[House Report 104-748]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Union Calendar No. 394
104th Congress, 2nd Session - - - - - - - - House Report 104-748
A TWO-YEAR REVIEW OF THE WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY REVEALS
MAJOR MISMANAGEMENT, LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SIGNIFICANT MISSION
CREEP
__________
TWELFTH REPORT
by the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
August 2, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr.,
Pennsylvania, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
DAN BURTON, Indiana
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New
Hampshire
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana
RANDY TATE, Washington
DICK CHRYSLER, Michigan
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, New Jersey
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
MICHAEL PATRICK FLANAGAN, Illinois
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South
Carolina
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois SCOTT L. KLUG, Wisconsin
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GARY A. CONDIT, California
COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota
KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, Michigan
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
GENE GREEN, Texas
CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
BILL BREWSTER, Oklahoma
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland
------
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Independent)
James L. Clarke, Staff Director
Kevin Sabo, General Counsel
Judith McCoy, Chief Clerk
Bud Myers, Minority Staff Director
_________________________________________________________________
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal
Justice
WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New
Hampshire, Chairman
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
TOM LANTOS, California
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York
GARY A. CONDIT, California
BILL BREWSTER, Oklahoma
ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland
Ex Officio
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr.,
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois Pennsylvania
Robert Charles, Staff Director
Jim Wilon, Professional Staff
Member
Ianthe Saylor, Clerk
Cherri Branson, Minority
Professional Staff
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, August 2, 1996.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, I submit herewith the
committee's twelfth report to the 104th Congress.
William F. Clinger, Jr.,
Chairman.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
I. Introduction.....................................................1
II. DOD Inspector General's investigation............................3
A. Mission creep........................................... 3
1. Description of mission creep........................ 3
2. Factors in mission creep............................ 5
a. Mission statements.............................. 5
b. Chain-of-command................................ 6
B. Lack of accountability and major mismanagement.......... 7
1. Procurement......................................... 7
a. Lack of prior review and approval............... 7
b. Lack of competitive bidding..................... 8
2. Financial management................................ 8
3. Property accountability............................. 9
a. Nonexpendable property.......................... 9
b. Expendable property............................. 9
c. Long-haul telecommunications.................... 10
d. Short-haul telecommunications................... 10
4. Maintenance management.............................. 10
5. Lack of oversight by DISA........................... 11
6. Identification of material weakness................. 11
C. Management response to the audit........................ 11
III. Hearings before the subcommittee................................12
A. First hearing--May 16, 1996............................. 13
1. Testimony of Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr., GAO.......... 13
2. Testimony of Mr. Robert J. Lieberman, DOD IG........ 14
3. Testimony of Col. Joseph J. Simmons, IV, WHCA....... 14
B. Second hearing--June 13, 1996........................... 15
1. Testimony of Col. Joseph J. Simmons, IV, WHCA....... 15
2. Testimony of Emmett Paige, Jr., ASD/C3I............. 16
IV. Conclusions and recommendations.................................16
A. Proper mission of WHCA.................................. 16
B. Accountability and internal controls.................... 17
C. Continued congressional oversight....................... 18
VIEWS
Dissenting views of Hon. Cardiss Collins, Hon. Karen L. Thurman,
Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Robert E. Wise, Jr., Hon. Major R.
Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Louise M. Slaughter, Hon. Paul
E. Kanjorski, Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Thomas M. Barrett,
Hon. Barbara-Rose Collins, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Hon.
James P. Moran, Hon. Carrie P. Meek, Hon. Chaka Fattah, and
Hon. Elijah E. Cummings........................................ 19
Union Calendar No. 394
104th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2nd Session 104-748
_______________________________________________________________________
A TWO-YEAR REVIEW OF THE WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY REVEALS
MAJOR MISMANAGEMENT, LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SIGNIFICANT MISSION
CREEP
_______
August 2, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Clinger, from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
submitted the following
TWELFTH REPORT
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
On July 25, 1996, the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight approved and adopted a report entitled ``A Two-Year
Review of the White House Communications Agency Reveals Major
Mismanagement, Lack of Accountability, and Significant Mission
Creep.'' The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the
Speaker of the House.
I. Introduction
A 2-year review of the White House Communications Agency
reveals major mismanagement, lack of accountability, and an
unsettling degree of mission creep. These findings are
discussed in detail below, with concrete bipartisan
recommendations for overall improvement in the agency's
management, accountability and mission containment.
The Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (``the
committee'') has primary legislative jurisdiction for the
``overall economy, efficiency and management of Government
operations and activities'' and for ``[r]eorganizations in the
executive branch of the Government.'' [Rules of the House of
Representatives, 104th Congress, X, 1(g)(6) and (12).] In
addition, the committee has primary oversight responsibility to
``review and study, on a continuing basis, the operation of
Government activities at all levels with a view to determining
their economy and efficiency.'' [Rules of the House of
Representatives, 104th Congress, X, 2(b)(2).] Finally, the
committee ``may at any time conduct investigations of any
matter without regard to the provisions . . . conferring
jurisdiction over such matter upon another standing
committee.'' [Rules of the House of Representatives, 104th
Congress, X, 4(c)(2).]
Pursuant to the foregoing grants of jurisdiction, the
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and
Criminal Justice (``the subcommittee'') initiated an
investigation, and subsequently convened two oversight
hearings, to assess the mission, structure and operations of
the White House Communications Agency (``WHCA''). WHCA is an
agency of the Department of Defense (``DOD'') and is primarily
responsible for providing communications support to the White
House. Specifically, the subcommittee examined the various
missions performed by WHCA to determine whether they were
appropriate for the agency, and the subcommittee examined the
conduct of WHCA's operations to determine whether they were
conducted in accordance with applicable DOD policies and
regulations.
The subcommittee's investigation arose from concerns
regarding long-term mission creep at WHCA, as well as a general
lack of accountability at the agency. Historically, WHCA's
predecessor, the White House Signal Detachment (``the
detachment''), was established in December of 1941 to assist
then-President Roosevelt in his direction of the United States'
World War II operations. Staffed by 30 military personnel, the
detachment allowed the President to communicate with United
States forces in the Pacific, the Atlantic, North Africa and
Europe, as well as with America's wartime allies. At the end of
the war, the detachment remained active, providing successive
Presidents with national security-related communications
support.
In 1954, DOD changed the detachment's name to the White
House Army Signal Agency. In 1962, the Secretary of Defense
changed the name again, this time to the White House
Communications Agency. At the same time, the Secretary
transferred WHCA from the U.S. Army to the Defense
Communications Agency (DCA), now called the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA).
When the name changed, the mission and organization of WHCA
also began to expand in directions which were unrelated to the
agency's original national security and war fighting mission.
The White House began to use WHCA for clerical, technical and
public relations tasks that did not call for any military
expertise. And, as the WHCA mission expanded, so did WHCA: by
the early 1990's, WHCA had over a thousand active-duty military
personnel in its ranks, and the agency was costing the American
taxpayer well over a hundred million dollars a year.
Further, as WHCA grew in size and began to do more and more
for the White House, the agency gradually slid out from
underneath any meaningful DOD supervision or control. In fact,
for almost 55 years, there was no comprehensive audit or
inspection of WHCA's operations, and the agency's internal
accountability decayed seriously in crucial areas such as
procurement, financial management, property inventory, and
equipment maintenance.
II. DOD Inspector General's Investigation
In March of 1994, alarmed by reports of possible fraud,
waste and abuse at WHCA, Representative William F. Clinger,
Jr., the chairman of the committee, and Representative William
H. Zeliff, Jr., the chairman of the subcommittee, requested
that the current administration permit the General Accounting
Office (``GAO'') to conduct a comprehensive audit of WHCA's
operations. Unexpectedly, the Clinton administration strongly
and consistently opposed any such audit, on the ground that any
inspection of WHCA would create a national security risk.
Representatives Clinger and Zeliff, along with the GAO, met
three times with representatives of the administration,
including Presidential Counsel Mikva. The Congressmen and the
GAO pointed out that most of the information which would be
involved in an audit of WHCA was not classified in any way, and
that GAO has effective mechanisms for auditing defense
organizations which deal with classified information. Despite
these reassurances, the Clinton administration inexplicably
blocked an audit for over a year. Finally, in mid-1995, as a
result of continued pressure by Representatives Clinger and
Zeliff, the administration agreed to let the DOD Inspector
General (``IG'') conduct such an audit.
