[Senate Report 104-10]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



   104th Congress 1st            SENATE                 Report
         Session
                                                        104-10
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

 
                     LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO ACT

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                        COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                                   on

                                 S. 14

                             together with

                     ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS




   February 27 (legislative day, February 22), 1995.--Ordered to be 
                                printed
                        COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

  PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, 
             Chairman
                                     CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
                                     DON NICKLES, Oklahoma
                                     PHIL GRAMM, Texas
                                     CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
                                     TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
                                     HANK BROWN, Colorado
                                     SLADE GORTON, Washington
                                     JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
                                     OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
                                     SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan
J. JAMES EXON, Nebraska              BILL FRIST, Tennessee
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, Louisiana
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
PAUL SIMON, Illinois
KENT CONRAD, North Dakota
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
BARBARA BOXER, California
PATTY MURRAY, Washington
    G. William Hoagland, Staff 
             Director
  William G. Dauster, Democratic 
 Chief of Staff and Chief Counsel


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
  I. Purpose..........................................................1
 II. Background.......................................................2
III. Legislative History..............................................8
 IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................9
  V. Cost Estimate...................................................14
 VI. Regulatory Impact Statement.....................................16
VII. Committee Votes.................................................16
VIII.
     Additional and Minority Views...................................19
 IX. Changes to Existing Law.........................................27
104th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE

 1st Session                                                     104-10
_______________________________________________________________________


                     LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO ACT

                                _______


   February 27 (legislative day, February 22), 1995.--Ordered to be 
                                printed

_______________________________________________________________________


Mr. Domenici, from the Committee on the Budget, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                          [To accompany S. 14]

    The Committee on Budget, to which was referred the bill (S. 
14) a bill to amend the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 to provide for the expedited consideration 
of certain proposed cancellations of budget items, having 
considered the same, reports thereon an amendment in the nature 
of a substitute without recommendation.

                               I. Purpose

    The purpose of S. 14, the Legislative Line Item Veto Act, 
is to provide the President with a legislative procedure to 
delete funding from appropriations Acts and targeted tax 
benefits from revenue Acts. While the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 provided legislative procedures 
for the consideration of the President's proposed spending 
reductions in a rescission bill, Congress has routinely ignored 
these procedures.
    Many charge that the President's control over spending 
decisions has been diluted and Congress has escaped 
accountability for individual programs and projects by 
incorporating these items in large appropriations bills. S. 14 
would increase the President's power over spending and the 
accountability of Congress by creating an expedited procedure 
that would guarantee a vote by Congress on the President's 
proposed rescissions and repeals of targeted tax benefits. 
Unless Congress votes against the President's proposed 
rescissions or repeal of targeted tax benefits, they would 
become law. S. 14 achieves these objectives without giving 
complete control over spending reductions to the President.
    The major provisions of S. 14, as reported by the 
Committee, are as follows:
          Within 20 days of the enactment of an appropriations 
        bill or a revenue bill, the President could propose the 
        reduction or repeal of new appropriations or the repeal 
        of a targeted tax benefit;
          A rescission bill limited to the President's 
        proposals would be introduced in Congress and within 10 
        days Congress would have to vote on that bill;
          No amendments are allowed to the President's 
        rescission bill, but motions to strike are allowed with 
        sufficient support; and
          If Congress passes the bill and the President signs 
        it into law, a lock box provides that any savings be 
        devoted to deficit reduction by lowering the 
        discretionary caps on spending.

                             II. Background

Overview

    The United States Constitution entrusts the ``power of the 
purse'' to the legislative branch of the United States. 
Pursuant to Article I, Section 8 Congress is empowered ``[t]o 
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises to pay the 
Debts and provide for the common Defence and General Welfare of 
the United States.'' The power of the purse is made more clear 
by Article I, Section 9 which provides that ``[n]o money shall 
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law.''
    However, the expenditure of funds pursuant to Congressional 
authorization is an executive function, consistent with the 
President's obligation under Article II, Section 3, that he 
``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed''. Presidents, 
at least since Thomas Jefferson, have asserted that the 
executive has some discretion in the expenditure of monies 
appropriated by Congress. This tug-of-war goes to the most 
basic tenet of the American democratic system of government--
the balance of powers between the executive and the legislative 
branches of government--the power of the purse versus the 
impoundment power.
    A review of writings on this subject shows that this 
conflict dates back to the earliest days of the Republic. The 
conflict has been made manifest through executive action, 
congressional legislation, and decisions of federal courts, 
including the United States Supreme Court.
    The first significant impoundment of appropriated funds, 
was made by the third President, Thomas Jefferson, who in 1803 
refused to spend $50,000 appropriated by Congress to provide 
gun boats to operate on the Mississippi River. The conflict 
came to a head in the early 1970's when the 37th President, 
Richard Nixon, withheld from expenditure over $12 billion for 
highway, water, and sewer projects, and millions of dollars in 
appropriated funds for housing, education, and health programs.
    It was President Nixon's challenge to Congress' power of 
the purse that was a major impetus to the enactment of the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Title 
X of this Act, the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, limited the 
President's management of appropriated funding by establishing 
procedures for the deferral or rescission of budget authority. 
In addition, title X provided legislative procedures for 
congressional action on these proposals.

Pre-1970 Impoundment Action \1\

    Following President Jefferson's withholding of $50,000 for 
Mississippi river gun boats because he thought their use 
unnecessary, the next major action on impoundment authority did 
not occur until the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case entitled 
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 
(1938). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the President 
could not withhold payment of a contract for delivery of the 
mail which Congress had authorized. The court saw this as a 
``ministerial'' function which the President could not refuse 
in the faithful execution of the law. Just two years later in 
Decatur v. Pauling, 39 U.S. (12 Pet.) 497 (1840), the Court 
upheld a decision by the Secretary of the Navy to refuse 
payment to a window whose claim was based on a congressional 
resolution. The Court found that the Secretary of the Navy's 
duty in this case was not merely ministerial but required 
discretion and judgment and, so, the court refused the writ of 
mandamus.
    \1\ The documentation for this section is largely taken from an 
article entitled ``History and Practice of Executive Impoundment of 
Appropriated Funds,'' by Niles Stanton, printed in the Nebraska Law 
Review, v. 53, no. 1, 1974, pp. 1-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1876 President Grant took up the impoundment mantle when 
he notified Congress that he did not intend to spend the total 
amount appropriated for harbor and river improvement projects 
because they were of a private or local interest rather than in 
the national interest. This mirrors the current debate over 
line item veto because proposed Presidential rescissions are 
often targeted to funding provided by Congress for specific 
projects (i.e. ``pork barrel'' projects) or for funding added 
by Congress above amounts requested by the Administration. 
However, Congress did not challenge Grant's action.
    In the years following Grant's impoundment, U.S. Attorneys 
General stated in formal opinions that congressional intent had 
to be considered, and not just statutory language, in 
determining whether the Congress was mandating an expenditure 
of funds or simply permitting the President to spend these 
funds.
    The executive impoundment of funds gained some legal status 
with the enactment of the Anti-Deficiency Acts of 1905 and 
1906. In addition to providing a method to prevent excessive 
expenditures that could necessitate supplemental funding later 
in the fiscal year, these Acts allowed the waiver of spending 
appropriated funds in cases of unforeseen emergencies. 
President Roosevelt used this authority during the Great 
Depression and World War II. He also impounded flood control 
funding, which did evoke a legislative response from Congress 
in 1943 to prohibit any agency or official (other than the 
Commissioner of Public Roads) from impounding funds 
appropriated for highway construction. Although limited in 
scope, Congress had responded to executive impoundment of 
congressionally provided funding.
    In the 1960s, Presidential impoundment of funds were 
largely limited to defense programs and projects as the 
President exercised his authority as ``Commander in Chief'' of 
the armed forces. However, President Johnson did withhold 
billions of dollars in funding for highway projects, which 
Congress had no mechanism to address.

Nixon Impoundments

    President Richard Nixon brought the impoundment issued to 
the fore by withholding congressionally appropriated funds and 
claiming that historic precedent affirmed this authority.
    Two court cases in 1973 addressed the impoundment of 
highway funds and water pollution control funds, but did not 
settle the legal question about the President's authority to 
impound funds. In Missouri Highway Commission v. Volpe, 479 
F.2d 1099 (8th Cir 1973), affirmed 347 F. Supp. (W.D. Mo. 
1972), the court of appeals held that highway funds could not 
be impounded for the stated purpose of trying to control 
inflationary pressures on the economy. In City of New York v. 
Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), the court held 
that the Nixon Administration had not authority to direct the 
Environmental Protection Agency not to allocate appropriated 
funds to the states because this was determined to be 
ministerial duty.
    The Administration and Congress again came to conflict when 
the President targeted rural loan and grant programs for 
termination through the mechanism of impounding the funds. 
Congress acted legislatively to thwart these actions but left 
the impoundment issue squarely before Congress for further 
action.

