell, Hagel,
Smith, Thomas, Grams, Frist, Brownback, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd,
Kerry, Robb, Feingold, and Feinstein. Those members voting
against were Senators Ashcroft and Wellstone.
The conditions and declarations and the rationale for
approving them are as follows:
Declaration 1: Reaffirmation that Membership in NATO
Remains a Vital National Security Interest of the
United States
Declaration 1 reiterates that NATO membership is a vital
national security interest for the United States. For over
fifty years, NATO has served as the preeminent organization to
defend the territory of the countries in the North Atlantic
area against all external threats. NATO prevailed in the task
of ensuring the survival of democratic governments throughout
the Cold War, NATO succeeded in maintaining the peace in
disputes among NATO members, and NATO has established a process
of cooperative security planning that enhances the security of
the United States and its allies while distributing the
financial burden of defending the democracies of Europe and
North America among the Allies.
Declaration 2: Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement
Declaration 2 lays out the strategic rationale for the
inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO.
NATO members have determined that, consistent with Article 10
of the North Atlantic Treaty, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic are in a position to further the principles of the
North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area. This step has been taken with the
acknowledgment that, notwithstanding the collapse of communism
in most of Europe, NATO allies continue to face threats to
their stability and territorial integrity. These threats stem
from the possibility of the emergence of a hegemonic power in
or around Europe, resumed conflict caused by ethnic and
religious enmity, or the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic will strengthen NATO by extending the zone
of security cooperation, serve as a deterrent to potential
aggressors, and advance the interests of the United States and
its NATO allies.
Declaration 3: Supremacy of the North Atlantic Council in
NATO Decision-Making
Declaration 3 emphasizes the supremacy of NATO members in
making the core decisions of the Alliance, notwithstanding the
Alliance's growing association with non-member states. Within
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the North Atlantic
Council, commonly referred to as the NAC, is the principal
decision-making body. Final NATO authority rests on its
decisions, and all members of NATO are represented. The NAC
does not require approval or consensus on its decisions from
any outside body, though it is committed by the North Atlantic
Treaty to act in accordance with international law. This
declaration also emphasizes that decisions are determined at
the NAC by consensus of all NATO members and are not subject to
approval or review of any forum affiliated with NATO, such as
the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council or the NATO-Ukraine
Commission. Additionally, the NAC does not require consent by
international organizations such as the United Nations in order
to undertake a mission that includes the use of force in
defense of its members.
Declaration 4: Full Membership for New NATO Members
Declaration 4 emphasizes that, upon completion of the
accession process, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will
have all the rights, privileges, obligations, responsibilities,
and protections that are afforded to all other NATO members. In
particular, the Committee would view unfavorably any legally
binding requirement arising from the adaptation talks of the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) that would
have the effect of constraining the ability of NATO to fulfill
its Article 5 guarantee to new member states. This provision
also endorses the political commitments made by NATO to the
Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, including
its provisions regarding a decision under current circumstances
neither to deploy nuclear weapons, nor to station forces on the
territory of new members. This provision emphasizes that the
Founding Act is not legally binding and cannot preclude any
decisions made by the North Atlantic Council.
Declaration 5: NATO-Russia Relationship
Declaration 5 expresses the Senate's support for NATO to
engage with the Russian Federation in a new and constructive
relationship as Russia continues to pursue democracy, market
reform, and peaceful relations with its neighbors.
Declaration 6: The Importance of European Integration
Declaration 6 emphasizes the important role that other
European institutions such as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe and the European Union must play in
advancing the political, economic, and social stability of
Europe.
Declaration 7: Future Consideration of Candidates for
Membership in NATO
Declaration 7 declares that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic are the only countries in Europe that have been
invited to join NATO, and that the consideration of future
members in NATO provided for under Article 10 of the Senate-
approved North Atlantic Treaty is subject to the requirement
for advice and consent under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of
the United States Constitution. Article 10 of the North
Atlantic Treaty provides for an open door to the admission into
NATO of other European countries that are in a position to
further the principles of the Treaty and that can contribute to
the security of the North Atlantic area. The only countries
that have been invited to accede to NATO are Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic, and the United States will not support
any subsequent invitation for admission to NATO if the
prospective member cannot fulfill the obligations and
responsibilities of NATO membership in a manner that serves the
overall political and strategic interests of the United States.