In 1995, at congressional direction and after continued
congressional insistence, the Clinton White House permitted the
first comprehensive audit in the history of WHCA; the
Department of Defense IG subsequently published its findings in
two substantial reports. (DODIG Report No. 96-033, ``White
House Communications Agency,'' dated November 29, 1995, and
hereinafter referred to as the ``First IG Report;'' and DODIG
Report No. 96-100, ``White House Communications Agency--Phase
II,'' dated April 29, 1996, and hereinafter referred to as the
``Second IG Report.'') The IG's audit reports confirmed that
WHCA was (a) suffering from significant mission creep, and (b)
suffering from serious accountability and mismanagement
problems.
A. MISSION CREEP
1. Description of mission creep
The IG reported that WHCA had made significant additions to
its original mission of providing military and wartime
communications for the President of the United States, and now
provides numerous and varied services to the President, First
Lady, Vice President, and to White House staffers in general.
Specifically, the IG found that WHCA's Audiovisual Unit--
with 113 authorized personnel--has become, in effect, an
adjunct to the White House press and publicity offices.\1\ For
example, WHCA provides sound amplification and media-quality
lighting systems, audio and video recording and editing,
lecterns, flags, seals, and speech teleprompter support for all
White House media events. WHCA also develops, prints and frames
pictures of the President, Vice President, First Lady and other
White House personnel, and provides camera equipment,
developing and printing services to White House photographers.
In addition, WHCA retains negatives of all pictures taken
during an administration, and makes audio and videotape
recordings of all Presidential events and speeches, for the
National Archives. While all these may be legitimate White
House functions, it is not clear why they should be
accomplished by military telecommunications personnel,
particularly with DOD funding.
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\1\ See First IG Report at 5-6, 8, 64-66; Second IG Report at 48-
49.
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In addition to employing and maintaining all the equipment
required by the above-described functions, WHCA's Audiovisual
Unit also operates a system that provides closed-circuit
television and distributes cable television broadcasts for the
entire White House. Each day, WHCA personnel videotape selected
television news broadcasts which are thought to be of interest
to the President and his staff. Also, WHCA provides graphic
arts and reproduction services, such as the production of
briefing charts, the printing of boarding passes for Air Force
One, and general document reproduction. Again, these
perquisites are wholly unrelated to military telecommunications
requirements.
Besides those services provided by the Audiovisual Unit,
the IG reported numerous other examples of mission creep. For
example, WHCA provides stenographic services--a steno pool--for
the White House Office of the Press Secretary.\2\ Also, WHCA's
Data Systems Unit--with 126 authorized personnel--provides
general-purpose computer, information systems, automation and
data processing services to the White House.\3\ Further, WHCA
provides news wire services so that White House personnel can
have ready access to the latest dispatches from the Associated
Press, United Press International, Reuters America, Knight
Ridder, Dow Vision, the Los Angeles Times, and The Washington
Post.\4\
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\2\ First IG Report at 6-7.
\3\ First IG Report at 64; Second IG Report at 49.
\4\ First IG Report at 7.
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Regarding all of the above-described services, the IG
concluded that they should not be provided and paid for by the
Department of Defense, but rather should be funded by the
Office of Administration, Executive Office of the President.\5\
The IG noted that WHCA itself had been consistently and
unsuccessfully attempting, since at least 1971, to transfer
funding for many of these services, most notably the
stenographic and news wire services, back to the White House,
but successive administrations have prevented such
transfers.\6\
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\5\ First IG Report at 9-11.
\6\ First IG Report at 7, 70-72.
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Finally, the IG also found that since at least fiscal year
1991, WHCA has provided telecommunications support to the
Secret Service, without collecting reimbursement for that
support as required by law.\7\ Once again, while the IG did not
go so far as to question the necessity of services provided to
the White House or the Secret Service, it did take the position
that these services should not be funded by the military.
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\7\ See First IG Report at 12-18.
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Although the IG did not provide a current total dollar
figure for money spent on all of the above-described
activities, it estimates that WHCA's audiovisual, stenographic
and news wire services, in fiscal year 1995, cost over $7.8
million, and that WHCA's unreimbursed Secret Service
expenditures amounted to roughly $1 million in fiscal year
1994.\8\
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\8\ First IG Report at 8, 15-16, 73-75.
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Due in large part to this mission creep, WHCA has steadily
increased its manpower and funding during the past 55 years. As
of December 31, 1995, WHCA had 946 military and 8 civilian
personnel authorized, of which 824 military and 7 civilian
personnel were actually assigned. (As of June 13, 1996, the
number of assigned personnel had increased to 856.) The cost to
operate WHCA for fiscal years 1995 and 1996 will have totaled
approximately $110 million and $122 million, respectively.\9\
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\9\ Second IG Report at 2-3; original transcript of June 13, 1996
hearing at 24; see also First IG Report at 67-69; Second IG Report at
50-52.
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Tangentially, it should also be noted that WHCA's manning
and budget have tended to increase most substantially during
Presidential election years.
2. Factors in mission creep
a. Mission statements
The IG reports concluded that WHCA's mission creep has been
fostered by a number of factors. First, WHCA's mission
statement has been expanded over the years.\10\ While initially
WHCA and its predecessor agencies were solely devoted to
military and war fighting missions in support of the President,
a broader mission statement was formulated and promulgated by
the Defense Communications Agency (``DCA'')--to which WHCA was
then assigned as a subcommand--in its Instruction 4850.7,
``White House Communications Agency,'' dated September 6, 1962.
Instruction 4850.7 stated that ``the mission of the White House
Communications Agency is to provide telecommunications and
other related support to the President of the United States and
to other elements related to the President.'' (Emphasis added.)
This mission statement left ample room for mission creep.
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\10\ First IG Report at 58-61; Second IG Report at 4, 43-46.
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WHCA's mission statement was further expanded in DCA
Circular 640-45-48, dated March 3, 1978, and revised on July
17, 1989. The mission statement read as follows:
Mission. The mission of WHCA is to provide
telecommunications and other related support to the
President of the United States and to other elements
related to the President.
A. Other related support includes, but is not limited
to, audiovisual services, including videotape recording
for the President and others as directed; photographic
laboratory and drafting support of the White House; and
general purpose automated data processing support for
the National Security Council (NSC) and the White
House.
B. Elements related to the President are his staff,
the First Family, the Vice President, the U.S. Secret
Service Protective Forces, and others as directed.
(Emphasis added.) Again, the new mission statement was
extremely open-ended and allowed many different tasks to be
assigned to WHCA.
Furthermore, in 1977, the Director of DCA testified before
Congress that, as a practical matter, DCA would defer to the
President and the White House in their determinations of what
missions were appropriate for WHCA. [Hearings before the
Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, First
Session, part 3, page 758, March 29, 1977.] On September 7,
1977, the DCA General Counsel issued a legal opinion
memorandum, ``Legal Authorities That Support the WHCA
Mission,'' which indicated that there were almost no practical
limits on the types of missions that could be assigned to WHCA.
The opinion letter stated that ``the President can make almost
any assignment he wants of functions to an executive branch
organization so long as the assignment is not one which is
vested by law in one department or agency and he proposes to
abolish it or reassign it to another agency; such abolition or
reassignment requiring the consent of the Congress.''
Finally, a DCA Report entitled ``Management Review of the
White House Communications Agency,'' dated June-July 1987,
retrospectively approved much of the mission creep which had
already taken place. Specifically, the report concluded that
WHCA's provision of audiovisual support for political and media
events, and its provision of various photographic, drafting,
graphics, and data processing services to the White House and
the National Security Council, were well-established and valid
missions.
In short, the IG reported that over the years, successive
administrations in the White House began to use WHCA for an
increasing number and variety of missions, and DCA repeatedly
validated the mission creep by broadening WHCA's mission
statement.
b. Chain-of-command
The second factor contributing to WHCA's mission creep was
the historical transfer of command and control of WHCA from the
Department of Defense to the White House. Although WHCA is now
technically under the supervision of the Defense Information
Systems Agency (``DISA''), the successor agency to DCA, DISA
does not in fact direct the operations of WHCA. Rather, WHCA
receives its day-to-day orders and directions from the White
House Military Office (WHMO), which is staffed by political
appointees and is part of the Executive Office of the
President. The Director of WHMO--who is a civilian and a
political appointee, and also holds the position of Deputy
Assistant to the President--directs the activities of WHCA, and
also writes the annual Officer Evaluation Report which
determines the future career prospects of the WHCA Commander.
This Officer Evaluation Report is also reviewed, supplemented
and signed by the White House Chief of Staff.\11\
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\11\ First IG Report at 3; Second IG Report at 3-5.
