[House Report 104-748]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                                                 Union Calendar No. 394

104th Congress, 2nd Session -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - House Report 104-748

 
  A TWO-YEAR REVIEW OF THE WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY REVEALS 
 MAJOR MISMANAGEMENT, LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SIGNIFICANT MISSION 
                                 CREEP

                               __________

                             TWELFTH REPORT

                                 by the

                        COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
                          REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                                     



 August 2, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed


              COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

     WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr., 
      Pennsylvania, Chairman
                                     BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
                                     DAN BURTON, Indiana
                                     J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois
                                     CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
                                     CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
                                     STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
                                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
                                     WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New 
                                     Hampshire
                                     JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
                                     STEPHEN HORN, California
                                     JOHN L. MICA, Florida
                                     PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts
                                     THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia
                                     DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana
                                     RANDY TATE, Washington
                                     DICK CHRYSLER, Michigan
                                     GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
                                     MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
                                     WILLIAM J. MARTINI, New Jersey
                                     JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
                                     JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
                                     MICHAEL PATRICK FLANAGAN, Illinois
                                     CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire
                                     STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
                                     MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South 
                                     Carolina
                                     ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois            SCOTT L. KLUG, Wisconsin
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GARY A. CONDIT, California
COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota
KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, Michigan
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
GENE GREEN, Texas
CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
BILL BREWSTER, Oklahoma
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland
            ------
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Independent)

  James L. Clarke, Staff Director
    Kevin Sabo, General Counsel
     Judith McCoy, Chief Clerk
Bud Myers, Minority Staff Director
_________________________________________________________________

Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal 
                                Justice

   WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New 
        Hampshire, Chairman
                                     ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
                                     STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
                                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
                                     JOHN L. MICA, Florida
                                     PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts
                                     MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida            JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
TOM LANTOS, California
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York
GARY A. CONDIT, California
BILL BREWSTER, Oklahoma
ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland

                               Ex Officio

                                     WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr., 
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois            Pennsylvania
  Robert Charles, Staff Director
  Jim Wilon, Professional Staff 
              Member
       Ianthe Saylor, Clerk
     Cherri Branson, Minority 
        Professional Staff


                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                  House of Representatives,
                                    Washington, DC, August 2, 1996.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, I submit herewith the 
committee's twelfth report to the 104th Congress.

                                   William F. Clinger, Jr.,
                                                          Chairman.



                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
  I. Introduction.....................................................1
 II. DOD Inspector General's investigation............................3
      A. Mission creep...........................................     3
          1. Description of mission creep........................     3
          2. Factors in mission creep............................     5
              a. Mission statements..............................     5
              b. Chain-of-command................................     6
      B. Lack of accountability and major mismanagement..........     7
          1. Procurement.........................................     7
              a. Lack of prior review and approval...............     7
              b. Lack of competitive bidding.....................     8
          2. Financial management................................     8
          3. Property accountability.............................     9
              a. Nonexpendable property..........................     9
              b. Expendable property.............................     9
              c. Long-haul telecommunications....................    10
              d. Short-haul telecommunications...................    10
          4. Maintenance management..............................    10
          5. Lack of oversight by DISA...........................    11
          6. Identification of material weakness.................    11
      C. Management response to the audit........................    11
III. Hearings before the subcommittee................................12
      A. First hearing--May 16, 1996.............................    13
          1. Testimony of Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr., GAO..........    13
          2. Testimony of Mr. Robert J. Lieberman, DOD IG........    14
          3. Testimony of Col. Joseph J. Simmons, IV, WHCA.......    14
      B. Second hearing--June 13, 1996...........................    15
          1. Testimony of Col. Joseph J. Simmons, IV, WHCA.......    15
          2. Testimony of Emmett Paige, Jr., ASD/C3I.............    16
 IV. Conclusions and recommendations.................................16
      A. Proper mission of WHCA..................................    16
      B. Accountability and internal controls....................    17
      C. Continued congressional oversight.......................    18

                                 VIEWS

Dissenting views of Hon. Cardiss Collins, Hon. Karen L. Thurman, 
  Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Robert E. Wise, Jr., Hon. Major R. 
  Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Louise M. Slaughter, Hon. Paul 
  E. Kanjorski, Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Thomas M. Barrett, 
  Hon. Barbara-Rose Collins, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Hon. 
  James P. Moran, Hon. Carrie P. Meek, Hon. Chaka Fattah, and 
  Hon. Elijah E. Cummings........................................    19
  


                                                 Union Calendar No. 394
104th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 2nd Session                                                    104-748
_______________________________________________________________________

  A TWO-YEAR REVIEW OF THE WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY REVEALS 
 MAJOR MISMANAGEMENT, LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SIGNIFICANT MISSION 
                                 CREEP

                                _______
                                

 August 2, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


  Mr. Clinger, from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
                        submitted the following

                             TWELFTH REPORT

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

    On July 25, 1996, the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight approved and adopted a report entitled ``A Two-Year 
Review of the White House Communications Agency Reveals Major 
Mismanagement, Lack of Accountability, and Significant Mission 
Creep.'' The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the 
Speaker of the House.

                            I. Introduction

    A 2-year review of the White House Communications Agency 
reveals major mismanagement, lack of accountability, and an 
unsettling degree of mission creep. These findings are 
discussed in detail below, with concrete bipartisan 
recommendations for overall improvement in the agency's 
management, accountability and mission containment.
    The Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (``the 
committee'') has primary legislative jurisdiction for the 
``overall economy, efficiency and management of Government 
operations and activities'' and for ``[r]eorganizations in the 
executive branch of the Government.'' [Rules of the House of 
Representatives, 104th Congress, X, 1(g)(6) and (12).] In 
addition, the committee has primary oversight responsibility to 
``review and study, on a continuing basis, the operation of 
Government activities at all levels with a view to determining 
their economy and efficiency.'' [Rules of the House of 
Representatives, 104th Congress, X, 2(b)(2).] Finally, the 
committee ``may at any time conduct investigations of any 
matter without regard to the provisions . . . conferring 
jurisdiction over such matter upon another standing 
committee.'' [Rules of the House of Representatives, 104th 
Congress, X, 4(c)(2).]
    Pursuant to the foregoing grants of jurisdiction, the 
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and 
Criminal Justice (``the subcommittee'') initiated an 
investigation, and subsequently convened two oversight 
hearings, to assess the mission, structure and operations of 
the White House Communications Agency (``WHCA''). WHCA is an 
agency of the Department of Defense (``DOD'') and is primarily 
responsible for providing communications support to the White 
House. Specifically, the subcommittee examined the various 
missions performed by WHCA to determine whether they were 
appropriate for the agency, and the subcommittee examined the 
conduct of WHCA's operations to determine whether they were 
conducted in accordance with applicable DOD policies and 
regulations.
    The subcommittee's investigation arose from concerns 
regarding long-term mission creep at WHCA, as well as a general 
lack of accountability at the agency. Historically, WHCA's 
predecessor, the White House Signal Detachment (``the 
detachment''), was established in December of 1941 to assist 
then-President Roosevelt in his direction of the United States' 
World War II operations. Staffed by 30 military personnel, the 
detachment allowed the President to communicate with United 
States forces in the Pacific, the Atlantic, North Africa and 
Europe, as well as with America's wartime allies. At the end of 
the war, the detachment remained active, providing successive 
Presidents with national security-related communications 
support.
    In 1954, DOD changed the detachment's name to the White 
House Army Signal Agency. In 1962, the Secretary of Defense 
changed the name again, this time to the White House 
Communications Agency. At the same time, the Secretary 
transferred WHCA from the U.S. Army to the Defense 
Communications Agency (DCA), now called the Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA).
    When the name changed, the mission and organization of WHCA 
also began to expand in directions which were unrelated to the 
agency's original national security and war fighting mission. 
The White House began to use WHCA for clerical, technical and 
public relations tasks that did not call for any military 
expertise. And, as the WHCA mission expanded, so did WHCA: by 
the early 1990's, WHCA had over a thousand active-duty military 
personnel in its ranks, and the agency was costing the American 
taxpayer well over a hundred million dollars a year.
    Further, as WHCA grew in size and began to do more and more 
for the White House, the agency gradually slid out from 
underneath any meaningful DOD supervision or control. In fact, 
for almost 55 years, there was no comprehensive audit or 
inspection of WHCA's operations, and the agency's internal 
accountability decayed seriously in crucial areas such as 
procurement, financial management, property inventory, and 
equipment maintenance.

