[House Report 104-680]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
104th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 104-680
_______________________________________________________________________
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996
_______
July 16, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. McCollum, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 3166]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill
(H.R. 3166) to amend title 18, United States Code, with respect
to the crime of false statement in a Government matter, having
considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment
and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Language of the Bill............................................. 1
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 3
Hearings......................................................... 6
Committee Consideration.......................................... 6
Vote of the Committee............................................ 6
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 6
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight..................... 6
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 6
Congressional Budget Office Estimate............................. 6
Inflationary Impact Statement.................................... 7
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 7
Agency Views..................................................... 10
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Government Accountability Act of
1996''.
SEC. 2. RESTORATION OF FALSE STATEMENT PENALTIES.
Section 1001 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as
follows:
``Sec. 1001. Statements or entries generally
``(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any
matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or
judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and
willfully--
``(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme,
or device a material fact;
``(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or representation; or
``(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the
same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both.
``(b) Subsection (a) does not apply--
``(1) to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's
counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents
submitted by such party or counsel to a judge in that
proceeding; or
``(2) to--
``(A) any non-administrative matter; or
``(B) any investigative matter, other than with
respect to a person furnishing information pursuant to
a duly authorized investigation;
within the jurisdiction of an entity within the legislative
branch.''.
Purpose and Summary
Section 1001 of title 18 United States Code makes it a
crime to knowingly and willfully falsify, conceal or cover up
by any trick, scheme, or device, a material fact, or make any
false statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States. Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Hubbard v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 1754
(1995), Section 1001 applied to all three branches of the
Federal Government. In Hubbard, the Court held that Section
1001 did not apply to the judicial branch, and by implication,
to the legislative branch of the Federal Government. The
purpose of H.R. 3166 is to ensure that section 1001 applies to
the judicial and legislative branches as well as the executive
branch, thereby ensuring the integrity of legislative and
judicial functions and proceedings. H.R. 3166 accomplishes this
purpose by applying section 1001 to persons who knowingly and
willfully make misrepresentations to all three branches of the
Federal Government.
The bill includes two sections. Section 1 provides that
the short title is the ``Government Accountability Act of
1996.'' Section 2 provides for the restoration of false
statement penalties by applying the criminal penalties of
section 1001 to all three branches of the Federal Government.
It does so while ensuring that the scope of section 1001 is
limited, as it was prior to Hubbard. Consequently, section 2
establishes both judicial and legislative function exceptions,
limiting the application of section 1001 so as to ensure that
the judicial and legislative functions of the Federal judiciary
and Congress are not undermined. To that end, the judicial
function exception exempts from section 1001's application
those representations made by a party or party's counsel to a
judge during a judicial proceeding, so as to avoid any chilling
effect upon the adversarial process. Similarly, the legislative
function exception exempts from section 1001's application
those communications made to or before Congress and which do
not constitute administrative filings and which are not
furnished pursuant a duly authorized investigation.
Background and Need for the Legislation
Section 1001 of title 18 of the United States Code states:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States knowingly and
willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or
representations or makes any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
Congress passed section 1001 of title 18 of the United
States Code in 1934. It was interpreted expansively in 1955 so
as to include statements made to Congress and the courts, when
the courts were functioning in their administrative, not
adjudicatory, capacity.1 Over the last four decades,
section 1001 has been used to prosecute Members of Congress who
lie on their financial disclosure forms, initiate ghost
employee schemes, knowingly submit false vouchers, and purchase
personal goods and services with taxpayer dollars.2 Courts
consistently held that section 1001 covered reports filed
pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act.3
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\1\ U.S. v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955); See also Morgan v.
United States, 309 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
917 (1963).
\2\ See United States v. Levine, 860 F.Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1994),
United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979) and United States
v. Marvoules, 819 F.Supp. 1109 (D. Mass 1993).