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Thus, although WHCA is technically a subcommand of DISA,
and theoretically under the supervision of DISA, in practice
the power relationship is exactly reversed. Because of WHCA's
proximity and direct responsibility to the President, DISA has
generally taken a deferential and subservient attitude toward
WHCA, and has focused on ministering to the requirements of
WHCA rather than exercising effective supervision. In light of
the power relationships involved, it is not surprising that
WHCA has been willing to expand its mission steadily to
accommodate successive Presidents, even though many of the new
missions should be funded and performed by other agencies.
B. LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND MAJOR MISMANAGEMENT
The IG also found that WHCA suffered from serious
accountability problems in a number of different areas.
1. Procurement
a. Lack of prior review and approval
In order to ensure that military procurements are fully
justified and as cost-effective as possible, DOD regulations
require that every procurement contract be reviewed and
approved by an authorized contracting officer. Additionally, to
provide further review, DISA contracting procedures require
that every commercial acquisition valued at more than $1
million--and every intra-DOD purchase valued at more than
$100,000--be reviewed and approved by the DISA Acquisition
Review Panel. However, WHCA has consistently ignored these
requirements. The IG reported that WHCA has consistently
approved its own contracts without consulting a DISA
contracting officer or the Acquisition Review Panel. In
addition, WHCA personnel have frequently made purchases without
any official written contractual documents, simply making
purchases on an ad hoc basis.\12\
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\12\ Second IG Report at 8-11.
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Because WHCA's acquisitions are not reviewed as carefully
as they should be, WHCA has made some serious and expensive
procurement errors. Recently, at Clinton administration
direction, WHCA expended $4.9 million on two air-transportable
mobile communications systems that did not meet operational
needs. Although the systems were originally designed to
accompany the President on most Presidential trips, it soon
became apparent that (a) the system, together with its
associated personnel and equipment, could not fit on one C-141
cargo aircraft as originally planned; (b) the system could not
draw electrical power from many of the hotels visited by the
Presidential party; and (c) the interior design of the system
made it difficult for a full complement of personnel and
communications equipment to operate without mutual
interference.\13\ Thus, the systems were employed on only 3 of
63 Presidential trips during the period from May to December of
1995. As a result, WHCA chose not to exercise its option to
purchase another six systems for an additional $5.5 million;
however, the original $4.9 million has already been wasted.
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\13\ Second IG Report at 8, 53-54.
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The IG also noted an instance where due to lack of prior
review and approval, WHCA officials independently estimated
that a certain type of satellite terminal would cost $269,000
per terminal. WHCA was later surprised to learn that the cost
was actually $618,000 per terminal. After making this discovery
late in the procurement process, WHCA was forced to reduce its
purchase to only 6 terminals, although the original intent and
purpose of the procurement had been to replace 11 older model
terminals by purchasing 12 new terminals.\14\ Once again, lack
of prior review by the designated contracting authorities
resulted in a severely flawed procurement process.
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\14\ Second IG Report at 9, 54.
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The IG reported that WHCA officials purchasing temporary
telecommunications services have generally proceeded without
written contracts.\15\ For example, no contracting documents
were prepared for 140 Presidential trips taken during a 9-month
period in fiscal year 1995. The contracting officer merely
filed the invoices in a desk drawer. In part because there are
no written contracting documents, WHCA officials also have
generally neglected to verify that WHCA is being charged
according to the proper tariff of telecommunications rates.
This has resulted in WHCA paying many overcharges without
protest.
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\15\ See Second IG Report at 14-21.
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b. Lack of competitive bidding
In addition to short-circuiting the prior approval process,
the IG found that WHCA has generally avoided DOD competitive
bidding requirements. The IG reports cited various examples,
including multimillion dollar WHCA procurements, such as the
Washington Area System radio network, the above-described
satellite communications terminals, and the entire category of
temporary telecommunications equipment and services.\16\ The IG
noted that WHCA has used a number of different mechanisms to
avoid competitive bidding, including (a) improperly using Small
Business Administration set-asides; (b) reducing purchase
amounts to below the dollar amount where competitive bidding is
required; (c) claiming that ``national security
considerations'' make competitive bidding impossible; (d)
claiming that time requirements make competitive bidding
impossible; or (e) simply ignoring the competitive bidding
requirements. The IG concluded that WHCA's justifications were
generally insufficient, and that WHCA should take steps to
insure that competitive bidding is used in the future so that
the American taxpayer can be sure that WHCA is getting the most
for its money.
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\16\ See First IG Report at 51-53; Second IG Report at 55.
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2. Financial management
As a result of WHCA's sloppy procurement procedures, WHCA
has experienced difficulties keeping track of its
disbursements. The IG noted that WHCA sometimes makes duplicate
payments to contractors, or even pays for equipment or services
which were never delivered; worse yet, the IG reported that
WHCA has been paying only 17% of its invoices on time, so that
interest and penalties must be paid on the other 83% of WHCA's
obligations.\17\ Again, the American taxpayer has been ill-
served by this management.
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\17\ Second IG Report at 19-20.
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One example of WHCA's failure to validate its contractual
disbursements is in the purchase of ``long-haul''
telecommunications facilities, which provide long-distance
telecommunications between remote sites and facilities.
(``Short-haul'' telecommunications, by way of contrast, are
used to communicate within a single base or facility.) DOD
regulations require that charges for long-haul
telecommunications services must be validated--i.e., the using
agency must determine that each charge is legitimate and
accurate. However, the IG found that WHCA was not validating
these charges, and as a result WHCA was erroneously paying for
some services that were previously terminated, and for some
services that were ordered but not delivered.\18\
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\18\ First IG Report at 38-40.
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Agency-wide, WHCA had recorded approximately $14.5 million
in ``unliquidated obligations'' as of February 23, 1996.\19\
Due to inadequate recordkeeping, the majority of these
unliquidated obligations--many of which go back as far as
1991--could not be validated; thus, WHCA was unable to
determine when or whether they should be paid.
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\19\ Second IG Report at 23-25.
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3. Property accountability
a. Nonexpendable property
In every military unit, all nonexpendable property--i.e.,
major durable goods--must be recorded in the unit property book
when it is received, so that it can be regularly inventoried
and accounted for. If property is received by a unit but is not
recorded in the property book, that property becomes especially
vulnerable to loss, theft or damage.
The IG found that WHCA failed to exercise internal controls
over its property book procedures.\20\ Specifically, many of
WHCA's operational units were in the habit of ordering and/or
receiving property without reporting it to WHCA's Logistics
Branch, which maintains the unit property book. As a result,
significant quantities of nonexpendable property--including
$555,000 worth of computers and $22,000 worth of photographic
equipment--were never recorded in the property book, and the IG
estimated that the total dollar figure for nonrecorded property
may have been as high as $738,000. In addition, because of the
lack of centralized property accountability, it was often
difficult to determine whether nonexpendable property which had
been ordered and paid for, had actually been received. In fact,
the IG report noted that WHCA had 102 open purchase requests
requiring investigation and reconciliation.
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\20\ First IG Report at 24-27, 76-77.
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b. Expendable property
In addition to its problems managing nonexpendable
property, WHCA also was engaged in wasteful practices regarding
the management of its expendable property.\21\ (Expendable
property generally consists of lower-cost, consumable items,
such as cleaning supplies or office products.) The IG found
that WHCA did not keep the required records of demand histories
for its expendable supplies, so that it could not accurately
predict its future needs. WHCA compensated for this uncertainty
by maintaining excessive stocks of its expendable supplies, and
in some cases by stocking items which had no demand histories
at all. The IG estimated that by following sensible practices
and applicable regulations regarding expendable supplies, WHCA
could save over $225,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ First IG Report at 27-28.
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c. Long-haul telecommunications
The IG found that WHCA was not following DOD regulations
which require regular inventory and revalidation of long-haul
telecommunications circuits and equipment.\22\ As a result,
WHCA was continuing to pay for 21 leased circuits, and
associated equipment, which were no longer required. The IG
estimated that those unnecessary circuits and equipment were
costing WHCA over $117,000 a year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ First IG Report at 34-37, 79-84.
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d. Short-haul telecommunications
Finally, the IG found that WHCA was completely unable to
provide a reasonably accurate inventory of its ``short-haul''
telecommunications, which are the internal telephone lines used
to communicate within a base, installation, headquarters, or
Federal building.\23\ The IG found that WHCA had been
disregarding DOD regulations which require regular inventory
and revalidation of short-haul telecommunications equipment and
services. Because WHCA was unable to provide an inventory, the
IG could not conduct a thorough audit of WHCA's short-haul
telecommunications. Rather, the IG simply noted that in the
absence of regular inventory and revalidation of requirement,
it was highly likely that WHCA was wasting funds on obsolete,
unnecessary or duplicative short-haul telecommunications
equipment and services.
