[House Report 104-18]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



H.L.C.

                                                                       
104th Congress                                             Rept. 104-18
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 1st Session                                                     Part 3
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                  NATIONAL SECURITY REVITALIZATION ACT

_______________________________________________________________________


                February 6, 1995.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______


   Mr. Combest, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                         [To accompany H.R. 7]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was 
referred title V of the bill (H.R. 7) to revitalize the 
national security of the United States, having considered the 
same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend 
that the bill as amended do pass.
  The amendments (stated in terms of the page and line numbers 
of the introduced bill) are as follows:
  Page 34, line 10, strike ``intelligence,''.
  Page 34, line 11, insert ``, but not including intelligence 
activities reportable under title V of the National Security 
Act of 1947'' after ``support''.
  Page 34, line 19, insert ``, but not including intelligence 
activities reportable under title V of the National Security 
Act of 1947'' after ``support''.
  Page 39, beginning on line 5, strike ``control, 
communications or intelligence'' and insert ``control or 
communications''.
  Page 39, line 14, insert ``or intelligence activities 
reportable under title V of the National Security Act of 1947'' 
after ``contributions''.
  Page 50, strike line 17 and all that follows through line 11 
on page 53 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

SEC. 512. CONDITIONS ON PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE TO THE UNITED 
                    NATIONS.

  (a) In General.--The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 
(22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is further amended by adding the 
following new section:
  ``Sec. 12. (a) Provision of Intelligence Information to the 
United Nations.--Before intelligence information is provided by 
the United States to the United Nations, the President shall 
ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Defense, has established guidelines governing the provision of 
intelligence information to the United Nations which shall 
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure in accordance with section 103(c)(5) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)).
  ``(b) Periodic and Special Reports.--(1) The President shall 
periodically report, but not less frequently than semiannually, 
to the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House and the Committee 
on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the Senate on the types of intelligence provided to the 
United Nations and the purposes for which it was provided 
during the period covered by the report. The President shall 
also report to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the Senate, within 15 days after it becomes 
known to him, any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence 
provided to the United Nations.
  ``(2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first 
sentence of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to 
the provision of intelligence that is provided only to, and for 
the use of, United States Government personnel serving with the 
United Nations.
  ``(c) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate 
or assign the duties of the President under this section.
  ``(d) Improved Handling of Intelligence Information by the 
United Nations.--The Secretary of State (or the designee of the 
Secretary), in consultation with the Director of Central 
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall work with the 
United Nations to improve the handling, processing, 
dissemination, and management of all intelligence information 
provided to it by its members.
  ``(e) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to--
          ``(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the 
        Director of Central Intelligence to protect 
        intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
        disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); 
        or
          ``(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of 
        title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
        413-415).''.
  (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
shall take effect 45 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.

                                Purpose

    The principal purpose of H.R. 7, as amended, is to 
revitalize the national security of the United States.

                       Items of Special Interest

    The Committee reviewed Sections 502, 504, and 512 of H.R. 
7, the National Security Revitalization Act. As introduced, 
Section 502 requires monthly written reporting under Section 4 
of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 on any 
assistance or support for ongoing or new United Nations 
peacekeeping operations, including intelligence support. The 
reports are to be submitted by the 10th of each month to the 
House International Relations Committee, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, and the Appropriations Committees of the 
House and Senate. Section 504 of H.R. 7 requires 15 days prior 
notification under Section 7 of the United Nations 
Participation Act of 1945, to the designated congressional 
committees, before any agency or entity of the United States 
Government makes available to the United Nations any assistance 
(valued at $1 million or more, $5 million or more if 
reimbursable) or facility to support or facilitate its 
peacekeeping activities. In emergency situations, notification 
may be provided within 48 hours after such assistance or 
facility is made available. The definition of ``assistance'' is 
broad and covers the provision of ``support * * * or 
services.'' The definition includes ``intelligence 
assistance.''
    As introduced, Section 512 requires that the United States 
may provide intelligence to the United Nations only pursuant to 
a written agreement between the President and the Secretary 
General of the United Nations. The agreement must specify:
          The types of intelligence to be provided to the U.N.;
          The circumstances under which intelligence may be 
        provided; and
          The procedures to be observed by the U.N. concerning 
        persons who shall have access and the procedures to be 
        observed by the U.N. to protect the intelligence 
        against disclosure not authorized by the agreement.
    Section 512 would require notification to Congress of not 
less than 30 days prior to the entry into force of the 
agreement. The agreement itself is not to be effective for a 
period exceeding one year. Section 512 provides that the 
President may delegate the authority and assign the duties of 
the President under this section only to the Secretary of 
Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence. Finally, 
Section 512 excepts from these requirements the provision of 
intelligence that is provided only to and for the use of United 
States Government personnel serving with the United Nations. It 
also excepts from its requirements the provision of 
intelligence that is essential for the protection of U.S. 
nationals, including members of the United States Armed Forces 
and civilian personnel of the United States Government.

                               background

    With the collapse of the Cold War order, worldwide 
strategic balances shifted, with the result being the demise of 
power structures that had for along time held political and 
ethnic rivalries in check. Thus, in recent years, the world has 
witnessed increased regional tensions, and innumerable 
conflicts, that while generally small in scale, are of concern 
due to their potential to escalate and because they often 
jeopardize large numbers of civilians.
    From 1988 to the present, the United Nations has undertaken 
21 new peacekeeping operations. This is almost double the 
number it pursued from 1947-1988. Besides the sheer numbers, 
the U.N. has discovered that the nature of its peacekeeping 
missions has changed as well. Many more now involve ongoing 
hostilities between opposing sides rather than armistices and 
truces, as well as deep-seated, seemingly intractable ethnic 
disputes. The increased danger to U.N. personnel operating 
under such circumstances has led some within the U.N. to call 
for more efficient use of tactical information or intelligence 
to better protect peacekeepers.
    For its part, the United States has shared this view. In a 
1992 speech before the United Nations, President Bush pledged 
that the United States would, `` * * * work with the United 
Nations to best employ our considerable lift, logistics, 
communications and intelligence capabilities to support 
peacekeeping operations.'' United States involvement in U.N. 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and related activities has 
increased markedly in the past several years, but not without 
significant controversy. The intractability of the conflicts 
and poor management by the U.N. have led many to question U.N. 
capabilities in this area. Then, too, the initial success in 
Somalia was later overshadowed by the deaths of 18 U.S. 
servicemen in Mogadishu in October 1993. The loss of these 
soldiers led many to question even more intensely the extent of 
U.S. national security interests in these matters, and the 
wisdom of burdening the U.S. military with these activities, at 
a time when the military is experiencing sharp downsizing and 
funding reductions.
    In May 1994, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD) 25, which established more stringent guidelines 
for U.S. support to and participation in peace operations. 
Although intelligence support to the U.N. has previously been 
authorized by presidential decisions, in PDD-25, President 
Clinton emphasized the importance of being as responsive as 
possible to multilateral peacekeeping and humanitarian 
activities where these activities advance U.S. foreign policy 
goals and national security interests. PDD-25 states that 
providing intelligence information should be considered one 
ingredient of this responsiveness, provided a determination is 
made that intelligence sources and methods will be protected.

