[House Report 104-486]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                                                 Union Calendar No. 235

104th Congress, 2d Session -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  House Report 104-486

 
      NATIONAL DRUG POLICY: A REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE DRUG WAR

                               __________

                             SEVENTH REPORT

                                 by the

               COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS


                                     


                                     

 March 19, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed
              COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

     WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr., 
      Pennsylvania, Chairman
                                     BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
                                     DAN BURTON, Indiana
                                     J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois
                                     CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
                                     CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
                                     STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
                                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
                                     WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New 
                                     Hampshire
                                     JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
                                     STEPHEN HORN, California
                                     JOHN L. MICA, Florida
                                     PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts
                                     THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia
                                     DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana
                                     JON D. FOX, Pennsylvania
                                     RANDY TATE, Washington
                                     DICK CHRYSLER, Michigan
                                     GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
                                     MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
                                     WILLIAM J. MARTINI, New Jersey
                                     JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
                                     JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
                                     MICHAEL PATRICK FLANAGAN, Illinois
                                     CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire
                                     STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
                                     MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South 
                                     Carolina
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois            ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GARY A. CONDIT, California
COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota
KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, Michigan
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
GENE GREEN, Texas
CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
BILL BREWSTER, Oklahoma
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
------ ------
            ------
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Independent)

  James L. Clarke, Staff Director
    Kevin Sabo, General Counsel
  Jane Cobb, Professional Staff 
              Member
     Judith McCoy, Chief Clerk
Bud Myers, Minority Staff Director

Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal 
                                Justice

   WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New 
        Hampshire, Chairman
                                     ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
                                     STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
                                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
                                     JOHN L. MICA, Florida
                                     PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts
                                     MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida            JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
TOM LANTOS, California
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York
GARY A. CONDIT, California
BILL K. BREWSTER, Oklahoma
------ ------

                               Ex Officio

                                     WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr., 
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois            Pennsylvania
  Robert Charles, Staff Director
  Sean Littlefield, Professional 
           Staff Member
 Robert Shea, Professional Staff 
              Member
        Sally Dionne, Clerk
     Cherri Branson, Minority 
        Professional Staff
                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                  House of Representatives,
                                    Washington, DC, March 19, 1996.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, I submit herewith the 
committee's seventh report to the 104th Congress.
                                 William F. Clinger, Jr., Chairman.



                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
  I. Summary, Oversight Findings and Recommendations..................1
        A. Introduction..........................................     1
        B. Overview of Investigation.............................     3
        C. Committee Findings....................................     5
        D. Committee Recommendations.............................     7
 II. Report on the Committee's Oversight Review......................11
        A. Background............................................    11
        B. Proceedings of the Subcommittee on National Security, 
            International Affairs, and Criminal Justice..........    15
              1. March 9, 1995, Hearing..........................    15
                  a. Purpose and Panels..........................    15
                  b. Summary of Findings.........................    15
                  c. Subcommittee Chairman's Introduction........    16
                  d. Testimony of First Lady Nancy Reagan........    16
                  e. Testimony of John P. Walters................    18
                  f. Testimony of William J. Bennett.............    22
                  g. Testimony of Robert C. Bonner...............    23
                  h. Testimony of Dr. Lee P. Brown...............    26
                  i. Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost..............    31
                  j. Testimony of Thomas Hedrick, Jr.............    32
                  k. Testimony of G. Bridget Ryan................    34
                  l. Testimony of James Copple...................    35
                  m. Testimony of Charles Robert Heard, III......    35
              2. April 6, 1995, Hearing..........................    36
                  a. Subcommittee Chairman's Introduction........    36
                  b. Interdiction: The Kramek Letter Revisited...    37
                  c. Interdiction In General.....................    38
                  d. Source Country Programs.....................    40
                  e. Prevention In General.......................    41
                  f. Prevention and Accountability...............    41
                  g. Shift to Treatment..........................    43
                  h. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network........    44
                  i. White House Drug Use........................    44
                  j. Surgeon General and Legalization............    44
                  k. Subcommittee Chairman's Closing Remarks.....    45
              3. June 27, 1995, Hearing..........................    45
                  a. Testimony of DEA Administrator Thomas A. 
                      Constantine................................    46
                  b. Testimony of GAO's Director-in-Charge of 
                      International Affairs, Joseph Kelley, and 
                      GAO Investigators, Allan Fleener and Ron 
                      Noyes......................................    47
                  c. Testimony of Acting Assistant Secretary of 
                      State for International Narcotics and Law 
                      Enforcement Affairs, Jane E. Becker........    49
                  d. Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
                      Defense for Drug Enforcement and Support 
                      Brian Sheridan.............................    49
              4. June 28, 1995, Hearing..........................    50
                  a. Testimony of U.S. Interdiction Coordinator 
                      and U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral 
                      Robert E. Kramek...........................    50
                  b. Testimony of the Commissioner of U.S. 
                      Customs George Weise.......................    51
              5. September 25, 1995, Hearing.....................    52
                  a. Background on the Problem, How Community 
                      United, and the Interagency Task Force.....    52
                  b. State Attorney General Jeff Howard Credits 
                      Effective Coordination, Drug Task Force, 
                      and Byrne Grants...........................    53
                  c. Director of State Office of Alcohol and Drug 
                      Abuse Prevention Geraldine Sylvester Urged 
                      Prevention, Treatment, Student Assistance, 
                      Parental Training and Peer Counseling......    53
                  d. Commissioner of the State Department of 
                      Corrections Paul Brodeur Urged Support for 
                      Byrne Grants, Correctional Pathways Program    53
                  e. State Narcotics Investigation Unit's 
                      Assistant Commander Neal Scott Explained 
                      Usage Breakdown, Urged Local Flexibility...    54
                  f. DEA Special-Agent-In-Charge Billy Yout 
                      Explained Recent Trends, Concurred in 
                      Support for Prevention, Law Enforcement....    54
                  g. Manchester Mayor Ray Wieczorek Testified on 
                      the Importance of Public Sector-Private 
                      Sector Cooperation.........................    54
                  h. Manchester Police Chief Peter Favreau 
                      Explained Multi-Agency Effort and How 
                      Operation Streetsweeper Succeeded..........    54
                  i. United States Attorney Paul Gagnon Discussed 
                      Cooperation and Funding....................    55
                  j. Citizen Groups Represented by Alice Sutphen 
                      Urged Community Action.....................    55
                  k. Dover Police Captain Dana Mitchell Urged 
                      support for D.A.R.E. and Law Enforcement's 
                      Role in Prevention.........................    55
                  l. Executive Director of Nashua Youth Council 
                      Michael Plourde Urged Community Need 
                      Assessment Prior to Receipt of Federal 
                      Funds......................................    56
                  m. Marathon House Regional Director John Ahman 
                      Urged Support for Effective Treatment......    56
                  n. Manchester Police Sergeant Dick Tracy Urged 
                      Strong Support for D.A.R.E. Program........    56
        C. Fact-Finding Trip to Transit Zone.....................    56
              1. OPBAT Operations Need Resources.................    57
              2. Aerostat Radars Were Deterrent..................    57
              3. Cuba Creates Overflight and Maritime Constraints    57
              4. Puerto Rico: Drug Gateway, Assets Needed........    58
              5. Joint Interagency Task Force--East..............    58
        D. Interdiction Policy Oversight.........................    59
              1. Interdiction From 1984-1990.....................    59
              2. Clinton's Cuts In Drug Interdiction.............    60
                  a. ONDCP Interdiction Budget Cuts..............    60
                  b. Assets Lost According to Admiral Yost.......    60
                  c. ONDCP Strategy Confirms Specific Reductions.    61
                  d. Field Representatives Confirm Assets Lost 
                      and Explain Impact.........................    61
                  e. USIC Memorandum Confirms Assets Lost........    62
                  f. Additional Expert Testimony Confirms Assets 
                      Lost.......................................    62
                  g. Admiral Kramek's December 1994 Letter to 
                      Drug Czar Lee Brown Confirms Assets Lost, 
                      And Interdiction Coordinator's Unsuccessful 
                      Efforts to Restore.........................    64
                  h. Admiral Kramek's June 1995 Testimony 
                      Underscore's Interdiction's Importance and 
                      the Missing Priority.......................    64
                  i. Testimony Of Drug Czar Lee Brown Confirms 
                      Low Priority on Interdiction...............    65
                  j. No Heroin Strategy Until November 1995......    65
                  k. GAO Reports Serious Deficiencies in Clinton 
                      Administration Source Country Programs.....    66
                  l. Bottom National Security Priority...........    66
                  m. Only Six Staff for Nation's Interdiction 
                      Coordinator, and No Supply Side Deputy 
                      Director of ONDCP..........................    66
                  n. ONDCP Has No Deputy for Supply Reduction....    66
                  o. ONDCP Staff And Budget Gutted--Not Restored.    67
                  p. Conclusions on Interdiction Policy..........    67
              3. The Implications of Reduced Interdiction........    67
                  a. Lower Prices, Higher Availability and Purity    67
                  b. Exploding Casual Use by Youth...............    68
                  c. Increasing Drug Related Juvenile Crime......    69
                  d. Nature of Juvenile Drug Use Changing Toward 
                      Addiction..................................    70
                  e. Drug Emergencies At Record Level............    70
                  f. Foreign Perceptions of U.S. Commitment 
                      Altered By Clinton Reductions..............    70
        E. Source Country Programs Oversight.....................    71
              1. The ``Controlled Shift''........................    71
              2. GAO Study of Clinton's Source Country Programs..    72
              3. Admiral Kramek's View in December 1994 of the 
                  Source Country Programs........................    72
              4. Invitations Rejected By the President's National 
                  Security Advisor and By the President..........    72
              5. Conclusions on Source Country Programs..........    73
        F. Prevention Programs Oversight.........................    74
              1. Prevention is Central to Drug War...............    75
                  a. Interdiction Experts Agree..................    75
                  b. The Partnership For a Drug-Free America 
                      Explains Broad Effectiveness of Drug 
                      Prevention.................................    75
                  c. The BEST Foundation Describes Differences 
                      Between Validated and Unvalidated 
                      Prevention Programs........................    76
                  d. Community Antidrug Coalitions of America 
                      (CADCA) Favors Renewed National Leadership 
                      And Accountable, Well-Funded Drug 
                      Prevention.................................    77
                  e. Texans' War on Drugs Program Favors Renewed 
                      Presidential Leadership, Possible 
                      Separation of Prevention and Treatment, And 
                      Block Grant of Unified Agency for 
                      Prevention Programs........................    77
                  f. New Hampshire Experts Urge Support for Byrne 
                      Grants, Attention to Prevention, Treatment, 
                      Correctional Programs......................    78
              2. Media Have a Key Role...........................    78
              3. Accountability Concerns Are Serious, 
                  Specifically In Safe and Drug Free Schools Act 
                  Monies.........................................    78
              4. Presidential Leadership Missing.................    81
              5. Fact-Finding Trip With Director of ONDCP........    81
              6. Conclusions on Prevention Policy................    81
        G. Treatment Programs Oversight..........................    82
              1. Background: Treatment Needed in Drug War........    82
              2. Administration Shift to Treatment...............    82
              3. Contrary to ONDCP Assertions, Treatment Funding 
                  Grew in Past Strategies........................    83
              4. Treatment Limitations: Bureaucracy..............    83
              5. Treatment Limitations: Effectiveness............    83
              6. The June 1994 RAND Treatment Study: A Poor Basis 
                  For National Drug Policy.......................    84
              7. Treatment Conclusions...........................    86
III. Conclusions and Recommendations.................................87
        A. Conclusions...........................................    87
        B. Recommendations.......................................    89

                                 VIEWS

Additional views of Hon. Karen L. Thurman, Hon. Henry A. Waxman, 
  Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon. Robert E. Wise, Jr., Hon. Major R. Owens, 
  Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Louise McIntosh Slaughter, Hon. Paul 
  E. Kanjorski, Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Thomas M. Barrett, 
  Hon. Barbara-Rose Collins, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Hon. 
  James P. Moran, Hon. Carrie P. Meek, Hon. Chaka Fattah, and 
  Hon. Tim Holden................................................    94
Additional views of Hon. William H. Zeliff, Jr...................   107
Additional views of Hon. Mark Souder.............................   111
  
                                                 Union Calendar No. 235
104th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 2d Session                                                     104-486
_______________________________________________________________________

      NATIONAL DRUG POLICY: A REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE DRUG WAR

                                _______


 March 19, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


  Mr. Clinger, from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
                        submitted the following

                             SEVENTH REPORT

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

 based on a study by the national security, international affairs, and 
                     criminal justice subcommittee

    On March 7, 1996, the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight approved and adopted a report entitled ``National 
Drug Policy: A Review of the Status of the Drug War.'' The 
chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the 
House.

           I. Summary, Oversight Findings and Recommendations


                            a. introduction


    The Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (``the 
Committee'') has primary legislative and oversight jurisdiction 
for the ``overall economy, efficiency and management of 
[G]overnment operations and activities . . . and for 
``[r]eorganizations in the Executive Branch of the 
government.'' [Rules of the House of Representatives, 104th 
Congress, X,1(g)(6) and (12).]
    In addition, the Committee has primary oversight 
responsibility to ``review and study, on a continuing basis, 
the operation of government activities at all levels with a 
view to determining their economy and efficiency.'' [Rules of 
the House of Representatives, 104th Congress, X,2(b)(2).] 
Finally, the Committee ``may at any time conduct investigations 
of any matter without regard to the provisions . . . conferring 
jurisdiction over such matter upon another standing 
committee.'' [Rules of the House of Representatives, 104th 
Congress, X,4(c)(2).]
    Pursuant to the foregoing grants of jurisdiction, the 
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and 
Criminal Justice convened five oversight hearings during 1995 
to assess the status of the Nation's Federal drug control 
strategy and its implementation. Specifically, the Subcommittee 
examined the status of Federal interdiction, source country, 
prevention and treatment programs.
    Advice and recommendations were sought from top 
Administration officials and preeminent outside experts. The 
Subcommittee's twin aims were (a) identifying strategic and 
implementation issues requiring improvement, and (b) 
identifying sound recommendations for achieving measurable 
improvement in combating illegal drug importation and illegal 
drug use.
    The Subcommittee's inquiry was driven by seven background 
facts, discussed in more detail in the ``Background'' section 
below. In brief, these facts are as follows.
    First, drug use has been rising markedly across American 
society over the past three to four years, especially among the 
Nation's juvenile population. The statistics are deeply 
troubling.
    Second, drug use fell markedly between 1981 and at least 
early 1992, following what most agree was concerted federal, 
state, community and parental counter narcotics activity, as 
well as strong national leadership on the issue by Presidents 
Reagan and Bush, and First Lady Nancy Reagan.
    Third, rising juvenile drug use and rising violent juvenile 
crime are integrally related, and have tended to feed upon each 
other.
    Fourth, objective indicators of the overall attention being 
devoted to the antidrug message by the media, national leaders, 
and the President have been lower during the past several years 
than at any time in recent history.
    Fifth, objective indicators of Federal support for the 
counter narcotics effort or the Drug War, particularly for drug 
interdiction, show a substantial reduction in resources 
committed to key areas. In early 1995, key budget numbers were 
already clearly below the prior high water marks deemed 
necessary for an effective strategy.
    Sixth, the Administration's 1994 and 1995 Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Strategies represent two 
conscious shifts in policy, one toward greater drug treatment 
emphasis within the demand reduction component of the strategy 
and one toward greater source country program emphasis within 
the supply-reduction component.
    Seventh, the 1994 and 1995 White House Strategies depart 
from prior White House Strategies and from the statutory 
requirement of ``quantifiable goals,'' offering instead broad, 
prescriptive goals, such as ``[r]educe the number of drug users 
in America.'' \1\
    \1\ Office of National Drug Control Strategy, National Drug Control 
Strategy, February 1995, p. 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These seven facts compelled oversight and review of the 
status of the Nation's Federal counter narcotics effort, the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy, the National Drug 
Control Strategy and its implementation.


                      b. overview of investigation


    The Nation's anti-drug effort has been a long and evolving 
one, spanning at least six Presidents and involving continuous 
reassessments. In fact, the impact of illegal drugs on our 
society has been a growing concern since the early 1970s. In 
June 1971, President Nixon told Congress that a national 
response to drug addiction was needed since ``the problem has 
assumed the dimensions of a national emergency.'' \2\
    \2\ Musto, David F., The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic 
Control, p. 256 (1987).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By 1980, illegal drug use was so widespread that antidrug 
parent groups such as Pride and National Family Partnership 
began to form. That year, more than half of all minors surveyed 
acknowledged illegal drug use.\3\
    \3\ In 1979, 54 percent of youth respondents to the Monitoring the 
Future Survey indicated drug use. See the 1995 Pride Report, Executive 
Summary, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the early 1980's, then-First Lady Nancy Reagan 
became a leader in the anti-drug, or drug abuse prevention, 
movement. Nancy Reagan effectively led the campaign to educate 
our Nation's youth and stem rising youth drug abuse. Her most 
famous statement, ``Just Say No,'' the answer to a child's 
question about how to respond if pressed to take drugs, became 
the guiding phrase of the prevention movement. Unrivaled in her 
energy and commitment, Nancy Reagan became the movement's chief 
spokesperson. During the mid-1980's, President Reagan showed 
unprecedented leadership in what soon became known as a war 
against illegal drug use and those who trafficked in illegal 
drugs.\4\
    \4\ See ``Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost,'' supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 
effectively establishing the first Federal framework of 
mandatory minimum sentences for drug trafficking.\5\ The 1986 
Act created ``two tiers of mandatory prison terms for first-
time drug traffickers: a five-year and ten-year minimum 
sentence. Under the statute, these prison terms are triggered 
exclusively by the quantity and type of drug involved in the 
offense. For example, the ten-year penalty is triggered if the 
offense involved at least one kilogram of heroin or five 
kilograms of powder cocaine or 50 grams of cocaine base.'' \6\
    \5\ See P.L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
    \6\ Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing 
Policy, United States Sentencing Commission, February 1995, p. 116.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 
(P.L. 100-690, Title I, Subtitle A), which established the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and created the 
new position of ``White House Drug Czar'' or ONDCP Director. 
The Act also required the White House ONDCP Director to present 
an annual strategy with measurable goals and a Federal drug 
control budget to the President and Congress.\7\
    \7\ P.L. 100-690, Title I, Subtitle A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1994, pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322, Title X), the ``drug 
czar'' was authorized to make recommendations to agencies 
during budget formulation. The aim of this Act was to improve 
resource targeting and policy consistency at Federal agencies 
involved in implementing the National Drug Control Strategy, as 
well as to heighten overall counter narcotics coordination 
throughout the Federal Government. In addition, the ``drug 
czar'' was authorized under the 1994 Act to exercise discretion 
over two percent of the overall drug budget; the ``drug czar'' 
could theoretically transfer up to two percent of the budget 
among National Drug Control Program accounts, upon approval by 
the appropriations committees.\8\
    \8\ In fact, this two percent measure has proved more theoretical 
than actual, as particular agency heads have resisted the transfers and 
prevailed in those efforts. For example, FBI Director Louis Freeh 
reportedly blocked resource allocations by ONDCP in 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During recent prior sessions of Congress, legislative and 
oversight hearings have been held on various aspects of 
national drug policy. The Subcommittee's 1995 oversight 
hearings, proposed and supported by both minority and majority 
Subcommittee members, were the result of recent developments, 
including the steep rise in juvenile and overall drug use 
(including both rising casual drug use, and increasing 
regularity of use); the growing awareness that increased 
juvenile drug use is linked to rising juvenile crime; \9\ the 
absence of a long-promised White House Heroin Strategy; \10\ an 
objective reduction in interdiction efforts; \11\ an apparent 
lack of progress in source countries toward goals set forth for 
so-called source country programs; \12\ reports of lagging 
accountability in certain drug prevention programs; \13\ the 
deemphasis by the media on drug abuse; \14\ the overall rise in 
drug related juvenile violence; \15\ and general concerns about 
interagency coordination of the Federal counter narcotics 
effort.\16\
    \9\ 1995 OJJDP Report, pp. 58-65.
    \10\ The President promised a Heroin Strategy within 120 days of 
taking office. Without any White House announcement, he signed a Heroin 
Strategy in late November 1995. The signed Strategy offers little 
detail, and was promulgated without implementing guidelines, which has 
so far made it a nullity.
    \11\ See ``Interdiction Policy Oversight'' section, below.
    \12\ See ``Source Country Program Oversight'' section, below.
    \13\ In particular, reports of waste and misapplication of funds 
have been associated with certain states' administration of Safe and 
Drug Free Schools monies, and these allegations are under investigation 
by the Department of Education Inspector General's Office and the 
United States General Accounting Office.
    \14\ See ``Prevention Policy Oversight'' section, below.
    \15\ See ``Background'' section, below.
    \16\ See, e.g., Yost Testimony, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The intent to examine National Drug Control Strategy was 
set forth in the February 6, 1995 Subcommittee Strategic Plan, 
in accord with the minority and majority view that the area 
required oversight.\17\
    \17\ The topic was discussed at a meeting of the full Subcommittee 
in early February, views were solicited by the Chairman, and both 
minority and majority members indicated a desire to conduct oversight 
in this area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the course of investigating the status of the National 
Drug Control Strategy, the Strategy's implementation and the 
need for improvement, the Subcommittee engaged in extensive 
correspondence with the Administration, including direct 
correspondence with the President; the Vice President; the 
President's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake; the 
Director of ONDCP, Dr. Lee P. Brown; the United States 
Interdiction Coordinator and Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral 
Robert E. Kramek; the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Thomas A. Constantine; the Commissioner of the 
U.S. Customs Service, George Weise; the Department of Defense 
Deputy Assistant for Drug Enforcement Policy, Brian Sheridan; 
the Department of State Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Ambassador Jane E. 
Becker; and others at the Departments of Justice, Defense, 
State, ONDCP and elsewhere in the Administration.
    The Subcommittee investigation included one fact finding 
trip. Subcommittee members, the United States Coast Guard and 
staff, traveled to the Seventh Coast Guard District in the 
Caribbean transit zone. There, they attended briefings at 
Seventh District Headquarters in Miami, Coast Guard 
interdiction initiatives at sea, Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) activities in the Greater Antilles, high 
level interagency briefings in Puerto Rico by the FBI, DEA, 
Customs, Border Patrol, and local authorities, and received in 
depth briefings by Admiral Granuzo and others at Joint Task 
Force Six in Key West, dedicated to Eastern Caribbean Drug 
Interdiction. This interdiction trip was arranged in 
coordination with the United States Coast Guard, and 
invitations were extended to minority and majority members. The 
trip occurred on June 16 through 19, 1995. Additionally, in 
coordination with ONDCP, the Subcommittee Chairman traveled 
with the White House Director of ONDCP to see prevention and 
treatment programs first-hand in Massachusetts.
    Throughout 1995, the Chairman, Members and Subcommittee 
staff met extensively with the agencies involved in the counter 
narcotics effort, and endeavored to collect directly and 
indirectly both statistical and anecdotal evidence on the 
effectiveness and accountability of the current National Drug 
Control Strategy and programs. These efforts spanned the key 
areas of interdiction, law enforcement, prevention, treatment, 
and source country initiatives. The Subcommittees sought 
further insight from GAO investigators, agents in the field, 
and departmental inspectors general.


                         c. committee findings


    The Committee's 1995 examination of the National Drug 
Control Strategy, its implementation and overall effectiveness 
resulted in the following findings:
    (1) Casual teenage drug use trends have suffered a marked 
reversal over the past three years, and are dramatically up in 
virtually every age group and for every illicit drug, including 
heroin, crack, cocaine, hydrochloride, LSD, non-LSD 
hallucinogens, methamphetamine, inhalants, stimulants, and 
marijuana.
    (2) Rising casual teenage drug use is closely correlated 
with rising juvenile violent crime.
    (3) If rising teenage drug use and the close correlation 
with violent juvenile crime continue to rise on their current 
path, the Nation will experience a doubling of violent crime by 
2010.\18\
    \18\ See Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report, OJJDP, 
Department of Justice, September 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (4) The nature of casual teenage drug use is changing. 
Annual or infrequent teenage experimentation with illegal drugs 
is being replaced by regular, monthly or addictive teenage drug 
use.\19\
    \19\ See 1995 surveys conducted by PRIDE, The National Household 
Survey, and The University of Michigan's Monitoring the Future Survey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (5) The nationwide street price for most illicit drugs is 
lower than at any time in recent years, and the potency of 
those same drugs, particularly heroin and crack, is higher.\20\
    \20\ See ``Interdiction Policy Oversight'' section, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (6) Nationwide, drug related emergencies are at an all time 
high.\21\
    \21\ See ``Background'' section, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (7) The 1994 and 1995 White House ONDCP strategies 
consciously endeavored to shift resources away from priorities 
set in the late 1980's, namely from the prior emphasis on 
prevention and interdiction to a post-1993 increase emphasis on 
treatment of ``hardcore addicts'' and a ``controlled shift'' to 
source country programs.
    (8) During 1993, 1994 and the early part of 1995, the 
President put little emphasis on, and manifested little 
interest in, either the demand side war against illegal drug 
use or the supply side war against international narcotics 
traffickers; an objective look at the President's public 
addresses and his actions regarding gutting the ONDCP when he 
became President, interactions with Congress, and discussions 
with foreign leaders reveals that attention to the rising tide 
of illegal drug use was a low presidential priority.\22\
    \22\ See ``Background,'' ``Interdiction Policy Oversight'' and 
``Prevention Policy Oversight'' sections, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (9) The President's actual attention to this problem, 
measured by other than the paucity of speeches and proposed 
budget cuts, has been uniformly low. In addition to the absence 
of direct presidential involvement in the drug war, the 
President produced no 1993 Annual Strategy, despite a statutory 
duty to do so under the 1988 Antidrug Abuse Act; delayed 
appointment of a White House Drug Czar, or ONDCP Director, 
until half way through 1993; and produced only a terse 
``interim'' strategy in 1993.
    (10) The Drug War appears also to have been expressly 
reduced to a low national security priority early in the 
Administration, and not to have been formally elevated at any 
time since.\23\
    \23\ See ``Interdiction Policy Oversight'' section, below. 
Reportedly, the drug war's national security priority during the first 
3 years of the Clinton Administration was number 29 out of 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (11) While the position is contested by the 
Administration's ONDCP Director, a wide cross section of drug 
policy experts inside and outside of the Administration concur 
that the absence of direct presidential involvement in foreign 
and domestic counter narcotics efforts has contributed to 
recent reversals in youth drug use trends, reduced street 
prices for most narcotics, and increased potency of most 
illicit drugs.
    (12) Prevention programs that teach a right-wrong 
distinction in drug use, or ``no use,'' such as D.A.R.E., 
G.R.E.A.T., the Nancy Reagan After School Program, community-
based efforts run by groups such as C.A.D.C.A., PRIDE, the 
National Parents Foundation, and Texans War on Drugs, as well 
as other local school and workplace programs, have proven both 
successful and popular where they have been well-managed and 
accountable--despite the 1995 White House ONDCP Strategy 
statement that ``[a]ntidrug messages are losing their potency 
among the Nation's youth''; \24\ while some of these programs, 
for accountability reasons, have come under increased scrutiny, 
such as Federal monies disbursed under the Safe and Drug Free 
Schools Act, others have received increased funding, such as 
the Byrne Grants, which help to finance the D.A.R.E. program.
    \24\ See ``Prevention Oversight'' section, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (13) Federal drug prevention programs, such as Safe and 
Drug Free Schools, while supporting successful prevention 
programs in many parts of the country, are of two types; some 
have been widely lauded, such as D.A.R.E., while others have 
been subject to continuing concerns about misapplication, waste 
and abuse of funds.\25\
    \25\ See ``Prevention Oversight'' section, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (14) The Nation's law enforcement community needs greater 
flexibility and support from the Federal Government in 
addressing the rise in juvenile and drug related crime. While 
certain developments are promising, such as the $25 million 
increase in Byrne Grant funding in fiscal 1996, a law 
enforcement block grant to supersede the COPS program, and 
increased reliance on joint interagency task forces, valuable 
time has been lost in addressing this need; renewed attention 
to strengthening local, county, state and Federal law 
enforcement's counter narcotics efforts are required.
    (15) The Nation's interdiction effort has been dramatically 
curtailed over the past three years, due to lack of White House 
support for interdiction needs, reduced funding, a tiny staff 
at the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator's Office, the absence of 
an ONDCP Deputy for Supply Reduction, reduced support for 
National Guard container search days, the elimination of 
certain cost effective assets in the Eastern Caribbean, 
reassignment or absence of key intelligence gathering assets, 
reluctance by the Department of State to elevate counter 
narcotics to a top priority in certain source and transit 
countries, unnecessary interagency quarreling over asset 
management and personnel issues, and the apparent inability or 
unwillingness of the White House Drug Czar to bring essential 
interdiction community concerns to the attention of the 
President or to aid the President's Interdiction Coordinator in 
doing so; and
    (16) Poor management and interagency coordination in source 
countries has been discovered and was described in detail by 
the General Accounting Office (GAO).


                      d. committee recommendations


    Upon review of the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy and 
an assessment of the status of the Drug War through expert 
testimony at oversight hearings, receipt of reliable 
documentary evidence, reference to General Accounting Office 
studies commissioned by the Subcommittee, and contacts with 
experts inside and outside the Federal government, the 
Subcommittee advances the following recommendations for 
improvement of the Nation's national drug control strategy:
    (1) To assure that the Drug War becomes a top national 
priority, the President should, in close consultation with 
Congress, establish an overall budget that places counter 
narcotics high among national priorities.
    (2) To reverse the rise in casual drug use by juveniles, 
the President should, in close consultation with Congress, 
establish a National Drug Control Strategy which returns 
accountable prevention programs to highest priority among 
Federal demand reduction programs, and does not 
disproportionately favor increased drug treatment funding at 
the expense of accountable prevention.
    (3) To reverse the rise in illegal drug importation, high 
drug availability, high drug purities, and low street prices, 
the President should, in close consultation with Congress, 
establish a National Drug Control Strategy which returns well-
coordinated interdiction programs to highest priority among 
Federal supply reduction programs, and does not embrace further 
cuts in interdiction assets or funding, or otherwise shift 
interdiction assets or funding to source country programs.
    (4) To restore accountability to ONDCP and the national 
drug policy, the President should return to promulgating, in 
compliance with the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988, a clear set of 
measurable and quantifiable annual goals as part of the annual 
National Drug Control Strategy.
    (5) To restore accountability, the overall National Drug 
Control Strategy should be more than descriptive, and more than 
a collection of laudable goals to which agencies aspire; the 
Strategy should become the standard against which success or 
failure of all agencies' antidrug programs are measured; the 
Strategy should also be the basic document against which future 
justification for antidrug funding at each agency is measured.
    (6) To restore accountability to Federal demand reduction 
programs, the President, in close consultation with Congress, 
should establish workable accountability mechanisms and clear 
measures of effectiveness, either by statute or regulation. 
Prevention programs that have no means for assuring 
accountability, that cannot demonstrate achievement of any 
measurable goals, or that do not fund ``no use'' messages 
should be unfunded in subsequent budget cycles; similarly, 
treatment programs unable to assure accountability and 
effectiveness should be unfunded.
    (7) To restore accountability to supply reduction programs 
(e.g. source country programs), the President, in close 
consultation with Congress, should establish workable 
accountability mechanisms; while effectiveness may be more 
difficult to measure on the supply side, programs that have no 
means for assuring accountable expenditures or fail to meet 
previously established goals should be unfunded in subsequent 
budget cycles.
    (8) To restore accountability, coordination and meaningful 
ONDCP guidance of the overall Federal antidrug efforts, 
antidrug programs that receive their justification in the 
annual ONDCP Drug Strategy Budget should be identified with 
greater specificity, and the 50-plus agencies that receive 
funding through these programs should be required to place the 
details of each program before the ONDCP Director prior to the 
production of succeeding annual budgets.
    (9) To restore accountability and coordination of the 
Nation's overall drug strategy, the White House Drug Czar 
should become the chief voice within the Administration on 
whether programs continue to be funded or not and at what 
levels, in consultation with OMB and the authorizing and the 
appropriations committees. However, in all antidrug efforts, 
the Drug Czar--and not individual agency heads--should then be 
viewed by the President, OMB and Congress as the primary 
decision-maker on national drug policy;
    (10) The President should be encouraged to be unequivocal, 
vocal and constant in his support of the Drug Czar, and to 
delegate to him or her the fullest authority possible on all 
issues relating to the Nation's counter narcotics efforts.
    (11) In support of the Drug Czar and heightened interagency 
coordination, the President should insist that all relevant 
agency heads coordinate antidrug activities directly through 
that person, and insist that all major counter narcotics 
decisions be approved by that person. Moreover, the one 
document that should govern all coordination efforts should be 
the National Drug Control Strategy.
    (12) The President should maximize the Drug Czar's 
authority by:
     Funding ONDCP itself back to late 1980's levels, 
including a complement of 150 ONDCP staff and a substantial 
increase in the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator's staff 
(currently six);
     Expressly delegating all authority for program 
prioritization and, in consultation with OMB, selected budget 
matters to ONDCP;
     Expressly giving ONDCP the authority to evaluate 
antidrug program effectiveness across all agencies of the 
Federal Government, and the authority to offer the primary 
recommendation to the President and Congress on program 
continuation, enhancement, reduction or elimination;
     Insisting that all agency heads meet personally 
with the ONDCP Director at least quarterly, following a format 
similar to the never-repeated October 1994 drug interdiction 
agency head conference.
     Confirming that the White House Drug Czar's 
priorities are the President's priorities in all contacts with 
agency heads.
     Publicly supporting efforts of the White House 
Drug Czar and ONDCP through regular discussion in the media, 
with Cabinet Officials, and in periodic addresses to the Nation 
or other public speeches.
    (13) To demonstrate the President's constant concern, 
awareness and consistent support for the Nation's Drug Control 
Strategy, and the many public and private sector advocates and 
implementors of policies within or consistent with that 
Strategy, the President should speak out regularly on the 
topic, utilizing the presidential ``bully pulpit'' to elevate 
the issue and build public support for demand and supply 
reduction efforts.
    (14) To bring the issue immediately back to the forefront 
of the Nation's agenda, the President should consider one or 
all of the following: An address to the Nation from the Oval 
Office or to a Joint Session of Congress on the topic of 
exploding teenage drug use; a series of White House Drug Policy 
Conferences, including one each on prevention, narcotics-
related law enforcement, interdiction, source country programs, 
treatment programs, and the role of the media; meeting 
personally with congressional leaders on this issue at least 
once or twice annually, notably the Bi-Partisan Drug Policy 
Group (currently co-chaired by Congressman Bill Zeliff, R-NH, 
and Congressman Charles Rangel, D-NY) or a similar counter 
narcotics leadership group; and appoint a bipartisan White 
House Commission on ``Winning the Drug War,'' to study the 
evolving options in depth and report new policy ideas and 
findings to the President and Congress for swift action.
    (15) In specific support of supply reduction, the National 
Drug Control Strategy should:
     Elevate the Drug War threat on the National 
Security Council's list of national security priorities to a 
top position;
     Restore funding for interdiction efforts, as 
recommended by the current U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, to 
``1992-1993 levels;''
     Restore funding to ONDCP for staff and policy 
support lost in 1993 Administration cuts;
     Restore funding for intelligence gathering lost 
between 1993 and 1995;
     Restore lost Ship Days, National Guard Container 
Search Works Days, and Flight Hours lost in 1993, 1994 and 1995 
Administration cuts;
     Restore to the Transit Zone the lost airborne and 
stationary radars, Jayhawk helicopters, Coast Guard Cutters and 
SES Patrol Boats, HU-25 Falcon Interceptor aircraft (five 
lost), E2-C Hawkeye AEW aircraft (4 lost), EC130-V AEW aircraft 
with rotodome (transferred to DoD), modernized sea-based 
aerostats (all lost), and personnel, including Transit Zone 
personnel and personnel formerly assigned to C3I East, 
subsequently consolidated into the Customs Domestic Air 
Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC) and suffering 
``serious manning shortages;''
     Establish a process for direct, regular 
communications between the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) 
and the National Security Advisor, if not also between the USIC 
and the President;
     Issue the missing agency implementation guidelines 
that should have accompanied the November 1995 Heroin Strategy;
     Provide sufficient staff to the USIC (who now 
coordinates the Nation's interdiction policy with a staff of 
6);
     Rescind or modify PDD-14 to reflect either a 
slower shift of resources or no shift at all toward source 
country programs.
     Insist on accountability mechanisms in source 
country programs that assure improved management, interagency 
coordination, clarity and targeting.
     Restore support for law enforcement's counter 
narcotics mission through a combination of greater flexibility 
by block grants, increasing the Byrne Grant and similar 
programs, heightened drug prosecutions in the Federal courts, 
and encouraging increased cross over of high technologies 
available to the military but not yet economically to law 
enforcement;
     Encourage wider use of joint interagency task 
forces, by reducing jurisdictional conflicts, bureaucratic 
impediments, and restrictive regulations, as well as 
rechannelling funds to these joint efforts.
    (16) In specific support of demand reduction efforts, the 
National Drug Control Strategy should:
     Reaffirm the central place of drug use prevention 
in the overall national drug strategy;
     Respond to recommendations that develop out of the 
GAO and Department of Education investigations of prevention 
program accountability, including the accountability of the 
Safe and Drug Free Schools Program;
     Encourage greater private sector and media support 
for drug prevention efforts nationwide;
     Offer greater flexibility to States and 
localities, through mechanisms such as a separate prevention 
block grant (independent of treatment), while clearly 
supporting only ``no use'' messages and ``no use'' curricula;
     Encourage greater cooperation among the prevention 
and law enforcement communities, while increasing support for 
such overlapping programs as the Byrne Grants, D.A.R.E. and 
G.R.E.A.T. programs;
     Fund only ``validated'' prevention programs, as 
suggested by national prevention efforts in the March 1995 
Subcommittee hearings;
     Encourage the establishment of accepted criteria 
for effective drug treatment and the creation of programs that 
are likely to meet these criteria;
     Encourage greater application of effective 
treatment programs in correctional institutions;
     Provide opportunities for the President to 
regularly and forcefully speak out on the issue;
     Explore means for establishing a larger number of 
overall treatment ``slots,'' so long as the treatment programs 
under consideration are effective;
     Reducing the Federal ``treatment bureaucracy'' to 
allow a greater flow of treatment funds to the states and 
localities outside Washington, D.C.
     Consider increased funding for research into 
potentially more effective drug treatment.

