[Senate Executive Report 105-14]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



105th Congress                                               Exec. Rpt.
                                 SENATE

 2d Session                                                      105-14
_______________________________________________________________________


 
 PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, 
                    HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

                                _______
                                

                 March 6, 1998.--Ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


   Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                   [To accompany Treaty Doc. 105-36]

    The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred 
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession 
of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which were opened 
for signature at Brussels on December 16, 1997, and signed on 
behalf of the United States of America and other parties to the 
North Atlantic Treaty, having considered the same, reports 
favorably thereon and recommends that the Senate give its 
advice and consent to ratification thereof subject to seven 
declarations and four conditions as set forth in this report 
and the accompanying resolution of ratification.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

  I. The Future of NATO and the Enlargement of the Alliance...........2
 II. Qualifications of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for 
     NATO Membership..................................................8
III. The Cost of NATO Enlargement....................................17
 IV. NATO-Russia Relations...........................................23
  V. Senate Action...................................................28
 VI. Resolution of Ratification......................................37
VII. Views of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.................46
VIII.Views of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence............56

       I. The Future of NATO and the Enlargement of the Alliance

United States Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

    The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was 
established as an alliance of common defense among democratic 
and market oriented governments in North America and Western 
Europe on August 24, 1949, with the entry into force of the 
North Atlantic Treaty. Original members included the United 
States, Canada, and ten European countries emerging from the 
destruction of World War II (Great Britain, France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Iceland 
and Italy). Subsequently, the Alliance has been enlarged on 
three separate occasions--to include Greece and Turkey in 1952, 
the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. 
NATO has been central to peace and stability in Europe for 
almost fifty years and provides the United States with an 
ongoing and direct leadership role in European security 
affairs.
    During the Cold War, NATO served as a bulwark against the 
threat of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites. The 
U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee served as a deterrent to 
Soviet aggression, and U.S. conventional forces stationed in 
Europe, reaching over 300,000 at their peak, were evidence that 
the United States would meet its commitment to collective 
defense under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO members have made 
significant cuts in their military forces, including a 
substantial reduction in U.S. forces stationed in Europe. Since 
1991, NATO has shifted from its Cold War strategy of mounting a 
massive, static defense against a significant military threat 
from a single direction. Instead, NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept 
revised the strategy to provide mobile response to diverse and 
multi-directional risks to the North Atlantic area.
    According to the 1991 Strategic Concept, the primary role 
of Alliance military forces is still to guarantee the security 
and territorial integrity of member states. The Alliance is 
also pursuing a broader, cooperative security relationship with 
a total of 44 European and North American countries in the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO has established a forum 
for constructive dialogue and cooperation with the Russian 
Federation in the Permanent Joint Council, and NATO has forged 
a relationship with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission. 
Within the guidelines of its Resolution of Ratification, the 
Committee supports these initiatives as a way to demonstrate 
the defensive and stabilizing intentions of NATO. Nonetheless, 
the core purpose of the Alliance must remain the defense of its 
members. In order to fulfill this purpose, the forces of 
Alliance members must remain capable of defending against a 
significant military threat, and all members of the Alliance 
must fully meet their military commitments.
    History may judge the collapse of communism in Europe to be 
largely a result of NATO's success in containing the massive, 
external threat posed by the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, 
however, NATO also played a second role--equally important as 
the defense against communism--a role that remains relevant 
today. After two World Wars in the first half of the century 
into which the United States was drawn, the close relationship 
among NATO members allowed countries to lay aside historical 
grievances and develop democratic traditions and market 
economies to the enormous benefit of themselves, their 
neighbors, and the United States. Under NATO's security 
umbrella, old enemies have not only been reconciled but now 
stand side by side as allies; national defense polices are 
coordinated; and, on a daily basis, consultation, joint 
planning, joint training and cooperation reinforce the trust 
and commitment to common principles that are the very essence 
of the Alliance.
    As Poland and Germany, and Hungary and Romania, and several 
other former antagonists in Central and Eastern Europe build 
constructive, friendly relations in the post-Cold War era, the 
stabilizing influence of NATO membership, and potential 
membership, is illustrated yet again. The defensive nature of 
the Alliance, the democratic nature of its decision-making, and 
membership based not upon force of arms or coercion, but the 
willing choice of democratic governments, are the central 
reasons that association with the Alliance, and even 
membership, is a foreign policy priority for many European 
nations previously denied the rights of self-determination, 
freedom, and democracy. And for this reason, no country in 
Europe, with the exceptions of Belarus and Russia, has objected 
to the enlargement of the Alliance.
    With NATO's continued importance to European stability, and 
a narrow mission of defending the North Atlantic area, the 
Committee supports a continued United States commitment to, and 
leadership in, NATO. The Committee welcomes the strategic 
rationale for NATO that was provided by Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright in testimony before the Foreign Relations 
Committee on October 7, 1997. In explaining the purpose of the 
Alliance, Secretary Albright stated that:

          First, there are dangers of Europe's past. It is easy 
        to forget this, but for centuries virtually every 
        European nation treated virtually every other nation as 
        a military threat. That pattern was broken only when 
        NATO was born and only in the half of Europe NATO 
        covered. With NATO, each member's security came to 
        depend on cooperation with others, not competition. 
        That is one reason why NATO remains essential. It is 
        also one reason why we need a larger NATO which extends 
        its positive influence to Europe's other half.
          A second set of dangers lies in Europe's present. 
        Because of the conflict in the Balkans and the former 
        Soviet Union, Europe has already buried more victims of 
        war since the Berlin Wall fell than in all the years of 
        the cold war. It is sobering to recall that this 
        violence has its roots in the same problems of 
        shattered states and of ethnic hatreds that tyrants 
        exploited to start this century's great wars.
          Finally, Mr. Chairman, and most important, we must 
        consider the dangers of Europe's future. By this I mean 
        direct threats against the soil of NATO members that a 
        collective defense pact is designed to meet. Some are 
        visible on Europe's horizon, such as the threat posed 
        by rogue states with dangerous weapons. Others may not 
        seem apparent today, but they are not unthinkable. 
        Within this category lie questions about the future of 
        Russia. We want Russian democracy to endure. We are 
        optimistic that it will, but one should not dismiss the 
        possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of 
        its past. By engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we 
        give Russia every incentive to deepen its commitment to 
        peaceful relations with neighbors, while closing the 
        avenue to more destructive alternatives.

The Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement

    Notwithstanding the collapse of communism in most of Europe 
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and 
its allies face continuing threats to their stability and 
territorial integrity, including the potential for the 
emergence of a hegemonic power in or around Europe, conflict 
stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of 
historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders. 
Furthermore, emerging capabilities to use and deliver weapons 
of mass destruction, as well as transnational threats such as 
terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime threaten both 
new and old democracies on the European continent. By providing 
a defense against many of these threats, NATO membership for 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will expand the area in 
Europe where peace and democracy are not only present, but 
secure.
    Through much of its history, Europe has seen many insecure 
and small powers, a few great powers, and far too many 
nationalist defense policies--a dangerous catalyst for 
collusion and conflagration. Twice in this century these 
dynamics have pulled the United States into conflict on the 
European continent. With the enlargement of NATO, the United 
States and its allies have an opportunity to build a more 
stable Europe, to lock in that stability, and to replace the 
dynamics of confrontation and conflict with trust and 
cooperation. NATO membership will extend to Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic the institutions, practices, and 
traditions of consultation, joint planning, joint training, and 
joint operations that have made NATO an effective military 
alliance for the last half century. This structure has proven 
that vital U.S. interests in Europe can be guaranteed by a 
stable architecture of security and cooperation based upon a 
common commitment to the defense of democracy.
    The Committee finds that the accession of Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic to NATO will make the Alliance stronger 
and more cohesive. Each of the three countries is an 
established democracy with a growing market economy. Each 
shares the culture, history, and commitment to democracy that 
unite the transatlantic community. Their militaries are firmly 
under civilian control. In addition, these three countries have 
proven themselves ready to bear a share of the burden in 
support of American and Allied interests beyond their borders. 
Each contributed forces to Operation Desert Storm, all three 
are prepared to return to the Gulf if necessary, and today, 
Polish, Hungarian, and Czech troops stand side by side with 
U.S. forces in Bosnia.
    NATO enlargement is not a reaction to any single event or 
threat; rather it is a strategic opportunity for the expansion 
of a zone of peace and democracy in a continent that is of 
vital interest to the United States. In the view of the 
Committee, this is the best way to minimize the possibility 
that U.S. troops will be called upon again to fight in a major 
war across the Atlantic. The invasion or military 
destabilization of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic--with 
or without the extension of NATO membership--would threaten the 
stability of Europe, jeopardize vital United States national 
security interests, and would quite likely lead to the 
engagement of United States forces. NATO enlargement is a 
prudent step to ensure that this does not happen.

NATO's Strategic Concept

    The Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the subsequent 
disarray of the Russian military have, in the view of NATO, 
significantly reduced any immediate, conventional threat to 
Western Europe and the United States. Consequently, in 1991, 
NATO members agreed to a new Strategic Concept. The Strategic 
Concept reiterates the central importance of collective defense 
to the Alliance, but it also notes that, with the emergence of 
independent democratic states in Central Europe, ``the 
political division of Europe that was the source of the 
military confrontation of the Cold War period has . . . been 
overcome.''
    The Committee Resolution of Ratification declares that, in 
order for NATO to serve the security interests of the United 
States, the core purpose of NATO must remain the collective 
defense of the territory of all Alliance members. With that 
focus, the Committee supports the 1991 Strategic Concept's 
leaner approach to security for the post-Cold War environment, 
provided that NATO's forces remain sufficient to deter and 
counter any significant military threat to the territory of any 
NATO member.
    Under the Strategic Concept, the allies agreed to move away 
from a positional forward defense and to develop forces to 
counter ``diverse and multi-directional risks.'' Such forces 
would ``require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an 
assured capability for augmentation when necessary. . . . This 
ability to build up by reinforcement, by mobilizing reserves, 
or by reconstituting forces, must be in proportion to potential 
threats. . . .'' The Committee supports the Strategic Concept's 
realistic force adjustments to meet new threats to the 
territory of NATO. Nonetheless, the Committee considers some 
positional forces to have continued importance as an element of 
static defense, especially in fulfilling the military 
requirements of defending the new members. The Committee 
Resolution of Ratification declares that as NATO develops 
forces with enhanced flexibility and mobility, it must continue 
to pursue defense planning, command structures, and force goals 
first and foremost to meet the requirements of Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty.
    The Committee recognizes that, under Article 4 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance may address instability outside 
NATO's borders if that instability could lead to a more direct 
threat to NATO members. The Committee Resolution of 
Ratification makes clear that this mission should not be 
elevated, and it requires such activities to be undertaken only 
on a case-by-case basis and only when a threat arises both to 
the security and to the interests of the Alliance. Any attempt 
to make this mission the primary purpose of the Alliance, or 
any expansion of this concept, or expansive use of it, would be 
a matter of great concern to the Committee.
    No consensus exists in the Committee in support of a 
broader mission for NATO. While NATO has been successful in 
maintaining support for the narrow mission of the territorial 
defense of its members, some members of the Committee are 
deeply concerned about proposals to allow NATO forces to defend 
interests outside the North Atlantic area, such as in Africa or 
the Middle East; to use NATO forces increasingly for operations 
other than war (peacekeeping, crisis management, etc.); to 
require that NATO gain approval of non-NATO countries, the 
United Nations, or the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe in order to act; and for a new mission 
for the Alliance to respond preemptively to emerging 
capabilities to use weapons of mass destruction among non-NATO 
countries.
    The Committee strongly advises the Executive Branch to 
consult extensively with the Senate before undertaking any 
interpretation, reinterpretation, expansion, or revision of 
NATO's Strategic Concept. Because NATO will undertake 
negotiations to review the Strategic Concept in 1998, the 
Committee Resolution of Ratification requires close 
consultation on this matter including specific requirements for 
briefings of the Committee.
    Finally, the Committee finds that the Strategic Concept and 
burdensharing are inextricably linked. Because the United 
States is the leading military power in NATO and has force 
projection capabilities far superior to those of its allies, 
the costs associated with a mission to respond to diverse and 
multi-directional risks falls disproportionately upon the 
United States military. Active development of the Combined 
Joint Task Force concept, in which European forces would 
undertake some NATO missions on their own, with support from 
the United States, also will reduce the burden on the U.S. 
military. However, differences exist among Alliance members 
over the extent and purpose of such missions, and there is some 
question of how well the European allies can accomplish such 
new missions on their own, with only limited U.S. involvement.
    The current disparities between the United States and its 
NATO allies in transport, logistics, communications, and 
intelligence capabilities (made apparent in the Persian Gulf 
War and in the on-going Bosnia operations) indicate that NATO 
is moving toward a two-tiered Alliance in which the United 
States and its NATO allies have vast differences in 
capabilities. The Committee notes that in a February 1997 
report to Congress on the rationale, benefits, costs, and 
implications of NATO enlargement, the Department of Defense 
concluded that in order to prevent such disparities the current 
allies would have to spend some $8-10 billion for force 
modernization by the year 2010. The Committee Resolution of 
Ratification requires a specific and detailed report on 
progress by members of the Alliance to meet their commitments 
in fulfilling force goals.