The Senate emphasizes that no state will be invited to become a
member of NATO unless the Executive Branch fulfills the
Constitutional requirement for seeking the advice of the
Senate, a consensus decision to proceed is reached in NATO, and
ratification is achieved according to the national procedures
of each NATO member, including the consent to ratification by
the Senate.
Condition 1: The Strategic Concept of NATO
Condition 1 declares that NATO's central purpose remains
the defense of its members. Any proposal to revise this mission
will require full consultation by the Executive Branch. The
Strategic Concept of NATO is the guiding policy document that
describes NATO's strategy and the steps NATO takes to
accomplish it. Collective defense is reaffirmed as NATO's core
purpose. The Senate declares that NATO must continue to pursue
defense planning, command structures, and force goals first and
foremost to meet the requirement of the collective defense of
NATO members.
Condition 1 further directs the President to submit a
report to Congress that explains the manner in which the
Strategic Concept of NATO affects global U.S. military
requirements. The report must also contain an analysis of all
potential threats to the North Atlantic area over the next
decade, and must identify the alternative system architectures
for deployment of a NATO missile defense for the region of
Europe that would counter any current or emerging threat by
ballistic and cruise missile systems in countries other than
the declared nuclear powers. Additionally, the report will
contain a detailed, country-specific report on the progress of
all NATO members on meeting current force goals in support of
the Alliance. The Senate is interested in a full account of the
vulnerabilities or weaknesses posed to NATO due to the failure
of individual members to meet previously agreed upon force
goals. Through required briefings, the Executive branch will
keep the Senate informed of any discussions in NATO to revise
the Strategic Concept.
Condition 2: Cost, Benefits, Burdensharing, and Military
Implications of the Enlargement of NATO
Condition 2 requires the President to reaffirm
understandings on the cost, benefits, and military implications
of NATO enlargement. Prior to depositing the instrument of
ratification, the President is required to certify to the
Senate that the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech
Republic in NATO will not increase the United States' overall
percentage share of the NATO common budget. Similarly, the
President is required to certify that the United States is
under no obligation to subsidize the national expenses
necessary for Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic to meet
those countries' NATO commitments, and that the membership of
Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic in NATO will not detract
in any way from the ability of the United States to meet its
military commitments outside the North Atlantic area. This
provision does not prohibit voluntary assistance programs by
the United States such as the ongoing Warsaw Initiative.
Condition 2 further directs the President to submit an
annual report to the Senate during the five year period
following the entry into force of the protocols. The report is
to include detailed information on the annual defense budgets
of all NATO members, their contributions to the common budget
and cost-sharing arrangements of NATO, and an itemization of
costs incurred by the United States in support of Polish, Czech
and Hungarian membership in NATO.
Condition 3: The NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Permanent
Joint Council
Condition 3 requires the President to certify the
previously stated position of the Executive Branch on areas of
cooperation under the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the nature
of discussions in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The
resolution reiterates the Executive Branch interpretation of
Russia's role under the Founding Act and the firewalls between
the deliberations of the North Atlantic Council and the
Permanent Joint Council to preserve the integrity of decision-
making and the security of NATO. The Senate states that any
discussions in the Permanent Joint Council will be for
explanatory, not decision-making purposes, and that these
discussions will not extend to a level of detail that could in
any way compromise the security of NATO. Further it is the
understanding of the Senate that no issue will be discussed in
the Permanent Joint Council until after NATO has reached
consensus on its position. The Senate explicitly states that
under no circumstance will the Russian Federation have a veto
over NATO policy or any role in NATO decision-making under the
auspices of the Founding Act or the Permanent Joint Council.