Impoundment Control Act

    The 1974 Impoundment Control Act was preceded by the 1972 
Federal Impoundment and Information Act, which required the 
President to submit reports to Congress and the General 
Accounting Office on funding which had been withheld. Such 
information, however, did not address what was perceived as a 
misuse of executive authority in refusing to spend funds 
appropriated by the Congress. Congress addressed this issue by 
establishing the current impoundment control procedures.
    Title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974 requires that the President submit messages to the 
Congress if he proposes to defer (temporarily withhold) or 
rescind (permanently cancel) appropriated funds. A reading of 
the general history shows that executive impoundments have 
largely have undertaken to establish spending priorities. 
Presidents have tended to impound funds appropriated for 
programs that exceed his budget request or that represent 
specific projects of interest to Congress. With the exception 
of President Nixon's actions, the impoundment of funds has not 
traditionally been viewed as a significant tool to reduce 
federal spending.
            Deferrals
    The President can temporarily withhold from expenditure or 
delay the obligation of funds that are not currently needed. 
Congress can disapprove the deferral of funds through enactment 
of an impoundment resolution. However, since deferrals are now 
made largely for management rather than policy reasons, it is 
unusual for Congress to act to disapprove deferrals, and the 
funds are generally released for expenditure.
            Rescissions
    The President can propose to rescind (permanently cancel) 
budget authority. In the case of rescissions, Congress has 45 
calendar days (of continuous session excluding 3-day recess 
periods) within which to approve these rescissions. If Congress 
does not enact legislation to approve the proposed rescissions, 
in whole or in part, the President must make the funds 
available for expenditure. The Congress can substitute its own 
rescissions for the President's proposal, and often has. Under 
this process, there is no requirement that Congress consider 
and vote on the President's proposed rescissions.
    The General Accounting Office (GAO) recently reported that 
since enactment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act in 1974 through October 7, 1994, U.S. Presidents 
have officially proposed 1,084 rescissions of budget authority 
totaling $72.8 billion. Congress has adopted only 399, or 37 
percent, of the proposed rescissions in the amount of $22.9 
billion. Congress has also initiated 649 rescissions totaling 
$70.1 billion, largely in response to the President's proposals 
and often to pay for other federal spending. In total, over the 
twenty years of the current budget process, Congress has 
enacted 1,048 rescissions totaling $92.9 billion.

Mandatory Spending and Tax Expenditures

    With rescission authority applying to only one-third of the 
overall federal budget, rescission authority, no matter what 
the form, is not the cure-all for reducing the federal deficit 
and balancing the budget. The remaining two-thirds of the 
federal budget is largely uncontrollable in that funding goes 
to mandatory or entitlement programs established by law and to 
payment of interest on the public debt.
    Since the enactment of the 1974 Impoundment Control Act, 
discretionary spending (annual spending approved in 
appropriations acts) as a percentage of the total budget has 
shrunk from 53 percent to 37 percent of total outlays. During 
this same period (1974 to the present), mandatory spending 
(spending outside the direct control of the appropriations 
process) excluding net interest outlays has grown as a 
percentage of the total budget from 39 percent to 49 percent. 
The Congressional Budget Office estimates this disparity will 
grow over the next 10 years. By 2005, CBO estimates that 
mandatory spending will consume 62 percent of total outlays, 
with discretionary spending contributing to 27 percent of total 
outlays.
    In recognition of this fact, some Members of Congress have 
sought to expand the scope of proposals for a legislative line 
item veto to mandatory spending. In addition, many argue that 
``special interest'' tax expenditures inserted in large revenue 
bills also should be subject to the line item veto.
    The Congressional Budget Act defines a tax expenditure as 
revenue losses resulting from provisions of law that grant 
special tax relief.\2\ These tax expenditures, or so-called tax 
breaks, include the net exclusion of pension contributions and 
earnings, home mortgage interest deductions, employer-paid 
health benefits exclusion, Social Security and Railroad 
Retirement benefits exclusion, State and local income and 
personal property tax deductions, and the charitable 
contribution tax deduction.
    \2\ Sec. 3(3) of the Budget Act defines the term tax expenditure. 
For more information on tax expenditures, see Tax Expenditures: 
Compendium of Background Material on Individual Provisions, Committee 
on the Budget, U.S. Senate, S. Prt. 103-101, December 1994 (prepared by 
the Congressional Research Service).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1971, tax expenditures totaled approximately $52 
billion, or 5 percent of GDP. The 1986 Tax Reform Act sought to 
eliminate many such tax breaks, and that effort was largely 
successful, taking tax expenditures down to $293 billion in 
1989. By 1994, however, the estimated level of tax expenditures 
is approximately $429 billion and is leveling off at about 6.5 
percent of GDP.

Line Item Veto

    The current debate over the legislative line-item veto 
proposals transcends the historical context of executive 
impoundment of funds to set spending priorities other than 
those approved by Congress. The debate has now centered on the 
granting of additional authority to the President to reduce 
federal spending as Congress seeks to balance the federal 
budget.
    According to the Congressional Research Service of the 
Library of Congress, at least ten Presidents since the Civil 
War have stated support for the line-item veto, including 
Presidents Grant, Hayes, Arthur, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, 
Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush. More recently, 
President Clinton campaigned on a line item veto, claiming that 
he could reduce spending by $9.8 billion over four years, and 
urged Congress again in this year's State of the Union address 
to give him the line item veto. Two Presidents--Taft and 
Carter--opposed the line-item veto authority for the President. 
It is also documented that the Governors of 43 of the 50 states 
have some form of line-item veto authority (see table I).

                   TABLE I.--GOVERNORS' VETO AUTHORITY                  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                No Item 
                 State                   Item Veto   No Veto      Veto  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama................................          X  .........  .........
Alaska.................................          X  .........  .........
Arizona................................          X  .........  .........
Arkansas...............................          X  .........  .........
California.............................          X  .........  .........
Colorado...............................          X  .........  .........
Connecticut............................          X  .........  .........
Delaware...............................          X  .........  .........
Florida................................          X  .........  .........
Georgia................................          X  .........  .........
Hawaii.................................          X  .........  .........
Idaho..................................          X  .........  .........
Illinois...............................          X  .........  .........
Indiana................................  .........  .........          X
Iowa...................................          X  .........  .........
Kansas.................................          X  .........  .........
Kentucky...............................          X  .........  .........
Louisana...............................          X  .........  .........
Maine..................................  .........  .........          X
Maryland...............................          X  .........  .........
Massachusetts..........................          X  .........  .........
Michigan...............................          X  .........  .........
Minnesota..............................          X  .........  .........
Mississippi............................          X  .........  .........
Missouri...............................          X  .........  .........
Montana................................          X  .........  .........
Nebraska...............................          X  .........  .........
Nevada.................................  .........  .........          X
New Hampshire..........................  .........  .........          X
New Jersey.............................          X  .........  .........
New Mexico.............................          X  .........  .........
New York...............................          X  .........  .........
North Carolina.........................  .........          X  .........
North Dakota...........................          X  .........  .........
Ohio...................................          X  .........  .........
Oklahoma...............................          X  .........  .........
Oregon.................................          X  .........  .........
Pennsylvania...........................          X  .........  .........
Rhode Island...........................  .........  .........          X
South Carolina.........................          X  .........  .........
South Dakota...........................          X  .........  .........
Tennessee..............................          X  .........  .........
Texas..................................          X  .........  .........
Utah...................................          X  .........  .........
Vermont................................  .........  .........          X
Virginia...............................          X  .........  .........
Washington.............................          X  .........  .........
West Virginia..........................          X  .........  .........
Wisconsin..............................          X  .........  .........
Wyoming................................          X  .........  .........
      TOTAL............................         43          1          6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Senate Budget Committee. Compiled from information in House     
  Committee on Rules, 99th Cong., 2d Session, Item Veto: State          
  Experience and its Application to the Federal Situation, Appendix C-1 
  (Comm. Print 1986), and Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental      
  Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, Vol. 1, p. 12,  
  June 1994.                                                            

    Congress has stopped short of considering a constitutional 
amendment to grant the President this authority, and has chosen 
to address the line-item veto authority by statute. During the 
1980s three statutory approaches developed on the line-item 
veto.
          Separate enrollment legislation would require each 
        item in an appropriations or tax bill be enrolled as a 
        separate Act, allowing the President to veto these 
        individual items.
          Enhanced rescission legislation would delegate to the 
        President unilateral authority to rescind budget 
        authority provided in appropriations Acts or repeal tax 
        expenditures in revenue acts. The President's 
        rescissions or repeals could only be overturned by 
        passage of a separate law. Assuming the President's 
        veto of a law overturning his own rescissions or 
        repeals, it would take a two-thirds vote of each House 
        to overturn his actions.
          Expedited recession legislation, such as S. 14, would 
        establish fast-track procedures for the consideration 
        of the President's proposals to rescind budget 
        authority provided in an appropriations act or repeal 
        tax expenditures in revenue acts. These proposals would 
        only go into effect if passed by a majority of each 
        House and signed into law.
    Table II shows Senate action over the past 12 years on 
these three approaches to the line-item veto. Even the 
legislative granting of such authority puts issues of the power 
of the purse and the balance of powers between the Congress and 
the President squarely before the Congress.