               II. DOD Inspector General's Investigation

    In March of 1994, alarmed by reports of possible fraud, 
waste and abuse at WHCA, Representative William F. Clinger, 
Jr., the chairman of the committee, and Representative William 
H. Zeliff, Jr., the chairman of the subcommittee, requested 
that the current administration permit the General Accounting 
Office (``GAO'') to conduct a comprehensive audit of WHCA's 
operations. Unexpectedly, the Clinton administration strongly 
and consistently opposed any such audit, on the ground that any 
inspection of WHCA would create a national security risk. 
Representatives Clinger and Zeliff, along with the GAO, met 
three times with representatives of the administration, 
including Presidential Counsel Mikva. The Congressmen and the 
GAO pointed out that most of the information which would be 
involved in an audit of WHCA was not classified in any way, and 
that GAO has effective mechanisms for auditing defense 
organizations which deal with classified information. Despite 
these reassurances, the Clinton administration inexplicably 
blocked an audit for over a year. Finally, in mid-1995, as a 
result of continued pressure by Representatives Clinger and 
Zeliff, the administration agreed to let the DOD Inspector 
General (``IG'') conduct such an audit.
    In 1995, at congressional direction and after continued 
congressional insistence, the Clinton White House permitted the 
first comprehensive audit in the history of WHCA; the 
Department of Defense IG subsequently published its findings in 
two substantial reports. (DODIG Report No. 96-033, ``White 
House Communications Agency,'' dated November 29, 1995, and 
hereinafter referred to as the ``First IG Report;'' and DODIG 
Report No. 96-100, ``White House Communications Agency--Phase 
II,'' dated April 29, 1996, and hereinafter referred to as the 
``Second IG Report.'') The IG's audit reports confirmed that 
WHCA was (a) suffering from significant mission creep, and (b) 
suffering from serious accountability and mismanagement 
problems.

                            A. MISSION CREEP

1. Description of mission creep

    The IG reported that WHCA had made significant additions to 
its original mission of providing military and wartime 
communications for the President of the United States, and now 
provides numerous and varied services to the President, First 
Lady, Vice President, and to White House staffers in general.
    Specifically, the IG found that WHCA's Audiovisual Unit--
with 113 authorized personnel--has become, in effect, an 
adjunct to the White House press and publicity offices.\1\ For 
example, WHCA provides sound amplification and media-quality 
lighting systems, audio and video recording and editing, 
lecterns, flags, seals, and speech teleprompter support for all 
White House media events. WHCA also develops, prints and frames 
pictures of the President, Vice President, First Lady and other 
White House personnel, and provides camera equipment, 
developing and printing services to White House photographers. 
In addition, WHCA retains negatives of all pictures taken 
during an administration, and makes audio and videotape 
recordings of all Presidential events and speeches, for the 
National Archives. While all these may be legitimate White 
House functions, it is not clear why they should be 
accomplished by military telecommunications personnel, 
particularly with DOD funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See First IG Report at 5-6, 8, 64-66; Second IG Report at 48-
49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to employing and maintaining all the equipment 
required by the above-described functions, WHCA's Audiovisual 
Unit also operates a system that provides closed-circuit 
television and distributes cable television broadcasts for the 
entire White House. Each day, WHCA personnel videotape selected 
television news broadcasts which are thought to be of interest 
to the President and his staff. Also, WHCA provides graphic 
arts and reproduction services, such as the production of 
briefing charts, the printing of boarding passes for Air Force 
One, and general document reproduction. Again, these 
perquisites are wholly unrelated to military telecommunications 
requirements.
    Besides those services provided by the Audiovisual Unit, 
the IG reported numerous other examples of mission creep. For 
example, WHCA provides stenographic services--a steno pool--for 
the White House Office of the Press Secretary.\2\ Also, WHCA's 
Data Systems Unit--with 126 authorized personnel--provides 
general-purpose computer, information systems, automation and 
data processing services to the White House.\3\ Further, WHCA 
provides news wire services so that White House personnel can 
have ready access to the latest dispatches from the Associated 
Press, United Press International, Reuters America, Knight 
Ridder, Dow Vision, the Los Angeles Times, and The Washington 
Post.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ First IG Report at 6-7.
    \3\ First IG Report at 64; Second IG Report at 49.
    \4\ First IG Report at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Regarding all of the above-described services, the IG 
concluded that they should not be provided and paid for by the 
Department of Defense, but rather should be funded by the 
Office of Administration, Executive Office of the President.\5\ 
The IG noted that WHCA itself had been consistently and 
unsuccessfully attempting, since at least 1971, to transfer 
funding for many of these services, most notably the 
stenographic and news wire services, back to the White House, 
but successive administrations have prevented such 
transfers.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ First IG Report at 9-11.
    \6\ First IG Report at 7, 70-72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, the IG also found that since at least fiscal year 
1991, WHCA has provided telecommunications support to the 
Secret Service, without collecting reimbursement for that 
support as required by law.\7\ Once again, while the IG did not 
go so far as to question the necessity of services provided to 
the White House or the Secret Service, it did take the position 
that these services should not be funded by the military.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ See First IG Report at 12-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the IG did not provide a current total dollar 
figure for money spent on all of the above-described 
activities, it estimates that WHCA's audiovisual, stenographic 
and news wire services, in fiscal year 1995, cost over $7.8 
million, and that WHCA's unreimbursed Secret Service 
expenditures amounted to roughly $1 million in fiscal year 
1994.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ First IG Report at 8, 15-16, 73-75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Due in large part to this mission creep, WHCA has steadily 
increased its manpower and funding during the past 55 years. As 
of December 31, 1995, WHCA had 946 military and 8 civilian 
personnel authorized, of which 824 military and 7 civilian 
personnel were actually assigned. (As of June 13, 1996, the 
number of assigned personnel had increased to 856.) The cost to 
operate WHCA for fiscal years 1995 and 1996 will have totaled 
approximately $110 million and $122 million, respectively.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Second IG Report at 2-3; original transcript of June 13, 1996 
hearing at 24; see also First IG Report at 67-69; Second IG Report at 
50-52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Tangentially, it should also be noted that WHCA's manning 
and budget have tended to increase most substantially during 
Presidential election years.

2. Factors in mission creep

            a. Mission statements
    The IG reports concluded that WHCA's mission creep has been 
fostered by a number of factors. First, WHCA's mission 
statement has been expanded over the years.\10\ While initially 
WHCA and its predecessor agencies were solely devoted to 
military and war fighting missions in support of the President, 
a broader mission statement was formulated and promulgated by 
the Defense Communications Agency (``DCA'')--to which WHCA was 
then assigned as a subcommand--in its Instruction 4850.7, 
``White House Communications Agency,'' dated September 6, 1962. 
Instruction 4850.7 stated that ``the mission of the White House 
Communications Agency is to provide telecommunications and 
other related support to the President of the United States and 
to other elements related to the President.'' (Emphasis added.) 
This mission statement left ample room for mission creep.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ First IG Report at 58-61; Second IG Report at 4, 43-46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    WHCA's mission statement was further expanded in DCA 
Circular 640-45-48, dated March 3, 1978, and revised on July 
17, 1989. The mission statement read as follows:
          Mission. The mission of WHCA is to provide 
        telecommunications and other related support to the 
        President of the United States and to other elements 
        related to the President.
          A. Other related support includes, but is not limited 
        to, audiovisual services, including videotape recording 
        for the President and others as directed; photographic 
        laboratory and drafting support of the White House; and 
        general purpose automated data processing support for 
        the National Security Council (NSC) and the White 
        House.
          B. Elements related to the President are his staff, 
        the First Family, the Vice President, the U.S. Secret 
        Service Protective Forces, and others as directed.
(Emphasis added.) Again, the new mission statement was 
extremely open-ended and allowed many different tasks to be 
assigned to WHCA.
    Furthermore, in 1977, the Director of DCA testified before 
Congress that, as a practical matter, DCA would defer to the 
President and the White House in their determinations of what 
missions were appropriate for WHCA. [Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, First 
Session, part 3, page 758, March 29, 1977.] On September 7, 
1977, the DCA General Counsel issued a legal opinion 
memorandum, ``Legal Authorities That Support the WHCA 
Mission,'' which indicated that there were almost no practical 
limits on the types of missions that could be assigned to WHCA. 
The opinion letter stated that ``the President can make almost 
any assignment he wants of functions to an executive branch 
organization so long as the assignment is not one which is 
vested by law in one department or agency and he proposes to 
abolish it or reassign it to another agency; such abolition or 
reassignment requiring the consent of the Congress.''
    Finally, a DCA Report entitled ``Management Review of the 
White House Communications Agency,'' dated June-July 1987, 
retrospectively approved much of the mission creep which had 
already taken place. Specifically, the report concluded that 
WHCA's provision of audiovisual support for political and media 
events, and its provision of various photographic, drafting, 
graphics, and data processing services to the White House and 
the National Security Council, were well-established and valid 
missions.
    In short, the IG reported that over the years, successive 
administrations in the White House began to use WHCA for an 
increasing number and variety of missions, and DCA repeatedly 
validated the mission creep by broadening WHCA's mission 
statement.
            b. Chain-of-command
    The second factor contributing to WHCA's mission creep was 
the historical transfer of command and control of WHCA from the 
Department of Defense to the White House. Although WHCA is now 
technically under the supervision of the Defense Information 
Systems Agency (``DISA''), the successor agency to DCA, DISA 
does not in fact direct the operations of WHCA. Rather, WHCA 
receives its day-to-day orders and directions from the White 
House Military Office (WHMO), which is staffed by political 
appointees and is part of the Executive Office of the 
President. The Director of WHMO--who is a civilian and a 
political appointee, and also holds the position of Deputy 
Assistant to the President--directs the activities of WHCA, and 
also writes the annual Officer Evaluation Report which 
determines the future career prospects of the WHCA Commander. 
This Officer Evaluation Report is also reviewed, supplemented 
and signed by the White House Chief of Staff.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ First IG Report at 3; Second IG Report at 3-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, although WHCA is technically a subcommand of DISA, 
and theoretically under the supervision of DISA, in practice 
the power relationship is exactly reversed. Because of WHCA's 
proximity and direct responsibility to the President, DISA has 
generally taken a deferential and subservient attitude toward 
WHCA, and has focused on ministering to the requirements of 
WHCA rather than exercising effective supervision. In light of 
the power relationships involved, it is not surprising that 
WHCA has been willing to expand its mission steadily to 
accommodate successive Presidents, even though many of the new 
missions should be funded and performed by other agencies.