             II. Report on the Committee's Oversight Review


                             a. background


    The Nation's Drug Control Policy must be evaluated against 
the backdrop of seven incontrovertible facts. First, drug use 
has been rising markedly across American society over the past 
three years, especially among the Nation's juvenile population. 
The statistics are alarming.
    In 1994, for the third consecutive year, reputable 
nationwide surveys, including the National Household Survey 
\26\ and Michigan University's Monitoring the Future Study,\27\ 
measured disturbing increases in drug use and acceptability, 
especially among the Nation's youth.
    \26\ Substance Abuse Mental Health Services Administration, 
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Population Estimates 1994, 
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, 
September 1995.
    \27\ Johnston, L., O'Malley, P. and Bachman, J., Monitoring the 
Future Study, University of Michigan (1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to the 1994 Michigan University study, 13 percent 
of 8th-graders experimented with marijuana in 1993, about twice 
the 1991 level. Experimentation among 10th-graders increased 
about two-thirds the previous three years, and daily use among 
high school seniors was up by half over 1993 levels.
    Increasing use was also reported in 1994 by the Drug Abuse 
Warning Network Data, which collected data from emergency rooms 
around the country on drug related emergencies in 1993. That 
data showed an 8 percent increase in drug related emergency 
room cases between 1992 and 1993, with 45 percent being heroin 
overdoses. Cocaine was also at an all-time high, having more 
than doubled since 1988, and marijuana emergencies increased 22 
percent between 1992 and 1993.
    1995 data is worse: The National Household Survey released 
in September 1995 shows that overall drug use among kids ages 
12 to 17 jumped 50 percent in 1994, from 6.6 percent to 9.5 
percent. The National Pride Survey of 200,000 students shows 
that one in three American high school seniors now smokes 
marijuana; there has been a 36 percent increase in cocaine use 
among students in grades 9 through 12 since 1991-92; and 
hallucinogen use by high schoolers has risen 75 percent since 
1988-89.
    Finally, October 1995 DAWN data shows that, in 1994, 
``Cocaine-related episodes reached their highest level in 
history'' and registered a ``15 percent increase from 1993 and 
40 percent increase from 1988.'' On top of this, marijuana or 
hashish-related emergencies rose 39 percent from 1993 to 1994, 
and total drug related emergency cases rose 10 percent between 
1993 and 1994.
    Not surprisingly, a significant quantity of the narcotics 
producing the foregoing statistics come from a foreign source; 
for example, from mid-1993 to early 1995, Mexican traffickers 
reportedly produced at least 150 tons of methamphetamine, or 
speed; not surprisingly, Mexico also imported an estimated 170 
tons of ephedrine, a precurser chemical in production of 
methamphetamine. Similarly, the Drug Enforcement Administration 
confirms that approximately 70 percent of the estimated 400 
tons of cocaine was smuggled into the United States annually 
comes across Mexico's border with the United States. Other 
leading source countries include, not surprisingly, Colombia, 
Bolivia, Peru and Burma.\28\
    \28\ See, e.g., February 22, 1996 letter from the President to the 
Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, The Senate Committee on Appropriations, The House Committee on 
Appropriations and the House Committee on International Relations. This 
letter lists as ``major illicit drug producing or drug transit 
countries,'' the following: Afgahanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatamala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Jamaica, Laos, Lebanon, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Syria, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela and Vietnam.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The second incontrovertible fact is that overall drug use 
fell markedly between 1981 and 1992, during a period of 
concerted Federal, State, community and parental counter 
narcotics activity, and vocal national leadership by Presidents 
Reagan and Bush, as well as First Lady Nancy Reagan.
    In combination with nationwide grassroots parent groups, 
such as Pride and the National Family Partnership, Mrs. 
Reagan's ``Just Say No'' prevention program began the push to 
reduce drug use through education in the early 1980s. Mrs. 
Reagan's effort was supplemented by Federal drug prevention 
monies in 1987, and coordinated with the first concerted drug 
interdiction program in the late 1980s.
    Aided by new programs at the Departments of Defense and 
Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Customs 
Service, Border Patrol, and State and local law enforcement 
agencies, then-Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Paul Yost 
coordinated and implemented a drug interdiction effort based on 
the increased flow or ``pulsing'' of resources into the transit 
zone at high-drug trafficking times.
    Together, these prevention, law enforcement and 
interdiction efforts demonstrated results. Monthly cocaine use 
dropped from 2.9 million users in 1988 to 1.3 million in 1990. 
Overall drug abuse dropped from 14.5 million users in 1991 to 
11.4 million in 1992. The perceived risk of drug use rose, as 
did prices, while availability and purity fell.
    The third incontrovertible fact is that juvenile drug use 
and violent juvenile crime are closely related, and predictably 
feed upon each other. In September 1995, the Justice 
Department's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention (OJJDP) reported that, ``[a]fter years of relative 
stability, juvenile involvement in violent crime known to law 
enforcement has been increasing,'' and ``juveniles were 
responsible for about 1 in 5 violent crimes.'' \29\
    \29\ DOJ, OJJDP, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report 
(1995), Overview.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    OJJDP also confirmed 1994 National Institutes of Justice 
Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) data showing that ``1 in 3 juvenile 
detainees were under the influence of drugs at the time of 
their offense.'' \30\ For example, the level of marijuana use 
in 1993 varied from 14 percent to 51 percent of juveniles 
tested at 12 sites, making an average value of 26 percent, 
which was substantially above the 1992 average value of 16 
percent.\31\
    \30\ 1995 OJJDP Report, p. 64; NIJ Study (1994), Drug Use 
Forecasting: 1993 annual report on juvenile arrestees/detainees. 
Research in Brief.
    \31\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A fourth central fact is that objective indicators of 
overall attention being devoted to the antidrug effort by the 
media, national leaders and the President in particular is 
lower than at any time in recent history. Media coverage of the 
Drug War, which peaked in 1989, has been anemic since. The 
Partnership for a Drug Free America was able to afford in 1990 
and 1991, with media financing, roughly one antidrug message 
per household per day; Tom Hedrick of the Partnership testified 
that ``support for these messages has declined 20 percent in 
the past three years . . . because the media is not as 
convinced that the drug issue is as important as it was.'' 
Moreover, media coverage is also down--from 600 antidrug 
stories on the three major networks in 1989 to 65 last year, a 
free-fall.
    Presidential leadership has been equally weak. In 1993 and 
1994, President Clinton made seven addresses to the Nation; 
none mentioned illegal drugs. The President's 1993 presidential 
papers reveal 13 references to illegal drugs in a total 1,628 
presidential statements, addresses, and interviews. Of 1,742 
presidential statements and other utterances in 1994, illegal 
drugs were mentioned only 11 times.\32\
    \32\ Presidential Papers of President William Jefferson Clinton, 
1993 and 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The fifth fact: Objective indicators of Federal support for 
the counter narcotics effort, or Drug War, particularly for 
drug interdiction, show a substantial reduction in resources 
committed to key areas. In early 1995, key budget numbers were 
already clearly below prior high water marks, lines formerly 
defined as the minimum necessary for effective conduct of the 
Drug War.\33\
    \33\ The term ``Drug War'' is employed throughout this report to 
denote not just interdiction and international source country programs, 
but the entire gamut of Federal counter narcotics efforts, including 
prevention and treatment programs, law enforcement, and various Federal 
support efforts. For specific budget request and appropriation numbers, 
see below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the total antidrug budget rose from $1.5 billion in 
fiscal 1981 to $13.2 billion in fiscal 1995,\34\ ONDCP reports 
a drop in both drug interdiction and international program 
funding,\35\ and concedes a significant shift among demand 
reduction programs to treatment efforts.
    \34\ Teasley, David, Congressional Research Service Report 95-943, 
September 6, 1995, p. 1.
    \35\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February 
1995, p. 113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Notably, drug interdiction's budget authority fell from 
$1.511 billion in fiscal 1993 to $1.312 billion in fiscal 1994; 
President Clinton's fiscal 1994 budget slashed the interdiction 
budget by $200 million, again by $18 million to $1.293 billion 
in fiscal 1995, and finally by another $15 million to $1.278 
billion in fiscal 1996.\36\
    \36\ Id. p. 113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the same time, international or source country counter 
narcotics funding fell from a high of $523 million in fiscal 
1993 to $329 million in fiscal 1994 to $309 million in fiscal 
1995, recovering only slightly to $399 million in fiscal 
1996.\37\
    \37\ Id. p. 113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A sixth key fact is that the Administration's 1994 and 1995 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Strategies 
represent several conscious shifts. First, they represent a 
conscious shift of available resources toward treatment 
programs for hardcore drug users, and away from prevention 
programs for casual and non users.
    The 1995 White House National Drug Control Strategy 
identifies first on its list of ``National Funding Priorities 
for FY's 1997-99'' the ``[s]upport programs that expand drug 
treatment capacity and services so that those who need 
treatment can receive it.'' \38\ In support of this shift to 
drug treatment, the President has markedly increased treatment 
resources. In fiscal 1993, treatment resources stood at $2.339 
billion. But the figure increased to $2.398 billion in fiscal 
1994, increased to $2.646 billion for fiscal 1995, and the 
President's request for fiscal 1996 was at the all-time high of 
$2.826 billion.\39\ With respect to rising casual use, the 
President's 1995 Drug Control Strategy acknowledges that 
``casual drug use is increasing among our youth,'' \40\ but 
instead of focusing on casual use, states: ``Antidrug messages 
are losing their potency among the Nation's youth.'' \41\
    \38\ Id. p. 119.
    \39\ Id. p. 113.
    \40\ Id. p. 9.
    \41\ Id. p. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additionally, the 1994 and 1995 White House Strategies 
represent a conscious shift of resources away from interdiction 
or transit zone counter narcotics programs.
    Finally, seventh, the Clinton White House Drug Strategies 
depart from prior White House Strategies and from the statutory 
requirement of ``quantifiable goals,'' \42\ and offer instead 
broad, prescriptive goals, such as: ``Reduce the number of drug 
users in America.'' \43\
    \42\ 1988 Antidrug Abuse Act.
    \43\ Id. p. 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These seven facts, already becoming apparent in early 1995, 
strongly implied the need for continuing oversight and 
investigation into the status of the Nation's Federal counter 
narcotics effort, as well as review of the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy, the National Drug Control Strategy and its 
implementation.


b. proceedings of the subcommittee on national security, international 
                     affairs, and criminal justice