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\23\ First IG Report at 30-33; Second IG Report at 39.
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4. Maintenance management
The IG found that WHCA's maintenance management suffered
from a grave lack of internal controls.\24\ First, WHCA was
unable to keep accountability of its repair parts inventory. In
response to the IG's request for an inventory, six of WHCA's
seven operational units failed to adequately describe,
quantify, or provide the value for their repair parts on hand.
Although WHCA was invited to remedy this situation during the 5
months intervening between the IG's first and second reports,
WHCA failed to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ First IG Report at 19-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A related deficiency was that until June of 1995, WHCA's
Logistics Branch did not keep records of the historical demand
frequency for repair parts, and thus could not accurately
predict WHCA's future needs. Taken together, the lack of
historical demand frequency data and the failure to keep an
accurate inventory of repair parts on hand resulted in two
problems: (1) WHCA's operational capabilities were always in
danger of being hampered by shortages of critical repair parts,
and (2) WHCA wasted time and money by ordering and maintaining
excessively large inventories of repair parts, in order to
compensate for the uncertainty caused by poor inventory
management.
Second, WHCA failed to keep adequate records of its
maintenance contracts with outside contractors. For 20 of its
32 maintenance contracts, WHCA failed to keep accurate lists of
the equipment covered by each contract. In addition, WHCA
failed to keep historical records of the type, frequency and
cost of maintenance provided under each contract. These two
failings contributed to the creation of an operational
environment where critical maintenance could be forgotten or
overlooked, and, in addition, money could be wasted on
maintenance contracts which were not cost-effective.
The IG noted that military units avoid such problems by
implementing maintenance management systems which schedule
maintenance activities, record historical data, and forecast
future needs. WHCA did purchase a maintenance management
system, in 1993, at a cost of $303,000. However, because the
system has generally not been used, it has not resulted in
increased efficiency or cost savings for WHCA; rather, the
maintenance management system has merely resulted in a net
acquisition cost of $303,000.
5. Lack of oversight by DISA
The IG report attributed at least part of the
responsibility for WHCA's widespread failure of internal
controls, and lack of accountability, to a lack of oversight by
DISA.\25\ Although WHCA is nominally a subsidiary command of
DISA, and thus DISA is technically in charge of WHCA, DISA has
exercised almost no oversight and supervisory control over
WHCA's administration, finances, and operations. Historically,
DISA has taken the position that its mission with respect to
WHCA is merely to provide administrative support when needed,
and that WHCA is subject to WHMO as far as oversight is
concerned. Neither DISA nor WHMO have exercised oversight to
insure that WHCA follows DOD procedures and regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ See Second IG Report at 4-13.
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6. Identification of material weakness
As a result of WHCA's widespread failure of accountability
and lack of oversight, the IG concluded that ``the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence) management control program needs improvement
because a material weakness exists in that administrative,
financial and operational oversight was not provided to the
White House Communication Agency.'' \26\ The IG identified the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence (the ASD/C3I) as the
responsible entity because the ASD/C3I is in charge of DISA,
which in turn is technically in charge of WHCA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Second IG Report at ii.
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C. MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE AUDIT
The required management response to the IG audit was
provided by Emmett Paige, Jr., the ASD/C3I, who submitted joint
comments on his own behalf and on behalf of the Director of
DISA and the Commander of WHCA. In response to the IG's
findings of mission creep, the ASD/C3I denied that any problem
existed. The ASD/C3I took the position that all of WHCA's
activities were within the parameters of WHCA's mission
statement, if that mission statement was properly (i.e.,
broadly) construed.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ First IG Report at 95-107.
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However, the ASD/C3I did concur with almost all of the IG's
findings and recommendations regarding WHCA's lack of
accountability and internal controls.\28\ The ASD/C3I
acknowledged not only that each individual accountability
problem needed to be corrected, but also that the scope and
nature of WHCA's accountability problems, taken as a whole,
demanded an overarching, systemic solution. To that end, the
ASD/C3I entered into consultations and negotiations with White
House staff, with a view to resolving WHCA's accountability
problems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ See First IG Report at 107-112; Second IG Report at 63-67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of those meetings, the ASD/C3I eventually
executed a two-page Memorandum of Agreement with the White
House Office of Management and Administration, which is the
White House office in charge of WHMO.\29\ The Memorandum of
Agreement was signed on March 8, 1996 by Secretary Paige, and
was also signed, on March 14, 1996, by Ms. Jodie R. Torkelson,
the Assistant to the President for Management and
Administration. The memorandum purported to set out some of the
terms and conditions governing WHCA's future operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ ``Memorandum of Agreement Between the White House Office of
Management and Administration and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command, Control, and Communications and Intelligence,'' undated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sadly, with regard to mission creep, the memorandum did not
recognize or address any existing problems; rather, the
memorandum fully validated the status quo, and included a WHCA
mission statement broad enough to encompass almost any White
House activity whatsoever. Regarding WHCA's accountability
problems, the memorandum also validated the status quo, noting
that ``The WHMO provides operational direction and control to
WHCA,'' and ``The DISA provides administrative support to the
WHCA.'' On the other hand, the memorandum also included the
following language emphasizing DISA's oversight
responsibilities over WHCA: ``To ensure that WHCA manages
information technology services efficiently and effectively,
DISA will provide administrative support for WHCA and
functional oversight of the WHCA information technology
services.'' Unfortunately, the memorandum did not go on to
define or elaborate DISA's ``functional oversight.''
III. Hearings Before the Subcommittee
After the release of the IG Reports, the subcommittee
announced a hearing to take testimony, draw conclusions, and
recommend long-term, systemic solutions to a set of pervasive,
deeply-rooted and long-standing problems. The subcommittee
scheduled its hearing for Thursday, May 16, 1996, and invited
the following representatives of the agencies involved: Ms.
Jodie R. Torkelson, Assistant to the President for Management
and Administration; Mr. Alan P. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant to
the President and Director, White House Military Office; Emmett
Paige, Jr., ASD/C3I; Col. Joseph J. Simmons IV, the Commander
of WHCA; Mr. Robert J. Lieberman, Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing for the DOD IG; and Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr.,
Assistant Comptroller General for the GAO's National Security
and International Affairs Division.
Unfortunately, both Ms. Torkelson and Mr. Sullivan
unequivocally refused to participate in the subcommittee's
hearing. In fact, the subcommittee received two letters from
Mr. Jack Quinn, the White House Counsel, summarily stating that
neither Ms. Torkelson nor Mr. Sullivan would testify because
``White House officials generally do not testify before
Congress.'' \30\ In fact, White House officials do testify
before Congress on many different issues, and on a fairly
frequent basis. Thus, the subcommittee was surprised and
disappointed at the administration's apparent decision to
obstruct its investigation. Since Mr. Sullivan and Ms.
Torkelson are in charge of WHCA, their self-enforced absence
from the subcommittee's oversight process was remarkable; and
it should be noted that the White House, having chosen not to
participate in the oversight process, has forfeited the
opportunity to contribute to the subcommittee's conclusions and
recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Letter from Mr. Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to the
Honorable William H. Zeliff, Jr., subcommittee chairman, dated May 8,
1996; letter from Mr. Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to the
Honorable William H. Zeliff, Jr., subcommittee chairman, dated May 15,
1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To avoid further delays, the subcommittee chose not to
subpoena, at the time of the hearing, either Ms. Torkelson or
Mr. Sullivan, but proceeded instead with the witnesses who were
available. The subcommittee may revisit this issue in the near
future.
A. FIRST HEARING--MAY 16, 1996
1. Testimony of Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr., GAO
Mr. Hinton's testimony \31\ contained four important
points. First, Mr. Hinton described the current
administration's resistance to GAO's investigation of WHCA.
During 1994, the administration consistently limited DOD
contact with GAO and the release of DOD data. Citing ``national
security concerns,'' the administration kept GAO from receiving
copies of WHCA's budgeting and financial records, and on three
occasions--in May, June, and August of 1994--DOD officials
informed GAO that the White House had prohibited DOD contact
with GAO or release of DOD data. In January of 1995, White
House Counsel staff informed GAO that GAO would not be provided
with the information needed to conduct its investigation of
WHCA, and in February of 1995, GAO's efforts to investigate
WHCA were terminated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ See ``Defense Communications: White House Communications
Agency Activities and Funding,'' Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr.,
Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International
Affairs Division, GAO/T-NSIAD-96-168, dated May 16, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, Mr. Hinton provided historical background
information regarding the oversight relationship between DISA
and WHCA. Although WHCA is technically a subcommand of DISA,
GAO found that it was not historically treated in the same way
as DISA's other subcommands. For example, in approving the
budgets of its other subcommands, DISA required and reviewed
detailed written justifications for all expenditures; however,
WHCA's budget approval process consisted of periodic meetings
between the Commander of WHCA and the Director of DISA.\32\
Similarly, while DISA's other subcommands often had their
budget requests cut, WHCA's requested budget amounts had never
been reduced, except as part of an across-the-board reduction.