  TABLE II.--SELECTED SENATE FLOOR VOTES ON OR RELATING TO MEASURES TO PROVIDE EXPANDED RESCISSION AUTHORITY OR 
                       SEPARATE ENROLLMENT SINCE ENACTMENT OF THE IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT                       
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Congress                Measure                  Sponsor      Date/Chamber        Vote        Type of proposal
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
103rd.......  Amendment 542 to S. 1134......  Bradley.........  6/24/93.....  53-45...........  Separate        
                                                                Senate        (Budget Act       enrollment.     
                                                                               waiver)                          
103rd.......  Amendment 264 to S. Con. Res.   Bradley.........  3/25/93.....  73-24...........  Separate        
               18.                                              Senate                          enrollment.     
103rd.......  Amendment 200 to S. Con. Res.   Cohen...........  3/25/93.....  Voice vote......  Expedited       
               18.                                              Senate                          rescission.     
103rd.......  Amendment 200 to S. Con. Res.   Cohen...........  3/25/93.....  34-65...........  Expedited       
               18.                                              Senate        (to table)        rescission.     
103rd.......  Amendment 73 to S. 460........  McCain..........  3/10/93.....  45-52...........  Expedited       
                                                                Senate        (Budget Act       rescission.     
                                                                               waiver)                          
102nd.......  Amendment 3013 to H.R. 5677...  McCain/Coats....  9/17/92.....  40-56...........  Enhanced        
                                                                Senate        (Budget Act       rescission.     
                                                                               waiver)                          
102nd.......  Amendment 1698 to S. 479......  McCain..........  2/27/92.....  44-54...........  Enhanced        
                                                                Senate        (Budget Act       rescission.     
                                                                               waiver)                          
101st.......  Amendment 1955 to S. 341......  McCain..........  6/6/90......  43-50...........  Enhanced        
                                                                Senate        (Budget Act       rescission.     
                                                                               waiver)                          
101st.......  Amendment 1092 to H.R. 3015...  Coats et al.....  11/9/89.....  40-51...........  Enhanced        
                                                                Senate        (Budget Act       rescission.     
                                                                               waiver)                          
100th.......  Amendment 650 to H.J. Res. 324  Evans...........  7/31/87.....  41-48...........  Separate        
                                                                Senate                          enrollment.     
100th.......  Amendment 1294 to H.J. Res.     Evans...........  12/11/87....  44-51...........  Separate        
               395.                                             Senate                          enrollment.     
99th........  S. 43.........................  Mattingly et al.  7/18/85.....  57-42...........  Separate        
                                                                Senate        (cloture)         enrollment.     
99th........  S. 43.........................  Mattingly et al.  7/24/85.....  58-40...........  Separate        
                                                                Senate        (cloture)         enrollment.     
99th........  Amendment 2853 to S. 2706.....  Quayle/Exon.....  9/19/96.....  34-62...........  Expedited       
                                                                Senate        (Budget Act       rescission.     
                                                                               waiver)                          
98th........  Amendment 2625 to H.J. Res.     Armstrong.......  11/16/83....  49-46...........  Enhanced        
               308.                                             Senate        (to table)        rescission.     
98th........  Amendment 3045 to H.R. 2163...  Mattingly.......  5/3/84......  56-34...........  Separate        
                                                                Senate        (out of order)    enrollment.     
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Memorandum to the Senate Budget Committee on the Line-Item Veto, Virginia McMurtry, Specialist in       
  American National Government, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, February 14, 1995.         

                        III. Legislative History

    Senator Domenici introduced S. 14, the Legislative Line 
Item Veto Act, on January 4, 1995. S. 14 was the product of an 
effort to consolidate proposals that provided for expedited 
procedures for the consideration of reductions in spending or 
repeals of targeted tax benefits. Senators Exon, Craig, 
Bradley, and Cohen--all principal authors of such legislation--
are original cosponsors of S. 14. In addition, Senators Dole 
and Daschle cosponsored the legislation.
    The Senate Budget Committee first took action on line item 
veto legislation in 1990. During the markup of budget process 
reform legislation, the Committee defeated two proposals 
proposed by Senator Armstrong to grant the President enhanced 
rescission authority. The Committee did approve legislation put 
forward by Senator Hollings and reported S. 3181, the 
Legislative Line Item Veto Separate Enrollment Authority Act, 
on October 10, 1990 (Report No. 101-518).
    During the 103rd Congress, the House passed two bills that 
were similar to S. 14. On April 29, 1993, the House passed H.R. 
1578, the Expedited Rescissions Act of 1993. A little over a 
year later the House passed a stronger expedited rescission 
bill, H.R. 4600, on July 14, 1994. Although both House-passed 
bills were referred to the Senate Budget Committee, the 
committee did not take action on the legislation. The Committee 
did hold a hearing on line item veto legislation on October 5, 
1994, 3 days prior to the date the Senate adjourned, 
essentially, to end the 103rd Congress. (The Senate did return 
on November 30 and December 1, but only for the purposes of 
consideration of legislation on the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade).
    The 104th Congress saw immediate action on line item veto 
legislation. On January 18, 1995, the Senate Budget Committee 
held hearings on line item veto legislation. The House passed 
H.R. 2, legislation that would grant the President enhanced 
rescission authority, on February 6, 1995.
    The Senate Budget Committee marked up S. 14 and ordered it 
reported, without recommendation, on February 14. Senator 
Domenici offered a substitute amendment that was modified by 
amendments offered by Senators Exon and Nickles. The Exon 
amendment extended the rescission procedures to targeted tax 
benefits. The Nickles amendment narrowed the definition of 
targeted tax benefits as a benefit to 100 taxpayers or less. 
The Committee adopted the Domenici substitute with these 
amendments. The bill, as reported, modified S. 14 as follows:
          narrowed the definition of targeted tax benefits and 
        dropped direct spending from the expedited rescission 
        procedures;
          tightened the congressional procedures for 
        consideration of rescissions; and,
          extended the sunset date to September 30, 2002.

                    IV. Section-by-Section Analysis

                         section 1. short title

    This Act may be cited as the ``Legislative Line Item Veto 
Act''.

section 2. expedited consideration of certain proposed rescissions and 
            repeals of tax expenditures and direct spending

    Subsection (a) adds a new section, 1012A, to Title X of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974. This new section sets forth 
procedures under which the President proposes the rescission of 
budget authority and Congress considers and votes on such 
proposals. These procedures are also available to the President 
to repeal targeted tax benefits contained in revenue or 
reconciliation Acts.
    This section is an optional avenue for the President to 
ensure Congressional disposition of his proposals for 
rescission of discretionary budget authority. The existing 
rescission procedures under section 1012 of the Budget Act are 
not superseded by this section.

Subsection (a) of Section 1210A. Proposed Rescissions

    The President many transmit a special message and a draft 
bill proposing the rescission of any budget authority in an 
appropriation Act. The President may also propose the repeal of 
a targeted tax benefit contained in a revenue Act or a 
reconciliation Act. [The terms ``budget authority'', 
``appropriation Act'', ``rescission of budget authority'' and 
``targeted tax benefit'' are defined in subsection (f)].
    Once the President proposes rescission of budget authority 
or repeal of a tax benefit under this new section, the 
President may not propose the same rescission or repeal again 
under title X of the Congressional Budget Act. This language 
requires the President to choose between transmitting his 
proposed rescission under current law or under the new 
procedures. A rescission proposal transmitted under the 
expedited authority in section 1210A could not be transmitted 
subsequently under section 1210.

Subsection (b) of Section 1210A. Transmittal of the Special Message

            (1) In General
    The President may transmit a special message proposing 
rescission of budget authority contained in an appropriations 
Act or repeal of a targeted tax benefit contained in revenue or 
reconciliation Act. The President is prohibited from 
transmitting more than one message under this section per Act 
and is prohibited from including rescissions or repeals from 
more than one Act in a special message. The language requires 
the President, if he chooses to transmit a message under this 
section, to include all of the rescissions or repeals that the 
proposes from that single Act. In addition, the language 
prohibits the President from packaging rescissions/repeals from 
more than one Act into one special message.
            (2) Time Limitations
    The President may transmit a special message during the 20 
calendar day period after enactment of the provision proposed 
to be rescinded or repeals. The 20 day count excludes 
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
    A problem arises if this time limitation runs up against an 
adjournment date. Therefore, the President may also transmit a 
special message on the first day of a session of Congress where 
an Act was enacted after the sine die adjournment of preceding 
session of a Congress. In addition, the President is authorized 
to retransmit, notwithstanding the prohibition in subsection 
(a), a special message where the special message was originally 
transmitted within the 20-day time limited and Congress 
adjourned sine die prior to the expiration of the 10 days 
within which the Houses have to vote on the proposal.
            (3) Draft Bill
    A draft bill is required to be included with the special 
message. The draft bill must include all of the rescissions of 
budget authority or repeals of targeted tax benefits that are 
proposed for rescission or repeal in that special message. The 
bill is to clearly identify the budget authority proposed for 
rescission or the tax benefit proposed for repeal and, where 
applicable, the program, project, or activity to which the 
rescission/repeal related. The President's discretion is 
limited to proposing the rescission, in whole or in part, of 
budget authority or the repeal of a targeted tax benefit only--
no other matter shall be included in the text of the draft 
bill.
            (4) Contents of the Special Message
    The special message is required to specify, for each 
rescission and, where applicable, for each repeal: 1) the 
amount proposed for rescission/repeal, 2) the account, 
department, project, or function for which the budget authority 
was available, 3) the reasons for the rescission/repeal, 4) the 
affects of such rescission/repeal, and 5) all such other 
information relating to or bearing on the proposed rescission/
repeal.
            (5) Deficit Reduction
    This paragraph establishes a lockbox. Five days after 
enactment of a bill under this section rescinding budget 
authority, the President is required to reduce the 
discretionary spending limits under section 601 of the Budget 
Act to reflect the savings in budget authority and outlays 
resulting from that rescission. The Chairman of the Senate and 
House Budget Committees are also required to adjust appropriate 
allocations to reflect that rescission.