Future NATO Enlargement

    Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that NATO 
members, by unanimous agreement, may invite the accession to 
the North Atlantic Treaty of any other European state in a 
position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty 
and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. 
The Committee emphasizes, however, that in the process of 
considering the qualifications and purpose for the admission of 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO, the 
Committee did not state a view on when, or whether, the United 
States should invite any additional countries to join NATO. The 
Committee Resolution of Ratification declares that only Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic have been invited by NATO 
members to join the Alliance. No other agreement or document, 
including the July 8, 1997 Madrid Summit Declaration of NATO, 
or the January 16, 1998 Baltic Charter, should be construed 
otherwise.
    It is the Committee's understanding that the United States 
will not support the invitation to NATO membership to any 
further candidates unless the Senate is first consulted, unless 
any proposed candidate can fulfill the obligations and 
responsibilities of membership, and unless their inclusion 
would serve the overall political and strategic interests of 
the United States. The Executive Branch has stated its 
understanding of the need for consultation with the Senate. On 
March 3, 1998, in a written answer to a question for the 
record, Secretary of State Albright stated:

          We understand fully the Senate's constitutional 
        responsibility to advise and consent to the 
        ratification of any Treaty into which the United States 
        enters. As we have done in the past, as well as on this 
        occasion, we will keep the Senate and the Foreign 
        Relations Committee fully informed of significant 
        developments with regard to possible future rounds of 
        NATO enlargement and seek its advice on important 
        decisions. We would of course be required to obtain the 
        Senate's advice and consent to any future amendments to 
        the Washington Treaty that enlarge NATO.

    The Committee Resolution of Ratification reiterates that no 
action or agreement other than a consensus decision by the full 
membership of NATO, approved by the national procedures of each 
NATO member, including, in the case of the United States, the 
requirements of Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
Constitution of the United States (regarding the advice and 
consent of the Senate to the making of treaties), will 
constitute a security commitment pursuant to the North Atlantic 
Treaty.

Senate Advice on NATO Enlargement

    NATO members preliminarily endorsed the expansion of the 
Alliance at a January 1994 NATO summit, setting in motion a 
process to expand NATO for the fourth time since 1949. 
Admission of new members is governed by Article 10 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, which states: ``The parties may, by unanimous 
agreement, invite any other European State in a position to 
further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the 
security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.'' 
In the view of the Committee, the Executive Branch has 
consulted and sought the advice of the Senate, consistent with 
the requirements of Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
Constitution of the United States, as the membership of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO has been proposed and 
considered. Indeed, this consultation is a model of how the two 
branches should cooperate in exericising their treaty-making 
power.
    As is evident in the Senate Action portion of this report, 
the Clinton Administration and the Senate have been in constant 
dialogue on this policy for four years. The Senate debated and 
approved legislation in support of NATO enlargement in 1994, 
1995, and 1996. On July 25, 1996, by an 81-16 vote, the Senate 
approved legislation stating that ``The admission to NATO of 
emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe which are 
found to be in a position to further the principles of the 
North Atlantic Treaty would contribute to international peace 
and contribute to the security of the region.'' Throughout 1996 
and 1997 the Executive Branch worked closely with the Foreign 
Relations Committee as this policy was pursued in NATO.
    On April 22, 1997, by agreement of the Senate Majority and 
Minority Leaders, the 28-member Senate NATO Observer Group was 
established to permit close interaction between the Executive 
Branch and the Senate during the negotiations on NATO 
enlargement. The Observer Group includes in its membership the 
Chairman and Ranking members of the Committees on Foreign 
Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations, as well as other 
interested Senators. Special procedures were established 
between the Observer Group and the Executive Branch by which 
documents or agreements in negotiation were discussed with the 
Senate prior to completion.
    The President invited Senate delegations to accompany him 
to the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in Paris on May 
27, 1997, and the NATO summit in Madrid on July 8-9, 1997. 
Prior to the NATO summit, the President met with Senators to 
seek advice on which countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
should be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Accession negotiations with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic began in September 1997, and NATO foreign ministers 
signed the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty to admit 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic on December 16, 1997. 
The President transmitted the protocols to the Senate on 
February 11, 1998 for Senate action.

II. Qualifications of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for NATO 
                               Membership

    Countries in Central and Eastern Europe first gained 
institutional access to NATO in late 1991 through the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a forum which included all 
former Warsaw Pact members. At the January 1994 NATO summit, 
the Alliance launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a U.S. 
initiative designed to develop military cooperation among NATO 
members and interested countries in Europe. Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic were early signatories to the PfP 
framework agreement.
    Since 1994, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have 
actively participated in PfP military exercises, which have 
provided their militaries the opportunity to work with NATO 
military headquarters, and alongside NATO allies, in the field, 
and have contributed to increasing the interoperability between 
prospective new members and the Alliance. After visiting 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic last fall, NATO 
assessment teams concluded that the PfP program directly 
contributed to the preparation of these countries for NATO 
membership.
    Of the three prospective members, Poland brings the largest 
military establishment to NATO. The Hungarian and Czech armed 
forces, however, are equal or greater in size than those of 
several current NATO members, including Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal. Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic have demonstrated the ability to meld battalion-
sized or smaller units into NATO operations through 
participation in operations in Bosnia, training exercises under 
the PfP program, or participation in the U.S.-led coalition 
during the Persian Gulf War. In anticipation of NATO 
membership, they have made significant progress in adopting the 
NATO unit structure. In addition, ground force units deployed 
in accordance with the former Warsaw Pact's offensive doctrine 
are being re-located to reflect NATO's defensive posture.
    In accordance with direction from NATO, Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic have made interoperability of air 
traffic control and air defense their first modernization 
priority. This would facilitate rapid reinforcement in the 
event of a crisis. None of the countries is expected, nor has 
NATO indicated an immediate need, to begin ``big ticket'' 
modernization programs before 2000. In examining the equipment 
inherited from Warsaw Pact days, NATO advance teams found that 
some existing equipment is either adequate or in need only of 
minor modification. As an immediate priority, the three 
countries are focusing on personnel reform, training and the 
adoption of NATO doctrine, and interoperability. Personnel 
reform in each country, including reducing overall force 
levels, increasing the ratio of junior to senior officers, 
strengthening the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps, and 
increasing of the ratio of professionals to conscripts, is well 
underway.
    After being invited to join NATO at the Madrid summit in 
July 1997, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic announced 
their intention to intensify defense cooperation in preparation 
for joining the Alliance. Further, the Chairmen of the Foreign 
Relations and Defense Committees in each country plan to meet 
regularly to discuss the steps each country is taking to 
fulfill commitments on enlargement related issues.
    In considering the qualifications of the three countries, 
the Committee has examined the degree to which each has 
satisfied the ``Perry Principles,'' five principles that former 
Secretary of Defense William Perry enunciated in a June 1996, 
speech at NATO's Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) in 
Norfolk, Virginia. These principles are: commitment to 
democratic reform; commitment to a free market economy; good 
neighborly relations; civilian control of the military; and 
military capability to operate effectively with the Alliance. 
An evaluation of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic on 
each of these criteria follows.

Poland

            Democratic Reform
    Poland's democratic political institutions have operated 
smoothly since 1989. Poland has held seven free and fair 
elections and has had two democratic changes of government 
since the collapse of communism, demonstrating the vitality of 
its democratic system. In 1997, Poland adopted a new 
constitution, approved in a popular referendum, that codifies 
the division of powers among the President, the Council of 
Ministers, and the parliament. The government has been a strong 
supporter of human rights and civil liberties. The judiciary is 
independent, and freedom of the press is upheld.
            Free Market Economy
    Poland was the first formerly communist country in Eastern 
Europe to launch drastic economic reforms in 1990. Early 
reforms focused on price and trade liberalization, small-scale 
privatization, currency convertibility, and structural reforms. 
As a result, Poland was the first country to emerge from 
economic decline and currently has one of the fastest growing 
economies in Europe. Poland's gross domestic product (GDP) has 
grown steadily since 1993, with growth rates exceeding 5% in 
each of the last four years. The basic tenets of economic 
reform have been sustained through numerous changes of 
government. Private sector activity, especially new 
enterprises, has grown rapidly and currently accounts for about 
two-thirds of GDP and about 60% of the work force.
    Poland's current account deficit may prove to be 
problematic, and privatization of large-scale industries and 
pension reform need addressing. However, the government is 
taking steps to bring the budget deficit down, and has 
successfully tackled inflation, reducing it to 13% in 1997 from 
20% in 1996. Growth in 1997 was a robust 7%.
            Good Neighborly Relations
    For the first time in its history, Poland has good 
relations with all seven of the states on its borders. In 
December 1997, Poland launched a multinational mechanized 
infantry corps with Germany and Denmark, which will be based in 
Poland. In May 1997, Poland and Ukraine concluded a declaration 
of reconciliation that, among other things, established a joint 
battalion. Poland is also establishing a joint battalion with 
Lithuania, which is expected to reach operational capacity 
later this year. The Polish government is actively cooperating 
on defense matters with the Baltic states, and is working with 
Russia to strengthen economic ties. Poland has even maintained 
a stable relationship with Belarus, a country led by an 
authoritarian leader.
            Civilian Control of the Military
    The new Polish constitution, approved in April 1997, 
codifies civilian control over, and parliamentary oversight of, 
the military. The government is establishing the appropriate 
structures to ensure that these principles are effectively 
implemented. The 1996 National Defense Law subordinates the 
Chief of the General Staff to the Minister of Defense and 
shifts supervision of financial planning, administration, 
personnel, and military intelligence from the General Staff to 
the Defense Ministry. Both of these changes were confirmed in 
the Constitution. In addition, the Defense Committee of the 
Sejm, the lower house of parliament, is taking an active role 
in overseeing the Polish military. In 1997 it examined military 
personnel and procurement decisions, reviewed and amended the 
budget, and pressed the government for increased defense 
expenditures.
            Military Capabilities
    U.S. officials have judged Poland to have the most capable 
armed forces in Eastern Europe. Relatively large (Army-152,000; 
Air Force-56,000; Navy-14,000), well-trained and disciplined, 
the armed forces are progressing smoothly with unit structure 
reorganization and redeployment from Warsaw Pact dispositions. 
Polish officers and non-commissioned officers are participating 
in NATO and U.S. military English language training programs. 
Poland's participation in multinational operations in Bosnia 
and Haiti, as well as its participation in over 50 Partnership 
for Peace exercises, has demonstrated its ability to carry out 
battalion-sized operations in conjunction with NATO forces. In 
the PfP exercises, Poland has emphasized military training and 
tactical exercises. It should be noted, however, that the 
operations in Bosnia and Haiti have not involved combat and do 
not reflect the demands of a large-unit, high-intensity 
conflict.
    A U.S. Air Force team conducting an ongoing assessment of 
Poland's military capabilities has reported that Poland has 
made substantial progress in laying the groundwork for 
achieving NATO interoperability. Ports, airfields, rail and 
road networks, and other infrastructure are currently capable 
of receiving NATO reinforcements. Poland is already installing 
NATO-compatible Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) systems in 
its aircraft and is upgrading its air defense network with 
NATO-compatible radar.
    Equipment modernization is the largest challenge facing the 
Polish military. As a result of NATO requirements, the early 
focus has been on upgrading air traffic control and air defense 
communications. Additional large-scale procurement programs are 
not expected to begin prior to 2000. Priority areas for 
modernization include ground attack aircraft, fighter aircraft, 
attack helicopters, main battle tanks (T-72 upgrade), and 
armored fighting vehicles.
    The Polish Ministry of Defense has developed a 
comprehensive 15-year plan to modernize the military and make 
it interoperable with NATO. To pay for this program, Poland 
intends to increase annual defense spending at a rate pegged to 
the growth of its GDP. In 1996, Poland's defense budget was 
$3.1 billion, approximately 2.4% of GDP, which is comparable to 
most (and higher than half of) other NATO countries. The 
Ministry of Defense estimates that defense spending after 2000 
may reach 2.7% to 3.0% of GDP.
    Poland has declared a willingness to commit all of its 
operational forces to NATO. One-third will be designated 
specifically as ``NATO-Assigned,'' which are already in part 
capable of joint operations within NATO. The other two-thirds 
of Polish forces will be ``NATO-Earmarked,'' which means they 
could be put under NATO operational command or control when 
needed.