           B. LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND MAJOR MISMANAGEMENT

    The IG also found that WHCA suffered from serious 
accountability problems in a number of different areas.

1. Procurement

            a. Lack of prior review and approval
    In order to ensure that military procurements are fully 
justified and as cost-effective as possible, DOD regulations 
require that every procurement contract be reviewed and 
approved by an authorized contracting officer. Additionally, to 
provide further review, DISA contracting procedures require 
that every commercial acquisition valued at more than $1 
million--and every intra-DOD purchase valued at more than 
$100,000--be reviewed and approved by the DISA Acquisition 
Review Panel. However, WHCA has consistently ignored these 
requirements. The IG reported that WHCA has consistently 
approved its own contracts without consulting a DISA 
contracting officer or the Acquisition Review Panel. In 
addition, WHCA personnel have frequently made purchases without 
any official written contractual documents, simply making 
purchases on an ad hoc basis.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Second IG Report at 8-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because WHCA's acquisitions are not reviewed as carefully 
as they should be, WHCA has made some serious and expensive 
procurement errors. Recently, at Clinton administration 
direction, WHCA expended $4.9 million on two air-transportable 
mobile communications systems that did not meet operational 
needs. Although the systems were originally designed to 
accompany the President on most Presidential trips, it soon 
became apparent that (a) the system, together with its 
associated personnel and equipment, could not fit on one C-141 
cargo aircraft as originally planned; (b) the system could not 
draw electrical power from many of the hotels visited by the 
Presidential party; and (c) the interior design of the system 
made it difficult for a full complement of personnel and 
communications equipment to operate without mutual 
interference.\13\ Thus, the systems were employed on only 3 of 
63 Presidential trips during the period from May to December of 
1995. As a result, WHCA chose not to exercise its option to 
purchase another six systems for an additional $5.5 million; 
however, the original $4.9 million has already been wasted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Second IG Report at 8, 53-54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The IG also noted an instance where due to lack of prior 
review and approval, WHCA officials independently estimated 
that a certain type of satellite terminal would cost $269,000 
per terminal. WHCA was later surprised to learn that the cost 
was actually $618,000 per terminal. After making this discovery 
late in the procurement process, WHCA was forced to reduce its 
purchase to only 6 terminals, although the original intent and 
purpose of the procurement had been to replace 11 older model 
terminals by purchasing 12 new terminals.\14\ Once again, lack 
of prior review by the designated contracting authorities 
resulted in a severely flawed procurement process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Second IG Report at 9, 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The IG reported that WHCA officials purchasing temporary 
telecommunications services have generally proceeded without 
written contracts.\15\ For example, no contracting documents 
were prepared for 140 Presidential trips taken during a 9-month 
period in fiscal year 1995. The contracting officer merely 
filed the invoices in a desk drawer. In part because there are 
no written contracting documents, WHCA officials also have 
generally neglected to verify that WHCA is being charged 
according to the proper tariff of telecommunications rates. 
This has resulted in WHCA paying many overcharges without 
protest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ See Second IG Report at 14-21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. Lack of competitive bidding
    In addition to short-circuiting the prior approval process, 
the IG found that WHCA has generally avoided DOD competitive 
bidding requirements. The IG reports cited various examples, 
including multimillion dollar WHCA procurements, such as the 
Washington Area System radio network, the above-described 
satellite communications terminals, and the entire category of 
temporary telecommunications equipment and services.\16\ The IG 
noted that WHCA has used a number of different mechanisms to 
avoid competitive bidding, including (a) improperly using Small 
Business Administration set-asides; (b) reducing purchase 
amounts to below the dollar amount where competitive bidding is 
required; (c) claiming that ``national security 
considerations'' make competitive bidding impossible; (d) 
claiming that time requirements make competitive bidding 
impossible; or (e) simply ignoring the competitive bidding 
requirements. The IG concluded that WHCA's justifications were 
generally insufficient, and that WHCA should take steps to 
insure that competitive bidding is used in the future so that 
the American taxpayer can be sure that WHCA is getting the most 
for its money.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ See First IG Report at 51-53; Second IG Report at 55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Financial management

    As a result of WHCA's sloppy procurement procedures, WHCA 
has experienced difficulties keeping track of its 
disbursements. The IG noted that WHCA sometimes makes duplicate 
payments to contractors, or even pays for equipment or services 
which were never delivered; worse yet, the IG reported that 
WHCA has been paying only 17% of its invoices on time, so that 
interest and penalties must be paid on the other 83% of WHCA's 
obligations.\17\ Again, the American taxpayer has been ill-
served by this management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Second IG Report at 19-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One example of WHCA's failure to validate its contractual 
disbursements is in the purchase of ``long-haul'' 
telecommunications facilities, which provide long-distance 
telecommunications between remote sites and facilities. 
(``Short-haul'' telecommunications, by way of contrast, are 
used to communicate within a single base or facility.) DOD 
regulations require that charges for long-haul 
telecommunications services must be validated--i.e., the using 
agency must determine that each charge is legitimate and 
accurate. However, the IG found that WHCA was not validating 
these charges, and as a result WHCA was erroneously paying for 
some services that were previously terminated, and for some 
services that were ordered but not delivered.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ First IG Report at 38-40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Agency-wide, WHCA had recorded approximately $14.5 million 
in ``unliquidated obligations'' as of February 23, 1996.\19\ 
Due to inadequate recordkeeping, the majority of these 
unliquidated obligations--many of which go back as far as 
1991--could not be validated; thus, WHCA was unable to 
determine when or whether they should be paid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Second IG Report at 23-25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Property accountability

            a. Nonexpendable property
    In every military unit, all nonexpendable property--i.e., 
major durable goods--must be recorded in the unit property book 
when it is received, so that it can be regularly inventoried 
and accounted for. If property is received by a unit but is not 
recorded in the property book, that property becomes especially 
vulnerable to loss, theft or damage.
    The IG found that WHCA failed to exercise internal controls 
over its property book procedures.\20\ Specifically, many of 
WHCA's operational units were in the habit of ordering and/or 
receiving property without reporting it to WHCA's Logistics 
Branch, which maintains the unit property book. As a result, 
significant quantities of nonexpendable property--including 
$555,000 worth of computers and $22,000 worth of photographic 
equipment--were never recorded in the property book, and the IG 
estimated that the total dollar figure for nonrecorded property 
may have been as high as $738,000. In addition, because of the 
lack of centralized property accountability, it was often 
difficult to determine whether nonexpendable property which had 
been ordered and paid for, had actually been received. In fact, 
the IG report noted that WHCA had 102 open purchase requests 
requiring investigation and reconciliation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ First IG Report at 24-27, 76-77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. Expendable property
    In addition to its problems managing nonexpendable 
property, WHCA also was engaged in wasteful practices regarding 
the management of its expendable property.\21\ (Expendable 
property generally consists of lower-cost, consumable items, 
such as cleaning supplies or office products.) The IG found 
that WHCA did not keep the required records of demand histories 
for its expendable supplies, so that it could not accurately 
predict its future needs. WHCA compensated for this uncertainty 
by maintaining excessive stocks of its expendable supplies, and 
in some cases by stocking items which had no demand histories 
at all. The IG estimated that by following sensible practices 
and applicable regulations regarding expendable supplies, WHCA 
could save over $225,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ First IG Report at 27-28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            c. Long-haul telecommunications
    The IG found that WHCA was not following DOD regulations 
which require regular inventory and revalidation of long-haul 
telecommunications circuits and equipment.\22\ As a result, 
WHCA was continuing to pay for 21 leased circuits, and 
associated equipment, which were no longer required. The IG 
estimated that those unnecessary circuits and equipment were 
costing WHCA over $117,000 a year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ First IG Report at 34-37, 79-84.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            d. Short-haul telecommunications
    Finally, the IG found that WHCA was completely unable to 
provide a reasonably accurate inventory of its ``short-haul'' 
telecommunications, which are the internal telephone lines used 
to communicate within a base, installation, headquarters, or 
Federal building.\23\ The IG found that WHCA had been 
disregarding DOD regulations which require regular inventory 
and revalidation of short-haul telecommunications equipment and 
services. Because WHCA was unable to provide an inventory, the 
IG could not conduct a thorough audit of WHCA's short-haul 
telecommunications. Rather, the IG simply noted that in the 
absence of regular inventory and revalidation of requirement, 
it was highly likely that WHCA was wasting funds on obsolete, 
unnecessary or duplicative short-haul telecommunications 
equipment and services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ First IG Report at 30-33; Second IG Report at 39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Maintenance management