Subsection (c) of Section 1210A. Procedures for Expedited Consideration

            (1) In General
    (A) Introduction. The Majority Leader or Minority Leader of 
the House or Senate is required to introduce the President's 
draft bill, by request, before the close of the second day of 
session following receipt of a special message. If the bill is 
not so introduced, then any Member of the House or Senator may 
introduce that bill on the following day of session. A ``day of 
session'' is intended to be a calendar day on which that House 
is in session.
    (B) Referral and Reporting. The bill introduced following 
receipt of a special message shall be referred to the 
appropriate committee. The committee has five days of session 
in which to report, or the committee will be discharged from 
further consideration of the bill. The committee must not make 
substantive revisions to the bill and may report the bill, with 
or without recommendation.
    (C) Final Passage. A vote on passage shall be taken in the 
House and Senate before the close of the 10th day of session 
following introduction of the bill in that House. This 
provision requires the Presiding Officer to lay the bill before 
the Senate on his own initiative prior to the recess or 
adjournment of the Senate on the appropriate day and requires 
an ``up-or-down'' vote on the bill.
            (2) Consideration in the House
    Subparagraph (A) provides that the motion to proceed is 
highly privileged and it not subject to debate, amendment, or a 
motion to reconsider. Subparagraph (B) provides that the only 
amendment in order is a motion to strike a rescission or repeal 
in the bill, if it is supported by 49 Members. Subparagraph (C) 
limits debate in the House to four hours, equally divided, 
provides for a non-debatable motion to further limit debate and 
prohibits motions to recommit or to reconsider. Subparagraph 
(D) provides that appeals are not debatable. Finally, 
subparagraph (E) provides that it is not in order to consider 
the bill under Suspension of the Rules or under a Special Rule. 
Except as provided above, the Rules of the House shall govern 
consideration of the bill.
            (3) Consideration in the Senate
    Subparagraph (A) provides that a motion to proceed is not 
debatable and is not subject to a motion to reconsider. 
Subparagraph (B) provides that the only amendment in order is a 
motion to strike a rescission or repeal in the bill, if it is 
supported by 11 Members. Subparagraphs (C) and (D) limit debate 
in the Senate. Debate on the bill, debatable motions and 
appeals, is limited to ten hours, while debate on those motions 
or appeals is limited to one hour. Debate is equally divided 
and controlled in the usual form. Subparagraphs (E) and (F) 
provide that a motion to further limit debate is not debatable 
and no motion to recommit is in order.
    Subparagraph (G) provides procedures for consideration of 
the House bill. If the Senate receives the House companion bill 
prior to the vote required under this subsection, the Senate 
may consider and vote on the House bill. This provision 
clarifies that the vote required on passage in the Senate is 
not necessarily required to be on the bill that was introduced 
in the Senate; however, the Senate, presumably, will not 
consider the House bill unless no rescissions/repeals have been 
struck from that bill. If the Senate considers and votes on the 
Senate bill, then immediately following that vote the House 
bill will be considered.
    If the House bill is identical to the Senate bill as voted 
upon, then the vote on the Senate bill will be deemed to be the 
vote on the House bill. If the House bill is not identical, the 
Senate will proceed to consideration of the House bill under 
the provisions of paragraph (3), except that a motion to strike 
all after the enacting clause and substitute the text of the 
Senate bill, as voted upon, is in order.
    If the House bill has not been received in the Senate prior 
to the vote required under subsection (c), then upon receipt of 
the House bill the same procedures stated in the preceding 
paragraph apply.
    Subparagraph (H) provides that overall debate on the 
motions necessary to resolve amendments between Houses, 
including the motions necessary to send the bill to conference, 
is limited to two hours. Debate on each motion, appeal, or 
point of order submitted to the Senate, is limited to 30 
minutes. The time is equally divided and controlled in the 
usual form.
            (4) Conference
    (A) Authority of the Conferees. Where a motion to strike or 
a series of such motions is before the conference, the 
conferees may only recommend that a House recede from its 
disagreement and concur or recede from its amendment. Where an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute is before the 
conference, the conferees must retain all provisions that both 
Houses agreed to, and may include provisions that were included 
by either House, but may not include any other matter.
    Where the two Houses cannot reach agreement concerning 
motions by the Houses to strike proposed rescissions or 
repeals, a conference, then, becomes necessary. This 
subparagraph limits the discretion of the conferees so that the 
conference agreement must contain all of the rescissions or 
repeals that both Houses agreed to, must not contain those 
rescissions and repeals that both Houses struck, and may 
contain those rescissions or repeals that either House had 
agreed to.
    (B) Consideration of Conference Reports. Debate on the 
conference report and any amendments in disagreement is limited 
to two hours, equally divided and controlled in the usual form. 
A motion to further limit debate is in order and is not 
debatable, and no motion to recommit or to reconsider the vote 
is in order.
    (C) Failure of Conference to Act. A conference report is 
required to be filed within five calendar days. If the 
conference fails to report in that time, any Member of either 
House may introduce the bill as originally drafted by the 
President on the next day of session and the bill shall be 
considered under the provisions of this section, except that a 
motion to strike is not in order.

  subsection (d) of Section 1210A. Amendments and Divisions Prohibited

    Amendments to the bill considered under section 1210A are 
not in order, except an amendment to strike a rescission or a 
repeal or an amendment to strike all after the enacting clause 
of the House bill and substitute the text of the Senate bill. 
In the House of Representatives, a demand for division of the 
question is prohibited, as is a motion or a unanimous consent 
request to suspend this subsection.

 Subsection (e) of Section 1210A. Temporary Presidential Authority to 
                                Rescind

    This language permits the President to delay 1) the 
obligation of budget authority that he proposes to rescind or 
2) the effectiveness of a repeal of a tax benefit that he 
proposes for repeal under section 1210A for a period up to 45 
days. The President may make budget authority available or make 
the tax benefit effective at a date earlier than the 45 days 
upon a determination that continuation of the delay would not 
further the purposes of this Act.
    For example, if Congress rejects a President's proposed 
rescission prior to the expiration of the 45 day period, the 
committee expects the President to make that budget authority 
available after such rejection and this subsection provides the 
authority to the President to make that available at that 
earlier date.

              subsection (f) of Section 1210A. Definitions

    Appropriations Act means any general or special 
appropriations Act, and any Act or joint resolution making 
supplemental, deficiency, or continuing appropriations.
    Budget authority means any amount, in whole or in part, of 
budget authority provided in an appropriations Act. The term 
does not include budget authority in an appropriations Act to 
fund a direct spending program. The definition limits the 
budget authority to discretionary budget authority provided in 
an appropriation Act.
    Rescission of budget authority means the rescission, in 
whole or in part, of budget authority provided in an 
appropriation Act.
    Targeted tax benefit means any provision in a revenue Act 
or a reconciliation Act that the President determines provides 
a Federal tax deduction, credit, exclusion, preference, or 
other concession to 100 or fewer beneficiaries. The definition 
clarifies that partnerships, limited partnerships, trusts, S-
corporations, and any subsidiary or affiliate of the same 
parent corporation is a single beneficiary, regardless of the 
number of partners, beneficiaries of the trust, or affiliated 
corporate entities.

 subsection (g) of Section 1210A. Application to Targeted Tax Benefits

    Permits the President to propose the repeal of any targeted 
tax benefit, under the same conditions, and subject to the same 
Congressional consideration as a proposal under this section to 
rescind budget authority.

Subsection (b) of Section 2. Exercise of Rulemaking Powers

    This subsection amends Section 904 of the Congressional 
Budget Act to include new Section 1210A as enacted as an 
exercise of the rulemaking powers of Congress. They are 
considered as part of the rules of each House or to the rules 
of the House to which they specifically apply. They are also 
enacted with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
either House to change such rules.

Subsection (c) of Section 2. Clerical Amendments

    This subsection amends the table of sections for subpart B 
of title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act to reflect the addition of the new section 1210A.

Subsection (d) of Section 2. Effective Period

    The new section 1210A and other amendments in section 2 
take effect on the date of enactment, apply only to budget 
authority or targeted tax benefits provided in Acts enacted on 
or after the date of enactment of this Act, and is sunset on 
September 30, 2002.

                            V. Cost Estimate

    Paragraph 11 of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate require reports accompanying measures to include an 
estimate of the costs that would be incurred in carrying out 
that measure. In accordance with that rule, the Congressional 
Budget Office has submitted the following cost estimate to the 
committee:
                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                 Washington, DC, February 22, 1995.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on the Budget, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
reviewed S. 14, the Legislative Line Item Veto Act, as ordered 
reported without recommendation by the Senate Committee on the 
Budget on February 14, 1995.
    S. 14 would grant the President the authority to propose 
legislation that would rescind all or part of any discretionary 
budget authority or repeal any targeted tax benefit (defined as 
any provision of a revenue or reconciliation bill that provides 
a federal tax benefit to 100 or fewer taxpayers) provided 
within a bill that has just been enacted. S. 14 would also 
establish procedures ensuring that the House and Senate vote on 
that legislation.
    To exercise this authority, the President must transmit a 
special message to both houses of Congress specifying each 
amount proposed to be rescinded (or provision repealed) from 
appropriations (or tax provisions) within a particular bill 
just signed by the President. Furthermore, the message must 
include the governmental functions involved, the reasons for 
the veto, and--to the extent practicable--the estimated fiscal, 
economic, and budgetary effect of the action. This message must 
be transmitted within 20 calendar days (excluding Saturdays, 
Sundays, and holidays) of enactment of the legislation 
containing the vetoed items.
    Along with the special message, the President must submit a 
draft bill that, if enacted, would carry out the proposed 
rescissions or vetoes. That draft bill must be introduced in 
each House within three days of its receipt. Within five days 
of session thereafter, the committee of jurisdiction in each 
house must report the bill. A vote on final passage shall be 
taken in each chamber within 10 days of session after 
introduction of the legislation. The only amendments allowed 
would be motions to strike proposed rescissions. S. 14 also 
provides procedures to expedite the resolution of any 
differences between the versions of bills passed by the House 
and Senate. If a recission bill considered pursuant to this 
legislation is enacted, the President shall reduce the 
discretionary spending caps for all affected years to reflect 
the rescission. The provisions of S. 14 would be effective 
through September 30, 2002.
    The budgetary impact of this bill is uncertain, because it 
would depend on the manner in which the President exercises the 
authority granted and the response of the Congress to the 
proposed bills; however, potential savings or costs are likely 
to be relatively small. Discretionary spending currently 
accounts for only one-third of total outlays and is ready 
tightly controlled. Mandatory spending, by far the larger part 
of the budget, is not affected by S. 14. By the same token, 
repealing a tax break that benefits fewer than 100 people is 
unlikely to generate large savings.
    By itself, this bill would not affect direct spending or 
receipts, so there would be no pay-as-you-go scoring under 
section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985.
    Enactment of this legislation would not directly affect the 
budgets of state and local governments. However, exercising the 
new authority could affect federal grants to states, federal 
contributions towards shared programs or projects, and the 
demand for state and local programs to compensate for increases 
or reductions in federal programs.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact on this issue is 
Jeffrey Holland, who can be reached at 226-2880.
            Sincerely,
                                              James L. Blum
                              (For Robert D. Reischauer, Director).