                                Overview

    The Committee's goal in examining Section 512 of the 
National Security Revitalization Act was not to question 
whether nor not or to what degree it is in the United States' 
interest to become involved in U.N. peacekeeping activities. 
Rather, the Committee recognized that, in order to best assess 
the merits of Section 512, the Committee should first review 
what U.S./U.N. intelligence sharing was already taking place. 
Having established what ``intelligence sharing with the U.N.'' 
encompassed, the Committee would then review the procedures by 
which intelligence is shared with the U.N. and the purposes for 
which intelligence is provided. Lastly, the Committee would 
consider the effect of Section 512 on intelligence support for 
U.S. diplomatic and policymaking activities.
    On Thursday, January 19, 1995, the Committee held a hearing 
on ``Intelligence Sharing with the U.N.'' The hearing was held 
initially in open session, but was later closed so that more 
sensitive issues pertaining to intelligence community 
procedures for providing intelligence information would be 
discussed.
    The witnesses for the hearing were: Toby T. Gati, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; Ambassador 
K.F. Inderfurth of the United States Mission to the United 
Nations; Ambassador Hugh Montgomery, Special Assistant to the 
Director of Central Intelligence for Foreign Intelligence 
Relationships; and Major General Patrick M. Hughes, United 
States Army, Director of Intelligence, J-2, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.
    Testimony during the hearing clarified for the Committee 
exactly what intelligence sharing with the U.N. involves. U.S. 
policymakers working with the U.N. use intelligence information 
as part of their broader diplomatic efforts to advance U.S. 
foreign policy interests with other governments and U.N. 
agencies. This may include support to peacekeeping activities, 
humanitarian missions, sanctions enforcement, nonproliferation, 
opposition to ethnic cleansing and other issues clearly of 
importance to U.S. foreign policy.
    Specific criteria must be met before the United States 
Government may share intelligence with the United Nations. 
First, a decision must be reached among senior policymakers 
that the U.N. mission in question is an activity the U.S. 
Government wishes to support in this way. The State 
Department's Bureau for Intelligence and Research (INR) plays a 
central role in coordinating foreign policy objectives with 
intelligence capabilities. If the decision is made to support a 
U.N. activity with intelligence, intelligence community 
representatives meet to determine the kinds of information that 
may be provided without compromising any sources and methods. 
The National Security Act of 1947 requires that the Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI) protect sensitive intelligence 
sources and methods.
    Once these concerns have been satisfied, the Joint Staff is 
normally tasked to transmit the intelligence information. The 
U.N. Support Desk in the U.S. National Military Joint 
Intelligence Center in the Pentagon supports the U.N. with 
sanitized intelligence on both a daily and ad hoc basis. 
Intelligence information can be transferred from the Pentagon 
to the U.S./U.N. mission in New York, and ultimately to the 
Situation Center in the U.N. The Joint Staff Intelligence 
Center also provides U.S. Unified Commanders overseas with 
sanitize Intelligence to augment their support to U.N. 
operations in their areas of responsibility.
    Witnesses described to the Committee several instances in 
which the current intelligence sharing arrangement with the 
U.N. has yielded specific foreign policy successes. Information 
was shared with Security Council members on Iraqi troop build-
ups, in support of a multilateral effort to prevent a repeat of 
Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait. Intelligence has also assisted 
United Nations Special Commission in Iraq (UNSCOM) inspectors 
in their attempts to enforce U.N. sanctions calling for the 
dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. 
U.S. imagery has helped U.N. relief agencies determine the 
magnitude and direction of refugee flows within and from 
Rwanda. Timely intelligence sharing has also helped save the 
lives of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 
peacekeeping troops in Bosnia by locating threatening 
artillery.
    Some Members expressed concern with providing intelligence 
information to the U.N. A multinational organization, the U.N. 
is not known for following security procedures, either for its 
personnel or for the information it acquires. thus, when 
intelligence is provided to the U.N., it is handed over with 
these institutional shortcomings in mind. There have been 
instances of unauthorized disclosures of information, but no 
evidence was presented to the Committee suggesting that 
intelligence sources and methods have at any time been 
compromised.

                              section 512

    Section 512, as introduced, was opposed by the 
Administration on the grounds that it would severely undercut 
U.S. foreign policy initiatives, would not improve the security 
interests of the United States, and would unconstitutionally 
restrict the President's ability to conduct foreign policy. In 
fact, it was argued that requiring a written agreement between 
the President of the United States and the U.N. Security 
General before any intelligence sharing could take place would, 
as a practical matter, stop intelligence from being shared. It 
was judged that because of sensitivities relating to possible 
public disclosure of the details of such an agreement to share 
intelligence, executing a high-level, formal, written agreement 
would be unacceptable to both the United Nations and the United 
States.
    Moreover, U.S. policymakers believe that the current system 
allows intelligence to be provided on a case-by-case basis, 
when and how the U.S. wishes to make that information 
available. A written agreement would make this process less 
flexible. In fact, testimony was given asserting that an 
agreement executed by the President and Secretary General would 
create an obligation on the part of the U.S. to provide 
intelligence to the U.N. when requested. The flexibility of the 
current system allows the U.S. to provide information at a 
moment's notice, if need be, to make rapid decisions about what 
should be conveyed, and work the process through a U.S.-
controlled system of safeguards.
    Concerns was expressed that Section 512 would intrude upon 
the power of the President and the statutory prerogatives of 
the DCI, who is responsible for protecting sources and methods. 
Witnesses argued that the provisions of Section 512 conflict 
with the President's sole authority to negotiate and enter into 
executive agreements with the content and timing of his 
choosing. Section 512 would impinge on the President's role in 
determining what will or will not be communicated in diplomatic 
conversations. Finally, the argument was made that Section 512 
would limit the President's ability to delegate his authority, 
thus impinging on two core Executive Branch functions--the 
collection and dissemination of intelligence.