Hungary

            Democratic Reform
    Hungary is a stable parliamentary democracy. Hungary 
adopted a new constitution in December 1990, and is currently 
working on its revision. The country has had two complete 
democratic changes of government since 1989 in fully free and 
fair elections. It has stable governmental institutions and an 
independent judiciary. Hungary is committed to upholding the 
principles of human rights, freedom of expression, and the rule 
of law. On November 16, 1997, the government held a binding 
referendum on the question of NATO membership. 85% of voters 
supported Hungary's inclusion into NATO.
             Free Market Economy
    Hungary's approach to economic transformation from a 
command economy built upon its longstanding experience with 
gradual reforms under communism. After 1989, Hungary adopted 
price and trade liberalization and institutional and legal 
changes. In March 1995, the government embarked on an extensive 
economic stabilization program designed to redress Hungary's 
budget and current account deficits and to accelerate 
structural reform. The austerity program, while unpopular, did 
much to reverse the imbalances and restore international 
confidence in the Hungarian economy. The economy experienced 
modest growth in 1994 and 1995, but declined to 1% growth in 
1996, largely as a result of the austerity program. In 1997, 
however, the economy rebounded and the GDP grew by a healthy 
4%. Overall, the private sector produces approximately 80% of 
GDP in Hungary.
    Hungary had a heavy foreign debt burden, but as a result of 
the austerity program it has been able to service its debt 
obligations. Inflation rates are problematic, and the Hungarian 
government is taking steps to address the issue. The government 
has also privatized almost all of the banking, 
telecommunications, and energy sectors. Hungary has attracted 
almost one-third of all foreign direct investment in Central 
and Eastern Europe.
            Good Neighborly Relations
    A high priority for Hungarian foreign policy has been 
improving relations with neighboring countries that have large 
ethnic Hungarian populations. Hungary ratified treaties on 
Understanding, Cooperation, and Good-Neighborliness with 
Slovakia (March 1995) and Romania (September 1996), which 
include provisions on ethnic minority rights and the 
inviolability of frontiers. Military-to-military relations with 
Romania are solid, and the two countries are actively planning 
to set up a joint battalion. In addition, Hungary is 
participating in a joint Hungarian-Italian-Slovenian brigade. 
Hungary and Austria already have established a battalion that 
is participating in the United Nations peacekeeping operation 
in Cyprus.
            Civilian Control of the Military
    Hungary has enshrined civilian control of the military in 
its legislative and constitutional mechanisms. The Defense 
Ministry is granted oversight of the military, and the 
parliament is granted oversight of the Defense Ministry. The 
1993 Defense Law specifies that the Minister of Defense is 
superior to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Services. 
Additionally, Hungary's constitution gives the parliament 
control of the military budget, structure, deployment, 
fielding, stationing, and senior leadership.
            Military Capabilities
    The Hungarian armed forces total about 60,000 personnel 
(Army-45,000; Air Force-15,000). Unit restructuring in 
accordance with NATO brigade/corps organization, is well 
underway. The officers and NCOs of the designated ``NATO 
Brigade'' are undergoing military and English-language training 
sponsored by current NATO members. Downsizing has resulted in a 
smaller, more capable force. Hungary has successfully 
restructured the General Staff and Service Staffs along NATO 
lines.
    Hungary currently has a battalion participating in NATO's 
Bosnia operation and hosts a major NATO logistics facility in 
southern Hungary in support of those operations. To facilitate 
the U.S. presence in Bosnia, Hungary has brought into force a 
bilateral supplement to the NATO-PfP Status of Forces 
Agreement, granting additional privileges and immunities to 
U.S. forces and contractors. Over 80,000 U.S. military 
personnel have rotated in and/or out of Bosnia through the 
Hungarian air base at Taszar. Hungarian armed forces have also 
participated in over 50 Partnership for Peace exercises with 
NATO. Hungary was the first country to include a PfP line item 
in its defense budget.
    Hungary has assigned immediate and rapid reaction forces to 
NATO, which at this time only are partially able to conduct 
joint operations, but are working toward this goal. Hungary has 
integrated a system of defense planning compatible with the 
NATO system and incorporated NATO command, control and 
communications procedures into training. Other recent 
modernization efforts have focused on meeting NATO air traffic 
control and air defense communications standards. Top 
priorities include the U.S.-sponsored Regional Airspace 
Initiative, the development of the NATO brigade, and building a 
peacekeeping capability. Nonetheless, tight defense budgets 
have led Hungary to continue procuring some military equipment 
from Russia as part of a debt-forgiveness program.
    After a six-year decline, Hungarian defense spending 
increased in 1997 to approximately 1.8% of its GDP. Hungary has 
pledged that it will increase defense spending by .1% of GDP 
each year over the next five years. Priority modernization 
efforts will include fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, and 
armored fighting vehicles. The Hungarian government voted in 
its 1998 budget for a special appropriation to fund increased 
NATO interoperability. Hungary has also formulated a plan 
called Force 2000 to prepare it for admission to NATO. Its 
goals are to downsize the armed forces, standardize structures 
to NATO requirements, professionalize and increase volunteer 
personnel, and improve the quality of life for the military 
force.

Czech Republic

             Democratic Reform
    The Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy. The 
state's democratic institutions and charter of fundamental 
rights are established in the constitution. The constitution, 
which entered into force on January 1, 1993, provides for an 
independent judiciary and guarantees internationally recognized 
human rights. Since 1989, first Czechoslovakia, then the Czech 
Republic, have held three fully free and fair elections. 
Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the 
press are protected. President Vaclav Havel, himself a former 
political prisoner of the communist regime, is a world-renowned 
advocate of human rights and social justice.
    After the resignation of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus in 
late November 1997, due to bribery and campaign election 
scandals, President Havel appointed a caretaker government. 
This government survived a vote of no confidence in January 
1998 and will govern until parliamentary elections are held in 
mid-June 1998. Despite the change in government, overall 
stability and commitment to democratic principles remain 
unchanged.
            Free Market Economy
    The Czech Republic's transformation from a centrally 
planned economy has progressed steadily since 1991. Early 
elements of the reform program included price liberalization, 
tight monetary and fiscal policies, and privatization of state 
enterprises. Industry remains the largest productive sector, 
with services, including tourism, growing rapidly. In April and 
May 1997, the government imposed harsh austerity measures 
designed to redress economic imbalances and spur economic 
growth. The reforms included large budget cuts, a currency 
devaluation, stronger regulatory mechanisms, and swifter large 
privatization. Nearly 80% of the economy is in private hands, 
and real GDP has been rising since 1994. Inflation is below 10% 
and unemployment is low.
    Though the Czech economy grew by about 4% in 1996, growth 
during 1997 dropped to 1.7% due to a widening of the current 
account deficit and the devaluation of the Czech crown. In 
addition, severe floods in the summer of 1997 caused billions 
of dollars in damages. Even so, the Czech economy showed 
positive signs in late 1997 and is expected to rebound in 1998.
            Good Neighborly Relations
    The Czech Republic has excellent relations with its 
neighbors. Relations between the Czech and German governments 
are particularly strong, though some tensions persist between 
segments of their populations. On January 21, 1997, Germany and 
the Czech Republic signed a formal reconciliation pact that 
addressed animosity between the two countries that has been 
present since World War II. Germany is the leading foreign 
investor in the Czech Republic. Austria and the Czech Republic 
have stable governmental and economic relations. With regard to 
Slovakia, although some issues still remain unresolved after 
the break-up of Czechoslovakia, the two countries have 
fundamentally sound relations.
            Civilian Control of the Military
    Under the Czech constitution, the President is the 
Commander-in-Chief of the military. The Minister of Defense is 
a civilian, and the Czech parliament is increasingly active in 
defense and military issues. The government currently is 
working on a law that will formally legislate the 
constitutional mandate of civilian control of the military.
            Military Capabilities
    The Czech Republic has the smallest military of the three 
NATO invitees, with about 56,000 personnel (Army-38,000; Air 
Force-14,000; logistics corps-4,000). As with Poland and 
Hungary, unit restructuring and redeployment is ongoing, select 
officers and NCOs are being trained in NATO schools, and 
modernization programs have focused on air traffic control and 
air defense communications. The Czechs have a battalion serving 
in Bosnia, and they contributed troops to the U.N. mission in 
Croatia. A Czech chemical warfare defense unit joined the U.S.-
led coalition in the Persian Gulf War. To date, Czech troops 
have participated in 27 Partnership for Peace exercises.
    The Czechs have incorporated NATO command, control, and 
communications procedures into their military training regimen, 
and have adopted a modernization strategy with an emphasis on 
communication, intelligence, and English language skills. In a 
widely praised initiative, the Czechs anticipated the NATO 
requirement for secure and non-secure digital communications 
programs, and applied NATO standards to the national programs 
it is pursuing on its own. Czech airfields and rail and road 
networks are capable currently of receiving some NATO troops 
and materiel, and the Czech military is working on enhancing 
its infrastructure to be NATO compatible.
    Priority needs for the Czech armed forces over the next 
several years include light attack aircraft, fighter aircraft, 
attack helicopters, air-to-air and air defense missiles, 
upgrading Soviet era T-72 tanks to NATO standard, and command 
and control communications.
    In March 1997, the Czech Republic adopted a new national 
defense strategy, including programs to improve the mobility, 
compatibility, and interoperability of the armed forces over 
the next decade. Implementation of the concept began on July 1, 
1997, and is scheduled to be completed by the end of 1998.
    Defense spending in 1997 was approximately 1.7% of GDP, and 
the government's draft budget for 1998 includes an increase in 
the military budget, despite deep cuts in other spending; 1998 
levels are expected to reach 1.88% of GDP. The Czech Republic 
has pledged to increase defense spending by .1% of GDP each 
year for the next three years. About 20% of the defense budget 
likely will be devoted to modernization. Czech officials have 
stated that they are willing to commit up to 90% of Czech 
operational forces to NATO in times of crisis.

Additional Issues

    The Committee finds that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic are meeting the requirements laid out in the ``Perry 
Principles.'' Some issues, however, have come to the attention 
of the Committee where a deeper and continuing commitment to 
these principles is necessary, not only in order to qualify for 
NATO membership, but to complete a process of transformation 
from the communist era.
    The Committee is concerned about the inability of some 
American citizens to receive fair and appropriate compensation 
for their property in the Czech Republic that was confiscated 
by the Nazi or communist regimes.
    In 1928, the United States entered into a bilateral treaty 
with Czechoslovakia that stated that if a citizen of one 
country became a citizen of the other country the individual 
automatically would lose his or her primary citizenship. The 
terms of the treaty were not applicable in periods of 
hostilities. The Czech government interpreted this ``time of 
war'' provision to include the period of 1938-1958.
    During 1990-91, the Czech government enacted a series of 
laws limiting restitution and compensation for individuals 
whose property had been confiscated under Nazi and communist 
rule (1938-1989) if they were citizens and residents of the 
Czech Republic.
    In 1994, the Czech Supreme Court ruled that the permanent 
residency requirement was unconstitutional and required the 
government to allow for the filing of claims by all individuals 
who still had their Czech citizenship, regardless of where they 
lived. Czechs in France, Germany, and elsewhere were eligible 
to pursue their claims, but American citizens were told they 
were no longer Czech citizens under the terms of the 1928 
treaty. American citizens who had fled the Czech Republic 
during the ``time of war'' period were not affected due to the 
treaty terms, but those who became American citizens after 1958 
are unable to pursue their claims.
    The Czech law that applies to compensation is not 
discriminatory by nature, but its compensation rules are 
impeding the ability of American citizens to receive fair and 
adequate compensation for their property. The Committee 
strongly urges the Government of the Czech Republic--as part of 
its continuing effort to build a sound civil society based upon 
the principle of justice--to work closely with those whose 
property was unjustly confiscated either by Nazi or communist 
regimes
    Additionally, the Committee emphasizes the importance of a 
full accounting of all United States prisoners of war (POWs) 
and the missing in action during the Cold War period. Relations 
between the U.S. government and the communist governments in 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were hostile throughout 
this period. The Committee notes that the U.S. government has 
pursued reports that the Soviet Union used Central European 
countries for transshipment or detention of American POWs 
during the Cold War. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
have fully cooperated with the U.S. government on this issue.
    In Poland, senior officials have agreed to conduct a 
thorough search of their archives and other files and make all 
relevant information on missing American soldiers available to 
the United States. The Polish National Security Bureau, 
Ministry of Defense, Military Intelligence Service, Office of 
State Security, and Central Archives are all fully cooperating 
in this search. Additionally, the Polish government has 
facilitated meetings between the U.S. government and Polish 
non-governmental organizations that may have information on 
this subject.
    Hungarian officials have provided the United States with 
full access to Hungarian archives to search for any relevant 
information or any potential witnesses with regard to American 
prisoners of war or the missing in action from the Vietnam and 
Korean wars.
    The Czech Republic has searched the State Central Archives, 
as well as the archives of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Ministry of Health, Ministry 
of Education, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and the Military Historical Archives. To date, neither U.S. nor 
Czech officials have discovered any information relevant to 
American prisoners of war or the missing in action. The Czech 
Republic has opened the archives of the communist-era secret 
services and is attempting to identify all Czechoslovak 
personnel who were stationed in China, Korea, or Vietnam during 
the wars.
    The Committee appreciates the cooperation afforded to the 
U.S. government by Polish, Hungarian, and Czech officials in 
the effort to determine the fate of all American prisoners of 
war or the mission in action. The Committee encourages Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic to continue full and complete 
cooperation in helping the United States fully resolve all 
outstanding issues relating to prisoners of war and the missing 
in action.
    The Committee also notes the necessity for countries in 
Europe fully to account for, and fairly to compensate, 
surviving victims of the Holocaust or their beneficiaries. Such 
accounting and compensation must include payment of pre-war 
insurance claims and the return of, or remuneration for, 
property seized by the Nazis and later confiscated by the 
communist regimes in the region.
    The Committee strongly encourages Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, and all other countries in Europe promptly to 
take steps to resolve fully the issue of rightful ownership of 
assets.