Additionally, the Senate reiterates its understanding of the
limits of discussions in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint
Council.
Condition 4: Treaty Interpretation
Condition (4) reaffirms condition (1) in the resolution of
ratification of the INF Treaty, which was approved by the
Senate in 1988. That condition, known as the ``Biden-Byrd-
Helms'' condition, sets forth important principles of treaty
interpretation. The condition has been reaffirmed by the Senate
several times since 1988, including during consideration of the
CFE Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, the START I and START II
Treaties, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. These principles
apply regardless of whether the Senate chooses to say so during
consideration of any particular treaty.
A full discussion of the background to, and rationale for,
this condition may be found in the Committee's report on the
INF Treaty (S. Exec. Rept. No. 15, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.), and
the Committee's report on the CFE Flank Document (S. Exec.
Rept. No. 1, 105th Cong., 1st Sess.).
VI. Resolution of Ratification
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein),
SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO DECLARATIONS AND
CONDITIONS.
The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession
of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which were opened
for signature at Brussels on December 16, 1997, and signed on
behalf of the United States of America and other parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty, as defined in section 4(6), subject to
the declarations of section 2 and the conditions of section 3.
SEC. 2. DECLARATIONS.
The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is subject to the
following declarations:
(1) Reaffirmation that united states membership in
nato remains a vital national security interest of the
united states.--The Senate declares that--
(A) for nearly 50 years the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) has served as the
preeminent organization to defend the territory
of the countries in the North Atlantic area
against all external threats;
(B) through common action, the established
democracies of North America and Europe that
were joined in NATO persevered and prevailed in
the task of ensuring the survival of democratic
government in Europe and North America
throughout the Cold War;
(C) NATO enhances the security of the United
States by embedding European states in a
process of cooperative security planning, by
preventing the destabilizing renationalization
of European military policies, and by ensuring
an ongoing and direct leadership role for the
United States in European security affairs;
(D) the responsibility and financial burden
of defending the democracies of Europe and
North America can be more evenly shared through
an alliance in which specific obligations and
force goals are met by its members;
(E) the security and prosperity of the United
States is enhanced by NATO's collective defense
against aggression that may threaten the
territory of NATO members; and
(F) United States membership in NATO remains
a vital national security interest of the
United States.
(2) Strategic rationale for nato enlargement.--The
Senate finds that--
(A) notwithstanding the collapse of communism
in most of Europe and the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO
allies face threats to their stability and
territorial integrity, including--
(i) the potential for the emergence
of a hegemonic power in Europe;
(ii) conflict stemming from ethnic
and religious enmity, the revival of
historic disputes, or the actions of
undemocratic leaders;
(iii) the proliferation of
technologies associated with nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons as well
as ballistic and cruise missile systems
and other means of the delivery of
those weapons; and
(iv) possible transnational threats
that would adversely affect the core
security interests of NATO members;
(B) the invasion of Poland, Hungary, or the
Czech Republic, or their destabilization
arising from external subversion, would
threaten the stability of Europe and jeopardize
vital United States national security
interests;
(C) Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic,
having established democratic governments and
having demonstrated a willingness to meet all
requirements of membership, including those
necessary to contribute to the territorial
defense of all NATO members, are in a position
to further the principles of the North Atlantic
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area; and
(D) extending NATO membership to Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic will strengthen
NATO, enhance security and stability in Central
Europe, deter potential aggressors, and thereby
advance the interests of the United States and
its NATO allies.
(3) Supremacy of the north atlantic council in nato
decision-making.--The Senate understands that--
(A) as the North Atlantic Council is the
supreme decision-making body of NATO, the North
Atlantic Council will not subject its decisions
to review, challenge, or veto by any forum
affiliated with NATO, including the Permanent
Joint Council or the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council, or by any nonmember state
participating in any such forum;
(B) the North Atlantic Council does not
require the consent of the United Nations, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, or any other international organization
in order to take any action pursuant to the
North Atlantic Treaty in defense of the North
Atlantic area, including the deployment,
operation, or stationing of forces; and
(C) the North Atlantic Council has direct
responsibility for matters relating to the
basic policies of NATO, including development
of the Strategic Concept of NATO (as defined in
section 3(1)(E)), and a consensus position of
the North Atlantic Council will precede any
negotiation between NATO and non-NATO members
that affects NATO's relationship with non-NATO
members participating in fora such as the
Permanent Joint Council.