    The IG found that WHCA's maintenance management suffered 
from a grave lack of internal controls.\24\ First, WHCA was 
unable to keep accountability of its repair parts inventory. In 
response to the IG's request for an inventory, six of WHCA's 
seven operational units failed to adequately describe, 
quantify, or provide the value for their repair parts on hand. 
Although WHCA was invited to remedy this situation during the 5 
months intervening between the IG's first and second reports, 
WHCA failed to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ First IG Report at 19-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A related deficiency was that until June of 1995, WHCA's 
Logistics Branch did not keep records of the historical demand 
frequency for repair parts, and thus could not accurately 
predict WHCA's future needs. Taken together, the lack of 
historical demand frequency data and the failure to keep an 
accurate inventory of repair parts on hand resulted in two 
problems: (1) WHCA's operational capabilities were always in 
danger of being hampered by shortages of critical repair parts, 
and (2) WHCA wasted time and money by ordering and maintaining 
excessively large inventories of repair parts, in order to 
compensate for the uncertainty caused by poor inventory 
management.
    Second, WHCA failed to keep adequate records of its 
maintenance contracts with outside contractors. For 20 of its 
32 maintenance contracts, WHCA failed to keep accurate lists of 
the equipment covered by each contract. In addition, WHCA 
failed to keep historical records of the type, frequency and 
cost of maintenance provided under each contract. These two 
failings contributed to the creation of an operational 
environment where critical maintenance could be forgotten or 
overlooked, and, in addition, money could be wasted on 
maintenance contracts which were not cost-effective.
    The IG noted that military units avoid such problems by 
implementing maintenance management systems which schedule 
maintenance activities, record historical data, and forecast 
future needs. WHCA did purchase a maintenance management 
system, in 1993, at a cost of $303,000. However, because the 
system has generally not been used, it has not resulted in 
increased efficiency or cost savings for WHCA; rather, the 
maintenance management system has merely resulted in a net 
acquisition cost of $303,000.

5. Lack of oversight by DISA

    The IG report attributed at least part of the 
responsibility for WHCA's widespread failure of internal 
controls, and lack of accountability, to a lack of oversight by 
DISA.\25\ Although WHCA is nominally a subsidiary command of 
DISA, and thus DISA is technically in charge of WHCA, DISA has 
exercised almost no oversight and supervisory control over 
WHCA's administration, finances, and operations. Historically, 
DISA has taken the position that its mission with respect to 
WHCA is merely to provide administrative support when needed, 
and that WHCA is subject to WHMO as far as oversight is 
concerned. Neither DISA nor WHMO have exercised oversight to 
insure that WHCA follows DOD procedures and regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ See Second IG Report at 4-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Identification of material weakness

    As a result of WHCA's widespread failure of accountability 
and lack of oversight, the IG concluded that ``the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and 
Intelligence) management control program needs improvement 
because a material weakness exists in that administrative, 
financial and operational oversight was not provided to the 
White House Communication Agency.'' \26\ The IG identified the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence (the ASD/C3I) as the 
responsible entity because the ASD/C3I is in charge of DISA, 
which in turn is technically in charge of WHCA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Second IG Report at ii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  C. MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE AUDIT

    The required management response to the IG audit was 
provided by Emmett Paige, Jr., the ASD/C3I, who submitted joint 
comments on his own behalf and on behalf of the Director of 
DISA and the Commander of WHCA. In response to the IG's 
findings of mission creep, the ASD/C3I denied that any problem 
existed. The ASD/C3I took the position that all of WHCA's 
activities were within the parameters of WHCA's mission 
statement, if that mission statement was properly (i.e., 
broadly) construed.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ First IG Report at 95-107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, the ASD/C3I did concur with almost all of the IG's 
findings and recommendations regarding WHCA's lack of 
accountability and internal controls.\28\ The ASD/C3I 
acknowledged not only that each individual accountability 
problem needed to be corrected, but also that the scope and 
nature of WHCA's accountability problems, taken as a whole, 
demanded an overarching, systemic solution. To that end, the 
ASD/C3I entered into consultations and negotiations with White 
House staff, with a view to resolving WHCA's accountability 
problems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ See First IG Report at 107-112; Second IG Report at 63-67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As a result of those meetings, the ASD/C3I eventually 
executed a two-page Memorandum of Agreement with the White 
House Office of Management and Administration, which is the 
White House office in charge of WHMO.\29\ The Memorandum of 
Agreement was signed on March 8, 1996 by Secretary Paige, and 
was also signed, on March 14, 1996, by Ms. Jodie R. Torkelson, 
the Assistant to the President for Management and 
Administration. The memorandum purported to set out some of the 
terms and conditions governing WHCA's future operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ ``Memorandum of Agreement Between the White House Office of 
Management and Administration and the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Command, Control, and Communications and Intelligence,'' undated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sadly, with regard to mission creep, the memorandum did not 
recognize or address any existing problems; rather, the 
memorandum fully validated the status quo, and included a WHCA 
mission statement broad enough to encompass almost any White 
House activity whatsoever. Regarding WHCA's accountability 
problems, the memorandum also validated the status quo, noting 
that ``The WHMO provides operational direction and control to 
WHCA,'' and ``The DISA provides administrative support to the 
WHCA.'' On the other hand, the memorandum also included the 
following language emphasizing DISA's oversight 
responsibilities over WHCA: ``To ensure that WHCA manages 
information technology services efficiently and effectively, 
DISA will provide administrative support for WHCA and 
functional oversight of the WHCA information technology 
services.'' Unfortunately, the memorandum did not go on to 
define or elaborate DISA's ``functional oversight.''

                 III. Hearings Before the Subcommittee

    After the release of the IG Reports, the subcommittee 
announced a hearing to take testimony, draw conclusions, and 
recommend long-term, systemic solutions to a set of pervasive, 
deeply-rooted and long-standing problems. The subcommittee 
scheduled its hearing for Thursday, May 16, 1996, and invited 
the following representatives of the agencies involved: Ms. 
Jodie R. Torkelson, Assistant to the President for Management 
and Administration; Mr. Alan P. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant to 
the President and Director, White House Military Office; Emmett 
Paige, Jr., ASD/C3I; Col. Joseph J. Simmons IV, the Commander 
of WHCA; Mr. Robert J. Lieberman, Assistant Inspector General 
for Auditing for the DOD IG; and Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr., 
Assistant Comptroller General for the GAO's National Security 
and International Affairs Division.
    Unfortunately, both Ms. Torkelson and Mr. Sullivan 
unequivocally refused to participate in the subcommittee's 
hearing. In fact, the subcommittee received two letters from 
Mr. Jack Quinn, the White House Counsel, summarily stating that 
neither Ms. Torkelson nor Mr. Sullivan would testify because 
``White House officials generally do not testify before 
Congress.'' \30\ In fact, White House officials do testify 
before Congress on many different issues, and on a fairly 
frequent basis. Thus, the subcommittee was surprised and 
disappointed at the administration's apparent decision to 
obstruct its investigation. Since Mr. Sullivan and Ms. 
Torkelson are in charge of WHCA, their self-enforced absence 
from the subcommittee's oversight process was remarkable; and 
it should be noted that the White House, having chosen not to 
participate in the oversight process, has forfeited the 
opportunity to contribute to the subcommittee's conclusions and 
recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Letter from Mr. Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to the 
Honorable William H. Zeliff, Jr., subcommittee chairman, dated May 8, 
1996; letter from Mr. Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to the 
Honorable William H. Zeliff, Jr., subcommittee chairman, dated May 15, 
1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To avoid further delays, the subcommittee chose not to 
subpoena, at the time of the hearing, either Ms. Torkelson or 
Mr. Sullivan, but proceeded instead with the witnesses who were 
available. The subcommittee may revisit this issue in the near 
future.

                     A. FIRST HEARING--MAY 16, 1996

1. Testimony of Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr., GAO

    Mr. Hinton's testimony \31\ contained four important 
points. First, Mr. Hinton described the current 
administration's resistance to GAO's investigation of WHCA. 
During 1994, the administration consistently limited DOD 
contact with GAO and the release of DOD data. Citing ``national 
security concerns,'' the administration kept GAO from receiving 
copies of WHCA's budgeting and financial records, and on three 
occasions--in May, June, and August of 1994--DOD officials 
informed GAO that the White House had prohibited DOD contact 
with GAO or release of DOD data. In January of 1995, White 
House Counsel staff informed GAO that GAO would not be provided 
with the information needed to conduct its investigation of 
WHCA, and in February of 1995, GAO's efforts to investigate 
WHCA were terminated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ See ``Defense Communications: White House Communications 
Agency Activities and Funding,'' Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., 
Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International 
Affairs Division, GAO/T-NSIAD-96-168, dated May 16, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, Mr. Hinton provided historical background 
information regarding the oversight relationship between DISA 
and WHCA. Although WHCA is technically a subcommand of DISA, 
GAO found that it was not historically treated in the same way 
as DISA's other subcommands. For example, in approving the 
budgets of its other subcommands, DISA required and reviewed 
detailed written justifications for all expenditures; however, 
WHCA's budget approval process consisted of periodic meetings 
between the Commander of WHCA and the Director of DISA.\32\ 
Similarly, while DISA's other subcommands often had their 
budget requests cut, WHCA's requested budget amounts had never 
been reduced, except as part of an across-the-board reduction. 
According to one DISA financial management officer, WHCA was 
strangely ``immune'' from the usual level of review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ See also Second IG Report at 7-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, WHCA's acquisition and contracting decisions 
were generally made without the participation or approval of 
DISA contracting officers; WHCA's failure to obtain 
reimbursement for services provided to other agencies was 
unreviewed by DISA; and WHCA generally did not suffer the same 
personnel reductions as DISA's other subcommands. In short, the 
GAO's research painted a picture of WHCA as an DOD agency which 
was essentially excused from DOD oversight because of its 
proximity to the power and influence of the White House.
    Third, Mr. Hinton noted that the necessary oversight of 
WHCA, which was not provided by DISA, was also not provided by 
the White House. Although a 1987 task force report on WHCA 
criticized management deficiencies and concluded that the White 
House was not exercising effective oversight over 
telecommunications procurement and deployment, successive 
administrations did not improve their oversight over WHCA.
    Fourth and finally, Mr. Hinton stated the GAO's conclusion 
and recommendation, based on the longstanding and pervasive 
nature of WHCA's deficiencies and on the fact that there is 
still disagreement regarding many of the IG's recommendations: 
Continued congressional oversight of WHCA is important and 
appropriate.

2. Testimony of Mr. Robert J. Lieberman, DOD IG

    Mr. Lieberman's testimony summarized the IG's audit 
findings, which are set out in greater detail in part II of 
this report, above. His testimony did not alter or vary the 
findings, conclusions and recommendations arrived at in either 
IG report.

3. Testimony of Col. Joseph J. Simmons, IV, WHCA

    On May 15, the day before the hearing, the subcommittee 
received two different testimony submissions from Col. Simmons. 
The disparities between the statements engendered considerable 
controversy.
    Col. Simmons' prepared testimony was delivered to the 
subcommittee offices early on May 15. However, following the 
delivery of that document (version 1), subcommittee staff 
received two telephone calls from WHCA notifying the 
subcommittee that there were major revisions going on, and that 
Col. Simmons would be submitting a revised version of his 
prepared testimony later in the day. At 5:30 p.m., on May 15, 
another messenger arrived with the updated testimony (version 
2).
    Upon careful review, it turned out that the two versions of 
Col. Simmons' prepared testimony differed in important 
respects. For example, version 1 made it clear that WHMO 
exercises complete operational direction and control over WHCA 
and its commander, and stated that ``[i]f oversight is needed 
to ensure WHCA purchases only those goods and services 
necessary to fulfill its mission, this oversight should come 
from WHMO [i.e. a political office in the White House].'' 
However, all references to WHMO's presence in the chain-of-
command, or to WHMO's oversight responsibility, were deleted 
from version 2, which merely indicated that DISA provides 
administrative support and ``functional oversight'' to WHCA.
    Also, version 1 contained descriptions of some of WHCA's 
more questionable activities--such as photographic and graphics 
services, audiovisual and speech teleprompter services, and 
various types of support furnished to Secret Service personnel, 
White House staffers, and ``traveling dignitaries''--all of 
which were deleted from version 2. Overall, version 2 was a 
less forthright and more defensive document than version 1.
    In itself, this revision of prepared testimony might have 
been excused, even if the revisions occurred at the behest of 
the White House. However, when Representative Mica moved to 
include both versions of Col. Simmons' prepared testimony in 
the record, Col. Simmons denied knowledge of, and 
responsibility for, version 1 of his prepared testimony, 
stating that he had ``no idea'' where it came from. Given the 
similarities in form and content between version 1 and version 
2--and the circumstances surrounding the delivery of version 1, 
the interim revisions, and the delivery of version 2--Col. 
Simmons' statements were unsettling. To give all the involved 
parties an opportunity to resolve their questions regarding the 
provenance or genuineness of version 1, Subcommittee Chairman 
Zeliff recessed the hearing for the day.

                    B. SECOND HEARING--JUNE 13, 1996

    The WHCA hearing reconvened on Thursday, June 13, 1996. 
Shortly after the first hearing, Subcommittee Chairman Zeliff, 
Chairman Clinger and Representative Thurman, the ranking 
minority member, met with Col. Simmons. As a result of that 
discussion, and a follow-on discussion, Col. Simmons told 
Subcommittee Chairman Zeliff that he was prepared to stand by 
either version of his prepared testimony at the second hearing.

1. Testimony of Col. Joseph J. Simmons, IV, WHCA

    In response to questions regarding the IG's findings, Col. 
Simmons generally acknowledged WHCA's shortcomings but 
attributed them to the faulty oversight and support provided by 
DISA, and by other DOD agencies such as the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service (DFAS) and the Army Information Systems 
Command.\33\ However, on the matter of the $4.9 million mobile 
communications systems, Col. Simmons unequivocally stated that 
the systems were working quite well, and that the IG's 
criticisms of the mobile communications systems were entirely 
incorrect and unjustified.\34\ Col. Simmons was unable to 
explain why he had earlier concurred in writing with the IG's 
findings on this matter, and since the IG representatives were 
not present at the second hearing, the question could not be 
debated in detail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ See original transcript of June 13, 1996 hearing at 34, 43, 
103.
    \34\ See original transcript of June 13, 1996 hearing at 73-81, 
103-107, 109-111, 114.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To resolve the issue, Subcommittee Chairman Zeliff 
requested that Col. Simmons send him a letter explaining why 
the IG's conclusions regarding the mobile communications system 
were incorrect.\35\ However, Col. Simmons did not do so. 
Subcommittee Chairman Zeliff subsequently sent a letter to the 
DOD IG requesting clarification and substantiation of their 
conclusions on this matter, and the IG responded with a 
detailed analysis of the systems' shortcomings.\36\ The IG also 
provided copies of internal WHCA analyses--both prospective and 
retrospective--which confirmed that although WHCA had 
originally planned to use the systems on almost all 
Presidential trips, WHCA officials discovered after purchasing 
the systems that they suffered from a number of significant 
limitations which made them more expensive, less convenient, 
and as a practical matter useful for only a small percentage of 
Presidential trips.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ See original transcript of June 13, 1996 hearing at 115.
    \36\ Letter from Eleanor Hill, Department of Defense Inspector 
General, to the Honorable William H. Zeliff, subcommittee chairman, 
dated July 8, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Testimony of Emmett Paige, Jr., ASD/C3I

    On the issue of mission creep, Secretary Paige took the 
position that WHCA's present mission is appropriate. The 
Secretary did not agree with the IG's recommendation that some 
of WHCA's taskings be transferred to the Executive Office of 
the President.
    Regarding the accountability issues, the Secretary stated 
that primary responsibility for the efficiency of WHCA's 
operations resides with the WHCA Commander.\37\ The secretary 
went on to say that the new Memorandum of Agreement between 
ASD/C3I and the White House Office of Management and 
Administration, together with a new commitment to oversight and 
support on the part of DISA, should ensure that WHCA conducts 
its operations in accordance with all applicable DOD policies 
and regulations in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ See original transcript of June 13, 1996 hearing at 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

                       A. PROPER MISSION OF WHCA

    Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the U.S. Armed 
Services have been steadily downsized to the point where the 
United States today has less than two-thirds of the combat 
power which it had as recently as the 1991 Gulf War. This 
reduction in combat power has been accompanied by concomitant 
reductions in manpower and funding, with the defense budget 
continually declining in terms of constant dollars.
    At the same time as the Armed Services have experienced 
drastic reductions in manpower, funding, and combat power, they 
have been called upon to perform an ever-increasing quantity 
and variety of new missions. United States Forces have been 
keeping the peace in Bosnia, maintaining a United States 
presence in Saudi Arabia, patrolling the waters off Taiwan, 
guarding refugees in Cuba, supporting the Olympics in Atlanta, 
and assisting in the war on drugs, to name just a few of their 
higher-profile missions. With fewer and fewer units performing 
more and more missions, our men and women in uniform are 
subjected to ever-greater strains as they maintain their 
personal and professional readiness.
    In this climate, it is crucial that our limited military 
assets not be diverted into the performance of civilian tasks. 
While no one will deny that the White House is entitled to have 
audiovisual support for press conferences, stenographic 
services, news wire services, and so on, these services should 
not be provided by soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. 
Rather, such tasks should be accomplished and paid for by the 
Executive Office of the President, not by the Department of 
Defense. In short, each agency of Government should be used for 
the purpose for which it is designed, which means that the 
military should not be used for civilian tasks and political 
ends.
    Furthermore, if the Executive Office of the President is 
required to pay for the services which it uses, then it will 
have an incentive to insure that such services are procured and 
paid for in an economical and efficient manner. This would be a 
marked improvement over the present situation, where the 
Executive Office of the President has little incentive to 
exercise careful control over DOD funds.
    Thus, the committee recommends that legislation be enacted 
limiting WHCA's mission to the provision of national security-
related telecommunications services required by the President 
in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, 
and providing that all other functions presently performed by 
WHCA be transferred to the Executive Office of the President. 
It should be noted that legislation addressing some of the 
committees concerns is currently pending in the House of 
Representatives, having been put forward by Representative 
Floyd Spence, Chairman of the National Security Committee, in 
the form of an amendment to H.R. 3230, a Department of Defense 
authorization bill.

                B. ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTERNAL CONTROLS

    WHCA's accountability problems have arisen from the same 
source as its mission creep: the complete separation of 
responsibility from control. DOD bears direct and complete 
responsibility for WHCA, in that it must provide the personnel, 
equipment and funding required by WHCA to perform its assigned 
missions. However, while DOD has complete responsibility for 
WHCA, DOD has no effective control over WHCA, because that 
control is entirely in the hands of the White House Military 
Office.
    The current administration has struggled valiantly to 
obscure this basic fact by withholding witnesses, altering 
testimony, and seeking to put the blame for WHCA's shortcomings 
on DISA. However, it remains obvious that the reason why DOD 
and DISA have been completely unable to exercise effective 
oversight over WHCA, is that WHCA is under the complete 
protection and influence of the White House. As long as WHCA 
takes its primary direction from WHMO, and as long as the WHCA 
Commander is rated and reviewed by the Director of WHMO and the 
White House Chief of Staff, WHCA will always strive 
singlemindedly to fulfill White House requirements, while 
freely ignoring DOD and DISA requirements.
    Thus, the committee recommends that the WHCA Commander be 
rated by the Director of DISA, and reviewed by the ASD/C3I. The 
DISA Director and the ASD/C3I will ensure that WHCA continues 
to support the national security-related requirements of the 
Commander-in-Chief with maximum effectiveness, and are also 
much more likely than White House staffers to ensure that WHCA 
sticks to its military mission and adheres to applicable DOD 
policies and regulations.

                  C. CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

    Finally, the lack of cooperation from the White House, 
together with the attempts made by the ASD/C3I and especially 
the WHCA Commander to minimize the nature and extent of WHCA's 
continuing difficulties, make it clear that WHCA will probably 
not undergo any substantial reform unless it is overseen by 
Congress. To that end, the committee recommends that 
legislation be enacted requiring WHCA, WHMO, and the DOD IG to 
provide annual reports to the subcommittee over a period of 5 
years, to include fiscal years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 
2000. These reports should describe the continuing progress (or 
lack thereof) toward solving the problems identified by the DOD 
IG and by this subcommittee, and each report should be 
submitted within 90 days after the end of the fiscal year to 
which it applies.
 DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. CARDISS COLLINS, HON. KAREN L. THURMAN, HON. 
 HENRY A. WAXMAN, HON. ROBERT E. WISE, JR., HON. MAJOR R. OWENS, HON. 
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, HON. LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER, HON. PAUL E. KANJORSKI, HON. 
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, HON. THOMAS M. BARRETT, HON. BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, 
 HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, HON. JAMES P. MORAN, HON. CARRIE P. MEEK, 
             HON. CHAKA FATTAH, AND HON. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS

    From January 1995 until July 1996, the Inspector General 
(IG) of the Department of Defense (DOD) has issued no fewer 
than 350 reports detailing problems of the Department of 
Defense. Yet the White House Communications Agency (WHCA) is 
the only matter involving oversight of any Department of 
Defense agency that the Subcommittee on National Security, 
International Affairs, and Criminal Justice has held under the 
control of the Republican majority.
    It should be noted that in FY 1995, the Department of 
Defense had a budget of $260 billion and issued an average of 
$35 million an hour in checks. In that same year, the White 
House Communications Agency had a total budget of $68 million, 
less than 2 hours worth of Defense Department spending.
    The Inspector General found no evidence of waste, fraud or 
abuse in the agency's disbursement of resources. Moreover, the 
Inspector General noted that some of the management and 
oversight problems found in WHCA were widespread throughout the 
Department of Defense. When problems specific to WHCA were 
identified, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, 
Control, Communications and Intelligence and the Defense 
Information Systems Agency concurred with the Inspector 
General's findings. The corrective procedures adopted by the 
agency were those recommended by the Inspector General.
    In its review of WHCA, the Department of Defense Inspector 
General found ``no evidence of theft or significant waste of 
agency resources.'' However, one would never know that basic 
fact by an examination of the majority's report based on the 
Department of Defense's audit. The majority report entitled ``A 
Two-Year Review of the White House Communications Agency 
Reveals Major Mismanagement, Lack of Accountability and 
Significant Mission Creep'' attacks the Armed Forces personnel 
who serve in this highly sensitive communications complex known 
as the White House Communications Agency.
    The majority fails to note that as a Department of Defense 
entity, WHCA immediately implemented several corrective actions 
recommended by the DOD IG. Moreover, instead of allowing the 
Department of Defense to oversee the completion and review of 
corrective actions undertaken, the majority proposes three 
unnecessary and ill-advised legislative ``remedies.'' We 
disagree with the majority's report and with the legislative 
remedies which they propose.
    Moreover, it should be noted that for 55 years, no other 
administration has allowed this agency to be audited or 
inspected by any agency, inside or outside of the Department of 
Defense. The Clinton administration should be commended for 
allowing this inspection and assuring that sound management and 
oversight procedures are implemented. By taking these steps, 
this administration has changed five decades of lax practices. 
It would seem that the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight would want to applaud such an effort, not ensure that 
it may never happen again.

                           I. Background \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ All background information on WHCA is taken from the White 
House Communications Agency study done by the Department of Defense 
Inspector General, Report No. 96-100.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The White House Communications Agency (WHCA) began as an 
informal organization in December 1941 called the White House 
Signal Detachment. It was officially activated in March 1942 to 
operate telecommunications radio networks for security forces 
and for backup telephone services. The Signal Detachment 
established private telephone exchanges with lines to key 
offices in Washington, DC and to persons the President wished 
to summon in emergencies. In 1962, the Secretary of Defense 
reassigned WHCA from the Army to the Defense Communications 
Agency (DCA), now the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA).
    WHCA provides telecommunications and other related support 
to the President and Vice President, the President's staff, the 
First family, the Secret Service and others as directed. 
Support provided by WHCA includes secure and nonsecure voice 
and data communications, printed message communications, 
audiovisual services and photographic and graphics services. 
WHCA also provides general purpose automated data processing 
support for the National Security Council and the White House 
Military Office.
    As defined in the Department of Defense, Defense 
Communications Agency Circular 640-45-489, issued in 1989, the 
mission of WHCA is to provide ``telecommunications and other 
related support'' to the President. Other related support is 
defined as ``including, but not limited to, audiovisual 
services, including video tape recording; photographic 
laboratory and drafting support of the White House and general 
purpose automated data processing support of the National 
Security Council and the White House.''

                  II. Allegations of ``Mission Creep''

                           a. duties of whca

    The majority contends that the basic telecommunications 
mission has expanded. It should be noted the rapid change in 
telecommunications technology in the last 50 years may account 
for some of this alleged ``creep.'' As defined in the 
Department of Defense, Defense Communications Agency Circular 
640-45-489, issued in 1989, the mission of WHCA is to provide 
``telecommunications and other related support'' to the 
President. Other related support is defined as ``including, but 
not limited to, audiovisual services, including video tape 
recording; photographic laboratory and drafting support of the 
White House and general purpose automated data processing 
support of the National Security Council and the White House.''
    Additionally, in a 1987 classified document (nonclassified 
portions were quoted in the DOD IG's audit), other services 
provided by WHCA were examined and deemed to be ``well 
documented and supported'' by the Defense Communications Agency 
(DISA's predecessor). DCA examined WHCA's role in political 
events, including providing audiovisual services, photographic 
laboratory support, drafting, and other graphic services for 
the White House staff. If the provision of these services is 
acceptable where the President participates in a political 
event, then contrary conclusions are not warranted concerning 
nonpolitical events involving duties squarely within the scope 
of the presidency.
    The majority does not contend that the President is not 
entitled to these services. Their argument is that DOD should 
not pay for them or should be reimbursed through the Executive 
Office of the President. This is essentially an argument about 
bookkeeping. Given that their major contention is one of 
bookkeeping, the ``mission creep'' allegation becomes a bit 
murky because it attempts to argue on one hand that the 
services are impermissible, but on the other hand that some 
other entity ought to be responsible for providing them. It 
seems that adopting the majority's contention that another 
entity ought to provide services would only serve to create an 
inefficient and artificial division of labor. Currently, there 
is one entity which provides these services efficiently.
    On the other hand, to adopt the majority's premise that the 
services should be provided by the Department of Defense but 
paid for by the Executive Office of the President seems to 
undercut the majority's concern over who will control the 
provision of the services. Under the current arrangement, the 
services are provided by, paid for and controlled by the 
Department of Defense. Under the majority's scheme, the 
services would be provided by Defense, but paid for by the 
White House. It seems that such an arrangement would 
necessitate the Executive Office of the President having direct 
control over an entity of the Department of Defense. Such a 
system would create an unworkable and highly inefficient 
bureaucracy.
    Finally, as noted by an opinion of a Bush administration 
Assistant Attorney General (``White House Communications Agency 
Expenses Incurred on Presidential Political Travel,'' October 
22, 1990):

          As Commander in Chief as well as in his other 
        official roles, the President requires dependable means 
        by which to communicate instantly with individuals 
        anywhere in the world at any moment. In an age when 
        conflict may develop and escalate to crisis proportions 
        in minutes, the President cannot be expected to rely on 
        unpredictable and variable private communications 
        facilities. Indeed, it was precisely to eliminate the 
        need for reliance upon such nongovernmental facilities 
        that WHCA was created.

