[House Report 104-680]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



104th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 2d Session                                                     104-680
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996
                                _______
                                

 July 16, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. McCollum, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 3166]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 
(H.R. 3166) to amend title 18, United States Code, with respect 
to the crime of false statement in a Government matter, having 
considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment 
and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Language of the Bill.............................................     1
Purpose and Summary..............................................     2
Background and Need for Legislation..............................     3
Hearings.........................................................     6
Committee Consideration..........................................     6
Vote of the Committee............................................     6
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     6
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.....................     6
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................     6
Congressional Budget Office Estimate.............................     6
Inflationary Impact Statement....................................     7
Section-by-Section Analysis......................................     7
Agency Views.....................................................    10

    The amendment is as follows:
    Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu 
thereof the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Government Accountability Act of 
1996''.

SEC. 2. RESTORATION OF FALSE STATEMENT PENALTIES.

  Section 1001 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as 
follows:

``Sec. 1001. Statements or entries generally

  ``(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any 
matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or 
judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and 
willfully--
          ``(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, 
        or device a material fact;
          ``(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
        statement or representation; or
          ``(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the 
        same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
        statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or 
both.
  ``(b) Subsection (a) does not apply--
          ``(1) to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's 
        counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents 
        submitted by such party or counsel to a judge in that 
        proceeding; or
          ``(2) to--
                  ``(A) any non-administrative matter; or
                  ``(B) any investigative matter, other than with 
                respect to a person furnishing information pursuant to 
                a duly authorized investigation;
        within the jurisdiction of an entity within the legislative 
        branch.''.

                          Purpose and Summary

    Section 1001 of title 18 United States Code makes it a 
crime to knowingly and willfully falsify, conceal or cover up 
by any trick, scheme, or device, a material fact, or make any 
false statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of any 
department or agency of the United States. Prior to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Hubbard v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 1754 
(1995), Section 1001 applied to all three branches of the 
Federal Government. In Hubbard, the Court held that Section 
1001 did not apply to the judicial branch, and by implication, 
to the legislative branch of the Federal Government. The 
purpose of H.R. 3166 is to ensure that section 1001 applies to 
the judicial and legislative branches as well as the executive 
branch, thereby ensuring the integrity of legislative and 
judicial functions and proceedings. H.R. 3166 accomplishes this 
purpose by applying section 1001 to persons who knowingly and 
willfully make misrepresentations to all three branches of the 
Federal Government.
     The bill includes two sections. Section 1 provides that 
the short title is the ``Government Accountability Act of 
1996.'' Section 2 provides for the restoration of false 
statement penalties by applying the criminal penalties of 
section 1001 to all three branches of the Federal Government. 
It does so while ensuring that the scope of section 1001 is 
limited, as it was prior to Hubbard. Consequently, section 2 
establishes both judicial and legislative function exceptions, 
limiting the application of section 1001 so as to ensure that 
the judicial and legislative functions of the Federal judiciary 
and Congress are not undermined. To that end, the judicial 
function exception exempts from section 1001's application 
those representations made by a party or party's counsel to a 
judge during a judicial proceeding, so as to avoid any chilling 
effect upon the adversarial process. Similarly, the legislative 
function exception exempts from section 1001's application 
those communications made to or before Congress and which do 
not constitute administrative filings and which are not 
furnished pursuant a duly authorized investigation.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

    Section 1001 of title 18 of the United States Code states:

          Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any 
        department or agency of the United States knowingly and 
        willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any 
        trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any 
        false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or 
        representations or makes any false writing or document 
        knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or 
        fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined under 
        this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
        both.