According to one DISA financial management officer, WHCA was
strangely ``immune'' from the usual level of review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See also Second IG Report at 7-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, WHCA's acquisition and contracting decisions
were generally made without the participation or approval of
DISA contracting officers; WHCA's failure to obtain
reimbursement for services provided to other agencies was
unreviewed by DISA; and WHCA generally did not suffer the same
personnel reductions as DISA's other subcommands. In short, the
GAO's research painted a picture of WHCA as an DOD agency which
was essentially excused from DOD oversight because of its
proximity to the power and influence of the White House.
Third, Mr. Hinton noted that the necessary oversight of
WHCA, which was not provided by DISA, was also not provided by
the White House. Although a 1987 task force report on WHCA
criticized management deficiencies and concluded that the White
House was not exercising effective oversight over
telecommunications procurement and deployment, successive
administrations did not improve their oversight over WHCA.
Fourth and finally, Mr. Hinton stated the GAO's conclusion
and recommendation, based on the longstanding and pervasive
nature of WHCA's deficiencies and on the fact that there is
still disagreement regarding many of the IG's recommendations:
Continued congressional oversight of WHCA is important and
appropriate.
2. Testimony of Mr. Robert J. Lieberman, DOD IG
Mr. Lieberman's testimony summarized the IG's audit
findings, which are set out in greater detail in part II of
this report, above. His testimony did not alter or vary the
findings, conclusions and recommendations arrived at in either
IG report.
3. Testimony of Col. Joseph J. Simmons, IV, WHCA
On May 15, the day before the hearing, the subcommittee
received two different testimony submissions from Col. Simmons.
The disparities between the statements engendered considerable
controversy.
Col. Simmons' prepared testimony was delivered to the
subcommittee offices early on May 15. However, following the
delivery of that document (version 1), subcommittee staff
received two telephone calls from WHCA notifying the
subcommittee that there were major revisions going on, and that
Col. Simmons would be submitting a revised version of his
prepared testimony later in the day. At 5:30 p.m., on May 15,
another messenger arrived with the updated testimony (version
2).
Upon careful review, it turned out that the two versions of
Col. Simmons' prepared testimony differed in important
respects. For example, version 1 made it clear that WHMO
exercises complete operational direction and control over WHCA
and its commander, and stated that ``[i]f oversight is needed
to ensure WHCA purchases only those goods and services
necessary to fulfill its mission, this oversight should come
from WHMO [i.e. a political office in the White House].''
However, all references to WHMO's presence in the chain-of-
command, or to WHMO's oversight responsibility, were deleted
from version 2, which merely indicated that DISA provides
administrative support and ``functional oversight'' to WHCA.
Also, version 1 contained descriptions of some of WHCA's
more questionable activities--such as photographic and graphics
services, audiovisual and speech teleprompter services, and
various types of support furnished to Secret Service personnel,
White House staffers, and ``traveling dignitaries''--all of
which were deleted from version 2. Overall, version 2 was a
less forthright and more defensive document than version 1.
In itself, this revision of prepared testimony might have
been excused, even if the revisions occurred at the behest of
the White House. However, when Representative Mica moved to
include both versions of Col. Simmons' prepared testimony in
the record, Col. Simmons denied knowledge of, and
responsibility for, version 1 of his prepared testimony,
stating that he had ``no idea'' where it came from. Given the
similarities in form and content between version 1 and version
2--and the circumstances surrounding the delivery of version 1,
the interim revisions, and the delivery of version 2--Col.
Simmons' statements were unsettling. To give all the involved
parties an opportunity to resolve their questions regarding the
provenance or genuineness of version 1, Subcommittee Chairman
Zeliff recessed the hearing for the day.
B. SECOND HEARING--JUNE 13, 1996
The WHCA hearing reconvened on Thursday, June 13, 1996.
Shortly after the first hearing, Subcommittee Chairman Zeliff,
Chairman Clinger and Representative Thurman, the ranking
minority member, met with Col. Simmons. As a result of that
discussion, and a follow-on discussion, Col. Simmons told
Subcommittee Chairman Zeliff that he was prepared to stand by
either version of his prepared testimony at the second hearing.
1. Testimony of Col. Joseph J. Simmons, IV, WHCA
In response to questions regarding the IG's findings, Col.
Simmons generally acknowledged WHCA's shortcomings but
attributed them to the faulty oversight and support provided by
DISA, and by other DOD agencies such as the Defense Finance and
Accounting Service (DFAS) and the Army Information Systems
Command.\33\ However, on the matter of the $4.9 million mobile
communications systems, Col. Simmons unequivocally stated that
the systems were working quite well, and that the IG's
criticisms of the mobile communications systems were entirely
incorrect and unjustified.\34\ Col. Simmons was unable to
explain why he had earlier concurred in writing with the IG's
findings on this matter, and since the IG representatives were
not present at the second hearing, the question could not be
debated in detail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See original transcript of June 13, 1996 hearing at 34, 43,
103.
\34\ See original transcript of June 13, 1996 hearing at 73-81,
103-107, 109-111, 114.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To resolve the issue, Subcommittee Chairman Zeliff
requested that Col. Simmons send him a letter explaining why
the IG's conclusions regarding the mobile communications system
were incorrect.\35\ However, Col. Simmons did not do so.
Subcommittee Chairman Zeliff subsequently sent a letter to the
DOD IG requesting clarification and substantiation of their
conclusions on this matter, and the IG responded with a
detailed analysis of the systems' shortcomings.\36\ The IG also
provided copies of internal WHCA analyses--both prospective and
retrospective--which confirmed that although WHCA had
originally planned to use the systems on almost all
Presidential trips, WHCA officials discovered after purchasing
the systems that they suffered from a number of significant
limitations which made them more expensive, less convenient,
and as a practical matter useful for only a small percentage of
Presidential trips.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ See original transcript of June 13, 1996 hearing at 115.
\36\ Letter from Eleanor Hill, Department of Defense Inspector
General, to the Honorable William H. Zeliff, subcommittee chairman,
dated July 8, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Testimony of Emmett Paige, Jr., ASD/C3I
On the issue of mission creep, Secretary Paige took the
position that WHCA's present mission is appropriate. The
Secretary did not agree with the IG's recommendation that some
of WHCA's taskings be transferred to the Executive Office of
the President.
Regarding the accountability issues, the Secretary stated
that primary responsibility for the efficiency of WHCA's
operations resides with the WHCA Commander.\37\ The secretary
went on to say that the new Memorandum of Agreement between
ASD/C3I and the White House Office of Management and
Administration, together with a new commitment to oversight and
support on the part of DISA, should ensure that WHCA conducts
its operations in accordance with all applicable DOD policies
and regulations in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ See original transcript of June 13, 1996 hearing at 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
A. PROPER MISSION OF WHCA
Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the U.S. Armed
Services have been steadily downsized to the point where the
United States today has less than two-thirds of the combat
power which it had as recently as the 1991 Gulf War. This
reduction in combat power has been accompanied by concomitant
reductions in manpower and funding, with the defense budget
continually declining in terms of constant dollars.
At the same time as the Armed Services have experienced
drastic reductions in manpower, funding, and combat power, they
have been called upon to perform an ever-increasing quantity
and variety of new missions. United States Forces have been
keeping the peace in Bosnia, maintaining a United States
presence in Saudi Arabia, patrolling the waters off Taiwan,
guarding refugees in Cuba, supporting the Olympics in Atlanta,
and assisting in the war on drugs, to name just a few of their
higher-profile missions. With fewer and fewer units performing
more and more missions, our men and women in uniform are
subjected to ever-greater strains as they maintain their
personal and professional readiness.
In this climate, it is crucial that our limited military
assets not be diverted into the performance of civilian tasks.
While no one will deny that the White House is entitled to have
audiovisual support for press conferences, stenographic
services, news wire services, and so on, these services should
not be provided by soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines.