    The minority believes that neither national nor 
international affairs have changed in such a way to render this 
opinion of the Bush administration Assistant Attorney General 
moot.

                      b. whca budget and spending

    If the majority's concerns about ``mission creep'' were 
valid, it would seem that WHCA's budget and spending would have 
increased significantly during the Clinton administration. 
Instead of increased spending the agency has returned money to 
the Treasury. Under the Clinton administration, WHCA suffered a 
decrease of 18 percent authorized personnel and a 37 percent 
budget cut. Despite those limitations, the agency returned $6 
million to the Treasury ($3 million in FY 1993 and $3 million 
in FY 1994). Therefore, if WHCA increased its activities under 
this administration, as alleged by the majority, it has done so 
with less money and fewer people while achieving a surplus. 
Such an outcome is unlikely. However, if such an outcome were 
to occur, it would seem that WHCA's methods should be applauded 
and not castigated as they are in the majority's report.
    It should be noted that according to the DOD IG, the 
greatest increase in personnel and spending for WHCA occurred 
during FY 1991 and FY 1992, under the Bush administration. At 
that time WHCA posted a 66-percent increase in personnel for 
campaign related personnel.
    Finally, it appears that the allegations of ``mission 
creep'' have been rendered moot by the passage of the Spence 
amendment to the FY 1997 Defense Authorization bill on May 14, 
1996, 2 days before the subcommittee's first hearing on WHCA. 
The Spence amendment specifically limits WHCA to providing 
``telecommunications services'' and uses ``mission creep'' as a 
justification for restricting WHCA's functions. It should be 
noted that no other hearings on WHCA were held in this Congress 
by any committee. Therefore, it would appear that partisan 
concerns have overridden the legitimate oversight role of this 
committee.

              III. Involvement of the White House in WHCA

    The majority contends that WHCA is under the operational 
control of the White House Military Office (WHMO). In the 
alternative, they assert that WHCA is a ``defacto agent of the 
White House under the direction and control of the Special 
Assistant to the President for Management and Administration 
through the White House Military Office.'' Neither assertion is 
accurate. According to DOD Directive 5105.15, dated June 25, 
1991, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) provides 
administrative support to the White House Communications 
Agency. Administrative support is defined as ``budgeting, 
funding, contracting, legal counseling and personnel 
management.'' DISA is under the operational control of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence.
    The Inspector General found that DISA did not carry out 
those responsibilities despite this directive because it 
erroneously believed that the WHMO was responsible for these 
functions. Moreover the audit found that the White House 
Military Office did not carry out these functions because it 
correctly believed that the responsibility belonged to DISA.
    However, despite the audit's findings that the WHMO did not 
exercise control over WHCA, the majority sought the testimony 
of two White House political appointees, Ms. Jody Torkelson, 
Assistant to the President, and Mr. Alan Sullivan, Deputy 
Assistant to the President and head of the White House Military 
Office (a civilian entity). The White House Counsel's office 
objected to the appearance of these witnesses and declined the 
invitation.
    The White House argued that under the Separation of Powers 
Doctrine, there is long-standing precedent of declining 
invitations to testify before congressional panels for White 
House officials who are involved in policymaking. However, 
exceptions have been made under extraordinary circumstances 
involving issues of fact which only the requested witness can 
address.\2\ Conversely, objections are not raised where 
invitations to testify are issued to White House employees 
involved in ``operations.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ While the majority notes that White House policy officials have 
appeared before congressional investigative panels, it fails to mention 
that such appearances were limited to proceedings involving allegations 
of criminal and quasi-criminal actions by the officials in question or 
which said officials were believed to have personal knowledge. Notably, 
White House policy officials appeared before Congress during the 
Watergate Investigation and the Iran-Contra investigation. None of the 
allegations surrounding WHCA is criminal in nature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This policy has evolved to the generally accepted principle 
that the testimony of White House employees involved in 
``operations'' \3\ is open to formal congressional inquiry, 
while the testimony of an employee involved in ``policy'' \4\ 
is not subject to formal congressional inquiry. \5\ This 
principle has been recognized and applied by all previous 
administrations. (See June 16, 1992 letter below to Chairman 
Jack Brooks from Mr. Nicholas Calio). The majority recognizes 
this principle yet seeks to evade it by redefining the roles 
and responsibilities of these two requested witnesses. They 
assert that they are not responsible for policy but for 
operations, which the majority terms ``administrative 
decisionmaking.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ As a practical matter, testimony about the operations or day to 
day affairs of an agency are essentially factual questions which would 
necessitate the statements of one who has been present during the 
occurrence of the events at issue.
    \4\ As a practical matter, testimony about ``policy'' involves 
inquiring into discussions surrounding the facts and considerations 
that were reviewed in reaching the decision or setting the policy.
    \5\ This does not mean that Congress has no other means to obtain 
requested information from individuals who hold policy positions. 
Letters, meetings and informal discussions are not precluded. It could 
be argued that informal discussions may actually yield more information 
than formal proceedings. Additionally, the subpoena is always available 
to compel the appearance of any unwilling witness whose testimony is 
critical to the issue at hand.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This is a distinction without a difference. It can be 
argued that any position requiring ``decisionmaking'' is one 
involved with forming positions or constructing policy. 
Discussions, factors and considerations involved in forming 
policy (administrative or otherwise) would be open to 
questioning. Therefore, the Office of White House Counsel 
declined the invitations for policy personnel under well-
established precedent.

                                           The White House,
                                         Washington, June 16, 1992.
    Dear Mr. Chairman:
    I am writing in response to your letter of June 11 to the President 
regarding your June 23 scheduled hearing. In that letter, you invited 
the Administration to send appropriate Administration officials to 
testify. We would propose to send Mr. Robert Mueller, Assistant 
Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, and Mr. 
Laurence Urgenson, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal 
Division, Department of Justice. In addition, I would note that the 
Administration has previously testified in great detail regarding pre-
Desert Storm Iraq policy, the administration of the relevant programs 
and related investigations. I attach a copy of this testimony and ask 
that it be made available to all Committee Members before the hearing.
    Your letter also requested the appearance of Mr. Nicholas Rostow, 
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Legal 
Affairs, National Security Council; and Mr. C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to 
the President. As I advised the Chairman of the Committee on Banking, 
Finance and Urban Affairs in response to a similar request, it is the 
longstanding practice of the Executive Branch to decline requests for 
testimony by members of the President's personal staff. For that 
reason, I must decline your request for personal testimony by Messrs. 
Gray and Rostow. In light of the unusual circumstances presented here, 
however, the Administration is prepared to work with you to develop an 
alternative, mutually acceptable mechanism for making available to 
Members of the Committee the White House officials whose testimony you 
have sought.
    Finally, attached to your letter was a request for documents from 
the Department of Agriculture, the State Department, the Department of 
Justice, the White House, the Department of the Treasury/U.S. Customs 
Service, and the Department of Commerce. In order to expedite a 
response to that request, we have forwarded it to the listed 
Departments outside the White House, and have directed them to respond 
directly to the Committee. In light of the large number of documents 
requested, it is unlikely that they or the White House will be able to 
meet the June 18 response date, but we have requested that they respond 
as quickly as possible.
            Sincerely,
                                         Nicholas E. Calio,
                Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs.
Chairman Jack Brooks,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives,
2138 Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, D.C. 20515-6218.

cc: The Honorable Hamilton Fish, Jr.
attachments

            IV. Involvement of the General Accounting Office

    The majority contends that the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) was prevented from obtaining information in its attempt 
to conduct an audit of WHCA pursuant to a request by Chairman 
Clinger. In raising the issue of the involvement of GAO, the 
majority's concern seems to be that GAO did not obtain what 
they believed to be adequate responses to certain inquires. 
Specifically, in response to GAO's requests for information, 
DISA, WHCA, White House Office of Management and White House 
Counsel's Office provided briefings, summary documents and a 
White House management study.
    However, GAO deemed that this information was insufficient 
to determine specific activities or costs. In May 1994, GAO 
provided a list of additional data requirements. After several 
meetings, representatives of GAO were told that the DOD 
expressed concerns about the handling of classified data. 
Because of WHCA's role in providing secured communications for 
several entities including the Office of the President, the 
Office of the Vice President, the National Security Council and 
any official in the line of Presidential Succession, such a 
concern should not be taken lightly. This basic function could 
be seriously compromised through inadvertent release of 
information concerning the operation of WHCA, the number and 
locations of existing secured circuits used in its 
telecommunications functions as well as information concerning 
the identity of vendors of such secured lines and circuits.
    GAO seemed to believe that DOD was not sufficiently 
sensitive to its ability to handle such delicate information. 
DOD believed that the likelihood of release of such security 
information was in no small way related to the number of people 
who had access to it. Therefore, DOD determined that the 
optimal solution would be for the information to remain in-
house and for the audit to be conducted by the agency's 
Inspector General.
    However, this issue is moot because in February 1995, 
Chairman Clinger and Subcommittee Chairman Zeliff requested the 
appointment of Derek Vander Schaff, Department of Defense 
Deputy Inspector General, as auditor of WHCA. Mr. Vander Schaff 
conducted the audit which formed the basis of the Department of 
Defense Inspector General Report on WHCA (DOD Report No. 96-
100). The majority has not criticized the outcome or 
methodology of the audit.