     Congress passed section 1001 of title 18 of the United 
States Code in 1934. It was interpreted expansively in 1955 so 
as to include statements made to Congress and the courts, when 
the courts were functioning in their administrative, not 
adjudicatory, capacity.1 Over the last four decades, 
section 1001 has been used to prosecute Members of Congress who 
lie on their financial disclosure forms, initiate ghost 
employee schemes, knowingly submit false vouchers, and purchase 
personal goods and services with taxpayer dollars.2 Courts 
consistently held that section 1001 covered reports filed 
pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act.3
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ U.S. v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955); See also Morgan v. 
United States, 309 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 
917 (1963).
    \2\ See United States v. Levine, 860 F.Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1994), 
United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979) and United States 
v. Marvoules, 819 F.Supp. 1109 (D. Mass 1993).
    \3\ 5 U.S.C. Sec. 101. See United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940 
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Hubbard v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 1754 (1995), the 
Supreme Court held that a Federal court is not a ``department'' 
or ``agency'' within the meaning of section 1001, and that the 
statute, therefore, does not apply to false statements made in 
a judicial proceeding. The court argued that a common sense, 
ordinary reading of the text of section 1001 does not define 
``agency'' to include courts.4 While the Court did not 
directly address the question of whether section 1001 still 
applies to Congress, in holding that section 1001 does not 
apply to the courts, Hubbard is widely interpreted as leaving 
section 1001 covering only the executive branch, leaving 
Congress outside its scope. Lower courts have already taken 
this view. After Hubbard, Ethics in Government Act reports 
filed by officials within the Courts and Congress are no longer 
covered by section 1001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ ``There is nothing in the text of the statute, or in any 
related legislation, that even suggests--let alone shows--that the 
normal definition of `department' was not intended.'' Hubbard, 115 
S.Ct. at 1758.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In May, 1995, Congressman Martini introduced H.R. 1678, 
which applied section 1001 to all three branches of the Federal 
Government, without exception. At a Crime Subcommittee hearing 
on June 30, 1995, witnesses expressed concern that the broad 
application of section 1001 to all three branches would chill 
advocacy in judicial proceedings and also undermine the fact-
gathering process that is indispensable to the legislative 
process. In response to these concerns, Representative Martini 
introduced H.R. 3166 on March 27, 1996, which included a 
judicial function exception, exempting from the scope of 
section 1001 those representations made by a party or party's 
counsel to a judge during a judicial proceeding. At the 
Judiciary Committee mark-up of H.R. 3166, Representative 
McCollum, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, offered an 
amendment, which passed on voice vote without opposition, to 
provide a legislative function exception to section 1001.
    H.R. 3166 applies section 1001 to all three branches of the 
U.S. Government, with two exceptions. First, the bill does not 
apply section 1001 ``to a party to a judicial proceeding, or 
that party's counsel, for statements, representations, writings 
or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge in 
that proceeding.'' Such an exception is intended to codify the 
judicial function exception which has long been recognized by 
many Federal courts as necessary to safeguard from the threat 
of prosecution statements made in the course of adversarial 
litigation.5 Allowing the criminal penalties of section 
1001 to apply to statements made in the course of adversarial 
litigation would chill vigorous advocacy, thereby undermining 
the adversarial process. The exception is consistent with the 
Court's reasoning in Bramblett and Morgan, and subsequent case 
law, which consistently distinguished the adjudicative from the 
administrative functions of the court, exempting from section 
1001 only those communications made to the court when it is 
acting in its adjudicative or judicial capacity, and leaving 
subject to section 1001 those representations made to the court 
when it is functioning in its administrative capacity. Thus, 
false statements uttered during the course of court proceedings 
or contained in court pleadings would not be covered by section 
1001. The language of the exception recognizes that a wide 
range of filings are an integral part of the adversarial 
process, and therefore goes beyond merely exempting 
``statements,'' exempting as well ``representations, writings 
or documents'' submitted to the judge. Importantly, such 
filings made in judicial proceedings are already covered by 
other statutes, further limiting any supposed necessity of 
covering these filings with section 1001.6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ In his concurring opinion in Hubbard, Justice Scalia recognized 
the merits of the judicial function exception, noting that without the 
exception there ``remains * * * a serious concern that the threat of 
criminal prosecution under the capacious provisions of Sec. 1001 will 
deter vigorous representation of opposing interests in adversarial 
litigation, particularly representation of criminal defendants, whose 
adversaries control the machinery of Sec. 1001 prosecution.'' Hubbard, 
at 1765.
    \6\ For example, perjury (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1621) and obstruction of 
justice (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1505).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The second exception exempts from section 1001's scope 
certain representations that are made involving the legislative 
branch. The purpose of the exception is to avoid creating an 
atmosphere which might so discourage the submission of 
information to Congress that it undermines the fact-gathering 
process which is indispensable to the legislative process. 
Consequently, the exception provides that certain information 
provided to Congress--information which is neither furnished as 
part of an administrative filing, nor furnished pursuant to a 
duly authorized Congressional investigation--is not subject to 
the criminal penalties of section 1001.
    Without such an exception, the criminal penalties of 
section 1001 would apply to all forms of communication made to 
Congress. This would include, for example, opinions expressed 
through constituent correspondence and all forms of unsworn 
testimony. Prior to Hubbard, the ambiguities regarding the 
exact scope of section 1001 resulted in the statute not being 
applied to such forms of communications.7 Moreover, 
applying section 1001's criminal penalties to such statements 
would almost certainly have contributed to an intimidating 
atmosphere, not only undermining the fact-gathering function of 
Congress, but perhaps also discouraging the exercise of 
Constitutional rights such as the First Amendment rights of 
free speech and the right to petition the Government for 
redress of grievances. The Committee believes that the scope of 
a criminal law should be sufficiently clear so as to in no way 
discourage the exercise of constitutional rights, and that the 
failure to clarify how section 1001 applies to all forms of 
communications and representations made to Congress invites 
such an outcome. H.R. 3166 avoids this result by explicitly 
limiting the application of section 1001 in a congressional 
setting to administrative and duly authorized investigative 
matters. As such, section 1001 would continue to apply--as it 
has in the past--to members of Congress who knowingly and 
willfully lie on their financial disclosure forms, initiate 
ghost employee schemes, knowingly submit false vouchers, and 
purchase personal goods and services with taxpayer dollars. It 
would also apply to those who knowingly and willfully mislead a 
duly authorized Congressional investigation. As in the past, 
statutes such as perjury (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1621), obstruction of 
justice (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1505) and contempt of Congress (2 
U.S.C. Sec. 192) continue to provide possible means of 
punishing those who would willfully mislead Congress in various 
forms of communication to Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     7 The Committee is unaware of any cases involving the use of 
section 1001 to prosecute opinions offered to Congress in the form of 
unsworn testimony or representations made that were not obtained 
pursuant to a subpoena.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It has been argued that section 1001 should apply to all 
forms of communication made to Congress, including all forms of 
testimony and correspondence, and that prosecutors should be 
trusted to use such a broad statute with restraint. The 
Committee does not find this view persuasive. A criminal 
statute should not be broadly formulated and then defended by 
asserting that prosecutors will not apply it in selected 
circumstances. Certainty about the scope of a criminal statute 
must not be based on the hope of future prosecutorial 
restraint. Rather, certainty must be based on a specifically-
tailored statute that criminalizes only what is intended to be 
a crime. As the Supreme Court stated in Hubbard: ``[W]e have 
often emphasized the need for clarity in the definition of 
criminal statutes, to provide fair warning, in language that 
the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do 
if a certain law is passed.'' Hubbard, at 1758.
    It has also been argued that section 1001 applied to all 
forms of communications made to Congress for at least 40 years 
prior to Hubbard, without any indication that it adversely 
affected the legislative process. While the Committee is 
cognizant that section 1001 has not been used to prosecute 
statements such as unsworn Congressional testimony or 
constituent mail directed to Congress, the fact remains that 
section 1001 could have been applied to these types of 
communications. The Subcommittee on Crime received testimony 
asserting that the ambiguities regarding the exact scope of 
Sec. 1001 served to check its use in such settings; it is 
precisely that ambiguity which will be eliminated after 
Congress amends section 1001. Leaving section 1001 explicitly 
applying to all forms of communications made to Congress would 
clearly signal the breadth of its application, thereby inviting 
more extensive use of the statute than occurred prior to 
Hubbard.