Rather, such tasks should be accomplished and paid for by the
Executive Office of the President, not by the Department of
Defense. In short, each agency of Government should be used for
the purpose for which it is designed, which means that the
military should not be used for civilian tasks and political
ends.
Furthermore, if the Executive Office of the President is
required to pay for the services which it uses, then it will
have an incentive to insure that such services are procured and
paid for in an economical and efficient manner. This would be a
marked improvement over the present situation, where the
Executive Office of the President has little incentive to
exercise careful control over DOD funds.
Thus, the committee recommends that legislation be enacted
limiting WHCA's mission to the provision of national security-
related telecommunications services required by the President
in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces,
and providing that all other functions presently performed by
WHCA be transferred to the Executive Office of the President.
It should be noted that legislation addressing some of the
committees concerns is currently pending in the House of
Representatives, having been put forward by Representative
Floyd Spence, Chairman of the National Security Committee, in
the form of an amendment to H.R. 3230, a Department of Defense
authorization bill.
B. ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTERNAL CONTROLS
WHCA's accountability problems have arisen from the same
source as its mission creep: the complete separation of
responsibility from control. DOD bears direct and complete
responsibility for WHCA, in that it must provide the personnel,
equipment and funding required by WHCA to perform its assigned
missions. However, while DOD has complete responsibility for
WHCA, DOD has no effective control over WHCA, because that
control is entirely in the hands of the White House Military
Office.
The current administration has struggled valiantly to
obscure this basic fact by withholding witnesses, altering
testimony, and seeking to put the blame for WHCA's shortcomings
on DISA. However, it remains obvious that the reason why DOD
and DISA have been completely unable to exercise effective
oversight over WHCA, is that WHCA is under the complete
protection and influence of the White House. As long as WHCA
takes its primary direction from WHMO, and as long as the WHCA
Commander is rated and reviewed by the Director of WHMO and the
White House Chief of Staff, WHCA will always strive
singlemindedly to fulfill White House requirements, while
freely ignoring DOD and DISA requirements.
Thus, the committee recommends that the WHCA Commander be
rated by the Director of DISA, and reviewed by the ASD/C3I. The
DISA Director and the ASD/C3I will ensure that WHCA continues
to support the national security-related requirements of the
Commander-in-Chief with maximum effectiveness, and are also
much more likely than White House staffers to ensure that WHCA
sticks to its military mission and adheres to applicable DOD
policies and regulations.
C. CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Finally, the lack of cooperation from the White House,
together with the attempts made by the ASD/C3I and especially
the WHCA Commander to minimize the nature and extent of WHCA's
continuing difficulties, make it clear that WHCA will probably
not undergo any substantial reform unless it is overseen by
Congress. To that end, the committee recommends that
legislation be enacted requiring WHCA, WHMO, and the DOD IG to
provide annual reports to the subcommittee over a period of 5
years, to include fiscal years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and
2000. These reports should describe the continuing progress (or
lack thereof) toward solving the problems identified by the DOD
IG and by this subcommittee, and each report should be
submitted within 90 days after the end of the fiscal year to
which it applies.
DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. CARDISS COLLINS, HON. KAREN L. THURMAN, HON.
HENRY A. WAXMAN, HON. ROBERT E. WISE, JR., HON. MAJOR R. OWENS, HON.
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, HON. LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER, HON. PAUL E. KANJORSKI, HON.
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, HON. THOMAS M. BARRETT, HON. BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS,
HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, HON. JAMES P. MORAN, HON. CARRIE P. MEEK,
HON. CHAKA FATTAH, AND HON. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS
From January 1995 until July 1996, the Inspector General
(IG) of the Department of Defense (DOD) has issued no fewer
than 350 reports detailing problems of the Department of
Defense. Yet the White House Communications Agency (WHCA) is
the only matter involving oversight of any Department of
Defense agency that the Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs, and Criminal Justice has held under the
control of the Republican majority.
It should be noted that in FY 1995, the Department of
Defense had a budget of $260 billion and issued an average of
$35 million an hour in checks. In that same year, the White
House Communications Agency had a total budget of $68 million,
less than 2 hours worth of Defense Department spending.
The Inspector General found no evidence of waste, fraud or
abuse in the agency's disbursement of resources. Moreover, the
Inspector General noted that some of the management and
oversight problems found in WHCA were widespread throughout the
Department of Defense. When problems specific to WHCA were
identified, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence and the Defense
Information Systems Agency concurred with the Inspector
General's findings. The corrective procedures adopted by the
agency were those recommended by the Inspector General.
In its review of WHCA, the Department of Defense Inspector
General found ``no evidence of theft or significant waste of
agency resources.'' However, one would never know that basic
fact by an examination of the majority's report based on the
Department of Defense's audit. The majority report entitled ``A
Two-Year Review of the White House Communications Agency
Reveals Major Mismanagement, Lack of Accountability and
Significant Mission Creep'' attacks the Armed Forces personnel
who serve in this highly sensitive communications complex known
as the White House Communications Agency.
The majority fails to note that as a Department of Defense
entity, WHCA immediately implemented several corrective actions
recommended by the DOD IG. Moreover, instead of allowing the
Department of Defense to oversee the completion and review of
corrective actions undertaken, the majority proposes three
unnecessary and ill-advised legislative ``remedies.'' We
disagree with the majority's report and with the legislative
remedies which they propose.
Moreover, it should be noted that for 55 years, no other
administration has allowed this agency to be audited or
inspected by any agency, inside or outside of the Department of
Defense. The Clinton administration should be commended for
allowing this inspection and assuring that sound management and
oversight procedures are implemented. By taking these steps,
this administration has changed five decades of lax practices.
It would seem that the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight would want to applaud such an effort, not ensure that
it may never happen again.
I. Background \1\
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\1\ All background information on WHCA is taken from the White
House Communications Agency study done by the Department of Defense
Inspector General, Report No. 96-100.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The White House Communications Agency (WHCA) began as an
informal organization in December 1941 called the White House
Signal Detachment. It was officially activated in March 1942 to
operate telecommunications radio networks for security forces
and for backup telephone services. The Signal Detachment
established private telephone exchanges with lines to key
offices in Washington, DC and to persons the President wished
to summon in emergencies. In 1962, the Secretary of Defense
reassigned WHCA from the Army to the Defense Communications
Agency (DCA), now the Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA).
WHCA provides telecommunications and other related support
to the President and Vice President, the President's staff, the
First family, the Secret Service and others as directed.
Support provided by WHCA includes secure and nonsecure voice
and data communications, printed message communications,
audiovisual services and photographic and graphics services.
WHCA also provides general purpose automated data processing
support for the National Security Council and the White House
Military Office.
As defined in the Department of Defense, Defense
Communications Agency Circular 640-45-489, issued in 1989, the
mission of WHCA is to provide ``telecommunications and other
related support'' to the President. Other related support is
defined as ``including, but not limited to, audiovisual
services, including video tape recording; photographic
laboratory and drafting support of the White House and general
purpose automated data processing support of the National
Security Council and the White House.''
II. Allegations of ``Mission Creep''
a. duties of whca
The majority contends that the basic telecommunications
mission has expanded. It should be noted the rapid change in
telecommunications technology in the last 50 years may account
for some of this alleged ``creep.'' As defined in the
Department of Defense, Defense Communications Agency Circular
640-45-489, issued in 1989, the mission of WHCA is to provide
``telecommunications and other related support'' to the
President. Other related support is defined as ``including, but
not limited to, audiovisual services, including video tape
recording; photographic laboratory and drafting support of the
White House and general purpose automated data processing
support of the National Security Council and the White House.''
Additionally, in a 1987 classified document (nonclassified
portions were quoted in the DOD IG's audit), other services
provided by WHCA were examined and deemed to be ``well
documented and supported'' by the Defense Communications Agency
(DISA's predecessor). DCA examined WHCA's role in political
events, including providing audiovisual services, photographic
laboratory support, drafting, and other graphic services for
the White House staff. If the provision of these services is
acceptable where the President participates in a political
event, then contrary conclusions are not warranted concerning
nonpolitical events involving duties squarely within the scope
of the presidency.
The majority does not contend that the President is not
entitled to these services. Their argument is that DOD should
not pay for them or should be reimbursed through the Executive
Office of the President. This is essentially an argument about
bookkeeping. Given that their major contention is one of
bookkeeping, the ``mission creep'' allegation becomes a bit
murky because it attempts to argue on one hand that the
services are impermissible, but on the other hand that some
other entity ought to be responsible for providing them. It
seems that adopting the majority's contention that another
entity ought to provide services would only serve to create an
inefficient and artificial division of labor. Currently, there
is one entity which provides these services efficiently.
