[House Report 104-582]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



104th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 2d Session                                                     104-582
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                  PROVIDING FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF 
 
              H.R. 3144, THE DEFEND AMERICA ACT OF 1996

                                _______


May 16, 1996.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

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 Mr. Diaz-Balart, from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                       [To accompany H. Res. 438]

    The Committee on Rules, having had under consideration 
House Resolution 438, by a nonrecord vote, report the same to 
the House with the recommendation that the resolution be 
adopted.

               brief summary of provisions of resolution

    The rule provides for consideration in the House with two 
hours of debate divided equally between the chairman and 
ranking minority member of the Committee on National Security. 
The rule waives all points or order against the bill and 
against its consideration.
    The rule also makes in order without intervention of any 
point of order one minority amendment in the nature of a 
substitute to be offered by Mr. Spratt or his designee and 
which is printed in this report. The rule provides that the 
substitute shall be debatable separately for one hour divided 
equally between the proponent and an opponent. Finally, the 
rule provides for one motion to recommit with or without 
instructions.

The Amendment To Be Offered by Representative Spratt of South Carolina, 
                  or a Designee, Debatable for 1 Hour

  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Ballistic Missile Defense Act 
of 1996''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

  Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) Short-range theater ballistic missiles threaten 
        United States Armed Forces wherever engaged abroad. 
        Therefore, the expeditious deployment of theater 
        missile defenses to intercept ballistic missiles at 
        greater ranges and higher altitudes is the highest 
        priority among all ballistic missile defense programs.
          (2) The United States is developing defensive systems 
        to protect the United States against the threat of 
        limited ballistic missile attacks. Ground-based 
        defensive systems are attainable, compliant with the 
        ABM Treaty, more affordable than space-based 
        interceptors or space-based lasers, and can protect all 
        of the United States from limited ballistic missile 
        attack.
          (3) Defending against ballistic missile attacks upon 
        our national territory requires not only missile 
        defenses but arms control agreements and 
        nonproliferation measures that lower the threat and 
        curb the spread of ballistic missile technology.
          (4) The massive retaliatory capability of the United 
        States deterred the Soviet Union, and any other nation, 
        from launching an attack by intercontinental ballistic 
        missiles throughout the Cold War. The Nuclear Posture 
        Review conducted by the Department of Defense affirms 
        the effectiveness of deterrence now and into the 
        future. While the threat of intentional attack upon the 
        United States has receded, the risk of an accidental or 
        unauthorized attack by Russia or China remains but is 
        remote.
          (5) United States arms control agreements (notably 
        the START I Treaty and the START II Treaty, once 
        implemented) will lower the threat to the United States 
        from large-scale nuclear attack. The START I Treaty, 
        when fully implemented, will reduce deployed warheads 
        by over 40 percent below 1990 levels. By the end of 
        1996, only Russia, among the states of the former 
        Soviet Union, will deploy nuclear weapons. The START II 
        Treaty, if implemented, will reduce warheads deployed 
        in Russia by 66 percent below their levels before the 
        Start I Treaty.
          (6) As strategic offensive weapons are reduced, the 
        efficacy and affordability of defensive systems 
        increases, raising the possibility of deterrence based 
        upon effective defenses rather than deterrence based 
        solely upon threat of massive retaliation.
          (7) Countries hostile to the United States (such as 
        Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya) have manifested an 
        interest in developing ballistic missiles capable of 
        reaching the United States. These countries may 
        accelerate the development of long-range missiles if 
        they receive external support, but in the absence of 
        outside assistance, newly emerging threats may take as 
        long as 15 years to mature, according to recent 
        intelligence estimates.
          (8) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile 
        Technology Control Regime, the Biological and Chemical 
        Weapons Convention, and continuing United States 
        efforts to enforce export controls will prevent or 
        delay external assistance needed by those countries to 
        develop intercontinental ballistic missiles and weapons 
        of mass destruction.
          (9) The ABM Treaty has added to strategic stability 
        by restraining the requirement on both sides for 
        strategic weapons. At the summit in May 1995, the 
        President of the United States and the President of 
        Russia each reaffirmed his country's commitment to the 
        ABM Treaty.
          (10) Abrogating the ABM Treaty to deploy a 
        noncompliant system will not add to strategic stability 
        if it impedes implementation of the START I or START II 
        Treaty. Without the removal of strategic weapons 
        scheduled by both treaties, the consequences and risks 
        of unauthorized or accidental launches will remain 
        undiminished, as will the potential threat of a large-
        scale attack capable of overwhelming any defenses 
        deployed.
          (11) If the nuclear arsenal of the United States must 
        be maintained at START I levels, significant unbudgeted 
        costs will be incurred, encroaching on funds for 
        ballistic missile defenses and other defense 
        requirements.
          (12) Should arms control, nonproliferation efforts, 
        and deterrence fail, the United States must be able to 
        defend itself against limited ballistic missile attack.
          (13) Missile defense systems consistent with the ABM 
        Treaty are capable of defending against limited 
        ballistic missile attack. Should a national missile 
        defense system require modification of the ABM Treaty, 
        the treaty establishes the means for the parties to 
        amend the treaty, which the parties have used in the 
        past.

SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

  (a) In General.--It is the policy of the United States to 
develop by the year 2000 a National Missile Defense System that 
can be deployed in 2003.
  (b) Capability of System.--The National Missile Defense 
System to be developed pursuant to subsection (a) shall be 
capable, when deployed, of providing a highly effective defense 
of the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks.
  (c) Testing Before Deployment.--The system developed pursuant 
to subsection (a) shall be rigorously tested during 
development.
  (d) Improvements.--If a decision to deploy the system 
developed pursuant to subsection (a) is not made by the end of 
the year 2000, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the 
system is improved by incorporation of evolving technology to 
increase effectiveness and reduce costs of a subsequent 
deployment, and that rigorous testing continues.

SEC. 4. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PRIORITIES.

  The following, in the order listed, shall be the policy of 
the United States with respect to the priority for development 
and deployment of ballistic missile defense programs:
          (1) First, maintaining the operational readiness of 
        the Armed Forces, including a good quality of life for 
        servicemembers and their families, and modernization of 
        weapons systems to ensure mission effectiveness in the 
        future.
          (2) Second, as part of such modernization, completing 
        the development and deployment of essential theater 
        missile defense (TMD) systems as soon as practicable.
          (3) Third, developing by the year 2000 for deployment 
        in the year 2003 the system referred to in section 3 
        and section 5(b) and developing for deployment as soon 
        as practicable the space-based sensors described in 
        section 5(c).

SEC. 5. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE.

  (a) Requirement for National Missile Defense Program.--To 
implement the policy established in section 3, the Secretary of 
Defense shall initiate a National Missile Defense Program, 
which shall position the United States, by the end of the year 
2000, to be capable of deploying a National Missile Defense 
system, as described in section 3(b), within three years.
  (b) Elements of the NMD Program.--The National Missile 
Defense Program shall include the following elements:
          (1) A ground-based interceptor system that provides 
        coverage of the continental United States (including 
        Alaska) and Hawaii.
          (2) Fixed ground-based radars.
          (3) Space-based sensors.
          (4) Battle management, command, control and 
        communications (BM/C3).

SEC. 6. IMPLEMENTATION OF NMD PROGRAM.

  The Secretary of Defense shall--
          (1) initiate plans and actions necessary to meet the 
        deployment readiness goals specified in section 5(a);
          (2) conduct rigorous integrated system testing using 
        elements representative of the National Missile Defense 
        architecture referred to in section 5(b);
          (3) prescribe and use streamlined acquisition 
        policies and procedures, in accordance with existing 
        law, to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of 
        developing the system referred to in section 5(b); and
          (4) develop technologies that have the potential of 
        improving the National Missile Defense system 
        prescribed in section 5(b).

SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

  Not later than March 15, 1997, the Secretary of Defense shall 
submit to Congress a report on the Secretary's plan for the 
National Missile Defense Program required by this Act. The 
report shall include the following matters:
          (1) The Secretary's plan for carrying out this Act, 
        including--
                  (A) a detailed description of the system 
                architecture selected for development under 
                section 5(b); and
                  (B) a justification of the architecture 
                selected and reasons for the rejection of the 
                other candidate architectures.
          (2) The Secretary's estimate of the amount of 
        appropriations required for research, development, 
        test, evaluation, and for procurement, for each of 
        fiscal years 1997 through 2003 in order to achieve an 
        initial operational capability in 2003.
          (3) A description of promising technologies to be 
        pursued in accordance with the requirements of section 
        6(4).
          (4) A determination of the point at which any 
        activity that is required to be carried out under this 
        Act would conflict with the terms of the ABM Treaty, 
        together with a description of any such activity, the 
        legal basis for the Secretary's determination, and an 
        estimate of the time at which such point would be 
        reached in order to meet an initial operating 
        capability in the year 2003.

SEC. 8. POLICY REGARDING REDUCTION OF THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES 
                    FROM WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