                    VI. Regulatory Impact Statement

    Paragraph 11(b) of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate requires the committee report accompanying each reported 
bill to include an evaluation of the regulatory impact of the 
reported legislation. That evaluation is to include an estimate 
of the economic, paperwork, and privacy impact on individuals, 
businesses, and consumers.
    S. 14 provides for expedited consideration by Congress of 
rescission of new budget authority and repeals of new targeted 
tax benefits proposed by the President. The legislation 
addresses Federal legislative process and will affect only that 
process.
    The legislation has no direct economic, paperwork, or 
privacy impact on individuals, businesses, or consumers. These 
groups are not involved in the processes covered by the 
legislation's requirements.
    S. 14 could have a regulatory or paperwork impact only to 
the extent that its process permitted the rescission of budget 
authority or the repeal of a targeted tax benefit that resulted 
in such a regulatory or paperwork impact.

                          VII. Committee Votes

    Paragraph 7(b) of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate requires the committee report accompanying a measure 
reported from the committee to include the results of each roll 
call vote taken on the measure and any amendments thereto. In 
addition, paragraph 7(c) requires the report to include a 
tabulation of the vote cast by each member of the committee on 
the question of reporting the measure.
    In accordance with the Standing Rules of the Senate, the 
following are roll call votes taken during Senate Budget 
Committee mark-up of S. 14, the Legislative Line-Item Veto Act, 
held on Tuesday, February 14, 1995.
    (1) Exon amendment, to the Chairman's substitute, providing 
a legislative line-item veto for targeted tax benefits.
    Amendment adopted by: Yeas 12 Nays 10.
        YEAS                          NAYS
Brown                               Domenici
Gregg                               Grassley
Exon                                Nickles
Hollings                            Gramm
Johnston \1\                        Bond \1\
Lautenberg                          Lott
Simon                               Gorton
Conrad                              Snowe
Dodd                                Abraham
Sarbanes                            Frist
Box\1\
Murray
    (2) Exon amendment, to the Chairman's substitute, changing 
the sunset date to September 30, 1998.
    Amendment rejected by: Yeas 10 Nays 12.
        YEAS                          NAYS
Exon                                Domenici
Hollings                            Grassley \1\
Johnston \1\                        Nickles
Lautenberg                          Gramm
Simon                               Bond \1\
Conrad                              Lott
Dodd                                Brown
Sarbanes                            Gorton
Boxer\1\                            Gregg
Murray                              Snowe
                                    Abraham
                                    Frist
    (3) Hollings amendment, to the Chairman's substitute, 
codifying the existing Pay-as-you-go point of order in the 
Budget Act.
    Amendment tabled by: Yeas 12 Nays 10.
        YEAS                          NAYS
Domenici                            Exon
Grassley                            Hollings
Nickles                             Johnston \1\
Gramm                               Lautenberg
Bond \1\                            Simon
Lott                                Conrad
Brown                               Dodd
Gorton                              Sarbanes
Gregg \1\                           Boxer \1\
Snowe                               Murray
Abraham
Frist
    (4) Nickles amendment, to the Chairman's substitute, 
defining ``targeted tax benefit''.
    Amendment adopted by: Yeas 12 Nays 10.
        YEAS                          NAYS
Domenici                            Exon
Grassley \1\                        Hollings \1\
Nickles                             Johnston \1\
Gramm\1\                            Lautenberg
Bond\1\                             Simon
Lott\1\                             Conrad
Brown                               Dodd
Gorton                              Sarbanes
Gregg\1\                            Boxer
Snowe                               Murray
Abraham
Frist
    (5) Dodd amendment, to the Chairman's substitute, 
permitting relevant amendments.
    Amendment rejected by: Yeas 9 Nays 12.
        YEAS                          NAYS
Exon                                Domenici
Hollings \1\                        Grassley \1\
Lautenberg \1\                      Nickles
Simon \1\                           Gramm \1\
Conrad                              Bond \1\
Dodd                                Lott \1\
Sarbanes                            Brown
Boxer                               Gorton
Murray                              Gregg
                                    Snowe \1\
                                    Abraham
                                    Frist
    Not voting: Johnston.
    (6) Motion to report S. 14, as amended, without 
recommendation.
    Motion adopted by: Yeas 13 Nays 8.
        YEAS                          NAYS
Domenici                            Exon
Grassley \1\                        Hollings \1\
Nickles                             Johnston \1\
Bond \1\                            Lautenberg \1\
Lott                                Dodd
Brown                               Sarbanes
Gorton                              Boxer
Gregg                               Murray
Snowe \1\
Abraham
Frist
Simon \1\
Conrad
    Not voting: Gramm.

    \1\ Indicates vote by proxy
                  VIII. Additional and Minority Views

                              ----------                              


              ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR SPENCER ABRAHAM

    During my campaign for the U.S. Senate, I strongly 
supported enactment of a line-item veto. Forty-three governors 
use the line-item veto to strike egregious ``pork-barrel'' 
spending from budget bills. I believe the President of the 
United States should have the same authority.
    The Senate Budget Committee has reported two versions of 
the line-item veto--S. 4, the McCain-Coats bill and S. 14, the 
Domenici bill. I voted with the majority to report S. 4 and S. 
14--as amended--out of the Committee without recommendation. I 
believe that the line-item veto should apply only to government 
spending. The original version of S. 14 would have allowed the 
President to rescind not only appropriated and new mandatory 
spending, but new ``targeted tax benefits'' as well. In other 
words, under S. 14 the President would have been empowered to 
raise taxes by striking new tax deductions, credits, and 
exclusions.
    I certainly oppose wasteful tax loopholes designed to 
benefit one taxpayer or a narrow group of taxpayers. However, I 
believe the general concept of ``tax expenditures'' is 
fundamentally flawed because it assumes that taxpayers' income 
belongs to the Federal government first. The fact is that the 
government does not create money with which to spend on tax 
credits, deductions and exclusions. Tax dollars belong to 
American people first. Many of the so-called ``tax 
expenditures'' simply allow people to keep more of their own 
hard-earned tax dollars. Some examples include the home 
mortgage interest deduction, Individual Retirement Accounts, 
and the 25 percent health insurance deduction for self-employed 
individuals.
    Further, the definition of what would constitute a 
``special tax benefit'' in the original version of S. 14 was 
too broadly-defined. During the Committee's January 18th 
hearing on the line-item veto, I asked Sen. Bill Bradley, one 
of the lead co-sponsors of S. 14, to provide his view of what 
would qualify as a special tax benefit that could be rescinded 
by the President. In response to my questioning, Sen. Bradley 
said that a capital gains tax reduction would qualify. In my 
judgement, a capital gains tax reduction is not a special tax 
benefit. In addition to directly benefitting millions of 
American families, retirees, homeowners, small businessowners 
and farmers, a capital gains tax cut would significantly 
enhance investment, productivity, job creation and U.S. 
international competitiveness. Further, the capital gains tax 
is an unfair ``double tax'' on the same stream of income. The 
government taxes income when it is earned. If this after-tax 
income is invested in a capital asset, the government taxes it 
again when that asset is sold and a capital gain is realized.
    During the Committee mark-up, I voted for an amendment to 
S. 14 offered by Sen. Don Nickles that limited the definition 
of special tax benefits to those that benefit 100 or fewer 
taxpayers. This language is identical to the targeted tax 
benefit language in the House-passed version of the line-item 
veto. I voted to report S. 14, as amended, to keep the process 
moving and to bring the line-item veto before the full Senate. 
But my clear preference would be to enact a line-item veto that 
is limited to spending because our Nation's budget deficit is 
caused by overspending, not undertaxation. In 1960, both 
Federal tax receipts and outlays as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) stood at 18.3 percent. Although tax 
receipts had increased to 18.8 percent of GDP by 1994, spending 
had increased even more, rising to 22.3 percent of national 
income.
    In summary, the American people believe that $1.5 trillion 
that they spend on government programs is more than enough. 
They want us to make it work by reducing spending instead of 
raising taxes. A line-item veto would help restore fiscal 
responsibility to the budget process.