               Committee Amendments to Title V of H.R. 7

    The Committee considered and adopted three amendments to 
Title V of the bill.
    After considering the testimony and responses to Members' 
questions on Section 512, as introduced, the Committee adopted 
a substitute. The amendment modifies the United Nations 
Participation Act of 1945 to add a new Section 12 regarding 
conditions on the provision of intelligence to the United 
Nations. The amendment sets out two non-delegable 
responsibilities for the President:
    Before intelligence is provided by the United States to the 
United Nations, the President must ensure that the Director of 
Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretaries of 
State and Defense, has established guidelines governing the 
provision of intelligence to the United Nations that protect 
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
    Periodic and special reports by the President regarding 
intelligence provided to the United Nations are required. 
Periodic reports must be made not less frequently than 
semiannually to the Intelligence and International Relations 
Committees of the House and to the Intelligence and Foreign 
Relations Committees of the Senate specifying the types of 
intelligence provided to the United Nations and the purposes 
for which the intelligence was provided. This requirement does 
not apply to intelligence provided only to, and for the use of, 
United States Government personnel serving with the United 
Nations. The President must also report to the two intelligence 
committees any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence provided 
to the United Nations within 15 days after the disclosure 
becomes known to the President.
    The amendment requires the Secretary of State, or the 
Secretary's designee, in consultation with the Director of 
Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, to work with 
the United Nations to improve its handling, processing, 
dissemination, and management of all intelligence information 
provided to it by its members.
    The amendment makes clear that its provisions shall not be 
construed to impair or otherwise affect the existing authority 
of the Director of Central Intelligence under the National 
Security Act of 1947 to protect intelligence sources and 
methods from unauthorized disclosure or to supersede or 
otherwise affect the congressional intelligence oversight 
provisions of that act.
    The amendment would take effect 45 days after the date of 
enactment.
    The Administration expressed separation of powers concerns 
over the non-delegability provision in the Committee 
substitute. Some members also expressed reservations on this 
point. In view of the expanding number of circumstances in 
which U.S. participation in or support for U.N. activities may 
involve considerations of providing intelligence to the U.N., a 
majority of Committee Members believe it is important to have 
the President ensure that, before the U.S. provides 
intelligence to the U.N., U.S. officials have established 
guidelines to protect intelligence sources and methods from 
unauthorized disclosure. Moreover, the specific duties required 
of the President are not onerous. The Committee notes that 
guidelines already are in place that will satisfy the 
requirements of the Committee's substitute.
    The Committee also adopted parallel amendments to the 
reporting requirements in Section 502 and Section 504, as 
introduced. The amendments simply substitute the existing 
requirements of Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 on 
reporting intelligence activities to the two intelligence 
committees instead of reporting to other committees as proposed 
in these sections of the bill.

                          Additional Concerns

    One of the intentions of the Committee amendment to Section 
512 is to improve Committee oversight regarding the provision 
of intelligence information to the United Nations. The 
reporting requirements set forth in the amendment apply only to 
this process. In fact, in absolutely no way is the amendment 
intended to monitor, control, impede or seek periodic reporting 
on intelligence provided directly to U.S. forces involved with 
U.N. peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. The Committee does 
not intend for any provision of H.R. 7 to impede the free flow 
of intelligence to and for U.S. personnel serving with a United 
Nations force.

                            Committee Action

    On January 27, 1995, the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, a quorum being present, met to consider Title V 
of the bill H.R. 7, the ``National Security Revitalization 
Act''. Amendments were offered to the bill to:
    (1) Substitute the existing intelligence oversight 
reporting requirements of Title V of the National Security Act 
of 1947 on reporting intelligence activities to the two 
intelligence committees instead of lumping intelligence in with 
the definition of ``assistance'' in the reporting provisions of 
sections 502 and 504 of the bill.
    (2) Substitute for existing section 512 a provision 
containing--
          (A) non-delegable requirements that (i) before the 
        United States provides intelligence to the United 
        Nations, the President must ensure that the Director of 
        Central Intelligence (in consultation with the 
        Secretaries of State and Defense) has established 
        guidelines governing the provision of intelligence to 
        the United Nations that protect intelligence sources 
        and methods from unauthorized disclosure, and (ii) the 
        President report to the House International Relations 
        and Intelligence Committees and the Senate Foreign 
        Relations and Intelligence Committees at least 
        semiannually on the types of intelligence provided to 
        the U.N. and the purposes for which it was provided and 
        that the President report to the House and Senate 
        Intelligence Committees within 15 days after becoming 
        aware of the occurrence of any unauthorized disclosure 
        of intelligence information provided to the U.N.;
          (B) a requirement that the Secretary of State (or the 
        Secretary's designee), in consultation with the 
        Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of 
        Defense, work with the United Nations to improve its 
        handling, processing, dissemination, and management of 
        all intelligence information provided to it by its 
        members;
    The amendments were adopted by voice vote. The bill, as 
amended, was ordered reported by a recorded vote of 11 ayes to 
0 noes. On that recorded vote, Members voted as follows: the 
Chairman (Mr. Combest)--aye, Mr. Dornan--aye, Mr. Young--aye, 
Mr. Lewis--aye, Mr. Castle--aye, Mr. Dicks--aye, Mr. Dixon--
aye, Mr. Coleman--aye, Ms. Pelosi--aye, Mr. Laughlin--aye, and 
Mr. Goss--aye.

Findings and Recommendations of the Committee on government Reform and 
                               Oversight

    With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the House 
of Representatives, the Committee has not received a report 
from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 
pertaining to the subject of this bill.

                  Congressional Budget Office Estimate

    In compliance with clause (2)(l)(3)(B) and (C) of rule XI 
of the Rules of the House of Representatives, an estimate 
prepared by the Congressional Budget Office submitted pursuant 
to sections 308 and 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
is as follows:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                  Washington, DC, February 3, 1995.
Hon. Larry Combest,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
reviewed the amendments to H.R. 7, National Security 
Revitalization Act, as ordered reported by the House Select 
Committee on Intelligence on January 27, 1995. Neither the 
Committee's amendments nor the bill as introduced would have 
pay-as-you-go implications. They would not explicitly authorize 
appropriations nor would they have an impact on the budgets of 
state and local governments.
    A few provisions of H.R. 7 could imply changes in the 
authorization of discretionary appropriations--particularly, 
Title II (Missile Defense), Title V (United Nations), and Title 
VI (expansion of NATO). The attachment discusses these 
implications of H.R. 7 as introduced. The costs discussed in 
the attachment would come to bear only if subsequent 
legislation explicitly authorizes appropriations.
    If you would like further details on this estimate, we will 
be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Kent 
Christensen, Raymond Hall, and Michael Miller.
            Sincerely,
                                    Robert D. Reischauer, Director.
    Attachment.