1. March 9, 1995, Hearing
            a. Purpose and Panels
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine President 
Clinton's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy, and to begin an 
assessment of how effectively the Nation is fighting illegal 
drug abuse, domestically and internationally. Acknowledged 
components of the Drug War under review include prevention, 
treatment, interdiction, law enforcement, and source country 
programs.
    At this hearing, testimony was received from four panels. 
The Subcommittee heard first from former First Lady of the 
United States, Nancy Reagan.
    Second, testimony was received from former Director of the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) William J. 
Bennett, former Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration Robert C. Bonner, and former Acting Director of 
ONDCP John Walters.
    Third, the Subcommittee received testimony from the current 
Director of ONDCP, Dr. Lee P. Brown. Finally, the Subcommittee 
heard from former Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Paul A. Yost, 
Jr. and several nationally-recognized drug abuse prevention 
experts, including Senior Representative of the Partnership for 
a Drug-Free America, Thomas Hedrick, Jr.; Executive Director of 
California's BEST Foundation, G. Bridget Ryan; National 
Director of the Community Antidrug Coalitions of America 
(CADCA), James Copple; and Director of Program Services for 
Texans' War on Drugs, Charles Robert Heard, III.
            b. Summary of Findings
    With varying degrees of emphasis, all panels acknowledged 
that current Federal efforts are under strain from reduced 
emphasis on certain components of the Drug War, budgetary 
pressure, and in some cases accountability.
    The panels also acknowledged that, over the past several 
years, there has been a marked reversal in several important 
national trend lines, including most notably a rise in casual 
drug use by juveniles, but also reaching to perceived drug 
availability (up), perceived risk of use (down), average street 
price (down), drug related medical emergencies (up), drug 
related violent juvenile crime (up), total Federal drug 
prosecutions (down), and parental attention to the drug issue 
(down).\44\
    \44\ Press Release, The University of Michigan, ``Drug Use Rises 
Again in 1995 Among American Teens:'' December 15, 1995; Press Release, 
PRIDE, ``Teen Drug Use Rises for Fourth Straight Year,'' November 2, 
1995; Preliminary Estimates from the Drug Abuse Warning Network, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, September 1995; James E. 
Burke, ``Presentation: An Overview of Illegal Drugs in America,'' 
Partnership for a Drug-Free America, Fall 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Subcommittee found that these reversals have continued 
through the period 1993 to 1995, although certain trend lines, 
including a shift from falling to rising casual use, typically 
among juveniles, began in 1992. In addition, a shift of certain 
interdiction resources, which were earlier a part of the 
counter narcotics force structure, began in late 1991 with the 
advent of the Persian Gulf War.
    All panels agreed, albeit with differing emphases, that 
renewed national leadership, including both Presidential and 
Congressional leadership, will be necessary to combat these 
recent trend reversals, especially the rise in juvenile drug 
abuse and drug related violent juvenile crime.
            c. Subcommittee Chairman's Introduction
    The Subcommittee Chairman initiated the hearing by noting 
that Mrs. Reagan ``woke the Nation up to this [juvenile drug 
abuse] problem and its pervasiveness in the early 1980's.'' 
Zeliff observed that the former First Lady's ``Just Say No'' 
campaign effectively launched a ``national crusade'' for drug 
abuse prevention.
    The Chairman also noted that, in April 1985, Mrs. Reagan 
held the first International Drug Conference for the world's 
First Ladies; in 1988 she held the second such conference and 
became the first American First Lady to speak before the United 
Nations; and after leaving the White House, she founded the 
Nancy Reagan Foundation, which has since ``awarded grants in 
excess of $5 million to drug prevention and education programs 
. . .''
            d. Testimony of First Lady Nancy Reagan
    Essentially, First Lady Nancy Reagan testified that America 
has forgotten the dangers of drug use, that America's children 
are at increased risk in 1995, that there is an absence of 
national leadership on the drug issue, and that a national 
strategy focused on treatment of so-called hardcore addicts 
misses the largest at-risk population, namely children 
participating in casual use.
    Mrs. Reagan pleaded with national opinion leaders, for the 
sake of the nation's children, to raise this issue to the top 
of the national agenda.
    Specifically, Mrs. Reagan explained that she had ``decided 
to speak [before Congress on the drug issue] only after a lot 
of soul searching . . . because my husband and everything he 
stands for calls for me to be here.''
    She then explained that the Nation ``is forgetting how 
endangered our children are by drugs,'' that societal 
``tolerance for drugs'' is up, and that ``the psychological 
momentum we had against drug use [in the late 1980's and early 
1990's] has been lost.'' In short, she asked, ``How could we 
have forgotten so quickly?''
    Mrs. Reagan detailed that, in eight years as First Lady, 
she had traveled ``hundreds of thousands of miles'' to stem 
drug abuse among young people and highlight its ``tragic human 
consequences.'' To illustrate the misery left in its wake, she 
read aloud a letter received from a 16-year-old girl.
    The letter poignantly described how this girl of low self-
esteem got caught in the ``vicious cycle'' of drug use, 
prostitution to buy more drugs, the death of her deformed and 
premature baby, and her heart-rending reaction to these events. 
The letter ended with a plea, which Mrs. Reagan repeated: 
``Please reach kids my age and younger. Don't let what has 
happened to me and what destroyed my life happen to them.''
    Mrs. Reagan also testified that, ``[b]efore the drug use 
increases of 1993 and 1994, we really had seen marked 
progress,'' and that ``[juvenile] attitudes were being 
changed.''
    In support of these statements, Mrs. Reagan offered that 
``monthly cocaine use dropped from nearly 3 million users in 
1988 to 1.3 million users in 1990,'' and ``[b]etween 1991 and 
1992, overall drug use dropped from 14.5 million users to 11.4 
million.'' She credited many elements of society, including 
``athletes and entertainers,'' ``many CEO's of large 
companies,'' and political leaders.
    She also explained the origins of her ``Just Say No'' 
message; it came in answer to a child's question about what to 
do if pressured to buy or use drugs. As she explained, it was 
an intentionally simple answer, and was never intended to be a 
``total answer.'' In short, Mrs. Reagan said, it is ``important 
for children to appreciate that `no' is in the vocabulary . . 
.''
    Directing herself to national policy, Mrs. Reagan quoted 
from President Clinton's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy, 
which states that ``[a]nti-drug messages have lost their 
potency.'' Mrs. Reagan disagreed, testifying: ``That's not my 
experience. If there's a clear and forceful no use message 
coming from strong, outspoken leadership, it is potent . . . 
Half-hearted commitment doesn't work. This drift, this 
complacency, is what led me to accept your invitation to be in 
Washington today . . . [W]e have lost a sense of priority on 
this problem, we have lost all sense of national urgency and 
leadership.''
    Elaborating, Mrs. Reagan noted that the current national 
strategy seems to shift resources toward treatment and away 
from prevention and education. While she stated that treatment 
is important in the overall mix of antidrug measures, it cannot 
supplant prevention as the nation's demand side priority. Mrs. 
Reagan pointed toward a more effective antidrug strategy when 
she observed simply that ``treatment can't begin to replace the 
overwhelming importance of education and prevention,'' since 
``tomorrow's hardcore users are today's children.''
    As she explained to the Subcommittee, ``[r]oughly 80 
percent of drug users are casual users. Only 20 percent are 
hardcore, and most of the casual users are children and 
adolescents. They are the ones whose lives are changed by 
prevention and education.''
    Overall, Mrs. Reagan argued for greater attention to demand 
reduction, although she testified that ``many outstanding 
prevention programs across the country'' were ``started and 
funded privately,'' including her own foundation, which 
recently ``merged with the BEST Foundation for a Drug-Free 
Tomorrow'' and ``has trained over 13,000 teachers and others.''
    Beyond the private sector, she said, the antidrug effort 
``requires leadership here in Washington.'' Rhetorically, she 
asked, ``[w]here has it gone?,'' and in closing, she called for 
renewed leadership on this issue. ``Today, the antidrug message 
just seems to be fading away. Children need to hear it and hear 
it often, just like they need to hear that they're loved.'' 
Missing is ``our common national purpose'' in combating drugs 
and teaching young Americans to ``live in the world that God 
made, not the nightmare world of drugs.''
            e. Testimony of John P. Walters
    John P. Walters, president of the New Citizenship Project 
and former Acting Director of ONDCP, testified essentially that 
President Clinton has promoted policies that reversed or 
accelerated the reversal of nearly a decade of falling drug 
use.
    Walters also tagged President Clinton as the source of 
major reversals in: the cultural aversion to drug use, falling 
drug availability, falling drug purities and rising drug 
prices. Walters sees these trends as significant and dangerous.
    Specifically, Walters testified that, between 1977 and 
1992, America's culture underwent a significant transformation. 
``The moral injunction not to use drugs swept over the Nation'' 
and ``[b]etween 1985 and 1992 alone, monthly cocaine use 
declined by 78 percent.''
    However, this ``sea change'' in attitudes was undone by the 
Clinton Administration, said Walters, noting that the Clinton 
Administration is ``undermining existing antidrug efforts on 
almost all fronts.''
    Walters pointed to the President's 80 percent reduction in 
ONDCP staff,\45\ the Attorney General's stated goal of reducing 
mandatory minimum sentences for drug trafficking,\46\ a 
presidential directive reducing Department of Defense support 
to drug interdiction efforts, the reduction in resources to 
transit and source countries by 33 percent (from $523.4 million 
in FY 1993 to $351.4 million in FY 1994),\47\ a reduction in 
Federal domestic marijuana eradication efforts, a call by the 
President's Surgeon General for study of drug legalization,\48\ 
and ``no moral leadership or encouragement'' from President 
Clinton himself.
    \45\ On February 9, 1993, the White House announced that ONDCP 
would have its personnel cut from 146 to 25.
    \46\ See also Isikoff, The Washington Post (November 26, 1993), pp. 
A1, A10-A11.
    \47\ See also, ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy: Budget 
Summary (February 1994, p. 184.)
    \48\ See also, Reuters, ``Elders Reiterates Her Support For Study 
of Drug Legalization,'' The Washington Post (January 15, 1994), p. A8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Walters testified that the impact of President Clinton's 
deemphasis on the Drug War was palpable, as illustrated by 
recent nationwide studies of youth use and attitudes towards 
illegal drug use. Again turning to hard numbers, Walters noted 
that the December 1994 University of Michigan study of 8th, 
10th and 12th graders showed that marijuana use ``rose sharply 
in 1994, as it did in 1993, after virtually a decade of steady 
decline'' and that ``student attitudes were becoming 
significantly less hostile toward illegal drug use.'' \49\
    \49\ See also University of Michigan, Monitoring the Future Study, 
December 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Walters saw this reversal as alarming, and testified that 
recent projections by the non-partisan Center on Addiction and 
Substance Abuse at Colombia University, show: ``If historical 
trends continue, the jump in marijuana use among America's 
children (age 12-18) from 1992 to 1994 signals that 820,000 
more of these children will try cocaine in their lifetime . . . 
Of that number, about 58,000 will become regular cocaine users 
and addicts.''
    Arguing that the Clinton Administration has oversold drug 
treatment, Walters also contended that the Administration has 
failed to create the number of treatment ``slots'' necessary to 
accommodate its own stated treatment priority.
    First, turning to hard numbers, Walters noted that the 
current strategy's success cannot be found in chronic, hardcore 
drug user numbers--since these are also rising.
    Despite the stated aim of the Clinton strategy, namely 
reduction of hardcore use by heightened emphasis on treatment, 
data gathered by the non-partisan Drug Abuse Warning Network 
from emergency rooms around the country shows that ``drug 
related emergency room cases . . . have reached the highest 
levels ever, in reporting going back to 1978'' and ``[c]ocaine, 
heroin, and marijuana cases all increased sharply to record 
levels [in 1994].''
    Second, while Walters explained the value of effective 
treatment, he testified that today's Federal ``government 
[drug] treatment bureaucracy is manifestly ineffective.'' He 
said the Clinton Administration has, on the one hand, sought 
increased treatment funding, yet on the other, failed to 
provide sufficient treatment slots to effectuate the policy: 
``Although Federal drug treatment spending almost tripled 
between FY 1988 and FY 1994, the number of treatment slots 
remained virtually unchanged and the estimated number of 
persons treated declined--from 1,557,000 in 1989 to 1,412,000 
in 1994,'' Walters testified.
    Walters also offered statistics to support his view that 
the current Administration has eroded the effectiveness of 
international programs, ``destroyed'' intelligence support for 
the Drug War, and abandoned ``presidential leadership'' on the 
issue.
    On international counter narcotics efforts, Walters rings 
an alarm bell. He testified that, while the President's FY 1995 
request for international antidrug programs was $428 million, 
or $76 million above FY 1994, it is still $96 million below the 
Administration's FY 1993 funding and $233 million below FY 
1992. In addition, the President failed last year to secure the 
request from a Democratically-controlled Congress.
    In short, Walters testified, ``the drug problem is simply 
not a part of the foreign policy agenda of the United States 
under President Clinton--there is no carrot and no stick facing 
countries from which the poison destroying American lives every 
day comes.'' Walters noted, finally, that this deemphasis on 
international efforts ``fuels calls in other countries for 
abandoning antidrug cooperation.'' \50\
    \50\ See also The New York Times (February 20, 1994), p. A6; The 
New York Times (February 27, 1994), Section 4, p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Walters further testified that President Clinton's policies 
are ``destroying the intelligence support to the drug war'' by, 
for example, last year cutting $600,000 in intelligence funding 
for FY 1995, and taking other measures to redirect resources 
away from this key priority.
    As a result, citing the Clinton Administration's own 
documentation, Walters noted that ONDCP itself admits more 
teenagers nationwide are using heroin and marijuana, that 
cocaine use is stable but high,\51\ and that heroin, cocaine 
and marijuana are now available at lower prices and higher 
purities than at any time in recent years.\52\
    \51\ See ONDCP, ``Pulse Check: National Trends in Drug Abuse,'' 
December, 1994, pp. 5, 8 and 10.
    \52\ See ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy: Strengthening 
Communities' Response to Drugs and Crime, February, 1995, pp. 45-48, 
146 (Table B-16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Walter's view, ``if these trends continue, by 1996, the 
Clinton Administration will have presided over the greatest 
increase in drug use in modern American history.''
    Looking forward, Walters advocated several policies for 
getting the drug war ``back on track,'' including direct 
presidential leadership or use of ``the bully pulpit,'' 
limited-duration antidrug block grants for states, putting the 
military ``in charge'' of all international counter narcotics 
efforts, using trade and diplomatic sanctions against source 
countries, establishing clear no-use prevention programs, 
closing open-air drug markets nationwide, drug testing where 
constitutionally permissible, and calling on local media to 
tackle the drug issue in a new wave of public service 
announcements.
    Walters concluded by noting that ``most Americans have 
never used illegal drugs and have always been strongly opposed 
to their use.'' Nevertheless, the Nation is on a collision 
course with devastating extrapolations, and a swift change of 
policy and return to effective implementation is required.
    On questioning, Walters affirmed that pursuing the so-
called kingpin strategy for apprehension of cocaine cartel 
leaders was a ``Federal responsibility.'' For that reason, the 
FBI and DEA should return to ``the long, hard, crafted effort 
to go after kingpins [that] has been dismantled by the 
Administration in favor of . . . helping street-level local law 
enforcement . . . for political reasons.'' Walters described 
that, at present, ``there is no plan by Federal law enforcement 
to dismantle . . . organizations that are moving hundreds of 
millions of dollars a month out of the United States.''
    Again upon questioning, Walters testified that ``the 
military and other interdiction agencies have received a 50 
percent force reduction in 1994, that has caused over a 50 
percent reduction in their ability to interdict drugs . . . 
[in] the transit zone.''
    Walters took issue with the Clinton Administration's 
granting of a national security waiver to Colombia, which was 
this year technically de-certified. He indicated that the 
national security waiver obviated the decertification.
    Asked about the efficacy of drug testing, Walters suggested 
that ``pre-employment testing ought to be able to be done 
everywhere, Congress, the Judiciary, the Executive Branch,'' 
and that the Federal employees should also be subject to 
``random testing,'' although he also noted that he was not a 
lawyer and that testing is subject to legal limits.
    Both Bennett and Bonner concurred with Walter's 
recommendation for wider drug testing, although Judge Bonner 
noted that there are legal limits on employee drug testing 
which generally require that a job be ``potentially dangerous'' 
to the public or involve ``security.'' Bonner noted 
countervailing concerns of citizen privacy, yet added that 
``drug testing has proved effective in deterring drug use,'' 
especially ``in the military.'' Walters concluded the 
discussion of drug testing by noting that the Federal work 
force is only part of the problem, and that drug testing in the 
larger private sector is key.
    Congressman Robert E. Wise, Jr. questioned whether the 
Andean initiative had not already been failing, leading to 
increased cocaine availability, during the Bush Administration.
    In response, Walters testified that a shift of military 
assets to the Persian Gulf War toward the end of the Bush 
Administration affected the Andean initiative. However, Walters 
drew a distinction between the Bush and Clinton 
Administrations, noting that ``the [Clinton] administration 
intentionally and vocally changed policy, shifting out of 
interdiction into hardcore treatment . . . ,'' and that the 
Clinton administration never returned military assets to the 
pre-Gulf War interdiction force structure.
    Judge Bonner contested Congressman Wise's cocaine 
availability numbers, stating that ``throughout most of 1990 
[there was] a substantial and sharp increase in the price of 
cocaine that was being marketed on a wholesale basis in the 
United States, and we again saw through about half of 1992 that 
kind of increase.'' Judge Bonner attributed this progress to 
the DEA, United States agencies and the Colombian Government, 
which were effectively ``destroying the Medellin cartel.'' 
Bonner also noted that the Mexican Government was, at that 
time, closely cooperating with the United States.
    Finally, on questioning, Walters closely linked drug use to 
crime. Walters testified that, in his experience, the ``biggest 
single contributor'' to drug related crime was not trafficker 
violence, but violence by people using drugs--who ``abuse 
children, abuse their spouses, be[come] violent with other 
people, be[come] disinhibited and paranoid and more proned to 
violence.''
    Surprisingly, Walters cited a study by ONDCP, conducted in 
New York City, Chicago and San Diego, which found that ``public 
assistance is the major and perhaps the single largest source 
of income for heroin users,'' noting that it is the poorest 
Americans who are most often devastated by heroin. Walters 
called it a ``national disgrace that in inner city 
neighborhoods, it is accepted as a fact of life that we are 
going to allow open air drug markets to exist without 
harassment.''
    Walters concluded that ``the Clinton administration has 
turned its back on the drug problem and taken actions that 
undermine achievements in prevention, interdiction and 
enforcement.''
            f. Testimony of William J. Bennett
    William J. Bennett, current Co-Director of Empower America 
and former Director of ONDCP, testified that there has been a 
``sharp rise in drug use,'' citing many of the same studies 
cited by Zeliff, Reagan, Walters and others.
    According to Bennett, this rise should have ``mobilized the 
Federal Government to forcefully state the case against drug 
use, enforce the law and provide safety and security to its 
citizens.'' Instead, ``the Clinton administration has abdicated 
its responsibility'' and ``has been AWOL in the War on Drugs,'' 
said the former White House Drug Czar.
    Widely regarded as the most effective White House Drug Czar 
to date, Bennett denounced the 80 percent cut by President 
Clinton in the ONDCP staff, and the willingness of Clinton's 
Attorney General to endorse reductions in mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug traffickers.
    Strikingly, Bennett noted that the Administration's 1995 
strategy would ``cut . . . more than 600 positions from drug 
enforcement divisions of the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' 
cut ``more than 100 drug prosecution positions in United States 
Attorney's offices,'' cut ``drug interdiction and drug 
intelligence programs from fiscal 1994 levels,'' and was ``an 
unfocused, wasteful drug treatment strategy that will do little 
to target hardcore users.''
    Bennett introduced new facts into the national dialogue 
when he observed that, ``last year, the Clinton administration 
directed the U.S. Military to stop providing radar tracking of 
cocaine-trafficker aircraft to Colombia and Peru,'' a policy 
``Congress again had to reverse,'' and noted that ``last month, 
for the first time in history, the nation's drug control 
strategy was introduced without the participation of the 
president.''
    Bennett also believes that, if present trends continue, by 
1996 the Clinton administration will have presided over the 
greatest increase in drug use ``in modern American history.''
    Expanding his analysis beyond the failure of public policy, 
Bennett testified that ``the Clinton Administration suffers 
from moral torpor on the issue'' and that, as a general matter, 
``policy follows attitude.''
    In support of this statement, Bennett quoted several 
statements by the President on his own prior use of drugs, in 
particular, Clinton's 1991 statement that he had never ``broken 
any drug law,'' followed by the 1992 statement that he had used 
marijuana in England but ``didn't inhale it,'' followed in 
turn, when asked if he would inhale if he had it to do over, 
by: ``Sure, if I could, I tried before.''
    Bennett also articulated the oddity of continued 
presidential support for a Surgeon General who ``had favorable 
words to say about legalization,'' noting that her eventual 
dismissal had nothing to do with her remarks on drug 
legalization.
    Citing ``massive policy failures'' by the Clinton 
Administration, Bennett proposed basic remedial measures. 
First, communities need to be able to ``choose their own 
antidrug priorities by combining Federal antidrug support with 
that from states and localities.''
    Second, the U.S. Military must be clearly given a 
leadership role in the international war on drugs. Third, 
international trade and diplomatic sanctions must be used, and 
all aid to cocaine-source countries should be eliminated if 
they fail to reduce production. Fourth, the Justice Department 
should make apprehension and prosecution of drug traffickers a 
top priority.
    Upon questioning, Bennett testified that he favored ``drug 
testing'' for Federal employees, and pursued the matter as Drug 
Czar until confronted by legal obstacles; ONDCP did use random 
and pre-employment drug testing, premised on ``security and 
safety.''
    Bennett noted, on closing, that ``success in the drug war 
depends above all on the efforts of parents and schools and 
churches and police chiefs and judges and community leaders.'' 
Giving examples from more than 100 cities he visited while 
President Bush's Drug Czar, Bennett urged renewed leadership.
            g. Testimony of Robert C. Bonner
    Robert C. Bonner, former Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) under both Presidents Bush and 
Clinton, a former Federal judge, and currently a partner at 
Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher, testified forcefully for renewed 
leadership in the Drug War: ``The bottom line is unmistakable--
during the past two years, drug use among the youth of America 
has soared in nearly every category of illegal drug . . . When 
juxtaposed against the immediately preceding period and nearly 
a decade of declining drug use, there can be only one 
conclusion--the Clinton Administration's National Drug Strategy 
has failed miserably, and indeed it is a tragedy.''
    Supporting this statement, Judge Bonner offered 
observations from his experience as DEA Administrator, and 
referred to a number of recent studies.
    Bonner testified that he was ``deeply troubled'' by the 
``absence of an effective, coherent national drug strategy and 
the apparent abandonment of any presidential leadership in this 
area.''
    Moreover, Bonner believes drugs now pose ``a serious threat 
to the well-being of our nation'' and a genuine ``national 
security threat.'' Bonner called for a bipartisan effort to 
address this ``resurgent threat to our nation's security,'' 
noting that the threat ``does not distinguish among 
Republicans, Democrats or Independents.''
    Bonner vividly described the costs of drug use to the 
Nation in the 1970's. ``Families were torn apart by drugs, more 
than many realize. Child and spousal abuse, bankruptcy, and 
criminal prosecutions followed . . . [h]undreds of thousands of 
drug-addicted babies were born to young mothers who, more often 
than not, could not support themselves, let alone children 
requiring serious medical attention. Drug related health care 
costs soared, draining still unacknowledged capital from our 
economy. Rampant in the work place, the wide-spread use of 
illegal drugs literally threatened America's ability to compete 
in the global marketplace.''
    Crediting Mrs. Reagan's ``Just Say No'' campaign and the 
antidrug Abuse Act of 1988, Bonner noted that the onslaught of 
direct and indirect damage from illegal drugs was turned back 
in the mid-1980's and early 1990's. In Bonner's view, national 
will, and a combination of ``strong law enforcement,'' a strong 
``educational and moral message,'' and effective treatment 
programs for hardcore users has made the difference. However, 
he warns that drug treatment programs should not be 
``oversold.''
    Statistically, he reminded the Subcommittee that ``our 
national drug strategy [in the 1980's and early 1990's] was 
working . . .'' Citing household surveys by the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), Bonner added new statistics to 
the record. ``[R]egular users of cocaine dropped from 5.8 
million Americans in 1985 to 1.3 million in 1992 . . . a 
decline of over 80 percent'' and that ``crack cocaine use 
sharply declined from nearly a million in 1990 to just over 
300,000 two years later in 1992,'' said Bonner.
    Judge Bonner observed that ``marijuana use . . . plummeted 
from about 22 million regular users in 1985 to approximately 
8.5 million in 1992 . . . a decrease of an astonishing 61 
percent in seven years.''
    However, he confirmed that there has been a ``rollback over 
the past two years of hard-fought victories achieved between 
the mid-1980's and the early 1990's.'' Citing the University of 
Michigan study of high school students, he noted that use of 
``heroin, LSD, cocaine, and crack,'' and ``the ill-named 
recreational drugs, marijuana, stimulants and inhalants'' was 
up and ``ominous.''
    According to Bonner, ``[w]e have seen a 100 percent 
increase in the number of 8th graders who used marijuana in 
just three years from 1991 to 1994; and just since last year, 
we have witnessed a 50 percent increase in the daily use of 
marijuana by 8th graders.'' Meanwhile, ``the perceived risks 
and disapproval of drug use has declined.''
    Bonner also shared the view of Joseph Califano, President 
Carter's Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and current 
co-director of CASA, that ``if this relaxed attitude [toward 
drug use] continues, further marked increases in drug use by 
children can be expected.''
    This, he said, is why casual use by juveniles must not be 
become peripheral or secondary to treatment of hardcore 
addicts. In a nutshell, ``if you emphasize, as [the Clinton 
Administration] is, . . . treatment of hardcore drug users, 
you're assuming that the drug problem is a static one--that we 
have a certain number of hardcore drug users here, and then we 
have certain number of casual drug users, and if we just take 
care of these hardcore drug users, the problem goes away.'' He 
strongly contested this view.
    ``That's wrong,'' says Bonner, ``the drug problem is a 
dynamic one, [because] as you increase the number of casual 
users, you are down the pipeline going to be increasing the 
number of hardcore users that [you] have to deal with.'' Bonner 
drew the analogy to bailing a leaky ship while failing to patch 
the leaks; eventually ``that's going to sink the boat.''
    He called the medical impact of the recent rise in drug use 
alarming. For example, the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) 
data for emergency room admissions in recent years indicates 
``significant increases in hospital emergency room admissions 
related to drug abuse, with the largest increases in heroin 
admissions, up by 44 percent between 1992 and 1993,'' noted 
Bonner.
    The chief causes for recent reversals in juvenile drug use, 
according to Bonner, include: ``lack of national, and 
specifically, presidential leadership; lack of a clear, loud, 
and persistent moral message that illegal drug use is wrong; 
and a misallocation of resources that undermines drug law 
enforcement and prevention efforts and overemphasizes hardcore 
user treatment . . .''
    Bluntly, Bonner concluded, ``there has been a near total 
absence of presidential leadership by President Clinton in the 
fight to turn back illegal drug use . . .'' and his Surgeon 
General's remarks on legalization ``arguably encourages it'' by 
further reducing perceived risk; Bonner called Surgeon General 
Jocelyn Elders' statement on legalization ``dead wrong and 
flagrantly irresponsible for a national public health 
official.''
    On treatment, Bonner testified that ``the Clinton Strategy 
badly oversells the efficacy of the treatment of hardcore drug 
abusers'' and fails to acknowledge that ``studies repeatedly 
indicate the low success rates associated with many programs . 
. .''
    Specifically, Bonner cited the work of Harvard University's 
Mark Kleiman, a former member of the Clinton Justice Department 
Transition Team, which shows that ``even the most expensive 
treatment program--long-term residential treatment programs 
costing as much as $20,000/patient--have success rates as low 
as 15 to 25 percent.''
    Upon questioning, Bonner reminded the Subcommittee that 
``with respect to crack addicts . . . after treatment programs, 
less than 10 percent are free of drugs, free of crack after 24 
weeks, so you don't want to put too many eggs in that 
[treatment] basket.''
    Addressing reversals in availability and price, Bonner 
testified that ``from 1990 to 1992, the wholesale price of 
cocaine in the U.S. increased substantially'' as law 
enforcement involvement went up; meanwhile, demand fell. By 
contrast, based on the laws of supply and demand, ``as the 
resources for enforcement and interdiction have been cut, the 
price of cocaine has gone down and the estimated number of 
heavy users has gone up.''
    Upon questioning, Judge Bonner stated that the Cali Cartel 
is ``supplying between 80 and 90 percent of all of the cocaine 
that reaches the United States . . .''
    Contradicting later testimony by Dr. Brown, the current 
ONDCP Director, Bonner stated that the Clinton administration 
was ``moving away from'' the Bush Administration's ``Linear 
kingpin strategy,'' which Bonner explained ``was designed to go 
after the leadership, the key lieutenants, the means of 
transport, the means of production . . . of the drug 
trafficking organizations . . .'' Bonner called this 
regrettable.
    In conclusion, Bonner said, ``we are regressing in the 
fight against drugs, after making significant, hard-fought and 
dramatic gains.'' Quoting University of Michigan researchers, 
he said, ``[d]espite substantial progress against illicit drug 
use in earlier years . . . it is a problem which is getting 
worse at a fairly rapid pace.''
    Sadly, Bonner, President Clinton's former DEA 
Administrator, observed: ``The Clinton administration has 
utterly failed to appreciate the value of strong international 
drug law enforcement as a major component in an effective drug 
control strategy.'' He called on the President to ``reverse 
this trend and start leading our Nation's antidrug efforts.''
            h. Testimony of Dr. Lee P. Brown
    Dr. Lee P. Brown, President Clinton's Director of the White 
House Office of Drug Control Strategy, or White House Drug 
Czar, testified in defense of the 1995 National Drug Control 
Strategy.
    (i). Overall Drug Policy Spending.--Brown testified that 
President Clinton's fiscal 1996 budget sought $14.6 billion in 
funding across the Federal Government for drug related Federal 
programs.
    For context, the President's 1995 National Drug Control 
Strategy lists the total ``Drug Budget'' as $14,550.4 
(million). This figure is somewhat misleading, however, since 
it contains funding for a variety of programs mixed purposes, 
such as the Federal Court System, Food and Drug Administration, 
Social Security Administration, Department of Agriculture's 
Agricultural Research Service, U.S. Forest Service, Department 
of Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land 
Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, 
Department of Justice's Community Policy, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, U.S. Marshal's Service and Tax 
Division, an unidentified grant to the Department of Labor, 
ONDCP's ``gift fund'' (zeroed out in fiscal 1996), the Small 
Business Administration, the Agency for International 
Development (AID), the Department of Treasury's Internal 
Revenue Service, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Information Agency 
(USIA), and a range of other disparate Federal initiatives.\53\
    \53\ See National Drug Control Strategy, February 1995, The White 
House, pp. 120-121.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A dual concern raised by some members of the Subcommittee 
was how these funds are actually spent and who coordinates the 
spending. The latter concern boiled down to accountability, 
avoiding duplication, and assuring interagency coordination.
    Dr. Brown testified that the President recognized the drug 
``link to other domestic policy issues, such as individual 
economic security, health care, housing, jobs, educational 
opportunities, crime and violence, and family and community 
stability.''
    (ii). Shift To Treatment.--Seeking to justify the 
Administration's acknowledged shift to treatment of hardcore 
drug users and the President's request for ``$2.8 billion for 
treatment'' in fiscal 1996, Dr. Brown noted that ``chronic 
hardcore drug users comprise 20 percent of the drug user 
population but consume two-thirds of the drugs . . .'' From 
this, he argued that ``past strategy [sic] ignores this 
inextricable part of the drug problem.''
    In fact, while the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy does 
increase the proportion of overall spending devoted to 
treatment, past strategies have included--and have steadily 
increased--funding for treatment. In fact, Federal treatment 
funding has increased every year from 1982 to 1995.\54\
    \54\ Fiscal Year 1992, Federal treatment spending stood at $505.6 
million. Fiscal year 1995, Federal treatment spending stood at $ 2.65 
billion. National Drug Control Strategy: Budget Summary, Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, February 1995, p. 238.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    John Walters further testified that ``between 1988 and 
1993, we roughly tripled the treatment budget of the Federal 
Government,'' while the ``number of people treated per year 
declined.'' The decline, according to Walters, was the result 
of ``bureaucracy'' and money being channeled to effective 
treatment programs.
    Dr. Brown testified that ``the best way to reduce the 
overall demand for drugs and the related crime and violence is 
to reduce the number of hardcore drug users,'' adding that 
``treatment works.''
    In defense of this statement, Brown cited a June 1994 RAND 
study that reportedly found that ``drug treatment is the most 
cost effective drug control intervention.'' Brown asserted that 
the study found that ``for every dollar invested in drug 
treatment in 1992, taxpayers saved $7 in crime and health care 
costs.''
    Brown did not comment on the arguments raised by Walters, 
Bennett, and Bonner against increasing treatment spending vis-
a-vis other programs, namely that many of the funded treatment 
programs are ineffective and that the Administration has not 
created enough ``slots'' to absorb increased spending.
    Moreover, he did not acknowledge fundamental limitations of 
the June 1994 RAND study as a guide to national policy. The 
study was conducted by C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham 
and entitled, ``Controlling Cocaine: Supply versus Demand 
Programs.'' While the study is of value, it is also easily 
misread, is subject to clear limitations, and is arguably 
flawed.
    Before examining methodology, two observations on substance 
are worth making. First, the study properly condemns 
legalization.\55\ Second, the study implies that the 
Administration's ``controlled shift'' from interdiction to 
source country programs is a serious misstep.\56\
    \55\ On legalization, the RAND study explains the devastating 
effect that drug legalization would have on overall drug use, by 
applying the economic mechanism of reduced prices, or price elasticity. 
In 1994, the average street or retail price for a pure gram of cocaine 
was $143; if cocaine were legalized, the estimated retail price would 
be $15-$20 per gram; See RAND Study, supra, pp. 11, 13.
    \56\ On the ``controlled shift,'' the RAND study concludes that 
dollar-for-dollar, interdiction is more effective than pumping money 
into source country programs. Ironically, while the Administration 
embraces the study's pro-treatment conclusion, it obviously rejects 
this conclusion. As one drug policy expert noted, ``[t]his analysis 
implies that the National Drug Control Strategy's `controlled shift' of 
resources from interdiction to source-country control might be a 
misstep.'' See Schnaubelt, Christopher, ``Drug treatment Versus Supply 
Reduction: Which Is Cheaper?,'' National Interagency Counterdrug 
Institute, May 1995, p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As discussed below, in the ``Treatment Policy Oversight'' 
section, the RAND study has serious limitations, including 
omission of prevention as an effective demand reduction 
tool,\57\ failure to follow up assessments of active 
residential and outpatient treatment programs for long-term 
effectiveness,\58\ a disfavoring of supply side programs 
because they yield only ``indirect'' benefits and are further 
removed from the user population, and the employment of a 
flawed measure of effectiveness, namely reduced overall cocaine 
consumption rather than a reduced number of users.
    \57\ See, e.g., Gleason, Thomas J., Hall, Douglas J., Oliver, 
William D., The Executive Summary of PRIDE Communities: A Grassroots 
Drug Prevention Effort for Healthy Teens, PRIDE, August, 1995; Burke, 
James, E., An Overview of Illegal Drugs in America, Partnership For A 
Drug-Free America, Fall, 1995; Johnson, Dr. Lloyd G., Monitoring the 
Future, December 1995, University of Michigan Institute for Social 
Research.
    \58\ The RAND study itself acknowledges that, once treatment ends, 
only about 12 percent of out-patient and 17 percent of residential 
treatment recipients stop heavy use of cocaine. See C. Peter Rydell and 
Susan S. Everingham, ``Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand 
Programs,'' RAND Drug Policy Research Center, Santa Monica, California, 
June 1994, pp. 24-25, 88-89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (iii). Prevention Programs.--Brown acknowledged that ``drug 
use among adolescents is rising,'' but attributed the trend to 
the final year of the Bush Administration. Brown offered the 
view that Safe and Drug Free Schools monies are ``the 
cornerstone of this Nation's efforts to educate our children 
about drug use'' and are currently disbursed to ``94 percent of 
the school districts in this country.''
    After first calling for a ``non-partisan'' discussion of 
antidrug measures and stating that he was ``determined not to 
play politics,'' Brown proceeded to call the 1995 rescission 
package, containing unspent 1994 prevention funding for the 
complaint-ridden Safe and Drug Free Schools program, a 
Republican ``anti-children rescission package.''
    No mention was made of accountability problems in Federal 
prevention programs, proposed remedies for these reported 
problems, or on-going investigations into dispersement of Safe 
and Drug Free Schools funds by the Federal Department of 
Education or in any of the states.
    Congressman Mark Souder raised documentary evidence, 
including a study by the Michigan State Governor's Office, 
supporting the view that the Safe and Drug Free Schools program 
monies had, at least in that state, been ``misapplied, 
untargeted and unaudited.''
    Congressman Souder also took Brown to task for Brown's 
political partisanship, noting that he ``took a direct shot and 
very political shot'' at Republicans by suggesting that they 
were funding ``a tax break for the wealthiest Americans by 
gutting drug education in our schools.'' Souder then quoted 
from Democratic Congressman Charles Rangel, who he said had 
observed, ``I have been in Congress for over two decades, and I 
have never, never, never found any Administration that has been 
so silent on this great challenge to the American people.''
    Brown responded that the rising youth use trend justified 
support for ``school-based prevention programs,'' regardless of 
reported accountability problems.\59\ Brown did not address the 
1995 Strategy's deemphasis on prevention vis-a-vis treatment.
    \59\ See, e.g., publications of Office of Drug Control Policy, 
Michigan State, Robert E. Peterson Director, concerning waste, fraud 
and abuse in Federal prevention funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Upon questioning, and against the backdrop of his own 
favorable comments regarding Mrs. Reagan's ``Just Say No'' 
campaign, Brown sought to defend statements in the President's 
1995 Strategy, particularly the Strategy's contentions that 
``simplistic prevention messages of the past appear not to work 
for today's young people'' and ``[a]nti-drug messages are 
losing their potency among the Nation's youth.'' \60\
    \60\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February 
1995, p. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    His defense of these messages hinged on the view that ``we 
have seen a substantial reduction in your non-addicted, if you 
would, the casual drug user population,'' and emphasis had to 
be placed, after 1993, on the ``chronic hardcore drug user 
population.''
    Brown did not address recent numbers indicating increases 
in both the casual and hardcore user populations, numbers that 
contradict both his contentions--that casual use is 
sufficiently low to warrant a shift of strategy, and that the 
Administration's post-1993 shift toward hardcore users has 
shown results.
    (iv). Interdiction Mentioned.--Brown confirmed a shift in 
trafficking patterns toward greater use of container cargo and 
noted that ``over 70 percent of the cocaine entering our 
country crosses the border with Mexico,'' but was unable to 
explain reduced emphasis in the current strategy on National 
Guard Container Search Workdays along the U.S.-Mexican border. 
Specifically, Brown had no answer for the question why National 
Guard Container Search Workdays fell from 227,827 in 1994 to a 
1996 projection of 209,000, as described in ONDCP's own 1995 
Strategy at page 41.
    Notably, the 1995 ONDCP Strategy also describes an 
inexplicable drop in other National Guard workdays from 597,385 
in 1994 to 589,000 in 1995 and 530,000 projected for 1996; a 
drop in Ship Days devoted to drug interdiction from 2,268 in 
1994 to 1,545 in 1995 and projected for 1996; and a reduction 
in Department of Defense flight hours from 50,624 in 1994 to 
50,000 in 1995 and projected for 1996.\61\
    \61\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February 
1995, p. 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congressman Gene Taylor (D-Miss), citing ``serious flaws in 
the policy'' and noting his own recent trip to Colombia, asked 
Dr. Brown why more Customs agents were not available for border 
inspections of containers coming out of Colombia.
    Brown responded that he had been on the U.S.-Mexican border 
himself, that he was ``committed to make sure that we do all 
that's humanly possible,'' and that ``it becomes the 
responsibility of the Mexican Government to do what they can . 
. .''
    Pressed again by Taylor to provide an answer on U.S. 
Customs resources, Dr. Brown offered that the Administration 
had a source country policy. Finally, in frustration, Taylor 
stated: ``We're in the same political party. I'm not here to 
beat up on you. But I'm asking you to rethink the strategy . . 
.'' Dr. Brown never answered Congressman Taylor's Customs 
question.
    Dr. Brown testified that, at the Department of Justice, the 
original Bush administration ``kingpin strategy'' was still 
being pursued, and on a different topic, Brown testified that 
he had no evidence that Haitian President Aristide was 
``involved in any drug trafficking.''
    Generally, Brown condemned ``Congress'' for having ``failed 
to fulfill [the President's] budget request.'' However, Brown 
made no attempt to provide specific answers to members' 
questions concerning (1) the President's own proposed deep cuts 
in interdiction and international program funding, (2) 
accountability, (3) shifting interdiction resources to source 
countries, (4) a reduction of Customs agents at the Southwest 
border, or (5) the shift in resources from prevention of casual 
use (80 percent of total users) by juveniles to treatment for 
older, chronic, hardcore users (20 percent of total).
    (v). Interdiction and the Kramek Letter.--Subcommittee 
Chairman Bill Zeliff (R-NH) introduced an unclassified piece of 
correspondence dated December 1994 between the Interdiction 
Coordinator, Admiral Kramek, and the Director of ONDCP, Dr. 
Brown, which stated that a consensus of agency heads believed 
``we need to restore assets to the interdiction force structure 
. . .'' and ``we must return to the 1992-1993 levels of 
effort.''
    The Kramek letter also indicated that the source country 
programs were not yet ``producing necessary results.'' 
Addressing drugs as a national security threat, the Kramek 
letter specifically asked for a meeting with the President. The 
letter read, ``I believe it appropriate that we meet with the 
President and National Security Advisor as soon as possible to 
brief them on the results of our conference and discuss the 
current state of implementation and national strategy . . . Of 
key importance to this meeting is the determination of priority 
of counting narcotics trafficking as a threat to national 
security of the United States as evaluated against other 
threats to our security that compete for resources.''
    The Subcommittee Chairman asked Brown if he had followed 
the Interdiction Coordinator's and agency heads' consensus that 
drug interdiction resources be returned to the ``1992-1993 
levels.'' Brown indicated that he held a view different from 
that of the Interdiction Coordinator and had, apparently, not 
followed that recommendation. Similarly, the Subcommittee 
Chairman asked Brown if he had taken the Interdiction 
Coordinator's request to the President or National Security 
Advisor. Brown indicated that he had not, and apparently also 
had not set up the requested meetings between Kramek and the 
President, or between Kramek and the National Security Advisor 
to ``determin[e] [the] priority of counting narcotics 
trafficking as a threat to national security . . .''
    (vi). Shift to Source Countries.--Brown conceded a shift of 
resources from interdiction to ``international efforts in 
source countries,'' but was unable to offer results of the 
shift or details about how the source country programs were 
being implemented or managed.
    As an addenda, hearings held by the Subcommittee in June 
1995 (see below) revealed serious mismanagement and 
misdirection of the source country programs, according to 
General Accounting Office investigators.
    (vii). No Measurable Goals.--Brown extolled the President's 
Strategy as ``new'' and ``action-oriented'', and testified that 
it offered ``specific targets and steps to achieve these 
targets.''
    As a matter of record, however, the Clinton Strategies have 
arguably failed even to meet the clear statutory obligation 
that specific goals and measurable objectives be set forth--
goals against which progress or a lack thereof can meaningfully 
be gauged.
    Section 1005 of the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988 sets forth 
the requirement that every National Drug Control Strategy 
present both ``long-range goals for reducing drug abuse in the 
United States'' and ``short-term measurable objectives'' for 
completion in two years from the date of the strategy's 
submission. These are statutory requirements.
    Thus, between 1989 and 1992, the Bush Administration set 
forth clear and quantifiable goals and objectives, each one 
susceptible to evaluation on an ``achieved'' or ``did not 
achieve'' basis. In the language of the 1992 Strategy, the 
President laid out ``10 detailed goals and objectives with 
specific numerical and proportional targets,'' and expressly 
stated that ``if levels and rates of national drug use do not 
fall, the Strategy is a failure--a test this document continues 
to invite.''
    By example, the Bush strategy set the goal to ``reduce 
current overall drug use by 15 percent,'' but then stated in 
1992: ``Goal not met. Current overall drug use declined 13 
percent from 1988 to 1991.'' The same 1992 strategy, projecting 
long-range goals, sought a 1994 goal of ``25 percent reduction 
below the 1988 level in the number of people reporting any 
illegal use of drugs in the past month'' and a 2002 objective 
of ``65 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of 
people reporting any illegal use of drugs in the past month.'' 
Each of the prior Bush Drug Control Strategies, and the 
remaining 1992 goals, were similarly specific. Each met the 
requirements of the statute, and permitted accountability.
    The Clinton Strategies have been a stark contrast. Contrary 
to Dr. Brown's assertions of specificity, the statutory 
requirement has likely not been met.
    For example, the first stated goal of the 1995 Drug Control 
Strategy is simply ``reduce the number of drug users in 
America.'' The second goal is to ``expand treatment capacity 
and services and increase treatment effectiveness so that those 
who need treatment can receive it.'' The third goal is ``reduce 
the burden on the health care system by reducing the spread of 
infectious diseases related to drug use.''
    All the remaining goals are similarly open-ended, 
essentially unmeasurable, and lacking the statutorily required 
``objectives with specific numerical and proportional 
targets.'' In short, contrary to Dr. Brown's assertions before 
the Subcommittee, the goals were neither specific nor 
measurable in terms prescribed by the 1988 Antidrug Abuse Act.
    (viii). No Heroin Strategy.--Brown testified that the 
Nation faced ``growing availability of cheap and high purity 
heroin,'' and acknowledged ``concern about the possibility of 
another heroin epidemic.''
    He assured the Subcommittee that ``the Clinton 
administration was responding . . . with a new heroin strategy 
which reaffirms that heroin control is one of our major foreign 
policy objectives.''
    In fact, as later conceded, President Clinton had promised 
the Nation a heroin strategy within 120 days of taking office. 
As of March 1995, he had not yet signed a heroin strategy.
    The President finally signed a heroin strategy on November 
29, 1995, according to internal reports. The Strategy, however, 
apparently has no implementing guidelines.
    Brown concluded his testimony by agreeing to return to 
testify before the Subcommittee within one month.
            i. Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost
    Admiral Paul Yost, former 18th Commandant of the United 
States Coast Guard and presently President of the non-partisan 
James Madison Fellowship Foundation, testified on the topics of 
interdiction and interagency coordination.
    He testified that the Nation witnessed a ``major build-up 
in drug interdiction in the at-sea war on drugs from 1984 
through 1990,'' with the result that this interdiction effort 
``successfully interrupted the flow of bulk marijuana by sea 
and cocaine by air over the water routes [of the Caribbean].''
    In Admiral Yost's view, ``strong interdiction and law 
enforcement were providing a climate [from 1984 through 1990] 
that made it clear to the [drug] trafficker that `this is 
wrong, and your chances of being intercepted are very high.' ''
    Since that time, he testified, there has been a ``tragic 
dismantling'' of the at-sea interdiction effort, so that today 
``there are several orders of magnitude less effort spent on 
drug interdiction.''
    Specifically, Yost testified that ``ship days and aircraft 
hours are drastically reduced [from 1990],'' and ``[a]ll of the 
Coast Guard jet aircraft, the Falcons with the f-16 intercept 
radars, were taken away from interdiction . . .'' ``The three 
Coast Guard E-2C airborne early warning aircraft have been 
turned back to the Navy and used for other purposes,'' and 
``the Coast Guard Air Station at St. Augustine, Florida, which 
was established to support these three multimillion dollar 
aircraft, is now closed.'' On questioning, Yost indicated that 
he believed some of the E-2Cs were even being 
``decommissioned.''
    Moreover, Yost testified, ``the Coast Guard C-130 airborne 
early warning aircraft has been turned over to the Air Force, 
stripped of its equipment, including a dome-mounted radar, and 
is now used for transportation of cargo.'' ``In addition, the 
new Command Control Communications and Intelligence Center has 
been closed, and its duties performed elsewhere.''
    Calling the resultant increase in drug availability and 
drug use predictable, Yost testified that the Nation ``will 
never stop drug use without a solid interdiction foundation for 
. . . education and treatment programs.''
    Accordingly, Yost favored a return to ``emphasiz[ing] the 
interdiction prong of the drug strategy'' and increased budget 
authority for the Coast Guard.
    Finally, Yost discussed the need for better interagency 
coordination. He supports greater ``authority'' for the White 
House Drug Czar and President's Interdiction Coordinator. 
Without the ability, specifically, to ``direct cabinet-level 
officers regarding budget allocation, personnel allocation, or 
forced deployments'' on this issue, both positions are 
``largely ceremonial,'' he said.
    Yost believes that ``a priority on drug interdiction . . . 
would have to be imposed on Cabinet departments by the 
President himself.'' An effective interdiction policy would 
require that one person be ``in charge,'' and able to ``lay 
force requirements on other agency heads for specific filed 
operations,'' as well as receiving ``authority to direct both 
strategy and tactics . . .'' A ``theater commander'' is needed, 
according to Yost, and ``a totally committed Congress and 
Administration.'' Yost concluded by observing that, ``up to 
now, we have been unable to select a theater commander and to 
delegate to him the authority he needs to win.''
    Responding to a question from the Subcommittee Chairman, 
Admiral Yost noted that his successful at-sea weapons 
interdiction program in Vietnam had ``three or four times the 
drug interdiction assets per mile of coast,'' ``a dedicated 
commander,'' a ``chain of command,'' and mechanisms for 
assuring ``responsibility and accountability,'' all of which 
are missing from the current drug war.
    Yost emphasized that interdiction, alone, will not win the 
drug war; interdiction must be the foundation for prevention, 
education, and treatment--and ``that's what'll win the war.''
            j. Testimony of Thomas Hedrick, Jr.
    Thomas Hedrick, Jr., Vice Chairman of the Partnership for a 
Drug-Free America, testified that prevention and interdiction 
advocates must begin to work together, and that ``preventing 
drug use by young people'' is essential ``if we are to have a 
prayer of building safe and healthy families and communities.''
    (i). Removing Barriers to Winning the Drug War.--As a 
prevention expert with ten years of experience, Hedrick 
testified that, ``quite frankly, I am frightened because after 
nearly a decade of progress, drug use is rapidly increasing.''
    Hedrick testified that drug abuse is a ``process'' that 
begins with the first use decision, and that ``any use'' of 
illegal drugs should be defined as ``abuse.''
    Hedrick testified that the Partnership sees three major 
barriers, each a public misperception, to winning the drug war.
    The first misperception is that ``we have lost the so-
called `war on drugs.' '' In fact, since the height of drug 
use, we have seen an ``enormous decrease'' in drug use, 
according to Hedrick. We have to recognize this progress, and 
see that ``solving the drug problem'' is not ``hopeless,'' 
despite recent slippages.
    Second, drug use is not primarily ``a problem of inner city 
ethnic kids.'' This ``terrible stereotype'' causes inner city 
kids, incorrectly, to think that their peers are all using 
drugs; and it also incorrectly leads ``the rest of America'' to 
think that their kids do not have drug problem. In fact, ``75 
percent of all drug users are white . . .,'' according to 
Hedrick.
    Third, there is a misperception that drugs are a stand-
alone issue. They are not, says Hedrick. They have ``become 
severely imbedded [over] the last 30 years in every major 
social issue we face in this nation.'' For example, drug abuse 
is ``inextricably linked to crime and violence,'' but also 
``contributes to the breakdown of our families, the abuse of 
children and adults . . . the spread of the AIDS virus, school 
drop-outs and declining quality of education, homelessness, 
urban decay, high health care costs, and even economic 
productivity and competitiveness.''
    (ii). Needed: Parents and Media.--The issue has 
``overarching importance.'' `` `Crisis' is not an overly 
dramatic or inappropriate description, particularly when you 
consider that drug use among our youngest kids, 13 and 14, has 
more than doubled in the last three years,'' observed Hedrick.
    Hedrick favors increased parent involvement in setting a 
``clear expectation of no use,'' better in-school education, 
and reduced exposure of children to ``pro-drug information,'' 
especially exposure to the ``recent re-glamorization of drug 
use in some of the media.''
    Significantly, Hedrick reported that the Partnership has 
received, since inception, ``over $2 billion in time and 
space'' from the media. In 1990 and 1991, this produced roughly 
one antidrug message per household per day.
    However, Hedrick testified that ``support for these 
messages has declined 20 percent in the past three years,'' 
apparently ``because the media is not as convinced that the 
drug issue is as important as it was.''
    Media coverage is also down, from 600 antidrug stories on 
the three major networks in 1989 to 65 last year, which Hedrick 
said is tantamount to ``zero'' from a communications point of 
view.
    Hedrick expressed the view that ``Federal support and 
Federal leadership in making drugs a critical national priority 
is essential, if we are to help convince the media that this is 
an important issue.'' National leaders must also tell those 
community leaders involved in this fight that what they are 
doing is important.
    Hedrick also strongly supported continuing public and 
private funding of drug prevention initiatives, since drug 
abuse is ``preventable.''
    Hedrick's 14-year-old son, Todd, testified briefly that his 
generation is surrounded by drugs. He said that ``parents need 
a serious wake-up call'' and that all kids now know where to 
get drugs in their schools. ``This entire country needs a huge 
turn-around in how it deals with drugs,'' since ``the fact that 
drugs aren't a prominent issue anymore tells kids that adults 
don't care about it.'' The younger Hedrick said, ``that's 
suicide to my generation . . .'' He proposed starting 
prevention earlier, in elementary school, having parents talk 
more with their kids, increasing media attention to the 
problem, and stopping the legalization movement.
            k. Testimony of G. Bridget Ryan
    Bridget Ryan, former Program Director for the Charles 
Stuart Mott Foundation and presently Executive Director of the 
BEST Foundation for a Drug-Free Tomorrow, testified that a 
recent RAND study advocated drug prevention as ``the first 
priority'' in curbing drug abuse. Ryan distinguished between 
``validated'' and ``unvalidated'' drug prevention programs, and 
urged that the former be adequately funded.
    (i). Validated Prevention Works.--The best ``validated'' 
prevention programs build, Ryan testified, on three 
propositions--first, ``target[ing] substances used first and 
most widely by young people;'' second, ``helping students 
develop the motivation to resist using drugs;'' and third, 
teaching effectively.
    Ryan described a recent RAND study on the effectiveness of 
prevention as one ``conducted with methodological exactitude'' 
and ``one of the most rigorous ever undertaken.''
    Ryan testified that the RAND prevention study disproves 
three common criticisms of prevention: ``first, that it works 
only for middle class, largely white, suburban situations; 
second, that the programs work only for kids who need them 
least; and finally, that prevention programs prevent only 
trivial levels of use.''
    RAND found that a properly designed prevention program, 
such as Project Alert, ``works well in urban, suburban, and 
rural areas, in middle- and low-income communities, and in 
schools with high and low minority populations.'' Project Alert 
is one of the prevention programs made available to ``schools 
across America'' by the BEST Foundation.
    According to Ryan, who described herself as ``on the front 
line of the implementation process,'' there should be no 
question that ``prevention can and does work, but our educators 
and policy makers must be selective in funding and implementing 
validated programs.'' Ryan noted that, ``it is estimated that 
more than 2,000 non-validated programs are in use.''
    (ii). Policy Ideas.--On policy, Ryan finds that ``we need 
to make information about valid [prevention] approaches more 
widely available and provide incentives for educators to choose 
programs that have demonstrated results.'' In particular, 
prevention programs ``must be specific;'' ``motivating children 
to avoid drugs is not the same thing as motivating them to 
avoid violence.''
    In addition, programs should provide ``continued 
reinforcement during high school'' and ``funding to develop and 
validate high school programs is critical,'' since ``education 
and school-based programs should be at the core of 
prevention.'' Ryan notes that another successful prevention 
program has been the BEST Foundation's ``Nancy Reagan After 
School Program.''
    Ryan notes, in closing, that influences outside the 
classroom, namely family and community, are also very important 
in stemming childhood drug abuse.
            l. Testimony of James Copple
    James Copple, National Director of the Community Anti-Drug 
Coalitions of America (CADCA), testified that CADCA is a non-
partisan group with approximately 2,500 community coalition 
members in every State and two U.S. territories. He noted that 
CADCA was founded in 1992 by the President's Drug Advisory 
Council, a creation of President Bush, and is privately funded.
    (i). Prevention Favored.--Expressing support for the Safe 
and Drug Free Schools Program, Copple retold a moving story of 
a young child that ``made her stand'' against drugs, while 
forced to live in a crack house. During a law enforcement raid 
of the house, this child was found in her room, surrounded by 
antidrug posters and ``a workbook on drug refusal skills;'' the 
posters and workbook were funded by Safe and Drug Free Schools 
monies.
    (ii). Leadership Needed.--In general, Copple testified that 
``CADCA members have been more than a little frustrated with 