                   III. The Cost of NATO Enlargement

    An important issue reviewed by the Committee during its 
examination of enlargement was the matter of the financial 
cost. Several cost estimates have been prepared over the past 
few years. The Committee has reviewed the Department of Defense 
estimate of February 1997, the NATO cost estimate of December 
1997, and the General Accounting Office (GAO) March 6, 1998 
report on the NATO cost estimate. It also heard testimony from 
the authors of a 1996 Congressional Budget Office study and a 
1996 RAND corporation study.
    At the outset, it should be emphasized that cost estimates 
are just that: estimates. Estimates are based on certain 
assumptions--assumptions that may later prove unwarranted 
because of the passage of time and/or changed circumstances. 
Estimates are also based on uncertainties--uncertainties 
inherent in predictions about the future. The Committee can be 
reasonably certain about the accuracy of cost estimates for 
1999, but is less certain about the accuracy of estimates for 
costs to be incurred in 2009. It is with these cautionary 
thoughts in mind that the Committee reviewed the current 
estimates of the costs of NATO enlargement.

Critical Assumptions

    The Committee's evaluation was based upon comparison of the 
full range of private sector and U.S. government studies. It 
draws most heavily, however, upon the February 1997 cost study 
by the U.S. Department of Defense and the subsequent survey by 
NATO of military requirements and costs, completed in December 
1997. As noted above, every cost estimate is based upon 
assumptions. The Committee's evaluation of the costs of NATO 
enlargement is premised upon four critical assumptions that are 
explicit in both the Pentagon and NATO studies.
    First, NATO will continue to face, for the indefinite 
future, the current strategic environment. There is no 
immediate threat of large-scale conventional aggression in 
Europe. Any reemergence of a significant conventional threat 
would take several years to develop, providing the Alliance 
with ample warning time. This assumption is crucial to the 
relatively modest cost estimates put forward by both NATO and 
the Pentagon.
    That said, were a conventional threat to emerge, the cost 
to NATO would be substantial, regardless of whether or not 
enlargement had occurred. Indeed, in such a situation, 
enlargement might actually reduce some costs to the United 
States by enabling NATO to meet a renewed threat more 
effectively. In this worst-case scenario, some burdens that 
otherwise would likely have been shouldered by the United 
States would instead be borne by the new, front-line states. 
The addition of three new NATO members would dramatically 
increase the manpower, military capabilities, and strategic 
depth of the Alliance.
    Second, this evaluation assumes that NATO will not station 
substantial new forces on the territories of the new members; 
rather, Article 5 guarantees will be extended through the 
commitment rapidly to deploy forces in the event of a crisis. 
This assumption flows logically from the previous one. Were the 
threat environment to change, prompting a military requirement 
for the forward stationing of NATO forces, obviously the costs 
to the United States would prove far higher. Likewise this 
would be the case with or without enlargement.
    Third, standard burdensharing rules will apply to the costs 
of NATO enlargement. These include the requirements that new 
members pay for their own national forces, and that all members 
share the costs of infrastructure improvements according to the 
common budgets' formulae.
    Fourth, U.S. military modernization requirements are 
national initiatives that will not be commonly-funded through 
NATO. The United States Armed Forces in Europe already possess 
all of the military capabilities necessary to fulfill the 
Article 5 commitment to the new NATO invitees required of the 
United States. For example, the air units within U.S. Air 
Forces Europe (USAFE) that are earmarked for air power 
projection from the territory of member states (in the event of 
a crisis) are already fully capable of performing this mission. 
Thus, NATO enlargement should not require any new U.S. 
modernization expenditures, whether common-funded or not, 
beyond those which the United States already intends to 
undertake.

Relevant Costs

    In general, the costs of NATO enlargement fit into one of 
two categories: 1) the cost for each of the current NATO 
members, and the new members, to meet fully their individual 
obligations to support the collective defense of the alliance, 
and; 2) what each of the sixteen current allies, plus the three 
new members, must pay to support common costs of the Alliance. 
The latter category includes everything from the construction 
of co-located airfields and a secure communications 
architecture, to the purchase of desks and chairs for NATO 
headquarters.
    The costs that each of the three new members must pay to 
meet fully their individual obligations to support the 
collective defense of the Alliance are not germane to the 
Committee's evaluation. The United States will likely continue 
to provide some assistance to these countries--as it does with 
other NATO allies--probably in the form of Foreign Military 
Financing, defense loan guarantees, and excess defense 
articles. Nevertheless, military modernization by Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic is the responsibility solely of 
those countries. The United States will not underwrite that 
process.
    Further, only those costs that represent expenditures above 
and beyond what normally would be incurred are relevant. 
Accordingly, because the United States will incur little or no 
additional cost in meeting its collective defense obligations, 
the principal expense to the United States for NATO enlargement 
will be the cost, over the next decade, related to 
infrastructure improvements on the territory of the three new 
members.

NATO's Common Budgets

    All sixteen members of NATO make annual contributions to 
the common costs of the Alliance, which comprise three 
accounts: 1) Civil Budget; 2) Military Budget; and 3) the 
Security Investment Program. The Civil Budget provides for, 
among other things, the operating expenses of NATO's civilian 
headquarters, the International Secretariat, NATO science and 
defense research activities, and some Partnership for Peace 
programs. The Military Budget funds the international military 
headquarters, the airborne early warning aircraft operations, 
the NATO petroleum pipeline, and the NATO Maintenance and 
Supply Agency. The Security Investment Program, formerly called 
the Infrastructure Fund, supports a broad range of projects 
recommended by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and 
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) in accordance with 
a specified planning cycle that generally requires about two 
years to execute. Typical project areas include the mobility 
and deployability of NATO forces, NATO command and control, 
allied reconnaissance and intelligence, and maintaining 
logistics and training facilities.
    The total and individual contributions for the NATO common 
costs are determined through Alliance-wide negotiation. 
Enlargement is expected to result in some increases within the 
Civil and Military Budgets. These will be necessary to 
accommodate additional headquarters personnel from the new 
members. The Security Investment Program, however, will contain 
the most significant increases, because this account 
traditionally is used to fund precisely the types of projects 
most needed by the new members--namely, infrastructure 
improvements.
    In what seems to be an effort to reduce costs, some of 
NATO's European members have recommended that dramatic 
increases in this account should not occur, urging instead that 
some currently planned projects should be put aside in favor of 
the NATO priority of enlargement. Apparently, some officials at 
NATO still intend to pursue this approach. The General 
Accounting Office found in its March 6, 1998 report on the NATO 
cost estimate that ``according to officials at NATO, some of 
the costs of enlargement may be absorbed in existing budgets, 
for example, through the reprioritization of existing 
projects.'' It may indeed be appropriate to fund a portion of 
enlargement costs by reconfiguring various programmatic 
priorities. The Committee, however, notes that maintaining a 
robust, effective Alliance will not be without expense, and 
expects that NATO will proceed with all projects necessary for 
the common defense. Current allies must be held to their 
commitments made at the Madrid Summit to provide the resources 
necessary for enlargement without diluting the importance of 
other priorities. Paying for NATO enlargement should not impede 
the effectiveness of the Alliance adequately to perform its 
core mission of collective defense.
    Both the NATO headquarters and the Department of Defense 
have provided statistical breakdowns of U.S. and allied 
contributions to the common costs and of comparative national 
defense spending. The U.S. share for each element of the Common 
Costs is: Civil Budget--24.3%; Military Budget--24.1%; Security 
Investment Program--23.8% (see Table 1). The U.S. total 
contribution to NATO common costs over the last several years 
and projected for 1998 are: 1993--$318 million; 1994--$342 
million; 1995--$407 million; 1996--$453 million; 1997--$489 
million; 1998 (est.)--$493 million (see Table 2).
    Obviously, when the new members are included in the 
calculus, a slight reduction in each member's percentage share 
of common funded costs will occur. During accession 
negotiations, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic agreed to 
the percentage share they will pay to the common NATO budgets 
upon accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. Poland will pay 
2.48%, Hungary will pay 0.65%, and the Czech Republic will pay 
0.9%. Consequently, the Committee assumes that the U.S. share 
of common costs will decline. The Committee Resolution of 
Ratification contains a condition requiring the President, 
prior to the deposit of the instrument of ratification, to 
certify that the U.S. percentage of common costs will not 
increase as a result of enlargement.

Estimating the Costs of Enlargement

    The Committee has examined the various cost studies on NATO 
enlargement prepared to date. The estimates vary widely, in 
large part due to differing assumptions, differing threat 
assessments, and varying degrees of recognition of the 
distinction between costs unique to NATO enlargement and costs 
that will be incurred by NATO members regardless of whether 
NATO enlarges.
    In February 1997, at the direction of Congress, the 
Department of Defense prepared an estimate of the costs of NATO 
enlargement. The Pentagon study considered both direct 
enlargement costs as well as two other categories: (1) the cost 
to current members of meeting their military commitments; and, 
(2) the cost to new members of developing their military 
forces. Combining these three categories, the Pentagon estimate 
totaled $27-35 billion over the next ten years, with $9-12 
billion attributed directly to enlargement costs. Of this, 
approximately 60 percent ($5.5-7 billion) would be eligible for 
funding from NATO's common budgets. Notably, the Pentagon 
compiled this estimate with four, rather than three, new 
members in mind. Adjusted to account for this fact, the 
Pentagon's proper illustrative figure totals $4.9-6.2 billion 
in common costs. Thus, according to the Department of Defense 
the U.S. financial obligation would total $1.2-1.6 billion over 
the next ten years (averaging $120-160 million per year).
    In December 1997, NATO completed two studies that focused 
exclusively on the cost to NATO's common-funded budgets of 
enlarging the Alliance to include Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic. NATO first identified the military requirements 
of incorporating these three new members into the Alliance. 
Teams of experts were then dispatched to each country to 
evaluate facilities, infrastructure, and current capabilities 
to meet NATO's projected military requirements. With this 
information, NATO then developed a cost estimate for bringing 
the current capabilities into line with NATO requirements. The 
NATO studies concluded that the cost of enlargement will total 
$1.5 billion over the next ten years. Thus, according to NATO, 
the additional U.S. payment to the common-funded budgets will 
average approximately $40 million per year over ten years.
    The Pentagon and NATO used similar assumptions and military 
requirements in preparing their cost estimates. They arrived, 
however, at markedly different conclusions, which vary with 
respect to the cost of enlargement to the United States by as 
much as $122.5 million per year. Aside from minor pricing 
differences, there are three reasons for this discrepancy.
    First, the earlier Pentagon study was illustrative, and did 
not have the benefit of site surveys from which to compile its 
assessment. The NATO survey teams dispatched to the countries 
found, in many cases, that the necessary infrastructure was in 
far better condition than expected. In particular, the road and 
rail conditions in all three countries were judged to be 
adequate for NATO reinforcement purposes, whereas previously 
the Pentagon had expected that significant improvements would 
be required. According to the Pentagon, the common 
infrastructure costs for NATO enlargement could still grow or 
diminish for a number of reasons. These include changes as 
details of the NATO implementation plan are finalized (e.g. as 
specific airfields are chosen as reception facilities for 
reinforcing air squadrons), as detailed engineering surveys are 
completed, or in the event that the criteria for common-funded 
eligibility are reconsidered.
    A second reason for the difference in the estimates between 
the two studies is that NATO was more strict in determining 
whether improvements would be eligible for common funding. For 
example, whereas the Pentagon assumed that off-loading 
capabilities at various facilities would be commonly-funded, 
NATO determined that each country deploying reinforcements to 
the new invitees would bear responsibility for deploying off-
loading equipment. Most of these assumptions seem reasonable. 
Although NATO certainly has the ability to make exceptions to 
its common-funding eligibility criteria, the Committee expects 
a detailed explanation of any proposal by NATO to make eligible 
for common funding any of the projects that it had previously 
determined to be ineligible.
    The final reason for the cost discrepancies between the 
NATO and Pentagon studies is that, in general, the Pentagon 
sets higher standards for military infrastructure than does 
NATO. Because of this differential, NATO planners recommended 
fewer necessary infrastructure improvements for the three new 
members than the Department of Defense. For example, NATO did 
not include in its estimate the need to upgrade two additional 
airfields and associated facilities, and more generally called 
for fewer road, rail and port facility upgrades. Moreover, NATO 
planners did not include in the estimate all of the 
expenditures on staging areas or brigade- size training 
facilities that U.S. military planners previously had 
anticipated. According to the Pentagon, this differential 
accounted for $500-700 million of the gap between the two 
studies.
    The Committee notes, as did the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have testified that the military 
requirements underpinning NATO's cost estimate are valid and 
sound. General Shelton stated before the Foreign Relations 
Committee on February 24, 1998, that the ``five month [NATO 
study] is thorough and militarily sound and is sufficiently 
detailed to serve as the basis for accurate cost estimates.'' 
The Committee finds that if the requirements contained in the 
NATO study are met fully, NATO would be able to meet all 
foreseeable contingencies, given the current threat 
environment.
    GAO has concluded that ``the approach used by NATO in 
determining its estimated direct enlargement cost of $1.5 
billion for commonly funded requirements is reasonable.'' The 
GAO report also noted: ``Because NATO officials used a 
conservative interpretation of the over-and-above principle, 
NATO's cost estimate for the commonly funded military 
requirements may be lower than the cost actually incurred. For 
example, the NATO study did not include the cost of repaving 
runways, although NATO staff acknowledged that the runways, 
while up to national standards were not up to NATO standards.''
    Regardless of the exact amount, these estimates for the 
cost of enlargement represent only a small fraction of the 
costs that will be necessary to ensure that NATO remains a 
viable alliance in the next century. All members in the 
Alliance must continue to expend resources necessary to meet 
the force goals. With NATO membership comes responsibility. The 
Committee again stresses the importance of all current and 
future allies to meet their commitments to the common defense. 
Anything less will result in a hollow strategic commitment.