  (a) Measures To Address Threats From Weapons of Mass 
Destruction.--In order to defend against weapons of mass 
destruction by preventing the spread of fissile materials and 
other components of weapons of mass destruction, the President 
shall--
          (1) enhance efforts, both unilaterally and in 
        cooperation with other nations, to prevent terrorist 
        organizations from obtaining and using weapons of mass 
        destruction;
          (2) expedite United States efforts to assist the 
        Governments of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, 
        Belarus, and Kazakhstan, as appropriate, in improving 
        the safety, security, and accountability of fissile 
        materials and nuclear warheads;
          (3) undertake additional steps to prevent weapons of 
        mass destruction and their components from being 
        smuggled into the United States, through the use of 
        improved security devices at United States ports of 
        entry, increased numbers of Border Patrol agents, 
        increased monitoring of international borders, and 
        other appropriate measures;
          (4) seek the widest possible international adherence 
        to the Missile Technology Control Regime and pursue to 
        the fullest other export control measures intended to 
        deter and counter the spread of weapons of mass 
        destruction and their components; and
          (5) enhance conventional weapons systems to ensure 
        that the United States possesses effective deterrent 
        and counterforce capabilities against weapons of mass 
        destruction and their delivery systems.
  (b) Measures To Address Threats From ICBMs.--In order to 
reduce the threat to the United States from weapons of mass 
destruction delivered by intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
including accidental or unauthorized launches, the President 
shall--
          (1) urge the Government and Parliament of the Russian 
        Federation to ratify the START II Treaty as soon as 
        possible, permitting its expeditious entry into force;
          (2) pursue with the Government of the Russian 
        Federation, after START II entry-into-force, a 
        symmetrical program of early deactivation of strategic 
        forces to be eliminated under START II; and
          (3) work jointly with countries possessing 
        intercontinental ballistic missiles to improve command 
        and control technology and operations to the maximum 
        extent practicable.
  (c) Department of Defense Program.--Consistent with, and in 
order to complement, the steps to be taken by the President 
under subsection (a)(3), the Secretary of Defense shall carry 
out a program to enhance the capabilities of the United States 
relating to the threat to the United States of a chemical or 
biological weapons attack inside the United States by 
unconventional means. In carrying out such program, the 
Secretary shall take into consideration the assessments and 
recommendations of the task force established under subsection 
(d). The activities to be carried out by the Secretary under 
the program shall include the following:
          (1) Research, development, test, and evaluation of 
        technologies relating to any of the following:
                  (A) Detection of chemical or biological 
                weapons.
                  (B) Interception of such weapons.
                  (C) Protection against such weapons.
                  (D) Response to an attack inside the United 
                States using such weapons.
                  (E) Decontamination of areas affected by an 
                attack using such weapons.
          (2) Training of personnel for the activities 
        specified in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph 
        (1).
          (3) Identification of Federal equipment and 
        technologies that can be transferred from one Federal 
        agency to another agency or to State and local agencies 
        consistent with the purposes of the program under this 
        subsection.
  (d) Interagency Task Force.--(1) There is hereby established 
in the executive branch an interagency task force to assess, 
and make recommendations concerning, the capabilities of the 
United States relating to the threat of a chemical or 
biological weapons attack inside the United States by 
unconventional means.
  (2) The task force shall on an ongoing basis assess the 
current state of the United States with respect to each of the 
following and shall identify and recommend potential 
improvements:
          (A) The nature of the threat to the United States of 
        a chemical or biological weapons attack inside the 
        United States by unconventional means.
          (B) Capabilities related to detection and 
        interception of such weapons or the possibility of such 
        an attack.
          (C) Capabilities related to protection against the 
        effects of such an attack.
          (D) Capabilities related to preparedness for, and 
        response to, such an attack.
          (E) Capabilities related to decontamination following 
        such an attack.
          (F) Public education concerning the dangers of such 
        an attack and the appropriate response to such an 
        attack.
  (3) Membership of the task force shall include 
representatives of the following departments and agencies:
          (A) The Department of Defense.
          (B) The Central Intelligence Agency, but only with 
        respect to assessment of the nature of the threat.
          (C) The Department of Justice, including the Federal 
        Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and 
        Naturalization Service.
          (D) The Federal Emergency Management Agency.
          (E) The Department of the Treasury, including the 
        Customs Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
        Firearms.
          (F) The Department of Health and Human Services, 
        including the Centers for Disease Control.
  (4) In carrying out its activities, the task force shall 
consult regularly with, and shall seek the views of, 
representatives of--
          (A) State and local government law enforcement 
        authorities; and
          (B) State and local government emergency planning 
        authorities.
  (5) Administrative support for the task force shall be 
provided by the Secretary of Defense.
  (e) Annual Report.--The President shall submit to Congress an 
annual report on actions by the United States to comply with 
the provisions of this section. The first such report shall be 
submitted not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.

SEC. 9. POLICY REGARDING THE ABM TREATY.

  (a) In General.--The President shall--
          (1) carry out the policies, programs, and 
        requirements of this Act in a manner consistent with 
        the ABM Treaty or through processes specified within 
        the ABM Treaty;
          (2) at an appropriate time, seek amendments to the 
        ABM Treaty, as provided in Articles XIII and XIV of the 
        Treaty, if such amendments are required to deploy the 
        National Missile Defense system prescribed in section 
        5; and
          (3) treat any negotiated amendment to the ABM Treaty 
        as having entered into force only if such amendment is 
        made in the same manner as a treaty (including the 
        requirement that ratification by the United States is 
        subject to the advice and consent of the Senate).
  (b) Modifications Restricting TMD Systems.--The United States 
shall not be bound by any amendment or other substantive 
modification to the ABM treaty that restricts theater ballistic 
missile defense systems unless--
          (1) that system is actually flight-tested against a 
        ballistic missile that exceeds (A) a range of 3,500 
        kilometers, or (B) a velocity of 5 kilometers per 
        second; or
          (2) the agreement for such modification is made 
        pursuant to the requirements of section 235 of the 
        National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 
        (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 231).

SEC. 10. ABM TREATY DEFINED.

  For purposes of this Act, the term ``ABM Treaty'' means the 
Treaty between the United States and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, and includes 
Protocols to that Treaty signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974, and 
all Agreed Statements and amendments to such Treaty in effect.

                                
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