            V. Inspector General Findings and WHCA Responses

    In its review of all activities at WHCA, the functions and 
missions of the agency and the funding and reporting of those 
activities, the DOD IG chosen by Chairman Clinger and Chairman 
Zeliff, found ``no evidence of theft or significant waste of 
resources.'' However, they did note 38 instances of management 
deficiencies and a lack of oversight. In 36 instances, the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence fully concurred with the 
findings and implemented the IG's suggestions for correcting 
the deficiencies. In two instances, there was a partial 
concurrence with the findings.
    The following is a summary of the major deficiencies found 
by the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General and 
WHCA's responses:
    1. The IG found that DOD provides audiovisual, news wire 
and stenographic services and camera equipment to the White 
House, which exceed the stated mission of WHCA to provide 
telecommunications support to the President. As a result, DOD 
funded about $7.8 million for services and equipment during FY 
1995 that would have been more appropriately funded by the 
Office of Administration, Executive Office of the President. 
The IG recommended a memorandum of understanding between the 
Director of Defense Information Systems Agency, the Commander 
of WHCA and the Executive Office of the President detailing 
specific services to be provided. That memo was signed in March 
1996.
    2. The IG found that WHCA provided reimbursable services to 
the Secret Service and had not reported such to the Secretary 
of Defense or obtained reimbursement from the Secret Service. 
Thus, between October 1990 and March 31, 1995, the Secret 
Service was enriched by about $4.3 million. The IG recommended 
a revised memorandum of understanding with the Secret Service 
concerning reimbursable expenses. However, Congress voided this 
necessity by exempting the Secret Service from such 
reimbursements.
    3. The IG found that WHCA did not maintain control over 
repair parts inventories and contracting officers 
representatives did not document equipment maintenance 
information in accordance with DISA guidelines. The IG 
recommended the development of a comprehensive plan to oversee 
maintenance systems, inventory excess repair parts and to 
comply with DISA guidelines. The Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence agreed 
and is developing a plan.
    4. The IG found that WHCA had not established 
accountability for all nonexpendable property (equipment with a 
value over $100, such as radios, computers and vehicles) and 
had excess expendables (supplies with a value under $100) on 
hand. The Assistant Secretary concurred in the findings and 
agreed to revise instructions on property accountability no 
later than November 1995. By issuance of the report, WHCA had 
recorded the computer and photographic equipment and 
implemented a procedure to reduce excess supplies.
    5. The IG found that WHCA's inventory of short-haul 
telecommunications equipment and services is neither complete 
nor accurate. The Assistant Secretary concurred and WHCA is 
currently conducting an inventory and formalizing procedures 
for maintaining inventory records. These were completed on 
March 31, 1996.
    6. The IG found that WHCA paid for 21 leased long-haul 
telecommunications circuits and equipment items that were no 
longer required. They failed to maintain an inventory of long-
haul equipment and services and did not keep records of all 
telecommunications equipment. The Assistant Secretary concurred 
and stated that WHCA is currently revalidating 11 circuits that 
were specifically questioned and formalizing its process to 
review one-eighth of its long-haul circuits each quarter. WHCA 
will establish an inventory during implementation of the review 
and validation program.
    7. The IG found that WHCA did not validate Customer Cost 
and Obligation reports that list charges for long-haul 
telecommunications equipment and services. WHCA had no 
procedure for verifying the accuracy of vendor charges. The 
Assistant Secretary concurred with the findings and stated that 
WHCA had changed procedures to ensure the accuracy of vendor 
charges.
    8. The IG found that DISA has exercised limited 
administrative, financial and operational oversight of WHCA, a 
DISA organization. The IG found that the Memorandum of 
Agreement discussed in item No. 1 resolved this issue.
    9. The IG found that WHCA did not use contracting officers 
to acquire temporary telecommunications equipment and services, 
competitively select vendors, establish contracts with selected 
vendors, validate quoted prices, or establish a formal 
memorandum of agreement with a contracting office. The 
procurement and payment process was flawed because WHCA did not 
comply with Federal and DOD telecommunications, contracting and 
accounting regulations. The Assistant Secretary concurred and 
agreed to assign the Defense Information Technology Contracting 
Office to provide contract support to WHCA for temporary 
telecommunications equipment and services; entered into a 
memorandum of agreement to specify payment functions by WHCA 
and Defense Finance and Accounting Service (finalized March 7, 
1996) and instituted interim procedures to ensure that 
contracts are established in accordance with regulations.
    10. The IG found that WHCA could not validate outstanding 
unliquidated obligations totaling $14.5 million or equipment 
and services leased as of February 1996. An unliquidated 
obligation is a bill for which there is insufficient ``backup'' 
documentation. It may be legitimate but it is difficult to 
tell. The Assistant Secretary agreed and has implemented 
procedures to establish obligations for overseas trips; 
establish procedures to review unliquidated obligations on a 
monthly basis and agreed to establish procedures with the 
Department of State to ensure supporting documentation is 
provided to WHCA in a timely manner.

               VI. Majority's Legislative Recommendations

    A. The majority recommends that legislation be enacted that 
limits WHCA's mission to the provision of national security 
related telecommunications services required by the President 
in his capacity as Commander in Chief. We disagree with this 
recommendation. We note that the recommendation is moot because 
of the above-referenced Spence amendment. Moreover, we note 
that contrary to the majority's implication of a neat 
delineation of Presidential duties (Commander in Chief versus 
non-Commander in Chief), no such clear distinction is manifest 
in law or fact. As noted by an Assistant Attorney General 
during the Bush administration (``White House Communications 
Agency Expenses Incurred on Presidential Political Travel,'' 
October 22, 1990), ``As Commander in Chief as well as in his 
other official roles, the President requires dependable means 
by which to communicate instantly with individuals anywhere in 
the world at any moment.''
    B. The majority recommends that legislation be enacted 
requiring that the Commander of WHCA be rated by the Director 
of DISA instead of the Head of the White House Military Office. 
We disagree with this recommendation. This is an effort to 
unneccessarily micromanage an agency of the executive branch. 
Concerns about which official writes the personnel evaluation 
for another official does not rise to the level of importance 
necessary for congressional action.
    C. The majority recommends that legislation be enacted 
requiring annual reports to Congress by WHCA, WHMO and DOD IG. 
We disagree with this recommendation because it is unnecessary. 
The DOD IG currently issues semiannual reports to Congress. 
Moreover, any legitimate oversight concerns the majority may 
have concerning the implementation of corrective actions by 
WHCA can be addressed by followup audits by the DOD IG. 
Finally, the majority has presented no evidence tending to show 
that additional oversight of WHMO is necessary.

                               Conclusion

    In its review of WHCA, the Department of Defense Inspector 
General found ``no evidence of theft or significant waste of 
agency resources.'' However, one would never know that basic 
fact by an examination of the majority's report based on the 
Department of Defense's audit. The Clinton administration 
should be commended for allowing this inspection and assuring 
that sound management and oversight procedures are implemented. 
By taking these steps,
this administration has changed five decades of lax practices. 
It would seem that the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight would want to applaud such an effort, not ensure that 
it may never happen again.
                                   Hon Cardiss Collins.
                                   Hon. Karen L. Thurman.
                                   Hon. Henry A. Waxman.
                                   Hon. Robert E. Wise, Jr.
                                   Hon. Major R. Owens.
                                   Hon. Edolphus Towns.
                                   Hon. Louise M. Slaughter.
                                   Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski.
                                   Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney.
                                   Hon. Thomas M. Barrett.
                                   Hon. Barbara-Rose Collins.
                                   Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton.
                                   Hon. James P. Moran.
                                   Hon. Carrie P. Meek.
                                   Hon. Chaka Fattah.
                                   Hon. Elijah E. Cummings.

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