 Budgetary Implications of H.R. 7, National Security Revitalization Act

    This document considers the budgetary implications of H.R. 
7 as introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on January 
4, 1995. It serves as a basis for understanding the budgetary 
impacts of any Committee or floor amendments.
    Strictly speaking, H.R. 7 has no direct budgetary impact. 
It has no pay-as-you-go implications nor does it explicitly 
authorize appropriations Nevertheless, some provisions of H.R. 
7 could imply changes in the authorization of discretionary 
appropriations--particularly, Title II (Missile Defense), Title 
V (United Nations), and Title VI (Revitalization and Expansion 
of NATO.) These implications would come to bear only if 
subsequent legislation explicitly authorizes appropriations.
    Title II--Missile Defense. H.R. 7 calls on the Secretary of 
Defense to develop national and theater missile defenses, but 
it is silent on how much funding would be available for this 
purpose. The cost of such a system could total $29 billion to 
$30 billion over the next five years, or about $10 billion to 
$11 billion more than is currently programmed for missile 
defense.
    In 1992, the Department of Defense planned to deploy a 
national missile defense (NMD) system at an initial site by 
2004 and at multiple sites soon thereafter. This plan called 
for deploying both ground-based systems and space-based sensors 
commonly referred to as Brilliant Eyes. These two components of 
the 1992 plan are the basis for our current estimate for the 
costs of a NMD system. The current estimate does not, however, 
embrace the component of the 1992 plan calling for space-based 
interceptors (commonly known as Brilliant Pebbles.) An 
enhancement to NMD, Brilliant Pebbles raises more concerns 
about violating the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Defense Treaty 
than do other elements of NMD.
    Deploying a ground-based system of radars, interceptors, 
and command and control at an initial site by 2006 would cost 
about $10 billion. This sum would also support eventual 
deployment at multiple sites. Finally, the additional funding 
would support research and development into technologies that 
would enable the system to counter emerging threats.
    For about $1 billion more this system could be expanded to 
accelerate the deployment of space-based sensors. With this 
additional funding, some sensors could be deployed by 2002 to 
provide cuing and initial targeting data. This sensor 
capability is supposed to permit the ground-based interceptors 
at the initial site to protect the entire continental United 
States against limited missile attacks from the north.
    As for theater missile defense, this estimate assumes that 
the current plan for theater missile defense is consistent with 
the aims of H.R. 7. That plan would deploy groundbased radars 
and missiles with forward-deployed elements of the Army and 
Marine Corps by the end of the century. Eventually more capable 
systems such as the Navy's sea-based vertical launch systems, 
the Air Force's boost-phase interceptors, or the Army's mobile 
air and missile defenses would be deployed.
    Under these assumptions H.R. 7 would add $10 billion to $11 
billion to missile defense costs and bring the total budget for 
these capabilities to $29 billion or $30 billion. But the 
ultimate costs are quite uncertain. These estimates assume that 
the 1992 plan is technically feasible, that the financial plan 
matched the real components of the system, and that the plan 
could be resumed after a two-year hiatus with costs rising only 
for inflation.
    Title III--Revitalization of National Security Commission. 
The bill would establish a commission to conduct a 
comprehensive review of defense strategy, force structure, 
modernization, readiness, infrastructure, and funding. Of the 
funds otherwise available to DoD, $1.5 million would be 
available to carry out the provisions of the title.
    Title IV--Command of United States Forces. H.R. 7 would 
amend title 10 of the U.S. Code and the United Nations 
Participation Act to prohibit a foreign national from 
commanding U.S. forces unless the President makes certain 
certifications. Neither change would have a significant 
budgetary impact.
    Title IV would also require the Congress to approve in law 
any agreement between the President and the U.N. Security 
Council for the use of U.S. forces in maintaining international 
peace and security. CBO cannot predict the extent of U.S. 
involvement in peacekeeping activities. Nevertheless, if 
Congress denied U.S. participation in some peacekeeping 
activities the budgetary savings would likely be no more than a 
few hundred million dollars per year based on recent 
experience. For example, if the United States had not used 
forces in Bosnia it would not have incurred expenses of about 
$300 million a year in 1994 and 1995. Similarly for U.S. 
expenses in Somalia, the average savings would have been about 
$700 million a year in 1993 and 1994. Aside from deployment to 
Southwest Asia, the deployments to Bosnia and Somalia have been 
the most costly contingencies of recent years.
    Title V--United Nations. Title V addresses U.S. financial 
responsibilities to the U.N. in support of international 
peacekeeping. Enactment of Title V could:
          Lower payments of assessed and voluntary 
        contributions that help fund U.N. peacekeeping 
        activities;
          Lower payments of assessed contributions that help 
        fund the U.N. operating budget; and
          Limit DoD's involvement in U.N.-sponsored 
        peacekeeping activities.
    Certain sections of Title V would the overlapping effects. 
For example, sections 501 and 507 could reduce assessed 
payments to the United Nations for peacekeeping--currently 
about $1.0 billion a year--for fiscal years after 1995. 
Similarly sections 507 and 511 could reduce the assessments and 
voluntary contributions totalling about $0.1 billion a year. 
Thus, the potential budgetary effects of these sections are not 
additive.
    Section 501 would probably lower or eliminate the payment 
of assessed peacekeeping contributions, which will total about 
$1.0 billion in 1995 if the President's supplemental request is 
fully funded by the Congress. Under section 501, payments would 
be lowered by the total cost of using U.S. forces in 
peacekeeping activities that are authorized by the U.N. unless 
the U.N. has reimbursed DoD for those costs.
    DoD currently is incurring incremental peacekeeping costs 
from U.N. authorized operations in Haiti, the former 
Yugoslavia, and elsewhere that will total about $2 billion in 
1995. Total costs could be much higher. If DoD continues its 
current level of peacekeeping activity, section 501 would 
eliminate the payment of U.S. contributions because DoD's total 
costs could far exceed peacekeeping assessments. If, however, 
DoD dramatically scales back its peacekeeping activities, and 
if payments for assessed contributions remain at about $1.0 
billion annually, section 501 could lower U.S. contributions by 
hundreds of millions of dollars.
    Similarly, section 507 would deny assessed and voluntary 
contributions for unreimbursed costs, but section 507 focuses 
more on noncombat operations while section 501 would affect all 
types of U.N.-authorized peacekeeping operations. The Secretary 
of Defense however, may waive this provision if he determines 
that an emergency exists. This provision could lower annual 
payments for assessments by the same $1.0 billion targeted by 
section 501, and voluntary payments by about $0.1 billion 
annually.
    Section 511 would reduce payments to the U.N. unless the 
U.N. has appointed an Inspector General (IG) and has 
established an operational IG office that could investigate the 
U.N. and its specialized agencies. Under section 511, 50 
percent of the peacekeeping assessments, 20 percent of the 
payments in support of the U.N. operating budget, and all 
payments from voluntary contributions would be withheld unless 
the President certifies that the IG provisions have been met. 
Thus, section 511 could reduce payments for peacekeeping 
assessments (like section 501 and 507) by about $0.5 billion, 
payments for the U.N. operating budget by about $0.05 billion, 
and voluntary payments (like section 507) by $0.1 billion 
unless the President makes the certification.
    Section 508 would prohibit DoD from participating in 
peacekeeping activities sponsored by the U.N. unless Congress 
has authorized it to use funds for such purposes. Peacekeeping 
activities sponsored by the U.N. typically have far less US. 
involvement than activities authorized by the U.N. The 
incremental cost to the United States of a large U.N.-sponsored 
peacekeeping operation historically has been less than $50 
million annually. Thus, if the Congress denied U.S. 
participation in any one operation, savings could total up to 
$50 million a year.
    Section 508 would also prohibit DoD funds from being used 
to pay U.N. peacekeeping assessments. Compared with current 
law, this provision would not have any budget impact because 
DoD is not authorized to use funds for such purposes
    Title VI--Revitalization and Expansion of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. H.R. 7 would reaffirm the United 
States' commitment to NATO and support the expansion of NATO to 
include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
other countries designated by the President. The bill would 
authorize the use of economic support assistance and 
nonproliferation and disarmament assistance to facilitate the 
transition to NATO membership. Any implicit authorization of 
appropriations is open-ended. For 1995, the Economic Support 
Fund (ESF) is funded at roughly $2.4, billion with about $4.0 
billion of that going to Egypt and Israel and about $0.4 
billion going to about 20 other countries, Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament funding is now $10 million.
    Title VII--Budget Firewalls. This title expresses a sense 
of Congress that there should be firewalls between defense and 
nondefense discretionary spending for 1996, 1997, 1998. This 
title would affect only the distribution, not the level, of 
spending under the caps on discretionary spending that were 
established under the Budget Enforcement Act.