(4) Full membership for new nato members.--
(A) In general.--The Senate understands that
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, in
becoming NATO members, will have all the
rights, obligations, responsibilities, and
protections that are afforded to all other NATO
members.
(B) Political commitments.--The Senate
endorses the political commitments made by NATO
to the Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia
Founding Act, which are not legally binding and
do not in any way preclude any future decisions
by the North Atlantic Council to preserve the
security of NATO members.
(5) NATO-Russia relationship.--The Senate finds that
it is in the interest of the United States for NATO to
develop a new and constructive relationship with the
Russian Federation as the Russian Federation pursues
democratization, market reforms, and peaceful relations
with its neighbors.
(6) The importance of european integration.--
(A) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of
the Senate that--
(i) the central purpose of NATO is to
provide for the collective defense of
its members;
(ii) the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe is a
fundamental institution for the
promotion of democracy, the rule of
law, crisis prevention, and post-
conflict rehabilitation and, as such,
is an essential forum for the
discussion and resolution of political
disputes among European members,
Canada, and the United States; and
(iii) the European Union is an
essential organization for the
economic, political, and social
integration of all qualified European
countries into an undivided Europe.
(B) Policy of the united states.--The policy
of the United States is--
(i) to utilize fully the institutions
of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe to reach
political solutions for disputes in
Europe; and
(ii) to encourage actively the
efforts of the European Union to expand
its membership, which will help to
stabilize the democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe.
(7) Future consideration of candidates for membership
in nato.--
(A) Senate findings.--The Senate finds that--
(i) Article 10 of the North Atlantic
Treaty provides that NATO members by
unanimous agreement may invite the
accession to the North Atlantic Treaty
of any other European state in a
position to further the principles of
the North Atlantic Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North
Atlantic area;
(ii) in its Madrid summit declaration
of July 8, 1997, NATO pledged to
``maintain an open door to the
admission of additional Alliance
members in the future'' if those
countries satisfy the requirements of
Article 10 of the North Atlantic
Treaty;
(iii) other than Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic, the United States
has not consented to invite any other
country to join NATO in the future; and
(iv) the United States will not
support the admission of, or the
invitation for admission of, any new
NATO member unless--
(I) the President consults
with the Senate consistent with
Article II, section 2, clause 2
of the Constitution of the
United States (relating to the
advice and consent of the
Senate to the making of
treaties); and
(II) the prospective NATO
member can fulfill the
obligations and
responsibilities of membership,
and its inclusion would serve
the overall political and
strategic interests of NATO and
the United States.
(B) Requirement for consensus and
ratification.--The Senate declares that no
action or agreement other than a consensus
decision by the full membership of NATO,
approved by the national procedures of each
NATO member, including, in the case of the
United States, the requirements of Article II,
section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the
United States (relating to the advice and
consent of the Senate to the making of
treaties), will constitute a security
commitment pursuant to the North Atlantic
Treaty.
SEC. 3. CONDITIONS.
The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the
Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is subject
to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the
President:
(1) The strategic concept of nato.--
(A) The fundamental importance of collective
defense.--The Senate declares that--
(i) in order for NATO to serve the
security interests of the United
States, the core purpose of NATO must
continue to be the collective defense
of the territory of all NATO members;
and
(ii) NATO may also, pursuant to
Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty,
on a case-by-case basis, engage in
other missions when there is a
consensus among its members that there
is a threat to the security and
interests of NATO members.