On the other hand, to adopt the majority's premise that the
services should be provided by the Department of Defense but
paid for by the Executive Office of the President seems to
undercut the majority's concern over who will control the
provision of the services. Under the current arrangement, the
services are provided by, paid for and controlled by the
Department of Defense. Under the majority's scheme, the
services would be provided by Defense, but paid for by the
White House. It seems that such an arrangement would
necessitate the Executive Office of the President having direct
control over an entity of the Department of Defense. Such a
system would create an unworkable and highly inefficient
bureaucracy.
Finally, as noted by an opinion of a Bush administration
Assistant Attorney General (``White House Communications Agency
Expenses Incurred on Presidential Political Travel,'' October
22, 1990):
As Commander in Chief as well as in his other
official roles, the President requires dependable means
by which to communicate instantly with individuals
anywhere in the world at any moment. In an age when
conflict may develop and escalate to crisis proportions
in minutes, the President cannot be expected to rely on
unpredictable and variable private communications
facilities. Indeed, it was precisely to eliminate the
need for reliance upon such nongovernmental facilities
that WHCA was created.
The minority believes that neither national nor
international affairs have changed in such a way to render this
opinion of the Bush administration Assistant Attorney General
moot.
b. whca budget and spending
If the majority's concerns about ``mission creep'' were
valid, it would seem that WHCA's budget and spending would have
increased significantly during the Clinton administration.
Instead of increased spending the agency has returned money to
the Treasury. Under the Clinton administration, WHCA suffered a
decrease of 18 percent authorized personnel and a 37 percent
budget cut. Despite those limitations, the agency returned $6
million to the Treasury ($3 million in FY 1993 and $3 million
in FY 1994). Therefore, if WHCA increased its activities under
this administration, as alleged by the majority, it has done so
with less money and fewer people while achieving a surplus.
Such an outcome is unlikely. However, if such an outcome were
to occur, it would seem that WHCA's methods should be applauded
and not castigated as they are in the majority's report.
It should be noted that according to the DOD IG, the
greatest increase in personnel and spending for WHCA occurred
during FY 1991 and FY 1992, under the Bush administration. At
that time WHCA posted a 66-percent increase in personnel for
campaign related personnel.
Finally, it appears that the allegations of ``mission
creep'' have been rendered moot by the passage of the Spence
amendment to the FY 1997 Defense Authorization bill on May 14,
1996, 2 days before the subcommittee's first hearing on WHCA.
The Spence amendment specifically limits WHCA to providing
``telecommunications services'' and uses ``mission creep'' as a
justification for restricting WHCA's functions. It should be
noted that no other hearings on WHCA were held in this Congress
by any committee. Therefore, it would appear that partisan
concerns have overridden the legitimate oversight role of this
committee.
III. Involvement of the White House in WHCA
The majority contends that WHCA is under the operational
control of the White House Military Office (WHMO). In the
alternative, they assert that WHCA is a ``defacto agent of the
White House under the direction and control of the Special
Assistant to the President for Management and Administration
through the White House Military Office.'' Neither assertion is
accurate. According to DOD Directive 5105.15, dated June 25,
1991, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) provides
administrative support to the White House Communications
Agency. Administrative support is defined as ``budgeting,
funding, contracting, legal counseling and personnel
management.'' DISA is under the operational control of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence.
The Inspector General found that DISA did not carry out
those responsibilities despite this directive because it
erroneously believed that the WHMO was responsible for these
functions. Moreover the audit found that the White House
Military Office did not carry out these functions because it
correctly believed that the responsibility belonged to DISA.
However, despite the audit's findings that the WHMO did not
exercise control over WHCA, the majority sought the testimony
of two White House political appointees, Ms. Jody Torkelson,
Assistant to the President, and Mr. Alan Sullivan, Deputy
Assistant to the President and head of the White House Military
Office (a civilian entity). The White House Counsel's office
objected to the appearance of these witnesses and declined the
invitation.
The White House argued that under the Separation of Powers
Doctrine, there is long-standing precedent of declining
invitations to testify before congressional panels for White
House officials who are involved in policymaking. However,
exceptions have been made under extraordinary circumstances
involving issues of fact which only the requested witness can
address.\2\ Conversely, objections are not raised where
invitations to testify are issued to White House employees
involved in ``operations.''
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\2\ While the majority notes that White House policy officials have
appeared before congressional investigative panels, it fails to mention
that such appearances were limited to proceedings involving allegations
of criminal and quasi-criminal actions by the officials in question or
which said officials were believed to have personal knowledge. Notably,
White House policy officials appeared before Congress during the
Watergate Investigation and the Iran-Contra investigation. None of the
allegations surrounding WHCA is criminal in nature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This policy has evolved to the generally accepted principle
that the testimony of White House employees involved in
``operations'' \3\ is open to formal congressional inquiry,
while the testimony of an employee involved in ``policy'' \4\
is not subject to formal congressional inquiry. \5\ This
principle has been recognized and applied by all previous
administrations. (See June 16, 1992 letter below to Chairman
Jack Brooks from Mr. Nicholas Calio). The majority recognizes
this principle yet seeks to evade it by redefining the roles
and responsibilities of these two requested witnesses. They
assert that they are not responsible for policy but for
operations, which the majority terms ``administrative
decisionmaking.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ As a practical matter, testimony about the operations or day to
day affairs of an agency are essentially factual questions which would
necessitate the statements of one who has been present during the
occurrence of the events at issue.
\4\ As a practical matter, testimony about ``policy'' involves
inquiring into discussions surrounding the facts and considerations
that were reviewed in reaching the decision or setting the policy.
\5\ This does not mean that Congress has no other means to obtain
requested information from individuals who hold policy positions.
Letters, meetings and informal discussions are not precluded. It could
be argued that informal discussions may actually yield more information
than formal proceedings. Additionally, the subpoena is always available
to compel the appearance of any unwilling witness whose testimony is
critical to the issue at hand.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is a distinction without a difference. It can be
argued that any position requiring ``decisionmaking'' is one
involved with forming positions or constructing policy.
Discussions, factors and considerations involved in forming
policy (administrative or otherwise) would be open to
questioning. Therefore, the Office of White House Counsel
declined the invitations for policy personnel under well-
established precedent.
The White House,
Washington, June 16, 1992.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am writing in response to your letter of June 11 to the President
regarding your June 23 scheduled hearing. In that letter, you invited
the Administration to send appropriate Administration officials to
testify. We would propose to send Mr. Robert Mueller, Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, and Mr.
Laurence Urgenson, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, Department of Justice. In addition, I would note that the
Administration has previously testified in great detail regarding pre-
Desert Storm Iraq policy, the administration of the relevant programs
and related investigations. I attach a copy of this testimony and ask
that it be made available to all Committee Members before the hearing.
Your letter also requested the appearance of Mr. Nicholas Rostow,
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Legal
Affairs, National Security Council; and Mr. C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to
the President. As I advised the Chairman of the Committee on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs in response to a similar request, it is the
longstanding practice of the Executive Branch to decline requests for
testimony by members of the President's personal staff. For that
reason, I must decline your request for personal testimony by Messrs.
Gray and Rostow. In light of the unusual circumstances presented here,
however, the Administration is prepared to work with you to develop an
alternative, mutually acceptable mechanism for making available to
Members of the Committee the White House officials whose testimony you
have sought.
Finally, attached to your letter was a request for documents from
the Department of Agriculture, the State Department, the Department of
Justice, the White House, the Department of the Treasury/U.S. Customs
Service, and the Department of Commerce. In order to expedite a
response to that request, we have forwarded it to the listed
Departments outside the White House, and have directed them to respond
directly to the Committee. In light of the large number of documents
requested, it is unlikely that they or the White House will be able to
meet the June 18 response date, but we have requested that they respond
as quickly as possible.
Sincerely,
Nicholas E. Calio,
Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs.
Chairman Jack Brooks,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives,
2138 Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, D.C. 20515-6218.
cc: The Honorable Hamilton Fish, Jr.
attachments
IV. Involvement of the General Accounting Office
The majority contends that the General Accounting Office
(GAO) was prevented from obtaining information in its attempt
to conduct an audit of WHCA pursuant to a request by Chairman
Clinger. In raising the issue of the involvement of GAO, the
majority's concern seems to be that GAO did not obtain what
they believed to be adequate responses to certain inquires.
Specifically, in response to GAO's requests for information,
DISA, WHCA, White House Office of Management and White House
Counsel's Office provided briefings, summary documents and a
White House management study.