                        Committee Cost Estimate

    The Committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional 
Budget Office.

                     Inflationary Impact Statement

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee estimates that 
enactment of the provisions of the bill within its jurisdiction 
will have no significant impact on prices and costs in the 
operation of the national economy.

                           Oversight Findings

    With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of the rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, as indicated in the 
Overview section of this report, the Committee held a hearing 
on intelligence issues raised in H.R. 7. In the 103rd Congress, 
the Committee also had hearings and briefings involving various 
aspects of intelligence support for U.S. forces involved in 
U.N. sponsored missions. The amendments to H.R. 7 adopted by 
the Committee reflect conclusions reached by the Committee in 
light of that oversight activity.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by title 
V of the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

                      TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

          * * * * * * *

             CHAPTER 20--HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE

     * * * * * * *

                  SUBCHAPTER I--HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Sec.
401.  Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with 
          military operations.
     * * * * * * *
406.  Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of 
          costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: limitation.
     * * * * * * *

Sec. 406. Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of 
                    costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: 
                    limitation

  (a) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Payment of Assessment.--
No funds available to the Department of Defense shall be 
available for payment of any United States assessed or 
voluntary contribution for United Nations peacekeeping 
activities.
  (b) Limitation on Use of Funds for Participation in 
Peacekeeping Activities.--Funds available to the Department of 
Defense may be used for payment of the incremental costs 
associated with the participation of elements of the armed 
forces in United Nations peacekeeping activities only to the 
extent that Congress has by law specifically authorized the use 
of those funds for such purposes.
          * * * * * * *
                              ----------                              


                UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945

          * * * * * * *
  Sec. 4. (a) Periodic Reports.--The President shall, from time 
to time as occasion may require, but not less than once each 
year, make reports to the Congress of the activities of the 
United Nations and of the participation of the United States 
therein. [He shall make special current reports on decisions of 
the Security Council to take enforcement measures under the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and on the 
participation therein, under his instructions, of the 
representative of the United States.]
          * * * * * * *
  (d) Annual Report.--In addition to the report required by 
subsection (a), the President, at the time of submission of the 
annual budget request to the Congress, shall submit to the 
designated congressional committees a report that includes the 
following:
          (1) Costs of peacekeeping operations.--
                  (A) * * *
          * * * * * * *
                  (D) A description of the anticipated budget 
                for the next fiscal year for United States 
                participation in United Nations peacekeeping 
                activities, including a statement of--
                          (i) the aggregate amount of funds 
                        available to the United Nations for 
                        that fiscal year, including assessed 
                        and voluntary contributions, which may 
                        be made available for United Nations 
                        peacekeeping activities; and
                          (ii) the aggregate amount of funds 
                        (from all accounts) and the aggregate 
                        costs of in-kind contributions that the 
                        United States proposes to make 
                        available to the United Nations for 
                        that fiscal year for United Nations 
                        peacekeeping activities.
                  [(D)] (E) In the case of the first 2 reports 
                submitted pursuant to this subsection, a 
                projection of all United States costs for 
                United Nations peacekeeping operations during 
                each of the next 2 fiscal years, including 
                assessed and voluntary contributions.
          * * * * * * *
  (e) Consultations and Reports on U.N. Peacekeeping 
Operations.--
          (1) Consultations.--Each month the President shall 
        consult with the Congress on the status of United 
        Nations peacekeeping operations.
          (2) Information to be provided.--In connection with 
        these consultations, the following information shall be 
        provided in written form not later than the 10th day of 
        each month to the designated congressional committees:
                  (A) With respect to ongoing United Nations 
                peacekeeping operations, the following:
                          (i) A list of all resolutions of the 
                        United Nations Security Council 
                        anticipated to be voted on during such 
                        month that would extend or change the 
                        mandate of any United Nations 
                        peacekeeping operation.
                          (ii) For each such operation, any 
                        changes in the duration, mandate, and 
                        command and control arrangements that 
                        are anticipated as a result of the 
                        adoption of the resolution.
                          (iii) An estimate of the total cost 
                        to the United Nations of each such 
                        operation for the period covered by the 
                        resolution, and an estimate of the 
                        amount of that cost that will be 
                        assessed to the United States.
                          (iv) Any anticipated significant 
                        changes in United States participation 
                        in or support for each such operation 
                        during the period covered by the 
                        resolution (including facilities, 
                        training, transportation, 
                        communication, and logistical support, 
                        but not including intelligence 
                        activities reportable under title V of 
                        the National Security Act of 1947), and 
                        the estimated costs to the United 
                        States of such changes.
                  (B) With respect to each new United Nations 
                peacekeeping operation that is anticipated to 
                be authorized by a Security Council resolution 
                during such month, the following information 
                for the period covered by the resolution:
                          (i) The anticipated duration, 
                        mandate, and command and control 
                        arrangements of such operation.
                          (ii) An estimate of the total cost to 
                        the United Nations of the operation, 
                        and an estimate of the amount of that 
                        cost that will be assessed to the 
                        United States.
                          (iii) A description of the functions 
                        that would be performed by any United 
                        States Armed Forces participating in or 
                        otherwise operating in support of the 
                        operation, an estimate of the number of 
                        members of the Armed Forces that will 
                        participate in or otherwise operate in 
                        support of the operation, and an 
                        estimate of the cost to the United 
                        States of such participation or 
                        support.
                          (iv) A description of any other 
                        United States assistance to or support 
                        for the operation (including 
                        facilities, training, transportation, 
                        communication, intelligence, and 
                        logistical support, but not including 
                        intelligence activities reportable 
                        under title V of the National Security 
                        Act of 1947), and an estimate of the 
                        cost to the United States of such 
                        assistance or support.
          (3) Interim information.--(A) The President shall 
        submit to the designated congressional committees a 
        written interim report if, during the period between 
        the monthly consultations required by paragraph (1), 
        the United States learns that the United Nations 
        Security Council is likely, before the next such 
        consultation, to vote on a resolution that would 
        authorize a new United Nations peacekeeping operation 
        and that resolution was not previously reported on 
        pursuant to paragraph (2)(B). Each interim report shall 
        include the information described in clauses (i) 
        through (iv) of paragraph (2)(B).
          (B) Any such interim report shall be submitted not 
        less than 5 days before the vote of the United Nations 
        Security Council, unless the President determines that 
        exceptional circumstances prevented compliance with the 
        requirement to report 5 days in advance. If the 
        President makes such a determination, the interim 
        report shall be submitted promptly (but in no case 
        later than 3 days after the vote) and shall include a 
        copy of the determination and a description of the 
        exceptional circumstances which were the basis for that 
        determination.
          (4) New united nations peacekeeping operation 
        defined.--As used in paragraphs (2) (B) and (3), the 
        term `new United Nations peacekeeping operation' 
        includes any existing or otherwise ongoing United 
        Nations peacekeeping operation--
                  (A) that is to be expanded by more than 25 
                percent during the period covered by the 
                Security Council resolution, as measured by 
                either the number of personnel participating 
                (or authorized to participate) in the operation 
                or the budget of the operation; or
                  (B) that is to be authorized to operate in a 
                country in which it was not previously 
                authorized to operate.
          (5) Quarterly reports.--The President shall submit 
        quarterly reports to the designated congressional 
        committees on all assistance provided by the United 
        States during the preceding calendar quarter to the 
        United Nations to support peacekeeping operations. Each 
        report shall describe the assistance provided for each 
        such operation, listed by category of assistance. The 
        report for the fourth calendar quarter of each year 
        shall be submitted as part of the annual report 
        required by subsection (d) and shall include cumulative 
        information for the preceding calendar year.
  [(e) Designated Congressional Committees.--As used in this 
section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' has 
the meaning given that term by section 415 of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995.]
  (f) Designated Congressional Committees.--As used in this 
section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' has 
the meaning given such term in section 10(f).
          * * * * * * *
  Sec. 7. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law 
other than subsection (e)(1), the President, upon the request 
by the United Nations for cooperative action, and to the extent 
that he finds that it is consistent with the national interest 
to comply with such request, may authorize, in support of such 
activities of the United Nations as are specifically directed 
to the peaceful settlement of disputes and not involving the 
employment of armed forces contemplated by chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter--
          (1) * * *
          * * * * * * *
  (b)(1) Whenever personnel or assistance is made available 
pursuant to the authority contained in subsection (a) (1) and 
(2) of this section, the President shall require reimbursement 
from the United Nations for the expense thereby incurred by the 
[United States: Provided, That in exceptional circumstances, or 
when the President finds it to be in the national interest, he 
may waive, in whole or in part, the requirement of such 
reimbursement: Provided further, That when] United States. When 
any such reimbursement is made, it shall be credited, at the 
option of the appropriate department of the Department of 
Defense, either to the appropriation, fund, or account utilized 
in incurring the obligation, or to an appropriate 
appropriation, fund, or account currently available for the 
purposes for which expenditures were made.
  (2) The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement for 
reimbursement under paragraph (1) if the Secretary, after 
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, determines that an 
emergency exists which justifies waiver of that requirement. 
Any such waiver shall be submitted to the designated 
congressional committees, as defined in section 10(a)(3)(B), at 
least 15 days before it takes effect, except that if the 
President determines that an emergency exists which prevents 
compliance with the requirement that the notification be 
provided 15 days in advance and that the provision under 
subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of personnel or assistance on a 
nonreimbursable basis is in the national security interests of 
the United States, such notification shall be provided in a 
timely manner but no later than 48 hours after such waiver 
takes effect.
          * * * * * * *
  (e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), at least 
15 days before any agency or entity of the United States 
Government makes available to the United Nations any assistance 
or facility to support or facilitate United Nations 
peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify the 
designated congressional committees.
  (2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to--
          (A) assistance having a value of less than $1,000,000 
        in the case of nonreimbursable assistance or less than 
        $5,000,000 in the case of reimbursable assistance; or
          (B) assistance provided under the emergency drawdown 
        authority contained in sections 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2) 
        of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
        2318(a)(1), 2348a(c)(2)).
  (3) If the President determines that an emergency exists 
which prevents compliance with the requirement in paragraph (1) 
that notification be provided 15 days in advance and that the 
contribution of any such assistance or facility is in the 
national security interests of the United States, such 
notification shall be provided in a timely manner but not later 
than 48 hours after such assistance or facility is made 
available to the United Nations.
  (4) For purposes of this subsection, the term 
``assistance''--
          (A) means assistance of any kind, including 
        logistical support, supplies, goods, or services 
        (including command, control or communications 
        assistance and training), and the grant of rights of 
        passage; and
          (B) includes assistance provided through in-kind 
        contributions or through the provision of support, 
        supplies, goods, or services on any terms, including on 
        a grant, lease, loan, or reimbursable basis; but
          (C) does not include the payment of assessed or 
        voluntary contributions or intelligence activities 
        reportable under title V of the National Security Act 
        of 1947.
  (f) The Secretary of State shall ensure that goods and 
services provided on a reimbursable basis by the Department of 
Defense to the United Nations for United Nations peacekeeping 
operations under this section or any other provision of law are 
reimbursed at the appropriate value, as determined by the 
Secretary of Defense.
          * * * * * * *
  Sec. 10. (a) Credit Against Assessment for Expenditures in 
Support of Peacekeeping Operations.--
          (1) Limitation.--Funds may be obligated for payment 
        to the United Nations of the United States assessed 
        share of peacekeeping operations for a fiscal year only 
        to the extent that--
                  (A) the amount of such assessed share 
                exceeds--
                  (B) the amount equal to--
                          (i) the total amount identified in 
                        the report submitted pursuant to 
                        paragraph (2) for the preceding fiscal 
                        year, reduced by
                          (ii) the amount of any reimbursement 
                        or credit to the United States by the 
                        United Nations for the costs of United 
                        States support for, or participation 
                        in, United Nations peacekeeping 
                        activities for that preceding fiscal 
                        year.
          (2) Annual report.--The President shall, at the time 
        of submission of the budget to the Congress for any 
        fiscal year, submit to the designated congressional 
        committees a report on the total amount of funds 
        appropriated for national defense purposes for any 
        fiscal year that were expended during the preceding 
        fiscal year to support or participate in, directly or 
        indirectly, United Nations peacekeeping activities. 
        Such report shall include a separate listing by United 
        Nations peacekeeping operation of the amount of funds 
        expended to support or participate in each such 
        operation.
          (3) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection:
                  (A) United nations peacekeeping activities.--
                The term ``United Nations peacekeeping 
                activities'' means any international 
                peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or 
                similar activity that is authorized by the 
                United Nations Security Council under chapter 
                VI or VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
                  (B) Designated congressional committees.--The 
                term ``designated congressional committees'' 
                includes the Committee on National Security of 
                the House of Representatives and the Committee 
                on Armed Services of the Senate.
  (b) Notice to Congress Regarding Contributions for 
Peacekeeping Activities.--
          (1) Notice regarding united nations billing 
        request.--Not later than 15 days after the date on 
        which the United States receives from the United 
        Nations a billing requesting a payment by the United 
        States of any contribution for United Nations 
        peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify 
        the designated congressional committees.
          (2) Notice regarding proposed obligation of funds.--
        The President shall notify the designated congressional 
        committees at least 15 days before the United States 
        obligates funds for any assessed or voluntary 
        contribution for United Nations peacekeeping 
        activities, except that if the President determines 
        that an emergency exists which prevents compliance with 
        the requirement that such notification be provided 15 
        days in advance and that such contribution is in the 
        national security interests of the United States, such 
        notification shall be provided in a timely manner but 
        no later than 48 hours after such obligation.
  (c) Prohibition on Use of Funds To Pay Assessed or Voluntary 
Contributions for Peacekeeping Activities Unless Department of 
Defense Reimbursed for Certain Goods and Services.--
Appropriated funds may not be used to pay any United States 
assessed or voluntary contribution during any fiscal year for 
United Nations peacekeeping activities until the Secretary of 
Defense certifies to the Congress that the United Nations has 
reimbursed the Department of Defense directly for all goods and 
services that were provided to the United Nations by the 
Department of Defense on a reimbursable basis during the 
preceding fiscal year for United Nations peacekeeping 
activities, including personnel and assistance provided under 
section 7 (except to the extent that the authority of 
subsection (b)(2) of such section to waive the reimbursement 
requirement was exercised with respect to such personnel or 
assistance).
  (d) Limitation on Assessed Contribution With Respect to a 
Peacekeeping Operation.--Funds authorized to be appropriated 
for ``Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities'' 
for any fiscal year shall not be available for the payment of 
the United States assessed contribution for a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation in an amount which is greater than 25 
percent of the total amount of all assessed contributions for 
that operation.
  (e) Buy American Requirement.--No funds may be obligated or 
expended to pay any United States assessed or voluntary 
contribution for United Nations peacekeeping activities unless 
the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the 
designated congressional committees that United States 
manufacturers and suppliers are being given opportunities to 
provide equipment, services, and material for such activities 
equal to those being given to foreign manufacturers and 
suppliers.
  (f) Designated Congressional Committees Defined.--As used in 
this section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' 
means--
          (1) the Committee on International Relations and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives; and
          (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