the failure of the nation's leadership to keep the 
pervasiveness of drug abuse before the American people.'' He 
described recent increases in marijuana, cocaine and heroin use 
as ``alarming.'' CADCA has found it frustrating that their 
``messages of the dangers associated with drug abuse are 
getting lost in the clutter of other messages, such as 
legalization . . .''
    Copple stated that ``there is a growing fear among CADCA 
members that any national drug strategy is only words on paper 
and visions vanishing in clouds of hopelessness.'' In 
particular, referring to the 1995 White House ONDCP Strategy, 
Copple testified that ``a strategy . . . is only as good as the 
resources that follow it and the visible leadership that 
advances it.'' More pointedly, he held that ``there must be a 
national voice advocating for substance abuse prevention, and 
that voice should be loudest from the White House and the 
Congress.''
    In closing, Copple cited Peter Drucker's recommendation 
that budget cutting be conducted without imperiling the Federal 
Government's ability to conduct some ``national crusades.'' 
Copple noted that Drucker identified the war on drugs as one 
such crusade, and Copple urged the Congress to ``embrace a 
national strategy that is comprehensive, balanced and directs 
the majority of the resources to local communities to address 
local problems.''
            m. Testimony of Charles Robert Heard, III
    Charles Robert (``Bobby'') Heard, III, Director of Program 
Services at the Texans' War on Drugs, testified that ``parents, 
community leaders, and elected officials don't realize how easy 
it is for kids to get involved in drugs.'' He credited the 
precipitous drop in drug use ``between 1979 and 1992'' to 
substance abuse prevention, and noted that ``no other social 
issue can claim that kind of success.''
    Heard sees the primary solution to drug abuse as demand 
reduction. He testified that ``prisons alone will not break the 
cycle,'' and ``we can't treat our way out of this problem.'' He 
also noted that prevention is not a one-time mission, but a 
continuing duty that must continue ``from generation to 
generation.''
    (i). Missing National Leadership.--Heard testified that 
``national leadership'' is missing in the drug war, and without 
it, renewed success will continue to elude us. Heard believes 
success is possible. ``As we proved in the 1980's, with 
national focus and attention . . . we can make a tremendous 
difference in reducing demand,'' stated Heard. He also voiced 
his concern about possible disinterest in the drug problem by 
Congress, which he felt could signal a movement toward 
``dismantl[ing] our entire prevention structure.'' He cautioned 
against such a movement. Heard also cautioned against a Senate 
youth development proposal, to be administered by local 
officials, since that particular proposal omitted ``substance 
abuse prevention specialists.''
    Turning to an absence of presidential leadership, Heard 
testified that it was ``equally disheartening'' to see ``in the 
President's budget a proposal to consolidate the demonstration 
programs for the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention and the 
Center for Substance Abuse Treatment under SAMSA, the Substance 
Abuse Mental Health Services Administration,'' since 
``prevention and treatment are two very different approaches to 
dealing with the drug problem.'' Pointedly, Heard expressed 
concern that the President is under-emphasizing prevention, in 
favor of treatment.
    (ii). Policy Ideas.--Heard did note that, ``in this time of 
consolidation and cost savings, what might make sense is to 
consolidate all Federal substance abuse prevention programs 
under one agency or create a separate drug abuse prevention 
block grant'' for the States. These ideas would not pit 
prevention against treatment, but would preserve and target 
prevention monies.
2. April 6, 1995, Hearing
    Testimony at this hearing was received from Dr. Lee P. 
Brown, the Director of ONDCP, and continued testimony he gave 
the Subcommittee on March 9, 1995. Brown testified on a range 
of topics, including treatment, prevention, law enforcement, 
interdiction and source country programs.
    The purpose of this hearing was to continue an evaluation 
of President Clinton's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy, and 
assess the status of the nation's fight against illegal drug 
trafficking and drug abuse.
            a. Subcommittee Chairman's Introduction
    The Subcommittee Chairman opened with an observation. He 
noted that the Subcommittee's March 9 hearing may have jump-
started media interest in the drug war, since a series of 
articles appeared after the hearing. Zeliff credited the 
Washington Post with ``an excellent series of articles 
describing the brutal infiltration by Colombia's Cali drug 
cartel in our own society.'' The series included the assessment 
that, ``[t]he Cali cartel is increasingly using violence to 
protect its lucrative U.S. cocaine market . . . [a]nd they are 
trying to do things in this country similar to what they do in 
Colombia.'' Zeliff also noted that the newly powerful Mexican 
drug cartels present a looming challenges to U.S. law 
enforcement, and credited the media with writing about this 
development.
            b. Interdiction: The Kramek Letter Revisited
    The Subcommittee Chairman initiated questioning. Zeliff 
returned to the December 1, 1994 letter from Admiral Kramek, 
U.S. Coast Guard Commandant and Interdiction Coordinator, to 
Dr. Brown containing Kramek's views that drugs constituted a 
national security priority, that funding of drug interdiction 
must be returned to the 1992-1993 levels, and that Kramek 
wanted a meeting with the President and National Security 
Advisor to discuss this issue.
    The Subcommittee Chairman and others were disturbed by the 
Director's failure to divulge the existence of the December 1, 
1994 Kramek letter, despite clear oral and written requests for 
it.
    Zeliff noted that he had personally asked Dr. Brown on 
March 3, 1995, four days before they met in Zeliff's 
congressional office and six days before the March 9, 1995 
hearing, for ``any communications received by you from the 
Administration's Interdiction Coordinator regarding the 
adequacy of interdiction resources.'' Brown had provided 
several letters, but the key December 1, 1994 letter was 
conspicuous by its absence.
    The Subcommittee Chairman asked Dr. Brown, who subsequently 
acknowledged having received the Chairman's requests, why he 
had failed to include this unclassified and critical letter.
    Dr. Brown conceded that Zeliff had been denied the 
document, but explained that this was because ``this letter was 
attached to a classified document.'' Brown's answer struck many 
as non-responsive, since the letter itself was unclassified. 
Indeed, it was secured by the Subcommittee through other 
sources independent of attachments. Moreover, it was obvious to 
all present that there was no legitimate reason for a Federal 
agency to hide or refuse disclosure of such a material document 
to a Member of Congress, whether classified or not. The issue 
was thereafter dropped.
    On the substance of the Kramek letter, Brown stated that 
Kramek's recommendation for returning interdiction funding to 
``1992-1993 levels'' did not ``provide [Brown] with the 
appropriate information upon which to make decisions.''
    Although he did not elaborate, Brown indicated he was 
``working with the Interdiction Coordinator,'' and ``once we 
come to a conclusion about what we need, then we can make some 
decisions . . .'' Brown did not address the then-existing lapse 
of six months from October 1994 to April 1995, and why the 
relevant interdiction decisions had not been made during that 
period.
    Referring again to the Kramek letter, Zeliff asked Brown if 
he had taken the October, 1994 interdiction conference 
findings, and Admiral Kramek's specific requests to meet with 
the President and National Security Advisor to the President. 
Brown conceded that ``the specific request was never given to 
the President . . .''
    The Subcommittee Chairman closed the discussion by 
observing that the Admiral Kramek's letter represented not only 
the Interdiction Coordinator's views, but an ``agency head 
consensus.'' Brown responded that he was a co-sponsor of the 
conference, and was ``working with the Interdiction 
Coordinator,'' which struck many as non-responsive.
            c. Interdiction In General
    Brown testified that the Bush Administration's ``linear 
kingpin strategy'' was still being pursued, contradicting 
testimony on March 9, 1995 by former Clinton DEA Administrator 
Bonner, but stressed that the Clinton administration had 
shifted resources to source country programs and away from the 
``less than effective interdiction efforts.'' Brown offered no 
statistical support for his view that interdiction was ``less 
than effective.''
    (i). Deep Cuts.--Questioned about the President's fiscal 
1993, 1994 and 1995 requests for reduced interdiction spending; 
collectively, a 12.3 percent cut, Brown responded that it was 
Congress which had cut the Defense and State Department budgets 
in 1993, and further that the President's interdiction cuts 
were part of the Administration's ``controlled shift'' to the 
source countries.
    Brown did not deny falling sequential requests by the 
President for interdiction spending, and neglected to mention 
that the 1993 Congress which he condemned was held by the 
President's own party.
    (ii). Customs and National Guard.--Asked by Congresswoman 
Thurman (D-Florida) to address ``allegations of corruption 
among Customs inspectors,'' Brown offered this statement: ``As 
could be expected, any allegation alleging misconduct is being 
investigated and the investigation is designed to determine if 
there is validity to any allegation made against a Customs 
official. That is the normal course of business. You know I 
come from a police background.'' No further details were 
provided.
    Congressman and Subcommittee Vice Chairman Robert Ehrlich 
(R-MD) directed Dr. Brown's attention to the U.S. Customs 
Service and apparent failures in stopping the free flow of 
drugs across the Southwest U.S. border. Citing a recent report 
on the issue, Ehrlich noted that, ``not a single pound of 
cocaine was confiscated from more than two million trucks that 
passed through three of the busiest entry points along the 
Southwest border where Federal officials say most of the drugs 
enter this country.''
    Ehrlich then quoted the President's ONDCP budget request to 
back Dr. Brown, and asked why, in view of these disturbing 
border search numbers, the President ``requested that U.S. 
Customs funding be cut from $573 million to $500 million.''
    Brown responded that the U.S. Customs Service was ``working 
very hard,'' and that he had ``visited the border myself.'' 
Brown also mentioned Operation Hardline, which will place more 
Customs agents on the Southwest border, and the formation of a 
new Border Technology Center. Brown avoided discussion of the 
President's proposed cuts in Customs funding.
    Referring again to the National Guard, Congressman Mica 
cited the 1995 Drug Strategy and asked why the President was 
recommending cuts, in particular, from 227,827 estimated 
container search days in 1994 to an estimated 209,000 in 1996, 
and from 2,268 ship days to 1,545 over this same period. ``Is 
part of your strategy to have reduced . . . container searches 
and ship days?,'' Mica asked. Brown would not respond directly 
to this question.
    Subsequently, the Subcommittee Vice Chairman re-asked the 
question, noting that 70 percent of the cocaine entering the 
United States comes across the Southwest border. Brown said 
only that the Administration was ``making some realignments in 
their overall budget'' and blamed the prior Congress for 
interdiction cuts, despite the President's own requests for 
reduced interdiction in 1993, 1994, and 1995 and a publicly 
acknowledged strategy shift away from interdiction.
    (iii). Mexico and Cooperation.--Presented specific evidence 
by Congressman Shadegg (R-Arizona) that Mexican authorities had 
not cooperated with U.S. counter narcotics efforts, and asked 
whether this was of concern to the Director, Brown responded: 
``Well, I am concerned with the totality of the drug problem,'' 
adding that he had ``had numerous meetings with the Mexican 
officials . . .,'' was ``engaging Mexico in a very aggressive 
way,'' and hoped for change by the new Mexican President.
    Questioned again about the specifics of any commitment from 
Mexico, Brown explained that ``we have a new strategy, we want 
to place greater emphasis in the source countries, that relates 
to what we think must be done.'' While this answer confirmed 
earlier testimony and the strategy itself, Mexico is not 
classified by the Administration as a ``source country,'' so 
the answer was non-responsive.
    Pressed by Congressman Shadegg for ``evidence . . . hard 
numbers in your budget'' to support the assertion that the 
Clinton administration is committed to interdiction, source 
country programs and continuing the Bush administration kingpin 
strategy, Brown asked Shadegg if he was requesting ``evidence . 
. . that we have a strategy.''
    Shadegg explained that he was simply seeking back up for 
Brown's public assertion that these were Administration 
priorities. Brown responded: ``I can tell you that the kingpin 
strategy, or linear strategy, has not changed. Contrary to what 
anyone else may tell you, I sit in this position. I know what's 
going on day after day after day. Someone who may have sat in 
this chair some years ago do not know what's going on day after 
day after day. Now, what evidence you're asking for I'll be 
delighted to provide any information you want to tell you what 
our strategy is.''
    Further support, however, for the assertion that these were 
Administration priorities was not provided, and Congressman 
Shadegg eventually concluded his questioning. Brown offered 
only that ``the President has corresponded with the President 
of Mexico,'' and other country presidents, on the issue.
    Congressman Blute, targeting the Mexico bailout, asked Dr. 
Brown pointedly: ``Why didn't the President expressly and 
publicly tie the Mexican financial aid package to a Mexican 
Government promise to crack down on their increased drug 
trade?''
    Brown testified that ``there was a great deal of debate on 
this issue,'' and a ``general understanding'' that Mexico would 
work more closely with the United States. He did not otherwise 
have an answer for whether the topic was addressed with Mexican 
leaders by the President during bailout discussions, or why a 
reduction in drug trafficking was not made a condition of the 
bailout.
    Under questioning by Congressman John Mica (R-Florida), 
Brown conceded that, during the arrangement of the $20 billion 
``bailout of Mexico,'' Brown never communicated to the Mexican 
Government or to anyone else the view that conditions, 
including specific counter narcotics efforts, should be 
attached to that money.
    Congressman Souder (R-Indiana) also pressed Dr. Brown to 
explain why the Administration did not put more pressure on 
Mexico to arrest drug trafficking on the Southwest border as a 
condition to receiving U.S. funds in the recent bailout so 
strongly advocated by President Clinton. The President's 
Director of the Office of Drug Control Policy responded--
somewhat surprisingly--that ``the peso and economic stability'' 
was ``a bigger issue than the drug issue,'' and protested that 
the Administration was not ``rewarding Mexico for shipping 
drugs into this country.''
    The Subcommittee Chairman concurred with Souder, noting 
that the Administration's decision not to tie the Mexican bail-
out to conditions on drug interdiction was ``a lost 
opportunity,'' although the Subcommittee Chairman acknowledged 
that Dr. Brown ``probably didn't make that decision.'' \62\
    \62\ During the early Summer of 1995, Congressman Souder and the 
Subcommittee Chairman jointly introduced an amendment to the foreign 
operations appropriations bill. That amendment conditioned release of 
funds to Mexico on a verifiable 10 percent reduction in drug 
trafficking over the Southwest U.S. border. The amendment passed the 
House of Representatives with strong bipartisan support, but was struck 
in conference with the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On Mexico, Congressman Condit suggested that many of the 
bailout questions should be put to the U.S. Trade 
Representative, Mr. Kantor, directly. Condit noted that the 
``bail-out . . . was the perfect time to demand reciprocal 
policies when it comes to drug policy,'' and was concerned that 
this linkage was not made. He called the decision to grant aid 
without ``get[ting] something in return'' was ``unwise.''
    (iv). Former ``Soviet Bloc'' Countries.--Brown stressed 
that he was ``concerned about the former Soviet Bloc nations 
and the drug trafficking that comes through those countries.'' 
Although he offered no statistics or details on trafficking in 
any ``former Soviet bloc nation,'' he argued for stronger 
``bilateral relationships.''
    (v). No Heroin Strategy.--Discussing heroin, Brown said it 
was a ``major concern.'' He suggested that ``the United Nations 
also play a very important part'' in addressing the issue with 
Asian nations. He confirmed that the President had not yet 
signed the long-promised heroin strategy. The National Heroin 
Strategy was promised by President Clinton to the Nation in 
November 1993 and was to issue within 120 days.\63\
    \63\ See, e.g., Testimony of Joseph Kelly before the Subcommittee, 
General Accounting Office, June 27, 1995, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            d. Source Country Programs
    Pressed to explain the source country programs, Brown 
stated only that the Administration was pursuing alternative 
means of economic development, and that he hoped these would 
supplant the coca industry. In support of this view, he 
observed that on a recent visit to a Bolivian banana 
plantation, he found farmers ``much more pleased to be able to 
be farming bananas than coca leaf.'' Stress was placed on the 
need for a long-term commitment.
    Asked whether source country programs were working, Brown 
provided this answer: It is ``inaccurate to characterize it as 
not working because we know that about 1,000 metric tons of 
cocaine is produced annually,'' and one-third is consumed, one-
third interdicted and one-third lost in transit. No direct 
answer was given and no further mention was made of 
effectiveness or measures of effectiveness for source country 
programs.
            e. Prevention In General
    Virtually all members of the Subcommittee expressed strong 
support for effective and accountable prevention programs. 
Those who took issue with existing programs, did so on the 
basis of specific instances of misapplication, waste, abuse, 
ineffectiveness or an overall lack of accountability in the 
programs (see below).
    Referring to the rescission of unspent Safe and Drug Free 
Schools monies, Brown called it ``outrageous'' and stated that 
Safe and Drug Free Schools was ``the only program we have in 
this Nation to educate our young people.''
    This bold ``only program'' statement contradicted testimony 
by prevention experts on March 9, 1995, and the public record, 
both of which suggest there are actually thousands of privately 
funded, State funded and community funded prevention programs 
across the Nation, and that there are also Federal funds 
supporting substance abuse prevention in the Health and Human 
Services (HHS) and Justice Departments, if not other agencies. 
The inaccuracy of this bold ``only program'' statement became 
apparent when Brown later observed that HHS had at least $430 
million in funding targeted at prevention, including ``block 
grant monies'' and ``demonstration funds.''
    Congresswoman and Ranking minority member Thurman (D-
Florida) echoed a position shared by Dr. Brown, the 
Subcommittee Chairman, and others on the Subcommittee, that 
some programs funded by Safe and Drug Free Schools money have 
been highly successful. Thurman observed that several programs 
in Florida, for example, which are administered by local school 
boards with advisory councils, have been well received, and 
Zeliff voiced support for the D.A.R.E. program.
            f. Prevention and Accountability
    Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen focused on accountability 
problems in current Federal drug prevention programs, such as 
the Safe and Drug Free Schools program. In particular, she 
stressed that ``there is a growing concern that Federal 
prevention monies have not only been wasted, mismanaged and 
been ineffective, but . . . have been spent on educational 
programs that teach value relativity and they decline to teach 
that illegal drug use is wrong, just plain and simple wrong.''
    Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen identified specific problem 
programs, and sought an explanation for Federal financing of 
so-called ``values clarification'' curricula, including 
``Quest,'' ``Here's Looking At You Too,'' and other programs 
that did not deliver a clear no-use message. A series of 
letters confirming these concerns from around the Nation were 
read, and a study released by Michigan State Office of Drug 
Control Policy documenting abuses in the Safe and Drug Free 
Schools monies was read.
    While Ros-Lehtinen made clear that she favored accountable 
prevention programs, she also explained that ``in Michigan, 
more than $10 million in Federal funds intended to provide our 
children a front line defense against drugs was utilized for 
the following: Over $81,000 for large teeth and giant 
toothbrushes; over $1.5 million on a human torso model used in 
one lesson of one grade, not even in the drug section of the 
curriculum; wooden cars with ping pong balls, over $12,300; 
hokey pokey song, over $18,000; over $7000 on sheep eyes, 
whatever that is; dog bone kits, $3,700; bicycle pumps, 
$11,000; latex gloves, $122,000; over $300,000 was spent on how 
we feel about sound.''
    Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen concluded her question of Dr. 
Brown by reading from an Indiana constituent's letter, quoting: 
``These nondirective programs are often funded through Federal 
Drug Free School grants, yet they do not usually comply with 
Federal law requiring that students be taught that drug use is 
wrong and harmful.'' The Congresswoman also read from the 
curriculum material itself, which failed to admonish against 
underage drinking or drug use, and in fact stated ``don't begin 
negatively with admonishments . . .''
    Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen asked Dr. Brown to justify these 
programs or, if he disagreed with them, to say so. Brown 
testified that he believed that the ``foundation upon which we 
start must be that drug use is wrong,'' that ``one should not 
be teaching responsible drug use to our children,'' and that 
``if that is being done . . . it should be stopped.''
    Asked what Brown would do about reported abuses in 
Michigan, Massachusetts, Texas, Washington State, Kansas, 
Indiana, and West Virginia, the ONDCP Director responded that 
``the Department of Education administers the Safe and Drug 
Free Schools Program . . . [and] we . . . have been working 
with [them] in looking at how to set up standards for 
addressing the problem.'' Brown added that the Department was 
working ``to alleviate and hopefully eliminate all the abuses 
in the program that takes [sic] place,'' and testified that ``I 
would be the first to admit that there are abuses of the [Safe 
and Drug Free Schools] program.''
    Revealingly, Brown's testimony implied a prior awareness by 
ONDCP and the Department of Education of accountability 
problems in one of the programs, Safe and Drug Free Schools, 
that Brown was condemning Congress for not more fully funding.
    Brown did note that he knew of ``many success stories'' 
stemming from effective use of Safe and Drug Free Schools 
monies. Brown also testified that ``there are routine audits of 
State and local programs that are channeled through the 
Education Department's Office of Inspector General.'' Brown 
neglected to mention that the Safe and Drug Free Schools 
Program, according to the Inspector General's Office of the 
Education Department, is not large enough to require state 
audits of its spending.\64\
    \64\ In fact, at the request of Congress, both the Department of 
Education's Inspector General's Office and the General Accounting 
Office are currently conducting investigations, begun in late 1995, 
into the Safe and Drug Free Schools program, controls on its spending, 
assessment of spending priorities and overall accountability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When Congresswoman Thurman noted that attempts were made to 
instill greater accountability in the Safe and Drug Free 
Schools program during its last reauthorization, Congresswoman 
Ros-Lehtinen conceded that this might be true but added that, 
``these letters are dated March [1995], just a few weeks ago 
when we announced that we were going to continue with these 
hearings, and these teaching modules are still going out [to 
schools],'' suggesting that accountability remained a serious 
concern.
    Finally, Ros-Lehtinen introduced a July 15, 1994 letter 
into the record from Dr. Brown to the Assistant Secretary of 
the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education concerning the 
Safe and Drug Free Schools Program. Ros-Lehtinen noted for Dr. 
Brown that, ``you, yourself, pointed out seven accountability 
issues'' in this letter, adding ``I believe it's hypocritical--
excuse me, sir--but for you to attack some of us who are 
pointing out the ineffectiveness of the programs when you saw 
and wrote on it yourself.''
    Brown's only reply was that he was ``far from 
hypocritical'' and that it was his ``responsibility'' to 
address ``areas where we need improvement.'' While conceding 
that ``we have some abuses in the program,'' he continued to 
view deep cuts in the program as ``outrageous,'' since the 
funds went to ``94 percent'' of the school districts in the 
nation.
    Congresswoman Thurman noted that, since accountability by 
States may be a problem in the Safe and Drug Free Schools 
program, the advent of more block grants may call for a broader 
review of how to assure accountability. Responding to 
Congresswoman Thurman's observation, Dr. Brown added that the 
funds are used for many different programs, and ``go to more 
than just drug education.''
    On balance, the difference of opinion between those who 
favored deep 1995 cuts in programs which appear subject to 
abuse, such as Safe and Drug Free Schools, and those who did 
not favor such cuts was relatively straight forward: whether to 
fund programs that are highly successful in some locations, but 
have been subject to waste and abuse in others, and do not yet 
have adequate accountability mechanisms.
    The aim shared by all Subcommittee members and Dr. Brown 
appeared to be strong encouragement for effective and 
accountable drug prevention programs, as well as adequate 
funding for such programs, once accountability and the no-use 
message could be assured.
            g. Shift to Treatment
    On treatment programs, responding to questions from 
Congressman Condit (D-CA), Brown repeated that the 
Administration was turning away from strategies of ``previous 
administrations [which] placed a greater emphasis on casual 
drug [use] reduction,'' in favor of more treatment of the 
``hardcore drug user population, which comprises about 20 
percent of the drug users.''
    Brown again cited the RAND study advocating treatment, gave 
his own opinion that ``treatment works,'' stressed that he had 
visited treatment programs, indicated that there were ``one 
million people in this country'' in need of treatment, and 
reiterated his view that ``treatment is underfunded.''
            h. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
    On another issue, Congressman Steve Schiff (R-NM) asked 
Brown to explain contradictory correspondence which seemed to 
indicate that Brown had known about, and acquiesced in, a shift 
away from counter narcotics by the Treasury Department's 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN).
    Schiff pointed out that Brown was, by law, required under 
the 1988 Antidrug Abuse Act to ``sign off'' on whether FINCEN's 
antidrug funds are sufficient.
    Schiff asked why, on December 6, 1994, Brown had signed 
off, stating ``I certify that your request is adequate to 
implement the goals, priorities and objectives of the National 
Drug Control Strategy''--yet on September 28th, 1994, by 
contrast, Brown had cautioned the FINCEN Director, Stanley 
Morris, that FINCEN's ``budget submission seems to reflect a 
serious shift of resources away from the drug program . . .,'' 
adding that Brown was ``seriously concerned whether the level 
of drug related resources is adequate . . .'' Schiff wanted to 
know if the two statements were not contradictory, and what had 
changed Brown's mind.
    Brown responded that FINCEN serves other agencies and, 
while their drug related funding shifted from 80 percent to 50 
percent of the total FINCEN budget, he was satisfied that this 
was warranted by ``other criminal matters.'' Brown testified 
that FINCEN was ``getting more requests now for things that are 
not drug related'' from the Justice and Treasury Departments, 
thus reducing their drug related work.
    Brown could not explain why Justice or Treasury would now 
be requesting less information on drug related crime, at a time 
when drug related crime was increasing. Brown noted the 
incremental increase in FINCEN's overall requested funding for 
1996.
            i. White House Drug Use
    Subcommittee Vice Chairman Ehrlich asked Brown if, in view 
of reports that eleven White House staffers were now subject to 
random drug tests based on ``recent drug use,'' what more was 
being done. Brown responded that he favored pre-employment and 
random drug testing for senior positions and staff, Executive 
and Congressional. He added nothing further on the White House 
staff's reported ``recent drug use,'' an account based on 
recent testimony be Patsy Thomasson, Director of the White 
House Office of Administration before a Senate Subcommittee.
            j. Surgeon General and Legalization
    Questioned by Congressman Souder about the Surgeon 
General's remarks supporting the study of drug legalization, 
Brown stated that he disagreed with her and took a ``very, very 
strong stand against legalization.'' Three times, Congressman 
Souder asked Dr. Brown if he had requested from Surgeon General 
Elders the ``worldwide studies'' she referred to as supporting 
legalization. To the third question, Brown responded, ``yes, I 
did request any studies she was aware of about where 
legalization took the crime out of drugs,'' adding ``she did 
not send me any studies [and] I don't think any such studies 
exist.''
            k. Subcommittee Chairman's Closing Remarks
    The Subcommittee Chairman closed the hearing by applauding 
Dr. Brown's participation, noting that the drug war and drug 
abuse is ``probably the number one issue facing our country,'' 
and pledging to work with the Administration if the 
Administration will re-focus on this issue. The Subcommittee 
Chairman also asked Dr. Brown to seek a meeting between key 
congressional leaders concerned about this issue and the 
President.
3. June 27, 1995, Hearing
    In the first of two back-to-back interdiction hearings held 
on June 27, 1995 and June 28, 1995, entitled ``Illicit Drug 
Availability: Are Interdiction Efforts Hampered by a Lack of 
Agency Resources?,'' the Subcommittee received testimony from a 
variety of witnesses, beginning with a technology and K-9 
demonstration,\65\ proceeding through testimony from student 
witnesses, and concluding with testimony from the Administrator 
of the Drug Enforcement Administration and three investigators 
into the effectiveness of the Clinton Administration's source 
country programs from the General Accounting Office (GAO).
    \65\ The U.S. Customs Service Canine Training Center provided a 
demonstration on the utilization of drug sniffing dogs in illicit 
narcotic interdiction. Also, a representative from the U.S. Coast 
Guard's Miami Law Enforcement Division demonstrated how an Ionscan and 
the Compact Integrated Narcotic Detection Instrument (CINDI) operate to 
detect and locate illicit narcotics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Subcommittee first heard from four students affected by 
drugs in their schools, including Michael Taylor of Browne 
Junior High School, Natasha Surles of Roper Junior High School, 
Willie Brown of McFarland Middle School, and Lan Bui of Bell 
Multicultural School.
    Subsequently, the Subcommittee heard testimony by Thomas A. 
Constantine, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, and expert witnesses Joseph Kelley, Allan 
Fleener and Ron Noyes of the General Accounting Office; Kelley 
was Director-In-Charge of the International Affairs Section and 
Fleener and Noyes are investigators who principally assisted in 
producing the June 1995 GAO report on Source Country Programs.
    Finally, the Subcommittee also heard testimony from Jane E. 
Becker, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of 
State; and Brian Sheridan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Drug 
Enforcement Policy and Support at the Department of Defense.
    During this hearing, the Subcommittee examined the current 
drug interdiction efforts of the major Federal agencies engaged 
in the national drug control strategy, namely DEA, the U.S. 
Coast Guard, U.S. Customs, and the Departments of Defense and 
State.
    Collectively, the expert witnesses confirmed that on 
November 3, 1993, President Clinton signed a Presidential 
Decision Directive for Counternarcotics (PDD-14), which 
instructed Federal agencies to shift the emphasis in U.S. 
international antidrug programs from the transit zones such as 
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean to the source 
countries such as Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. PDD-14 provided 
that the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) should appoint a Coordinator for Drug Interdiction ``to 
ensure that assets dedicated by the Federal drug program 
agencies for interdiction are sufficient and that their use is 
properly integrated and optimized.'' [PDD-14, November 3, 
1993.]
    The aim of this hearing was to offer the Administration's 
principals on interdiction, those whose mission was affected by 
PDD-14, an opportunity broadly assess their own efforts and 
explain the impact on their agencies of PDD-14 and its 
concomitant ``controlled shift'' of resources.
    The opening panel, which consisted of local students 
Michael Taylor of Browne Junior High School, Natasha Surles of 
Roper Junior High School, Willie Brown of McFarland Middle 
School, and Lan Bui of Bell Multicultural School offered 
testimony on the availability of illegal drugs in their 
schools. Summing up their collective testimony, Lan Bui stated 
that ``[drugs] are really cheap to buy . . . I have seen them 
everywhere, from the streets which we use to get to school 
every day to right in front of my building.'' The students 
focused on the importance of role models, antidrug programs in 
their schools, student drug testing, and the need for national 
leadership.
            a. Testimony of DEA Administrator Thomas A. Constantine
    Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), testified on the role that 
the DEA, as the lead Federal agency in enforcing narcotics and 
controlled substances laws and regulations, plays in the 
interdiction of illicit narcotics. He noted that DEA has 
offices throughout the United States and in more than 50 
countries.
    Emphasizing the importance of interdiction Constantine 
stated, ``[w]hat happens in the source country often affects 
what happens on the streets of Boston or Schenectady or Tulsa 
or Savannah, Georgia,'' adding that those in charge of 
interdiction efforts must ``strike a balance between our 
domestic and our international role.''
    Constantine addressed the ``controlled shift'' to source 
countries by stressing that it is imperative that we ``destroy 
some of these organizations [drug trafficking cartels] rather 
than merely disrupt them,'' but he also testified that he was 
``concerned that if we relent on any of our efforts to control 
the drug problem in this country [the United States] . . . 
we're going to be facing immense problems in the future . . . 
[so] we have to address this problem effectively and 
dramatically in the present.''
    Constantine collapsed his testimony into three main areas 
of concern: the recent ``resurgence of heroin,'' the prevalence 
of methamphetamine production in the United States and Mexico, 
and the growth of Mexican drug trafficking cartels.
    On methamphetamine, he observed that ``[m]ethamphetamine . 
. . is becoming a drug of choice throughout the entire West 
Coast of America [and] there is enough amphedrine [precursor 
chemical utilized in the creation of methamphetamine] being 
shipped into Mexico that would lead you to believe all of North 
America suffers from asthma.''
    Constantine testified that the Nation's Southwest border 
with Mexico is the biggest transit zone, and a major focus of 
the DEA. In his view, the Southwest Border ``is going to be our 
problem for the [next] five or ten years [and] [a]ny resources 
that I get additional, I am funneling to the Southwest 
Border.'' Echoing the testimony of others, he said ``Mexico 
trafficking groups have become huge.''
    Constantine also emphasized that DEA headquarters attempts 
to allow each DEA office to have a role in focusing on their 
local needs. He further stated that DEA's efforts to 
decentralize include allocation of funds rather than central 
control, since decentralization enables the local offices to 
react to local trends faster.
    On the importance of having a consistent and long range 
strategy, he stated, ``what I think we have to be careful about 
is changing the strategy every year.''
    Constantine, in response to a question, asserted that the 
source country strategy is ``starting to show results,'' and 
noted hopefully that ``[i]n a few short years drug trends can 
change significantly.'' Constantine also called the jump in 
teenage drug use a ``time bomb'' and stressed the ``national 
security'' significance of the drug war.
            b. Testimony of GAO's Director-in-Charge of International 
                    Affairs, Joseph Kelley, and GAO Investigators, 
                    Allan Fleener and Ron Noyes
    Joseph Kelley, Director-In-Charge of International Affairs 
Issues at the General Accounting Office (GAO), testified on the 
GAO's review of the source country programs, including sub-
strategies and Federal efforts to stop production and 
trafficking of cocaine and heroin.
    As part of GAO's review, investigators traveled to 
Colombia, Mexico, and other nations to observe counternarcotics 
programs in those countries. GAO discussed these programs with 
U.S. officials at in-country headquarters and field locations. 
Mr. Kelley offered five general observations, each corroborated 
by the investigators themselves.
    First, in response to the shift in strategy from the 
transit zone to the source countries, the executive branch has 
had difficulty implementing key elements of their strategy. In 
fact, ``resources applied to the transit zone [have] been 
significantly reduced,'' said Kelly. At the same time, we have 
not seen a shift in resources to the source countries.'' This 
observation troubled GAO, and Kelly confirmed that 
counternarcotics assistance to each of the three primary source 
countries [Colombia, Bolivia and Peru] was less in 1995 than it 
was in 1991 and 1992. Kelley also emphasized that ``a plan for 
a country as well as a region [is necessary].''
    Second, GAO found that there is high intensity competition 
for attention and resources with other foreign policy 
objectives deemed important by the Department of State. As 
Kelley noted, ``[t]hese decisions may result in 
counternarcotics objectives receiving less U.S. attention than 
other objectives,'' for example, ``In Mexico . . . countering 
the drug trade is the fourth highest priority in what the [U.S. 
Department of State] call[s] the U.S. Mission Program Plan.'' 
Incredibly, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico told the GAO that he 
had focused his attention during the last year and a half on 
other issues.
    Notably, also, Kelley pointed out that $45 million that was 
originally intended for counternarcotics assistance was 
suddenly reprogrammed by the Clinton administration to assist 
Haiti's democratic transition.
    Third, GAO found that more coordination and leadership are 
needed in this effort. Kelley, in his testimony, stated that 
they found that U.S. officials generally agreed that ``no 
single organization was in charge of antidrug activities in the 
cocaine source countries of the transit zone.''
    Moreover, GAO reported that ``there was a lack of 
coordination and a clear statement of responsibilities in 
certain source countries' embassies. Kelley testified that 
``[s]everal U.S. officials in Colombia told [GAO] that they 
were unsure who had operational control over their activities 
and questioned who would be the best agency to provide that 
control.'' \66\
    \66\ The Subcommittee has received some reports that conflicting 
assertions of authority emanated from the Southern Command and the 
State Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As disturbing, GAO reported ``confusion over the role of 
the offices responsible for intelligence analysis and related 
operational plans for interdiction.''
    Compounding the problem, according to GAO, ``the Drug 
Enforcement Administration is reducing its presence in Colombia 
[and] the Southern Command is flying fewer sorties per month in 
support of source country interdiction.''
    Fourth, GAO reports that United States funds are ``not 
always well managed.'' While end-use monitoring requirements 
have been established in the source countries, oversight is 
limited. Kelley testified that, ``[i]n Colombia, the Narcotics 
Affairs Section of the Embassy conducts reviews of how the 
national police uses counternarcotics assistance,'' but ``they 
lacked reports from the Colombian Air Force on how U.S.-
provided equipment is being used--and this is some of the big 
ticket items . . . C-130s and things like that.''
    Finally, GAO found that our dependence on the willingness 
and ability of the foreign governments to combat the drug trade 
leaves us vulnerable in our counternarcotics efforts. This is 
especially apparent in countries such as Colombia and Mexico, 
where extensive corruption is prevalent, according to GAO. As 
the Ambassador in Mexico emphasized to the GAO review team, in 
Mexico, the key lies with the Mexicans, who must be committed 
and involved if counternarcotics efforts are to take hold.
    On balance, GAO delivered a stinging condemnation of the 
way in which the Clinton Administration's source country 
programs are organized, coordinated, prioritized and managed.
            c. Testimony of Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 
                    International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
                    Affairs, Jane E. Becker
    Jane E. Becker, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, testified 
on what she sees as her two missions.
    Becker testified that the office of International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) ``provide[s] counternarcotics 
support to those countries that demonstrate a commitment to 
narcotics control,'' adding the self-evident observation that 
``the goal is for those countries to use this assistance to 
reduce the supply of illicit drugs destined for the United 
States.'' She noted also that ``INL leads bilateral and 
multilateral diplomatic efforts to advance our international 
narcotics control policies.''
    Becker noted, somewhat surprisingly and contrary to other 
testimony on this topic, that ``cooperation [with Mexico and 
Colombia] has been good.'' She highlighted the source country 
focus of the Administration when she stated that ``transit 
interdiction is important to our overall counterdrug effort, 
[but] it is not the sole solution.'' For the record, no member 
of the Subcommittee had suggested that interdiction alone could 
serve as a ``sole solution.'' Becker drove the point home when 
she stated that ``the heart [of the Administration's 
counterdrug] policy lies in the source countries.''
    Becker had no response to the GAO study, and seemed 
strangely unfamiliar with essential facts surrounding the 
source countries, for example, she seemed unable to identify 
major cities in Colombia.
    Becker was questioned extensively on the Mexican 
Government's alleged cooperation in counterdrug operations. She 
was asked if Mexico, in order to allow more money to be 
allocated to it, should be re-defined as a source country. 
Becker answered that she does not think that a re-
classification is necessary, but testified that ``we need to 
fiddle with the resource allocation.''
    Becker retrenched in her essential defense of Mexican 
cooperation by testifying that ``[t]he Mexican Government under 
a new leader has shown very promising signs of being much more 
serious in this are than his predecessors,'' and asserting that 
the State Department has ``gotten good cooperation from the 
Zedillo Administration.''
    When directly questioned on the performance of the Clinton 
Administration's National Drug Control Strategy, Becker 
asserted that she could not quantify results accurately since 
the Strategy ``has never been fully funded.'' On balance, 
Becker's testimony added little to the Subcommittee's 
understanding of essential facts, Administration priorities, or 
program management.
            d. Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
                    Drug Enforcement and Support Brian Sheridan
    Brian Sheridan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Drug 
Enforcement Policy and Support at the Department of Defense 
(DoD), focused on DoD's five-point counterdrug program.
    DoD offers support to the following efforts: source 
nations, transit zone, domestic law enforcement, demand 
reduction and dismantling drug cartels.
    Sheridan emphasized DoD's objectives in the source nations, 
testifying that these efforts were threefold: They were, 
``first, to support the host nation interdiction efforts and 
help them disrupt the flow of semi-finished cocaine from Peru 
and Bolivia up to Colombia . . . second . . . support for our 
law enforcement and for host nation C4I programs, 
communications, equipment, [and] intelligence support . . . 
[and third,] ``provid[ing] a significant amount of training for 
host nation police and for some military units that are engaged 
in counternarcotics work.''
    Assessing programs in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, Sheridan 
testified that Colombia gets a ``C'' for their counterdrug 
performance, but their efforts of late have been much better. 
One area that he highlighted is the Colombian military's 
occupation of San Adreas Island and denial of it to the drug 
traffickers a transshipment point.
    Sheridan is also pleased with Peru's recent results. He 
pointed out that Peruvian President Fujimori has declared drug 
trafficking as the number one threat to Peruvian security, and 
embraced the force-down, shoot-down policy. Sheridan stated 
that ``you will find [Peru is] very engaged in counterdrug 
operations.''
    On Bolivia, DoD is disappointed, however, said Sheridan, 
there have been recent indications ``that they are going to 
eradicate cocoa in a more serious way.'' He did not elaborate.
    Sheridan noted that, in the transit zone, the use of 
general aviation aircraft by drug traffickers continues to 
decrease. He offered no clear support for this asserted 
development, although he observed that smuggling of drugs is 
now more common via maritime and ground transport.
    On DoD demand reduction, Sheridan again rolled out three 
points. First, DoD employs rigorous military drug testing; 
second, prevention and education are part of DoD's plan; and 
third, community outreach is conducted. Details of these 
programs and who they reach were not discussed.
4. June 28, 1995, Hearing
    On June 28, 1995, the Subcommittee received testimony on 
interdiction policy from additional Administration witnesses, 
including Admiral Robert E. Kramek, Commandant of U.S. Coast 
Guard and U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, as well as George 
Weise, Commissioner of U.S. Customs. This hearing, was a 
continuation of the June 27 hearing, ``Illicit Drug 
Availability: Are Interdiction Efforts Hampered by a Lack of 
Agency Resources?''
            a. Testimony of U.S. Interdiction Coordinator and U.S. 
                    Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert E. Kramek
    Admiral Robert E. Kramek, U.S. Interdiction Coordinator and 
Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, serves a dual role in the 
Nation's interdiction efforts. He testified before the 
Subcommittee in both capacities.
    Initially, he explained that the U.S. Coast Guard serves as 
the lead agency for maritime interdiction and as co-lead with 
Customs for air interdiction, adding that drug interdiction 
takes only 9 percent of the Coast Guard budget and emphasizing 
the important role intelligence plays in drug interdiction. On 
this topic, he testified that ``70 percent of our operations 
are based on intelligence.''
    Kramek, in his role as Interdiction Coordinator, does not 
have command or control of the affected agencies, nor does he 
have any authority over their budgets. Rather, he works with 
the agencies ``in a collegial atmosphere'' and ``coordinates]'' 
them. By the Interdiction Coordinator's testimony, the 
Interdiction Coordinator holds quarterly conferences that bring 
agency heads together.
    Kramek took particular note of the importance of national 
leadership on this issue. Offering implicit criticism of a 
reduced interdiction effort in the Clinton Administration, he 
testified that, ``[w]hen the [smugglers] see our foreign policy 
priorities chang[e] and making drug interdiction much lower on 
the list than other things, they're quick to take advantage of 
that.''
    More pointedly still, he testified that ``[w]hen they see 
it doesn't rate number one on our national security priority 
list, they're quick to take advantage of that.'' He stressed 
that, in his view, the issue stands ``number one'' with the 
American people.
    Kramek, in an effort to emphasize the importance of 
interdiction efforts, noted that interdiction ``returns 25-1 on 
the dollar in benefits to the public for every dollar spent,'' 
a new statistic in the national dialogue.
    In response to questions from the Subcommittee, he stated 
that he currently has just ``six people'' assigned to him as 
Interdiction Coordinator and that he ``brief[s] [ONDCP 
Director] Dr. Brown monthly.''
    Kramek commented further on the shift from a transit zone 
strategy to a source country strategy, saying that ``the source 
country strategy . . . is starting to take hold, [but it] is 
not robust enough, for us to reduce assets in the transit zone 
yet.'' Since many of these assets have already been reduced, 
this was a clear critique of current strategy. He did not 
mention his December 1994 letter at this time or hereafter, and 
he was not questioned further on the topic.
    On Puerto Rico, he did note that Puerto Rico has become a 
target for smugglers, for the simple reason that trafficking 
into Puerto Rico is as good as being in the United States.
            b. Testimony of the Commissioner of U.S. Customs George 
                    Weise
    George Weise, Commissioner, U.S. Customs, testified on 
Customs' interdiction of drugs at the Nation's borders.
    Weise reiterated the importance of knocking out smuggling 
by private plane into this country, and attributes the 
increased shift to ground smuggling along the Southwest border 
to the efforts against air transport,'' whether throughout the 
transit zone or into the United States was unclear. Weise 
testified that ``the [2,000 miles of the] Southwest border has 
now emerged as the primary entry point for cocaine, although he 
did not contradict Admiral Kramek's assessment that Puerto Rico 
has recently taken on new significance as a port of entry into 
the United States.
    Said Weise, ``our big load strategy is causing traffickers 
to . . . reduce the load size,'' although support for this 
assertion was thin. Reckless and aggressive driving along the 
border, or ``port running,'' has increased in the last few 
years, Weise stated.
    To assist in the inspection of containers, Customs now 
utilizes a cargo examination facility and full container x-ray 
machines. This ``allows [Customs] to examine whole tractors and 
trailers at one time.'' According to Weise, Customs has shifted 
50 agents to the Southwest border to assist this effort, adding 
that Customs' goal is to ``stop smuggling rather than to arrest 
more smugglers.''
    Weise was questioned on the North American Free Trade 
Agreement's (NAFTA's) impact on drug interdiction efforts. He 
asserted that Customs has ``maintained systems that [they] had 
prior to NAFTA pretty much in the same way in terms of the 
number, frequency of examinations,'' although he called it a 
``difficult balancing act.'' Weise testified that Customs has 
allocated resources to the Southwest border such that the 
effort remains at the same level. Weise could offer little 
evidence other than loads seized that interdiction at the 
Southwest border are proving effective, did not speak about the 
Customs air wing, and did not address the overall reduction in 
interdiction assets in 1993, 1994 and 1995.
    Weise's testimony concluded this second day of interdiction 
hearings.
5. September 25, 1995, Hearing
    At the Subcommittee's September 25, 1995, hearing on the 
drug problem in New Hampshire, entitled ``The Drug Problem in 
New Hampshire: A Microcosm of America,'' Members received 
testimony from an array of highly qualified witnesses.
    The purpose of the hearing was to continue an examination 
of national drug control policy, focusing on successful drug 
fighting efforts of Manchester, New Hampshire, which had 
recently participated in a joint interagency task force called 
Operation Streetsweeper.
            a. Background on the Problem, How Community United, and the 
                    Interagency Task Force
    Testimony was received from State and local law enforcement 
officials, local elected officials, representatives of the U.S. 
Department of Justice, leaders of New Hampshire grass roots 
antidrug groups and individuals involved in the attempt to 
rehabilitate drug users.
    Collectively, the expert testimony confirmed the following 
facts. Early in 1995, statistics showed that the overall crime 
rate in Manchester, which is New Hampshire's largest city, had 
declined. However, these statistics also showed that arrests 
for drug offenses had increased dramatically, as they had for 
other drug related crimes. After a number of murders were 
linked to drug distribution and usage, the community ``came 
together to rid their city of this scourge.''
    Manchester Police Chief Peter Favreau received a $100,000 
grant to help pay for State Police Officers to patrol city 
streets with city police, and a short time later Manchester 
Police were joined by the Sheriff's Department, the State 
Attorney General's Drug Task Force, the State Police Special 
Investigations Unit, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). This Federal-
State-local interagency task force put jurisdictional; issues 
aside and singularly pursued the aim of getting drug dealers 
off the streets of Manchester.
    As various panelists and community representatives 
testified, the change on the streets of Manchester could be 
felt immediately. As Chief Favreau testified, ``With as much 
coverage as we have out there, I honestly feel [the criminals] 
are going elsewhere. It's almost impossible not to have that 
happen.''
    In an effort to understand how the interagency task force 
worked and what made it so effective, the principals in this 
successful antidrug effort testified before the Subcommittee. 
Since illegal drugs and associated violent crime plague 
virtually every city in America, the accounts these witnesses 
told offer valuable insights into how best to tackle drugs and 
violent crime in other cities around this country.
            b. State Attorney General Jeff Howard Credits Effective 
                    Coordination, Drug Task Force, and Byrne Grants
    First, Jeff Howard, Attorney General for the State of New 
Hampshire, offered testimony regarding the value of effective 
coordination between local, State and Federal law enforcement 
in the fight against drugs.
    The Attorney General specifically credited the creation of 
the New Hampshire Drug Task Force with ``keep[ing] pressure on 
all areas of the problems, going from what we have identified 
as kingpins to mid-level dealers to street dealers, and putting 
as much of the resources as we can into treatment programs to 
include treatment of State prisoners, and prevention 
particularly through educational efforts.''
    The Attorney General also singled out the Byrne grant 
programs as an effective means of funding law enforcement, 
since it offers needed flexibility in how valuable law 
enforcement funds are utilized. In New Hampshire's case, as 
Howard noted, ``[the State] has committed less than one-quarter 
of the funds to State agencies . . . The rest of it has all 
gone back to the communities.''
            c. Director of State Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
                    Prevention Geraldine Sylvester Urged Prevention, 
                    Treatment, Student Assistance, Parental Training 
                    and Peer Counseling
    The Subcommittee then heard from Geraldine Sylvester, the 
Director of New Hampshire's Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
Prevention. Sylvester, in her testimony, emphasized the 
importance of ``giv[ing] equal attention to the battle fronts 
of treatment and prevention.'' She also noted the important 
role that student assistance programs, parental training and 
peer leadership groups play in preventing or abating drug usage 
among young people.
            d. Commissioner of the State Department of Corrections Paul 
                    Brodeur Urged Support for Byrne Grants, 
                    Correctional Pathways Program
    Paul Brodeur, Commissioner of New Hampshire Department of 
Corrections, offered testimony on the Byrne grant funded 
correctional options program called ``Pathways,'' utilized by 
the New Hampshire Department of Corrections. Brodeur noted that 
``Pathways'' emphasizes education, substance abuse treatment 
and employment counseling. Brodeur illustrated the importance 
of programs like ``Pathways,'' by pointing out that in New 
Hampshire 20 percent of the State's inmates are incarcerated 
for drug related offenses, and 80 percent or more of the 
inmates have substance abuse problems.
            e. State Narcotics Investigation Unit's Assistant Commander 
                    Neal Scott Explained Usage Breakdown, Urged Local 
                    Flexibility
    Neal Scott, Assistant Unit Commander of the Narcotics 
Investigation Unit at the New Hampshire State Police, offered 
testimony regarding the status of current drug usage in New 
Hampshire. Statewide, he testified, the number one problem is 
marijuana; cocaine in powder form is number two; crack, LSD and 
heroin run third. Scott quantified drug usage according to 
regions of New Hampshire, further emphasizing the importance of 
localities being able to set their own priorities according to 
local need.
            f. DEA Special-Agent-In-Charge Billy Yout Explained Recent 
                    Trends, Concurred in Support for Prevention, Law 
                    Enforcement
    Billy Yout, Special Agent in Charge at Drug Enforcement 
Administration, concurred with Commander Scott, stating the 
``marijuana . . . is by far the biggest problem [because it is] 
easily accessible to children.'' Yout also testified on how 
traffickers are moving their bases of operation into New 
Hampshire from Massachusetts and other New England States, 
although he noted that New Hampshire remains predominantly a 
consumer State.
            g. Manchester Mayor Ray Wieczorek Testified on the 
                    Importance of Public Sector-Private Sector 
                    Cooperation
    Ray Wieczorek, the Mayor of Manchester, in his testimony, 
focused on the important role that a public sector-private 
sector relationship plays in the war against illegal drugs. 
Wieczorek encouraged other communities to follow Manchester's 
model on how to establish a public-private partnership. Mayor 
Wieczorek explained how the city has effectively tapped all 
available resources, including cooperation from financial 
institutions, citizens and the business community, in uniting 
to fight this battle.
            h. Manchester Police Chief Peter Favreau Explained Multi-
                    Agency Effort and How Operation Streetsweeper 
                    Succeeded
    Peter Favreau, Chief of the Manchester Police Department 
(MPD), reviewed the creation of Operation Streetsweeper and its 
importance as a model for future multi-agency efforts. Early in 
1995, Favreau and United States Attorney Gagnon, planned a 
``round-up of crack dealers.'' Favreau testified that ``[MPD's] 
undercover people, along with the state drug task force 
[arranged to] make a lot of buys from [crack dealers], and make 
[the] round-up all at one time.'' This round-up occurred in 
June, 1995. As a result, 55 of the dealers were picked up by 
more than 150 law enforcement officers; most of the dealers are 
now behind bars. This was Phase I of Operation Streetsweeper.
    Favreau testified that Phase II included cooperation 
between the MPD and the New Hampshire State Police in 
dismantling street gangs and getting them off Manchester's 
streets. Phase III was a continuation of the anti-gang 
component of the Operation, Phase II, but included Federal law 
enforcement agencies.
            i. United States Attorney Paul Gagnon Discussed Cooperation 
                    and Funding
    Paul Gagnon, the U.S. Attorney for New Hampshire, focused 
on the role interagency cooperation, indicating that Operation 
Streetsweeper's success was as dependant upon cooperation as 
upon the institutional framework that made it possible. Gagnon 
also noted the importance of Federal funding in the success of 
Operation Streetsweeper, and urged continued funding. Finally, 
Gagnon recommended a similar marshaling of law enforcement 
resources and key agencies in the future.
            j. Citizen Groups Represented by Alice Sutphen Urged 
                    Community Action
    Alice Sutphen, a representative from the citizen group Take 
Back Our Neighborhoods, delivered testimony to the Subcommittee 
on the importance of citizens working with law enforcement and 
local authorities, as well as mobilizing on their own, to take 
back their neighborhoods. She described how a coordinated and 
dedicated citizenry can make a difference, and can genuinely 
assist law enforcement. Law enforcement representatives, such 
as Chief Favreau, and political leaders, such as Mayor 
Wieczorek, credited Sutphen and the local citizenry with making 
Operation Streetsweeper such a success and echoed her 
sentiments about citizen participation.
            k. Dover Police Captain Dana Mitchell Urged support for 
                    D.A.R.E. and Law Enforcement's Role in Prevention
    Dana Mitchell, Captain, Dover Police, offered testimony on 
the success and overall utilization of Dover's Drug Free 
program. He testified that this program includes an expansive 
D.A.R.E. program beginning in elementary school, and continuing 
through junior high and high school. Mitchell also stressed the 
importance of law enforcement's role in prevention, focusing on 
Dover's Youth Outreach Program. Mitchell noted that this 
program represented a successful initiative to ``bring the 
young people of [their] community into the prevention effort in 
the form of organized student groups.''
    Mitchell also testified that congressional leaders look at 
allowing greater creativity and flexibility as they authorize 
Federal drug prevention programs. By way of example, Mitchell 
noted that the Dover Police Department recently approached the 
director of a 180-unit low-income Dover Housing Authority, 
which is a Department of Housing and Urban Development 
facility, about mandating that all parents receiving the 
housing subsidy receive a D.A.R.E. seminar. The Housing 
Authority's director stated that Federal regulations bar that 
kind of condition on a housing subsidy. Greater flexibility in 
the hands of local authorities would allow them to cooperate 
more fully and adapt Federal programs to community needs.
            l. Executive Director of Nashua Youth Council Michael 
                    Plourde Urged Community Need Assessment Prior to 
                    Receipt of Federal Funds
    Michael Plourde, Executive Director of the Nashua Youth 
Council, offered testimony on how community coalitions assist 
in assessing the priorities that are needed for a locality. 
Plourde recommended that ``any Federal money that comes down to 
localities should require that those coalitions exist prior to 
the money being received, and that those coalitions assess the 
community needs prior to the money being distributed to those 
communities.''
            m. Marathon House Regional Director John Ahman Urged 
                    Support for Effective Treatment
    John Ahman, Regional Program Director for Marathon House, 
testified that is a definite link between crime and drug use, 
and emphasized the importance of effective drug treatment in 
breaking this link. Effective treatment, Ahman testified, means 
that ``after treatment, recovering addicts are less likely to 
be involved in crime and more likely to be employed.'' Ahman 
also stated that, in the case of drugs, treatment is often more 
appropriate and less expensive than incarceration.
            n. Manchester Police Sergeant Dick Tracy Urged Strong 
                    Support for D.A.R.E. Program
    Dick Tracy, Sergeant, Crime Prevention Division, Manchester 
Police Department, offered testimony on the effectiveness of 
the 17-week D.A.R.E. program for Manchester students. Tracy 
went on to testify that, ``having a police officer in the 
school to teach the kids about the dangers of drugs is more 
effective because the officer can relate firsthand experience 
of cases he has dealt with.'' Tracy's testimony concluded the 
expert witness testimony received by the Subcommittee at the 
hearing.