     Table 1.--NATO Common Cost: Budget Cost Sharing Formula in Percentages of the total NATO Common Budget     
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     Military        Security                   
                                                                      Budget        Investment     Civil Budget 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States...................................................           24.12         23.2708           23.35
Belgium.........................................................            2.85          4.1260            2.76
Canada..........................................................             5.6            2.75            5.60
Denmark.........................................................            1.68            3.33            1.59
France..........................................................           16.50         12.9044           16.50
Germany.........................................................           15.54         22.3974           15.54
Greece..........................................................            0.38            1.00            0.38
Iceland.........................................................            0.04           0.000            0.05
Italy...........................................................            5.91           7.745            5.75
Luxembourg......................................................            0.08          0.1973            0.08
Netherlands.....................................................            2.84            4.58            2.75
Norway..........................................................            1.16            2.83            1.11
Portugal........................................................            0.63           0.345            0.63
Spain...........................................................            3.50          3.2816            3.50
Turkey..........................................................            1.59            1.04            1.59
United Kingdom..................................................           17.58         10.1925           18.82
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

      

                                Table 2.--U.S. Contributions to NATO Common Costs                               
                                                 (in $ millions)                                                
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        FY1998  
                                            FY1993      FY1994      FY1995      FY1996      FY1997      (est.)  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Investment.....................          60         140         119         161         172         176
Military Budget.........................         216         161         248         249         273         273
Civilian Budget.........................          42          41          40          43          44          44
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...............................         318         342         407         453         489         493
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       IV. NATO-Russia Relations

    The Committee does not find NATO enlargement and the 
development of a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship to be 
mutually exclusive. NATO enlargement and cooperative NATO-
Russian relations both have immense value for the United States 
and for the nations of Europe, if they are pursued properly. 
They are complementary and reinforcing objectives. The 
challenge for the United States, and for NATO, is to do both 
correctly. Toward this end, the Committee Resolution of 
Ratification supports NATO's policy to develop a new and 
constructive relationship with the Russian Federation as the 
Russian Federation pursues democratization, market reforms, and 
peaceful relations with its neighbors.
    The enlargement of NATO, a purely defensive alliance 
comprised of democratic nations, does not threaten any country 
in Europe. In the view of the Committee, all of Europe benefits 
from the existence of NATO, including Russia. The Committee 
finds that admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
into NATO will multiply this benefit, not only by securing 
three countries that have fully embraced democracy and free 
markets, but also by calling upon those countries to lead in 
the defense of democracy and stability in Central and Eastern 
Europe. In appreciation of this fact, democracies throughout 
Europe--including those that are not seeking NATO membership--
have endorsed NATO's plans to extend its membership to Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In fact, with the exception of 
Belarus and Russia, every country in Europe has either 
expressed explicit support for, or remained neutral on, the 
issue of NATO enlargement.
    The Committee notes a tendency among opponents of NATO 
enlargement to lay every problem in the U.S.-Russia 
relationship--and every example of Russian misbehavior--at the 
doorstep of NATO enlargement. However, even a leading critic of 
NATO enlargement, Ambassador Jonathan Dean, observed in his 
October 9, 1997, testimony before the Committee that ``the 
souring of Russian political opinion toward relations with the 
United States did take place earlier and has been a constant.'' 
In the view of the Committee, the proposed NATO membership of 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is unrelated to the 
brutal massacre of civilians in Chechnya, the ongoing transfers 
of Russian technology and weapons to rogue states, and 
differing U.S. and Russian views over the appropriate response 
to the situation in Iraq.
    An emotional element of the Russian opposition to NATO 
enlargement is the misperception that NATO is for the first 
time approaching Russia's borders. In fact, a far more accurate 
description of enlargement is an effort to draw Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic closer to Western Europe. An 
enlarged NATO may indeed approach the borders of Ukraine and 
Belarus, but these countries are not, it should be emphasized, 
Russian territory. Hungary and the Czech Republic share no 
border with Russia, and both are geographically closer to 
France than they are to Russia. The only piece of Russian 
territory that Poland borders is the tiny exclave of 
Kaliningrad. All three countries are geographically west of the 
Russia-Norway border, a border that Russia has shared with NATO 
since 1949.
    Norway, in fact, is an excellent example of the 
relationship that can and should develop between new NATO 
members and Russia. An original NATO member, Norway has shared 
a border with Russia (and before that the Soviet Union) without 
threatening Russia. In fact, Norway has no foreign forces on 
its territory, has no nuclear weapons on its territory, and has 
no substantial, forward-deployed conventional forces. It is 
covered by NATO's Article 5 security guarantee, including the 
nuclear guarantee, yet it maintains good relations with Russia. 
Norway even provides foreign aid to Russia.
    A far more disturbing element found in the opposition of 
some Russian leaders is the notion that NATO, by enlarging, is 
encroaching upon Russia's legitimate space. The Committee 
rejects the suggestion that any sovereign state in Europe is 
within any other country's sphere of influence. That chapter of 
history was decisively rejected with the collapse of the Soviet 
empire, and any effort to return to those policies would 
guarantee instability and turmoil for Central and Eastern 
Europe. As Secretary of State Albright said in testimony before 
the Foreign Relations Committee on October 7, 1997, ``We often 
call them `former communist countries,' and that is true in the 
same sense that America is a `former British colony.' Yes, the 
Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians were on the other side of the 
Iron Curtain during the Cold War. But we were surely on the 
same side in the ways that truly count . . . We should also 
think about what would happen if we were to turn them away. 
That would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War membership and 
preserving the old Iron Curtain at its eastern frontier. It 
would mean locking out a whole group of otherwise qualified 
democracies simply because they were once, against their will, 
members of the Warsaw Pact.''
    Some critics argue that enlargement would irrevocably 
damage U.S.-Russian relations. These critics contend, for 
example, that enlargement is the reason that the Russian Duma 
has failed to approve the START II Treaty. In fact, shortly 
after START II was signed by the Russian government--and even 
before NATO enlargement was contemplated--Russian nationalists 
and communists urged rejection of the Treaty because they 
believed cuts in strategic weaponry disadvantaged Russia. 
Subsequently, key members of the Russian Duma indicated that 
the START II Treaty would not be approved unless the United 
States agreed to uphold all elements of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty. It was only later that members of the Duma 
linked NATO enlargement to the fate of the START II Treaty. 
Most recently, the Deputy Speaker of the Duma declared that 
START II would never be approved if the United States were to 
use force against Iraq. As Undersecretary of State Thomas 
Pickering, the United States Ambassador to Russia from 1993 to 
1996, stated in his appearance before the Committee ``The 
difficulty, I think, is that in the Russian Duma on START II, 
you have a parliamentary body that is dominated by communists 
who clearly do not believe that START II, for political 
reasons, is something they want to ratify and gratify President 
Yeltsin's reform government. As a result, they search for any 
set of arguments.''
    Critics of enlargement also argue that it would humiliate 
Russia and, hence, would serve as an inducement to nationalists 
to overturn Russian reformers' efforts to work constructively 
with the West in such areas as arms control, non-proliferation, 
and conflict prevention. Yet, since the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, practical experience in Europe has shown that 
Russia engages best in Europe when it works with NATO. The 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the CFE 
Flank Document were the result of NATO-Russia accord. An 
objective analysis of Russian involvement with NATO in the 
Implementation Force and Stabilization Force in the former 
Yugoslavia demonstrates a far better pattern of cooperation 
than did the pattern of Russian behavior, in the same region, 
under the UNPROFOR mission of the United Nations.
    In testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on 
October 29, 1997, Mr. Dimitri Simes, in responding to the 
charge that NATO enlargement could move Russian public opinion 
in a nationalist/extremist direction observed that the Russian 
leadership ``engaged in terrible atrocities in Chechnya 
against, among others, many Russian civilians. They are not 
paying wages and pensions to their people at the time when 
people can easily observe the huge mansions of the new elite 
and the private jets of Russia's new tycoons. None of this 
moves Russian politics in a nationalist or reactionary 
direction. But somehow an obstruction like NATO enlargement is 
supposed to have a mystical, destructive impact on Russian 
politics. It is very difficult for me to believe.'' Similarly, 
in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on October 
29, 1997, Undersecretary of State Pickering stated that the 
Russian public ``does not consider NATO to be the key threat to 
their future. They are far more concerned about other issues, 
from wages and pensions to corruption and crime.''
    To provide a forum for confidence building and information 
exchange, NATO and Russia formalized consultative procedures in 
a document called the Founding Act, which was signed on May 27, 
1997. The Founding Act established a Permanent Joint Council 
(PJC) for NATO-Russia consultations. The Committee Resolution 
of Ratification reiterates the outlines and limits on those 
consultations as explained by Secretary of State Albright on 
October 7, 1997 in an appearance before the Foreign Relations 
Committee. Secretary Albright said that:

          The Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council 
        created as a result do not provide Russia any role in 
        decisions the alliance takes on internal matters, the 
        way NATO organizes itself, conducts its business, or 
        plans, prepares for and conducts those missions which 
        affect only its members, such as collective defense, as 
        stated under Article 5.
          The Permanent Joint Council will not be a forum in 
        which NATO's basic strategy doctrine and readiness are 
        negotiated with Russia, nor will NATO use the Permanent 
        Joint Council as a substitute for formal arms control 
        negotiations such as the Conventional Forces in Europe 
        (CFE) Treaty.
          Consistent with our past approach to relations with 
        Russia, NATO will continue to explain to Russia its 
        general policy on a full range of issues, including its 
        basic military doctrine and defense policies. Such 
        explanation will not extend to a level of detail that 
        could in any way compromise the effectiveness of NATO's 
        military forces. Such explanations will only be 
        offered--and I state this very emphatically--after NATO 
        has first set its policies on issues affecting internal 
        matters. NATO has not and will not discuss these issues 
        with Russia prior to making decisions within the North 
        Atlantic Council.