  Sec. 11. (a) Withholding of Contributions.--
          (1) Assessed contributions for regular united nations 
        budget.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 20 
        percent of the amount of funds made available for that 
        fiscal year for United States assessed contributions 
        for the regular United Nations budget shall be withheld 
        from obligation and expenditure unless a certification 
        for that fiscal year has been made under subsection 
        (b).
          (2) Assessed contributions for united nations 
        peacekeeping.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 50 
        percent of the amount of funds made available for that 
        fiscal year for United States assessed contributions 
        for United Nations peacekeeping activities shall be 
        withheld from obligation and expenditure unless a 
        certification for that fiscal year has been made under 
        subsection (b).
          (3) Voluntary contributions for united nations 
        peacekeeping.--The United States may not during any 
        fiscal year pay any voluntary contribution to the 
        United Nations for international peacekeeping 
        activities unless a certification for that fiscal year 
        has been made under subsection (b).
  (b) Certification.--The certification referred to in 
subsection (a) for any fiscal year is a certification by the 
President to the Congress, submitted on or after the beginning 
of that fiscal year, of each of the following:
          (1) The United Nations has an independent office of 
        Inspector General to conduct and supervise objective 
        audits, inspections, and investigations relating to 
        programs and operations of the United Nations.
          (2) The United Nations has an Inspector General who 
        was appointed by the Secretary General with the 
        approval of the General Assembly and whose appointment 
        was made principally on the basis of the appointee's 
        integrity and demonstrated
ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, 
management analysis, public administration, or investigation.
          (3) The Inspector General is authorized to--
                  (A) make investigations and reports relating 
                to the administration of the programs and 
                operations of the United Nations;
                  (B) have access to all records, documents, 
                and other available materials relating to those 
                programs and operations;
                  (C) have direct and prompt access to any 
                official of the United Nations; and
                  (D) have access to all records and officials 
                of the specialized agencies of the United 
                Nations.
          (4) The United Nations has fully implemented, and 
        made available to all member states, procedures that 
        effectively protect the identity of, and prevent 
        reprisals against, any staff member of the United 
        Nations making a complaint or disclosing information 
        to, or cooperating in any investigation or inspection 
        by, the United Nations Inspector General.
          (5) The United Nations has fully implemented 
        procedures that ensure compliance with recommendations 
        of the United Nations Inspector General.
          (6) The United Nations has required the United 
        Nations Inspector General to issue an annual report and 
        has ensured that the annual report and all other 
        reports of the Inspector General are made available to 
        the General Assembly without modification.
          (7) The United Nations has provided, and is committed 
        to providing, sufficient budgetary resources to ensure 
        the effective operation of the United Nations Inspector 
        General.