                  c. fact-finding trip to transit zone


    As indicated above, the Subcommittee's 1995 investigation 
included one Subcommittee fact finding trip to the Drug War's 
front line. Subcommittee Members, the United States Coast Guard 
and staff, travelled to the Seventh Coast Guard District in the 
Caribbean transit zone between June 16 and June 19, 1995.
    In the transit zone, they attended briefings at Seventh 
District Headquarters in Miami, Coast Guard interdiction 
initiatives at sea, DEA activities in the Greater Antilles, 
high level interagency briefings in Puerto Rico by the FBI, 
DEA, Customs, Border Patrol, and local authorities, and 
received indepth briefings by Admiral Granuzo and others at 
Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF East) in Key West, 
dedicated to drug interdiction in the transit zone.
    This interdiction trip was arranged in coordination with 
the United States Coast Guard, and invitations were extended to 
minority and majority members. Additionally, in coordination 
with ONDCP, the Subcommittee Chairman also travelled with the 
White House Director of ONDCP to prevention and treatment 
programs in Massachusetts.
    In the transit zone, the Subcommittee learned a number of 
important facts. In addition to traveling on HU-25 interdiction 
aircraft as they demonstrated interceptions, witnessing FLIR or 
forward-looking infrared radar tracking during interceptions, 
and travelling to the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Mellon on the 
heels of that cutter's successful interdiction of 5,000 pounds 
of marijuana, the Subcommittee received demonstrations of the 
ion scanner and CINDI technologies, received briefings by 
agents participating in Operation OPBAT on the remote island of 
Great Inagua, and toured OPBAT assets by HH-60 helicopter. 
Before receiving briefings at JIATF East, the Subcommittee also 
visited the interdiction cutters Ocracoke and Spenser.
1. OPBAT Operations Need Resources
    In briefings, a number of interdiction facts became more 
clear. Agents participating in OBAT (Operation Bahamas, Turks 
and Caicos), a multi-agency, international operation based in 
Nassua, Bahamas, made clear that they have lost major assets 
over the past two years.
    OPBAT's mission is to halt the flow of cocaine and 
marijuana through the 700-island Bahamian region to the United 
States. To do so, OPBAT operates three widely dispersed 
helicopter bases, from which U.S. Coast Guard and DEA 
helicopters are dispatched on cue from tracking by the Joint 
Interagency Task Force (JIATF) or Domestic Air Interdiction 
Coordination Center (DAICC) aircraft. Since the helicopters 
must operate in foreign waters, they are piloted by personnel 
from either the Government of the Bahamas or Turks and Caicos 
Island police, who are in turn responsible for making arrests 
and seizures. A United States DEA agent is, however, on every 
flight to coordinate intelligence and provide additional 
advice.
2. Aerostat Radars Were Deterrent
    The Clinton Administration's decision to remove and destroy 
the aerostats based in the Bahamas has also had a perceived 
impact on interdiction capability. The Nassau DEA Office of 
OPBAT reported that, ``while no specific intel source indicates 
that traffickers perceive the removal of the aerostats [radars] 
from the Bahamas as a weakness in law enforcement detection 
capability, it stands to reason that a reduction in visible 
detection resources would equate to `safe' illicit activity.''
    Privately, agents confirm that trafficking patterns are 
changing to reflect the knowledge that aerostats are no longer 
monitoring certain areas. In fact, OPBAT agents report that 
there has been a measurable increase in ``trafficking events 
per month'' since the same period in 1994, which they attribute 
to a rise in maritime and air activity via the Atlantic, the 
removal of the aerostat radars, and the rise of trafficking 
from or through Jamaica.
3. Cuba Creates Overflight and Maritime Constraints
    Beyond loss of interdiction assets, interdiction in the 
region operates under other constraints. Cuban territorial 
waters are an obstacle to effective interdiction, since they 
offer legal shelter to traffickers. This tactic was used 
extensively in February 1995.
    The inability of U.S. aircraft to overfly Cuba is also a 
barrier to effective interdiction, since traffickers can 
overfly the island at altitudes radar is otherwise unable to 
track, and easily blend with ground cover. This is especially 
so for aircraft originating out of Jamaica and the West 
Caribbean.
4. Puerto Rico: Drug Gateway, Assets Needed
    At the Greater Antilles Section Coast Guard Base (GANTSEC) 
in Puerto Rico, which covers 1.3 million square miles, multi-
agency briefers expressed the view that, if 70 percent of the 
cocaine coming into the United States comes over the Southwest 
border, the rest comes through Puerto Rico, which has seen as 
much as $40 million in money laundering in recent years.
    In attendance at the briefing were representatives of the 
FBI, DEA, Border Patrol, Coast Guard, INS, Customs, Department 
of Defense and Puerto Rico.
    In Puerto Rico, members of the interagency group reported 
that approximately 84 metric tons of cocaine make it into 
Puerto Rico annually, of which ``we interdict 10 to 15 
percent.'' The missing variable, in the eyes of many present, 
was a stronger Federal interdiction commitment, both in terms 
of assets and personnel.
    There was a strong indication that assets lost in the last 
three years need to be replaced; needed are more 378-foot 
cutters and intelligence gathering radars to replace the 
aerostats. Also expressed was the need for more agents, 
presumably FBI and DEA, to support the denotation of San Juan 
as a HIDTA (High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area). An 
additional detection concern is that there is no money in the 
relevant budgets to pay for overtime in support of nighttime 
detection.
    Summarizing the candid counsel received at this briefing, 
the assets most needed are: more radars (including a suggested 
radar in Belize), more Jayhawk helicopters, more 378-foot Coast 
Guard Cutters, ion scanners and CINDI's, air rights agreements 
with more Caribbean nations (perhaps one day Cuba), and more 
top people. The Coast Guard also indicated that they have 
recently lost ``four of ten'' HU-25 intercepter aircraft by re-
deployment or demobilization.
5. Joint Interagency Task Force--East
    At JIATF East, briefers included Rear Admiral Andrew A. 
Granuzo, who bluntly admitted that the central obstacle to 
waging a more effective drug war, particularly in interdiction, 
is that ``there is no one in charge.'' This assessment mirrored 
the views of Admiral Yost, Bill Bennett, John Walters, Robert 
Bonner, and a host of others inside and outside the 
Administration.
    JIATF East was created by Presidential Decision Directive 
14 (PDD 14), which ordered a review of the Nation's 
counternarcotics command and control intelligence centers. 
Creation of three joint interagency task forces and a domestic 
air interdiction center was authorized by the White House Drug 
Czar in April 1994. Accordingly, JIATF East is joined in its 
interdiction mission by JIATF West in Almeda, California; JIATF 
South in Panama; the DAICC at March Air Force Base, California; 
and JTF-6 in El Paso, Texas.
    JIATF East is dedicated to ``deconfliction of all non-
detection and monitoring counter drug activities in the transit 
zone.'' The command integrates intelligence with operations, 
and ``coordinates the employment of the U.S. Navy and U.S. 
Coast Guard ships and aircraft, U.S. Air Force aircraft, and 
aircraft and ships from allied nations, such as Great Britain 
and the Netherlands.'' The command's mission boils down to 
``maximiz[ing] the disruption of drug transhipment,'' 
collecting, integrating and disseminating intelligence, and 
guiding detection and monitoring forces for tactical action.
    Just as importantly, JIATF East integrates law enforcement 
personnel, primarily from Customs, into the international 
interdiction effort. For that reason, the command includes FBI, 
DEA, DIA and State Department, in addition to the Department of 
Defense.


                    d. interdiction policy oversight


    Drawing on expert hearing testimony, information learned 
during the Subcommittee's transit zone fact finding trip, and 
reliable documentary evidence on the status of the Nation's 
interdiction effort, the Subcommittee reviewed current 
interdiction policy and force structure.
    Importantly, the Subcommittee found that, as with drug 
prevention and law enforcement, there is a broad, bipartisan 
consensus supporting effective interdiction as a central 
component of the drug war. Just as interdiction and law 
enforcement experts seem to recognize the central role played 
by parental, community, State and Federal drug prevention 
efforts, prevention experts acknowledged the importance of law 
enforcement and interdiction efforts in any effective use 
reduction strategy.
    The Subcommittee also found that interdiction assets, 
funding and Administration emphasis on drug interdiction have 
been substantially reduced over the past three years. This 
finding is in stark contrast to the concerted interdiction 
effort launched between 1984 and 1990, and the interdiction 
strategy pursued through the final year of the Bush 
Administration.
1. Interdiction From 1984-1990
    Admiral Paul Yost, former United States Coast Guard 
Commandant, headed the Nation's interdiction effort between 
1984 and 1990.
    Before the Subcommittee, Yost testified that the Nation 
experienced a ``major build-up in drug interdiction . . . from 
1984 through 1990'' \67\ Yost testified that this interdiction 
effort ``successfully interrupted the flow of bulk marijuana by 
sea and cocaine by air over the water routes [of the 
Caribbean].''
    \67\ Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost, Hearings of Subcommittee on 
National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, March 
9, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yost also testified that ``strong interdiction and law 
enforcement [during the period 1984 to 1990] were providing a 
climate that made it clear to the [drug] trafficker that `this 
is wrong, and your chances of being intercepted are very high.' 
''
2. Clinton's Cuts In Drug Interdiction
    While the Subcommittee heard testimony that selected 
interdiction assets were redeployed to the Persian Gulf in 
1991, the overwhelming reduction in the interdiction force 
structure has occurred between 1993 and 1995.
    Objective indicators of Federal support for the counter 
narcotics effort show a substantial reduction in resources 
committed to key areas; in early 1995, key budget numbers were 
already clearly below prior highwater marks, lines formerly 
defined as the minimum necessary for effective conduct of the 
Drug War.
    This general conclusion is supported by facts contained in 
the President's 1995 drug interdiction budget, documentary 
evidence originating with the Office of the United States 
Interdiction Coordinator, interviews with agency field 
representatives, 1995 reports and testimony by the General 
Accounting Office, and hearing testimony provided by Admiral 
Yost, former Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, John Walters, 
former Acting Director of ONDCP, Bill Bennett, former Director 
of ONDCP, Robert Bonner, former Administrator of DEA in the 
Clinton and Bush Administrations, and Dr. Lee Brown, the then-
current Director of ONDCP.
            a. ONDCP Interdiction Budget Cuts
    While the total antidrug budget rose from $1.5 billion in 
fiscal 1981 to $13.2 billion in fiscal 1995,\68\ ONDCP itself 
reports a drop in both drug interdiction and international 
program funding.\69\
    \68\ Teasley, David, Congressional Research Service Report 95-943, 
September 6, 1995, p. 1.
    \69\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February 
1995, p. 113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unmistakably, drug interdiction's budget authority fell 
from $1.511 billion in fiscal 1993 to $1.312 billion in fiscal 
1994, a $200 million reduction by President Clinton in the 
fiscal 1994 budget. In fiscal 1995, the interdiction budget was 
cut by another $18 million to $1.293 billion. In fiscal 1996, 
the President's request for drug interdiction funding fell 
another $15 million to $1.278 billion.\70\ Whatever else is 
said about a concurrence in these numbers by the 103rd 
Congress, they must stand alone as indicators of the 
President's reduced emphasis on and commitment to drug 
interdiction.
    \70\ Id. p. 113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the same time, international or source country counter 
narcotics funding fell from a highwater mark of $523 million in 
1992 to $329 million in fiscal 1994, and then to $309 million 
in fiscal 1995, recovering only slightly to $399 million in the 
Presidential request for fiscal 1996.\71\
    \71\ Id. p. 113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. Assets Lost According to Admiral Yost
    According to Yost, the Nation has recently experienced a 
``tragic dismantling'' of the Nation's interdiction efforts, 
such that today ``there are several orders of magnitude less 
effort spent on drug interdiction.'' \72\
    \72\ Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost, Hearing of Subcommittee on 
National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, March 
9, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Specifically, ``ship days and aircraft hours are 
drastically reduced,'' and ``[a]ll of the Coast Guard jet 
aircraft, the Falcons with the f-16 intercept radars, were 
taken away from interdiction . . .,'' said Yost.\73\
    \73\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additionally, Yost detailed that ``three Coast Guard E-2C 
airborne early warning aircraft have been turned back to the 
Navy and used for other purposes,'' and that ``the Coast Guard 
Air Station at St. Augustine, Florida, which was established to 
support these three multi-million dollar aircraft, is now 
closed.'' Yost indicated that he believed some of the E-2Cs 
were even being ``decommissioned.'' \74\
    \74\ Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost, Hearing of Subcommittee on 
National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, March 
9, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yost testified that ``the Coast Guard C-130 airborne early 
warning aircraft has been turned over to the Air Force, 
stripped of its equipment, including a dome-mounted radar, and 
is now used for transportation of cargo.'' ``In addition,'' 
Yost reported that ``the new Command Control Communications and 
Intelligence Center has been closed, and its duties performed 
elsewhere.''
            c. ONDCP Strategy Confirms Specific Reductions
    The Yost assessment of lost ``ship days'' and ``aircraft 
hours'' is confirmed by the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy 
Budget Summary. The Summary shows, for example, reports a drop 
in Department of Defense Flight Hours from 50,624 in 1994 to 
50,000 in 1995, with the same number projected for 1996. It 
also shows Ship Days down from 2,268 in 1994 to 1,545 in 1995, 
with the same number projected for 1996.\75\ Finally, although 
Yost did discuss National Guard, the Summary shows that 
National Guard Container Search Workdays dropped from 227,827 
in 1994 to 209,000 projected for 1996, while other [drug 
interdiction] National Guard Workdays fell from 597,385 in 1994 
to a 1996 projection of 530,000.\76\
    \75\ National Drug Control Strategy Budget Summary, The White 
House, February 1995, p. 41.
    \76\ Id. p. 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            d. Field Representatives Confirm Assets Lost and Explain 
                    Impact
    Yost's testimony is corroborated by agency field 
representatives interviewed in four locations during the 
Subcommittee's fact finding trip in June 1995. Field agents 
collectively confirmed the recent loss of key assets and 
personnel, including deficiencies in radars (airborne and 
stationary), Jayhawk helicopters, 378-foot Coast Guard Cutters, 
high technology, HU-25 Falcon interceptor aircraft (``four 
lost''), and agency personnel.
    The impact of interdiction assets lost was described in 
different ways. The Nassau DEA Office of OPBAT, for example, 
reported that, ``while no specific intel source indicates that 
traffickers perceive the removal of the aerostats [radars] from 
the Bahamas as a weakness in law enforcement detection 
capability, it stands to reason that a reduction in visible 
detection resources would equate to `safe' illicit activity,'' 
and they attributed the recent shift in trafficking patterns 
and increase in ``trafficking events per month'' partially to 
aerostat removal.
    In Puerto Rico, members of the interagency group explained 
that approximately 84 metric tons of cocaine now gets into 
Puerto Rico annually, of which ``we interdict 10 to 15 
percent.'' They noted that the missing component was a stronger 
Federal interdiction commitment, in assets and personnel, 
including such fundamentals as overtime pay in support of 
nighttime detection.
    At JIATF East, briefers admitted that there had been recent 
asset losses and noted that these losses were compounded by the 
fact that ``there is no one in charge.''
            e. USIC Memorandum Confirms Assets Lost
    An unclassified memorandum originating in the Office of the 
United States Interdiction Coordinator (USIC), dated June 1995 
offered additional details on the Clinton reductions.
    This USIC memorandum lists two sets of assets removed by 
the Clinton administration from the interdiction effort: 
``counterdrug assets removed from USCG [the United States Coast 
Guard] inventory to comply with FY 94 budget reductions,'' and 
``other assets removed prior to 1994.'' \77\
    \77\ Unclassified Memorandum from Office of United States 
Interdiction Coordinator, entitled ``Summary of USCG FY-94 Budget 
Reduction of $9M, Directed at Drug Interdiction Funding, Mandated by 
Congress,'' June 9, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the first group, USIC lists: five ``HU-25 Falcon jet 
interceptors,'' one ``Medium Endurance Cutter,'' three 
``Surface Effect Ship (SES) patrol boats,'' 49 personnel due to 
an ``end of participation in C3I East, Miami,'' and 24 more 
personnel due to the ``[d]isestablished . . . Caribbean 
Squadron Staff.'' Overall, USCG interdiction assets removed 
amounted to a reduction of ``$9,337,915,'' 306 total personnel, 
and ``21,151,338'' in ``recurring costs.'' \78\
    \78\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This USIC memorandum also notes that, although ``Customs 
has now consolidated the former functions of C3I East and C3I 
West into the Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center 
(DAICC) located at March AFB in California,'' the ``DAICC 
facility faces serious manning shortages.'' \79\
    \79\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the second group, assets removed ``prior to 1994,'' USIC 
lists: four ``E2-C Hawkeye AEW aircraft (1 lost to a crash; 3 
returned to the Navy),'' and one ``EC130-V AEW aircraft 
(delivered to USCG in FY92, Transferred to DoD in 1993 for lack 
of operations and maintenance funding).'' Additionally, the 
memorandum observes, in discussing the EC130-V AEW 
(intelligence gathering) aircraft transferred from USCG 
interdiction to DoD: ``The rotodome was removed from the 
airframe. Last we heard, the airframe was in storage,'' and 
adds that ``DoD retired all of the [sic] sea-based aerostats.'' 
\80\
    \80\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            f. Additional Expert Testimony Confirms Assets Lost
    In addition, the reports from Yost, field agents and USIC 
confirming lost or decommissioned interdiction assets during 
the Clinton Administration were supported by expert testimony 
from former Acting Director of ONDCP John Walters, former White 
House Drug Czar Bill Bennett, and former Bush and Clinton DEA 
Administrator Robert Bonner.
    Walters testified that ``the drug problem is simply not a 
part of the foreign policy agenda of the United States under 
President Clinton--there is no carrot and no stick facing 
countries from which the poison destroying American lives every 
day comes.'' He noted that the Administration's deemphasis of 
international counternarcotics ``fuels calls in other countries 
for abandoning antidrug cooperation.'' \81\
    \81\ See also The New York Times (February 20, 1994), p. A6; The 
New York Times (February 27, 1994), Section 4, p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More specifically, Walters testified that President 
Clinton's interdiction policy is ``destroying the intelligence 
support to the drug war,'' noting that the President last year 
cut $600,000 in intelligence funding and took other measures to 
redirect resources away from intelligence for the drug war. 
USIC confirms the loss of five key intelligence gathering AEW 
aircraft, ``end of participation in C3I East, Miami,'' and DoD 
retirement of ``all of the sea-based aerostats,'' facts 
supporting Walter's assessment.\82\
    \82\ USIC Memorandum, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Walters also testified that ``the military and other 
interdiction agencies have received a 50 percent force 
reduction in 1994, that has caused over a 50 percent reduction 
in their ability to interdict drugs . . . [in] the transit 
zone.''
    Concluding and linking interdiction to rising domestic drug 
use, Walters explained that ``if these trends continue, by 
1996, the Clinton administration will have presided over the 
greatest increase in drug use in modern American history.'' 
\83\
    \83\ Testimony of John Walters, Hearing of Subcommittee on National 
Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, March 9, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Bennett and Bonner offered similar assessments. Bennett 
noted that the Administration's 1995 strategy would ``cut . . . 
more than 600 positions from drug enforcement divisions of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration,'' cut ``more than 100 drug 
prosecution positions in United States Attorney's offices, and 
``cut . . . drug interdiction and drug intelligence programs 
from fiscal 1994 levels.'' Bennett also testified that ``last 
year, the Clinton Administration directed the U.S. Military to 
stop providing radar tracking of cocaine-trafficker aircraft to 
Colombia and Peru,'' a policy ``Congress again had to 
reverse,'' and stressed that ``massive policy failures'' plague 
the Clinton Administration.
    Bonner, stressed that drugs pose ``a serious threat to the 
well-being of our Nation,'' noting that ``our national drug 
strategy [in the 1980's and early 1990's] was working . . .,'' 
and observed that, ``as the resources for enforcement and 
interdiction have been cut, the price of cocaine has gone down 
and the estimated number of heavy users has gone up.''
    Noting also that the Cali Cartel is ``supplying between 80 
and 90 percent of all of the cocaine that reaches the United 
States . . .,'' Bonner testified that, ``the Clinton 
Administration has utterly failed to appreciate the value of 
strong international drug law enforcement as a major component 
in an effective drug control strategy,'' and called on the 
President to ``reverse this trend and start leading our 
Nation's antidrug efforts.''
            g. Admiral Kramek's December 1994 Letter to Drug Czar Lee 
                    Brown Confirms Assets Lost, And Interdiction 
                    Coordinator's Unsuccessful Efforts to Restore
    Unclassified correspondence between the Interdiction 
Coordinator, Admiral Kramek, and the Director of ONDCP, Dr. 
Brown--which incidently was requested of the Drug Czar and not 
provided, but was secured through other means by the 
Subcommittee--revealed that an ``agency head consensus'' 
believed in October 1994 that ``we need to restore assets to 
the interdiction force structure . . .'' and ``must return to 
the 1992-1993 levels of effort.''
    The December 1994 letter also states that the 
administration's source country programs are not ``producing 
necessary results'' yet, and addresses the drug problem as a 
threat to national security. Specifically, the Interdiction 
Coordinator wrote: ``I believe it appropriate that we meet with 
the President and National Security Advisor as soon as possible 
to brief them on the results of our conference and discuss the 
current state of implementation and national strategy . . . Of 
key importance to this meeting is the determination of priority 
of counting narcotics trafficking as a threat to national 
security of the United States as evaluated against other 
threats to our security that compete for resources.''
    This letter was corroborated by the essential findings of 
the Subcommitee in a range of agency contacts and 
corresponendence complementing the hearings, most of which were 
publicly discussed in 1995 drug policy hearings on interdiction 
and overall National Drug Control Policy.
    What became obvious was the need for a counterdrug strategy 
led from the top down. Such a strategy must embody greater 
willingness to establish effective interagency review and 
terminate ineffective programs; willingness to review the whole 
lead agency concept and be certain that the agency or 
department in charge is best suited to execute national drug 
control policy; greater commitment from senior levels of the 
Administration, beginning with the President himself; 
development of broader and more forward-looking policy guidance 
for interagency regional implementation plans; more specificity 
in identifying regional planning coordinators; and thoughtful 
attention to creating a more streamlined regional mechanism for 
planning and executing the strategy.\84\
    \84\ See generally, Members discussion during hearings on March 9, 
April 6, June 27, June 28, 1995, and September 25, 1995; see also 
discussion elsewhere in this report on the need for heightened 
interagency coordination, agency leadership and interdiction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            h. Admiral Kramek's June 1995 Testimony Underscore's 
                    Interdiction's Importance and the Missing Priority
    In testimony before the Subcommittee on June 27, 1995, 
Admiral Kramek offered implicit criticism of a reduced 
interdiction effort in the Clinton Administration, when he 
testified that, ``[w]hen the [smugglers] see our foreign policy 
priorities chang[e] . . . making drug interdiction much lower 
on the list than other things, they're quick to take advantage 
of that.'' He explained that ``[w]hen they see it doesn't rate 
number one on our national security priority list, they're 
quick to take advantage of that,'' and he stressed that in his 
view, the issue stands ``number one'' with the American people.
    In a further effort to emphasize the importance of 
interdiction, Kramek noted that interdiction ``returns 25-1 on 
the dollar in benefits to the public for every dollar spent,'' 
a new statistic in the national dialogue.
    Kramek commented further on the shift from a transit zone 
strategy to a source country strategy, saying that ``the source 
country strategy . . . is starting to take hold, [but it] is 
not robust enough, for us to reduce assets in the transit zone 
yet.''
    Since many are already gone, Kramek's critique calls into 
question the current strategy.
    On Puerto Rico, Kramek also noted that Puerto Rico has 
become a target for smugglers, since trafficking drugs to 
Puerto Rico is as good as being in the United States.
            i. Testimony Of Drug Czar Lee Brown Confirms Low Priority 
                    on Interdiction
    Testimony by White House Drug Czar Lee Brown revealed that 
he held a view different from that of the Interdiction 
Coordinator and, apparently, did not follow the Interdiction 
Coordinator's recommendation to arrange for the Interdiction 
Coordinator to present the ``agency head consensus'' to either 
the President or National Security Advisor.
    Brown further conceded the administration's ``controlled 
shift'' of resources from interdiction to ``international 
efforts in source countries,'' but was unable to offer results 
of the shift or details on source country program management.
    Brown justified the ``controlled shift'' to source 
countries by testifying that prior interdiction efforts, 
despite a precipitous drop in drug users, were ``less than 
effective.''
            j. No Heroin Strategy Until November 1995
    In November 1993, President Clinton promised a National 
Heroin Strategy within 120 days.\85\ While Brown testified that 
the Nation faced ``growing availability of cheap and high 
purity heroin'' and spoke of ``concern about the possibility of 
another heroin epidemic,'' President Clinton did not sign a 
National Heroin Strategy until November 21, 1995, and the 
strategy was not accompanied by any implementing guidelines.
    \85\ See, e.g., Testimony of Joseph Kelly before the Subcommittee, 
General Accounting Office, June 27, 1995, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, a recent General Accounting Office Report, 
commissioned by the Subcommittee Chairman, found that the 
heroin policies being pursued by the Clinton Administration are 
deficient. Specifically, although the United States' 
relationship with the Burmese Government makes cooperation 
difficult, United States reliance on the United Nations' drug 
control effort has been flawed. In particular, GAO found that, 
``the [drug control] projects have not significantly reduced 
opium production because (1) the scope of the projects has been 
too small to have a substantive impact on opium production, (2) 
the Burmese Government has not provided sufficient support to 
ensure project success, and (3) planning has been inadequate to 
ensure project effectiveness.'' \86\
    \86\ Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Program Encounters Many Obstacles in 
Southeast Asia, General Accounting Office, January 1996, p. 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            k. GAO Reports Serious Deficiencies in Clinton 
                    Administration Source Country Programs
    Hearings held by the Subcommittee in June 1995 revealed 
serious mismanagement and misdirection of the source country 
programs, according to General Accounting Office investigators. 
These deficiencies are discussed below under the Section 
``Source Country Programs Oversight,'' and above in the June 27 
and 28, 1995 interdiction policy hearings.
            l. Bottom National Security Priority
    Interdiction efforts are hampered by the reported low 
national security priority placed on the drug war early in the 
administration. Public reports indicate that the 
counternarcotics effort was placed at priority ``Number 29'' on 
a White House list of national security priorities. According 
to one account, ``The White House National Security Council has 
dropped the drug war from one of three top priorities to No. 29 
on a list of 29, according to several sources.'' \87\ Internal 
reports and interviews do not contradict this assessment, and 
there is no indication that the priority has been formally or 
informally elevated since February 1993. ONDCP's response to 
Admiral Kramek's letter of December 1994 urging reassessment of 
the ``national security'' threat is further corroboration of 
this low priority ranking.\88\ Note also that Subcommittee 
contacts with Administration personnel indicate an awareness of 
the public reports of the low priority ranking, and there has 
been no contrary documentation provided to the Subcommittee, 
despite requests for the same.]
    \87\ Star Tribune, Scripps Howard News Service, ``Clinton's Drug 
Policy Perceived As Retreat,'' February 14, 1993, p. 1.
    \88\ See December 1994 Letter, Admiral Kramek to ONDCP Director Lee 
Brown, supra; Testimony of Lee Brown, responding to Letter, at 
Subcommittee hearings on March 9, 1995 and April 6, 1995; Star Tribune, 
Scripps Howard News Service, ``Clinton's Drug Policy Perceived As 
Retreat,'' February 14, 1993, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            m. Only Six Staff for Nation's Interdiction Coordinator, 
                    and No Supply Side Deputy Director of ONDCP
    According to testimony heard from the Nation's Interdiction 
Coordinator at Subcommittee hearings in June 1995, the man in 
charge of the Nation's interdiction effort has been given a 
total of just six persons to administer all of United States 
interdiction policy. Responding to questions from the 
Subcommittee, Admiral Kramek testified that he briefs ONDCP 
Director Brown only monthly and has just ``six people'' 
assigned to him as Interdiction Coordinator.\89\
    \89\ Testimony of Admiral Kramek, Subcommittee Hearings, June 28, 
1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            n. ONDCP Has No Deputy for Supply Reduction
    At ONDCP itself, the President has allowed the Nation's 
central drug policy office, ONDCP, to remain without a Deputy 
for Supply Reduction, an unprecedented act revealing 
ambivalence, if not disinterest.
            o. ONDCP Staff And Budget Gutted--Not Restored
    Expert witnesses concurred that the sudden, unilateral 1993 
cut by President Clinton in ONDCP staff by more than 80 percent 
from 146 staff to 25, and a simultaneous reduction in the 
fiscal 1994 ONDCP appropriations from $101.2 million to $5.8 
million, has never fully been rectified, and continues to 
contribute both to the perception that the administration 
places a low priority on antidrug efforts, and to the reality 
that ONDCP is unable to perform all previous functions, 
especially on interdiction policy.
    As Senator Hatch (R-Utah) recently remarked on that early 
decision: ``With that staff cut, the administration ham-strung 
Dr. Brown, giving him a ``paper promotion to the Cabinet, while 
slashing his staff to the bone . . . He can't lead the War on 
Drugs with a staff of only 25 people, I mean give me a break,'' 
added Hatch.\90\
    \90\ See Testimony of John Walters, Subcommittee Hearing, March 9, 
1995; Drug Policy Foundation, Policy Track Manual, ``The Drug War and 
Clinton's Policy Shift,'' 1994, quoting Senator Hatch (R-Utah).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            p. Conclusions on Interdiction Policy
    Despite an expert consensus that interdiction is vital, 
there has been a reduced emphasis on drug interdiction by the 
Clinton Administration. President Clinton is undeniably 
responsible for a downgrading of interdiction within the 
National Drug Control Strategy, and for interdiction budget 
cuts in 1993, 1994 and 1995, many of which explain an absence 
of previously deployed assets.
    Objective indicators of Federal support for the counter 
narcotics effort show a substantial reduction both in resources 
committed to key areas and in overall deployment of assets to 
drug interdiction. By admission of the administration, key 
interdiction budget numbers are substantially below prior 
highwater marks (i.e. ``1992-1993 levels''), lines formerly 
defined as the minimum necessary for effective conduct of the 
Drug War.
3. The Implications of Reduced Interdiction
    Most experts agree that the main implications of reduced 
interdiction over the past three years, in combination with 
other factors, have been: (1) lower street prices for cocaine, 
heroin, and marijuana, (2) higher availability of these drugs, 
(3) higher purity levels for these drugs, (4) higher casual 
drug use by juveniles, (5) greater juvenile addiction, (6) 
rising drug related juvenile crime, (7) increasing drug related 
medical emergencies, and (8) a growing international perception 
of reduced U.S. commitment to the Drug War.
            a. Lower Prices, Higher Availability and Purity
    In general, the reduction in interdiction assets, funding 
and emphasis has had a palpable effect on street prices, 
availability, and purity.
    Citing the Clinton Administration's own documentation, 
former Acting ONDCP Director John Walters testified that 
heroin, cocaine and marijuana are now available at lower prices 
and higher purities than at any time in recent years.\91\
    \91\ See ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy: Strengthening 
Communities' Response to Drugs and Crime, February, 1995, pp. 45-48, 
146 (Table B-16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Specifically, the nationwide street price for most illicit 
drugs is lower and potency higher than any time in more than a 
decade. Beyond the leading survey and DAWN data, one report 
recently noted that, ``current price/purity data show cocaine 
prices at their lowest point since data collection began in 
1981.'' \92\
    \92\ Losing Ground Against Drugs: A Report on Increasing Illicit 
Drug Use and National Drug Policy, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
December 1995, citing U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement 
Administration and Abt Associates, Average Price and Purity of Cocaine 
in the United States, Average Price and Purity of Heroin in the United 
States, September 13, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Explaining the change, former DEA Administrator Bonner 
testified that ``from 1990 to 1992, the wholesale price of 
cocaine in the U.S. increased substantially'' as law 
enforcement involvement went up. As a result, demand fell.
    Today, by contrast, ``as the resources for enforcement and 
interdiction have been cut, the price of cocaine has gone down 
and the estimated number of heavy users has gone up,'' said 
Bonner.
    Even the RAND study often cited by ONDCP in support of its 
treatment emphasis confirms the inverse relationship between 
drug supply and drug consumption. Thus, ``current supply-
control efforts cause a kilogram of cocaine priced at $4,400 in 
South America to cost more than $129,000 when it reaches U.S. 
streets,'' which ``results in reduced consumption.'' By the 
same token, a falling off of supply reduction efforts lowers 
the price and increases consumption.\93\
    \93\ Schnaubelt, Christopher, ``Drug Treatment Versus Supply 
Reduction: Which Is Cheaper?'', National Interagency Counterdrug 
Institute, May 1995, p. 2, referring to Rydell, Peter C. and 
Everingham, Susan S., ``Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand 
Programs,'' RAND Drug Policy Research Center, Santa Monica, California 
(June 1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. Exploding Casual Use by Youth
    As availability and purity have risen, and prices have 
fallen, casual drug use by juveniles has skyrocketed. Downward 
trendlines through the 1980's and early 1990's have suffered a 
marked reversal since 1992, and are dramatically up in 
virtually every age group and for every illicit drug, including 
heroin, crack, cocaine hydrochloride, LSD, non-LSD 
hallucinogens, methamphetamine, inhalants, stimulants, and 
marijuana.\94\
    \94\ Drug use was falling in the late 1980s, as indicated by all 
major studies in the field; it is now markedly up and rising, according 
to all available data, including the September 1995 National Household 
Survey, the October 1995 PRIDE survey of 200,000 students, the December 
1995, University of Michigan Monitoring the Future Study, and other 
regional measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Historically, overall drug use fell from 1981 and 1992, 
following concerted Federal, State, community and parental 
counter narcotics action. The drive for strong interdiction, 
prevention, and law enforcement produced results. Nationwide 
surveys show monthly cocaine use dropped from 2.9 million users 
in 1988 to 1.3 million in 1990, overall drug abuse dropped from 
14.5 million users in 1991 to 11.4 million in 1992, and the 
perceived risk of drug use rose, as did prices, while 
availability and purity fell. In short, the strategy worked.
    One reason for the success of the policy in the 1980's and 
early 1990's was innovative interdiction and prevention. Aided 
by the Departments of Defense and Justice, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, U.S. Customs Service, Border Patrol, and State 
and local law enforcement agencies nationwide, then-Coast Guard 
Commandant Admiral Paul Yost coordinated and implemented a drug 
interdiction effort based on ``pulsing'' resources into the 
transit zone at high-drug trafficking times. Meanwhile, of 
course, grassroots parent groups, such as Pride and the 
National Family Partnership, and Mrs. Reagan's ``Just Say No'' 
prevention program began to push reduced drug use through 
education. Mrs. Reagan's effort was only supplemented by 
Federal drug prevention monies in 1987.
    Tragically, most of that ground has now been lost by a void 
of Presidential leadership and misguided policies, including 
the rollback of Federal interdiction efforts.
    In 1994, for the third consecutive year, major surveys and 
studies including the National Household Survey and Michigan 
University's Monitoring the Future Study \95\ revealed alarming 
increases in drug use and acceptability among the Nation's 
youth. According to the Michigan study, 13 percent of 8th-
graders experimented with marijuana in 1993, about twice the 
1991 level. Experimentation among 10th-graders increased about 
two-thirds the previous three years, and daily use among high 
school seniors was up by half over 1993 levels.
    \95\ Johnston, L., O'Malley, P. and Bachman, J., Monitoring the 
Future Study, University of Michigan (1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1995 data pull the curtain back further. The National 
Household Survey released in September 1995 shows that overall 
drug use among kids ages 12 to 17 jumped 50 percent in 1994, 
from 6.6 percent to 9.5 percent. The National Pride Study shows 
that one in three American high school seniors now smokes 
marijuana; that there has been a 36 percent increase in cocaine 
use among students in grades 9 through 12 since 1991-92; and 
that hallucinogen use by high schoolers has risen 75 percent 
since 1988-89.
    Notably, ONDCP itself admits more teenagers nationwide are 
using heroin and marijuana, and that cocaine use is stable but 
high.\96\
    \96\ See ONDCP, ``Pulse Check: National Trends in Drug Abuse,'' 
December, 1994, pp. 5, 8 and 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            c. Increasing Drug Related Juvenile Crime
    Rising casual teenage drug use is closely correlated with 
rising juvenile violent crime, as indicated by the 1995 Office 
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), 
Department of Justice, report entitled Juvenile Offenders and 
Victims: A National Report. Specifically, the OJJDP report now 
indicates that ``one in three juvenile detainees were under the 
influence of drugs at the time of their offense,'' based on the 
National Institutes of Justice's (NIJ's) Drug Use Forecasting 
program (DUF), and 81 percent of juvenile inmates admit having 
used drugs at some point in their lifetime. Additionally, OJJDP 
reports that the number of detainees testing positive for drugs 
at the time of arrest in 1993 was ``substantially above'' the 
number in 1992.
    The correlation between reduced interdiction, increased 
drug use and increasing juvenile crime reaches toward another 
conclusion. Department of Justice projections indicate that if 
rising teenage drug use and the close correlation with juvenile 
crime continue, the Nation will experience a doubling of 
violent crime by 2010.
    According to OJJDP, ``[a]fter years of relative stability, 
juvenile involvement in violent crime known to law enforcement 
has been increasing,'' and ``[l]ooking to the future, the 
report indicates that by the year 2010, the juvenile population 
aged 10-17 is projected to grow more than 20 percent over the 
1990 Census.'' \97\
    \97\ U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office 
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Overview: Juvenile 
Offenders and Victims: A National Report (September 1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            d. Nature of Juvenile Drug Use Changing Toward Addiction
    Also affecting this conclusion, the reported nature of 
casual teenage drug use is also changing. Annual or infrequent 
teenage experimentation with illegal drugs is being replaced by 
regular, monthly, addictive teenage drug use. \98\
    \98\ See 1995 PRIDE Study, supra; 1995 National Household Survey, 
supra; and 1995 University of Michigan Monitoring the Future Study, 
supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            e. Drug Emergencies At Record Level
    As indicated earlier, another critical indication that cuts 
in interdiction are having a negative impact on use and purity 
of available drugs is alarming new data on drug related 
emergencies.
    Increasing drug related medical emergencies first became 
obvious in the 1993 Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) Data, 
collected from emergency rooms around the country and released 
in December 1994. That data showed an 8 percent increase in 
drug related emergency room cases between 1992 and 1993, with 
45 percent being heroin overdoses. Cocaine was also at an all-
time high, having more than doubled since 1988, and marijuana 
emergencies increased 22 percent between 1992 and 1993.
    The DAWN data released in October 1995 darkens the 
assessment. It shows that, in 1994, ``cocaine-related episodes 
reached their highest level in history'' and registered a ``15 
percent increase from 1993 and 40 percent increase from 1988.'' 
On top of this, marijuana or hashish-related emergencies rose 
39 percent from 1993 to 1994, and total drug related emergency 
cases rose 10 percent between 1993 and 1994.
            f. Foreign Perceptions of U.S. Commitment Altered By 
                    Clinton Reductions
    Finally, and more broadly, testimony and interviews suggest 
that the reduced commitment of the White House to interdiction 
may have affected the foreign perception of the U.S. commitment 
to the drug war. For example, Senator Hatch recently noted that 
the White House is ``sending the wrong signals to our Latin and 
Caribbean allies,'' while former DEA Administrator Bonner 
testified that, for example, the ``deep cut in ONDCP has 
symbolic significance not only in Washington . . . but around 
the world . . . [since] [o]ur foreign allies read it as a 
signal that the Clinton Administration is backing away from a 
strong commitment to drug control policy.''
    On interdiction specifically, Walters testified that the 
Administration's deemphasis of international counternarcotics 
``fuels calls in other countries for abandoning antidrug 
cooperation.'' \99\
    \99\ See also The New York Times (February 20, 1994), p. A6; The 
New York Times (February 27, 1994), Section 4, p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Walters also took issue with the Clinton Administration's 
granting of a national security waiver to Colombia, which was 
this year technically de-certified. He indicated that the 
national security waiver obviated the decertification.


                  e. source country programs oversight


    Drawing on expert hearing testimony and reliable 
documentary evidence on the status of the Nation's source 
country programs, including a 1995 in-country study by GAO, the 
Subcommittee reviewed current source country programs.
    The Subcommittee found that the Clinton Administration has 
consciously authorized a ``controlled shift'' of resources from 
the transit zone into the leading source countries, chiefly 
Colombia, Bolivia and Peru.
    The Subcommittee also found that the Clinton 
Administration's source country programs have, according to GAO 
and other expert testimony, been badly supervised, poorly 
coordinated, given low priority by key agencies, and poorly 
managed.
1. The ``Controlled Shift''
    The President's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy not 
only refocused demand reduction resources on drug treatment, 
but theoretically refocused supply reduction resources on 
source country programs. This refocusing was termed a 
``controlled shift.''
    The 1995 Strategy states the National Security Council 
(NSC) conducted a ``lengthy review'' of drug trafficking in 
1993 and concluded that ``a stronger focus on source countries 
was necessary.'' Accordingly, the NSC (note: no mention is made 
of any other agencies' input or ONDCP in reaching this 
decision) ``determined that a controlled shift in emphasis was 
required--a shift away from past efforts that focused primarily 
on interdiction in the transit zones to new efforts that focus 
on interdiction in and around source countries.'' \100\
    \100\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February 
1995, p. 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Making this 1993 NSC recommendation national policy, 
President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 14 
(PDD-14),\101\ which called for (1) ``providing assistance to 
those nations that show the political will to combat narco-
trafficking through institution building,'' (2) ``conducting 
efforts to destroy narco-trafficking organizations,'' and (3) 
``interdicting narcotics trafficking in both source countries 
and transit zones,'' through the controlled shift of resources 
from the transit zones.\102\
    \101\ A Presidential Decision Directive is a written policy 
declaration, signed by the President, which directs Executive branch 
departments and agencies to follow a particular policy course. It is 
usually issued in concert with implementing instructions.
    \102\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February 
1995, p. 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ironically, in view of the deep transit zone interdiction 
cuts proposed and effectuated by President Clinton in 1993, 
1994 and 1995 (and proposed for 1996), and the 1995 testimony 
of ONDCP Director Brown that interdiction efforts are ``less 
than effective,'' the 1995 Strategy states that, ``without 
effective transit zone programs in place, the smooth 
implementation of the new source country program will be 
severely inhibited.'' \103\ The ``essential component'' of the 
source country programs is ``economic development,'' or ``job 
creation'' in fields other than illegal narcotics.\104\
    \103\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February 
1995, p. 44.
    \104\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. GAO Study of Clinton's Source Country Programs
    Through the collection of expert testimony from those 
inside and outside the administration, and commissioning an in-
country GAO report on program effectiveness, the Subcommittee 
learned that the Clinton Administration's source country 
programs have been badly supervised, poorly coordinated, 
subject to low priority by key agencies, poorly managed and, in 
some cases, non-existent.
    Testimony by GAO investigators, received by the 
Subcommittee during an interdiction hearing on June 27, 1995, 
raised serious concerns about these programs. For example, GAO 
reported that:
     No one is ``in charge of antidrug activities in 
the cocaine source countries;''
     There is a ``lack of coordination'' and 
``confusion over the role of the offices responsible for 
intelligence analysis and related operational plans;''
     ``The Drug Enforcement Administration is reducing 
its presence in Colombia, [and] Southern Command is flying 
fewer sorties per month in support of source country 
interdiction;''
     United States funds in source countries ``are not 
always well managed;''
     ``$45 million originally intended for counter 
narcotics assistance to the cocaine source countries were 
reprogrammed to assist Haiti's democratic transition;'' and
     Despite announcing in November 1993 that he would 
``develop a separate strategy to combat the heroin trade'' 
within 120 days, President Clinton had not [as of June 1995] 
developed or signed any heroin strategy.
3. Admiral Kramek's View in December 1994 of the Source Country 
        Programs
    In Admiral Kramek's December 1994 letter to ONDCP Director 
Lee Brown, the President's own Interdiction Coordinator 
expressed the view, not only that there was an agency head 
consensus that drug interdiction should ``return to the 1992-
1993 levels of effort,'' but also that this was necessary 
``until such time as a viable, comprehensive source country 
program is in place and producing necessary results.'' \105\ In 
other words, as of December 1994, a ``viable source country 
program'' was apparently neither ``in place'' nor ``producing 
necessary results,'' according to the President's own 
Interdiction Coordinator.
    \105\ Letter of Admiral Robert Kramek to ONDCP Director Lee Brown, 
December 1994, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Invitations Rejected By the President's National Security Advisor 
        and By the President
    Since the NSC was responsible for PDD-14 which initiated 
the shift of interdiction resources to the source countries, 
the Subcommittee Chairman wrote to National Security Advisor 
Anthony Lake in the Fall of 1995 and invited him to come before 
Congress, privately if necessary, to discuss the status of the 
drug war. The Subcommittee Chairman never received a response 
to that invitation, suggesting disinterest on the part of the 
National Security Advisor in discussing this issue with Members 
of Congress concerned about the strategy shift.
    Similarly, the Subcommittee Chairman has offered, 
repeatedly and in writing, to discuss with the President a 
bipartisan approach to restoring the drug war's effectiveness 
and re-elevating the drug war as a national security issue. The 
Subcommittee Chairman has further offered to coordinate a 
meeting with the full National Security, International Affairs, 
and Criminal Justice Subcommittee, with selected congressional 
leaders, with the bipartisan drug policy group co-chaired by 
Congressman Zeliff and Congressman Rangel (D-NY), or with the 
newly constituted Senate-House Drug Policy Task Force.
    The Subcommittee Chairman's invitations to the President to 
meet with Members of Congress concerned about this issue began 
in the March 9, 1995 Subcommittee hearing and continued 
throughout 1995. In December 1995, after an invitation to meet 
with a bipartisan group of congressional leaders on the drug 
issue was physically handed to the President by one of the 
Chairman's Subcommittee staffers following remarks of the 
President at the national CADCA Conference, the Subcommittee 
Chairman received a letter signed by a White House scheduler 
indicating the President's appreciation for the Subcommittee 
Chairman's ``support,'' and no interest in a meeting with 
congressional leaders.
5. Conclusions on Source Country Programs
    Despite the success of interdiction efforts in the late 
1980's and early 1990's, including innovative efforts such as 
resource ``pulses'' championed by former U.S. Coast Guard 
Commandant and Admiral Paul Yost, the Clinton Administration 
has abandoned the earlier transit zone strategy in favor of an 
NSC strategy focused on the source countries, and ``economic 
development'' in those countries.
    In December 1994, the President's own Interdiction 
Coordinator concluded that the source country programs were not 
yet ``viable,'' and were neither ``in place'' nor ``producing 
necessary results.'' \106\ No testimony given during 1995 by 
ONDCP Director Lee Brown offered any concrete evidence that 
this was not so.\107\
    \106\ Id.
    \107\ See. e.g. Testimony of Lee P. Brown, Subcommittee Hearings, 
March 9, 1995 and April 6, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In June 1995, the General Accounting Office conducted a 
comprehensive, in-country investigation of the source country 
programs and found that no one was ``in charge of antidrug 
activities in the cocaine source countries,'' there was a 
``lack of coordination'' and ``confusion over the role of the 
offices responsible for intelligence analysis and related 
operational plans,'' ``the Drug Enforcement Administration 
[was] reducing its presence in Colombia, [and] Southern Command 
[was] flying fewer sorties per month in support of source 
country interdiction,''
    United States funds in source countries ``are not always 
well managed,'' ``$45 million originally intended for counter 
narcotics assistance to the cocaine source countries were 
reprogrammed to assist Haiti's democratic transition,'' and 
despite a November 1993 promise that he would ``develop a 
separate strategy to combat the heroin trade'' within 120 days, 
President Clinton had not developed or signed any heroin 
strategy.
    These findings point up serious flaws in the source country 
shift strategy, and strongly suggest the need to rethink the 
1993 shift. The seeming unwillingness of the National Security 
Advisor to discuss with congressional leaders PDD-14 and its 
implications gives rise to added concern.


                    f. prevention programs oversight


    Drawing on expert hearing testimony from those inside and 
outside the Administration, information learned during a 
Chairman's visit to treatment and prevention programs with the 
ONDCP Director, and reliable documentary evidence on the status 
of the nation's prevention programs, the Subcommittee reviewed 
current drug prevention policy.
    Importantly, the Subcommittee found that, as with drug 
interdiction and law enforcement, there is a broad, bi-partisan 
consensus supporting effective and accountable drug prevention 
programs as a central component of the drug war.
    Encouragingly, just as prevention experts acknowledged the 
importance of law enforcement and interdiction in any effective 
drug use reduction strategy, interdiction and law enforcement 
experts recognized the central role that must be played by 
parental, community, State and Federal drug prevention efforts 
if the resurgence of drug use among the nation's youth is to be 
reversed.
    Essentially, the Subcommittee found that, while many drug 
prevention programs are ``validated'' and accountable, many are 
neither validated nor accountable. In particular, the 
Subcommittee received expert testimony and documentary evidence 
supporting the view that the Safe and Drug Free Schools program 
(SDFS), which provides seed money for some of the strongest 
drug prevention programs nationwide, has also reportedly been 
subject to serious misuse, waste and abuse of funding. While 
this conclusion is tentative and needs further exploration, the 
wide latitude in accountability is disturbing.
    The Subcommittee found that documentary evidence from 
several states suggests a need for tighter accountability 
either in the governing statute or by the Department of 
Education, as well as a clear need for further exploration of 
the program's basic effectiveness. This second concern has two 
parts. While a strong no-use message delivered through schools 
and community programs was universally applauded, missing 
financial audits and the content of some federally-funded 
curricula gave rise to questions about what the SDFS funds were 
actually expended on and precisely who, within the Federal 
Government, was keeping track of those expenditures. The 
Subcommittee, for example, received material from the 
Department of Education (DoEd) indicating that DoEd recognizes 
that it's current records do not allow it to identify with any 
specificity either the groups that receive these funds or on 
what they are expended.\108\
    \108\ Documentation collected by the Department of Education from 
several states indicates that a broad range of essentially undefined 
groups receive SDFS monies, and there is often no description of the 
purpose of the group, the purpose for which the Federal funds are 
expended or the actual purchases made. These DoEd documents are on file 
with the Subcommittee and are available for review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Again encouragingly, the SDFS accountability concern is 
presently being addressed by investigations undertaken by the 
Department of Education Inspector General's Office and 
inspectors with the General Accounting Office. When specific 
problems are identified through these investigations, the 
Subcommittee intends to address them, again noting the strong 
bipartisan support that exists for what experts testified is an 
essential component of the drug war; that is, a clear ``no 
use'' message and accountable drug prevention programs 
targeting America's youth.
    Overall, the Subcommittee found strong support for a 
renewed national effort to stem rising youth drug use through 
effective parental, local, State and Federal prevention 
programs.
1. Prevention is Central to Drug War
    Expert testimony received by the Subcommittee made it clear 
that prevention is central to the Drug War.
            a. Interdiction Experts Agree
    Even interdiction experts, like Bennett, Bonner and Walters 
agreed in Subcommittee hearings that prevention was central to 
success, including parental, local, State and Federal 
prevention efforts. Law enforcement experts testified that the 
Byrne Grant program and prevention efforts, such as D.A.R.E., 
are effective and relied on heavily.\109\
    \109\ Notably, funding for the Byrne Grant Program was increased, 
against the budget cutting trend, by $25 million in the 104th Congress, 
indicating that this program's effectiveness is widely recognized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After discussing the importance of interdiction and law 
enforcement, Bennett noted that ``success in the drug war 
depends above all on the efforts of parents and schools and 
churches and police chiefs and judges and community leaders,'' 
and gave examples from more than 100 cities he visited as 
President George Bush's White House Drug Czar.
    Admiral Yost emphasized that interdiction alone will not 
win the drug war, and that interdiction is just the foundation 
for effective prevention, education and treatment--and ``that's 
what'll win the war.''
            b. The Partnership For a Drug-Free America Explains Broad 
                    Effectiveness of Drug Prevention
    Prevention experts were no less direct. Thomas Hedrick, 
Jr., Vice Chairman of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, 
testified that prevention and interdiction advocates must begin 
to work together, and that ``preventing drug use by young 
people'' is essential ``if we are to have prayer of building 
safe and healthy families and communities.''
    He stressed that prevention is vital both for ethnic 
minorities and ``the rest of America,'' especially since ``75 
percent of all drug users are white . . .'' and drug use is not 
just ``a problem of inner city ethnic kids.''
    Hedrick favored increased parent involvement in setting a 
``clear expectation of no use,'' as well as better in-school 
education, and reduced exposure of children to ``pro-drug 
information,'' especially exposure to the ``recent 
reglamoraization of drug use in some of the media.''
    At the Federal level, Hedrick expressed the view that 
``Federal support and Federal leadership in making drugs a 
critical national priority is essential, if we are to help 
convince the media that this is an important issue.'' National 
leaders must also tell those community leaders involved in this 
fight that what they are doing is important.
            c. The BEST Foundation Describes Differences Between 
                    Validated and Unvalidated Prevention Programs
    Similarly, Bridget Ryan, Executive Director of the BEST 
Foundation for a Drug-Free Tomorrow, testified that a recent 
RAND study [not the June 1994 treatment study] advocated drug 
prevention as ``the first priority'' in curbing drug abuse.
    Ryan distinguished between ``validated'' and 
``unvalidated'' drug prevention programs, and urged that the 
former be adequately funded, noting that the validated 
prevention programs work.
    According to Ryan, who described herself as ``on the front 
line of the implementation process,'' there should be no 
question that ``prevention can and does work, but our educators 
and policy makers must be selective in funding and implementing 
validated programs.'' Ryan noted that, ``it is estimated that 
more than 2,000 non-validated programs are in use.''
    Ryan testified that the latest RAND prevention study 
disproves three common criticisms of prevention--``first, that 
it works only for middle class, largely white, suburban 
situations; second, that the programs work only for kids who 
need them least; and finally, that prevention programs prevent 
only trivial levels of use.''
    RAND found that properly designed prevention programs, such 
as Project Alert, ``work well in urban, suburban, and rural 
areas, in middle- and low-income communities, and in schools 
with high and low minority populations.'' Ryan notes that 
another successful prevention program has been the BEST 
Foundation's ``Nancy Reagan After School Program.''
    Ryan did note that ``we need to make information about 
valid [prevention] approaches more widely available and provide 
incentives for educators to choose programs that have 
demonstrated results,'' since drug prevention ``must be 
specific.''
    In addition, programs should provide ``continued 
reinforcement during high school'' and ``funding to develop and 
validate high school programs is critical,'' since ``education 
and school-based programs should be at the core of 
prevention.''
    Ryan noted, in closing, that influences outside the 
classroom--namely family and community--are also very important 
in stemming childhood drug abuse.
            d. Community Antidrug Coalitions of America (CADCA) Favors 
                    Renewed National Leadership And Accountable, Well-
                    Funded Drug Prevention
    James Copple, National Director of the Community Antidrug 
Coalitions of America (CADCA), which is privately funded and 
represents approximately 2,500 community coalitions nationwide, 
testified that, ``CADCA members have been more than a little 
frustrated with the failure of the nation's leadership to keep 
the pervasiveness of drug abuse before the American people,'' 
he noted, since this is part of the prevention effort. 
Referring to the 1995 White House ONDCP Strategy, Copple 
testified that ``a strategy . . . is only as good as the 
resources that follow it and the visible leadership that 
advances it.'' More pointedly, he held that ``there must be a 
national voice advocating for substance abuse prevention, and 
that voice should be loudest from the White House and the 
Congress.''
    CADCA also believes that the Safe and Drug Free Schools 
program is very important and, reported abuses notwithstanding, 
has often been effective. He stressed that the Federal 
Government still has a role, as Peter Drucker has written, in 
conducting ``national crusades,'' and this is one. CADCA urged 
Congress to ``embrace a national strategy that is 
comprehensive, balanced and directs the majority of the 
resources to local communities to address local problems.''
            e. Texans' War on Drugs Program Favors Renewed Presidential 
                    Leadership, Possible Separation of Prevention and 
                    Treatment, And Block Grant of Unified Agency for 
                    Prevention Programs
    Charles Robert (``Bobby'') Heard, III, Director of Program 
Services at the Texans' War on Drugs, credited the precipitous 
drop in drug use ``between 1979 and 1992'' to substance abuse 
prevention, and noted that ``no other social issue can claim 
that kind of success.'' He testified that Nancy Reagan's impact 
was profound, and that her ``Just Say No' campaign was key to 
success in the 1980's. ``As we proved in the 1980's, with 
national focus and attention . . . we can make a tremendous 
difference in reducing demand,'' noted Heard.
    On Presidential leadership, Texans' War on Drugs viewed as 
``disheartening'' the ``President's . . . proposal to 
consolidate the demonstration programs for the Center for 
Substance Abuse Prevention and the Center for Substance Abuse 
Treatment under SAMSA, the Substance Abuse Mental Health 
Services Administration,'' since ``prevention and treatment are 
two very different approaches to dealing with the drug 
problem.'' Pointedly, Heard expressed concern that the 
President is under-emphasizing prevention, in favor of 
treatment.
    Constructively, Texans War on Drugs notes that, ``in this 
time of consolidation and cost savings, what might make sense 
is to consolidate all Federal substance abuse prevention 
programs under one agency or create a separate drug abuse 
prevention block grant'' for the states, since this would not 
pit prevention against treatment, but would preserve and target 
the prevention monies.
            f. New Hampshire Experts Urge Support for Byrne Grants, 
                    Attention to Prevention, Treatment, Correctional 
                    Programs
    In discussing New Hampshire's successful 1995 experience 
with the joint interagency task force concept, the Director of 
the Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention, Geraldine 
Sylvester, testified to the importance of ``giv[ing] equal 
attention to the battle fronts of treatment and prevention,'' 
as well as the enhancement of prevention that can come from 
student assistance programs, parental training and peer 
leadership groups.
    Manchester, New Hampshire Police Chief Peter Favreau and 
Paul Brodeur, Commissioner of New Hampshire Department of 
Corrections, strongly supported the Byrne grant program. 
Brodeur urged particular support for a correctional options 
program called ``Pathways,'' utilized by the New Hampshire 
Department of Corrections. Brodeur noted that ``Pathways'' has 
effectively employed education, substance abuse treatment and 
employment counseling. Brodeur illustrated the importance of 
programs like ``Pathways,'' by pointing out that in New 
Hampshire 20 percent of the State's inmates are incarcerated 
for drug related offenses, and 80 percent or more of the 
inmates have substance abuse problems.
    Other experts urging support for prevention efforts 
included Manchester Mayor Ray Wieczorek who praised public-
private cooperation, United States Attorney Paul Gagnon who 
urged continued Federal funding for all antidrug efforts, Dover 
Police Captain Dana Mitchell who praised the D.A.R.E. program, 
Executive Director of Nashua's Youth Council Michael Plourde 
who urged community needs assessment prior to receipt of 
Federal funds, and Manchester Police Seargeant Dick Tracy who 
spoke strongly for the D.A.R.E. program and the need for 
greater program flexibility.
2. Media Have a Key Role
    The role of the media in stemming increased juvenile drug 
use, as well as contributing to the rise of increased use 
through the ``re-glamorization'' of drugs was much discussed by 
experts.
    Significantly, expert Thomas Hedrick of the Partnership for 
a Drug-Free America reported that the Partnership has 
received--since its inception--``over $2 billion in time and 
space'' from the media. In 1990 and 1991, this produced roughly 
one antidrug message per household per day.
    Yet, Hedrick testified that ``support for these messages 
has declined 20 percent in the past three years,'' apparently 
``because the media is not as convinced that the drug issue is 
as important as it was.''
    He and others noted that media coverage is also down, from 
600 antidrug stories on the three major networks in 1989 to 65 
last year, which Hedrick believes is tantamount to ``zero'' 
from a communications point of view.
3. Accountability Concerns Are Serious, Specifically In Safe and Drug 
        Free Schools Act Monies
    Despite strong bipartisan support for ``validated'' and 
accountable prevention programs, the Subcommittee discovered 
that many so-called prevention programs are neither validated 
nor accountable.
    Testimony from prevention expert G. Bridget Ryan of the 
BEST Foundation for a Drug-Free Tomorrow, who described herself 
as ``on the front line of the implementation process,'' 
indicated that while ``prevention can and does work,'' still 
``our educators and policy makers must be selective in funding 
and implementing validated programs.'' Ryan testified that, 
``it is estimated that more than 2,000 non-validated programs 
are in use.'' She urged Congress to insist that Federal funding 
flow to validated programs.
    Second, the Subcommittee received expert testimony and 
documentary evidence supporting the view that the Safe and Drug 
Free Schools program, which provides seed money for some of the 
most effective drug prevention programs nationwide, including 
documented successes in New Hampshire, Florida and elsewhere, 
has also reportedly been subject to serious misuse, waste and 
abuse of funding. Again, while this conclusion needs further 
exploration, it is corroborated by documentation from a variety 
of States and sources.
    The Department of Education's Inspector General and the GAO 
are both conducting investigations into the program, but prior 
studies strongly suggest a need for greater accountability. The 
aim of these efforts is not to downgrade or reduce support for 
the SDFS program, but to assure that Federal monies are 
distributed only to deserving, validated and genuine no-use 
drug prevention programs.
    At the April 6, 1995 Subcommittee hearing, Congresswoman 
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen first raised the accountability issue, 
noting that ``there is a growing concern that Federal 
prevention monies have not only been wasted, mismanaged and 
been ineffective, but . . . have been spent on educational 
programs that teach value relativity and they decline to teach 
that illegal drug use is wrong, just plain and simple wrong.''
    Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen identified specific problem 
programs, and sought an explanation from then-ONDCP Director 
Lee Brown for Federal financing of so-called ``values 
clarification'' curricula, including ``Quest,'' ``Here's 
Looking At You Too,'' and other programs that did not deliver a 
no-use message.
    Unfortunately, while Dr. Brown acknowledged the potential 
for abuse and disagreed with any program not teaching no-use, 
he offered no proposals for or assurance of heightened 
accountability. Asked what he would do about reported abuses in 
Michigan, Massachusetts, Texas, Washington State, Kansas, 
Indiana, and West Virginia, the ONDCP Director responded that 
``the Department of Education administers the Safe and Drug 
Free Schools Program . . . [and] we . . . have been working 
with [them] in looking at how to set up standards for 
addressing the problem.'' Brown added that the Department was 
working ``to alleviate and hopefully eliminate all the abuses 
in the program,'' and testified that ``I would be the first to 
admit that there are abuses of the Safe and Drug Free Schools 
program.''
    A series of letters confirming these concerns from around 
the Nation were introduced at that hearing, along with a study 
released by the Michigan State Office of Drug Control Policy 
documenting abuses in the Safe and Drug Free Schools monies.
    While Ros-Lehtinen made clear that she favored accountable 
prevention programs, she also explained that ``in Michigan, 
more than $10 million in Federal funds intended to provide our 
children a front line defense against drugs was utilized for 
the following: Over $81,000 for large teeth and giant 
toothbrushes; over $1.5 million on a human torso model used in 
one lesson of one grade, not even in the drug section of the 
curriculum; wooden cars with ping pong balls, over $12,300; 
hokey pokey song, over $18,000; over $7000 on sheep eyes, 
whatever that is; dog bone kits, $3,700; bicycle pumps, 
$11,000; latex gloves, $122,000; over $300,000 was spent on how 
we feel about sound.''
    Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen concluded with another 
constituent complaint: ``These nondirective programs are often 
funded through Federal Drug Free School grants, yet they do not 
usually comply with Federal law requiring that students be 
taught that drug use is wrong and harmful.''
    As disturbing was the curriculum material itself, also 
introduced into the record, which clearly failed to admonish 
against underage drinking or drug use, and in fact stated 
``don't begin negatively with admonishments . . .''
    When Congresswoman Thurman noted that attempts were made to 
instill greater accountability in the Safe and Drug Free 
Schools program during its last reauthorization, Congresswoman 
Ros-Lehtinen conceded that this might be true, but added, 
``these letters are dated March [1995], just a few weeks ago 
when we announced that we were going to continue with these 
hearings, and these teaching modules [which Ros-Lehtinen 
displayed] are still going out [to schools],'' suggesting 
accountability remains a serious concern.
    Finally, on April 6, 1995, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen 
introduced a July 15, 1994 letter into the record from Dr. 
Brown to the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Elementary 
and Secondary Education concerning the Safe and Drug Free 
Schools Program. Ros-Lehtinen noted for Dr. Brown that, ``you, 
yourself, pointed out seven accountability issues'' in this 
letter, adding ``I believe it's hypocritical--excuse me, sir--
but for you to attack some of us who are pointing out the 
ineffectiveness of the programs when you saw and wrote on it 
yourself.''
    Brown's only reply was that he was ``far from 
hypocritical'' and that it was his ``responsibility'' to 
address ``areas where we need improvement.'' Conceding that 
``we have some abuses in the program,'' he saw deep cuts in the 
program as inappropriate. He also conceded, however, that Safe 
and Drug Free Schools monies ``go to more than just drug 
education.''
    On balance, the difference of opinion between those who 
favored 1995 cuts in programs which appear subject to abuse, 
such as Safe and Drug Free Schools, and those who did not favor 
such cuts was relatively straight forward; the pivotal question 
was whether to fund programs that are successful in some 
locations, but in which there is also documented waste and 
abuse, or whether to discontinue full funding.
    This question aside, the aim shared by the Subcommittee and 
Dr. Brown was to encourage effective and accountable drug 
prevention programs, as well as adequate funding for such 
programs, once accountability and a no-use message are assured.
4. Presidential Leadership Missing
    During 1993, 1994 and most of 1995, the President spoke out 
rarely about either the need for demand side reduction of 
illegal drug use, or the need for supply side measures to stem 
the rise of international narcotics trafficking. An objective 
look at the President's compiled pubic addresses, 
communications with Congress, and discussions with foreign 
leaders reveals that presidential use of the ``bully pulpit'' 
for drawing public attention to the illegal drug crisis was a 
low personal priority for this President.
    In addition to the frustrations expressed by agency heads 
in gaining the President's attention, including Admiral Kramek, 
the President hardly spoke on the topic. In 1993, President 
Clinton made seven addresses to the Nation; drugs were 
mentioned in none of them. His presidential papers reveal only 
13 references to illegal drugs in a total of 1,628 statements, 
addresses and interviews. During 1994, presidential leadership 
was little better; of 1,742 presidential statements, only 11 
contained any mention of illegal drugs. Experts in the 
agencies, including GAO, and in the field agree that the 
effectiveness of the ONDCP Director is directly affected by the 
leadership and support of the President.
5. Fact-Finding Trip With Director of ONDCP
    In May 1995, the Subcommittee Chairman travelled to drug 
treatment and prevention programs with then-ONDCP Director Lee 
Brown, including a prison treatment program at the Roxbury 
Prison for Woman in Massachusetts. During that fact finding 
trip, the Chairman discussed prevention programs with the 
experts and the children directly affected by them; he 
discussed drug treatment programs in the prison with experts 
and with the prisoners affected, and discussed programs outside 
the prison with those who founded them and those who benefitted 
them. This information gave rise to testimony at the June 27, 
1995 hearing from students affected by drugs and drug 
prevention programs, as well as to testimony at the September 
25, 1995 hearing from experts in all fields at the New 
Hampshire field hearing.
6. Conclusions on Prevention Policy
    Essentially, there was wide agreement that prevention 
should be a priority, both for the National Drug Control 
Strategy and for National Leaders, including individual Members 
and the President. Congresswoman and Ranking minority member 
Thurman (D-Florida) echoed a position shared by Dr. Brown, the 
Subcommittee Chairman, and others on the Subcommittee, that 
some programs funded through the Safe and Drug Free Schools Act 
have been highly successful. For example, Thurman observed that 
several programs in Florida, which are administered by local 
school boards with qualified advisory councils, have been well 
received, and the Subcommittee Chairman spoke in favor of the 
D.A.R.E. program.
    On the other hand, it seems clear that serious 
accountability problems in the SDFS Act and its administration, 
including financial accountability, program validation, and 
concerns about waste, fraud and abuse require a closer 
examination. While the Subcommittee supports effective programs 
funded by SDFS, members believe that the SDFS Act, the 
Department of Education's administrative role, and the 
programs' accountability mechanisms must be reviewed. The aim, 
however, is correcting deficiencies, not elimination of the 
national prevention effort. To this end, the Subcommittee is 
monitoring the two on-going investigations by the DoE Inspector 
General and the GAO.