    In testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on 
October 29, 1997, Jack Matlock, the last U.S. Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, who opposes NATO enlargement, agreed with the 
Founding Act and ``the advantages of the relationship that the 
administration has negotiated with Russia . . .'' The Committee 
strongly urges the Executive Branch to pursue a broader 
dialogue with Russia in fora other than NATO as well. The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the 
bilateral relationship offer opportunities for resolving 
disputes among Russia, European countries, and the United 
States.
    The Committee notes that in the course of negotiations with 
NATO, the Russian government has received a political 
commitment that, under current circumstances, NATO will not 
deploy permanently stationed forces from other member states in 
Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic. NATO formally declared 
on March 14, 1997, that ``in the current and foreseeable 
security environment the alliance will carry out its collective 
defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary 
interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement 
rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial 
combat forces.'' The Committee further notes that NATO has made 
a political commitment that, under current circumstances, NATO 
would not deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of Poland, 
Hungary, or the Czech Republic. NATO stated on December 10, 
1996, that its members have ``no intention, no plan, and no 
reason'' to deploy nuclear weapons in new member states. The 
Committee Resolution of Ratification endorses these political 
commitments, both of which were repeated in the text of the 
NATO-Russia Founding Act, but notes that they are not legally 
binding and do not in any way preclude any future decisions by 
NATO to preserve the security of Alliance members.
    In the view of the Committee, two treaties currently under 
consideration by Russia and the United States--the START II 
Treaty and the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE)--could offer important, legally binding 
assurances to both Russia and the members of NATO with regard 
to the threat from conventional and nuclear armaments. The 
Committee urges the Russian Federation to ratify START II and 
to work constructively with the United States to reach 
agreement on CFE adaptation.
    The CFE Treaty, which was ratified by the United States in 
1991, has created a more balanced and stable military situation 
in Europe through transparent conventional armaments 
reductions. The CFE Treaty establishes regional and national 
limits on certain categories of military equipment, including 
tanks, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, fixed-wing 
aircraft, and attack helicopters among the members of NATO and 
former members of the Warsaw Pact (as well as their successor 
states). This Treaty has already led to the destruction of over 
53,000 pieces of treaty limited equipment. Negotiations on 
adaptation of the CFE Treaty are underway in order to update 
the Treaty and make it relevant to the post-Cold War security 
environment in Europe. Negotiations are moving slowly, and no 
final agreement on CFE adaptation is likely until late 1999.
    The Committee supports a serious effort to adapt the CFE 
Treaty so as to further increase the stability of Europe. At 
the same time, the Committee would view unfavorably any 
proposal that would have the effect of creating a second-class 
status for some NATO members. The Committee welcomes the close 
consultation between NATO and representatives of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic during the adaptation 
negotiations.
    The START II Treaty, which was approved by the United 
States Senate in 1995, is pending approval in the Russian Duma. 
This arms control agreement requires the United States and 
Russia to reduce nuclear weapons holdings to 3,000-3,500 
warheads each. At the Helsinki summit in March 1997, the United 
States and Russia committed to begin negotiations on a START 
III Treaty, with further reductions to a range of 2,000-2,500 
each, once START II enters into force. While a START III Treaty 
is far from a foregone conclusion--with many complicated issues 
dividing the two sides and an internal U.S. debate over how low 
the United States can take its level of strategic nuclear 
weapons and still retain effective deterrence--it is through 
these negotiations that the Russian government can gain real 
assurances of a reduced strategic nuclear threat.
    The enlargement of NATO would secure its members against 
domination by larger powers. Likewise, the development of a 
constructive relationship between NATO and Russia, as endorsed 
in the Committee Resolution of Ratification, may provide an 
avenue for Russia to contribute to the security and stability 
of Europe. The Committee notes that these goals are fully 
consistent with the effort the Alliance and Moscow are 
undertaking together to forge a historic new partnership 
through the NATO-Russia Founding Act--an agreement designed to 
ensure that Russia is constructively and legitimately engaged 
in European affairs.

                            V. Senate Action

    On December 16, 1997, in Brussels, Belgium, Secretary 
Albright, on behalf of the United States, signed the Protocols 
to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The Protocols were transmitted 
to the Senate on February 11, 1998 and referred on the same day 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
    The Committee held two public hearings in 1994 in 
conjunction with the Committee on Armed Services, two public 
hearings in 1995, seven public hearings in 1997, and one public 
hearing in 1998 on various issues relating to the enlargement 
of NATO. Both Administration and private sector witnesses 
appeared at these hearings.

February 1, 1994

The Future of NATO

The Honorable Frank Wisner, Undersecretary of Defense for 
        Policy
The Honorable Stephen Oxman, Assistant Secretary of State for 
        European and Canadian Affairs
The Honorable Robert Hunter, U.S. Ambassador to NATO
Lt. Gen. Daniel Christman, U.S. Representative to the NATO 
        Military Committee

February 23, 1994

The Future of NATO: The NATO Summit and Beyond

The Honorable James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense
The Honorable Max M. Kampelman, former U.S. Ambassador to the 
        Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
General John Galvin, USA (Ret.)

April 27, 1995

NATO's Future: Problems, Threats, and U.S. Interests

The Honorable Robert B. Zoellick, Federal National Mortgage 
        Association
Dr. Arnold Horelick, The RAND Corporation
The Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Center for Strategic and 
        International Studies
General William Odom, USA (Ret.), The Hudson Institute

May 3, 1995

Paths and Impediments to NATO Enlargement: Interests and Perceptions of 
        Allies, Applicants, and Russia

Dr. Ronald Asmus, The RAND Corporation
The Honorable Richard R. Burt, International Equity Partners
The Honorable Paula J. Dobriansky, Hunton & Williams
Mr. Dimitri K. Simes, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom
The Honorable Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Columbia University

October 7, 1997

The Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement

The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State

October 9, 1997

The Pros and Cons of NATO Enlargement

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr., United States Senator
The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski, Center for Strategic and 
        International Studies
The Honorable Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, American Enterprise 
        Institute
Dr. Michael Mandelbaum, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 
        International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University
Ambassador Jonathan Dean, Union of Concerned Scientists

October 22, 1997

Qualifications of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for NATO 
        Membership (Testimony Submitted for the Record)

The Honorable Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State for 
        European Affairs
The Honorable Franklin D. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of 
        Defense for International Security Affairs
Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Center for Strategic and International 
        Studies
Dr. Stephen F. Larrabee, RAND
Dr. John S. Micgiel, Columbia University

October 28, 1997

Costs, Benefits, Burdensharing, and Military Implications of NATO 
        Enlargement

The Honorable Walter Slocombe, Undersecretary of Defense for 
        Policy
Dr. Richard Kugler, National Defense University
Dr. Ivan Eland, CATO Institute
The Honorable Stephen Hadley, Shea and Gardner

October 30, 1997

NATO-Russia Relationship Part I

The Honorable Henry Kissinger, Kissinger and Associates

October 30, 1997

NATO-Russia Relationship Part II

The Honorable Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State for 
        Political Affairs
Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Institute for Advanced Study
Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA (Ret.), Hudson Institute
Mr. Dimitri K. Simes, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom

November 5, 1997

Public Views on NATO Enlargement

Mr. Jan Nowak, Central and Eastern European Coalition
Mr. Edward J. Moskal, Polish American Congress
Mr. Frank Koszorus, Jr., Hungarian American Coalition
Mr. Bob Doubek, American Friends of the Czech Republic
Mr. Mati Koiva, Joint Baltic American National Committee, Inc., 
        and Estonian American National Council
Mr. Charles Ciccolella, American Legion
Admiral Jack Shanahan, USN (Ret.), Center for Defense 
        Information
Colonel Herb Harmon, USMCR, Reserve Officers Association of the 
        United States
Mr. Daniel Plesch, British American Security Information 
        Council
Mr. David C. Acheson, The Atlantic Council of the United States
Mr. John T. Joyce, International Union of Bricklayers and 
        Allied Craftworkers
Mr. David Harris, American Jewish Committee
Mr. Adrian Karatnycky, Freedom House
Dr. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, University of Pennsylvania
Dr. Paula Stern, The Stern Group

February 24, 1998

Administration Views on the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 
        1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic

The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State
The Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense
General Henry H. Shelton, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

    In addition to Foreign Relations Committee action, since 
1995 the Senate Appropriations, Armed Services, and Budget 
Committees have held several hearings on NATO enlargement.
    On April 22, 1997, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and 
Minority Leader Tom Daschle created the Senate NATO Observer 
Group to provide a focal point for addressing NATO issues that 
cut across committee jurisdictions and to help educate Senators 
on the issues involved in any decision to enlarge NATO. Twenty-
eight Senators serve on the Observer Group:

Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.        Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
Senator Jeff Bingaman               Senator Trent Lott
Senator Robert C. Byrd              Senator John McCain
Senator Dan Coats                   Senator Mitch McConnell
Senator Paul Coverdell              Senator Barbara A. Mikulski
Senator Tom Daschle                 Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
Senator Byron L. Dorgan             Senator Paul S. Sarbanes
Senator Chuck Hagel                 Senator Gordon Smith
Senator Jesse Helms                 Senator Olympia J. Snowe
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison        Senator William V. Roth, Jr.
Senator Daniel K. Inouye            Senator Ted Stevens
Senator Robert J. Kerrey            Senator Strom Thurmond
Senator Patrick J. Leahy            Senator John W. Warner
Senator Carl Levin                  Senator Paul Wellstone

Senator Roth was appointed Chairman, and Senator Biden was 
appointed Co-Chairman. The Observer Group held numerous 
meetings with Administration, NATO officials, and foreign 
officials. These meetings are listed below.

May 13, 1997

Chairmen's Meeting with Czech President Vaclav Havel

May 14, 1997

Meeting with Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright

May 15, 1997

Meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott regarding 
        the NATO-Russia Founding Act

May 27, 1997

Observer Group delegation joined President Clinton's delegation 
        in Paris for the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding 
        Act

June 6, 1997

Meeting with U.S. Permanent Representative to the North 
        Atlantic Council Robert Hunter

June 11, 1997

Meeting with the President at the White House

June 25, 1997

Meeting with Secretary of Defense William Cohen

July 6/7, 1997

Observer Group delegation visit to Prague, Czech Republic

July 8, 1997

Observer Group delegation joined President Clinton's delegation 
        at the NATO summit in Madrid

July 8, 1997

Observer Group delegation lunch with the Presidents of Poland, 
        Hungary, and the Czech Republic

July 9, 1997

Observer Group delegation breakfast with Polish President 
        Aleksander Kwasniewski in Madrid

July 25, 1997

Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana

September 18, 1997

Meeting with NATO Chiefs of Defense

September 30, 1997

Meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Poland, Hungary, and the 
        Czech Republic

February 10, 1998

Meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Poland, Hungary, and the 
        Czech Republic

February 11, 1998

Meeting with Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov (jointly with 
        the Foreign Relations Committee)

February 26, 1998

Meeting with the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, General 
        Klaus Naumann

    At a markup on March 3, 1998, the Committee considered a 
Resolution of Ratification including seven declarations and 
four conditions. The resolution was agreed to by the Committee 
by a roll call vote of 16-2. Those members voting in the 
affirmative were Senators Helms, Lugar, Coverdell, Hagel, 
Smith, Thomas, Grams, Frist, Brownback, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, 
Kerry, Robb, Feingold, and Feinstein. Those members voting 
against were Senators Ashcroft and Wellstone.
    The conditions and declarations and the rationale for 
approving them are as follows:

            Declaration 1: Reaffirmation that Membership in NATO 
                    Remains a Vital National Security Interest of the 
                    United States
    Declaration 1 reiterates that NATO membership is a vital 
national security interest for the United States. For over 
fifty years, NATO has served as the preeminent organization to 
defend the territory of the countries in the North Atlantic 
area against all external threats. NATO prevailed in the task 
of ensuring the survival of democratic governments throughout 
the Cold War, NATO succeeded in maintaining the peace in 
disputes among NATO members, and NATO has established a process 
of cooperative security planning that enhances the security of 
the United States and its allies while distributing the 
financial burden of defending the democracies of Europe and 
North America among the Allies.
            Declaration 2: Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement
    Declaration 2 lays out the strategic rationale for the 
inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO. 
NATO members have determined that, consistent with Article 10 
of the North Atlantic Treaty, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic are in a position to further the principles of the 
North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the 
North Atlantic area. This step has been taken with the 
acknowledgment that, notwithstanding the collapse of communism 
in most of Europe, NATO allies continue to face threats to 
their stability and territorial integrity. These threats stem 
from the possibility of the emergence of a hegemonic power in 
or around Europe, resumed conflict caused by ethnic and 
religious enmity, or the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. Extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic will strengthen NATO by extending the zone 
of security cooperation, serve as a deterrent to potential 
aggressors, and advance the interests of the United States and 
its NATO allies.
            Declaration 3: Supremacy of the North Atlantic Council in 
                    NATO Decision-Making
    Declaration 3 emphasizes the supremacy of NATO members in 
making the core decisions of the Alliance, notwithstanding the 
Alliance's growing association with non-member states. Within 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the North Atlantic 
Council, commonly referred to as the NAC, is the principal 
decision-making body. Final NATO authority rests on its 
decisions, and all members of NATO are represented. The NAC 
does not require approval or consensus on its decisions from 
any outside body, though it is committed by the North Atlantic 
Treaty to act in accordance with international law. This 
declaration also emphasizes that decisions are determined at 
the NAC by consensus of all NATO members and are not subject to 
approval or review of any forum affiliated with NATO, such as 
the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council or the NATO-Ukraine 
Commission. Additionally, the NAC does not require consent by 
international organizations such as the United Nations in order 
to undertake a mission that includes the use of force in 
defense of its members.
            Declaration 4: Full Membership for New NATO Members
    Declaration 4 emphasizes that, upon completion of the 
accession process, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will 
have all the rights, privileges, obligations, responsibilities, 
and protections that are afforded to all other NATO members. In 
particular, the Committee would view unfavorably any legally 
binding requirement arising from the adaptation talks of the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) that would 
have the effect of constraining the ability of NATO to fulfill 
its Article 5 guarantee to new member states. This provision 
also endorses the political commitments made by NATO to the 
Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, including 
its provisions regarding a decision under current circumstances 
neither to deploy nuclear weapons, nor to station forces on the 
territory of new members. This provision emphasizes that the 
Founding Act is not legally binding and cannot preclude any 
decisions made by the North Atlantic Council.
            Declaration 5: NATO-Russia Relationship
    Declaration 5 expresses the Senate's support for NATO to 
engage with the Russian Federation in a new and constructive 
relationship as Russia continues to pursue democracy, market 
reform, and peaceful relations with its neighbors.
            Declaration 6: The Importance of European Integration
    Declaration 6 emphasizes the important role that other 
European institutions such as the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and the European Union must play in 
advancing the political, economic, and social stability of 
Europe.
            Declaration 7: Future Consideration of Candidates for 
                    Membership in NATO
    Declaration 7 declares that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic are the only countries in Europe that have been 
invited to join NATO, and that the consideration of future 
members in NATO provided for under Article 10 of the Senate-
approved North Atlantic Treaty is subject to the requirement 
for advice and consent under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of 
the United States Constitution. Article 10 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty provides for an open door to the admission into 
NATO of other European countries that are in a position to 
further the principles of the Treaty and that can contribute to 
the security of the North Atlantic area. The only countries 
that have been invited to accede to NATO are Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic, and the United States will not support 
any subsequent invitation for admission to NATO if the 
prospective member cannot fulfill the obligations and 
responsibilities of NATO membership in a manner that serves the 
overall political and strategic interests of the United States. 
The Senate emphasizes that no state will be invited to become a 
member of NATO unless the Executive Branch fulfills the 
Constitutional requirement for seeking the advice of the 
Senate, a consensus decision to proceed is reached in NATO, and 
ratification is achieved according to the national procedures 
of each NATO member, including the consent to ratification by 
the Senate.
            Condition 1: The Strategic Concept of NATO
    Condition 1 declares that NATO's central purpose remains 
the defense of its members. Any proposal to revise this mission 
will require full consultation by the Executive Branch. The 
Strategic Concept of NATO is the guiding policy document that 
describes NATO's strategy and the steps NATO takes to 
accomplish it. Collective defense is reaffirmed as NATO's core 
purpose. The Senate declares that NATO must continue to pursue 
defense planning, command structures, and force goals first and 
foremost to meet the requirement of the collective defense of 
NATO members.
    Condition 1 further directs the President to submit a 
report to Congress that explains the manner in which the 
Strategic Concept of NATO affects global U.S. military 
requirements. The report must also contain an analysis of all 
potential threats to the North Atlantic area over the next 
decade, and must identify the alternative system architectures 
for deployment of a NATO missile defense for the region of 
Europe that would counter any current or emerging threat by 
ballistic and cruise missile systems in countries other than 
the declared nuclear powers. Additionally, the report will 
contain a detailed, country-specific report on the progress of 
all NATO members on meeting current force goals in support of 
the Alliance. The Senate is interested in a full account of the 
vulnerabilities or weaknesses posed to NATO due to the failure 
of individual members to meet previously agreed upon force 
goals. Through required briefings, the Executive branch will 
keep the Senate informed of any discussions in NATO to revise 
the Strategic Concept.
            Condition 2: Cost, Benefits, Burdensharing, and Military 
                    Implications of the Enlargement of NATO
    Condition 2 requires the President to reaffirm 
understandings on the cost, benefits, and military implications 
of NATO enlargement. Prior to depositing the instrument of 
ratification, the President is required to certify to the 
Senate that the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech 
Republic in NATO will not increase the United States' overall 
percentage share of the NATO common budget. Similarly, the 
President is required to certify that the United States is 
under no obligation to subsidize the national expenses 
necessary for Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic to meet 
those countries' NATO commitments, and that the membership of 
Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic in NATO will not detract 
in any way from the ability of the United States to meet its 
military commitments outside the North Atlantic area. This 
provision does not prohibit voluntary assistance programs by 
the United States such as the ongoing Warsaw Initiative.
    Condition 2 further directs the President to submit an 
annual report to the Senate during the five year period 
following the entry into force of the protocols. The report is 
to include detailed information on the annual defense budgets 
of all NATO members, their contributions to the common budget 
and cost-sharing arrangements of NATO, and an itemization of 
costs incurred by the United States in support of Polish, Czech 
and Hungarian membership in NATO.
            Condition 3: The NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Permanent 
                    Joint Council
    Condition 3 requires the President to certify the 
previously stated position of the Executive Branch on areas of 
cooperation under the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the nature 
of discussions in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The 
resolution reiterates the Executive Branch interpretation of 
Russia's role under the Founding Act and the firewalls between 
the deliberations of the North Atlantic Council and the 
Permanent Joint Council to preserve the integrity of decision-
making and the security of NATO. The Senate states that any 
discussions in the Permanent Joint Council will be for 
explanatory, not decision-making purposes, and that these 
discussions will not extend to a level of detail that could in 
any way compromise the security of NATO. Further it is the 
understanding of the Senate that no issue will be discussed in 
the Permanent Joint Council until after NATO has reached 
consensus on its position. The Senate explicitly states that 
under no circumstance will the Russian Federation have a veto 
over NATO policy or any role in NATO decision-making under the 
auspices of the Founding Act or the Permanent Joint Council. 
Additionally, the Senate reiterates its understanding of the 
limits of discussions in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint 
Council.
            Condition 4: Treaty Interpretation
    Condition (4) reaffirms condition (1) in the resolution of 
ratification of the INF Treaty, which was approved by the 
Senate in 1988. That condition, known as the ``Biden-Byrd-
Helms'' condition, sets forth important principles of treaty 
interpretation. The condition has been reaffirmed by the Senate 
several times since 1988, including during consideration of the 
CFE Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, the START I and START II 
Treaties, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. These principles 
apply regardless of whether the Senate chooses to say so during 
consideration of any particular treaty.
    A full discussion of the background to, and rationale for, 
this condition may be found in the Committee's report on the 
INF Treaty (S. Exec. Rept. No. 15, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.), and 
the Committee's report on the CFE Flank Document (S. Exec. 
Rept. No. 1, 105th Cong., 1st Sess.).
                     VI. Resolution of Ratification

  Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
therein),

SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO DECLARATIONS AND 
                    CONDITIONS.

  The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the 
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession 
of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which were opened 
for signature at Brussels on December 16, 1997, and signed on 
behalf of the United States of America and other parties to the 
North Atlantic Treaty, as defined in section 4(6), subject to 
the declarations of section 2 and the conditions of section 3.

SEC. 2. DECLARATIONS.

  The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the 
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is subject to the 
following declarations:
          (1) Reaffirmation that united states membership in 
        nato remains a vital national security interest of the 
        united states.--The Senate declares that--
                  (A) for nearly 50 years the North Atlantic 
                Treaty Organization (NATO) has served as the 
                preeminent organization to defend the territory 
                of the countries in the North Atlantic area 
                against all external threats;
                  (B) through common action, the established 
                democracies of North America and Europe that 
                were joined in NATO persevered and prevailed in 
                the task of ensuring the survival of democratic 
                government in Europe and North America 
                throughout the Cold War;
                  (C) NATO enhances the security of the United 
                States by embedding European states in a 
                process of cooperative security planning, by 
                preventing the destabilizing renationalization 
                of European military policies, and by ensuring 
                an ongoing and direct leadership role for the 
                United States in European security affairs;
                  (D) the responsibility and financial burden 
                of defending the democracies of Europe and 
                North America can be more evenly shared through 
                an alliance in which specific obligations and 
                force goals are met by its members;
                  (E) the security and prosperity of the United 
                States is enhanced by NATO's collective defense 
                against aggression that may threaten the 
                territory of NATO members; and
                  (F) United States membership in NATO remains 
                a vital national security interest of the 
                United States.
          (2) Strategic rationale for nato enlargement.--The 
        Senate finds that--
                  (A) notwithstanding the collapse of communism 
                in most of Europe and the dissolution of the 
                Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO 
                allies face threats to their stability and 
                territorial integrity, including--
                          (i) the potential for the emergence 
                        of a hegemonic power in Europe;
                          (ii) conflict stemming from ethnic 
                        and religious enmity, the revival of 
                        historic disputes, or the actions of 
                        undemocratic leaders;
                          (iii) the proliferation of 
                        technologies associated with nuclear, 
                        chemical, or biological weapons as well 
                        as ballistic and cruise missile systems 
                        and other means of the delivery of 
                        those weapons; and
                          (iv) possible transnational threats 
                        that would adversely affect the core 
                        security interests of NATO members;
                  (B) the invasion of Poland, Hungary, or the 
                Czech Republic, or their destabilization 
                arising from external subversion, would 
                threaten the stability of Europe and jeopardize 
                vital United States national security 
                interests;
                  (C) Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, 
                having established democratic governments and 
                having demonstrated a willingness to meet all 
                requirements of membership, including those 
                necessary to contribute to the territorial 
                defense of all NATO members, are in a position 
                to further the principles of the North Atlantic 
                Treaty and to contribute to the security of the 
                North Atlantic area; and
                  (D) extending NATO membership to Poland, 
                Hungary, and the Czech Republic will strengthen 
                NATO, enhance security and stability in Central 
                Europe, deter potential aggressors, and thereby 
                advance the interests of the United States and 
                its NATO allies.
          (3) Supremacy of the north atlantic council in nato 
        decision-making.--The Senate understands that--
                  (A) as the North Atlantic Council is the 
                supreme decision-making body of NATO, the North 
                Atlantic Council will not subject its decisions 
                to review, challenge, or veto by any forum 
                affiliated with NATO, including the Permanent 
                Joint Council or the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
                Council, or by any nonmember state 
                participating in any such forum;
                  (B) the North Atlantic Council does not 
                require the consent of the United Nations, the 
                Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
                Europe, or any other international organization 
                in order to take any action pursuant to the 
                North Atlantic Treaty in defense of the North 
                Atlantic area, including the deployment, 
                operation, or stationing of forces; and
                  (C) the North Atlantic Council has direct 
                responsibility for matters relating to the 
                basic policies of NATO, including development 
                of the Strategic Concept of NATO (as defined in 
                section 3(1)(E)), and a consensus position of 
                the North Atlantic Council will precede any 
                negotiation between NATO and non-NATO members 
                that affects NATO's relationship with non-NATO 
                members participating in fora such as the 
                Permanent Joint Council.
          (4) Full membership for new nato members.--
                  (A) In general.--The Senate understands that 
                Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, in 
                becoming NATO members, will have all the 
                rights, obligations, responsibilities, and 
                protections that are afforded to all other NATO 
                members.
                  (B) Political commitments.--The Senate 
                endorses the political commitments made by NATO 
                to the Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia 
                Founding Act, which are not legally binding and 
                do not in any way preclude any future decisions 
                by the North Atlantic Council to preserve the 
                security of NATO members.
          (5) NATO-Russia relationship.--The Senate finds that 
        it is in the interest of the United States for NATO to 
        develop a new and constructive relationship with the 
        Russian Federation as the Russian Federation pursues 
        democratization, market reforms, and peaceful relations 
        with its neighbors.
          (6) The importance of european integration.--
                  (A) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of 
                the Senate that--
                          (i) the central purpose of NATO is to 
                        provide for the collective defense of 
                        its members;
                          (ii) the Organization for Security 
                        and Cooperation in Europe is a 
                        fundamental institution for the 
                        promotion of democracy, the rule of 
                        law, crisis prevention, and post-
                        conflict rehabilitation and, as such, 
                        is an essential forum for the 
                        discussion and resolution of political 
                        disputes among European members, 
                        Canada, and the United States; and
                          (iii) the European Union is an 
                        essential organization for the 
                        economic, political, and social 
                        integration of all qualified European 
                        countries into an undivided Europe.
                  (B) Policy of the united states.--The policy 
                of the United States is--
                          (i) to utilize fully the institutions 
                        of the Organization for Security and 
                        Cooperation in Europe to reach 
                        political solutions for disputes in 
                        Europe; and
                          (ii) to encourage actively the 
                        efforts of the European Union to expand 
                        its membership, which will help to 
                        stabilize the democracies of Central 
                        and Eastern Europe.
          (7) Future consideration of candidates for membership 
        in nato.--
                  (A) Senate findings.--The Senate finds that--
                          (i) Article 10 of the North Atlantic 
                        Treaty provides that NATO members by 
                        unanimous agreement may invite the 
                        accession to the North Atlantic Treaty 
                        of any other European state in a 
                        position to further the principles of 
                        the North Atlantic Treaty and to 
                        contribute to the security of the North 
                        Atlantic area;
                          (ii) in its Madrid summit declaration 
                        of July 8, 1997, NATO pledged to 
                        ``maintain an open door to the 
                        admission of additional Alliance 
                        members in the future'' if those 
                        countries satisfy the requirements of 
                        Article 10 of the North Atlantic 
                        Treaty;
                          (iii) other than Poland, Hungary, and 
                        the Czech Republic, the United States 
                        has not consented to invite any other 
                        country to join NATO in the future; and
                          (iv) the United States will not 
                        support the admission of, or the 
                        invitation for admission of, any new 
                        NATO member unless--
                                  (I) the President consults 
                                with the Senate consistent with 
                                Article II, section 2, clause 2 
                                of the Constitution of the 
                                United States (relating to the 
                                advice and consent of the 
                                Senate to the making of 
                                treaties); and
                                  (II) the prospective NATO 
                                member can fulfill the 
                                obligations and 
                                responsibilities of membership, 
                                and its inclusion would serve 
                                the overall political and 
                                strategic interests of NATO and 
                                the United States.
                  (B) Requirement for consensus and 
                ratification.--The Senate declares that no 
                action or agreement other than a consensus 
                decision by the full membership of NATO, 
                approved by the national procedures of each 
                NATO member, including, in the case of the 
                United States, the requirements of Article II, 
                section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the 
                United States (relating to the advice and 
                consent of the Senate to the making of 
                treaties), will constitute a security 
                commitment pursuant to the North Atlantic 
                Treaty.

SEC. 3. CONDITIONS.

  The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of 
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the 
Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is subject 
to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the 
President:
          (1) The strategic concept of nato.--
                  (A) The fundamental importance of collective 
                defense.--The Senate declares that--
                          (i) in order for NATO to serve the 
                        security interests of the United 
                        States, the core purpose of NATO must 
                        continue to be the collective defense 
                        of the territory of all NATO members; 
                        and
                          (ii) NATO may also, pursuant to 
                        Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
                        on a case-by-case basis, engage in 
                        other missions when there is a 
                        consensus among its members that there 
                        is a threat to the security and 
                        interests of NATO members.
                  (B) Defense planning, command structures, and 
                force goals.--The Senate declares that NATO 
                must continue to pursue defense planning, 
                command structures, and force goals to meet the 
                requirements of Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
                Treaty as well as the requirements of other 
                missions agreed upon by NATO members, but must 
                do so in a manner that first and foremost 
                ensures under the North Atlantic Treaty the 
                ability of NATO to deter and counter any 
                significant military threat to the territory of 
                any NATO member.
                  (C) Report.--Not later than 180 days after 
                the date of adoption of this resolution, the 
                President shall submit to the President of the 
                Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
                Representatives a report on the Strategic 
                Concept of NATO. The report shall be submitted 
                in both classified and unclassified form and 
                shall include--
                          (i) an explanation of the manner in 
                        which the Strategic Concept of NATO 
                        affects United States military 
                        requirements both within and outside 
                        the North Atlantic area;
                          (ii) an analysis of all potential 
                        threats to the North Atlantic area up 
                        to the year 2010, including the 
                        consideration of a reconstituted 
                        conventional threat to Europe, emerging 
                        capabilities of non-NATO countries to 
                        use nuclear, biological, or chemical 
                        weapons affecting the North Atlantic 
                        area, and the emerging ballistic and 
                        cruise missile threat affecting the 
                        North Atlantic area;
                          (iii) the identification of 
                        alternative system architectures for 
                        the deployment of a NATO missile 
                        defense for the region of Europe that 
                        would be capable of countering the 
                        threat posed by emerging ballistic and 
                        cruise missile systems in countries 
                        other than declared nuclear powers, 
                        together with a timetable for 
                        development and an estimate of costs;
                          (iv) a detailed assessment of the 
                        progress of all NATO members, on a 
                        country-by-country basis, toward 
                        meeting current force goals; and
                          (v) a general description of the 
                        overall approach to updating the 
                        Strategic Concept of NATO.
                  (D) Briefings on revisions to the strategic 
                concept.--Not less than twice in the 300-day 
                period following the date of adoption of this 
                resolution, each at an agreed time to precede 
                each Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic 
                Council, the Senate expects the appropriate 
                officials of the executive branch of Government 
                to offer detailed briefings to the Committee on 
                Foreign Relations of the Senate on proposed 
                changes to the Strategic Concept of NATO, 
                including--
                          (i) an explanation of the manner in 
                        which specific revisions to the 
                        Strategic Concept of NATO will serve 
                        United States national security 
                        interests and affect United States 
                        military requirements both within and 
                        outside the North Atlantic area;
                          (ii) a timetable for implementation 
                        of new force goals by all NATO members 
                        under any revised Strategic Concept of 
                        NATO;
                          (iii) a description of any 
                        negotiations regarding the revision of 
                        the nuclear weapons policy of NATO; and
                          (iv) a description of any proposal to 
                        condition decisions of the North 
                        Atlantic Council upon the approval of 
                        the United Nations, the Organization 
                        for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
                        or any NATO-affiliated forum.
                  (E) Definition.--For the purposes of this 
                paragraph, the term ``Strategic Concept of 
                NATO'' means the document agreed to by the 
                Heads of State and Government participating in 
                the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
                Rome on November 7-8, 1991, or any subsequent 
                document agreed to by the North Atlantic 
                Council that would serve a similar purpose.
          (2) Cost, benefits, burdensharing, and military 
        implications of the enlargement of nato.--
                  (A) Presidential certification.--Prior to the 
                deposit of the United States instrument of 
                ratification, the President shall certify to 
                the Senate that--
                          (i) the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, 
                        and the Czech Republic in NATO will not 
                        have the effect of increasing the 
                        overall percentage share of the United 
                        States in the common budgets of NATO;
                          (ii) the United States is under no 
                        commitment to subsidize the national 
                        expenses necessary for Poland, Hungary, 
                        or the Czech Republic to meet its NATO 
                        commitments; and
                          (iii) the inclusion of Poland, 
                        Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO 
                        does not detract from the ability of 
                        the United States to meet or to fund 
                        its military requirements outside the 
                        North Atlantic area.
                  (B) Annual reports.--
                          (i) Requirements.--Not later than 
                        April 1 of each year during the five-
                        year period following the date of entry 
                        into force of the Protocols to the 
                        North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the 
                        Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the 
                        Czech Republic, the President shall 
                        submit to the appropriate congressional 
                        committees a report which may be 
                        submitted in an unclassified and 
                        classified form and which shall contain 
                        the following information:
                                  (I) The amount contributed to 
                                the common budgets of NATO by 
                                each NATO member during the 
                                preceding calendar year.
                                  (II) The proportional share 
                                assigned to, and paid by, each 
                                NATO member under NATO's cost-
                                sharing arrangements.
                                  (III) The national defense 
                                budget of each NATO member, the 
                                steps taken by each NATO member 
                                to meet NATO force goals, and 
                                the adequacy of the national 
                                defense budget of each NATO 
                                member in meeting common 
                                defense and security 
                                obligations.
                                  (IV) Any costs incurred by 
                                the United States in connection 
                                with the membership of Poland, 
                                Hungary, or the Czech Republic 
                                in NATO, including the 
                                deployment of United States 
                                military personnel, the 
                                provision of any defense 
                                article or defense service, the 
                                funding of any training 
                                activity, or the modification 
                                or construction of any military 
                                facility.
                          (ii) Definition of appropriate 
                        congressional committees.--As used in 
                        this subparagraph, the term 
                        ``appropriate congressional 
                        committees'' means the Committee on 
                        Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
                        Armed Services, and the Committee on 
                        Appropriations of the Senate and the 
                        Committee on International Relations, 
                        the Committee on National Security, and 
                        the Committee on Appropriations of the 
                        House of Representatives.
          (3) The nato-russia founding act and the permanent 
        joint council.--Prior to the deposit of the United 
        States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
        certify to the Senate the following:
                  (A) In general.--The NATO-Russia Founding Act 
                and the Permanent Joint Council do not provide 
                the Russian Federation with a veto over NATO 
                policy.
                  (B) Nato decision-making.--The NATO-Russia 
                Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council do 
                not provide the Russian Federation any role in 
                the North Atlantic Council or NATO decision-
                making, including--
                          (i) any decision NATO makes on an 
                        internal matter; or
                          (ii) the manner in which NATO 
                        organizes itself, conducts its 
                        business, or plans, prepares for, or 
                        conducts any mission that affects one 
                        or more of its members, such as 
                        collective defense, as stated under 
                        Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
                  (C) Nature of discussions in the permanent 
                joint council.--In discussions in the Permanent 
                Joint Council--
                          (i) the Permanent Joint Council will 
                        not be a forum in which NATO's basic 
                        strategy, doctrine, or readiness is 
                        negotiated with the Russian Federation, 
                        and NATO will not use the Permanent 
                        Joint Council as a substitute for 
                        formal arms control negotiations such 
                        as the adaptation of the Treaty on 
                        Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 
                        done at Paris on November 19, 1990;
                          (ii) any discussion with the Russian 
                        Federation of NATO doctrine will be for 
                        explanatory, not decision-making 
                        purposes;
                          (iii) any explanation described in 
                        clause (ii) will not extend to a level 
                        of detail that could in any way 
                        compromise the effectiveness of NATO's 
                        military forces, and any such 
                        explanation will be offered only after 
                        NATO has first set its policies on 
                        issues affecting internal matters;
                          (iv) NATO will not discuss any agenda 
                        item with the Russian Federation prior 
                        to agreeing to a NATO position within 
                        the North Atlantic Council on that 
                        agenda item; and
                          (v) the Permanent Joint Council will 
                        not be used to make any decision on 
                        NATO doctrine, strategy, or readiness.
          (4) Treaty interpretation.--
                  (A) Principles of treaty interpretation.--The 
                Senate affirms the applicability to all 
                treaties of the constitutionally-based 
                principles of treaty interpretation set forth 
                in condition (1) in the resolution of 
                ratification of the INF Treaty, approved by the 
                Senate on May 27, 1988.
                  (B) Construction of senate resolution of 
                ratification.--Nothing in condition (1) of the 
                resolution of ratification of the INF Treaty, 
                approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988, shall 
                be construed as authorizing the President to 
                obtain legislative approval for modifications 
                or amendments to treaties through majority 
                approval of both Houses of Congress.
                  (C) Definition.--As used in this paragraph, 
                the term ``INF Treaty'' refers to the Treaty 
                Between the United States of America and the 
                Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
                Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and 
                Shorter Range Missiles, together with the 
                related memorandum of understanding and 
                protocols, done at Washington on December 8, 
                1987.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

  In this resolution:
          (1) NATO.--The term ``NATO'' means the North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization.
          (2) NATO members.--The term ``NATO members'' means 
        all countries that are parties to the North Atlantic 
        Treaty.
          (3) NATO-Russia founding act.--The term ``NATO-Russia 
        Founding Act'' means the document entitled the 
        ``Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and 
        Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation'', 
        dated May 27, 1997.
          (4) North atlantic area.--The term ``North Atlantic 
        area'' means the area covered by Article 6 of the North 
        Atlantic Treaty, as applied by the North Atlantic 
        Council.
          (5) North atlantic treaty.--The term ``North Atlantic 
        Treaty'' means the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at 
        Washington on April 4, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964), 
        as amended.
          (6) Protocols to the north atlantic treaty of 1949 on 
        the accession of poland, hungary, and the czech 
        republic.--The term ``Protocols to the North Atlantic 
        Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and 
        the Czech Republic'' refers to the following protocols 
        transmitted by the President to the Senate on February 
        11, 1998 (Treaty Document No. 105-36):
                  (A) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty 
                on the Accession of the Republic of Poland, 
                signed at Brussels on December 16, 1997.
                  (B) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty 
                on the Accession of the Republic of Hungary, 
                signed at Brussels on December 16, 1997.
                  (C) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty 
                on the Accession of the Czech Republic, signed 
                at Brussels on December 16, 1997.
          (7) United states instrument of ratification.--The 
        term ``United States instrument of ratification'' means 
        the instrument of ratification of the United States of 
        the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on 
        the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
        Republic.
          VII. Views of the Senate Committee on Armed Services





       VIII. Views of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence





                               
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