  Sec. 12. (a) Provision of Intelligence Information to the 
United Nations.--Before intelligence information is provided by 
the United States to the United Nations, the President shall 
ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Defense, has established guidelines governing the provision of 
intelligence information to the United Nations which shall 
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure in accordance with section 103(c)(5) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)).
  (b) Periodic and Special Reports.--(1) The President shall 
periodically report, but not less frequently than semiannually, 
to the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House and the Committee 
on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the Senate on the types of intelligence provided to the 
United Nations and the purposes for which it was provided 
during the period covered by the report. The President shall 
also report to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the Senate, within 15 days after it becomes 
known to him, any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence 
provided to the United Nations.
  (2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first 
sentence of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to 
the provision of intelligence that is provided only to, and for 
the use of, United States Government personnel serving with the 
United Nations.
  (c) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or 
assign the duties of the President under this section.
  (d) Improved Handling of Intelligence Information by the 
United Nations.--The Secretary of State (or the designee of the 
Secretary), in consultation with the Director of Central 
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall work with the 
United Nations to improve the handling, processing, 
dissemination, and management of all intelligence information 
provided to it by its members.
  (e) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to--
          (1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the 
        Director of Central Intelligence to protect 
        intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
        disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); 
        or
          (2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of 
        title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
        413-415).
                              ----------                              


                    FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION

                     ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1994 AND 1995

          * * * * * * *

                 TITLE IV--INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

       PART A--UNITED NATIONS REFORM AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

          * * * * * * *

SEC. 404. ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
                    OPERATIONS.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Limitation on United States Contributions.--
          (1) * * *
          [(2) Subsequent fiscal years.--Funds authorized to be 
        appropriated for ``Contributions for International 
        Peacekeeping Activities'' for any fiscal year after 
        fiscal year 1995 shall not be available for the payment 
        of the United States assessed contribution for a United 
        Nations peacekeeping operation in an amount which is 
        greater than 25 percent of the total of all assessed 
        contributions for that operation.]
          * * * * * * *

SEC. 407. CONSULTATIONS AND REPORTS.

  [(a) Consultations and Reports on U.N. Peacekeeping 
Operations.--
          [(1) Consultations.--Each month the President shall 
        consult with the Congress on the status of United 
        Nations peacekeeping operations.
          [(2) Information to be provided.--In connection with 
        these consultations, the following information shall be 
        provided each month to the designated congressional 
        committees:
                  [(A) With respect to ongoing United Nations 
                peacekeeping operations, the following:
                          [(i) A list of all resolutions of the 
                        United Nations Security Council 
                        anticipated to be voted on during such 
                        month that would extend or change the 
                        mandate of any United Nations 
                        peacekeeping operation.
                          [(ii) For each such operation, any 
                        changes in the duration, mandate, and 
                        command and control arrangements that 
                        are anticipated as a result of the 
                        adoption of the resolution.
                          [(iii) An estimate of the total cost 
                        to the United Nations of each such 
                        operation for the period covered by the 
                        resolution, and an estimate of the 
                        amount of that cost that will be 
                        assessed to the United States.
                          [(iv) Any anticipated significant 
                        changes in United States participation 
                        in or support for each such operation 
                        during the period covered by the 
                        resolution, and the estimated costs to 
                        the United States of such changes.
                  [(B) With respect to each new United Nations 
                peacekeeping operation that is anticipated to 
                be authorized by a Security Council resolution 
                during such month, the following information 
                for the period covered by the resolution:
                          [(i) The anticipated duration, 
                        mandate, and command and control 
                        arrangements of such operation.
                          [(ii) An estimate of the total cost 
                        to the United Nations of the operation, 
                        and an estimate of the amount of that 
                        cost that will be assessed to the 
                        United States.
                          [(iii) A description of the functions 
                        that would be performed by any United 
                        States Armed Forces participating in or 
                        otherwise operating in support of the 
                        operation, an estimate of the number of 
                        members of the Armed Forces that will 
                        participate in or otherwise operate in 
                        support of the operation, and an 
                        estimate of the cost to the United 
                        States of such participation or 
                        support.
          [(3) Written information.--The information described 
        in clauses (i) and (iii) of paragraph (2)(A) and the 
        information described in clauses (i) and (ii) of 
        paragraph (2)(B) shall be provided each month to the 
        designated congressional committees in written form not 
        later than the 10th day of that month.
          [(4) Interim information.--(A) The President shall 
        submit to the designated congressional committees a 
        written interim report if, during the period between 
        the monthly consultations required by paragraph (1), 
        the United States learns that the United Nations 
        Security Council is likely, before the next such 
        consultation, to vote on a resolution that would 
        authorize a new United Nations peacekeeping operation 
        and that resolution was not previously reported on 
        pursuant to paragraph (2)(B). Each interim report shall 
        include the information described in clauses (i) and 
        (ii) of paragraph (2)(B).
          [(B) Any such interim report shall be submitted not 
        less than 5 days before the vote of the United Nations 
        Security Council, unless the President determines that 
        exceptional circumstances prevented compliance with the 
        requirement to report 5 days in advance. If the 
        President makes such a determination, the interim 
        report shall be submitted promptly (but in no case 
        later than 3 days after the vote) and shall include a 
        copy of the determination and a description of the 
        exceptional circumstances which were the basis for that 
        determination.
          [(5) Notification and quarterly reports regarding 
        united states assistance.--(A) The President shall 
        notify the designated congressional committees at least 
        15 days before the United States provides any 
        assistance to the United Nations to support 
        peacekeeping operations. This subparagraph does not 
        apply to--
                  [(i) assistance having a value of less than 
                $3,000,000 in the case of nonreimburseable 
                assistance or less than $14,000,000 in the case 
                of reimburseable assistance, or
                  [(ii) assistance provided under the emergency 
                drawdown authority of sections 506(a)(1) and 
                552(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
                (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)(1) and 2348a(c)(2)).
          [(B) The President shall submit quarterly reports to 
        the designated congressional committees on all 
        assistance provided by the United States during the 
        preceding calendar quarter to the United Nations to 
        support peacekeeping operations. Each report shall 
        describe the assistance provided for each such 
        operation, listed by category of assistance. The report 
        for the fourth calendar quarter of each year shall be 
        submitted as part of the annual report required by 
        section 4(d) of the United Nations Participation Act of 
        1945 (as added by subsection (b) of this section) and 
        shall include cumulative information for the preceding 
        calendar year.]
          * * * * * * *