                    g. treatment programs oversight


    Expert testimony and reliable documentation supported the 
Subcommittee's review of national drug treatment strategy. 
While this area requires further exploration, the Subcommittee 
confirmed the Administration's demand reduction shift toward 
treatment of chronic or hardcore addicts, and recognized the 
element of treatment as one part of any effective national drug 
strategy.
    On the other hand, the Subcommittee was not persuaded that 
the demand reduction side of the drug war should be tipped 
toward treatment, particularly at the expense of prevention. 
Moreover, while the Subcommittee heard expert testimony in 
support of drug treatment, it also received expert testimony 
severely questioning program effectiveness. Finally, since the 
public rationale for the Clinton Administration's shift toward 
treatment repeatedly came back to the June 1994 RAND study, 
this study was reviewed and found to be a weak basis for 
guiding national drug policy.
1. Background: Treatment Needed in Drug War
    There was wide agreement that drug treatment, particularly 
for prison inmates, must be one part of the drug war. Virtually 
all qualified witnesses, from prevention experts like Charles 
Robert Heard, III, of Texans' War on Drugs, to treatment 
experts, such as John Ahman, of New Hampshire's Marathon House, 
to interdiction experts, like Admiral Yost, former U.S. Coast 
Guard Commandant, concurred that treatment is one aspect of 
demand reduction.
    Moreover, the Subcommittee Chairman, travelling with ONDCP 
Director Lee Brown, was favorably impressed by the inmates' 
treatment program utilized at the Roxbury, Massachusetts 
Women's Prison.
    This administration's basic rationale for treatment funding 
is removal from the Nation's user population of the 20 percent 
of the chronic or hardcore users, who consume upwards to 80 
percent of the cocaine in the country. Another rationale was 
explained by John Ahman of New Hampshire's Marathon House. 
Effective treatment, Ahman testified, means that ``after 
treatment, recovering addicts are less likely to be involved in 
crime and more likely to be employed,'' thus they become 
positive contributors to society rather than a cost or threat.
2. Administration Shift to Treatment
    The Subcommittee heard evidence of the Administration's 
overt shift to treatment at the expense of other demand 
reduction efforts.
    Accordingly, Brown testified that the President was seeking 
``$2.8 billion for treatment'' in the fiscal 1996 Federal 
budget for what Brown said were the ``one million drug users in 
this country who need and can benefit from treatment but cannot 
get it.''
    Seeking to explain the Administration's shift to 
proportionately greater drug treatment spending in 1995, Dr. 
Brown testified that ``the best way to reduce the overall 
demand for drugs and the related crime and violence is to 
reduce the number of hardcore drug users,'' adding that 
``treatment works.''
    In defense of this statement, Brown cited a June 1994 RAND 
study that reportedly found that ``drug treatment is the most 
cost effective drug control intervention'' and, Brown asserted, 
``for every dollar invested in drug treatment in 1992, 
taxpayers saved $7 in crime and health care costs.''
    In addition, Brown observed that ``chronic hardcore drug 
users comprise 20 percent of the drug user population but 
consume two-thirds of the drugs . . .'' From this, he argued 
that past strategies ignored this important part of the drug 
problem.
3. Contrary to ONDCP Assertions, Treatment Funding Grew in Past 
        Strategies
    The record indicates that ONDCP Director Brown's assertion 
that ``past strategies [sic] ignore this important 
[treatment]'' is not an accurate portrait of the past.
    While the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy does increase 
the proportion of overall spending devoted to treatment, past 
strategies have included--and have steadily increased--funding 
for treatment. In fact, Federal treatment funding has increased 
every year from 1982 to 1995.\110\
    \110\ See, e.g., Losing Ground Against Drugs: A Report on 
Increasing Illicit Drug Use and National Drug Policy, Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, December 1995, p. 6. Specifically, ONDCP's own 1995 
Budget Summary accompanying the National Drug Control Strategy shows, 
p. 238, that Federal treatment spending was $505.6 million in fiscal 
1982, yet Federal treatment spending today tops $2.65 billion. National 
Drug Control Strategy: Budget Summary, The White House, February 1995, 
p. 238.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Treatment Limitations: Bureaucracy
    At the Subcommittee's March 9, 1995 hearing, Walters 
testified that, ``between 1988 and 1993, we roughly tripled the 
treatment budget of the Federal government,'' while the 
``number of people treated per year declined.'' The decline, 
according to Walters, was the result of ``bureaucracy'' and 
money being channeled to ineffective treatment programs.
5. Treatment Limitations: Effectiveness
    The Subcommittee heard testimony indicating that low 
effectiveness plagues many drug treatment programs, while 
others suffer from an absence of any measure of effectiveness.
    Again, on March 9, 1995, Judge Bonner testified that ``the 
Clinton Strategy badly oversells the efficacy of the treatment 
of hardcore drug abusers'' and fails to acknowledge that 
``studies repeatedly indicate the low success rates associated 
with many programs . . .''
    Specifically, Bonner cited the work of Harvard University's 
Mark Kleiman, a former member of the Clinton Justice Department 
Transition Team, which shows that, ``even the most expensive 
treatment programs--long-term residential treatment programs 
costing as much as $20,000/patient--have success rates as low 
as 15 to 25 percent.''
    On questioning, Bonner reminded the Subcommittee that, 
``with respect to crack addicts . . . after treatment programs, 
less than 10 percent are free of drugs, free of crack after 24 
weeks, so you don't want to put too many eggs in that 
[treatment] basket.''
    In addition, Walters argued that the administration has 
failed to create the number of treatment ``slots'' necessary to 
accommodate its own stated treatment priority, and the current 
strategy has also failed to reduce the number of chronic, 
hardcore drug user numbers--which is rising.
    Specifically, Walters explained that the Federal 
``government [drug] treatment bureaucracy is manifestly 
ineffective,'' as evidenced by the Clinton Administration's 
increased treatment funding on one hand, and failure to provide 
sufficient treatment slots to effectuate this policy on the 
other; ``[a]though Federal drug treatment spending almost 
tripled between FY 1988 and FY 1994, the number of treatment 
slots remained virtually unchanged and the estimated number of 
persons treated declined--from 1,557,000 in 1989 to 1,412,000 
in 1994,'' Walters testified.
    Additionally, the contention that hardcore use has been 
reduced through heightened emphasis on treatment is belied by 
data gathered by the non-partisan Drug Abuse Warning Network 
(DAWN) from emergency rooms around the country, which shows 
that ``drug related emergency room cases . . . have reached the 
highest levels ever, in reporting going back to 1978'' and 
``[c]ocaine, heroin, and marijuana cases all increased sharply 
to record levels [in 1994].''
    Responding to questions from Congressman Condit (D-CA), 
Brown repeated that the Administration was turning away from 
strategies of ``previous administrations [which] placed a 
greater emphasis on casual drug [use] reduction,'' in favor of 
more treatment.
6. The June 1994 RAND Treatment Study: A Poor Basis For National Drug 
        Policy
    ONDCP Director Brown repeatedly sought to justify 
proportionately greater funding for treatment in the national 
strategy by reference to a June 1994 RAND study. The June 1994 
RAND study reportedly found that ``drug treatment is the most 
cost effective drug control intervention,'' according to Brown. 
Brown also credited the study for concluding that, ``for every 
dollar invested in drug treatment in 1992, taxpayers saved $7 
in crime and health care costs.'' By all indications, this was 
the centerpiece of Brown's request for ``$2.8 billion for 
treatment'' in the fiscal 1996 Federal budget.
    Such heavy reliance on this study, and the findings 
attributed to it, are reason for concern. First, Brown did not 
comment on the arguments raised by Walters, Bennett, and Bonner 
against increasing treatment spending vis-a-vis other demand 
reduction programs, including the arguments that treatment has 
low success rates and ``slots'' are unavailable.
    But the study itself also deserves special attention. The 
June 1994 RAND study was conducted by C. Peter Rydell and Susan 
S. Everingham and entitled ``Controlling Cocaine: Supply versus 
Demand Programs.'' While the study is of value, it is readily 
misinterpreted, has clear limitations, and operates from 
assumptions that few would accept.
    Before examining methodology, two observations on substance 
are important. First, the study is sound in condemning 
legalization. Second, the study implicitly condemns the 
Administration's ``controlled shift'' from interdiction to 
source country programs.
    On legalization, the RAND study notes the devastating 
effect that drug legalization would have on use, through the 
economic mechanism of reduced prices, or price elasticity. In 
1994, the average street or retail price for a pure gram of 
cocaine was $143; if cocaine were legalized, the estimated 
retail price would be $15-$20 per gram.\111\
    \111\ See RAND Study, supra, pp. 11, 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On ``controlled shift,'' the RAND study concludes that 
dollar-for-dollar, interdiction is more effective than pumping 
money into source country programs. Ironically, the 
Administration embraces the study's pro-treatment conclusion, 
yet must reject this anti-source country program conclusion; to 
date, Brown and the Administration have been silent on this 
discontinuity.
    As one drug policy expert favorably disposed to the RAND 
study conceded, ``[t]his analysis implies that the National 
Drug Control Strategy's `controlled shift' of resources from 
interdiction to source-country control might be a misstep.'' 
\112\
    \112\ Schnaubelt, Christopher, ``Drug treatment Versus Supply 
Reduction: Which Is Cheaper?,'' National Interagency Counterdrug 
Institute, May 1995, p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In any event, the RAND study has other serious limitations.
    First, the RAND study gives no attention to prevention 
programs; it simply does not take prevention into account as a 
viable means for reducing demand for cocaine. This is a serious 
omission, since prevention is widely recognized as a central 
and effective means for demand reduction.\113\
    \113\ See, e.g., Gleason, Thomas J., Hall, Douglas J., Oliver, 
William D., The Executive Summary of PRIDE Communities: A Grassroots 
Drug Prevention Effort for Healthy Teens, PRIDE, August, 1995; Burke, 
James, E., An Overview of Illegal Drugs in America, Partnership For A 
Drug-Free America, Fall, 1995; Johnson, Dr. Lloyd G., Monitoring the 
Future, December 1995, University of Michigan Institute for Social 
Research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Disturbingly, the President's 1995 Strategy is oddly 
consonant with the RAND study's omission of prevention, since 
it asserts that ``Anti-drug messages are losing their potency 
among the Nation's youth.'' \114\
    \114\ See National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February 
1995, p. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, the RAND study does not follow users for a 
meaningful time after active treatment, but notes only that 
cocaine consumption falls during residential and out-patient 
treatment. The study acknowledges that once treatment ends, 
only about 12 percent of out-patient and 17 percent of 
residential treatment recipients stop heavy use of 
cocaine.\115\ The Subcommittee finds that the Administration's 
treatment policy is seriously misguided as it centers on 12 to 
17 percent reductions in the smaller of the two user 
populations (i.e. the 20 percent of users who are hardcore).
    \115\ C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham, ``Controlling 
Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs,'' RAND Drug Policy Research 
Center, Santa Monica, California, June 1994, pp. 24-25, 88-89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, the RAND study favors treatment chiefly because it 
has a ``direct'' impact on users, minimizing supply side 
programs (e.g., interdiction, source country, domestic law 
enforcement, which affect a larger number of users because they 
have only an ``indirect'' impact on users. On the other hand, 
the RAND study acknowledges that higher street prices, 
resulting from interdiction, source country programs and 
domestic law enforcement, do reduce consumption.
    Finally, the RAND study uses a measure of effectiveness 
that is arguably flawed. It does not measure effectiveness by a 
reduction in cocaine users, but by reduction in the overall 
amount of cocaine consumed in the United States. Since the 
study holds that hardcore users, on average, use eight times 
the cocaine that casual users do, it becomes easy to justify 
treatment if this measure is employed.
    On the other hand, if the aim of national drug control 
policy is to reduce the number of users (not the amount of 
cocaine imported), a strategy favoring treatment would likely 
be catastrophic; while cocaine imports might fall, the total 
user population would grow as casual use climbed (even if all 
hardcore addicts at the time of initiation were cured). Experts 
agree that a certain percentage of casual users become hardcore 
users, thus the treatment strategy would soon become a losing 
battle to reduce the growing number of hardcore users 
multiplying out of the rapidly growing casual user population.
    In fact, that is exactly what the current strategy is 
fostering. Casual use is now rapidly growing, and with it the 
number of hardcore users, even if 10 to 17 percent of the 
original hardcore user population are being successfully 
treated.
    Most conservative extrapolations of the number of casual 
users that become hardcore addicts, for example those given by 
former Carter Cabinet member Joseph Califano, indicate that 
such a strategy would lead to a Nation awash in young cocaine 
addicts.
    Califano's Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at 
Colombia University recently concluded that, ``[i]f historical 
trends continue, the jump in marijuana use among America's 
children (age 12-18) from 1992 to 1994 signals that 820,000 
more of these children will try cocaine in their lifetime . . . 
of that number, about 58,000 will become regular cocaine users 
and addicts.''
7. Treatment Conclusions
    Essentially, all informed observers understand that 
treatment programs are part of any effective drug control 
strategy. On the other hand, the RAND study supporting a 
priority on treatment is flawed and omits prevention 
altogether. Moreover, the Administration's deliberate shift to 
treatment of older, chronic, hardcore addicts has not reduced 
the number of hardcore addicts. It has also come at an enormous 
opportunity cost, namely the skyrocketing of casual, juvenile 
use, and the associated increases in juvenile crime.\116\
    \116\ The December 1994 University of Michigan study of 8th, 10th 
and 12th-graders showed that marijuana use ``rose sharply in 1994, as 
it did in 1993, after virtually a decade of steady decline'' and that 
``student attitudes were becoming significantly less hostile toward 
illegal drug use;'' See also University of Michigan, Monitoring the 
Future Study, December 1994; ``Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A 
National Report, OJJDP, Department of Justice, September 1995, p. 20, 
which indicates that ``one in three juvenile detainees were under the 
influence of drugs at the time of their offense.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even advocates of drug treatment acknowledge that many 
programs are ineffective, and that long-term success rates are 
seldom higher than 20 percent. There can be little question 
that more research into varying drug treatment approaches and 
programs is necessary; finding effective methods for employing 
current treatment techniques and identifying new treatment 
techniques are important objectives.
    The implications of these findings are several. First, 
treatment should remain part of the overall strategy, but 
funding must be targeted at proven and effective programs, 
which may lie more often in correctional institutions.
    Second, treatment should not be raised in priority, or 
increased disproportionately in funding, as has occurred in 
1993, 1994 and 1995; that shift within the demand reduction mix 
has unfairly reduced the emphasis on prevention--with 
devastating results. Since 80 percent of drug use is casual use 
by youth, the strategy must be directed toward the at-risk 
population, especially since a large percentage of that 
population would thereafter become addicted.

                  III. Conclusions and Recommendations


                             a. conclusions


    On interdiction policy, despite an expert consensus that 
interdiction is vital, there has been a reduced emphasis on 
drug interdiction by the Clinton Administration. President 
Clinton is undeniably responsible for a downgrading of 
interdiction within the National Drug Control Strategy, and for 
interdiction budget cuts in 1993, 1994 and 1995, many of which 
explain an absence of previously deployed assets.
    Objective indicators of Federal support for the counter 
narcotics effort show a substantial reduction both in resources 
committed to key areas and in overall deployment of assets to 
drug interdiction. By admission of the Administration, key 
interdiction budget numbers are substantially below prior 
highwater marks (i.e. ``1992-1993 levels''), lines formerly 
defined as the minimum necessary for effective conduct of the 
Drug War.
    Despite the success of interdiction efforts in the late 
1980's and early 1990's, including innovative efforts such as 
resource ``pulses'' championed by former U.S. Coast Guard 
Commandant and Admiral Paul Yost, the Clinton administration 
has abandoned the earlier transit zone strategy in favor of an 
NSC strategy focused on the source countries, and ``economic 
development'' in those countries.
    On the source country programs, in December 1994, the 
President's own Interdiction Coordinator concluded that the 
source country programs were not yet ``viable,'' and were 
neither ``in place'' nor ``producing necessary results.'' \117\ 
No testimony given during 1995 by ONDCP Director Lee Brown 
offered any concrete evidence that this was not so.\118\
    \117\ Id.
    \118\ See. e.g. Testimony of Lee P. Brown, Subcommittee Hearings, 
March 9, 1995 and April 6, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In June 1995, the General Accounting Office conducted a 
comprehensive, in-country investigation of the source country 
programs and found that no one was ``in charge of antidrug 
activities in the cocaine source countries,'' there was a 
``lack of coordination'' and ``confusion over the role of the 
offices responsible for intelligence analysis and related 
operational plans,'' ``the Drug Enforcement Administration 
[was] reducing its presence in Colombia, [and] Southern Command 
[was] flying fewer sorties per month in support of source 
country interdiction,''
    United States funds in source countries ``are not always 
well managed,'' ``$45 million originally intended for counter 
narcotics assistance to the cocaine source countries were 
reprogrammed to assist Haiti's democratic transition,'' and 
despite a November 1993 promise that he would ``develop a 
separate strategy to combat the heroin trade'' within 120 days, 
President Clinton had not developed or signed any heroin 
strategy.
    These findings point up serious flaws in the source country 
shift strategy, and strongly suggest the need to rethink the 
1993 shift. The seeming unwillingness of the National Security 
Advisor to discuss with congressional leaders PDD-14 and its 
implications gives rise to added concern.
    On prevention, there was wide agreement that prevention 
should be a priority, both for the National Drug Control 
Strategy and for National leaders, including individual Members 
and the President. Congresswoman and Ranking Minority Member 
Thurman (D-Florida) echoed a position shared by Dr. Brown, the 
Subcommittee Chairman, and others on the Subcommittee, that 
some programs funded through the Safe and Drug Free Schools Act 
have been highly successful. On the other hand, it seems clear 
that serious accountability problems in the SDFS Act and its 
administration, including financial accountability, program 
validation, and concerns about waste, fraud and abuse require a 
closer examination. While the Subcommittee supports effective 
programs funded by SDFS, Members believe that the SDFS Act, the 
Department of Education's administrative role, and the 
programs' accountability mechanisms must be reviewed. The aim, 
however, is correcting deficiencies, not elimination of the 
national prevention effort. To this end, the Subcommittee is 
monitoring the two ongoing investigations by the Department of 
Education Inspector General and GAO.
    On treatment, nearly all informed observers understand that 
treatment programs are part of any effective drug control 
strategy. On the other hand, the RAND study supporting a 
priority on treatment is flawed and omits prevention 
altogether. Moreover, the Administration's deliberate shift to 
treatment of older, chronic, hardcore addicts has not reduced 
the number of hardcore addicts. It has also come at an enormous 
opportunity cost, namely the skyrocketing of casual, juvenile 
use, and the associated increases in juvenile crime.\119\
    \119\ The December 1994 University of Michigan study of 8th, 10th 
and 12th-graders showed that marijuana use ``rose sharply in 1994, as 
it did in 1993, after virtually a decade of steady decline'' and that 
``student attitudes were becoming significantly less hostile toward 
illegal drug use;'' See also University of Michigan, Monitoring the 
Future Study, December 1994; ``Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A 
National Report, OJJDP, Department of Justice, September 1995, p. 20, 
which indicates that ``one in three juvenile detainees were under the 
influence of drugs at the time of their offense.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even advocates of drug treatment acknowledge that many 
programs are ineffective, and that long-term success rates are 
seldom higher than 20 percent. More and better research into 
drug treatment approaches is necessary, since finding effective 
methods for employing current treatment techniques and 
identifying new techniques are both worthy objectives.
    The implications of these findings are several. First, 
treatment should remain part of the overall strategy, but 
funding must be targeted at proven and effective programs, 
which may lie more often in correctional institutions.
    Second, treatment should not be raised in priority, or 
increased disproportionately in funding, as has occurred in 
1993, 1994 and 1995; that shift within the demand reduction mix 
has unfairly reduced the emphasis on prevention--with 
devastating results. Since 80 percent of drug use is casual use 
by youth, the strategy must be directed toward the at-risk 
population, especially since a large percentage of that 
population would thereafter become addicted.


                           b. recommendations


    As indicated above, the Subcommittee arrived at its 
recommendations for an improved national drug strategy after 
review of the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy and an 
assessment of the status of the Drug War; the Subcommittee's 
review and assessment were based upon the receipt of expert 
testimony and reliable documentary evidence, reference to 
General Accounting Office studies commissioned by the 
Subcommittee, and contacts with experts inside and outside the 
Federal Government. Based on that searching inquiry, the 
committee advances the following recommendations for 
improvement of the Nation's national drug control strategy:
    First, to assure that the drug war becomes a top national 
priority, the President should, in close consultation with 
Congress, establish an overall budget that places counter 
narcotics high among national priorities.
    Second, to reverse the rise in casual drug use by 
juveniles, the President should, in close consultation with 
Congress, establish a National Drug Control Strategy which 
returns accountable prevention programs to highest priority 
among Federal demand reduction programs, and does not 
disproportionately favor increased drug treatment.
    Third, to reverse the rise in illegal drug importation, 
high drug availability, high drug purities, and low street 
prices, the President should, in close consultation with 
Congress, establish a National Drug Control Strategy which 
returns well-coordinated interdiction programs to highest 
priority among Federal supply reduction programs, and does not 
embrace further cuts in interdiction assets or funding, or 
otherwise shift interdiction assets or funding to source 
country programs, other than source country interdiction 
programs.
    Fourth, to restore accountability to ONDCP and the national 
drug policy, the President should return to promulgating, in 
compliance with the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988, a clear set of 
measurable and quantifiable annual goals as part of the annual 
National Drug Control Strategy.
    Fifth, to restore accountability, the overall National Drug 
Control Strategy should be more than descriptive, and more than 
a collection of laudable goals to which agencies aspire. The 
Strategy should become the standard against which success or 
failure of all agencies' antidrug programs are measured; the 
Strategy should also be the basic document against which future 
justification for antidrug funding at each agency is measured.
    Sixth, to restore accountability to demand reduction 
programs, the President, in close consultation with Congress, 
should establish workable accountability mechanisms and clear 
measures of effectiveness, either by statute or regulation. 
Prevention programs that have no means for assuring 
accountability, that cannot demonstrate achievement of any 
measurable goals, or that do not fund ``no use'' messages 
should not qualify for Federal monies and should be unfunded in 
subsequent budget cycles; similarly, treatment programs unable 
to assure accountability and effectiveness should be unfunded;
    Seventh, to restore accountability to supply reduction 
programs (e.g. source country programs), the President, in 
close consultation with Congress, should establish workable 
accountability mechanisms; while effectiveness may be more 
difficult to measure on the supply side, programs that have no 
means for assuring accountable expenditures or fail to meet 
previously established goals should be unfunded in subsequent 
budget cycles;
    Eighth, to restore accountability, coordination and 
meaningful ONDCP guidance of the overall Federal antidrug 
efforts, antidrug programs that receive their justification in 
the annual ONDCP Drug Strategy Budget should be identified with 
greater specificity, and the 50-plus agencies that receive 
funding through these programs should be required to place the 
details of each program before ONDCP Director prior to the 
production of succeeding annual budgets;
    Ninth, to restore accountability and coordination of the 
Nation's overall drug strategy, the White House Drug Czar 
should become the chief voice within the Administration on 
whether programs continue to be funded or not and at what 
levels, in consultation with OMB and the appropriations 
committees. However, in all antidrug efforts, the Drug Czar--
and not individual agency heads--should then be viewed by the 
President, OMB and Congress as the primary decision-maker on 
national drug policy;
    Tenth, the Drug Czar should be placed ``in charge'' of 
organization and coordination of the drug war (both as a 
``theater commander'' and demand reduction promoter), the 
President should be unequivocal, vocal and constant in his 
support of the Drug Czar, and should delegate to him or her the 
fullest authority possible on all issues relating to the 
Nation's counter narcotics efforts;
    Eleventh, in support of the Drug Czar, the President should 
insist that all relevant agency heads coordinate antidrug 
activities directly through that person, and insist that all 
major counternarcotics decisions be approved by that person. 
Moreover, the one document that should govern all coordination 
efforts should be the National Drug Control Strategy;
    Twelfth, the President should maximize the Drug Czar's 
authority by:
     Funding ONDCP itself back to late 1980's levels;
     Expressly delegating all authority for program 
prioritization and, in consultation with OMB, selected budget 
matters to ONDCP;
     Expressly giving ONDCP the authority to evaluate 
antidrug program effectiveness across all agencies of the 
Federal Government, and the authority to offer the primary 
recommendation to the President and Congress on program 
continuation, enhancement, reduction or elimination;
     Insisting that all agency heads meet personally 
with the ONDCP Director at least quarterly, following a format 
similar to the never-repeated October 1994 drug interdiction 
agency head conference
     Confirming that the White House Drug Czar's 
priorities are the President's priorities in all contacts with 
agency heads.
     Publicly supporting efforts of the White House 
Drug Czar and ONDCP through regular discussion in the media, 
with Cabinet Officials, and in periodic addresses to the Nation 
or other public speeches.
    Thirteenth, to demonstrate the President's constant 
concern, awareness and consistent support for the Nation's Drug 
Control Strategy, and the many public and private sector 
advocates and implementors of policies within or consistent 
with that Strategy, the President should speak out regularly on 
the topic, utilizing the presidential ``bully pulpit'' to 
elevate the issue and build public support for demand-and 
supply reduction efforts.
    Fourteenth, to bring the issue immediately back to the 
forefront of the Nation's agenda, the President should consider 
one or all of the following: an address to the Nation from the 
Oval Office or to a Joint Session of Congress on the topic of 
exploding teenage drug use; a series of White House Drug Policy 
Conferences, including one each on prevention, narcotics-
related law enforcement, interdiction, source country programs, 
treatment programs, and the role of the media; meeting 
personally with Congressional leaders on this issue at least 
once or twice annually, notably the Bi-Partisan Drug Policy 
Group (currently co-chaired by Congressman Bill Zeliff, R-NH, 
and Congressman Charles Rangel, D-NY) or a similar 
counternarcotics leadership group; and appoint a bipartisan 
White House Commission on ``Winning the Drug War,'' to study 
the evolving options in depth and report new policy ideas and 
findings to the President and Congress for swift action.
    Fifteenth, in specific support of supply reduction, the 
National Drug Control Strategy should:
     Elevate the drug war threat on the National 
Security Council's list of national security priorities to a 
top position;
     Restore funding for interdiction efforts, as 
recommended by the current U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, to 
``1992-1993 levels;''
     Restore funding to ONDCP for staff and policy 
support lost in 1993 Administration cuts;
     Restore funding for intelligence gathering lost 
between 1993 and 1995, including Navy P-3 AEW or additional E2-
C aircraft;
     Restore lost Ship Days, National Guard Container 
Search Works Days, and Flight Hours lost in 1993, 1994 and 1995 
Administration cuts;
     Restore to the Transit Zone the lost airborne and 
stationary radars, Jayhawk helicopters, Coast Guard Cutters and 
SES Patrol Boats, HU-25 Falcon Interceptor aircraft (five 
lost), E2-C Hawkeye AEW aircraft (4 lost), EC130-V AEW aircraft 
with rotodome (transferred to DoD), modernized sea-based 
aerostats (all lost), and personnel, including Transit Zone 
personnel and personnel formerly assigned to C3I East, 
subsequently consolidated into the Customs Domestic Air 
Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC) and suffering 
``serious manning shortages;''
     Fund excess U.S. Navy P-3 Airframes for conversion 
with AEW radars to be operated by U.S. Customs.
     Establish a process for direct, regular 
communications between the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) 
and the National Security Advisor, if not also between the USIC 
and the President;
     Issue the missing agency Implementation Guidelines 
that should have accompanied the November 1995 Heroin Strategy;
     Provide sufficient staff to the USIC (who now 
coordinates the nation's interdiction policy with a staff of 
6);
     Rescind or modify PDD-14 to reflect either a 
slower shift of resources or no shift at all toward source 
country programs;
     Insist on accountability mechanisms in source 
country programs that assure improved management, interagency 
coordination, clarity and targeting;
     Restore support for law enforcement's counter 
narcotics mission through a combination of greater flexibility 
by block grants, increasing the Byrne Grant and similar 
programs, heightened drug prosecutions in the Federal courts, 
and encouraging increased cross-over of high technologies 
available to the military but not yet economically to law 
enforcement;
     Encourage wider use of joint interagency task 
forces, by reducing jurisdictional conflicts, bureaucratic 
impediments, and restrictive regulations, as well as 
rechannelling funds to these joint efforts;
     Promptly replace, through efficient action by the 
State Department, critical source country assets that perish or 
are destroyed in pursuit of counternarcotics objectives 
believed by the President to be important to the overall U.S. 
counternarcotics effort, for example helicopters lost in 
efforts by the Columbian National Police during efforts to 
effectuate aims that are fully consistent with the U.S. source 
country and counternarcotics mission; \120\
    \120\ See, e.g., 14 November 1995 letter by Congressmen William H. 
Zeliff, Charles Rangel, Bill Clinger, Ben Gilman, Tim Hutchinson, Gene 
Green, Victor Frazer, Dan Burton, Peter Blute, Mark Souder, Robert 
Ehrlich, Bob Dornan, Jon Fox, Clay Shaw, Sue Myrick, and Donald Payne 
to The Honorable Robert Gelbard, Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Effectively utilize the Annual Certification 
Procedures contained in the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 
490A, 22 U.S.C. 229, et seq., to encourage counternarcotics 
cooperation between the United States and drug source 
countries.
    Sixteenth, in specific support of demand side, the National 
Drug Control Strategy should:
     Reaffirm the central place of drug prevention in 
the overall national drug strategy;
     Respond to recommendations that develop out of the 
GAO and Department of Education investigations of prevention 
program accountability, including the accountability of the 
Safe and Drug Free Schools Program;
     Encourage greater private sector and media support 
for drug prevention efforts nationwide;
     Offer greater flexibility to States and 
localities, through mechanisms such as a separate prevention 
block grant (independent of treatment), while clearly 
supporting only ``no use'' messages and ``no use'' curricula;
     Encourage greater cooperation among the prevention 
and law enforcement communities, while increasing support for 
such overlapping programs as the Byrne Grants, D.A.R.E. and 
G.R.E.A.T. programs;
     Fund only ``validated'' prevention programs;
     Encourage the establishment of accepted criteria 
for effective drug treatment and the creation of programs that 
are likely to meet these criteria;
     Encourage greater application of effective 
treatment programs in correctional institutions;
     Provide opportunities for the President to 
regularly and forcefully speak out on the issue;
     Explore means for establishing a larger number of 
overall treatment ``slots,'' so long as the treatment programs 
under consideration are effective;
     Reducing the Federal ``treatment bureaucracy'' to 
allow a greater flow of treatment funds to the states and 
localities outside Washington, D.C;
     Consider increased funding for research into 
potentially more effective drug treatment.
 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. KAREN L. THURMAN, HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, HON. 
    TOM LANTOS, HON. ROBERT E. WISE, JR., HON. MAJOR R. OWENS, HON. 
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, HON. LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, HON. PAUL E. KANJORSKI, 
  HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY, HON. THOMAS M. BARRETT, HON. BARBARA-ROSE 
 COLLINS, HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, HON. JAMES P. MORAN, HON. CARRIE 
            P. MEEK, HON. CHAKA FATTAH, AND HON. TIM HOLDEN