\3\ 5 U.S.C. Sec. 101. See United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
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In Hubbard v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 1754 (1995), the
Supreme Court held that a Federal court is not a ``department''
or ``agency'' within the meaning of section 1001, and that the
statute, therefore, does not apply to false statements made in
a judicial proceeding. The court argued that a common sense,
ordinary reading of the text of section 1001 does not define
``agency'' to include courts.4 While the Court did not
directly address the question of whether section 1001 still
applies to Congress, in holding that section 1001 does not
apply to the courts, Hubbard is widely interpreted as leaving
section 1001 covering only the executive branch, leaving
Congress outside its scope. Lower courts have already taken
this view. After Hubbard, Ethics in Government Act reports
filed by officials within the Courts and Congress are no longer
covered by section 1001.
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\4\ ``There is nothing in the text of the statute, or in any
related legislation, that even suggests--let alone shows--that the
normal definition of `department' was not intended.'' Hubbard, 115
S.Ct. at 1758.
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In May, 1995, Congressman Martini introduced H.R. 1678,
which applied section 1001 to all three branches of the Federal
Government, without exception. At a Crime Subcommittee hearing
on June 30, 1995, witnesses expressed concern that the broad
application of section 1001 to all three branches would chill
advocacy in judicial proceedings and also undermine the fact-
gathering process that is indispensable to the legislative
process. In response to these concerns, Representative Martini
introduced H.R. 3166 on March 27, 1996, which included a
judicial function exception, exempting from the scope of
section 1001 those representations made by a party or party's
counsel to a judge during a judicial proceeding. At the
Judiciary Committee mark-up of H.R. 3166, Representative
McCollum, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, offered an
amendment, which passed on voice vote without opposition, to
provide a legislative function exception to section 1001.
H.R. 3166 applies section 1001 to all three branches of the
U.S. Government, with two exceptions. First, the bill does not
apply section 1001 ``to a party to a judicial proceeding, or
that party's counsel, for statements, representations, writings
or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge in
that proceeding.'' Such an exception is intended to codify the
judicial function exception which has long been recognized by
many Federal courts as necessary to safeguard from the threat
of prosecution statements made in the course of adversarial
litigation.5 Allowing the criminal penalties of section
1001 to apply to statements made in the course of adversarial
litigation would chill vigorous advocacy, thereby undermining
the adversarial process. The exception is consistent with the
Court's reasoning in Bramblett and Morgan, and subsequent case
law, which consistently distinguished the adjudicative from the
administrative functions of the court, exempting from section
1001 only those communications made to the court when it is
acting in its adjudicative or judicial capacity, and leaving
subject to section 1001 those representations made to the court
when it is functioning in its administrative capacity. Thus,
false statements uttered during the course of court proceedings
or contained in court pleadings would not be covered by section
1001. The language of the exception recognizes that a wide
range of filings are an integral part of the adversarial
process, and therefore goes beyond merely exempting
``statements,'' exempting as well ``representations, writings
or documents'' submitted to the judge. Importantly, such
filings made in judicial proceedings are already covered by
other statutes, further limiting any supposed necessity of
covering these filings with section 1001.6
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\5\ In his concurring opinion in Hubbard, Justice Scalia recognized
the merits of the judicial function exception, noting that without the
exception there ``remains * * * a serious concern that the threat of
criminal prosecution under the capacious provisions of Sec. 1001 will
deter vigorous representation of opposing interests in adversarial
litigation, particularly representation of criminal defendants, whose
adversaries control the machinery of Sec. 1001 prosecution.'' Hubbard,
at 1765.
\6\ For example, perjury (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1621) and obstruction of
justice (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1505).
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The second exception exempts from section 1001's scope
certain representations that are made involving the legislative
branch. The purpose of the exception is to avoid creating an
atmosphere which might so discourage the submission of
information to Congress that it undermines the fact-gathering
process which is indispensable to the legislative process.
Consequently, the exception provides that certain information
provided to Congress--information which is neither furnished as
part of an administrative filing, nor furnished pursuant to a
duly authorized Congressional investigation--is not subject to
the criminal penalties of section 1001.