                                Hearings

    The Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime held 1 day 
of hearings on June 30, 1995. Testimony was received from three 
witnesses. They were Representative William J. Martini, 
Representative from the Eighth Congressional District of New 
Jersey, Timothy F. Flanigan, counsel, Jones, Day, Reavis & 
Pogue, and Gerald H. Goldstein, President, National Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

                        Committee Consideration

    The bill was reported favorably on a voice vote, without 
amendment, by the Subcommittee on Crime on March 29, 1996.
    On June 11, 1996, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered the bill favorably reported, by voice vote, with a 
single amendment in the nature of a substitute, a quorum being 
present.

                         Vote of the Committee

    The Committee considered the following amendment:
    Mr. McCollum offered an amendment to limit the application 
of Section 1001 in a legislative context by exempting from its 
scope those communications that are neither administrative 
matters nor duly authorized matters. The McCollum amendment was 
adopted by voice vote, without opposition.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports 
that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based 
on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

         Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Findings

    No findings or recommendations of the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight were received as referred to in 
clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 2(l)(3)(B) of House rule XI is inapplicable because 
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or 
increased tax expenditures.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 2(l)(C)(3) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets 
forth, with respect to the bill, H.R. 2259, the following 
estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, June 18, 1996.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
reviewed H.R. 3166, the Government Accountability Act of 1996, 
as ordered by the House Committee on the Judiciary on June 11, 
1996. CBO estimates that enacting the bill could lead to 
increases in both direct spending and receipts, but the amounts 
involved would be less than $500,000 a year. Because H.R. 3166 
could affect direct spending and receipts, pay-as-you-go 
procedures would apply. The bill contains no intergovernmental 
or private-sector mandates as defined in Public Law 104-4, and 
would impose no direct costs on state, local, or tribal 
governments.
    H.R. 3166 would provide that persons who make false 
statements to the Congress or the federal Judiciary could be 
prosecuted to the same extent as persons making false 
statements to the Executive Branch. Violators of the bill's 
provisions would be more likely to face criminal fines and 
imprisonment than they are under current law. The imposition of 
additional fines could cause governmental receipts to increase 
through greater penalty collections, but we estimate that any 
such increase would be less than $500,000 annually. Criminal 
fines would be deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and would be 
spent in the following year. Thus, direct spending from the 
fund would match the increase in revenues with a one-year lag.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Mark 
Grabowicz and Stephanie Weiner.
            Sincerely,
                                         June E. O'Neill, Director.

                     Inflationary Impact Statement

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee estimates that H.R. 
2259 will have no significant inflationary impact on prices and 
costs in the national economy.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis

                        Section 1.--Short title

    This section states the short title as the ``Government 
Accountability Act of 1996.''

          Section 2.--Restoration of False Statement Penalties

    This section amends section 1001 of title 18, United States 
Code, by providing that the criminal penalties of section 1001 
apply to all three branches of the Federal Government. It does 
so while ensuring that the scope of section 1001 is limited, as 
was the case prior to Hubbard. Consequently, section 2 
establishes both judicial and legislative function exceptions. 
To that end, the judicial function exception exempts from 
section 1001's application those statements made by a party or 
party's counsel to a judge during a judicial proceeding, so as 
to avoid any chilling effect upon the adversarial process. 
Similarly, the legislative function exception exempts from 
section 1001's application those unsworn statements made to or 
before Congress and which are not furnished pursuant a duly 
authorized investigation.
    Subsection (a) provides that section 1001 applies to the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches of the United 
States. As such, it returns the scope of section 1001 to its 
pre-Hubbard status, by explicitly providing that section 1001 
covers all three Federal branches.
    Subsection (a) further provides that section 1001 applies 
only to knowing and willful conduct within any of the three 
branches. Consequently, misrepresentations that are made 
without knowledge or that are unintentional would not be 
subject to punishment under section 1001.
    Paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of subsection (a) then 
delineate the three separate but related offenses that section 
1001 criminalizes. The paragraphs state that section 1001 
applies to anyone who, in any matter within the jurisdiction of 
any one of the branches of the Federal Government, knowingly 
and willfully: (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any 
trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any 
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or 
document knowing the same to contain any materially false, 
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry. Importantly, the 
offense in each of the three paragraphs has ``materiality'' as 
an element. This express requirement that all three offenses 
have materiality as an element resolves a conflict among 
circuits as to whether materiality is an element of all three 
offenses or merely the offense of falsifying as delineated in 
paragraph (3).8 Other than establishing materiality as an 
element of all three offenses, the Committee does not view the 
offenses defined in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) as changing 
already existing case law as it relates to the elements of the 
offenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    8 See United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) and 
United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1984).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, subsection (a) provides that anyone convicted of 
an offense under section 1001 shall be fined or imprisoned not 
more than 5 years, or both. These penalties are identical to 
those that were in effect prior to Hubbard.
    Subsection (b) establishes the two exceptions to the 
general application of section 1001 as delineated in subsection 
(a). First, subsection (b) provides that section 1001 does not 
apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's 
counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents 
submitted by such party or counsel to a judge in that 
proceeding. As such, section 1001 does not apply to 
representations made to a court that is acting in its judicial, 
or adjudicatory capacity; Rather, it applies only to 
representations made to a court acting in its administrative 
capacity. The language of the exception recognizes that a wide 
range of filings are an integral part of the advocacy process, 
and therefore goes beyond merely exempting ``statements,'' 
exempting as well ``representations, writings or documents'' 
submitted to the judge. This judicial or adjudicatory function 
exception is consistent with the Court's reasoning in United 
States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955) and Morgan v. United 
States, 309 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 
917 (1963), and subsequent case law, which distinguished 
between the adjudicative and administrative functions of the 
court. The judicial function exception provided in subsection 
(b) is intended to codify the judicial function exception as 
articulated in Bramblett. Consequently, consistent with 
Bramblett, only those representations made to a court when it 
is acting in its administrative or ``housekeeping'' capacity 
are within the scope of section 1001. Such representations 
would include any filings not related to a proceeding before 
the court, such as submissions related to bar membership, and 
would also include the submission of information to another 
entity within the judicial branch, such as the probation 
service.
    The second exception established in subsection (b) is the 
legislative function exception. The exception is defined in 
subsection (b) by identifying the two matters that section 1001 
does not apply to. The first such matter is ``any non-
administrative matter.'' The second such matter is ``any 
investigative matter, other than with respect to a person 
furnishing information pursuant to a duly authorized 
investigation.'' Consequently, stated in the affirmative, 
subsection (b) provides that, with respect to Congress, section 
1001 applies only to administrative matters and to duly 
authorized investigative matters.
    The administrative matters covered by subsection (b) 
includes, but is not limited to, all financial disclosure 
filings, including those required pursuant to the Ethics in 
Government Act, and all claims submitted to the House Finance 
Office. It is the Committee's view that congressional support 
entities--including the General Accounting Office, the 
Government Printing Office, the Library of Congress, the Office 
of the Inspector General of the House, and the Capitol Police--
are part of the legislative branch, and are therefore covered 
by section 1001 in the same manner that the rest of Congress is 
covered.
    Subsection (b) further limits the application of section 
1001 to duly authorized investigative matters. In so doing, the 
subsection differentiates between those congressional 
investigations that are ``duly authorized'' and those that are 
not, and applies section 1001 only to the former. The Committee 
is cognizant of the current array of circumstances and 
authorities that give rise to congressional investigations. It 
is, however, the view of the Committee that the means by which 
a congressional investigation can be duly authorized is limited 
to those investigations that are initiated through a formal 
action of a House or Senate committee, or the whole House or 
Senate. Consequently, an inquiry conducted by a Member of 
Congress or the staff of such Member which is relevant to such 
person's official duties is not a ``duly authorized 
investigation'' for purposes of section 1001. For example, an 
employee in a Member's office who contacts an executive branch 
employee to acquire information about a particular matter of 
interest to the Member is not engaged in a ``duly authorized 
investigation.'' Neither is the inquiry which is made by a 
House or Senate committee employee at the direction of the 
Chairman of the Committee, even when the inquiry pertains to a 
matter within such committee's jurisdiction, a ``duly 
authorized investigation'' for purposes of section 1001.
    The Committee anticipates that some consideration may be 
given in the future to the possibility of amending the rules of 
the House or Senate or particular committees to provide further 
clarification to the meaning of ``duly authorized 
investigation'' for purposes of section 1001. Such amendments 
may expand the ways in which investigations can be ``duly 
authorized,'' and would, as such, supersede the standard as 
provided in this report.

                              Agency Views

     The Committee has received a letter in support of H.R. 
3166 from the Office of Management and Budget of the Executive 
Office of the President. That letter is as follows:

                 Executive Office of the President,
                           Office of Management and Budget,
                                     Washington, DC, July 16, 1996.

                   Statement of Administration Policy


 h.r. 3166--government accountability act (martini (r) new jersey and 
                           three cosponsors)


    The Administration strongly supports House passage of H.R. 
3166, which is very similar to a proposal the Administration 
transmitted to the Congress on December 28, 1995.
          * * * * * * *

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the 
bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed 
to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is 
printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed 
is shown in roman):

              SECTION 1001 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE

[Sec. 1001. Statements or entries generally

  [Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any 
department or agency of the United States knowingly and 
willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, 
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or 
makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to 
contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
five years, or both.]

Sec. 1001. Statements or entries generally

  (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in 
any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, 
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United 
States, knowingly and willfully--
          (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, 
        scheme, or device a material fact;
          (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or 
        fraudulent statement or representation; or
          (3) makes or uses any false writing or document 
        knowing the same to contain any materially false, 
        fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 
years, or both.
  (b) Subsection (a) does not apply--
          (1) to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that 
        party's counsel, for statements, representations, 
        writings or documents submitted by such party or 
        counsel to a judge in that proceeding; or
          (2) to--
                  (A) any non-administrative matter; or
                  (B) any investigative matter, other than with 
                respect to a person furnishing information 
                pursuant to a duly authorized investigation;
        within the jurisdiction of an entity within the 
        legislative branch.