    In the mid-1980's casual illegal drug use reached an all 
time high of 22 million Americans. Today, approximately 11 
million Americans use illegal drugs. Of these 11 million 
Americans, twenty percent buy and use illicit drugs more than 
once per month. Total spending on this criminal activity is 
estimated to be $50 to $150 billion annually. In addition, 
according to the Institute for Health Policy, drug abuse costs 
society $66.9 billion due to direct and indirect medical 
expenses associated with illness, AIDS, death, and costs 
connected to the criminal justice system.
    Undeniably, drug use and abuse continue to be major 
problems in all segments of American society. The drug plague 
is an equal opportunity destructive force threatening the 
domestic security of all Americans regardless of race, gender, 
economic status, religion or political affiliation. We, in this 
Congress, owe each American parent and child the assurance that 
our commitment and concern for their ability to grow and mature 
in a drug-free world will be matched by appropriate funding 
levels and untempered by partisanship.
    We commend Subcommittee Chairman Zeliff for his leadership 
on the issue of drug use and abuse and urge him to continue his 
efforts to build bi-partisan coalitions that seek to examine 
causes and find solutions to the drug problem in America. 
However, the Majority report does little to end the scourge of 
drug abuse, promote responsible and effective drug policy or 
dispel the national fog of denial that hampers efforts at 
prevention, treatment, interdiction and eradication of drugs. 
On the contrary, this report distorts the successes and 
failures of the past and present. Without an honest 
examination, we cannot hope to overcome the problem of illicit 
narcotics use which exists in every village, town and city of 
this country.
    Therefore, in these Additional Views, we seek to set forth 
our common ground and areas of agreement with the Majority, 
provide a delineation of our areas of disagreement and promote 
cooperation with the Administration in our collective goal of 
eliminating the drug scourge on American shores. Hopefully, 
together we can renew a bi-partisan approach to the solution of 
this problem without rhetoric or distraction. These views 
contain points raised by Rep. Karen Thurman, Ranking Democratic 
Member of the Subcommittee and supported by Rep. Cardiss 
Collins, Ranking Democratic Member of the Full Committee at the 
Full Committee business meeting at which the report was 
approved.
    1) We agree with the Majority's concern and commitment for 
continued necessity of drug prevention efforts by the 
Administration and the Congress.
    2) We disagree with the Majority's assertion that drug use 
has ``risen markedly'' over the past three to four years. 
Casual drug use among young people began to rise in 1992, 
during the Bush Administration. According to the National 
Household Survey on Drug Abuse, the total number of illicit 
drug users has not changed since 1992. Counting marijuana, 
illicit drug use peaked in 1979, though use of illicit drugs 
other than marijuana peaked in 1985, during the Reagan 
Administration. Use of LSD and marijuana has risen during the 
past three years among high school seniors, but marijuana use 
is still far below the levels of the late 1970's. Seniors use 
of illicit drugs other than marijuana peaked in 1981 when 21.7 
per cent of students reported drug use at some time during the 
previous month, the figure was down to 10 percent in 1994.
    3) We agree in part with the Majority's contention that the 
overall attention being devoted to the anti-drug message by the 
media has been lower in recent years. However, we disagree with 
the Majority's contention that the level of anti-drug messages 
shown by the media is a result of a lack of attention by 
President Clinton. In particular the Majority points to the 
decrease in media exposure via Public Service Announcements 
(PSA's) by the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, a private 
non-profit group. Two years ago, partnership campaigns were 
allotted about $1 million a day in media usage. That number has 
decreased to $800,000 a day in media usage. However, the 
attribution of this decline to a lack of presidential attention 
not only misstates the facts on the level of significant 
presidential attention but evinces a serious misunderstanding 
of the decision-making process which PSA's undergo to reach the 
airways. Generally, PSA's are driven by social concerns and 
major news stories. As other pressing social issues such as 
AIDS prevention, homelessness and youth violence, began to 
become front page concerns, the public service announcements 
run by local stations began to reflect those concerns. In 
essence, the press of other social issues contributed to the 
decline of public service announcements with a singular focus 
on drug prevention.
    4) We disagree with the Majority's contention that the 
reduction in funding for drug interdiction efforts are below 
amounts necessary for an effective strategy. In 1993, the 
National Security Council concluded a study of international 
drug trafficking which became the basis for the Clinton 
Administration's interdiction strategy. The NSC found that to 
reduce cocaine availability more effectively, a stronger focus 
on source countries was necessary. The NSC determined that a 
controlled shift in emphasis was required--a shift away from 
past efforts that focused primarily on interdiction in the 
transit zones to new efforts that focus on interdiction in and 
around source countries. Moreover, GAO concluded that Congress 
should consider reducing DOD's detection and monitoring for 
drug interdiction funding for FY 1994 by at least $72 million. 
This funding level would return the services' counter drug 
costs of operating aircraft and ships to the 1990 level, when 
DOD first reported that it had achieved the ``full expansion'' 
of its drug control mission (Drug Control: Heavy Investment in 
Military Surveillance is Not Paying Off, GAO/NSIAD 93-220, 
September 1993).
    5) We agree with the Majority's observation the current 
White House strategy to reduce drug use departs from strategy 
under the Bush Administration. We note that in 1993, the Office 
of National Drug Control Policy convened a meeting of drug 
experts to review the relevancy of the goals established by the 
Bush Administration. The Strategy Goals Review Group was 
unanimous in its view that the Bush Administration did not 
fully address the problems of drug use and its consequences. 
The Group established fourteen goals to address the full range 
of issues dealing with reducing drug use among casual and 
hardcore drug users, reducing the consequences of drug use, 
improving the efficiency of law enforcement and goals to 
monitor progress with the source country strategy. These goals 
are being implemented and are the foundation of the annual 
National Drug Control Strategy Report.
    6) We disagree with the Majority's contention that 
President Clinton manifested little emphasis or interest in the 
drug issue. We note that the President delivered an address on 
drug issues before the United Nations and recently taped a 
Partnership for Drug Free America Public Service Announcement. 
Additionally, we note instances of substantial policy 
initiatives including the submission of FY 1996 budget proposal 
which puts forth $14.6 billion to fight drugs, the largest 
request ever made; elevation of the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy to a cabinet level position; the quick and 
decisive action to appoint General McCaffrey upon the 
retirement of Dr. Lee Brown, former Director of the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy and the proposal to increase 
staffing levels of the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
to 150 full time employees.
    7) We disagree with the Majority's criticism of Dr. Lee 
Brown's leadership as Director of the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy. We note that under Brown's leadership, the 
office made several important policy changes. Far from failing 
to take an active role in policy development, Brown shepherded 
a shift of emphasis to chronic, hardcore users; an increase in 
funding for prevention efforts; a ``big picture'' approach to 
the drug issue that views drug policy as a part of overall 
economic and domestic policy; and a shift in the focus of 
interdiction efforts away from transit zone interception to 
long term efforts in source and trafficking countries. 
Moreover, we note that in its report, The National Drug Policy 
Board: A Failure in the War on Drugs (H. Rep. 100-184, June 25, 
1987) this Committee found that President Reagan's National 
Drug Policy Board had failed to resolve interagency disputes, 
and had floundered in carrying out its budget responsibilities. 
A subsequent report, The National Drug Policy Board: Fighting 
the War Without a Battle Plan (H. Rep. 100-1063, October 1988) 
found that the Reagan Administration lacked any comprehensive 
strategy to set policy or allocate resources among the 
different agencies. Moreover, in September 1992, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee issued a report outlining several instances 
of questionable activities in the office of then Drug Czar 
Robert Martinez including the fact that forty percent of the 
Office's 109 employees where political appointees, a percentage 
far in excess of offices of similar size or policy making 
ability. Several of the appointees had little or no experience 
in drug policy.
    8) We applaud the shift in interdiction focus from transit 
zones to source countries. One could argue that to focus on 
transit zones is to fight the drug war once the planes are 
loaded and in mid-flight. With the ability to change flight 
paths, the technology to evade radar and the ability to use 
discrete landing areas, the focus on transit zones is bound to 
fail. However, a focus on crop destruction and other sanctions 
and incentives within source and trafficking countries is more 
likely to yield long term cooperation in reducing the supply of 
drugs in their countries of origin. Moreover, in combination 
with domestic treatment efforts which reduce demand, this 
strategy is more likely to yield long term benefits.
    9) The Majority argues that the Clinton Administration's 
focus on demand reduction and treatment have precluded 
formation of an effective interdiction (transit zone or source 
country) strategy. However, the Majority's budget cuts have 
undermined the Administration's efforts to implement its 
current strategy. The House Appropriation Subcommittees on 
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 
passed an amendment to the FY 1996 spending bill which 
effectively cuts more than half of the Administrations's 
requested funds for the Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement (INL) and rejects the Administration's proposal 
to consolidate all drug program funding within a single account 
at the State Department. The INL budget is the core of 
international drug control strategy. The State Department 
programs train and equip host country counter narcotics forces 
to destroy illegal coca crops, dismantle drug organizations and 
interdict drug shipments.
    10) We note that the Administration has used the 
Certification process as a means to fight the war on drugs and 
garner cooperation with source or transit countries. We note 
that in the 1996 certification process, the Administration 
determined that Colombia, Syria, Nigeria, Iran Burma and 
Afghanistan would lose U.S. economic assistance based upon each 
country's lack of efforts to combat drug trafficking within its 
borders. In 1995, President Clinton denied certification to 
eleven countries (including Burma, Iran, Nigeria, Syria and 
Afghanistan), which produce or distribute heroin or allow it to 
transit through their borders.
    11) We note that the Majority's report applauds prevention 
efforts such as the ``Just Say No'' programs without any 
studies of its effectiveness, yet castigates the Safe and Drug 
Free Schools Program using a two year old report from the 
Michigan State Office of Education. There is no indication that 
the Michigan experience is generalizable. Moreover, we note 
that the Majority report ignores and denies the existence of a 
national comprehensive study by the federal Department of 
Education (``How Do We Know They Work?: An Examination of 
Evidence for Effective in School Based Drug Prevention 
Programs,'' July 1995) which overwhelmingly found the Safe and 
Drug Free Schools programs effective.
    12) We note that the Majority's report: a) relies heavily 
on quotes from testimony of highly partisan witnesses, b) 
submits anecdotal evidence gathered in closed meetings with 
affected individuals decrying the reduction of military 
hardware as objective concerns and c) embraces anecdotes or 
hyperbole as fact. In quoting the testimony of Interdiction 
Commander Kramek, the report states ``interdiction returns 25-1 
on the dollar in benefits to the public for every dollar spent, 
a new statistic in the national dialogue'' (see pg. 51 of 
Majority report). There is no factual or statistical support 
for such a statement.
    13) We note that the Majority's report fails to draw 
meaningful comparisons because of its repeated mingling of 
calendar year and fiscal year figures.

                              DRUG POLICY

    Drug policy can be divided into three different areas--
prevention, treatment and interdiction. Over the course of the 
previous thirty years, different administrations have placed 
varying degrees of importance on each of the three major areas. 
The area of emphasis has defined the ensuing drug strategy and 
the concomitant level and disbursement of resources. Generally, 
Republican administrations have viewed prevention and 
unilateral interdiction efforts as the most important 
components of the drug war while Democrats have focused on 
prevention, treatment and multilateral interdiction efforts.

                             I. Prevention

    According to the GAO, researchers generally agree that 
there is a continuum of drug use, beginning with experimental 
use, moving to abuse and ending with dependence. However, they 
do not agree on how the points along the continuum should be 
determined. (Drug Use Among Youth, GAO December 1993, GAO/HRD 
94-24).
    Since the mid-eighties, casual drug use has declined 
significantly. Between 1981 and 1992 regular drug use among 
high school seniors declined about 2% per year. Additionally, 
the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
has found essentially no change since 1985 in the number of 
hard-core drug users. These hard-core users,\1\ consume the 
bulk of cocaine sold each year and are believed to be 
responsible for the majority of drug-related criminal activity.
    \1\ Hard core drug users are defined as those who use illegal drugs 
at least once a week and who exhibit drug-related behavioral problems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the decline in casual use and the stagnancy in the 
number of hard core users has been the national trend for over 
ten years, a recent study seems to indicate a slight increase 
in casual use among youth. In February 1994, the University of 
Michigan's Monitoring the Future Survey released 1993 figures 
which showed that marijuana, LSD and amphetamine use had 
increased slightly among high school students. The study shows 
that the greatest rise is a 4% increase in marijuana and 
hashish use among 10th and 12th grade students. In essence, 
this brings the percentage of 10th grade students who admit to 
marijuana use from 15 to 19% and the number of 12th grade 
students who admit to marijuana use from 21.9 to 26%. Given 
this slight rise in casual drug use, one could argue that 
rescission of funding for the Safe and Drug Free Schools must 
be replaced if this trend is to be reversed.

                     a. specific prevention efforts

The ``DARE'' Program
    The most widespread school-based drug prevention program is 
``Drug Abuse Resistance Education'' (DARE). DARE is primarily 
funded through the Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act, 
authorized under Title V of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act. Since its inception in 1987, funding for the 
Drug-Free Schools program (the major Federal school-based 
prevention program), increased steadily during the first 6 
years before suffering a consistent decrease in funding since 
FY 1992.
    DARE teaches kids to resist peer pressure and forego the 
use of drugs, alcohol and tobacco. According to a report 
published by the Office of Technology Assessment (Technologies 
for Understanding and Prevention Substance Abuse and Addiction, 
Report # OTA-EHR-597, September 1994), the DARE program is 
delivered in schools by uniformed police officers who have been 
trained in any of five regional training centers. DARE is 
delivered annually to about 5 million students in all 50 states 
at a total cost of about $50 million (an average annual cost of 
about $10 per student).
    OTA examined 17 published and unpublished evaluations of 
DARE. For the 11 studies that met minimal standards of 
methodological rigor, the average reductions in substance use 
were very small. Use among control schools and DARE schools was 
roughly equal. The few studies that were longitudinal found 
neither short-term nor long term reductions. However, OTA noted 
several positive benefits of the DARE program including 
favorable reactions among students; widespread political 
support; substantial funding and improved school-police 
relations.
Safe and Drug Free Schools Program
    One of the most successful prevention programs is the Safe 
and Drug Free School Program. Established by Congress, this 
program was slated for rescission and de-funding by the 
Republican Majority. However, despite unsubstantiated 
allegations of waste, this program continues to be an effective 
means of teaching drug awareness and resistance.
    In a report entitled ``How Do We Know They Work: An 
Examination of Evidence for Effectiveness in School-Based Drug 
Prevention Programs'' (July 1995), the Department of Education, 
found that Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities programs 
can have a significant positive impact on children and youth. 
In brief, the report found that students who participated in 
drug and violence prevention activities were less likely to 
abuse drugs and alcohol, less likely to resort to violence to 
solve problems, less likely to be arrested and less likely to 
ride with a drunk driver. Students were more likely to report 
having a positive self image and more likely to seek help and 
support for substance abuse and other problems when they needed 
it.
    Moreover, in a report requested by Subcommittee Chairman 
Zelliff and released on February 8, 1996, the Department of 
Education, Office of Inspector General examined nine school 
districts in eight states,\2\ and found that all nine districts 
had program elements that clearly discouraged drug use. In 
addition to drug avoidance, districts included program aspects 
designed to promote future resistance to drug use messages, 
including self-esteem training, conflict resolution and 
improvement of social behavior. Moreover, all nine districts, 
provided teacher and counselor training. Finally, all districts 
had established a system to gather input from a number of local 
groups in developing their annual plans for utilizing funds. 
The groups included parents, school district personnel, non-
public school personnel and community agencies.
    \2\ The nine School Districts examined were Dade County, Florida; 
Philadelphia School District, Pennsylvania; Long Beach Unified School 
District, California; Boston Public School District, Massachusetts; 
Seattle School District, Washington; St. Paul Public Schools, 
Minnesota; Round Rock Independent School District, Texas; Kansas City 
Unified School District, Kansas; and Elverta Joint Elementary School 
District, California.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Partnership for a Drug Free America Media Program
    In addition to school based programs, in the late 1980's 
the Partnership for a Drug Free America began a visual and 
print media campaign designed to discourage casual drug use and 
reduce drug abuse. The Partnership, a non-profit organization 
based in New York, produces public service announcements 
(PSA's) using donated time on local and national media outlets.
    Media used for Partnership ads is down 20% over the past 
two years (Advertising Age, Feb. 7, 1994). Two years ago, 
partnership campaigns were allotted about $1 million a day in 
media usage. That number has decreased to $800,000 a day in 
media usage. Despite its decline in donated air time, the 
Partnership remains one of the largest producers of PSA's in 
the nation. The partnership's large and extremely well 
coordinated media campaign may have played a large role in 
decreasing casual drug use. However, it is unlikely to have had 
any effect on hard core usage.
    However, the Majority's assertion that the reduction in 
media usage by the Partnership is related to Presidential 
concern on the drug prevention issue evinces a lack of 
understanding in the way local and national media allot time 
for public service announcements. Generally, PSA's are driven 
by the front page stories. Unfortunately, the media has devoted 
less time to drug stories. As other pressing issues such as 
AIDS prevention, homelessness and youth violence, began to 
become front page concerns, the public service announcements 
run by local stations began to reflect those concerns. In 
essence, the press of other social issues contributed to the 
decline of public service announcements with a singular focus 
on drug prevention.
    Partnership ads and school based prevention programs began 
about 10-12 years ago and have been common features in every 
community and school. This period of time would coincide with 
the entire academic careers of the 8th to 12th graders who are 
currently engaging in casual consumption. It would seem highly 
unlikely that this group would not have been exposed to one or 
both of these prevention strategies. Yet, despite their 
exposure, casual drug use escalates. Therefore, it would seem 
that prevention messages standing alone are not enough for the 
20-25% of high school students who may experiment with illegal 
drugs. However, that should not deter funding for education and 
prevention programs for the 75-80% of young people who seem to 
benefit from those programs. It seems that the experience of 
these two groups is telling. The decision to engage in casual 
use of drugs for a minority of the teenage population may be 
influenced by other social and economic influences including 
poverty, popular culture, peer pressure, family drug use, 
community attitudes, and other social and economic causes.

                             II. Treatment

    In 1994, the RAND Corporation reported that drug treatment 
is the most cost-effective drug control intervention, compared 
with other potential drug strategies. At the same time, a 
California study found that for every dollar invested in drug 
treatment, seven dollars were saved. The savings were 
attributed to decreased use of drugs, including alcohol, and 
significantly reduced costs related to crime and health care. 
The National Institute on Drug Abuse has reported similar cost/
benefit assessments for drug treatment.
    Hard core drug users are 20% of the drug using population. 
However, they account for 80% of the illicit narcotics 
consumed. Moreover, because of their drug involvement, hard 
core users commit the majority of drug related crimes. 
According to the Sentencing Project, a national nonprofit 
organization that promotes sentencing reform, of the 14 million 
arrests nationwide in 1993, 1.1 million were for drug offenses. 
Seventy percent of those arrests were for drug possession. As a 
result of tougher sanctions, including mandatory minimum 
sentences, arrests for drug possession have more than doubled 
since 1980. For example, the number of people in Federal prison 
on drug charges rose from 2,300 in 1980 to 13,000 in 1990, with 
the average term served increasing from 20 months to 66 months.
    Therefore, the long term benefits and cost savings make 
treatment the last reasonable option if prevention and 
interdiction fail.

                           III. Interdiction

    Under the Reagan and Bush Administrations, the ``war on 
drugs'' focused primarily on reducing the supply of illegal 
drugs entering the country. Invoking a call for ``zero 
tolerance'', Federal spending to combat drugs increased from 
$1.5 billion in 1981 to over $11 billion in 1992. Roughly 70% 
of the budget went toward law enforcement and interdiction 
efforts.
    Interdiction efforts under Reagan and Bush may have caused 
traffickers to change routes and decrease shipments of drugs 
which depend on bulk and volume to ensure profitability (e.g. 
marijuana), and precipitated a higher level of smuggling of 
drugs that can be easily concealed and retain high profit 
margins with diminished mass and quantity (e.g. heroin and 
cocaine).
    Basically, interdiction involves two broad functions: 
surveillance (detection and monitoring) and apprehension. The 
Department of Defense's mission is generally restricted to 
detection and monitoring. Although DOD is the primary agency 
with control over interdiction efforts, the U.S. Customs 
Service and the U.S. Coast Guard, share the overall leadership 
for air and maritime interdiction. Customs, the Coast Guard and 
the U.S. Border Patrol conduct the interception and 
apprehension phases of the interdiction efforts. The Department 
of State carries responsibility for diplomatic efforts to 
encourage cooperation in source countries and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) participates in training of 
other law enforcement personnel, surveillance and domestic 
apprehension.
    Despite the problems inherent in the division of turf, the 
efforts of these five entities may be limited even further by 
the nature of drug trafficking. The capability of military 
surveillance to increase drug seizures and arrests is limited. 
Louis Rodrigues of the General Accounting Office, testified 
before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, 
Committee on Government Operations that ``surveillance of 
suspect ships and planes is not the weak link in the 
interdiction process. The weak link is the inability to 
apprehend suspected smugglers in transit countries and at our 
borders'' . . . ``Success ultimately depends on the capability 
to apprehend smugglers, arrest people and seize cargo and 
equipment'', (Testimony, Hearing on Drug Control: Expanded 
Military Surveillance Not Justified by Measurable Goals or 
Results, October 5, 1993).
    A reliable and objective measurement of the effectiveness 
of an interdiction program designed to reduce supply is the 
price and availability of illegal drugs on American streets. If 
price increases while supply decreases, then efforts to reduce 
availability have succeeded. However, if price decreases or 
remains constant, while supply increases or remains constant, 
then efforts to reduce supply have failed.
    According to the General Accounting Office, the price, 
purity and availability of cocaine has remained relatively 
stable on American streets. (Testimony at hearing before the 
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service 
and General Government, Feb. 24, 1993).
    Therefore, by 1993 it became obvious that a strategy of 
transit zone interdiction with a goal of supply reduction was 
not effective. In 1993, the National Security Council concluded 
a study of international drug trafficking which became the 
basis for the Clinton administration interdiction strategy. The 
NSC found that to reduce cocaine availability more effectively, 
a stronger focus on source countries was necessary. The NSC 
determined that a controlled shift in emphasis was required--a 
shift away from past efforts that focused primarily on 
interdiction in the transit zones to new efforts that focus on 
interdiction in and around source countries. Traffickers are 
most visible and vulnerable at the production or distribution 
source.
    In order to carry out this philosophy, a three prong 
strategy developed which involved (1) providing assistance to 
nations that have a political will to combat narcotics 
trafficking; (2) conducting efforts to destroy trafficking 
organizations and (3) interdicting narcotics trafficking in 
source countries and transit zones. As a practical matter, 
implementation of this strategy involves eradication of 
narcotic crops in source countries; training of foreign law 
enforcement officers to de-stabilize trafficking networks; use 
of diplomatic initiatives to encourage cooperation from 
producing nations; sanctions against uncooperative drug 
producing or trafficking nations; and economic assistance for 
cooperative countries.
    DOD's surveillance mission supports the U.S. and foreign 
law enforcement agencies that apprehend suspects and seize 
cargo. Posse comitatus statutes prohibit DOD from the 
apprehension phase of interdiction efforts. Before 1989, 
civilian law enforcement agencies conducted limited 
surveillance operations of key transit areas in the Caribbean 
and the eastern Pacific. However, in 1989, the National Defense 
Authorization Act gave the Department of Defense the lead role 
in all federal efforts to detect and monitor drugs smuggled by 
air and sea. DOD's approach has been to layer ground, air and 
sea based radars near the South American countries where 
cocaine is produced and distributed.
    Funding for DOD's detection and monitoring mission was 
about $844 million at its height in FY 1993. Nearly two thirds 
of the funds were allocated to procurement, projects and 
related initiatives. The remainder, about $293 million was used 
to pay for the costs of operating aircraft and ships. Prior to 
the FY 1993 peak, DOD had spent about $212 million per year in 
funding its drug surveillance missions. In 1990, prior to the 
increased funding levels of the Bush Administration, the DOD 
announced that it had achieved ``full expansion'' of its role 
in deterring the flow of drugs. However, increases continued 
despite the failure of the DOD drug coordinator or the Office 
of National Drug Control to establish quantifiable goals or 
effectiveness measures for the DOD's role. (Drug Control: Heavy 
Investment in Military Surveillance is Not Paying Off, GAO/
NSIAD 93-220, September 1993).
    GAO concluded that Congress should consider reducing DOD's 
detection and monitoring for drug interdiction funding for FY 
1994 by at least $72 million. This funding level would return 
the services' counter drug costs of operating aircraft and 
ships to the 1990 level, when DOD first reported that it had 
achieved the ``full expansion'' of its drug control mission 
(Drug Control: Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance is Not 
Paying Off, GAO/NSIAD 93-220, September 1993).
Nature of Trafficking and Interdiction Efforts
    By the late 1980's, most cocaine entering the United States 
was flown directly from the producing countries of South 
America into northern Mexico, where the cargo was transported 
across the border by truck, tunnels and light planes. However, 
in response to joint U.S.-Mexican drug interdiction efforts in 
northern Mexico, traffickers began to adjust their routes and 
move operation and staging areas to Southern Mexico and 
neighboring Central American countries.
    The price growth in cocaine occurs after the drug crosses 
into the United States. It is estimated that processed cocaine 
costs about $4,000 per kilogram at a South American departure 
point. However, upon entering the United States, the same 
kilogram costs about $100,000 (Controlling Cocaine: Supply 
versus Demand Programs, Rand Corporation, 1994).
    Because the greatest price growth occurs after the product 
has passed beyond DOD surveillance or Coast Guard interception 
and apprehension efforts, it is unlikely that interdiction will 
be a cost effective deterrent to drug traffickers (Sealing the 
Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in 
Drug Interdiction, The Rand Corporation, 1988).
    In addition to lowering the profit margin, an effective 
strategy would seek to increase the personal risk to high 
ranking members of the drug trafficking organizations. To raise 
the personal risk, one would focus on capture of members of the 
current leading cartel's hierarchy and prevent the formation of 
new cartels. (For instance, the Clinton Administration's 
pressure on the Colombian Government to destroy the Medellin 
and Cali cartels). Obviously, these goals can only be 
accomplished through the commitment of segments of society 
including law enforcement agencies within drug-producing 
countries.
    Moreover, trafficker behavior is a major component to the 
long term success of any interdiction effort. Trafficker 
behavior is not static. Once a type of interdiction effort has 
been identified, traffickers tend to change their routes, mode 
of transportation, packaging methods and other aspects of the 
operation to elude detection. (Drug Control: Interdiction 
Efforts in Central America Have Had Little Impact on the Flow 
of Drugs, GAO/NSIAD 94-233, August 1994). Therefore, 
interdiction efforts which seek to concentrate equipment and 
personnel based on current behavior are likely to reach 
obsolence quickly. In essence, transit zone interdiction 
efforts became akin to squeezing a balloon--the air does not 
disappear, it is only redistributed.
    The Department of State's 1996 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report indicates that Mexico is a transit 
country for South American cocaine destined for the United 
States and a major country of origin for heroin and marijuana. 
According to the report, between 50 and 70 percent of the 
cocaine smuggled into the United States traveled through 
Mexico, entering primarily by land across the southwest border. 
In addition, about 23 percent of the heroin smuggled into the 
United States originated in Mexico. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service data show that Border Patrol narcotics 
seizures along the southwest border have risen. Between FY 
1990-93, the number of Border Patrol Narcotics seizures rose 
from around 4,200 to approximately 6,400, an increase of about 
50%. The amount of cocaine seized nearly doubled from about 
14,000 pounds in 1990 to about 27,000 pounds in 1993, 
(Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, 
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, March 10, 
1995, BORDER CONTROL: Revised Strategy is Showing Some Positive 
Results).
    The Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates that 
the decline in cocaine availability (from an estimated maximum 
of 539 metric tons in 1992 to an estimated maximum of 340 
metric tons in 1993) is an indication that counter narcotic 
efforts of the United States and its allies are impacting 
supply.
    Although use of heroin from Golden Triangle countries has 
become a concern in recent years, most interdiction efforts 
have been concentrated on cocaine from South America. 
Designated by the Office of National Drug Control Policy as the 
primary drug threat, cocaine traffickers and source countries 
have received the vast majority of attention from U.S. 
interdiction efforts.
Inhalants: The Other Drug Threat
    Concerns about the link between drug use and drug 
importation fail to consider the availability and increased use 
of drugs that do not require importation. According to the 1993 
Monitoring the Future study, inhalants rank as the third most 
used drug after alcohol and marijuana among 8th through 12th 
graders. The study found that 17% of adolescents say they have 
sniffed inhalants. However, this phenomena is not limited to 
young people. Approximately 1.8 million Americans abuse 
inhalants compared to about 1.6 million who use cocaine. In 
addition to the ``high'' from sniffing various compounds, part 
of the attraction among young people is that the substances are 
legal, easily available and cheap.\3\ Sniffing these substances 
(called ``huffing'') can lead to long term and permanent 
neurological damage. Some researchers have found that sniffing 
may be more hazardous than other drug use. According to Neil 
Rosenberg, M.D., a Denver neurologist, long-term sniffing leads 
to irreversible brain damage, muscle incoordination and damage 
to the kidneys, heart and bone marrow. Other complications 
include hepatitis, jaundice, dementia, hearing and memory loss 
and blindness. Additionally, because fumes of many substances 
pass directly to the brain, death can result from a single 
usage.
    \3\ Among the easily available substances commonly sniffed are air 
freshener, fabric protector (e.g. Scotch guard), nail polish remover, 
paint, moth balls, butane, Freon, hair spray, and airplane glue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is estimated that national fatalities from sniffing 
commonly available legal substances are about 1000 people per 
year. However, no one knows the exact number of fatalities from 
inhalant abuse because no national registry of inhalant-related 
injuries or deaths exists. Moreover, local death registries are 
often inadequate because Medical Examiners often attribute 
huffing deaths to suffocation, suicide or accidents.

                             IV. Conclusion

    Undeniably, drug use and abuse continue to be major 
problems in all segments of American society. The drug plague 
is an equal opportunity destructive force threatening the 
domestic security of all Americans regardless of race, gender, 
economic status, religion or political affiliation. We, in this 
Congress owe each American parent and child the assurance that 
our commitment and concern for their ability to grow and mature 
in a drug-free world will be matched by appropriate funding 
levels and untempered by partisanship.
                                  Karen L. Thurman.
                                   Henry A. Waxman.
                                        Tom Lantos.
                                Robert E. Wise, Jr.
                                    Major R. Owens.
                                    Edolphus Towns.
                         Louise McIntosh Slaughter.
                                 Paul E. Kanjorski.
                                Carolyn B. Maloney.
                                 Thomas M. Barrett.
                              Barbara-Rose Collins.
                             Eleanor Holmes Norton.
                                    James P. Moran.
                                    Carrie P. Meek.
                                      Chaka Fattah.
                                        Tim Holden.
            ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, JR.

    Two additional views not contained in our original report, 
because they were not available at the time, warrant a short 
mention.
    First, the appointment of General Barry R. McCaffrey as the 
Nation's latest Director of the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP), or ``Drug Czar,'' is highly promising. After 
three years of poorly defined, poorly conceived and poorly 
executed national drug control policy, the President has 
appointed an individual of exceptional abilities and 
experience, one whom both Republican and Democratic Members of 
Congress should be proud to work with and vigorous in 
supporting.
    Second, upon confirmation by ONDCP that another distributed 
ONDCP document is available for public discussion, I want to 
point out the existence of the October 26 and 27, 1994 ONDCP/
SOUTHCOM Counterdrug Conference After Action Report. This 
report contains valuable findings and recommendations which 
have, so far, been unacted upon by the President. Among the 
multi-agency conference's consensus findings, distributed by 
then-Southern Command General Barry R. McCaffrey and then-ONDCP 
Director Lee P. Brown, are a number of continuing needs:
     ``define the chain of command for implementing 
source-country strategy and establish an overall regional 
coordinator with adequate authority and responsibility to 
coordinate and execute strategy in the region;''
     ``creat[e] an interagency regional mechanism for 
planning and executing the strategy;''
     ``develop a coherent and consistent budget that is 
objective and threat-driven rather than program-driven [and] 
there needs to be an interagency willingness to terminate 
ineffective programs and to promote resource-effective 
programs;''
     ``regain American public awareness of the linkage 
between drugs and violent crime as to generate a clear mandate 
to prosecute the counterdrug effort on a continuing basis.''
    The internal agency consensus memorialized in this late 
1994 report continues to be instructive in 1996; with the 
thoughtful appointment of General McCaffrey, this report's 
ideas should again be considered seriously by the President. 
Among this report's forward-looking and detailed suggestions:
     ``To define a chain of command for implementing 
the source-country strategy . . . seek leadership from the top, 
the President, the Secretary of State, and Assistant Secretary 
of State; develop a regional coordination entity with authority 
to implement a strategic plan; [and] develop an interagency 
coordination process with authorities and responsibilities.''
     ``To rekindle the American public's and Congress' 
interest in supporting the supply side of this nation's 
counterdrug effort . . . ONDCP should develop a coherent and 
consistent message to Congress and the American people 
regarding the relationship of drugs to violent crime . . . ; 
all departments and agencies should support the ONDCP message 
and develop appropriate messages for use in their Public 
Diplomacy Programs; the United States should develop an 
implementation plan in Latin America tied to the reduction of 
drug abuse, drug trafficking and violent crime in the United 
States.''
     ``To develop a mechanism for executing the 
National Drug Control Strategy . . . Provide senior 
Administration leadership that has sufficient authority to 
identify and delegate responsibility to a regional planning 
coordinator in the field [and] support planning in the field 
and coordination at all levels; create a streamlined regional 
mechanism for planning and execution of the strategy with the 
necessary authority and responsibility to plan and coordinate 
programs; . . . review the National Drug Control Strategy to 
ensure that its components remain realistic from a budgetary 
perspective; develop an implementation plan that allows the 
community to `stay the course,' . . . ; consider options for a 
Drug Summit this fiscal year [noting] there was a consensus 
that this idea had merit but could only `make a difference' if 
concrete actions are identified and coordinated in advance 
[and] the United States must be prepared to prime the pump.''
     ``To raise the level of consciousness of [the 
American people, Congress and counterparts in foreign 
governments] not directly involved in strategy execution but to 
have an impact on that execution . . . develop a coherent and 
consistent message to the American people that will raise the 
priority of drugs on the list of public concerns [and] recouple 
drugs to crime; create a better relationship with Congress 
through a more consistent budget package [and] speak with a 
single voice to Congress and be prepared to present a clear set 
of effectiveness measurements; develop an implementation plan 
that realistically can persuade our allies that the drug fight 
is in their interest [and] this is not only a U.S. fight; [and] 
raise the level of drug discussions and action to the forefront 
. . . .''
     ``To maximize the impact of counterdrug resources 
in a declining budget environment . . . review tools to avoid 
high-cost resources with small payoff . . . ; determine if 
resources should be spread broadly and thinly or focused on 
critical nodes like the center of gravity, Peru . . . ; develop 
a strategy that includes required resources; emphasize training 
[and] use Special Forces as a multiplier to train host country 
forces; establish a lead person in each Country Team with the 
authority to coordinate all resources; [and] seek support from 
other countries [and] for example, request the European 
militaries to contribute material and personnel support to the 
counterdrug effort.''
     ``To present a coordinated budget providing the 
necessary resources to implement the National Strategy . . . 
develop a budget that is threat-driven as opposed to program 
driven; raise the level of senior leadership involvement in the 
counterdrug budget process . . . ; develop an interagency 
process that provides for a more consistent budget review . . . 
; establish a process to eliminate ineffective programs early 
and to reinforce effective programs; determine the department 
or agency best suited to accomplish the task and allocate 
resources accordingly; create an understanding with Congress 
through a more consistent, coherent budget package that 
reflects fiscal reality, a single voice, and implementation of 
the counterdrug strategy; [and] continue the dialogue to 
determine new, innovative means to develop the interagency 
counterdrug budget process.''
     ``To develop approaches to Latin American drug-
producing nations that will enhance their willingness to combat 
illicit production and trafficking . . . make trafficker 
organizations a serious liability for host county . . . ; 
illustrate the linkage between drugs and corruption or 
violation of sovereignty; assist host countries economically to 
fight the drug industry; separate the drug issue from other 
issues in-country; . . . negotiate an investment treaty with 
countries in return for stopping drugs; focus on the damage 
drugs can cause each country's political structure . . . ; 
assist in strengthening judicial institutions in Latin America 
. . . .''
    Other observations in the report that bear mentioning 
include the facts that:
     ``. . . there is an explicit correlation between 
the illicit use of drugs in the United States and the alarming 
rise in the violent crime rate [since] over 11.4 million 
Americans are using drugs today; use by children is on the 
rise; heroin use is growing, with over 600,000 heroin addicts 
on the streets of America; and cocaine use claims more than 2.1 
million cocaine addicts. [In addition,] DEA presented national 
statistics that indicated that 75 percent of the violent crime 
committed in the United States is directly attributed to drug 
use [and] . . . as USSOUTHCOM summarized, the annual cost of 
drug abuse is approaching $70 billion dollars a year and over 
10,000 lives.''
     ``The counterdrug strategy must be led from the 
top down, with Washington leadership pursuing policy and budget 
support and championing the need for the supply-side 
counterdrug effort. There also needs to be a command and 
control entity outside Washington to lead development of a 
strategic plan and oversee its implementation.''
     ``The United States lacks a regional action plan 
that governs the actions and resourcing of all agencies in a 
coordinated and coherent fashion [and] all agreed that there 
was no one person or agency in charge with a totally regional 
view . . . [and] it is critical to execution of the strategy . 
. . that a `source country coordinator' be identified and given 
the authority to act effectively.''
     Finally, ``regardless of the reasons, a clear 
conclusion of the conference was that those charged with 
implementing the drug strategy have a message problem.''
    Based on the Subcommittee's thorough, year-long evaluation 
of the Clinton Administration's first three years of drug 
policy performance, it is clear that virtually all of these 
criticisms and recommendations are as valid today as they were 
in October 1994. After three years of costly inaction, what has 
recently changed is that the President may be recognizing the 
enormous consequences that flow from poor coordination, low 
emphasis and relative inaction. I continue to believe that we 
can and will eventually win the drug war; we can and must 
significantly reduce the number of young casualties the Nation 
takes annually.
    I also believe that the President has, belatedly, made the 
right choice in selecting General Barry McCaffrey to lead his 
national effort to get the drug war back on track. Few people 
know the shortcomings of current policy as well as General 
McCaffrey, and few are better suited to put the 
counternarcotics and national anti-drug effort back on track. 
With these additional views, we must all now look forward.
                             William H. Zeliff, Jr.
                  ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. MARK SOUDER

    In addition to the findings and conclusions of our year-
long investigation, contained in the foregoing comprehensive 
report, I would like also to offer a few statistics from Ft. 
Wayne, my own home district. These terrible new numbers 
illustrate, convincingly I believe, how important it is that we 
refocus the Nation on the drug war, and recognize both its 
direct costs and its link to rising violent juvenile crime.
    In short, our Nation's future depends on meeting this 
national and personal security threat head on, and doing so 
immediately. We have suffered three years without presidential 
leadership, and we cannot continue to prosper as a nation 
without refinding our conviction on this issue.
    Here is what my own district is experiencing, and why 
stronger support for our efforts from the DEA and others is 
vital: In just two of the last four years, LSD confiscations 
from youth in Fort Wayne jumped from approximately 90 to more 
than 9,000--a staggering 100-fold increase. Police reports also 
indicate that, between 1994 and 1995, the total weight of drugs 
confiscated more than doubled, from 10,072 grams in 1994 to 
20,443 in 1995. These numbers indicate the epidemic that is in 
our midst, and the need to revitalize our demand-reduction and 
supply-reduction efforts, both at home and abroad. Perhaps most 
importantly, we need leadership again--in our communities and 
from the top, starting with the President. If the President 
himself is not engaged, we cannot expect again to make the kind 
of progress we were making in the late 1980's.
                                       Mark Souder.

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