However, GAO deemed that this information was insufficient
to determine specific activities or costs. In May 1994, GAO
provided a list of additional data requirements. After several
meetings, representatives of GAO were told that the DOD
expressed concerns about the handling of classified data.
Because of WHCA's role in providing secured communications for
several entities including the Office of the President, the
Office of the Vice President, the National Security Council and
any official in the line of Presidential Succession, such a
concern should not be taken lightly. This basic function could
be seriously compromised through inadvertent release of
information concerning the operation of WHCA, the number and
locations of existing secured circuits used in its
telecommunications functions as well as information concerning
the identity of vendors of such secured lines and circuits.
GAO seemed to believe that DOD was not sufficiently
sensitive to its ability to handle such delicate information.
DOD believed that the likelihood of release of such security
information was in no small way related to the number of people
who had access to it. Therefore, DOD determined that the
optimal solution would be for the information to remain in-
house and for the audit to be conducted by the agency's
Inspector General.
However, this issue is moot because in February 1995,
Chairman Clinger and Subcommittee Chairman Zeliff requested the
appointment of Derek Vander Schaff, Department of Defense
Deputy Inspector General, as auditor of WHCA. Mr. Vander Schaff
conducted the audit which formed the basis of the Department of
Defense Inspector General Report on WHCA (DOD Report No. 96-
100). The majority has not criticized the outcome or
methodology of the audit.
V. Inspector General Findings and WHCA Responses
In its review of all activities at WHCA, the functions and
missions of the agency and the funding and reporting of those
activities, the DOD IG chosen by Chairman Clinger and Chairman
Zeliff, found ``no evidence of theft or significant waste of
resources.'' However, they did note 38 instances of management
deficiencies and a lack of oversight. In 36 instances, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence fully concurred with the
findings and implemented the IG's suggestions for correcting
the deficiencies. In two instances, there was a partial
concurrence with the findings.
The following is a summary of the major deficiencies found
by the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General and
WHCA's responses:
1. The IG found that DOD provides audiovisual, news wire
and stenographic services and camera equipment to the White
House, which exceed the stated mission of WHCA to provide
telecommunications support to the President. As a result, DOD
funded about $7.8 million for services and equipment during FY
1995 that would have been more appropriately funded by the
Office of Administration, Executive Office of the President.
The IG recommended a memorandum of understanding between the
Director of Defense Information Systems Agency, the Commander
of WHCA and the Executive Office of the President detailing
specific services to be provided. That memo was signed in March
1996.
2. The IG found that WHCA provided reimbursable services to
the Secret Service and had not reported such to the Secretary
of Defense or obtained reimbursement from the Secret Service.
Thus, between October 1990 and March 31, 1995, the Secret
Service was enriched by about $4.3 million. The IG recommended
a revised memorandum of understanding with the Secret Service
concerning reimbursable expenses. However, Congress voided this
necessity by exempting the Secret Service from such
reimbursements.
3. The IG found that WHCA did not maintain control over
repair parts inventories and contracting officers
representatives did not document equipment maintenance
information in accordance with DISA guidelines. The IG
recommended the development of a comprehensive plan to oversee
maintenance systems, inventory excess repair parts and to
comply with DISA guidelines. The Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence agreed
and is developing a plan.
4. The IG found that WHCA had not established
accountability for all nonexpendable property (equipment with a
value over $100, such as radios, computers and vehicles) and
had excess expendables (supplies with a value under $100) on
hand. The Assistant Secretary concurred in the findings and
agreed to revise instructions on property accountability no
later than November 1995. By issuance of the report, WHCA had
recorded the computer and photographic equipment and
implemented a procedure to reduce excess supplies.
5. The IG found that WHCA's inventory of short-haul
telecommunications equipment and services is neither complete
nor accurate. The Assistant Secretary concurred and WHCA is
currently conducting an inventory and formalizing procedures
for maintaining inventory records. These were completed on
March 31, 1996.
6. The IG found that WHCA paid for 21 leased long-haul
telecommunications circuits and equipment items that were no
longer required. They failed to maintain an inventory of long-
haul equipment and services and did not keep records of all
telecommunications equipment. The Assistant Secretary concurred
and stated that WHCA is currently revalidating 11 circuits that
were specifically questioned and formalizing its process to
review one-eighth of its long-haul circuits each quarter. WHCA
will establish an inventory during implementation of the review
and validation program.
7. The IG found that WHCA did not validate Customer Cost
and Obligation reports that list charges for long-haul
telecommunications equipment and services. WHCA had no
procedure for verifying the accuracy of vendor charges. The
Assistant Secretary concurred with the findings and stated that
WHCA had changed procedures to ensure the accuracy of vendor
charges.
8. The IG found that DISA has exercised limited
administrative, financial and operational oversight of WHCA, a
DISA organization. The IG found that the Memorandum of
Agreement discussed in item No. 1 resolved this issue.
9. The IG found that WHCA did not use contracting officers
to acquire temporary telecommunications equipment and services,
competitively select vendors, establish contracts with selected
vendors, validate quoted prices, or establish a formal
memorandum of agreement with a contracting office. The
procurement and payment process was flawed because WHCA did not
comply with Federal and DOD telecommunications, contracting and
accounting regulations. The Assistant Secretary concurred and
agreed to assign the Defense Information Technology Contracting
Office to provide contract support to WHCA for temporary
telecommunications equipment and services; entered into a
memorandum of agreement to specify payment functions by WHCA
and Defense Finance and Accounting Service (finalized March 7,
1996) and instituted interim procedures to ensure that
contracts are established in accordance with regulations.
10. The IG found that WHCA could not validate outstanding
unliquidated obligations totaling $14.5 million or equipment
and services leased as of February 1996. An unliquidated
obligation is a bill for which there is insufficient ``backup''
documentation. It may be legitimate but it is difficult to
tell. The Assistant Secretary agreed and has implemented
procedures to establish obligations for overseas trips;
establish procedures to review unliquidated obligations on a
monthly basis and agreed to establish procedures with the
Department of State to ensure supporting documentation is
provided to WHCA in a timely manner.
VI. Majority's Legislative Recommendations
A. The majority recommends that legislation be enacted that
limits WHCA's mission to the provision of national security
related telecommunications services required by the President
in his capacity as Commander in Chief. We disagree with this
recommendation. We note that the recommendation is moot because
of the above-referenced Spence amendment. Moreover, we note
that contrary to the majority's implication of a neat
delineation of Presidential duties (Commander in Chief versus
non-Commander in Chief), no such clear distinction is manifest
in law or fact. As noted by an Assistant Attorney General
during the Bush administration (``White House Communications
Agency Expenses Incurred on Presidential Political Travel,''
October 22, 1990), ``As Commander in Chief as well as in his
other official roles, the President requires dependable means
by which to communicate instantly with individuals anywhere in
the world at any moment.''
B. The majority recommends that legislation be enacted
requiring that the Commander of WHCA be rated by the Director
of DISA instead of the Head of the White House Military Office.
We disagree with this recommendation. This is an effort to
unneccessarily micromanage an agency of the executive branch.
Concerns about which official writes the personnel evaluation
for another official does not rise to the level of importance
necessary for congressional action.
C. The majority recommends that legislation be enacted
requiring annual reports to Congress by WHCA, WHMO and DOD IG.
We disagree with this recommendation because it is unnecessary.
The DOD IG currently issues semiannual reports to Congress.
Moreover, any legitimate oversight concerns the majority may
have concerning the implementation of corrective actions by
WHCA can be addressed by followup audits by the DOD IG.
Finally, the majority has presented no evidence tending to show
that additional oversight of WHMO is necessary.
Conclusion
In its review of WHCA, the Department of Defense Inspector
General found ``no evidence of theft or significant waste of
agency resources.'' However, one would never know that basic
fact by an examination of the majority's report based on the
Department of Defense's audit. The Clinton administration
should be commended for allowing this inspection and assuring
that sound management and oversight procedures are implemented.
By taking these steps,
this administration has changed five decades of lax practices.
It would seem that the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight would want to applaud such an effort, not ensure that
it may never happen again.
Hon Cardiss Collins.
Hon. Karen L. Thurman.
Hon. Henry A. Waxman.
Hon. Robert E. Wise, Jr.
Hon. Major R. Owens.
Hon. Edolphus Towns.
Hon. Louise M. Slaughter.
Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski.
Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney.
Hon. Thomas M. Barrett.
Hon. Barbara-Rose Collins.
Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton.
Hon. James P. Moran.
Hon. Carrie P. Meek.
Hon. Chaka Fattah.
Hon. Elijah E. Cummings.
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