Without such an exception, the criminal penalties of
section 1001 would apply to all forms of communication made to
Congress. This would include, for example, opinions expressed
through constituent correspondence and all forms of unsworn
testimony. Prior to Hubbard, the ambiguities regarding the
exact scope of section 1001 resulted in the statute not being
applied to such forms of communications.7 Moreover,
applying section 1001's criminal penalties to such statements
would almost certainly have contributed to an intimidating
atmosphere, not only undermining the fact-gathering function of
Congress, but perhaps also discouraging the exercise of
Constitutional rights such as the First Amendment rights of
free speech and the right to petition the Government for
redress of grievances. The Committee believes that the scope of
a criminal law should be sufficiently clear so as to in no way
discourage the exercise of constitutional rights, and that the
failure to clarify how section 1001 applies to all forms of
communications and representations made to Congress invites
such an outcome. H.R. 3166 avoids this result by explicitly
limiting the application of section 1001 in a congressional
setting to administrative and duly authorized investigative
matters. As such, section 1001 would continue to apply--as it
has in the past--to members of Congress who knowingly and
willfully lie on their financial disclosure forms, initiate
ghost employee schemes, knowingly submit false vouchers, and
purchase personal goods and services with taxpayer dollars. It
would also apply to those who knowingly and willfully mislead a
duly authorized Congressional investigation. As in the past,
statutes such as perjury (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1621), obstruction of
justice (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1505) and contempt of Congress (2
U.S.C. Sec. 192) continue to provide possible means of
punishing those who would willfully mislead Congress in various
forms of communication to Congress.
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7 The Committee is unaware of any cases involving the use of
section 1001 to prosecute opinions offered to Congress in the form of
unsworn testimony or representations made that were not obtained
pursuant to a subpoena.
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It has been argued that section 1001 should apply to all
forms of communication made to Congress, including all forms of
testimony and correspondence, and that prosecutors should be
trusted to use such a broad statute with restraint. The
Committee does not find this view persuasive. A criminal
statute should not be broadly formulated and then defended by
asserting that prosecutors will not apply it in selected
circumstances. Certainty about the scope of a criminal statute
must not be based on the hope of future prosecutorial
restraint. Rather, certainty must be based on a specifically-
tailored statute that criminalizes only what is intended to be
a crime. As the Supreme Court stated in Hubbard: ``[W]e have
often emphasized the need for clarity in the definition of
criminal statutes, to provide fair warning, in language that
the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do
if a certain law is passed.'' Hubbard, at 1758.
It has also been argued that section 1001 applied to all
forms of communications made to Congress for at least 40 years
prior to Hubbard, without any indication that it adversely
affected the legislative process. While the Committee is
cognizant that section 1001 has not been used to prosecute
statements such as unsworn Congressional testimony or
constituent mail directed to Congress, the fact remains that
section 1001 could have been applied to these types of
communications. The Subcommittee on Crime received testimony
asserting that the ambiguities regarding the exact scope of
Sec. 1001 served to check its use in such settings; it is
precisely that ambiguity which will be eliminated after
Congress amends section 1001. Leaving section 1001 explicitly
applying to all forms of communications made to Congress would
clearly signal the breadth of its application, thereby inviting
more extensive use of the statute than occurred prior to
Hubbard.
Hearings
The Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime held 1 day
of hearings on June 30, 1995. Testimony was received from three
witnesses. They were Representative William J. Martini,
Representative from the Eighth Congressional District of New
Jersey, Timothy F. Flanigan, counsel, Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pogue, and Gerald H. Goldstein, President, National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
Committee Consideration
The bill was reported favorably on a voice vote, without
amendment, by the Subcommittee on Crime on March 29, 1996.
On June 11, 1996, the Committee met in open session and
ordered the bill favorably reported, by voice vote, with a
single amendment in the nature of a substitute, a quorum being
present.
Vote of the Committee
The Committee considered the following amendment:
Mr. McCollum offered an amendment to limit the application
of Section 1001 in a legislative context by exempting from its
scope those communications that are neither administrative
matters nor duly authorized matters. The McCollum amendment was
adopted by voice vote, without opposition.
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports
that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based
on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Findings
No findings or recommendations of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight were received as referred to in
clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
Clause 2(l)(3)(B) of House rule XI is inapplicable because
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or
increased tax expenditures.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
In compliance with clause 2(l)(C)(3) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets
forth, with respect to the bill, H.R. 2259, the following
estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, June 18, 1996.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
reviewed H.R. 3166, the Government Accountability Act of 1996,
as ordered by the House Committee on the Judiciary on June 11,
1996. CBO estimates that enacting the bill could lead to
increases in both direct spending and receipts, but the amounts
involved would be less than $500,000 a year. Because H.R. 3166
could affect direct spending and receipts, pay-as-you-go
procedures would apply. The bill contains no intergovernmental
or private-sector mandates as defined in Public Law 104-4, and
would impose no direct costs on state, local, or tribal
governments.
H.R. 3166 would provide that persons who make false
statements to the Congress or the federal Judiciary could be
prosecuted to the same extent as persons making false
statements to the Executive Branch. Violators of the bill's
provisions would be more likely to face criminal fines and
imprisonment than they are under current law. The imposition of
additional fines could cause governmental receipts to increase
through greater penalty collections, but we estimate that any
such increase would be less than $500,000 annually. Criminal
fines would be deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and would be
spent in the following year. Thus, direct spending from the
fund would match the increase in revenues with a one-year lag.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Mark
Grabowicz and Stephanie Weiner.
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neill, Director.
Inflationary Impact Statement
Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee estimates that H.R.
2259 will have no significant inflationary impact on prices and
costs in the national economy.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1.--Short title
This section states the short title as the ``Government
Accountability Act of 1996.''
Section 2.--Restoration of False Statement Penalties
This section amends section 1001 of title 18, United States
Code, by providing that the criminal penalties of section 1001
apply to all three branches of the Federal Government. It does
so while ensuring that the scope of section 1001 is limited, as
was the case prior to Hubbard. Consequently, section 2
establishes both judicial and legislative function exceptions.
To that end, the judicial function exception exempts from
section 1001's application those statements made by a party or
party's counsel to a judge during a judicial proceeding, so as
to avoid any chilling effect upon the adversarial process.
Similarly, the legislative function exception exempts from
section 1001's application those unsworn statements made to or
before Congress and which are not furnished pursuant a duly
authorized investigation.
Subsection (a) provides that section 1001 applies to the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of the United
States. As such, it returns the scope of section 1001 to its
pre-Hubbard status, by explicitly providing that section 1001
covers all three Federal branches.
Subsection (a) further provides that section 1001 applies
only to knowing and willful conduct within any of the three
branches. Consequently, misrepresentations that are made
without knowledge or that are unintentional would not be
subject to punishment under section 1001.
Paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of subsection (a) then
delineate the three separate but related offenses that section
1001 criminalizes. The paragraphs state that section 1001
applies to anyone who, in any matter within the jurisdiction of
any one of the branches of the Federal Government, knowingly
and willfully: (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry. Importantly, the
offense in each of the three paragraphs has ``materiality'' as
an element. This express requirement that all three offenses
have materiality as an element resolves a conflict among
circuits as to whether materiality is an element of all three
offenses or merely the offense of falsifying as delineated in
paragraph (3).8 Other than establishing materiality as an
element of all three offenses, the Committee does not view the
offenses defined in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) as changing
already existing case law as it relates to the elements of the
offenses.
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8 See United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) and
United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1984).
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Finally, subsection (a) provides that anyone convicted of
an offense under section 1001 shall be fined or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both. These penalties are identical to
those that were in effect prior to Hubbard.