(B) Defense planning, command structures, and
force goals.--The Senate declares that NATO
must continue to pursue defense planning,
command structures, and force goals to meet the
requirements of Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty as well as the requirements of other
missions agreed upon by NATO members, but must
do so in a manner that first and foremost
ensures under the North Atlantic Treaty the
ability of NATO to deter and counter any
significant military threat to the territory of
any NATO member.
(C) Report.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of adoption of this resolution, the
President shall submit to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives a report on the Strategic
Concept of NATO. The report shall be submitted
in both classified and unclassified form and
shall include--
(i) an explanation of the manner in
which the Strategic Concept of NATO
affects United States military
requirements both within and outside
the North Atlantic area;
(ii) an analysis of all potential
threats to the North Atlantic area up
to the year 2010, including the
consideration of a reconstituted
conventional threat to Europe, emerging
capabilities of non-NATO countries to
use nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons affecting the North Atlantic
area, and the emerging ballistic and
cruise missile threat affecting the
North Atlantic area;
(iii) the identification of
alternative system architectures for
the deployment of a NATO missile
defense for the region of Europe that
would be capable of countering the
threat posed by emerging ballistic and
cruise missile systems in countries
other than declared nuclear powers,
together with a timetable for
development and an estimate of costs;
(iv) a detailed assessment of the
progress of all NATO members, on a
country-by-country basis, toward
meeting current force goals; and
(v) a general description of the
overall approach to updating the
Strategic Concept of NATO.
(D) Briefings on revisions to the strategic
concept.--Not less than twice in the 300-day
period following the date of adoption of this
resolution, each at an agreed time to precede
each Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic
Council, the Senate expects the appropriate
officials of the executive branch of Government
to offer detailed briefings to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate on proposed
changes to the Strategic Concept of NATO,
including--
(i) an explanation of the manner in
which specific revisions to the
Strategic Concept of NATO will serve
United States national security
interests and affect United States
military requirements both within and
outside the North Atlantic area;
(ii) a timetable for implementation
of new force goals by all NATO members
under any revised Strategic Concept of
NATO;
(iii) a description of any
negotiations regarding the revision of
the nuclear weapons policy of NATO; and
(iv) a description of any proposal to
condition decisions of the North
Atlantic Council upon the approval of
the United Nations, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
or any NATO-affiliated forum.
(E) Definition.--For the purposes of this
paragraph, the term ``Strategic Concept of
NATO'' means the document agreed to by the
Heads of State and Government participating in
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Rome on November 7-8, 1991, or any subsequent
document agreed to by the North Atlantic
Council that would serve a similar purpose.
(2) Cost, benefits, burdensharing, and military
implications of the enlargement of nato.--
(A) Presidential certification.--Prior to the
deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to
the Senate that--
(i) the inclusion of Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic in NATO will not
have the effect of increasing the
overall percentage share of the United
States in the common budgets of NATO;
(ii) the United States is under no
commitment to subsidize the national
expenses necessary for Poland, Hungary,
or the Czech Republic to meet its NATO
commitments; and
(iii) the inclusion of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO
does not detract from the ability of
the United States to meet or to fund
its military requirements outside the
North Atlantic area.
(B) Annual reports.--
(i) Requirements.--Not later than
April 1 of each year during the five-
year period following the date of entry
into force of the Protocols to the
North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the
Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic, the President shall
submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report which may be
submitted in an unclassified and
classified form and which shall contain
the following information:
(I) The amount contributed to
the common budgets of NATO by
each NATO member during the
preceding calendar year.
(II) The proportional share
assigned to, and paid by, each
NATO member under NATO's cost-
sharing arrangements.
(III) The national defense
budget of each NATO member, the
steps taken by each NATO member
to meet NATO force goals, and
the adequacy of the national
defense budget of each NATO
member in meeting common
defense and security
obligations.
(IV) Any costs incurred by
the United States in connection
with the membership of Poland,
Hungary, or the Czech Republic
in NATO, including the
deployment of United States
military personnel, the
provision of any defense
article or defense service, the
funding of any training
activity, or the modification
or construction of any military
facility.