                                                   Spencer Abraham.
                   MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR JIM EXON

    I have been an ardent and long-time supporter of line-item 
veto legislation as a means to combat pork-barrel spending. 
Ideally, Congress should exhibit the type of self restraint and 
sacrifice that would swiftly put this wasteful practice to an 
end. We owe that to future generations of Americans and to our 
commitment to reduce the deficit.
    However, I am a realist and I know that while some Members 
would voluntarily refrain from pork-barrell spending, others 
would continue with business as usual.
    As of now, an enormous dilemma also faces the President. 
Pork-barrel spending projects are carefully woven into the 
appropriations legislation, or as Senator Bradley rightly 
observed, through targeted tax credits and expenditures in 
revenue acts. The President cannot simply pull out one thread 
without unraveling the entire bill. He does not have that 
authority.
    The President must look at each bill as a whole, 
determining whether to accept the bad with the good--whether 
the bad outweighs the good. More often than not, it is a case 
of the President holding his nose and signing the spending 
bill.
    The obvious solution is to grant the President the line-
item veto. Today, 43 of the 50 State Governors have some form 
of veto authority. As Governor of the State of Nebraska, I was 
privileged to have the line-item veto authority. To me, it was 
an invaluable weapon in my arsenal to effectively control the 
spending of my state legislature.
    I have long believed that the President too should have 
this power to challenge wasteful Government spending and keep 
us on the path of deficit reduction. All but two Presidents in 
the 20th century have supported some type of line-item veto 
authority. It is time we grant the President this power.

                        a bi-partisan compromise

    On the first day of the 104th Congress, I joined in 
introducing the legislative line-item veto proposal, S. 14. It 
was co-sponsored by the distinguished Majority Leader and 
Democratic Leader, and by my colleagues, the Chairman of the 
Budget Committee, Senator Domenici, and Senators Bradley, Craig 
and Cohen.
    The original S. 14 stood in stark contrast to some of the 
other line-item veto proposals, especially S. 4, sponsored by 
the Majority Leader, and Senators McCain and Coats, which was 
reported out of the Senate Budget Committee on February 14, 
1995.
    S. 14 bill would have forced Congress to vote on the 
cancellation of a budget item proposed by the President, but 
would still required approval of a simple majority of both 
Houses of Congress to put the President's proposed cancellation 
into effect.
    In contrast, S. 4, Senator McCain's bill, would require a 
two-thirds vote of both Houses to stop a Presidential 
rescission from taking effect. And while Senator McCain's bill 
applies only to appropriations, my bill applies to 
appropriations, new entitlements, and new targeted tax 
benefits.
    I believed that through S. 14--the Domenici-Exon bi-
partisan compromise--we could finally move forward on the line-
item veto. In S. 14, I had hoped that we had finally found the 
vehicle to carry us to the finish line. Unfortunately, S. 14, 
as originally written, was derailed during the markup.

            the committee failed to address tax expenditures

    I will not conceal my disappointment about what occurred 
during the Budget Committee markup of S. 14. I am convinced it 
is the only concept that has a chance of passing the Senate. 
The language in the original bill was weakened to the point 
that I could not support the Domenici substitute.
    My greatest concern about the Domenici substitute centered 
on one glaring absence: new tax expenditures would not be 
subject to a line-item veto. If we are serious about reducing 
the deficit, tax expenditures should be included in any line-
item veto legislation. Anything else would be a half-measure. 
However, even though I voted against reporting out the flawed 
version of S. 14 in Committee, I still nurture the hope that 
the scope and bite of the legislation can be restored on the 
Senate floor.
    On February 3, 1993, the Budget Committee held a hearing on 
the impact of tax expenditures on the Federal budget. What we 
found was startling. At that time, tax expenditures were 
projected to cost more than $400 billion and were slated to 
increase to $525 billion by 1997. Today, they are $450 billion 
and are projected to rise to $565 billion in 1999.
    As with entitlement programs, tax expenditures cost the 
Treasury billions of dollars each year. And like entitlements, 
they receive little scrutiny once they are enacted into law. 
Even though they increase the deficit just like mandatory 
programs, tax expenditures escape any sort of fiscal control or 
oversight. Indeed, by masquerading as a tax expenditure, a 
program or activity that could not pass Congressional muster, 
could be indirectly funded.
    Office of Management and Budget Director Dr. Alice Rivlin 
correctly summed up the situation: ``Tax expenditures add to 
the Federal deficit in the same way that direct spending 
programs do.''
    However, not all tax expenditures are wrong, or unworthy. 
Some are aimed at the wealthy; others are certainly worthwhile. 
Regardless, all these shadow entitlements deserve the same kind 
of scrutiny and attention as we would devote to other Federal 
activities that increase the deficit. If we are willing to 
subject annual appropriations to the President's veto pen, then 
that same oversight should be granted to the President on tax 
expenditures. Pork is pork. We should be willing to say ``no'' 
to both spending pork and and tax pork.
    During the markup of S. 14, the Committee, by a vote of 12 
to 10, wisely restored the tax expenditure language that was 
stripped from the substitute bill offered by Chairman Domenici. 
I would point out that the restored language dealing with tax 
expenditures closely tracks that contained in the so-called 
``Contract With America.'' I was encouraged that my amendment 
was adopted.
    However, as we took an important step forward to reinstate 
the bite of this bill, we later took a big step backwards with 
an amendment sponsored by Senator Nickles. His amendment, which 
was ultimately accepted by the Committee along party lines, 
would limit line-item veto authority to targeted tax provisions 
that benefit 100 or fewer taxpayers. In addition, the President 
would determine whether the tax expenditure benefits 100 or 
more individuals. In effect, this gutted my successful 
amendment referenced in the preceding paragraph.
    The American people do not need vague, fuzzy language 
subject to Presidential interpretation and vagaries. The 
Nickles amendment would also provide a ``cottage industry'' for 
tax attorneys who would somehow find a way to expand the pool 
beyond the 100 threshold. A proliferation of new tax loopholes 
is the last thing America needs. It's an open invitation to 
abuse and caused my eventual decision to oppose S. 14, as 
amended.
    Tax expenditures are far too important an issue to be 
watered down in this manner. Once the bill reaches the Senate 
floor, I will do everything in my power to strip the Nickles 
Committee Amendment. With that, I could still vigorously 
support the measure.

              the committee failed to address entitlements

    I will also not conceal my frustration that the Domenici 
latter-day version of S. 14 was confined only to appropriated 
spending. Its limited scope underscores the enormous problem we 
face today.
    For too long, many of our colleagues have clung to the thin 
reed that we can solve the deficit my cutting only appropriated 
spending. Unfortunately, the reed has given way and we are 
sinking in an ocean of red ink.
    In spite of the pay-as-you-go provisions of the 1990 Budget 
Enforcement Act, entitlement spending is the largest and 
fastest growing part of the Federal budget. The terrible truth 
is that mandatory spending is projected to grow from about 55 
percent of Federal spending in the current fiscal year to 62 
percent in 2005.
    The real surge occurs in Federal health care programs. They 
are the only programs that will grow at a rate significantly 
faster than the economy, increasing from 3.8 percent of GDP in 
Fiscal Year 1995 to 6 percent of GDP in 2005.
    On the other hand, discretionary spending, which currently 
makes up only about one-third of all Federal spending, has been 
significantly curbed and is expected to decline as a percent of 
the economy over the same time period.
    However, we cannot take much comfort in this success story. 
As much as we strip and shave away the fat and waste in 
appropriated spending, we get to a point of diminishing 
returns. The numbers tell us that we can only harvest so much 
deficit reduction from this field. We will not be able to 
balance the budget if we rely strictly on appropriated 
spending, and I would vigorously oppose greater cuts in defense 
spending, which could jeopardize our readiness.
    We have to look to other pastures--greener pastures with 
much higher grass for deficit reduction--and direct spending is 
one of them. Facts are facts. Sooner or later, we will have to 
look the deficit squarely in the eye and make some tough and 
painful choices. Entitlement spending and tax expenditures are 
two we can no longer avoid. Like ``Pac Man,'' they are 
devouring everything in sight.

                   a sunset provision helps the bill

    I do not want to leave the impression that there are only 
flaws in S. 14 because there is much to praise. I am gratified 
that the legislation still contains a sunset provision, 
although the date has been pushed back from 1998 to 2002.
    I have never understood why my colleagues get so vexed 
about sunset provisions. They are a common sight. We have had 
sunset provisions in everything from the crime bill, to school-
to-work, to the 1990 farm bill. A sunset provision demonstrates 
our commitment to quality legislation that meets not only 
today's needs, but tomorrow's needs as well. I believe that 
they work well and have served the American people well.
    In fact, a sunset provision will help, not hurt this bill. 
First, this is brand new legislation which is untried and 
untested. We only have the designers' assurances as to how it 
will work. The sunset provision gives us the equivalent of a 
shake-out cruise.
    It will enable us to see how well the legislation is 
working. We will be able to look at any bugs, glitches and 
problems that may arise. In addition, if for some reason, the 
line-item veto does not perform to our expectations, we can 
trade it in and start anew.
    Second, I have been stressing for some time that the only 
way to bring down the deficit is on a bipartisan basis. I 
support this legislation, but some of my colleagues have their 
reservations. They envision a lot of problems cropping up over 
time.
    I believe a sunset provision will ease some of those 
concerns, because this bill will not be cast in stone. If my 
colleagues' fears are realized, we will be able to revisit the 
bill at a date certain and make changes. The sunset provision 
gives us the benefit of the doubt.
    During the markup, I offered an amendment restoring the 
original 1998 sunset date. The legislative line-item veto does 
not exist in a vacuum. We will have to revisit the entire 
Budget Act in 1998. That is when the caps and the other major 
provisions, including the one that creates a 60-vote point of 
order and the entire system of sequesters, expire. What better 
time to reexamine the legislative line-item veto? The extended 
2002 sunset date turns a blind eye to this opportunity.

                               conclusion

    In conclusion, the substitute S. 14 is terribly flawed, but 
it is not fatally flawed. I believe that during Senate floor 
consideration, we can undo the damage that was done during 
markup and pass a legislative line-item veto bill that is as 
good as its promise to the American people.

                                                          Jim Exon.
                  MINORITY VIEWS SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

    I believe that the ``enhanced rescissions'' and ``expedited 
rescissions'' proposals voted out of this Committee create a 
dangerous shift of power from the Legislative to the Executive 
branch. The Constitution provides that Congress has the ``power 
of the purse.'' Under Article I, Section 9, ``No Money shall be 
drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations 
made by Law.'' In Federalist No. 48, James Madison stated that 
``the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of 
the people.''
    The power of the purse, Madison said in Federalist No. 58, 
represents the ``most complete and effectual weapon with which 
any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the 
people for obtaining a redress of every grievance and for 
carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.'' Through 
this power, Congress--as the directly elected representatives 
of the people--can serve as a check on the Executive branch.
    These expedited and enhanced rescissions proposals would 
dilute this power. The President would have the power to pick 
and choose which programs he likes and which he does not. This 
power could be used for political retribution or for political 
reward. For instance, will a state that traditionally votes 
Democratic see more of its programs in a Republican President's 
rescissions request? Will a state that is traditionally 
Republican face an overwhelming number of cuts under a 
Democratic President?
    Under both of these proposals, Congress would have an 
opportunity to vote on the President's proposed rescissions, 
but neither the enhanced rescissions nor the expedited 
rescissions proposals would allow Congress to substitute its 
spending cuts for those proposed by the President. In effect, 
part of the power of the pursue is being handed over to the 
President.
    The goal of these process changes is to bring us closer to 
a balanced budget. I support this goal. But, no ``expedited'' 
or ``enhanced'' process change will serve as a substitute for 
changing spending priorities and making the tough choices. No 
amount of process change will reduce the pain of tough budget 
cuts.
    The implication of these proposals is much broader than 
simply stemming the flow of federal red ink. They undermine our 
constitutional balance of powers. For this reason, I oppose 
these expedited and enhanced rescissions proposals.

                                                     Barbara Boxer.
                 MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

    I oppose both S. 4 and S. 14, two bills that grant the 
President line-item veto authority. I have read these bills and 
am convinced that they will achieve little to put this 
country's fiscal house in order.
    I have experience with line-item veto authority. I served 
in my State legislature and saw first-hand the kind of horse-
trading that can occur when the Executive has this power.
    I came to the United States Senate as a representative of 
the people of my home State of Washington. They elected me to 
be their voice on a wide array of issues--from funding the 
Hanford clean-up to providing economic relief to our hard-hit 
timber communities. Under no circumstances do I want to 
transfer my power to fight for the people of Washington State 
to any administration. That is precisely what these bills would 
do.
    Reducing our deficit takes courage. We must take tough 
votes. There is no assurance these bills will reduce the 
deficit. However, they definitely will just turn over more 
power to the White House. I say this at a time when the 
President is my friend and a member of my party.
    Line-item veto authority for the President is not what the 
framers of our Constitution envisaged. These bills go against 
the grain of our traditional balance of power.
    A number of amendments which would have gone a long way to 
improve these bills were voted down--largely on party lines--in 
this Committee. For that and all the abovementioned reasons, I 
voted against these bills in Committee.

                                                      Patty Murray.
                      IX. Changes to Existing Law

    Paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate requires the report to accompany a bill repealing or 
amending a statute to include a comparative print showing the 
proposed changes to existing law. Existing law proposed to be 
omitted is enclosed in black brackets while existing law to 
which no change is proposed is shown in roman. New matter is 
shown in italic.

      THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974

    Section 1. (a) Short Titles.--* * *
    (b) Table of Contents.--
          * * * * * * *

                      TITLE X--IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL

          * * * * * * *

     Part B--Congressional Consideration of Proposed Rescissions, 
            Reservations, and Deferrals of Budget Authority

Sec. 1011. Definitions.
Sec. 1012. Rescission of budget authority.
Sec. 1012A. Expedited consideration of certain proposed rescissions of 
          budget authority.
Sec. 1013. Proposed deferrals of budget authority.
          * * * * * * *

           TITLE IX--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS EFFECTIVE DATES

                     exercise of rulemaking powers

    Sec. 904. (a) The provisions of this title (except section 
905) and of titles I, III, IV, V, and VI (except section 
601(a)) and the provisions of sections 701, 703, [and 1017] 
1012A, and 1017 are endated by the Congress--
          (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the 
        House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, 
        and as such they shall be considered as part of the 
        rules of each House, respectively, or of that House to 
        which they specifically apply, and such rules shall 
        supersede other rules only to the extent that they are 
        inconsistent therewith; and
          * * * * * * *
    (d) Appeals in the Senate from the decisions of the Chair 
relating to any provision of title III or IV or [section 1017] 
sections 1012A and 1017 shall, except as otherwise provided 
therein, be limited to 1 hour, to be equally divided between 
and controlled by, the mover and the manager of the resolution, 
concurrent resolution, reconciliation bill, or rescission bill, 
as the case may be. * * *
          * * * * * * *

                      TITLE X--IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL

          * * * * * * *

     Part B--Congressional Consideration of Proposed Rescissions, 
            Reservations, and Deferrals of Budget Authority

          * * * * * * *

                     rescission of budget authority

    Sec. 1012. (a) Transmittal of Special Message.--* * *
    (b) Requirement to Make Available for Obligation.--
          * * * * * * *


   expedited consideration of certain proposed rescissions of budget 
                               authority


    Sec. 1012A. (a) Proposed Rescissions.--The President may 
propose, at the time and in the manner provided in subsection 
(b), the rescission of any budget authority provided in an 
appropriations Act. Except as otherwise provided in this 
section, budget authority proposed for rescission under this 
section may not be proposed for rescission again under this 
title.
    (b) Transmittal of Special Message.--
          (1) Special message.--
                  (A) In general.--Subject to the time 
                limitations provided in subparagraph (B), the 
                President may transmit to Congress a special 
                message proposing to rescind budget authority 
                contained in an appropriations Act. Except as 
                provided in subparagraph (B)(ii)(II), only one 
                special message shall be transmitted under this 
                section for any single Act and that message 
                shall propose to rescind budget authority 
                contained in that single Act.
                  (B) Time limitations.--A special message may 
                be transmitted under this section--
                          (i) during the 20-calendar-day period 
                        (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and 
                        legal holidays) commencing on the day 
                        after the date of enactment of the 
                        provisions proposed to be rescinded; or
                          (ii) on the first day of a session of 
                        Congress--
                                  (I) for rescissions contained 
                                in an Act enacted after the 
                                adjournment of the Congress to 
                                end the preceding session; or
                                  (II) for rescissions in an 
                                Act enacted prior to an 
                                adjournment of Congress to end 
                                the preceding session, if a 
                                special message had been 
                                transmitted under clause (i) 
                                but Congress adjourned prior to 
                                the expiration of the 10 days 
                                of session under subsection 
                                (c)(1)(C).
          (2) Draft bill.--The President shall include with 
        each special message transmitted under paragraph (1) a 
        draft bill that, if enacted, would rescind budget 
        authority proposed to be rescinded in that special 
        message. The draft bill shall clearly identify the 
        budget authority that is proposed to be rescinded 
        including, where applicable, each program, project, or 
        activity to which the rescission relates.
          (3) Contents of special message.--Each special 
        message shall specify, with respect to the budget 
        authority proposed to be rescinded--
                  (A) the amount of budget authority that the 
                President proposes be rescinded;
                  (B) any account, department, or establishment 
                of the Government to which such budget 
                authority is available for obligation, and the 
                specific project or governmental functions 
                involved;
                  (C) the reasons by the budget authority 
                should be rescinded;
                  (D) to the maximum extent practicable, the 
                estimated fiscal, economic, and budgetary 
                effect (including the effect on outlays and 
                receipts in each fiscal year) of the proposed 
                rescission; and
                  (E) all facts, circumstances, and 
                considerations relating to or bearing upon the 
                proposed rescission and the decision to effect 
                the proposed rescission, and to the maximum 
                extent practicable, the estimated effect of the 
                proposed rescission upon the objects, purposes, 
                and programs for which the budget authority is 
                provided.
          (4) Deficit reduction.--
                  (A) Discretionary spending limits.--Not later 
                than 5 days after the date of enactment of a 
                bill containing rescissions of budget authority 
                as provided under this section, the President 
                shall reduce the discretionary spending limits 
                under section 601 of the Congressional Budget 
                Act of 1974 for the budget year and any outyear 
                affected by the rescission bill to reflect the 
                rescission.
                  (B) Adjustment of committee allocations.--Not 
                later than 5 days after the date of enactment 
                of a rescission bill as provided under this 
                section, the Chairs of the Committees on the 
                Budget of the Senate and the House of 
                Representatives shall revise levels under 
                section 311(a) and adjust the committee 
                allocations under section 302(a) or 602(a) to 
                reflect the rescission, and the appropriate 
                committees shall report revised allocations 
                pursuant to section 302(b) or 602(b).
    (c) Procedures for Expedited Consideration.--
          (1) In general.--
                  (A) Introduction.--Before the close of the 
                second day of session of the Senate and the 
                House of Representatives, respectively, after 
                the date of receipt of a special message 
                transmitted to Congress under subsection (b), 
                the majority leader or minority leader of each 
                House shall introduce (by request) the draft 
                bill accompanying the special message. If the 
                bill is not introduced as provided in the 
                preceding sentence in either House, then, on 
                the third day of session of that House after 
                the date of receipt of that special message, 
                any Member of that House may introduce the 
                bill.
                  (B) Referral and reporting.--The bill shall 
                be referred to the appropriate committee. The 
                committee shall report the bill without 
                substantive revision and with or without 
                recommendation. The committee shall report the 
                bill not later than the fifth day of session of 
                that House after the date of introduction of 
                the bill in that House. If the committee fails 
                to report the bill within that period, the 
                committee shall be automatically discharged 
                from consideration of the bill, and the bill 
                shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
                  (C) Final passage.--A vote on final passage 
                of the bill shall be taken in the Senate and 
                the House of Representatives on or before the 
                close of the 10th day of session of that House 
                after the date of the introduction of the bill 
                in that House. If the bill is passed, the 
                Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the 
                House of Representatives, as the case may be, 
                shall cause the bill to be transmitted to the 
                other House on the next day of session of that 
                House.
          (2) Consideration in the house of representatives.--
                  (A) Motion to proceed to consideration.--A 
                motion in the House of Representatives to 
                proceed to the consideration of a bill under 
                this subsection shall be highly privileged and 
                not debatable. An amendment to the motion shall 
                not be in order, nor shall it be in order to 
                move to reconsider the vote by which the motion 
                is agreed to or disagreed to.
                  (B) Motion to strike.--During consideration 
                under this subsection in the House of 
                Representatives, any Member of the House of 
                Representatives may move to strike any proposed 
                rescission if supported by 49 other Members.
                  (C) Limits on debate.--Debate in the House of 
                Representatives on a bill under this subsection 
                shall not exceed 4 hours, which shall be 
                divided equally between those favoring and 
                those opposing the bill. A motion further to 
                limit debate shall not be debatable. It shall 
                not be in order to move to recommit a bill 
                under this subsection or to move to reconsider 
                the vote by which the bill is agreed to or 
                disagreed to.
                  (D) Appeals.--Appeals from decisions of the 
                Chair relating to the application of the Rules 
                of the House of Representatives to the 
                procedure relating to a bill under this section 
                shall be decided without debate.
                  (E) Application of house rules.--Except to 
                the extent specifically provided in this 
                section, consideration of a bill under this 
                section shall be governed by the Rules of the 
                House of Representatives. It shall not be in 
                order in the House of Representatives to 
                consider any bill introduced pursuant to the 
                provisions of this section under a suspension 
                of the rules or under a special rule.
          (3) Consideration in the senate.--
                  (A) Motion to proceed to consideration.--A 
                motion to proceed to the consideration of a 
                bill under this subsection in the Senate shall 
                not be debatable. It shall not be in order to 
                move to reconsider the vote by which the motion 
                to proceed is agreed to or disagreed to.
                  (B) Motion to strike.--During consideration 
                of a bill under this subsection, any Senator 
                may move to strike any proposed rescission if 
                supported by 11 other Members.
                  (C) Limits on debate.--Debate in the Senate 
                on a bill under this subsection, and all 
                debatable motions and appeals in connection 
                therewith (including debate pursuant to 
                subparagraph (D)), shall not exceed 10 hours, 
                equally divided and controlled in the usual 
                form.
                  (D) Appeals.--Debate in the Senate on any 
                debatable motion or appeal in connection with a 
                bill under this subsection shall be limited to 
                not more than 1 hour, to be equally divided and 
                controlled in the usual form.
                  (E) Motion to limit debate.--A motion in the 
                Senate to further limit debate on a bill under 
                this subsection is not debatable.
                  (F) Motion to recommit.--A motion to recommit 
                a bill under this subsection is not in order.
                  (G) Consideration of the house bill.--
                          (i) In general.--If the Senate has 
                        received the House companion bill to 
                        the bill introduced in the Senate prior 
                        to the vote required under paragraph 
                        (1)(C), then the Senate may consider, 
                        and the vote under paragraph (1)(C) may 
                        occur on, the House companion bill.
                          (ii) Procedure after vote on senate 
                        bill.--If the Senate votes, pursuant to 
                        paragraph (1)(C), on the bill 
                        introduced in the Senate, then 
                        immediately following that vote, or 
                        upon receipt of the House companion 
                        bill, as the case may be--
                                  (I) if the House companion 
                                bill is identical to the 
                                version of the Senate bill on 
                                which the vote under paragraph 
                                (1)(C) was taken, the House 
                                bill shall be deemed to be 
                                considered, read the third 
                                time, and the vote on passage 
                                of the Senate bill shall be 
                                considered to be the vote on 
                                the bill received from the 
                                House; or
                                  (II) if the House companion 
                                bill is not identical to the 
                                Senate bill on which the vote 
                                under paragraph (1)(C) was 
                                taken, the Senate shall proceed 
                                to the immediate consideration 
                                of the House companion bill, 
                                the procedures under this 
                                paragraph shall apply except 
                                that a motion to strike all 
                                after the enacting clause and 
                                insert the text of the Senate 
                                bill shall be in order.
                  (H) Amendment between houses.--Overall debate 
                on all motions necessary to resolve amendments 
                between the Houses on a bill under this section 
                shall be limited to 2 hours at any stage of the 
                proceedings. Debate on any motion, appeal, or 
                point of order under this section which is 
                submitted shall be limited to 30 minutes, and 
                such time shall be equally divided and 
                controlled in the usual form.
          (4) Conference.--
                  (A) Authority of conferees.--
                          (i) In general.--Except as provided 
                        in clause (ii), the conferees may only 
                        recommend that a House recede from a 
                        disagreement to an amendment of the 
                        other House, or recede from its own 
                        amendment, and that the other House 
                        concur in such action.
                          (ii) Exception.--If the second House 
                        has stricken all after the enacting 
                        clause of the first House, the 
                        amendment reported by the conferees 
                        shall include each provision that is 
                        included in the versions of both 
                        Houses, and may include a provision 
                        included by either House upon which the 
                        conferees have agreed, and may not 
                        include any other matter.
                  (B) Consideration of conference reports.--
                Debate in the House of Representatives or the 
                Senate on the conference report and any 
                amendments in disagreement on any bill 
                considered under this section shall be limited 
                to not more than 2 hours, equally divided and 
                controlled in the usual form. A motion further 
                to limit debate is not debatable. A motion to 
                recommit the conference report is not in order, 
                and it is not in order to move to reconsider 
                the vote by which the conference report is 
                agreed to or disagreed to.
                  (C) Failure of conference to act.--If the 
                committee on conference on a bill considered 
                under this section fails to submit a conference 
                report within 5 calendar days after the 
                conferees have been appointed by each House, 
                any Member of either House may introduce a bill 
                containing only the text of the draft bill of 
                the President on the next day of session 
                thereafter and the bill shall be considered as 
                provided in this section except that the bill 
                shall not be subject to any motion to strike.
    (d) Amendments and Divisions Prohibited.--Except as 
otherwise provided by this section, no amendment to a bill 
considered under this section shall be in order in either the 
Senate or the House of Representatives. It shall not be in 
order to demand a division of the question in the House of 
Representatives (or in a Committee of the Whole). No motion to 
suspend the application of this subsection shall be in order in 
the House of Representatives, nor shall it be in order in the 
House of Representatives to suspend the application of this 
subsection by unanimous consent.
    (e) Temporary Presidential Authority To Rescind.--
          (1) In general.--At the same time as the President 
        transmits to Congress a special message proposing to 
        rescind budget authority, the President may direct that 
        any budget authority proposed to be rescinded in that 
        special message shall not be made available for 
        obligation for a period not to exceed 45 calendar days 
        from the date the President transmits the special 
        message to Congress.
          (2) Early availability.--The President may make any 
        budget authority not made available for obligation 
        pursuant to paragraph (1) available at a time earlier 
        than the time specified by the President if the 
        President determines that continuation of the 
        rescission would not further the purposes of this Act.
    (f) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
          (1) the term ``appropriation Act'' means any general 
        or special appropriation Act, and any Act or joint 
        resolution making supplemental, deficiency, or 
        continuing appropriations;
          (2) the term ``budget authority'' means an amount, in 
        whole or in part, of budget authority provided in an 
        appropriation Act, except to fund direct spending 
        programs;
          (3) the term ``rescission of budget authority'' means 
        the rescission in whole or in part of any budget 
        authority provided in an appropriation Act; and
          (4) the term ``targeted tax benefit'' means any 
        provision of a revenue or reconciliation Act determined 
        by the President to provide a Federal tax deduction, 
        credit, exclusion, preference, or other concession to 
        100 or fewer beneficiaries. Any partnership, limited 
        partnership, trust, or S corporation, and any 
        subsidiary or affiliate of the same parent corporation, 
        shall be deemed and counted as a single beneficiary 
        regardless of the number of partners, limited partners, 
        beneficiaries, shareholders, or affiliated corporate 
        entities.
    (g) Application to Targeted Tax Benefits.--The President 
may propose the repeal of any targeted tax benefit in any bill 
that includes such a benefit, under the same conditions, and 
subject to the same congressional consideration, as a proposal 
under this section to rescind budget authority provided in an 
appropriations Act.

                 proposed deferrals of budget authority

    Sec. 1013. Transmittal of Special Message.-- * * *
          * * * * * * *