Subsection (b) establishes the two exceptions to the
general application of section 1001 as delineated in subsection
(a). First, subsection (b) provides that section 1001 does not
apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's
counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents
submitted by such party or counsel to a judge in that
proceeding. As such, section 1001 does not apply to
representations made to a court that is acting in its judicial,
or adjudicatory capacity; Rather, it applies only to
representations made to a court acting in its administrative
capacity. The language of the exception recognizes that a wide
range of filings are an integral part of the advocacy process,
and therefore goes beyond merely exempting ``statements,''
exempting as well ``representations, writings or documents''
submitted to the judge. This judicial or adjudicatory function
exception is consistent with the Court's reasoning in United
States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955) and Morgan v. United
States, 309 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
917 (1963), and subsequent case law, which distinguished
between the adjudicative and administrative functions of the
court. The judicial function exception provided in subsection
(b) is intended to codify the judicial function exception as
articulated in Bramblett. Consequently, consistent with
Bramblett, only those representations made to a court when it
is acting in its administrative or ``housekeeping'' capacity
are within the scope of section 1001. Such representations
would include any filings not related to a proceeding before
the court, such as submissions related to bar membership, and
would also include the submission of information to another
entity within the judicial branch, such as the probation
service.
The second exception established in subsection (b) is the
legislative function exception. The exception is defined in
subsection (b) by identifying the two matters that section 1001
does not apply to. The first such matter is ``any non-
administrative matter.'' The second such matter is ``any
investigative matter, other than with respect to a person
furnishing information pursuant to a duly authorized
investigation.'' Consequently, stated in the affirmative,
subsection (b) provides that, with respect to Congress, section
1001 applies only to administrative matters and to duly
authorized investigative matters.
The administrative matters covered by subsection (b)
includes, but is not limited to, all financial disclosure
filings, including those required pursuant to the Ethics in
Government Act, and all claims submitted to the House Finance
Office. It is the Committee's view that congressional support
entities--including the General Accounting Office, the
Government Printing Office, the Library of Congress, the Office
of the Inspector General of the House, and the Capitol Police--
are part of the legislative branch, and are therefore covered
by section 1001 in the same manner that the rest of Congress is
covered.
Subsection (b) further limits the application of section
1001 to duly authorized investigative matters. In so doing, the
subsection differentiates between those congressional
investigations that are ``duly authorized'' and those that are
not, and applies section 1001 only to the former. The Committee
is cognizant of the current array of circumstances and
authorities that give rise to congressional investigations. It
is, however, the view of the Committee that the means by which
a congressional investigation can be duly authorized is limited
to those investigations that are initiated through a formal
action of a House or Senate committee, or the whole House or
Senate. Consequently, an inquiry conducted by a Member of
Congress or the staff of such Member which is relevant to such
person's official duties is not a ``duly authorized
investigation'' for purposes of section 1001. For example, an
employee in a Member's office who contacts an executive branch
employee to acquire information about a particular matter of
interest to the Member is not engaged in a ``duly authorized
investigation.'' Neither is the inquiry which is made by a
House or Senate committee employee at the direction of the
Chairman of the Committee, even when the inquiry pertains to a
matter within such committee's jurisdiction, a ``duly
authorized investigation'' for purposes of section 1001.
The Committee anticipates that some consideration may be
given in the future to the possibility of amending the rules of
the House or Senate or particular committees to provide further
clarification to the meaning of ``duly authorized
investigation'' for purposes of section 1001. Such amendments
may expand the ways in which investigations can be ``duly
authorized,'' and would, as such, supersede the standard as
provided in this report.
Agency Views
The Committee has received a letter in support of H.R.
3166 from the Office of Management and Budget of the Executive
Office of the President. That letter is as follows:
Executive Office of the President,
Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, DC, July 16, 1996.
Statement of Administration Policy
h.r. 3166--government accountability act (martini (r) new jersey and
three cosponsors)
The Administration strongly supports House passage of H.R.
3166, which is very similar to a proposal the Administration
transmitted to the Congress on December 28, 1995.
* * * * * * *
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the
bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed
to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is
printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed
is shown in roman):
SECTION 1001 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE
[Sec. 1001. Statements or entries generally
[Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States knowingly and
willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or
makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.]
Sec. 1001. Statements or entries generally
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in
any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive,
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United
States, knowingly and willfully--
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply--
(1) to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that
party's counsel, for statements, representations,
writings or documents submitted by such party or
counsel to a judge in that proceeding; or
(2) to--
(A) any non-administrative matter; or
(B) any investigative matter, other than with
respect to a person furnishing information
pursuant to a duly authorized investigation;
within the jurisdiction of an entity within the
legislative branch.