(ii) Definition of appropriate
congressional committees.--As used in
this subparagraph, the term
``appropriate congressional
committees'' means the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate and the
Committee on International Relations,
the Committee on National Security, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
(3) The nato-russia founding act and the permanent
joint council.--Prior to the deposit of the United
States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to the Senate the following:
(A) In general.--The NATO-Russia Founding Act
and the Permanent Joint Council do not provide
the Russian Federation with a veto over NATO
policy.
(B) Nato decision-making.--The NATO-Russia
Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council do
not provide the Russian Federation any role in
the North Atlantic Council or NATO decision-
making, including--
(i) any decision NATO makes on an
internal matter; or
(ii) the manner in which NATO
organizes itself, conducts its
business, or plans, prepares for, or
conducts any mission that affects one
or more of its members, such as
collective defense, as stated under
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
(C) Nature of discussions in the permanent
joint council.--In discussions in the Permanent
Joint Council--
(i) the Permanent Joint Council will
not be a forum in which NATO's basic
strategy, doctrine, or readiness is
negotiated with the Russian Federation,
and NATO will not use the Permanent
Joint Council as a substitute for
formal arms control negotiations such
as the adaptation of the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,
done at Paris on November 19, 1990;
(ii) any discussion with the Russian
Federation of NATO doctrine will be for
explanatory, not decision-making
purposes;
(iii) any explanation described in
clause (ii) will not extend to a level
of detail that could in any way
compromise the effectiveness of NATO's
military forces, and any such
explanation will be offered only after
NATO has first set its policies on
issues affecting internal matters;
(iv) NATO will not discuss any agenda
item with the Russian Federation prior
to agreeing to a NATO position within
the North Atlantic Council on that
agenda item; and
(v) the Permanent Joint Council will
not be used to make any decision on
NATO doctrine, strategy, or readiness.
(4) Treaty interpretation.--
(A) Principles of treaty interpretation.--The
Senate affirms the applicability to all
treaties of the constitutionally-based
principles of treaty interpretation set forth
in condition (1) in the resolution of
ratification of the INF Treaty, approved by the
Senate on May 27, 1988.
(B) Construction of senate resolution of
ratification.--Nothing in condition (1) of the
resolution of ratification of the INF Treaty,
approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988, shall
be construed as authorizing the President to
obtain legislative approval for modifications
or amendments to treaties through majority
approval of both Houses of Congress.
(C) Definition.--As used in this paragraph,
the term ``INF Treaty'' refers to the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and
Shorter Range Missiles, together with the
related memorandum of understanding and
protocols, done at Washington on December 8,
1987.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this resolution:
(1) NATO.--The term ``NATO'' means the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.
(2) NATO members.--The term ``NATO members'' means
all countries that are parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty.
(3) NATO-Russia founding act.--The term ``NATO-Russia
Founding Act'' means the document entitled the
``Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and
Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation'',
dated May 27, 1997.
(4) North atlantic area.--The term ``North Atlantic
area'' means the area covered by Article 6 of the North
Atlantic Treaty, as applied by the North Atlantic
Council.
(5) North atlantic treaty.--The term ``North Atlantic
Treaty'' means the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at
Washington on April 4, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964),
as amended.
(6) Protocols to the north atlantic treaty of 1949 on
the accession of poland, hungary, and the czech
republic.--The term ``Protocols to the North Atlantic
Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic'' refers to the following protocols
transmitted by the President to the Senate on February
11, 1998 (Treaty Document No. 105-36):
(A) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty
on the Accession of the Republic of Poland,
signed at Brussels on December 16, 1997.
(B) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty
on the Accession of the Republic of Hungary,
signed at Brussels on December 16, 1997.
(C) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty
on the Accession of the Czech Republic, signed
at Brussels on December 16, 1997.
(7) United states instrument of ratification.--The
term ``United States instrument of ratification'' means
the instrument of ratification of the United States of
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on
the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic.
VII. Views of the Senate Committee on Armed Services
VIII. Views of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence