[House Report 104-18]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



104th Congress                                             Rept. 104-18
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 1st Session                                                     Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                  NATIONAL SECURITY REVITALIZATION ACT

                                _______


                February 6, 1995.--Ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


  Mr. Spence, from the Committee on National Security, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                    ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS

                         [To accompany H.R. 7]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
  The Committee on National Security, to whom was referred 
titles I, II, III, and V and section 401 of the bill (H.R. 7) 
to revitalize the national security of the United States, 
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an 
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``National Security 
Revitalization Act''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                TITLE I--FINDINGS, POLICY, AND PURPOSES

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Policy.
Sec. 103. Purposes.

                       TITLE II--MISSILE DEFENSE

Sec. 201. Policy.
Sec. 202. Actions of the Secretary of Defense.
Sec. 203. Report to Congress.

 TITLE III--ADVISORY COMMISSION ON REVITALIZATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Sec. 301. Establishment.
Sec. 302. Composition.
Sec. 303. Duties.
Sec. 304. Reports.
Sec. 305. Powers.
Sec. 306. Commission procedures.
Sec. 307. Personnel matters.
Sec. 308. Termination of the commission.
Sec. 309. Funding.

               TITLE IV--COMMAND OF UNITED STATES FORCES

Sec. 401. Limitation on expenditure of Department of Defense funds for 
United States forces placed under United Nations command or control.
Sec. 402. Limitation on placement of United States Armed Forces under 
foreign control for a United Nations peacekeeping activity.

                        TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 501. Credit against assessment for United States expenditures in 
support of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 502. Codification of required notice to Congress of proposed 
United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 503. Notice to Congress regarding United States contributions for 
United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 504. Revised notice to Congress regarding United States assistance 
for United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 505. United States contributions to United Nations peacekeeping 
activities.
Sec. 506. Reimbursement to the United States for in-kind contributions 
to United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 507. Prohibition on use of funds to pay United States assessed or 
voluntary contribution for United Nations peacekeeping activities 
unless Department of Defense reimbursed by United Nations for certain 
goods and services.
Sec. 508. Limitation on use of Department of Defense funds for United 
States share of costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 509. Codification of limitation on amount of United States 
assessed contributions for United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 510. Buy American requirement.
Sec. 511. United Nations peacekeeping budgetary and management reform.
Sec. 512. Conditions on provision of intelligence to the United 
Nations.

  TITLE VI--REVITALIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
                              ORGANIZATION

Sec. 601. Short title.
Sec. 602. Findings.
Sec. 603. United States policy.
Sec. 604. Revisions to program to facilitate transition to NATO 
membership.

                      TITLE VII--BUDGET FIREWALLS

Sec. 701. Restoration of budget firewalls for defense spending.
                TITLE I--FINDINGS, POLICY, AND PURPOSES

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

  The Congress finds the following:
          (1) Dramatic changes in the geo-political and military 
        landscape during the last decade have had significant impacts 
        on United States security.
          (2) Those changes include the breakup of the Warsaw Pact 
        alliance, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and an 
        increase in regional instability and conflict.
          (3) While the magnitude and implications of these and other 
        changes continues to evolve, the world remains an unstable and 
        dangerous place. This uncertainty mandates the need for an on-
        going process to establish an appropriate national security 
        strategy and the forces needed to implement that strategy.
          (4) The centerpiece of the defense strategy of the 
        Administration, the review of the Department of Defense 
        conducted by the Secretary of Defense in 1993 known as the 
        ``Bottom Up Review'', determined that United States forces must 
        be--
                  (A) prepared to fight and win two nearly simultaneous 
                Major Regional Conflicts;
                  (B) able to sustain robust overseas presence in 
                peacetime;
                  (C) prepared for a variety of regional contingencies; 
                and
                  (D) able to deter and prevent attacks with weapons of 
                mass destruction against United States territory and 
                forces and the territory and forces of our allies.
          (5) The Bottom Up Review also recommended significant 
        reductions in military forces, including reduction in the 
        number of Navy ships by one-third, the number of Air Force 
        wings by almost one-half, and the level of funding for missile 
        defenses by over 50 percent.
          (6) The General Accounting Office and the Congressional 
        Budget Office have estimated that the mismatch between even the 
        restrictive Bottom Up Review force and the Administration 
        defense budget may be up to anywhere from $65,000,000,000 to 
        $150,000,000,000.
          (7) Since January 1993, presidential budgets and budget plans 
        have set forth a reduction in defense spending of 
        $156,000,000,000 through fiscal year 1999.
          (8) The fiscal year 1995 budget is the 10th consecutive year 
        of reductions in real defense spending and, with the exception 
        of fiscal year 1948, represents the lowest percentage of gross 
        domestic product for any defense budget since World War II.
          (9) During fiscal year 1995, the number of active duty, 
        reserve component, and civilian personnel of the Department of 
        Defense will be reduced by 182,000, a rate of over 15,000 per 
        month or over 500 per day. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
        estimates that 1,200,000 defense-related private sector jobs 
        will be lost by 1997.
          (10) Despite severe reductions and shortfalls in defense 
        funding and force structure, since 1993 United States military 
        forces have been deployed more often and committed to more 
        peacetime missions per year than ever before. Most of these 
        missions involve United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian 
        efforts. At the end of fiscal year 1994, over 70,000 United 
        States personnel were serving in such regions as Iraq, Bosnia, 
        Macedonia, the Adriatic Sea, Rwanda, and the Caribbean Sea for 
        missions involving Haiti and Cuba.
          (11) Despite the dramatic increase in the pace of operations 
        and the diversion of training and exercise funds to cover the 
        costs of unbudgeted contingency operations, the Armed Forces of 
        the United States remain the most capable, motivated, and 
        effective military force in the world. The ability to 
        successfully deploy and maintain support for the range of on-
        going contingency operations demonstrates the continued quality 
        and professionalism of our troops.
          (12) However, persistent indictations of declining readiness 
        demonstrate that military units are entering the early stage of 
        a long-term systemic readiness problem. This downward readiness 
        trend risks a return to the ``hollow forces'' of the 1970s.
          (13) At the end of fiscal year 1994, one-third of the units 
        in the Army contingency force and all of the forward-deployed 
        and follow-on Army divisions were reporting a reduced state of 
        military readiness. During fiscal year 1994, training readiness 
        declined for the Navy's Atlantic and Pacific fleets. Training 
        funding shortfalls also resulted in a grounding of Navy and 
        Marine Corps aircraft squadrons and cancellation and 
        curtailment of Army training exercises. Marine and naval 
        personnel are not maintaining the standard 12- to 18-month 
        respite between six-month deployments away from home.
          (14) The significant increase in deployments in support of 
        peacekeeping, humanitarian, and contingency operations has 
        placed great personnel tempo stress on many critical 
        operational units.
          (15) A real commitment to equitable compensation and 
        protection of quality-of-life programs for servicemembers and 
        their families is an esssential component to ensuring high 
        personnel morale and sustaining force readiness. However, as of 
        January 1, 1995, military pay is approximately 12.8 percent 
        below comparable civilian levels. As a result, it is estimated 
        that close to 17,000 junior enlisted personnel have to rely on 
        food stamps and the Department of Defense will soon begin 
        providing supplementary food benefits to an estimated 11,000 
        military personnel and dependents living overseas.
          (16) Critical long-term modernization programs continue to be 
        delayed or cancelled as resources are diverted to cover short-
        term personnel and readiness shortfalls resulting from an 
        underfunded defense budget and an overextended force, 
        threatening the technological superiority of future United 
        States forces.
          (17) The fiscal year 1995 defense budget failed to meet the 
        current force structure goal of 184 modern long-range bombers, 
        as established in the Bottom-Up Review. Unless this long-range 
        bomber capability shortfall is addressed promptly, the Nation's 
        ability to project force will be undermined and the existing 
        bomber industrial base may be placed at risk.
          (18) The Administration has initially agreed to or proposed 
        treaty limitations, or has unilaterally adopted positions, that 
        prohibit the United States from testing or deploying effective 
        missile defense systems.
          (19) United Nations assessments to the United States for 
        peacekeeping missions totaled over $1,000,000,000 in 1994. The 
        United States is assessed 31.7 percent of annual United Nations 
        costs for peacekeeping and other United Nations missions. The 
        next highest contributor, Japan, only pays 12.5 percent of such 
        costs. The Department of Defense also incurs hundreds of 
        millions of dollars in costs every year for United States 
        military participation in United Nations peacekeeping or 
        humanitarian missions, most of which are not reimbursed by the 
        United Nations. For fiscal year 1994, these Department of 
        Defense costs totaled over $1,721,000,000.

SEC. 102. POLICY.

  The Congress is committed to providing adequate resources to protect 
the national security interests of the United States, including the 
resources necessary--
          (1) to provide for sufficient forces to meet the national 
        security strategy of being able to fight and win two nearly 
        simultaneously major regional conflicts;
          (2) to provide pay and benefits necessary for members of the 
        Armed Forces (including members of the National Guard and 
        Reserve as well as active duty members) to begin closing the 
        gap between rates of civilian pay and rates of military pay;
          (3) to maintain a high quality-of-life for military personnel 
        and their dependents;
          (4) to maintain a high level of military readiness and take 
        all necessary steps to avoid a return to the ``hollow forces'' 
        of the 1970s;
          (5) to fully provide for the necessary modernization of 
        United States military forces in order to ensure their 
        technological superiority over any adversary; and
          (6) to develop and deploy at the earliest practical date 
        highly effective national and theater missile defense systems.

SEC. 103. PURPOSES.

  The purposes of this Act are--
          (1) to establish an advisory commission to assess United 
        States military needs and address the problems posed by the 
        continuing downward spiral of defense spending;
          (2) to commit the United States to accelerate the development 
        and deployment of theater and national ballistic missile 
        defense capabilities;
          (3) to restrict deployment of United States forces to 
        missions that are in the national security interest of the 
        United States;
          (4) to maintain adequate command and control by United States 
        personnel of United States forces participating in United 
        Nations peacekeeping operations;
          (5) to reduce the cost to the United States of United Nations 
        peacekeeping activities and to press for reforms in the United 
        Nations management practices; and
          (6) to reemphasize the commitment of the United States to a 
        strong and viable North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

                       TITLE II--MISSILE DEFENSE

SEC. 201. POLICY.

  It shall be the policy of the United States to--
          (1) deploy at the earliest practical date an antiballistic 
        missile system that is capable of providing a highly effective 
        defense of the United States against ballistic missile attacks; 
        and
          (2) provide at the earliest practical date highly effective 
        theater missile defenses (TMDs) to forward-deployed and 
        expeditionary elements of the Armed Forces of the United States 
        and to friendly forces and allies of the United States.

SEC. 202. ACTIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

  (a) ABM Systems.--The Secretary of Defense shall develop for 
deployment at the earliest practical date a cost-effective, 
operationally effective antiballistic missile system designed to 
protect the United States against ballistic missile attacks.
  (b) Advanced Theater Missile Defenses.--The Secretary of Defense 
shall develop for deployment at the earliest practical date advanced 
theater missile defense systems.

SEC. 203. REPORT TO CONGRESS.

  (a) Requirement.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees a plan for the deployment of an 
antiballistic missile system pursuant to section 202(a) and for the 
deployment of theater missile defense systems pursuant to section 
202(b).
  (b) Congressional Defense Committees.--For purposes of this section, 
the term ``congressional defense committees'' means--
          (1) the Committee on National Security and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
          (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate.

 TITLE III--ADVISORY COMMISSION ON REVITALIZATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

SEC. 301. ESTABLISHMENT.

  There is hereby established an advisory commission to be known as the 
``Revitalization of National Security Commission'' (hereinafter in this 
title referred to as the ``Commission'').

SEC. 302. COMPOSITION.

  (a) Appointment.--The Commission shall be composed of 12 members, 
appointed as follows:
          (1) Four members shall be appointed by the President.
          (2) Four members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the 
        House of Representatives, one of whom shall be appointed upon 
        the recommendation of the minority leader of the House of 
        Representatives.
          (3) Four members shall be appointed by the president pro 
        tempore of the Senate, three of whom shall be appointed upon 
        the recommendation of the majority leader of the Senate and one 
        of whom shall be appointed upon the recommendation of the 
        minority leader of the Senate.
  (b) Qualifications.--The members of the Commission shall be appointed 
from among persons having knowledge and experience in defense and 
foreign policy.
  (c) Term of Members; Vacancies.--Members of the Commission shall be 
appointed for the life of the Commission. A vacancy on the Commission 
shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner as 
the original appointment was made.
  (d) Commencement.--The members of the Commission shall be appointed 
not later than 21 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. The 
Commission shall convene its first meeting to carry out its duties 
under this section 14 days after seven members of the Commission have 
been appointed.
  (e) Chairman.--The chairman of the Commission shall be designated 
jointly by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the majority 
leader of the Senate (after consultation with the minority leader of 
the House of Representatives and the minority leader of the Senate) 
from among members of the Commission appointed under subsection (a)(2) 
or (a)(3).

SEC. 303. DUTIES.

  (a) Comprehensive Review.--The Commission shall conduct a 
comprehensive review of the long-term national security needs of the 
United States. The review shall include the following:
          (1) An assessment of the need for a new national security 
        strategy and, if it is determined that such a new strategy is 
        needed, identification of such a strategy.
          (2) An assessment of the need for a new national military 
        strategy and, if it is determined that such a new strategy is 
        needed, identification of such a strategy.
          (3) An assessment of the military force structure necessary 
        to support the new strategies identified under paragraphs (1) 
        and (2).
          (4) An assessment of force modernization requirements 
        necessary to support the new strategies identified under 
        paragraphs (1) and (2).
          (5) An assessment of military infrastructure requirements 
        necessary to support the new strategies identified under 
        paragraphs (1) and (2).
          (6) An assessment of the funding needs of the Department of 
        Defense necessary to support the long-term national security 
        requirements of the United States.
          (7) An assessment of the adequacy of the force structure 
        recommended in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review in executing the 
        national military strategy.
          (8) An assessment of the adequacy of the current future-years 
        defense plan in fully funding the Bottom-Up Review force 
        structure while maintaining adequate force modernization and 
        military readiness objectives.
          (9) An assessment of the level of defense funds expended on 
        non-defense programs.
          (10) An assessment of the costs to the United States of 
        expanding the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty 
        Organization.
          (11) An assessment of the elements of military pay and 
        allowances constituting the regular military compensation of 
        members of the Armed Forces and the development of 
        recommendations for changes in those elements in order to end 
        the dependence of some members of the Armed Forces and their 
        families on Federal and local assistance programs.
          (12) An assessment of the need to revise the command and 
        control structure of the Army Reserve.
  (b)  Matters To Be Considered.--In carrying out the review, the 
Commission shall develop specific recommendations to accomplish each of 
the following:
          (1) Provide members of the Armed Forces with annual pay 
        raises and other compensation at levels sufficient to begin 
        closing the gap with comparable civilian pay levels.
          (2) Fully fund cost-effective missile defense systems that 
        are deployable at the earliest practical date following 
        enactment of this Act.
          (3) Maintain adequate funding for military readiness accounts 
        without sacrificing modernization programs.
          (4) Define policies for committing troops to peacekeeping, 
        peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or humanitarian missions.
          (5) Maintain a strong role for Guard and Reserve forces.
          (6) Provide a new funding system to avoid diversions from 
        military readiness accounts to pay for peacekeeping and 
        humanitarian deployments such as Haiti and Rwanda.
          (7) Support measures to enhance security in the Asia-Pacific 
        region, including security for the ASEAN Regional Forum member 
        nations.
          (8) Reduce the level of defense expenditures for non-defense 
        programs.

SEC. 304. REPORTS.

  (a) Final Report.--The Commission shall submit to the President and 
the designated congressional committees a report on the assessments and 
recommendations referred to in section 303 not later than January 1, 
1996. The report shall be submitted in unclassified and classified 
versions.
  (b) Interim Report.--The Commission shall submit to the President and 
the designated congressional committees an interim report describing 
the Commission's progress in fulfilling its duties under section 303. 
The interim report shall include any preliminary recommendations the 
Commission may have reached and shall be submitted not later than 
October 1, 1995.
  (c) Designated Congressional Committees.--For purposes of this 
section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' means--
          (1) the Committee on National Security, the Committee on 
        International Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
        the House of Representatives; and
          (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
  (d) Limitation Pending Submission of Interim Report.--The Secretary 
of the Army may not, during the period beginning on the date of the 
enactment of this Act and ending on the date on which the interim 
report under subsection (b) is submitted, take any action to implement 
the plan to reorganize the Army Reserve's continental United States 
headquarters structures that was announced by the Secretary on January 
4, 1995.

SEC. 305. POWERS.

  (a) Hearings.--The Commission may, for the purpose of carrying out 
this section, conduct such hearings, sit and act at such times, take 
such testimony, and receive such evidence, as the Commission considers 
appropriate.
  (b) Assistance From Other Agencies.--The Commission may secure 
directly from any department or agency of the Federal Government such 
information, relevant to its duties under this title, as may be 
necessary to carry out such duties. Upon request of the chairman of the 
Commission, the head of the department or agency shall, to the extent 
permitted by law, furnish such information to the Commission.
  (c) Mail.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same 
manner and under the same conditions as the departments and agencies of 
the Federal Government.
  (d) Assistance From Secretary of Defense.--The Secretary of Defense 
shall provide to the Commission such reasonable administrative and 
support services as the Commission may request.

SEC. 306. COMMISSION PROCEDURES.

  (a) Meetings.--The Commission shall meet on a regular basis (as 
determined by the chairman) and at the call of the chairman or a 
majority of its members.
  (b) Quorum.--A majority of the members of the Commission shall 
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.

SEC. 307. PERSONNEL MATTERS.

  (a) Compensation.--Each member of the Commission shall serve without 
compensation, but shall be allowed travel expenses including per diem 
in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5, 
United States Code, when engaged in the performance of Commission 
duties.
  (b) Staff.--The Commission shall appoint a staff director, who shall 
be paid at a rate not to exceed the maximum rate of basic pay under 
section 5376 of title 5, United States Code, and such professional and 
clerical personnel as may be reasonable and necessary to enable the 
Commission to carry out its duties under this title without regard to 
the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments 
in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of 
chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title, or any other 
provision of law, relating to the number, classification, and General 
Schedule rates. No employee appointed under this subsection (other than 
the staff director) may be compensated at a rate to exceed the maximum 
rate applicable to level 15 of the General Schedule.
  (c) Detailed Personnel.--Upon request of the chairman of the 
Commission, the head of any department or agency of the Federal 
Government is authorized to detail, without reimbursement, any 
personnel of such department or agency to the Commission to assist the 
Commission in carrying out its duties under this section. The detail of 
any such personnel may not result in the interruption or loss of civil 
service status or privilege of such personnel.

SEC. 308. TERMINATION OF THE COMMISSION.

  The Commission shall terminate upon submission of the final report 
required by section 303.

SEC. 309. FUNDING.

  Of the funds available to the Department of Defense, $1,500,000 shall 
be made available to the Commission to carry out the provisions of this 
title.

               TITLE IV--COMMAND OF UNITED STATES FORCES

SEC. 401. LIMITATION ON EXPENDITURE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS FOR 
                    UNITED STATES FORCES PLACED UNDER UNITED NATIONS 
                    COMMAND OR CONTROL.

  (a) In General.--(1) Chapter 20 of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting after section 404 the following new section:

``Sec. 405. Placement of United States forces under United Nations 
                    command or control: limitation

  ``(a) Limitation.--(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), 
funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of 
Defense may not be obligated or expended for activities of any element 
of the armed forces that after the date of the enactment of this 
section is placed under United Nations command or control.
  ``(2) In this section, the term `under United Nations command or 
control' means under the command or operational control of an 
individual acting on behalf of the United Nations for the purpose of 
international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar 
activity that is authorized by the Security Council under chapter VI or 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations if the senior military 
commander of the United Nations force or operation--
          ``(A) is a foreign national or is a citizen of the United 
        States who is not a United States military officer serving on 
        active duty; or
          ``(B) is a United States military officer serving on active 
        duty in a case in which--
                  ``(i) elements of the armed forces of the United 
                States assigned or detailed to that force or operation 
                are under the command or operational control of a 
                foreign national; and
                  ``(ii) that senior military commander does not have 
                the authority to dismiss any subordinate officer in the 
                chain of command (regardless of nationality) who is 
                exercising command or operational control over United 
                States forces, to establish rules of engagement for 
                United States forces involved, and to establish 
                criteria governing the operational employment of United 
                States forces involved.
  ``(b) Exception for Presidential Certification.--(1) Subsection (a) 
shall not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of 
the armed forces under United Nations command or control if the 
President, not less than 15 days before the date on which such United 
Nations command or control is to become effective (or as provided in 
paragraph (2)), meets the requirements of subsection (d).
  ``(2) If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency exists 
that precludes the President from meeting the requirements of 
subsection (d) 15 days before placing any element of the armed forces 
under United Nations command or control, the President may place such 
forces under such command or control and meet the requirements of 
subsection (d) in a timely manner, but in no event later than 48 hours 
after such command or control becomes effective.
  ``(c) Exception for Authorization by Law.--Subsection (a) shall not 
apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of the armed 
forces under United Nations command or control if the Congress 
specifically authorizes by law that particular placement of United 
States forces under United Nations command or control.
  ``(d) Presidential Certifications.--The requirements referred to in 
subsection (b)(1) are that the President submit to Congress the 
following:
          ``(1) Certification by the President that--
                  ``(A) such a United Nations command or control 
                arrangement is necessary to protect national security 
                interests of the United States;
                  ``(B) the commander of any unit of the armed forces 
                proposed for placement under United Nations command or 
                control will at all times retain the right--
                          ``(i) to report independently to superior 
                        United States military authorities; and
                          ``(ii) to decline to comply with orders 
                        judged by the commander to be illegal, 
                        militarily imprudent, or beyond the mandate of 
                        the mission to which the United States agreed 
                        with the United Nations, until such time as 
                        that commander receives direction from superior 
                        United States military authorities with respect 
                        to the orders that the commander has declined 
                        to comply with;
                  ``(C) any element of the armed forces proposed for 
                placement under United Nations command or control will 
                at all times remain under United States administrative 
                command for such purposes as discipline and evaluation; 
                and
                  ``(D) the United States will retain the authority to 
                withdraw any element of the armed forces from the 
                proposed operation at any time and to take any action 
                it considers necessary to protect those forces if they 
                are engaged.
          ``(2) A report setting forth the following:
                  ``(A) A description of the national security 
                interests that require the placement of United States 
                forces under United Nations command or control.
                  ``(B) The mission of the United States forces 
                involved.
                  ``(C) The expected size and composition of the United 
                States forces involved.
                  ``(D) The incremental cost to the United States of 
                participation in the United Nations operation by the 
                United States forces which are proposed to be placed 
                under United Nations command or control.
                  ``(E) The precise command and control relationship 
                between the United States forces involved and the 
                United Nations command structure.
                  ``(F) The precise command and control relationship 
                between the United States forces involved and the 
                commander of the United States unified command for the 
                region in which those United States forces are to 
                operate.
                  ``(G) The extent to which the United States forces 
                involved will rely on non-United States forces for 
                security and self-defense and an assessment on the 
                ability of those non-United States forces to provide 
                adequate security to the United States forces involved.
                  ``(H) The timetable for complete withdrawal of the 
                United States forces involved.
  ``(e) Classification of Report.--A report under subsection (c) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form and, if necessary, in classified 
form.
  ``(f) Exception for Small Forces.--This section does not apply in a 
case in which fewer than 50 members of the armed forces are 
participating in a particular United Nations operation or activity.
  ``(g) Interpretation.--Nothing in this section may be construed--
          ``(1) as authority for the President to use any element of 
        the armed forces in any operation; or
          ``(2) as authority for the President to place any element of 
        the armed forces under the command or operational control of a 
        foreign national.''.
  (2) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I of such 
chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``405. Placement of United States forces under United Nations command 
or control: limitation.''.

  (b) Report Relating to Constitutionality.--No certification may be 
submitted by the President under section 405(d)(1) of title 10, United 
States Code, as added by subsection (a), until the President has 
submitted to the Congress (after the date of the enactment of this Act) 
a memorandum of legal points and authorities explaining why the 
placement of elements of United States Armed Forces under the command 
or operational control of a foreign national acting on behalf of the 
United Nations does not violate the Constitution.
  (c) Exception for Ongoing Operations in Macedonia and Croatia.--
Section 405 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection 
(a), does not apply in the case of activities of the Armed Forces in 
Macedonia authorized pursuant to United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 795, adopted December 11, 1992, and subsequent 
reauthorization Resolutions, and in the case of activities of the Armed 
Forces in Croatia authorized pursuant to United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 743, adopted February 21, 1992, and subsequent 
reauthorization Resolutions, as part of the United Nations force 
designated as the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

SEC. 402. LIMITATION ON PLACEMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES UNDER 
                    FOREIGN CONTROL FOR A UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
                    ACTIVITY.

  (a) In General.--Section 6 of the United Nations Participation Act of 
1945 (22 U.S.C. 287d) is amended to read as follows:
  ``Sec. 6. (a) Agreements With Security Council.--(1) Any special 
agreement described in paragraph (2) that is concluded by the President 
with the Security Council shall not be effective unless approved by the 
Congress by law.
  ``(2) An agreement referred to in paragraph (1) is an agreement 
providing for the numbers and types of United States Armed Forces, 
their degree of readiness and general locations, or the nature of 
facilities and assistance, including rights of passage, to be made 
available to the Security Council for the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security in accordance with Article 43 of the 
Charter of the United Nations.
  ``(b) Limitation.--(1) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), 
the President may not place any element of the Armed Forces under the 
command or operational control of a foreign national acting on behalf 
of the United Nations for the purpose of international peacekeeping, 
peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar activity that is authorized by 
the Secretary Council under chapter VI or VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations.
  ``(2) For purposes of this section, elements of the Armed Forces 
shall be considered to be placed under the command or operational 
control of a foreign national acting on behalf of the United Nations 
only in a case in which the senior military commander of the United 
Nations force or operation is a foreign national.
  ``(c) Exception for Presidential Certification.--(1) Subsection (b) 
shall not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of 
the Armed Forces under such command or operational control if the 
President, not less than 15 days before the date on which such command 
or operational control is to become effective (or as provided in 
paragraph (2)), meets the requirements of subsection (e).
  ``(2) If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency exists 
that precludes the President from meeting the requirements of 
subsection (e) 15 days before placing any element of the Armed Forces 
under such command or operational control, the President may place such 
forces under such command or operational control and meet the 
requirements of subsection (e) in a timely manner, but in no event 
later than 48 hours after such command or operational control becomes 
effective.
  ``(d) Exception for Authorization by Law.--Subsection (b) shall not 
apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of the Armed 
Forces under such command or operational control if the Congress 
specifically authorizes by law that particular placement of United 
States forces under such command or operational control.
  ``(e) Presidential Certifications.--The requirements referred to in 
subsection (c)(1) are that the President submit to Congress the 
following:
          ``(1) Certification by the President that--
                  ``(A) such a command or operational control 
                arrangement is necessary to protect national security 
                interests of the United States;
                  ``(B) the commander of any unit of the Armed Forces 
                proposed for placement under the command or operational 
                control of a foreign national acting directly on behalf 
                of the United Nations will at all times retain the 
                right--
                          ``(i) to report independently to superior 
                        United States military authorities; and
                          ``(ii) to decline to comply with orders 
                        judged by the commander to be illegal, 
                        militarily imprudent, or beyond the mandate of 
                        the mission to which the United States agreed 
                        with the United Nations, until such time as 
                        that commander receives direction from superior 
                        United States military authorities with respect 
                        to the orders that the commander has declined 
                        to comply with;
                  ``(C) any element of the Armed Forces proposed for 
                placement under the command or operational control of a 
                foreign national acting directly on behalf of the 
                United Nations will at all times remain under United 
                States administrative command for such purposes as 
                discipline and evaluation; and
                  ``(D) the United States will retain the authority to 
                withdraw any element of the Armed Forces from the 
                proposed operation at any time and to take any action 
                it considers necessary to protect those forces if they 
                are engaged.
          ``(2) A report setting forth the following:
                  ``(A) A description of the national security 
                interests that require the placement of United States 
                forces under the command or operational control of a 
                foreign national acting directly on behalf of the 
                United Nations.
                  ``(B) The mission of the United States forces 
                involved.
                  ``(C) The expected size and composition of the United 
                States forces involved.
                  ``(D) The incremental cost to the United States of 
                participation in the United Nations operation by the 
                United States forces which are proposed to be placed 
                under the command or operational control of a foreign 
                national.
                  ``(E) The precise command and control relationship 
                between the United States forces involved and the 
                United Nations command structure.
                  ``(F) The precise command and control relationship 
                between the United States forces involved and the 
                commander of the United States unified command for the 
                region in which those United States forces are to 
                operate.
                  ``(G) The extent to which the United States forces 
                involved will rely on non-United States forces for 
                security and self-defense and an assessment on the 
                ability of those non-United States forces to provide 
                adequate security to the United States forces involved.
                  ``(H) The timetable for complete withdrawal of the 
                United States forces involved.
  ``(f) Classification of Report.--A report under subsection (e) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form and, if necessary, in classified 
form.
  ``(g) Exception for Small Forces.--This section does not apply in a 
case in which fewer than 50 members of the Armed Forces are 
participating in a particular United Nations operation or activity.
  ``(h) Interpretation.--Except as authorized in section 7 of this Act, 
nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as an authorization to 
the President by the Congress to make available to the Security Council 
United States Armed Forces, facilities, or assistance.''.
  (b) Report Relating to Constitutionality.--No certification may be 
submitted by the President under section 6(e)(1) of the United Nations 
Participation Act of 1945, as amended by subsection (a), until the 
President has submitted to the Congress (after the date of the 
enactment of this Act) a memorandum of legal points and authorities 
explaining why the placement of elements of United States Armed Forces 
under the command or operational control of a foreign national acting 
on behalf of the United Nations does not violate the Constitution.
  (c) Exception for Ongoing Operation in Macedonia.--Section 6 of the 
United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended by subsection (a), 
does not apply in the case of activities of the Armed Forces in 
Macedonia pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 795, 
adopted December 11, 1992, and 842, adopted June 18, 1993, as part of 
the United Nations force designated as the United Nations Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR).
                        TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 501. CREDIT AGAINST ASSESSMENT FOR UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES IN 
                    SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

  (a) In General.--The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 
U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:
  ``Sec. 10. (a) Credit Against Assessment for Expenditures in Support 
of Peacekeeping Operations.--
          ``(1) Limitation.--Funds may be obligated for payment to the 
        United Nations of the United States assessed share of 
        peacekeeping operations for a fiscal year only to the extent 
        that--
                  ``(A) the amount of such assessed share exceeds--
                  ``(B) the amount equal to--
                          ``(i) the total amount identified in the 
                        report submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) for 
                        the preceding fiscal year, reduced by
                          ``(ii) the amount of any reimbursement or 
                        credit to the United States by the United 
                        Nations for the costs of United States support 
                        for, or participation in, United Nations 
                        peacekeeping activities for that preceding 
                        fiscal year.
          ``(2) Annual report.--The President shall, at the time of 
        submission of the budget to the Congress for any fiscal year, 
        submit to the designated congressional committees a report on 
        the total amount of funds appropriated for national defense 
        purposes for any fiscal year that were expended during the 
        preceding fiscal year to support or participate in, directly or 
        indirectly, United Nations peacekeeping activities. Such report 
        shall include a separate listing by United Nations peacekeeping 
        operation of the amount of funds expended to support or 
        participate in each such operation.
          ``(3) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection:
                  ``(A) United nations peacekeeping activities.--The 
                term `United Nations peacekeeping activities' means any 
                international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-
                enforcing, or similar activity that is authorized by 
                the United Nations Security Council under chapter VI or 
                VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
                  ``(B) Designated congressional committees.--The term 
                `designated congressional committees' includes the 
                Committee on National Security of the House of 
                Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of 
                the Senate.''.
  (b) Effective Date.--The limitation contained in section 10(a)(1) of 
the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as added by subsection 
(a), shall apply only with respect to United Nations assessments for 
peacekeeping operations after fiscal year 1995.

SEC. 502. CODIFICATION OF REQUIRED NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF PROPOSED 
                    UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.

  (a) Required Notice.--Section 4 of the United Nations Participation 
Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287b) is amended--
          (1) by striking the second sentence of subsection (a);
          (2) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
          (3) by inserting after subsection (d) a new subsection (e) 
        consisting of the text of subsection (a) of section 407 of the 
        Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 
        (Public Law 103-236), revised--
                  (A) in paragraph (2)--
                          (i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), 
                        by inserting ``in written form not later than 
                        the 10th day of'' after ``shall be provided'';
                          (ii) in subparagraph (A)(iv), by inserting 
                        ``(including facilities, training, 
                        transportation, communication, intelligence, 
                        and logistical support)'' after ``covered by 
                        the resolution''; and
                          (iii) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the 
                        end the following new clause:
                          ``(iv) A description of any other United 
                        States assistance to or support for the 
                        operation (including facilities, training, 
                        transportation, communication, intelligence, 
                        and logistical support), and an estimate of the 
                        cost to the United States of such assistance or 
                        support.'';
                  (B) by striking paragraph (3);
                  (C) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3) 
                and in the last sentence of that paragraph by striking 
                ``and (ii)'' and inserting ``through (iv)'';
                  (D) by inserting after paragraph (3) (as so 
                redesignated) the following new paragraph:
          ``(4) New united nations peacekeeping operation defined.--As 
        used in paragraphs (2) (B) and (3), the term `new United 
        Nations peacekeeping operation' includes any existing or 
        otherwise ongoing United Nations peacekeeping operation--
                  ``(A) that is to be expanded by more than 25 percent 
                during the period covered by the Security Council 
                resolution, as measured by either the number of 
                personnel participating (or authorized to participate) 
                in the operation or the budget of the operation; or
                  ``(B) that is to be authorized to operate in a 
                country in which it was not previously authorized to 
                operate.''; and
                  (E) in paragraph (5)--
                          (i) by striking ``(5) Notification'' and all 
                        that follows through ``(B) The President'' and 
                        inserting ``(5) Quarterly reports.--The 
                        President''; and
                          (ii) by striking ``section 4(d)'' and all 
                        that follows through ``of this section)'' and 
                        inserting ``subsection (d)''.
  (b) Conforming Repeal.--Subsection (a) of section 407 of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 
103-236), is repealed.
  (c) Designated Congressional Committees.--Subsection (f) of section 4 
of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287b(f)), as 
redesignated by subsection (a), is amended to read as follows:
  ``(f) Designated Congressional Committees.--As used in this section, 
the term ``designated congressional committees'' has the meaning given 
such term in section 10(f).''.

SEC. 503. NOTICE TO CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS FOR 
                    UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.

  Section 10 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 is amended 
by adding after subsection (a), as added by section 501, the following 
new subsection:
  ``(b) Notice to Congress Regarding Contributions for Peacekeeping 
Activities.--
          ``(1) Notice regarding united nations billing request.--Not 
        later than 15 days after the date on which the United States 
        receives from the United Nations a billing requesting a payment 
        by the United States of any contribution for United Nations 
        peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify the 
        designated congressional committees.
          ``(2) Notice regarding proposed obligation of funds.--The 
        President shall notify the designated congressional committees 
        at least 15 days before the United States obligates funds for 
        any assessed or voluntary contribution for United Nations 
        peacekeeping activities, except that if the President 
        determines that an emergency exists which prevents compliance 
        with the requirement that such notification be provided 15 days 
        in advance and that such contribution is in the national 
        security interests of the United States, such notification 
        shall be provided in a timely manner but no later than 48 hours 
        after such obligation.''.

SEC. 504. REVISED NOTICE TO CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE 
                    FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.

  Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 
287d-1) is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``other than subsection 
        (e)(1)'' after ``any other law''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), at least 15 
days before any agency or entity of the United States Government makes 
available to the United Nations any assistance or facility to support 
or facilitate United Nations peacekeeping activities, the President 
shall so notify the designated congressional committees.
  ``(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to--
          ``(A) assistance having a value of less than $1,000,000 in 
        the case of nonreimbursable assistance or less than $5,000,000 
        in the case of reimbursable assistance; or
          ``(B) assistance provided under the emergency drawdown 
        authority contained in sections 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2) of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)(1), 
        2348a(c)(2)).
  ``(3) If the President determines that an emergency exists which 
prevents compliance with the requirement in paragraph (1) that 
notification be provided 15 days in advance and that the contribution 
of any such assistance or facility is in the national security 
interests of the United States, such notification shall be provided in 
a timely manner but not later than 48 hours after such assistance or 
facility is made available to the United Nations.
  ``(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term `assistance'--
          ``(A) means assistance of any kind, including logistical 
        support, supplies, goods, or services (including command, 
        control, communications or intelligence assistance and 
        training), and the grant of rights of passage; and
          ``(B) includes assistance provided through in-kind 
        contributions or through the provision of support, supplies, 
        goods, or services on any terms, including on a grant, lease, 
        loan, or reimbursable basis; but
          ``(C) does not include the payment of assessed or voluntary 
        contributions.''.

SEC. 505. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
                    ACTIVITIES.

  Section 4(d)(1) of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 
U.S.C. 287b(d)(1)) is amended--
          (1) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E); 
        and
          (2) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new 
        subparagraph:
                  ``(D) A description of the anticipated budget for the 
                next fiscal year for United States participation in 
                United Nations peacekeeping activities, including a 
                statement of--
                          ``(i) the aggregate amount of funds available 
                        to the United Nations for that fiscal year, 
                        including assessed and voluntary contributions, 
                        which may be made available for United Nations 
                        peacekeeping activities; and
                          ``(ii) the aggregate amount of funds (from 
                        all accounts) and the aggregate costs of in-
                        kind contributions that the United States 
                        proposes to make available to the United 
                        Nations for that fiscal year for United Nations 
                        peacekeeping activities.''.

SEC. 506. REIMBURSEMENT TO THE UNITED STATES FOR IN-KIND CONTRIBUTIONS 
                    TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.

  (a) In General.--Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act of 
1945 (22 U.S.C. 287d-1), as amended by section 504, is further 
amended--
          (1) in subsection (b)--
                  (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)'';
                  (B) by striking ``United States: Provided,'' through 
                ``Provided further, That when'' and inserting ``United 
                States. When''; and
                  (C) by adding at the end the following:
  ``(2) The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement for 
reimbursement under paragraph (1) if the Secretary, after consultation 
with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, determines that an emergency exists which 
justifies waiver of that requirement. Any such waiver shall be 
submitted to the designated congressional committees, as defined in 
section 10(a)(3)(B), at least 15 days before it takes effect, except 
that if the President determines that an emergency exists which 
prevents compliance with the requirement that the notification be 
provided 15 days in advance and that the provision under subsection 
(a)(1) or (a)(2) of personnel or assistance on a nonreimbursable basis 
is in the national security interests of the United States, such 
notification shall be provided in a timely manner but no later than 48 
hours after such waiver takes effect.''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(f) The Secretary of State shall ensure that goods and services 
provided on a reimbursable basis by the Department of Defense to the 
United Nations for United Nations peacekeeping operations under this 
section or any other provision of law are reimbursed at the appropriate 
value, as determined by the Secretary of Defense.''.
  (b) Initial Report.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Representative of the United 
        States to the United Nations shall submit to the designated 
        congressional committees a report on all actions taken by the 
        United States mission to the United Nations to achieve the 
        objective described in section 7(f) of the United Nations 
        Participation Act of 1945, as added by subsection (a)(2).
          (2) Designated congressional committees defined.--As used in 
        this subsection, the term ``designated congressional 
        committees'' has the meaning given such term in section 
        10(a)(3)(B) of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as 
        added by section 501.
SEC. 507. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO PAY UNITED STATES ASSESSED OR 
                    VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION FOR UNITED NATIONS 
                    PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES UNLESS DEPARTMENT OF 
                    DEFENSE REIMBURSED BY UNITED NATIONS FOR CERTAIN 
                    GOODS AND SERVICES.

  (a) In General.--Section 10 of the United Nations Participation Act 
of 1945 is amended by adding after subsection (b), as added by section 
503, the following new subsection:
  ``(c) Prohibition on Use of Funds To Pay Assessed or Voluntary 
Contributions for Peacekeeping Activities Unless Department of Defense 
Reimbursed for Certain Goods and Services.--Appropriated funds may not 
be used to pay any United States assessed or voluntary contribution 
during any fiscal year for United Nations peacekeeping activities until 
the Secretary of Defense certifies to the Congress that the United 
Nations has reimbursed the Department of Defense directly for all goods 
and services that were provided to the United Nations by the Department 
of Defense on a reimbursable basis during the preceding fiscal year for 
United Nations peacekeeping activities, including personnel and 
assistance provided under section 7 (except to the extent that the 
authority of subsection (b)(2) of such section to waive the 
reimbursement requirement was exercised with respect to such personnel 
or assistance).''.
  (b) Effective Date.--The prohibition contained in section 10(c) of 
the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as added by subsection 
(a), shall apply only with respect to fiscal years after fiscal year 
1995.

SEC. 508. LIMITATION ON USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS FOR UNITED 
                    STATES SHARE OF COSTS OF UNITED NATIONS 
                    PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.

  (a) In General.--(1) Chapter 20 of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting after section 405, as added by section 401 of this 
Act, the following new section:

``Sec. 406. Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share 
                    of costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: 
                    limitation

  ``(a) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Payment of Assessments and 
Voluntary Contributions.--(1) Funds available to the Department of 
Defense may not be used to make a financial contribution (directly or 
through another department or agency of the United States) to the 
United Nations--
          ``(A) for the costs of a United Nations peacekeeping 
        activity; or
          ``(B) for any United States arrearage to the United Nations.
  ``(2) The prohibition in paragraph (1)(A) applies to voluntary 
contributions, as well as to contributions pursuant to assessment by 
the United Nations for the United States share of the costs of a 
peacekeeping activity.
  ``(b) Limitation on Use of Funds for Participation in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Activities.--Funds available to the Department of Defense 
may be used for payment of the incremental costs associated with the 
participation of elements of the armed forces in a United Nations 
peacekeeping activity only to the extent that Congress has by law 
specifically authorized the use of those funds for that purpose.
  ``(c) Covered Peacekeeping Activities.--In this section, the term 
`United Nations peacekeeping activity' means a peacekeeping activity 
carried out pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations Security 
Council for which costs are met (in whole or in part) through 
assessments by the United Nations to its member nations.''.
  (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended 
by adding at the end the following new item:

``406. Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of 
costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: limitation.''.

  (b) Effective Date.--Section 406 of title 10, United States Code, as 
added by subsection (a), shall take effect on October 1, 1995.

SEC. 509. CODIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON AMOUNT OF UNITED STATES 
                    ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS 
                    PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

  (a) In General.--Section 10 of the United Nations Participation Act 
of 1945 is amended by adding after subsection (c), as added by section 
507, the following new subsection:
  ``(d) Limitation on Assessed Contribution With Respect to a 
Peacekeeping Operation.--Funds authorized to be appropriated for 
`Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities' for any 
fiscal year shall not be available for the payment of the United States 
assessed contribution for a United Nations peacekeeping operation in an 
amount which is greater than 25 percent of the total amount of all 
assessed contributions for that operation.''.
  (b) Effective Date.--The limitation contained in section 10(d) of the 
United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as added by subsection (a), 
shall apply only with respect to funds authorized to be appropriated 
for ``Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities'' for 
fiscal years after fiscal year 1995.
  (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 404(b) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236) is 
amended by striking paragraph (2).

SEC. 510. BUY AMERICAN REQUIREMENT.

  Section 10 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 is amended 
by adding after subsection (d), as added by section 509, the following 
new subsections:
  ``(e) Buy American Requirement.--No funds may be obligated or 
expended to pay any United States assessed or voluntary contribution 
for United Nations peacekeeping activities unless the Secretary of 
State determines and certifies to the designated congressional 
committees that United States manufacturers and suppliers are being 
given opportunities to provide equipment, services, and material for 
such activities equal to those being given to foreign manufacturers and 
suppliers.
  ``(f) Designated Congressional Committees Defined.--As used in this 
section, the term `designated congressional committees' means--
          ``(1) the Committee on International Relations and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; 
        and
          ``(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate.''.

SEC. 511. UNITED NATIONS BUDGETARY AND MANAGEMENT REFORM.

  (a) In General.--The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 
U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end the 
following new section:
  ``Sec. 11. (a) Withholding of Contributions.--
          ``(1) Assessed contributions for regular united nations 
        budget.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 20 percent of 
        the amount of funds made available for that fiscal year for 
        United States assessed contributions for the regular United 
        Nations budget shall be withheld from obligation and 
        expenditure unless a certification for that fiscal year has 
        been made under subsection (b).
          ``(2) Assessed contributions for united nations 
        peacekeeping.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 50 percent 
        of the amount of funds made available for that fiscal year for 
        United States assessed contributions for United Nations 
        peacekeeping activities shall be withheld from obligation and 
        expenditure unless a certification for that fiscal year has 
        been made under subsection (b).
          ``(3) Voluntary contributions for united nations 
        peacekeeping.--The United States may not during any fiscal year 
        pay any voluntary contribution to the United Nations for 
        international peacekeeping activities unless a certification 
        for that fiscal year has been made under subsection (b).
  ``(b) Certification.--The certification referred to in subsection (a) 
for any fiscal year is a certification by the President to the 
Congress, submitted on or after the beginning of that fiscal year, of 
each of the following:
          ``(1) The United Nations has an independent office of 
        Inspector General to conduct and supervise objective audits, 
        inspections, and investigations relating to programs and 
        operations of the United Nations.
          ``(2) The United Nations has an Inspector General who was 
        appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of the 
        General Assembly and whose appointment was made principally on 
        the basis of the appointee's integrity and demonstrated ability 
        in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management 
        analysis, public administration, or investigation.
          ``(3) The Inspector General is authorized to--
                  ``(A) make investigations and reports relating to the 
                administration of the programs and operations of the 
                United Nations;
                  ``(B) have access to all records, documents, and 
                other available materials relating to those programs 
                and operations;
                  ``(C) have direct and prompt access to any official 
                of the United Nations; and
                  ``(D) have access to all records and officials of the 
                specialized agencies of the United Nations.
          ``(4) The United Nations has fully implemented, and made 
        available to all member states, procedures that effectively 
        protect the identity of, and prevent reprisals against, any 
        staff member of the United Nations making a complaint or 
        disclosing information to, or cooperating in any investigation 
        or inspection by, the United Nations Inspector General.
          ``(5) The United Nations has fully implemented procedures 
        that ensure compliance with recommendations of the United 
        Nations Inspector General.
          ``(6) The United Nations has required the United Nations 
        Inspector General to issue an annual report and has ensured 
        that the annual report and all other reports of the Inspector 
        General are made available to the General Assembly without 
        modification.
          ``(7) The United Nations has provided, and is committed to 
        providing, sufficient budgetary resources to ensure the 
        effective operation of the United Nations Inspector General.''.
  (b) Effective Date.--Section 11 of the United Nations Participation 
Act of 1945, as added by subsection (a), shall apply only with respect 
to fiscal years after fiscal year 1995.

SEC. 512. CONDITIONS ON PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE TO THE UNITED 
                    NATIONS.

  (a) In General.--The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 
U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end the 
following new section:
  ``Sec. 12. (a) Conditions on Provision of Intelligence to the United 
Nations.--
          ``(1) Requirement for agreement.--The United States may 
        provide intelligence to the United Nations only pursuant to a 
        written agreement between the President and the Secretary 
        General of the United Nations.
          ``(2) Content of agreement.--Any such agreement shall 
        specify--
                  ``(A) the types of intelligence to be provided to the 
                United Nations;
                  ``(B) the circumstances under which intelligence may 
                be provided to the United Nations; and
                  ``(C) the procedures to be observed by the United 
                Nations--
                          ``(i) concerning persons who shall have 
                        access to the intelligence provided; and
                          ``(ii) to protect the intelligence against 
                        disclosure not authorized by the agreement.
          ``(3) Duration of agreement.--Any such agreement shall be 
        effective for a period not to exceed one year from the date on 
        which the agreement enters into force.
  ``(b) Advance Notification to Congress.--An agreement described in 
subsection (a) shall be effective only if the President has transmitted 
the agreement to the Committee on International Relations and the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate not less than 30 days in 
advance of the entry into force of the agreement.
  ``(c) Delegation of Authority.--The President may delegate the 
authority and assign the duties of the President under this section 
only to the Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central 
Intelligence.
  ``(d) Exceptions.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to the provision of 
intelligence--
          ``(1) that is provided only to, and for the use of, United 
        States Government personnel serving with the United Nations; or
          ``(2) that is essential for the protection of nationals of 
        the United States, including members of the United States Armed 
        Forces and civilian personnel of the United States Government.
  ``(e) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to--
          ``(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the 
        Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence 
        sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to 
        section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
        U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); or
          ``(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of--
                  ``(A) title V of the National Security Act of 1947 
                (50 U.S.C. 413-415); or
                  ``(B) section 112b of title 1, United States Code.''.
  (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take 
effect 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
  TITLE VI--REVITALIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
                              ORGANIZATION

SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.

  This title may be cited as the ``NATO Revitalization and Expansion 
Act of 1995''.

SEC. 602. FINDINGS.

  The Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) Since 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
        has helped to guarantee the security, freedom, and prosperity 
        of the United States and its partners in the alliance.
          (2) NATO has expanded its membership on three different 
        occasions since its founding in 1949.
          (3) The steadfast and sustained commitment of the member 
        countries of NATO to mutual defense against the threat of 
        communist domination played a significant role in precipitating 
        the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the demise of the Soviet 
        Union.
          (4) In the place of that threat, new security threats are 
        emerging to the shared interests of the member countries of 
        NATO.
          (5) Although these new threats are more geographically and 
        functionally diverse and less predictable, they still imperil 
        shared interests of the United States and its NATO allies.
          (6) Western interests must be protected on a cooperative 
        basis without an undue burden falling upon the United States.
          (7) NATO is the only multilateral organization that is 
        capable of conducting effective military operations to protect 
        Western interests.
          (8) The valuable experience gained from ongoing military 
        cooperation within NATO was critical to the success of joint 
        military operations in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait.
          (9) NATO is an important diplomatic forum for discussion of 
        issues of concern to its member states and for the peaceful 
        resolution of disputes.
          (10) Admission of Central and East European countries that 
        have recently been freed from Communist domination to NATO 
        could contribute to international peace and enhance the 
        security of those countries.
          (11) A number of countries, including the Visegrad countries 
        (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), the Baltic 
        states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and Ukraine, have 
        expressed interest in NATO membership.
          (12) In recognition of this interest, the Partnership for 
        Peace proposal offers limited military cooperation to many 
        European countries not currently members of NATO, but fails to 
        establish benchmarks or guidelines for eventual NATO 
        membership.
          (13) In particular, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
        Slovakia have made significant progress toward establishing 
        democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian 
        control of their armed forces, police, and intelligence 
        services, and the rule of law since the fall of their previous 
        Communist governments.

SEC. 603. UNITED STATES POLICY.

  It should be the policy of the United States--
          (1) to continue the Nation's commitment to an active 
        leadership role in NATO;
          (2) to join with the Nation's NATO allies to redefine the 
        role of the alliance in the post-Cold War world, taking into 
        account--
                  (A) the fundamentally changed security environment of 
                Central and Eastern Europe;
                  (B) the need to assure all countries of the defensive 
                nature of the alliance and the desire of its members to 
                work cooperatively with all former adversaries;
                  (C) the emerging security threats posed by the 
                proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
                weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver 
                them;
                  (D) the continuing challenges to the interests of all 
                NATO member countries posed by unstable and 
                undemocratic regimes harboring hostile intentions; and
                  (E) the dependence of the global economy on a stable 
                energy supply and the free flow of commerce;
          (3) to affirm that NATO military planning should include 
        joint military operations beyond the geographic bounds of the 
        alliance under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty when the 
        shared interests of the United States and other member 
        countries require such action to defend vital interests;
          (4) that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia 
        should be in a position to further the principles of the North 
        Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
        Atlantic area not later than January 10, 1999 (5 years from the 
        date of the establishment of the Partnership for Peace), and, 
        in accordance with Article 10 of such Treaty, should be invited 
        to become full NATO members not later than that date, provided 
        these countries--
                  (A) meet appropriate standards, including--
                          (i) shared values and interests;
                          (ii) democratic governments;
                          (iii) free market economies;
                          (iv) civilian control of the military, of the 
                        police, and of intelligence services;
                          (v) adherence to the values, principles, and 
                        political commitments embodied in the Helsinki 
                        Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
                        Cooperation in Europe;
                          (vi) commitment to further the principles of 
                        NATO and to contribute to the security of the 
                        North Atlantic area;
                          (vii) commitment to accept the obligations, 
                        responsibilities, and costs of NATO membership; 
                        and
                          (viii) commitment to implement infrastructure 
                        development activities that will facilitate 
                        participation in and support for NATO military 
                        activities; and
                  (B) remain committed to protecting the rights of all 
                their citizens and respecting the territorial integrity 
                of their neighbors;
          (5) that the United States, other NATO member nations, and 
        NATO itself should furnish appropriate assistance to facilitate 
        the transition of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
        Slovakia to full NATO membership not later than January 10, 
        1999; and
          (6) that other European countries emerging from communist 
        domination, in particular the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, 
        and Lithuania) and Ukraine, may be in a position at a future 
        date to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and 
        to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area, and 
        at the appropriate time they should receive assistance to 
        facilitate their transition to full NATO membership and should 
        be invited to become full NATO members.

SEC. 604. REVISIONS TO PROGRAM TO FACILITATE TRANSITION TO NATO 
                    MEMBERSHIP.

  (a) Establishment of Program.--Subsection (a) of section 203 of the 
NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of Public Law 103-447; 22 
U.S.C. 1928 note) is amended to read as follows:
  ``(a) Establishment of Program.--The President shall establish a 
program to assist in the transition to full NATO membership of Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia and any other European 
country emerging from communist domination that is designated by the 
President under subsection (d)(2).''.
  (b) Eligible Countries.--
          (1) Designated countries.--Subsection (d) of such section is 
        amended to read as follows:
  ``(d) Designation of Eligible Countries.--
          ``(1) Specified countries.--The following countries are 
        hereby designated for purposes of this title: Poland, Hungary, 
        the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.
          ``(2) Authority for president to designate other european 
        countries emerging from communist domination.--The President 
        may designate other European countries emerging from communist 
        domination (as defined in section 206) to receive assistance 
        under the program established under subsection (a). The 
        President may make such a designation in the case of any such 
        country only if the President determines, and reports to the 
        designated congressional committees, that such country--
                  ``(A) has made significant progress toward 
                establishing--
                          ``(i) shared values and interests;
                          ``(ii) democratic governments;
                          ``(iii) free market economies;
                          ``(iv) civilian control of the military, of 
                        the police, and of intelligence services;
                          ``(v) adherence to the values, principles, 
                        and political commitments embodied in the 
                        Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on 
                        Security and Cooperation in Europe; and
                          ``(vi) commitment to further the principles 
                        of NATO and to contribute to the security of 
                        the North Atlantic area;
                          ``(vii) commitment to accept the obligations, 
                        responsibilities, and costs of NATO membership; 
                        and
                          ``(viii) commitment to implement 
                        infrastructure development activities that will 
                        facilitate participation in and support for 
                        NATO military activities; and
                  ``(B) is likely, within five years of such 
                determination, to be in a position to further the 
                principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to 
                contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 
                area.''.
          (2) Conforming amendments.--
                  (A) Subsections (b) and (c) of such section are 
                amended by striking ``countries described in such 
                subsection'' and inserting ``countries designated under 
                subsection (d)''.
                  (B) Subsection (e) of such section is amended--
                          (i) by striking ``subsection (d)'' and 
                        inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''; and
                          (ii) by inserting ``(22 U.S.C. 2394)'' before 
                        the period at the end.
                  (C) Section 204(c) of such Act is amended by striking 
                ``any other'' and inserting ``any country designated 
                under section 203(d)(2)''.
  (c) Types of Assistance.--
          (1) Economic support assistance.--Subsection (c) of section 
        203 of such Act is amended--
                  (A) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as 
                paragraphs (4) and (5), respectively; and
                  (B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following 
                new paragraph (3):
          ``(3) Assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to the Economic Support 
        Fund).''.
          (2) Additional assistance.--
                  (A) In general.--Subsection (f) of such section is 
                amended to read as follows:
  ``(f) Additional Assistance.--In carrying out the program established 
under subsection (a), the President may, in addition to the security 
assistance authorized to be provided under subsection (c), provide 
assistance to countries designated under subsection (d) from funds 
appropriated under the `Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund' 
account.''.
                  (B) Effective date.--The amendment made by 
                subparagraph (A) does not apply with respect to funds 
                appropriated before the date of the enactment of this 
                Act.
  (d) Disqualification From Assistance for Support of Terrorism.--
Section 203 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end the 
following new subsection:
  ``(g) Prohibition on Providing Assistance to Foreign Governments That 
Export Lethal Military Equipment to Countries Supporting International 
Terrorism.--Assistance may only be provided through the program 
established under subsection (a) subject to the same terms and 
conditions that apply under section 563 of the Foreign Operations, 
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1995 (Public 
Law 103-306), with respect to the making available to foreign 
governments of funds appropriated or otherwise made available under 
that Act.''.
  (e) Annual Report.--Section 205 of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 
(title II of Public Law 103-447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note) is amended--
          (1) by inserting ``annual'' in the section heading before the 
        first word;
          (2) by inserting ``annual'' after ``include in the'' in the 
        matter preceding paragraph (1);
          (3) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as paragraphs (2) 
        and (3), respectively;
          (4) by inserting before paragraph (2), as so redesignated, 
        the following new paragraph (1):
          ``(1) An assessment of the progress made by Poland, Hungary, 
        the Czech Republic, and Slovakia and by any country designated 
        by the President under section 203(d)(2) toward meeting the 
        standards for NATO membership set forth in Article 10 of the 
        North Atlantic Treaty, including--
                  ``(A) an assessment of the progress of each such 
                country toward establishing--
                          ``(i) shared values and interests;
                          ``(ii) democratic governments;
                          ``(iii) free market economies;
                          ``(iv) civilian control of the military, of 
                        the police, and of intelligence services;
                          ``(v) adherence to the values, principles, 
                        and political commitments embodied in the 
                        Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on 
                        Security and Cooperation in Europe;
                          ``(vi) commitment to further the principles 
                        of NATO and to contribute to the security of 
                        the North Atlantic area;
                          ``(vii) commitment to accept the obligations, 
                        responsibilities, and costs of NATO membership; 
                        and
                          ``(viii) commitment to implement 
                        infrastructure development activities that will 
                        facilitate participation in and support for 
                        NATO military activities; and
                  ``(B) the commitment of each such country to 
                protecting the rights of all its citizens and 
                respecting the territorial integrity of its 
                neighbors.''; and
          (5) in paragraphs (2) and (3), as so redesignated, by 
        striking ``and other'' and all that follows through the period 
        at the end and inserting ``and any country designated by the 
        President pursuant to section 203(d)(2).''.
  (f) Definitions.--The NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of 
Public Law 103-447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note) is amended by adding at the 
end the following new section:

``SEC. 206. DEFINITIONS.

  ``For purposes of this title:
          ``(1) NATO.--The term `NATO' means the North Atlantic Treaty 
        Organization.
          ``(2) Other european countries emerging from communist 
        domination.--The term `other European countries emerging from 
        communist domination' means--
                  ``(A) any member of the Partnership for Peace that is 
                located--
                          ``(i) in the territory of the former Union of 
                        Soviet Socialist Republics; or
                          ``(ii) in the territory of the former 
                        Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; or
                  ``(B) Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, 
                or Albania.
          ``(3) Designated congressional committees.--The term 
        `designated congressional committees' means--
                  ``(A) the Committee on International Relations, the 
                Committee on National Security, and the Committee on 
                Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
                  ``(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 
                Appropriations of the Senate.''.

                      TITLE VII--BUDGET FIREWALLS

SEC. 701. RESTORATION OF BUDGET FIREWALLS FOR DEFENSE SPENDING.

  It is the sense of the Congress that so-called ``budget firewalls'' 
between defense and domestic discretionary spending should be 
established for each of fiscal years 1996, 1997, and 1998.
                         Purpose and Background

    Six years into the post-Cold War era, United States 
national security policy suffers from a lack of definition and 
credibility due to the significant mismatches between our 
defense strategy, military force structure and projected 
defense budgets. The 1993 Department of Defense ``Bottom Up 
Review,'' intended to serve as the national security blueprint 
for the Clinton Administration, has been widely criticized as 
fundamentally flawed due to its unsuccessful attempt to 
reconcile a two major regional conflict defense strategy and an 
inadequate defense budget plan--a plan that actually pre-dated 
the analysis underlying the Bottom Up Review strategy.
    The consequent effect has been a defense program stretched 
beyond prudence. The Bottom Up Review recommendations are 
leading to dramatic reductions in U.S. military forces, 
including a reduction in the number of Navy ships by one-third, 
the number of Air Force wings by almost one-half, and the level 
of funding for missile defenses by over fifty percent.
    Further, the defense budget proposed for fiscal year 1996 
represents the eleventh consecutive year of real decline in 
defense spending and, with the exception of fiscal year 1948, 
will mark the lowest percentage of gross domestic product of 
any defense budget since World War II.
    The combination of these significant reductions in military 
forces and defense budgets are being exacerbated by the 
increased pace of operations resulting from the growing number 
of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. These so-called 
contingency operations have led to personnel tempo problems and 
the diversion of already scarce training and exercise funds in 
order to maintain forward deployed forces. Not surprisingly, 
many military units are entering the early stages of a long-
term systemic readiness crisis.
    H.R. 7, the National Security Revitalization Act, is 
designed to serve as a critical step toward constructively 
addressing these and many other fundamental challenges 
afflicting U.S. national security policy. While H.R. 7 is not 
the vehicle for comprehensive legislative action on these 
issues, it serves as the policy framework to guide the 104th 
Congress as it moves through the traditional budget, 
authorization and appropriation process.

              Legislative History/Committee Consideration

    H.R. 7 was introduced on January 4, 1995 by Representatives 
Floyd Spence, Benjamin Gilman, Ed Bryant and James A. Hayes. In 
a split referral, Titles I, II, III, V, and section 401 were 
referred to the Committee on National Security. Other sections 
and titles were referred to the Committee on International 
Relations, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and 
the Committee on the Budget.
    The Committee on National Security held three hearings on 
H.R. 7 on January 19, 25, and 27. The first hearing addressed 
the issue of the adequacy of the Administration's defense 
funding plan. The second hearing addressed that portion of the 
bill pertaining to missile defense. At the third hearing the 
committee received testimony from Defense Secretary William 
Perry and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John 
Shalikashvili on the position of the Department of Defense with 
respect to this legislation.
    The bill was marked up on January 31, 1995 and, a quorum 
being present, reported favorably by a roll call vote of 41 to 
13. The individual roll call results are placed at the end of 
this report.

                      Section-By-Section Analysis

    The committee considered only those provisions of H.R. 7 
referred to it pursuant to the referral message. Therefore, the 
section-by-section analysis only discusses those provisions 
considered to fall under the committee's jurisdiction.

                 TITLE I--FINDINGS, POLICY AND PURPOSES

Section 101--Findings

    This provision would establish several findings providing 
the context and rationale for the National Security 
Revitalization Act.

Section 102--Policy

    This provision would establish the policy objectives behind 
the National Security Revitalization Act.

Section 103--Purposes

    This provision would summarize the purposes of the National 
Security Revitalization Act.

                       TITLE II--MISSILE DEFENSE

    The proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction poses a significant threat to U.S. military forces 
and U.S. global interests. The committee is concerned, however, 
that current Department of Defense policies and programs are 
not aggressive enough in responding to this threat.
    For example, the current Administration's budget for 
theater missile defense (TMD) is approximately 30 percent less 
than spending levels recommended by the previous 
Administration. As a result, several of the most promising TMD 
concepts, such as the Navy's ``Upper Tier'' program and the 
Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, have 
been delayed.
    The committee is also concerned about the Administration's 
proposal to turn the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 
into a new, multilateral ``ABM/TMD Treaty'' in its arms control 
talks with Russia and others. Current U.S. proposals will 
impose specific design limitations on U.S. systems that will 
unnecessarily tie the hands of U.S. engineers and lead to a 
significantly compromised U.S. TMD capability.
    The Administration's program for national missile defense--
a defense of the American homeland--is even more worrisome. 
There is currently no commitment to deploy a national missile 
defense. In fact, the Department of Defense presently plans to 
spend over eighty percent less for national missile defense 
programs than the spending levels recommended by the previous 
Administration--approximately $500 million per year over the 
next five years. This is less money than President Carter spent 
on national missile defense two decades ago.
    The Administration's decision to abandon plans to deploy a 
national missile defense is particularly disturbing in light of 
the range of potential missile threats to the United States. 
Both Russia and China today maintain and are aggressively 
modernizing nuclear forces capable of destroying American 
cities. Moreover, various ``rogue regimes'' are seeking a 
capability to attack the United States using ballistic 
missiles.
    According to senior U.S. intelligence officials, it may not 
take long for an outlaw regime to acquire such a capability. 
For instance, the Defense Intelligence Agency Director, 
Lieutenant General James Clapper, on January 10, 1995, 
testified that North Korean missiles now under development 
probably have sufficient range to reach targets in Alaska. On 
January 18, 1995, the Acting Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, Admiral William Studeman, testified that 
``The proliferation . . . relates to the nonproprietary nature 
of technology. This means that what will be proliferated will 
be new and more diverse forms of lethality, increasing threat 
reach--that is, longer ranges, including ultimately ranges from 
problem states that can reach the United States toward the end 
of this decade and the beginning of [the next] century. * * *''
    In response to these concerns, the committee recommends a 
provision (Title II) to strengthen the U.S. response to the 
missile proliferation threat. Title II commits the United 
States to the development and deployment of effective and 
affordable national and theater missile defenses.

Section 201--Policy

    This provision would establish that U.S. policy shall be to 
deploy a highly effective national missile defense (NMD) 
system, and to provide highly effective theater missile defense 
(TMD) systems to U.S. military forces and to friendly military 
forces and U.S. allies.

Section 202--Actions of the Secretary of Defense

    This provision would require certain actions of the 
Secretary of Defense in carrying out the policy stated in 
Section 201. Subsection 202(a) would direct the Secretary to 
develop for deployment a NMD system designed to protect the 
United States against ballistic missile attacks. Subsection 
202(b) would direct the Secretary to develop for deployment 
advanced TMD systems. The Secretary would be further directed 
to develop for deployment the NMD system and the advanced TMD 
systems ``at the earliest practical date.'' In addition to 
addressing the ballistic missile threat, the committee 
recognizes that this mandate will be carried taking into 
account a variety of other competing factors.

Section 203--Report to Congress

    This provision would direct the Secretary of Defense within 
sixty days of enactment of this act to submit a plan for the 
deployment of a NMD system pursuant to section 202(a) and TMD 
systems pursuant to section 202(b). Along with the plan, the 
committee directs the Secretary to submit a report detailing a 
range of NMD system options, including architectures that 
contain only ground-based elements, architectures that contain 
only space-based elements, and mixed architectures that contain 
ground and space-based elements. Likewise, the report should 
include some system options and architectures that are 
constrained to the current terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty and some that assume changes to the Treaty. The 
report should describe the cost, performance, and technical 
risk associated with each architecture option. Finally, the 
report should specify the Secretary's recommended architecture, 
and the reasons for his selection. Such a comprehensive report 
will assist the committee in carrying out its responsibility to 
carefully review the Department's fiscal year 1996 budget 
request for missile defense.

 TITLE III--ADVISORY COMMISSION ON REVITALIZATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Section 301--Establishment

    This provision would establish an advisory commission to be 
known as the ``Revitalization of National Security Commission'' 
to assist the executive and legislative branch in identifying 
and assessing national security strategy and policy options.

Section 302--Composition

    This provision would specify that the Commission shall be 
comprised of twelve members--four appointed by the President, 
four appointed by the Speaker of the House (one upon the 
recommendation of the House Minority Leader), and four 
appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate (three 
upon the recommendation of the Senate Majority Leader and one 
upon the recommendation of the Senate Minority Leader). The 
Chairman would be appointed jointly by the Speaker of the House 
and the Senate Majority Leader after consultations with the 
minority leaders of each chamber.
Section 303--Duties

    This provision would charge the Commission with conducting 
a comprehensive review of the long-term national security needs 
of the United States to include a number of specified 
assessments of critical national security issues. The 
Commission would also be required to develop specific 
recommendations to accomplish a number of policy goals.
    One area requiring an assessment by the Commission involves 
the need to revise the command and control structure of the 
Army Reserve. In carrying out this assessment, the Commission 
should consider the following: 1) the process and the explicit 
criteria by which the Army evaluated, ranked and made formal 
recommendations regarding the twenty Army Reserve Commands, 2) 
whether Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) district 
boundaries are the best possible geographic boundaries for use 
by the Army Reserve, and 3) whether and in what manner the 
restructuring plan influences Army Reserve readiness?

Section 304--Reports

    This provision would require the Commission to provide the 
President and the Congress a final report on the required 
assessments and recommendations by January 1, 1996. In 
addition, an interim report would be required by October 1, 
1995.
    Section 304 would also prohibit the Secretary of the Army 
from taking any action to implement the reorganization of the 
Army Reserve headquarters structure in the continental United 
States as announced by the Secretary on January 4, 1995, until 
the Commission submits the interim report as required by this 
section. The committee does not intend for this moratorium to 
be construed that the committee seeks to interrupt the planned 
restructuring of the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve, 
commonly known as ``the Offsite Agreement,'' announced by the 
Secretary of Defense on December 10, 1993. The committee views 
the December, 1993 Offsite Agreement plan and the January, 1995 
ARCOM reorganization plan as separate actions the 
implementation of which are not linked.

Sections 305-309

    These provisions would vest the Commission with appropriate 
powers and authorities to carry out its duties

               TITLE IV--COMMAND OF UNITED STATES FORCES

    Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) signed by 
President Clinton in May of 1994 contains a number of policy 
initiatives intended to promote peacekeeping as an important 
instrument of this Administration's national security policy. 
While the Administration continues to deny the committee access 
to this critical policy document, summary documents and 
extensive public and private briefings reveal that the 
Administration has adopted a policy of allowing the placement 
of U.S. armed forces under the operational control of foreign 
commanders when engaged in peacekeeping operations.
    The Administration continues to stress that the President 
will retain ``command'' of U.S. forces at all times. However, 
the usage of the term ``command'' in this context refers to the 
administrative control of military forces which has never been 
an issue of debate or contention. On the other hand, the 
practice of ceding ``operational control'' of U.S. military 
forces to non-U.S. commanders remains a highly controversial 
and troubling policy. While certain U.S. military units have 
operated under the operational control of other nations, these 
instances have been rare and usually as part of larger 
coalition military operations where the U.S. retains overall 
operational command of the theater of operation. Further, these 
instances occurred during traditional military operations that 
allowed a high degree of planning and coordination to minimize 
the inherent complications resulting from mixed command chains.
    By contrast, the concept of ceding operational control of 
U.S. forces to a United Nations peacekeeping command is a 
relatively recent practice that has thus far yielded decidedly 
mixed results. As demonstrated during the UNOSOM II operation 
in Somalia, peacekeeping operations place a high premium on the 
ability to rapidly employ effective military force in response 
to unplanned circumstances. The tactical demands of such 
operations tend to stress and exacerbate the limitations of 
mixed-nationality operations resulting from the usually 
significant cultural, language, doctrine, and training 
differences among the participating national contingents. While 
only U.S. logistics forces were placed under United Nations 
operational control during UNOSOM II, the unanimous view of 
U.S. commanders interviewed by the committee during its review 
of the Somalia operation was that United Nations mixed-
nationality command chains are inappropriate for demanding 
United Nations operations.

Section 401--Limitation on expenditure of Department of Defense funds 
        for United States forces placed under United Nations command or 
        control

    The committee recommends a provision (section 401) that 
would regulate the circumstances under which the President 
could commit U.S. forces under United Nations command or 
control. This provision would require that before U.S. forces 
may be deployed under the command or operational control of the 
United Nations, the President must first certify to the 
Congress that 1) such a command arrangement is necessary to 
protect U.S. national security interests, 2) the commander of 
the U.S. force involved will retain the right to report 
independently to U.S. military authorities and to decline to 
comply with orders judged to be illegal, militarily imprudent 
or beyond the mandate of the U.S. mission, 3) the U.S. force 
involved will remain under U.S. administrative command, and 4) 
the U.S. will retain the authority to withdraw the U.S. force 
involved and take action it considers necessary to protect this 
force if it is engaged.
    While this provision seeks to ensure that any deployment of 
U.S. forces under United Nations command or control is made 
with a clear and unambiguous understanding of the right of the 
United States to withdraw those forces at any time and to take 
any action considered necessary to protect such forces, the 
committee recognizes that any such decision to withdraw 
deployed U.S. forces should be made with due regard and 
consideration for the safety of U.S. and other national 
contingents deployed in any such given operation.
    The provision would further require the President to submit 
a report along with the aforementioned certification providing: 
(1) a description of the national security interests that 
require such a command arrangement, (2) the mission of the U.S. 
forces involved, (3) the expected size and composition of the 
U.S. forces involved, (4) the incremental cost to the U.S. of 
participation in the operation, (5) the precise command and 
control relationship between the U.S. forces and the United 
Nations command structure, (6) the precise command and control 
relationship between the U.S. forces involved and the U.S. 
unified commander for the region in which the forces will be 
operating, (7) the extent to which the U.S. forces involved 
will be relying on non-U.S. forces for self protection, and (8) 
the timetable for the complete withdrawal of the U.S. forces 
involved.

                        TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS

Section 506--Reimbursement to the United States for in-kind 
        contributions to United Nations peacekeeping activities

    This provision would require the Secretary of State to 
ensure that goods and services provided by the Department of 
State to the United Nations on a reimbursable basis shall be 
reimbursed at the appropriate value, as determined by the 
Secretary of Defense.

Section 507--Prohibition on use of funds to pay United States assessed 
        or voluntary contribution for United Nations peacekeeping 
        activities unless Department of Defense reimbursed by United 
        Nations for certain goods and services

    This provision would prohibit the payment of assessed and 
voluntary contributions to the United Nations until the 
Secretary of Defense certifies to the Congress that the United 
Nations has reimbursed the Department of Defense for goods and 
services provided on a reimbursable basis.

Section 508--Limitation on use of Department of Defense funds for 
        United States share of costs of United Nations peacekeeping 
        activities

    Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) proposes to 
change the manner in which the United States Government 
finances its annual assessed contribution to the United Nations 
for peacekeeping by having the Department of Defense pay for 
the U.S. costs of all Chapter VII operations and those Chapter 
VI operations involving U.S. troops. This so called ``shared 
responsibility'' arrangement was specifically rejected by the 
House Committee on Armed Services in the 103rd Congress during 
its consideration of the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense 
Authorization Act. While the provision prohibiting the ``shared 
responsibility'' arrangement passed the House and was 
eventually dropped during conference negotiations with the 
Senate, the issue remains a serious concern for the committee.
    Therefore, the committee recommends a provision (section 
508) that would specifically prohibit the expenditure of funds 
made available to the Department of Defense for voluntary or 
assessed financial contributions to the United Nations for the 
United States share of peacekeeping costs. The committee 
continues to strongly oppose the ``shared responsibility'' 
concept as it represents one more attempt to divert dwindling 
defense resources toward a non-defense purpose.
    The provision would also impose a limitation on the use of 
Department of Defense funds for participation in United Nations 
peacekeeping activities unless Congress has by law specifically 
authorized the use of those funds for that purpose. This 
limitation would cover only those United Nations peacekeeping 
activities that are financed through member assessments such as 
the UNPROFOR operation in the former Yugoslavia, the UNOSOM II 
operation in Somalia and the UNMIH operation in Haiti.

Section 512--Conditions on provision of intelligence to the United 
        States

    This provision would require that the provision of 
intelligence by the United States to the United Nations be 
carried out pursuant to an agreement between the President and 
the United Nations Secretary General. The agreement would be 
required to detail the types of intelligence to be provided and 
United Nations procedures and precautions to protect provided 
U.S. intelligence information against unauthorized disclosure.
                        Committee Cost Estimate

    The committee generally concurs with the cost estimate 
contained in the report of the Congressional Budget Office.

               congressional budget office cost estimate

    In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, the cost estimate 
prepared by the Congressional Budget Office and submitted 
pursuant to section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
is as follows:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                  Washington, DC, February 3, 1995.
Hon. Floyd D. Spence,
Chairman, Committee on National Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
reviewed the amendments to H.R. 7, National Security 
Revitalization Act, as ordered reported by the House Committee 
on National Security on January 31, 1995. Neither the 
Committee's amendments nor the bill as introduced would have 
pay-as-you-go implications. They would not explicitly authorize 
appropriations nor would they have an impact on the budgets of 
state and local governments.
    A few provisions of H.R. 7 could imply changes in the 
authorization of discretionary appropriations--particularly, 
Title II (Missile Defense), Title V (United Nations), Title VI 
(expansion of NATO). The attachment discusses these 
implications of H.R. 7 as introduced. The costs discussed in 
the attachment would come to bear only if subsequent 
legislation explicitly authorizes appropriations.
    If you would like further details on this estimate, we will 
be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Kent 
Christensen, Raymond Hall, and Michael Miller.
            Sincerely,
                                    Robert D. Reischauer, Director.
 budgetary implications of h.r. 7, national security revitalization act


    This document considers the budgetary implications of H.R. 
7 as introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on January 
4, 1995. It serves as a basis for understanding the budgetary 
impacts of any Committee or floor amendments.
    Strictly speaking, H.R. 7 has no direct budgetary impact. 
It has no pay-as-you-go implications nor does it explicitly 
authorize appropriations. Nevertheless, some provisions of H.R. 
7 could imply changes in the authorization of discretionary 
appropriations--particularly, Title II (Missile Defense), Title 
V (United Nations), and Title VI (Revitalization and Expansion 
of NATO). These implications would come to bear only if 
subsequent legislation explicitly authorizes appropriations.
    Title II--Missile Defense. H.R. 7 calls on the Secretary of 
Defense to develop national and theater missile defenses, but 
it is silent on how much funding would be available for this 
purpose. The cost of such a system could total $29 billion to 
$30 billion over the next five years, or about $10 billion to 
$11 billion more than is currently programmed for missile 
defense.
    In 1992, the Department of Defense planned to deploy a 
national missile defense (NMD) system at an initial site by 
2004 and at multiple sites soon thereafter. This plan called 
for deploying both ground-based systems and space-based sensors 
commonly referred to as Brilliant Eyes. These two components of 
the 1992 plan are the basis for our current estimate for the 
costs of a NMD system. The current estimate does not, however, 
embrace the component of the 1992 plan calling for space-based 
interceptors (commonly known as Brilliant Pebbles.) An 
enhancement to NMD, Brilliant Pebbles raises more concerns 
about violating the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Defense Treaty 
than do other elements of NMD.
    Deploying a ground-based system of radars, interceptors, 
and command and control at an initial site by 2006 would cost 
about $10 billion. This sum would also support eventual 
deployment at multiple sites. Finally, the additional funding 
would support research and development into technologies that 
would enable the system to counter emerging threats.
    For about $1 billion more this system could be expanded to 
accelerate the deployment of space-based sensors. With this 
additional funding, some sensors could be deployed by 2002 to 
provide cuing and initial targeting data. This sensor 
capability is supposed to permit the ground-based interceptors 
at the initial site to protect the entire continental United 
States against limited missile attacks from the north.
    As for theater missile defense, this estimate assumes that 
the current plan for theater missile defense is consistent with 
the aims of H.R. 7. That plan would deploy ground-based radars 
and missiles with forward-deployed elements of the Army and 
Marine Corps by the end of the century. Eventually more capable 
systems such as the Navy's sea-based vertical launch systems, 
the Air Force's boost-phase interceptors, or the Army's mobile 
air and missile defenses would be deployed.
    Under these assumptions H.R. 7 would add $10 billion to $11 
billion to missile defense costs and bring the total budget for 
these capabilities to $29 billion or $30 billion. But the 
ultimate costs are quite uncertain. These estimates assume that 
the 1992 plan is technically feasible, that the financial plan 
matched the real components of the system, and that the plan 
could be resumed after a two-year hiatus with costs rising only 
for inflation.
    Title III--Revitalization of National Security Commission. 
The bill would establish a commission to conduct a 
comprehensive review of defense strategy, force structure, 
modernization, readiness, infrastructure, and funding. Of the 
funds otherwise available to DoD, $1.5 million would be 
available to carry out the provisions of the title.
    Title IV--Command of United States Forces. H.R. 7 would 
amend title 10 of the U.S. Code and the United Nations 
Participation Act to prohibit a foreign national from 
commanding U.S. forces unless the President makes certain 
certifications. Neither change would have a significant 
budgetary impact.
    Title IV would also require the Congress to approve in law 
any agreement between the President and the U.N. Security 
Council for the use of U.S. forces in maintaining international 
peace and security. CBO cannot predict the extent of U.S. 
involvement in peacekeeping activities. Nevertheless, if 
Congress denied U.S. participation in some peacekeeping 
activities the budgetary savings would likely be no more than a 
few hundred million dollars per year based on recent 
experience. For example, if the United States had not used its 
forces in Bosnia it would not have incurred expenses of about 
$300 million a year in 1994 and 1995. Similarly for U.S. 
expenses in Somalia, the average savings would have been about 
$700 million a year in 1993 and 1994. Aside from deployments to 
Southwest Asia, the deployments to Bosnia and Somalia have been 
the most costly contingencies of recent years.
    Title V--United Nations. Title V addresses U.S. financial 
responsibilities to the U.N. in support of international 
peacekeeping. Enactment of Title V could:
          lower payments of assessed and voluntary 
        contributions that help fund U.N. peacekeeping 
        activities;
          lower payments of assessed contributions that help 
        fund the U.N. operating budget; and
          limit DoD's involvement in U.N.-sponsored 
        peacekeeping activities.
    Certain sections of Title V would have overlapping effects. 
For example, sections 501 and 507 could reduce assessed 
payments to the United Nations for peacekeeping--currently 
about $1.0 billion a year--for fiscal years after 1995. 
Similarly sections 507 and 511 could reduce the assessments and 
voluntary contributions totalling about $0.1 billion a year. 
Thus, the potential budgetary effects of these sections are not 
additive.
    Section 501 would probably lower or eliminate the payment 
of assessed peacekeeping contributions, which will total about 
$1.0 billion in 1995 if the President's supplemental request is 
fully funded by the Congress. Under section 501, payments would 
be lowered by the total cost of using U.S. forces in 
peackefeeping activities that are authorized by the U.N. unless 
the U.N. has reimbursed DoD for those costs.
    DoD currently is incurring incremental peacekeeping costs 
from U.N. authorized operations in Haiti, the former 
Yugoslavia, and elsewhere that will total about $2 billion in 
1995. Total costs could be much higher. If DoD continues its 
current level of peacekeeping activity, section 501 would 
eliminate the payment of U.S. contributions because DoD's total 
costs could far exceed peacekeeping assessments. If, however, 
DoD dramatically scales back its peacekeeping activities, and 
if payments for assessed contributions remain at about $1.0 
billion annually, section 501 could lower U.S. contributions by 
hundreds of millions of dollars.
    Similarly, section 507 would deny assessed and voluntary 
contributions for unreimbursed costs, but section 507 focuses 
more on noncombat operations while section 501 would affect all 
types of U.N.-authorized peacekeeping operations. The Secretary 
of Defense however, may waive this provision if he determines 
that an emergency exists. This provision could lower annual 
payments for assessments by the same $1.0 billion targeted by 
section 501, and voluntary payments by about $0.1 billion 
annually.
    Section 511 would reduce payments to the U.N. unless the 
U.N. has appointed an Inspector General (IG) and has 
established an operational IG office that could investigate the 
U.N. and its specialized agencies. Under section 511, 50 
percent of the peacekeeping assessments, 20 percent of the 
payments in support of the U.N. operating budget, and all 
payments for voluntary contributions would be withheld unless 
the President certifies that the IG provisions have been met. 
Thus, section 511 could reduce payments for peacekeeping 
assessments (like sections 501 and 507) by about $0.5 billion, 
payments for the U.N. operating budget by about $0.05 billion, 
and voluntary payments (like section 507) by $0.1 billion 
unless the President makes the certification.
    Section 508 would prohibit DoD from participating in 
peacekeeping activates sponsored by the U.N. unless Congress 
has authorized it to use funds for such purposes. Peacekeeping 
activities sponsored by the U.N. typically have far less U.S. 
involvement than activities authorized by the U.N. The 
incremental cost to the United States of a large U.N.-sponsored 
peacekeeping operation historically has been less than $50 
million annually. Thus, if the Congress denied U.S. 
participation in any one operation, savings could total up to 
$50 million a year.
    Section 508 would also prohibit DoD funds from being used 
to pay U.N. peaekeeping assessments. Compared with current law, 
this provision would not have any budget impact because DoD is 
not authorized to use funds for such purposes.
    Title VI--Revitalization and Expansion of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. H.R. 7 would reaffirm the United 
States' commitment to NATO and support the expansion of NATO to 
include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
other countries designated by the President. The bill would 
authorize the use of economic support assistance and 
nonproliferation and disarmament assistance to facilitate the 
transition to NATO membership. Any implicit authorization of 
appropriations in open-ended. For 1995, the Economic Support 
Fund (ESF) is funded at roughly $2.4 billion with about $2.0 
billion of that going to Egypt and Israel and about $0.4 
billion going to about 20 other countries. Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament funding is now $10 million.
    Title VII-Budget Firewalls. This title expresses a sense of 
Congress that there should be firewalls between defense and 
nondefense discretionary spending for 1996, 1997, 1998. This 
title would affect only the distribution, not the level, of 
spending under the caps on discretionary spending that were 
established under the Budget Enforcement Act.

                     Inflationary Impact Statement

    With respect to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, this legislation is assessed to 
have no inflationary effect on prices and costs in the 
operation of the national economy.

                           Oversight Findings

    With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, this legislation results from 
hearings and other oversight activities conducted by the 
committee pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X.
    With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(B) of rule XI of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, this legislation does not 
include any new budget, spending, or credit authority, nor does 
it provide for any increase or decrease in tax revenues or 
expenditures.
    With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the committee has not received 
a report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 
pertaining to the subject matter of H.R. 7.

                            Roll Call Votes

    In accordance with clause 2(l)(2)(B) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, the record of roll call 
votes taken with respect to H.R. 7 is appended to this report.
         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
titles I, II, III, and V and section 401 of the bill, as 
reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be 
omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in 
italics, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown 
in roman):

                      TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

          * * * * * * *

             CHAPTER 20--HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE
     * * * * * * *

                  SUBCHAPTER I--HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
Sec.
401.  Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with 
          military operations.
     * * * * * * *
405.  Placement of United States forces under United Nations command or 
          control: limitation.
406.  Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of 
          costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: limitation.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 405. Placement of United States forces under United Nations 
                    command or control: limitation

  (a) Limitation.--(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) 
and (c), funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the 
Department of Defense may not be obligated or expended for 
activities of any element of the armed forces that after the 
date of the enactment of this section is placed under United 
Nations command or control.
  (2) In this section, the term ``under United Nations command 
or control'' means under the command or operational control of 
an individual acting on behalf of the United Nations for the 
purpose of international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-
enforcing, or similar activity that is authorized by the 
Security Council under chapter VI or VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations if the senior military commander of the United 
Nations force or operation--
          (A) is a foreign national or is a citizen of the 
        United States who is not a United States military 
        officer serving on active duty; or
          (B) is a United States military officer serving on 
        active duty in a case in which--
                  (i) elements of the armed forces of the 
                United States assigned or detailed to that 
                force or operation are under the command or 
                operational control of a foreign national; and
                  (ii) that senior military commander does not 
                have the authority to dismiss any subordinate 
                officer in the chain of command (regardless of 
                nationality) who is exercising command or 
                operational control over United States forces, 
                to establish rules of engagement for United 
                States forces involved, and to establish 
                criteria governing the operational employment 
                of United States forces involved.
  (b) Exception for Presidential Certification.--(1) Subsection 
(a) shall not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any 
element of the armed forces under United Nations command or 
control if the President, not less than 15 days before the date 
on which such United Nations command or control is to become 
effective (or as provided in paragraph (2)), meets the 
requirements of subsection (d).
  (2) If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency 
exists that precludes the President from meeting the 
requirements of subsection (d) 15 days before placing any 
element of the armed forces under United Nations command or 
control, the President may place such forces under such command 
or control and meet the requirements of subsection (d) in a 
timely manner, but in no event later than 48 hours after such 
command or control becomes effective.
  (c) Exception for Authorization by Law.--Subsection (a) shall 
not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of 
the armed forces under United Nations command or control if the 
Congress specifically authorizes by law that particular 
placement of United States forces under United Nations command 
or control.
  (d) Presidential Certifications.--The requirements referred 
to in subsection (b)(1) are that the President submit to 
Congress the following:
          (1) Certification by the President that--
                  (A) such a United Nations command or control 
                arrangement is necessary to protect national 
                security interests of the United States;
                  (B) the commander of any unit of the armed 
                forces proposed for placement under United 
                Nations command or control will at all times 
                retain the right--
                          (i) to report independently to 
                        superior United States military 
                        authorities; and
                          (ii) to decline to comply with orders 
                        judged by the commander to be illegal, 
                        militarily imprudent, or beyond the 
                        mandate of the mission to which the 
                        United States agreed with the United 
                        Nations, until such time as that 
                        commander receives direction from 
                        superior United States military 
                        authorities with respect to the orders 
                        that the commander has declined to 
                        comply with;
                  (C) any element of the armed forces proposed 
                for placement under United Nations command or 
                control will at all times remain under United 
                States administrative command for such purposes 
                as discipline and evaluation; and
                  (D) the United States will retain the 
                authority to withdraw any element of the armed 
                forces from the proposed operation at any time 
                and to take any action it considers necessary 
                to protect those forces if they are engaged.
          (2) A report setting forth the following:
                  (A) A description of the national security 
                interests that require the placement of United 
                States forces under United Nations command or 
                control.
                  (B) The mission of the United States forces 
                involved.
                  (C) The expected size and composition of the 
                United States forces involved.
                  (D) The incremental cost to the United States 
                of participation in the United Nations 
                operation by the United States forces which are 
                proposed to be placed under United Nations 
                command or control.
                  (E) The precise command and control 
                relationship between the United States forces 
                involved and the United Nations command 
                structure.
                  (F) The precise command and control 
                relationship between the United States forces 
                involved and the commander of the United States 
                unified command for the region in which those 
                United States forces are to operate.
                  (G) The extent to which the United States 
                forces involved will rely on non-United States 
                forces for security and self-defense and an 
                assessment on the ability of those non-United 
                States forces to provide adequate security to 
                the United States forces involved.
                  (H) The timetable for complete withdrawal of 
                the United States forces involved.
  (e) Classification of Report.--A report under subsection (c) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form and, if necessary, in 
classified form.
  (f) Exception for Small Forces.--This section does not apply 
in a case in which fewer than 50 members of the armed forces 
are participating in a particular United Nations operation or 
activity.
  (g) Interpretation.--Nothing in this section may be 
construed--
          (1) as authority for the President to use any element 
        of the armed forces in any operation; or
          (2) as authority for the President to place any 
        element of the armed forces under the command or 
        operational control of a foreign national.

Sec. 406. Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of 
                    costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: 
                    limitation

  (a) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Payment of Assessments 
and Voluntary Contributions.--(1) Funds available to the 
Department of Defense may not be used to make a financial 
contribution (directly or through another department or agency 
of the United States) to the United Nations--
          (A) for the costs of a United Nations peacekeeping 
        activity; or
          (B) for any United States arrearage to the United 
        Nations.
  (2) The prohibition in paragraph (1)(A) applies to voluntary 
contributions, as well as to contributions pursuant to 
assessment by the United Nations for the United States share of 
the costs of a peacekeeping activity.
  (b) Limitation on Use of Funds for Participation in United 
Nations Peacekeeping Activities.--Funds available to the 
Department of Defense may be used for payment of the 
incremental costs associated with the participation of elements 
of the armed forces in a United Nations peacekeeping activity 
only to the extent that Congress has by law specifically 
authorized the use of those funds for that purpose.
  (c) Covered Peacekeeping Activities.--In this section, the 
term ``United Nations peacekeeping activity'' means a 
peacekeeping activity carried out pursuant to a resolution of 
the United Nations Security Council for which costs are met (in 
whole or in part) through assessments by the United Nations to 
its member nations.
          * * * * * * *
                              ----------                              


                UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945

          * * * * * * *
  Sec. 4. (a) Periodic Reports.--The President shall, from time 
to time as occasion may require, but not less than once each 
year, make reports to the Congress of the activities of the 
United Nations and of the participation of the United States 
therein. [He shall make special current reports on decisions of 
the Security Council to take enforcement measures under the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and on the 
participation therein, under his instructions, of the 
representative of the United States.]
          * * * * * * *
  (d) Annual Report.--In addition to the report required by 
subsection (a), the President, at the time of submission of the 
annual budget request to the Congress, shall submit to the 
designated congressional committees a report that includes the 
following:
          (1) Costs of peacekeeping operations.--
                  (A) * * *
          * * * * * * *
                  (D) A description of the anticipated budget 
                for the next fiscal year for United States 
                participation in United Nations peacekeeping 
                activities, including a statement of--
                          (i) the aggregate amount of funds 
                        available to the United Nations for 
                        that fiscal year, including assessed 
                        and voluntary contributions, which may 
                        be made available for United Nations 
                        peacekeeping activities; and
                          (ii) the aggregate amount of funds 
                        (from all accounts) and the aggregate 
                        costs of in-kind contributions that the 
                        United States proposes to make 
                        available to the United Nations for 
                        that fiscal year for United Nations 
                        peacekeeping activities.
                  [(D)](E) In the case of the first 2 reports 
                submitted pursuant to this subsection, a 
                projection of all United States costs for 
                United Nations peacekeeping operations during 
                each of the next 2 fiscal years, including 
                assessed and voluntary contributions.
          * * * * * * *
  (e) Consultations and Reports on U.N. Peacekeeping 
Operations.--
          (1) Consultations.--Each month the President shall 
        consult with the Congress on the status of United 
        Nations peacekeeping operations.
          (2) Information to be provided.--In connection with 
        these consultations, the following information shall be 
        provided in written form not later than the 10th day of 
        each month to the designated congressional committees:
                  (A) With respect to ongoing United Nations 
                peacekeeping operations, the following:
                          (i) A list of all resolutions of the 
                        United Nations Security Council 
                        anticipated to be voted on during such 
                        month that would extend or change the 
                        mandate of any United Nations 
                        peacekeeping operation.
                          (ii) For each such operation, any 
                        changes in the duration, mandate, and 
                        command and control arrangements that 
                        are anticipated as a result of the 
                        adoption of the resolution.
                          (iii) An estimate of the total cost 
                        to the United Nations of each such 
                        operation for the period covered by the 
                        resolution, and an estimate of the 
                        amount of that cost that will be 
                        assessed to the United States.
                          (iv) Any anticipated significant 
                        changes in United States participation 
                        in or support for each such operation 
                        during the period covered by the 
                        resolution (including facilities, 
                        training, transportation, 
                        communication, intelligence, and 
                        logistical support), and the estimated 
                        costs to the United States of such 
                        changes.
                  (B) With respect to each new United Nations 
                peacekeeping operation that is anticipated to 
                be authorized by a Security Council resolution 
                during such month, the following information 
                for the period covered by the resolution:
                          (i) The anticipated duration, 
                        mandate, and command and control 
                        arrangements of such operation.
                          (ii) An estimate of the total cost to 
                        the United Nations of the operation, 
                        and an estimate of the amount of that 
                        cost that will be assessed to the 
                        United States.
                          (iii) A description of the functions 
                        that would be performed by any United 
                        States Armed Forces participating in or 
                        otherwise operating in support of the 
                        operation, an estimate of the number of 
                        members of the Armed Forces that will 
                        participate in or otherwise operate in 
                        support of the operation, and an 
                        estimate of the cost to the United 
                        States of such participation or 
                        support.
                          (iv) A description of any other 
                        United States assistance to or support 
                        for the operation (including 
                        facilities, training, transportation, 
                        communication, intelligence, and 
                        logistical support), and an estimate of 
                        the cost to the United States of such 
                        assistance or support.
          (3) Interim information.--(A) The President shall 
        submit to the designated congressional committees a 
        written interim report if, during the period between 
        the monthly consultations required by paragraph (1), 
        the United States learns that the United Nations 
        Security Council is likely, before the next such 
        consultation, to vote on a resolution that would 
        authorize a new United Nations peacekeeping operation 
        and that resolution was not previously reported on 
        pursuant to paragraph (2)(B). Each interim report shall 
        include the information described in clauses (i) 
        through (iv) of paragraph (2)(B).
          (B) Any such interim report shall be submitted not 
        less than 5 days before the vote of the United Nations 
        Security Council, unless the President determines that 
        exceptional circumstances prevented compliance with the 
        requirement to report 5 days in advance. If the 
        President makes such a determination, the interim 
        report shall be submitted promptly (but in no case 
        later than 3 days after the vote) and shall include a 
        copy of the determination and a description of the 
        exceptional circumstances which were the basis for that 
        determination.
          (4) New united nations peacekeeping operation 
        defined.--As used in paragraphs (2) (B) and (3), the 
        term ``new United Nations peacekeeping operation'' 
        includes any existing or otherwise ongoing United 
        Nations peacekeeping operation--
                  (A) that is to be expanded by more than 25 
                percent during the period covered by the 
                Security Council resolution, as measured by 
                either the number of personnel participating 
                (or authorized to participate) in the operation 
                or the budget of the operation; or
                  (B) that is to be authorized to operate in a 
                country in which it was not previously 
                authorized to operate.
          (5) Quarterly reports.--The President shall submit 
        quarterly reports to the designated congressional 
        committees on all assistance provided by the United 
        States during the preceding calendar quarter to the 
        United Nations to support peacekeeping operations. Each 
        report shall describe the assistance provided for each 
        such operation, listed by category of assistance. The 
        report for the fourth calendar quarter of each year 
        shall be submitted as part of the annual report 
        required by subsection (d) and shall include cumulative 
        information for the preceding calendar year.
  [(e) Designated Congressional Committees.--As used in this 
section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' has 
the meaning given that term by section 415 of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995.]
  (f) Designated Congressional Committees.--As used in this 
section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' has 
the meaning given such term in section 10(f).
          * * * * * * *
  Sec. 7. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law 
other than subsection (e)(1), the President, upon the request 
by the United Nations for cooperative action, and to the extent 
that he finds that it is consistent with the national interest 
to comply with such request, may authorize, in support of such 
activities of the United Nations as are specifically directed 
to the peaceful settlement of disputes and not involving the 
employment of armed forces contemplated by chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter--
          (1) * * *
          * * * * * * *
  (b)(1) Whenever personnel or assistance is made available 
pursuant to the authority contained in subsection (a) (1) and 
(2) of this section, the President shall require reimbursement 
from the United Nations for the expense thereby incurred by the 
[United States: Provided, That in exceptional circumstances, or 
when the President finds it to be in the national interest, he 
may waive, in whole or in part, the requirement of such 
reimbursement: Provided further, That when] United States. When 
any such reimbursement is made, it shall be credited, at the 
option of the appropriate department of the Department of 
Defense, either to the appropriation, fund, or account utilized 
in incurring the obligation, or to an appropriate 
appropriation, fund, or account currently available for the 
purposes for which expenditures were made.
  (2) The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement for 
reimbursement under paragraph (1) if the Secretary, after 
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, determines that an 
emergency exists which justifies waiver of that requirement. 
Any such waiver shall be submitted to the designated 
congressional committees, as defined in section 10(a)(3)(B), at 
least 15 days before it takes effect, except that if the 
President determines that an emergency exists which prevents 
compliance with the requirement that the notification be 
provided 15 days in advance and that the provision under 
subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of personnel or assistance on a 
nonreimbursable basis is in the national security interests of 
the United States, such notification shall be provided in a 
timely manner but no later than 48 hours after such waiver 
takes effect.
          * * * * * * *
  (e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), at least 
15 days before any agency or entity of the United States 
Government makes available to the United Nations any assistance 
or facility to support or facilitate United Nations 
peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify the 
designated congressional committees.
  (2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to--
          (A) assistance having a value of less than $1,000,000 
        in the case of nonreimbursable assistance or less than 
        $5,000,000 in the case of reimbursable assistance; or
          (B) assistance provided under the emergency drawdown 
        authority contained in sections 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2) 
        of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
        2318(a)(1), 2348a(c)(2)).
  (3) If the President determines that an emergency exists 
which prevents compliance with the requirement in paragraph (1) 
that notification be provided 15 days in advance and that the 
contribution of any such assistance or facility is in the 
national security interests of the United States, such 
notification shall be provided in a timely manner but not later 
than 48 hours after such assistance or facility is made 
available to the United Nations.
  (4) For purposes of this subsection, the term 
``assistance''--
          (A) means assistance of any kind, including 
        logistical support, supplies, goods, or services 
        (including command, control, communications or 
        intelligence assistance and training), and the grant of 
        rights of passage; and
          (B) includes assistance provided through in-kind 
        contributions or through the provision of support, 
        supplies, goods, or services on any terms, including on 
        a grant, lease, loan, or reimbursable basis; but
          (C) does not include the payment of assessed or 
        voluntary contributions.
  (f) The Secretary of State shall ensure that goods and 
services provided on a reimbursable basis by the Department of 
Defense to the United Nations for United Nations peacekeeping 
operations under this section or any other provision of law are 
reimbursed at the appropriate value, as determined by the 
Secretary of Defense.
          * * * * * * *
  Sec. 10. (a) Credit Against Assessment for Expenditures in 
Support of Peacekeeping Operations.--
          (1) Limitation.--Funds may be obligated for payment 
        to the United Nations of the United States assessed 
        share of peacekeeping operations for a fiscal year only 
        to the extent that--
                  (A) the amount of such assessed share 
                exceeds--
                  (B) the amount equal to--
                          (i) the total amount identified in 
                        the report submitted pursuant to 
                        paragraph (2) for the preceding fiscal 
                        year, reduced by
                          (ii) the amount of any reimbursement 
                        or credit to the United States by the 
                        United Nations for the costs of United 
                        States support for, or participation 
                        in, United Nations peacekeeping 
                        activities for that preceding fiscal 
                        year.
          (2) Annual report.--The President shall, at the time 
        of submission of the budget to the Congress for any 
        fiscal year, submit to the designated congressional 
        committees a report on the total amount of funds 
        appropriated for national defense purposes for any 
        fiscal year that were expended during the preceding 
        fiscal year to support or participate in, directly or 
        indirectly, United Nations peacekeeping activities. 
        Such report shall include a separate listing by United 
        Nations peacekeeping operation of the amount of funds 
        expended to support or participate in each such 
        operation.
          (3) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection:
                  (A) United nations peacekeeping activities.--
                The term ``United Nations peacekeeping 
                activities'' means any international 
                peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or 
                similar activity that is authorized by the 
                United Nations Security Council under chapter 
                VI or VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
                  (B) Designated congressional committees.--The 
                term ``designated congressional committees'' 
                includes the Committee on National Security of 
                the House of Representatives and the Committee 
                on Armed Services of the Senate.
  (b) Notice to Congress Regarding Contributions for 
Peacekeeping Activities.--
          (1) Notice regarding united nations billing 
        request.--Not later than 15 days after the date on 
        which the United States receives from the United 
        Nations a billing requesting a payment by the United 
        States of any contribution for United Nations 
        peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify 
        the designated congressional committees.
          (2) Notice regarding proposed obligation of funds.--
        The President shall notify the designated congressional 
        committees at least 15 days before the United States 
        obligates funds for any assessed or voluntary 
        contribution for United Nations peacekeeping 
        activities, except that if the President determines 
        that an emergency exists which prevents compliance with 
        the requirement that such notification be provided 15 
        days in advance and that such contribution is in the 
        national security interests of the United States, such 
        notification shall be provided in a timely manner but 
        no later than 48 hours after such obligation.
  (c) Prohibition on Use of Funds To Pay Assessed or Voluntary 
Contributions for Peacekeeping Activities Unless Department of 
Defense Reimbursed for Certain Goods and Services.--
Appropriated funds may not be used to pay any United States 
assessed or voluntary contribution during any fiscal year for 
United Nations peacekeeping activities until the Secretary of 
Defense certifies to the Congress that the United Nations has 
reimbursed the Department of Defense directly for all goods and 
services that were provided to the United Nations by the 
Department of Defense on a reimbursable basis during the 
preceding fiscal year for United Nations peacekeeping 
activities, including personnel and assistance provided under 
section 7 (except to the extent that the authority of 
subsection (b)(2) of such section to waive the reimbursement 
requirement was exercised with respect to such personnel or 
assistance).
  (d) Limitation on Assessed Contribution With Respect to a 
Peacekeeping Operation.--Funds authorized to be appropriated 
for ``Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities'' 
for any fiscal year shall not be available for the payment of 
the United States assessed contribution for a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation in an amount which is greater than 25 
percent of the total amount of all assessed contributions for 
that operation.
  (e) Buy American Requirement.--No funds may be obligated or 
expended to pay any United States assessed or voluntary 
contribution for United Nations peacekeeping activities unless 
the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the 
designated congressional committees that United States 
manufacturers and suppliers are being given opportunities to 
provide equipment, services, and material for such activities 
equal to those being given to foreign manufacturers and 
suppliers.
  (f) Designated Congressional Committees Defined.--As used in 
this section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' 
means--
          (1) the Committee on International Relations and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives; and
          (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
  Sec. 11. (a) Withholding of Contributions.--
          (1) Assessed contributions for regular united nations 
        budget.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 20 
        percent of the amount of funds made available for that 
        fiscal year for United States assessed contributions 
        for the regular United Nations budget shall be withheld 
        from obligation and expenditure unless a certification 
        for that fiscal year has been made under subsection 
        (b).
          (2) Assessed contributions for united nations 
        peacekeeping.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 50 
        percent of the amount of funds made available for that 
        fiscal year for United States assessed contributions 
        for United Nations peacekeeping activities shall be 
        withheld from obligation and expenditure unless a 
        certification for that fiscal year has been made under 
        subsection (b).
          (3) Voluntary contributions for united nations 
        peacekeeping.--The United States may not during any 
        fiscal year pay any voluntary contribution to the 
        United Nations for international peacekeeping 
        activities unless a certification for that fiscal year 
        has been made under subsection (b).
  (b) Certification.--The certification referred to in 
subsection (a) for any fiscal year is a certification by the 
President to the Congress, submitted on or after the beginning 
of that fiscal year, of each of the following:
          (1) The United Nations has an independent office of 
        Inspector General to conduct and supervise objective 
        audits, inspections, and investigations relating to 
        programs and operations of the United Nations.
          (2) The United Nations has an Inspector General who 
        was appointed by the Secretary General with the 
        approval of the General Assembly and whose appointment 
        was made principally on the basis of the appointee's 
        integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, 
        auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, 
        public administration, or investigation.
          (3) The Inspector General is authorized to--
                  (A) make investigations and reports relating 
                to the administration of the programs and 
                operations of the United Nations;
                  (B) have access to all records, documents, 
                and other available materials relating to those 
                programs and operations;
                  (C) have direct and prompt access to any 
                official of the United Nations; and
                  (D) have access to all records and officials 
                of the specialized agencies of the United 
                Nations.
          (4) The United Nations has fully implemented, and 
        made available to all member states, procedures that 
        effectively protect the identity of, and prevent 
        reprisals against, any staff member of the United 
        Nations making a complaint or disclosing information 
        to, or cooperating in any investigation or inspection 
        by, the United Nations Inspector General.
          (5) The United Nations has fully implemented 
        procedures that ensure compliance with recommendations 
        of the United Nations Inspector General.
          (6) The United Nations has required the United 
        Nations Inspector General to issue an annual report and 
        has ensured that the annual report and all other 
        reports of the Inspector General are made available to 
        the General Assembly without modification.
          (7) The United Nations has provided, and is committed 
        to providing, sufficient budgetary resources to ensure 
        the effective operation of the United Nations Inspector 
        General.
  Sec. 12. (a) Conditions on Provision of Intelligence to the 
United Nations.--
          (1) Requirement for agreement.--The United States may 
        provide intelligence to the United Nations only 
        pursuant to a written agreement between the President 
        and the Secretary General of the United Nations.
          (2) Content of agreement.--Any such agreement shall 
        specify--
                  (A) the types of intelligence to be provided 
                to the United Nations;
                  (B) the circumstances under which 
                intelligence may be provided to the United 
                Nations; and
                  (C) the procedures to be observed by the 
                United Nations--
                          (i) concerning persons who shall have 
                        access to the intelligence provided; 
                        and
                          (ii) to protect the intelligence 
                        against disclosure not authorized by 
                        the agreement.
          (3) Duration of agreement.--Any such agreement shall 
        be effective for a period not to exceed one year from 
        the date on which the agreement enters into force.
  (b) Advance Notification to Congress.--An agreement described 
in subsection (a) shall be effective only if the President has 
transmitted the agreement to the Committee on International 
Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate not less than 30 days in advance of the entry into force 
of the agreement.
  (c) Delegation of Authority.--The President may delegate the 
authority and assign the duties of the President under this 
section only to the Secretary of Defense or the Director of 
Central Intelligence.
  (d) Exceptions.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to the 
provision of intelligence--
          (1) that is provided only to, and for the use of, 
        United States Government personnel serving with the 
        United Nations; or
          (2) that is essential for the protection of nationals 
        of the United States, including members of the United 
        States Armed Forces and civilian personnel of the 
        United States Government.
  (e) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to--
          (1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the 
        Director of Central Intelligence to protect 
        intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
        disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); 
        or
          (2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of--
                  (A) title V of the National Security Act of 
                1947 (50 U.S.C. 413-415); or
                  (B) section 112b of title 1, United States 
                Code.
                              ----------                              

                    FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION

          * * * * * * *

                 TITLE IV--INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

       PART A--UNITED NATIONS REFORM AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

          * * * * * * *

SEC. 404. ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
                    OPERATIONS.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Limitation on United States Contributions.--
          (1) * * *
          [(2) Subsequent fiscal years.--Funds authorized to be 
        appropriated for ``Contributions for International 
        Peacekeeping Activities'' for any fiscal year after 
        fiscal year 1995 shall not be available for the payment 
        of the United States assessed contribution for a United 
        Nations peacekeeping operation in an amount which is 
        greater than 25 percent of the total of all assessed 
        contributions for that operation.]
          * * * * * * *

SEC. 407. CONSULTATIONS AND REPORTS.

  [(a) Consultations and Reports on U.N. Peacekeeping 
Operations.--
          [(1) Consultations.--Each month the President shall 
        consult with the Congress on the status of United 
        Nations peacekeeping operations.
          [(2) Information to be provided.--In connection with 
        these consultations, the following information shall be 
        provided each month to the designated congressional 
        committees:
                  [(A) With respect to ongoing United Nations 
                peacekeeping operations, the following:
                          [(i) A list of all resolutions of the 
                        United Nations Security Council 
                        anticipated to be voted on during such 
                        month that would extend or change the 
                        mandate of any United Nations 
                        peacekeeping operation.
                          [(ii) For each such operation, any 
                        changes in the duration, mandate, and 
                        command and control arrangements that 
                        are anticipated as a result of the 
                        adoption of the resolution.
                          [(iii) An estimate of the total cost 
                        to the United Nations of each such 
                        operation for the period covered by the 
                        resolution, and an estimate of the 
                        amount of that cost that will be 
                        assessed to the United States.
                          [(iv) Any anticipated significant 
                        changes in United States participation 
                        in or support for each such operation 
                        during the period covered by the 
                        resolution, and the estimated costs to 
                        the United States of such changes.
                  [(B) With respect to each new United Nations 
                peacekeeping operation that is anticipated to 
                be authorized by a Security Council resolution 
                during such month, the following information 
                for the period covered by the resolution:
                          [(i) The anticipated duration, 
                        mandate, and command and control 
                        arrangements of such operation.
                          [(ii) An estimate of the total cost 
                        to the United Nations of the operation, 
                        and an estimate of the amount of that 
                        cost that will be assessed to the 
                        United States.
                          [(iii) A description of the functions 
                        that would be performed by any United 
                        States Armed Forces participating in or 
                        otherwise operating in support of the 
                        operation, an estimate of the number of 
                        members of the Armed Forces that will 
                        participate in or otherwise operate in 
                        support of the operation, and an 
                        estimate of the cost to the United 
                        States of such participation or 
                        support.
          [(3) Written information.--The information described 
        in clauses (i) and (iii) of paragraph (2)(A) and the 
        information described in clauses (i) and (ii) of 
        paragraph (2)(B) shall be provided each month to the 
        designated congressional committees in written form not 
        later than the 10th day of that month.
          [(4) Interim information.--(A) The President shall 
        submit to the designated congressional committees a 
        written interim report if, during the period between 
        the monthly consultations required by paragraph (1), 
        the United States learns that the United Nations 
        Security Council is likely, before the next such 
        consultation, to vote on a resolution that would 
        authorize a new United Nations peacekeeping operation 
        and that resolution was not previously reported on 
        pursuant to paragraph (2)(B). Each interim report shall 
        include the information described in clauses (i) and 
        (ii) of paragraph (2)(B).
          [(B) Any such interim report shall be submitted not 
        less than 5 days before the vote of the United Nations 
        Security Council, unless the President determines that 
        exceptional circumstances prevented compliance with the 
        requirement to report 5 days in advance. If the 
        President makes such a determination, the interim 
        report shall be submitted promptly (but in no case 
        later than 3 days after the vote) and shall include a 
        copy of the determination and a description of the 
        exceptional circumstances which were the basis for that 
        determination.
          [(5) Notification and quarterly reports regarding 
        united states assistance.--(A) The President shall 
        notify the designated congressional committees at least 
        15 days before the United States provides any 
        assistance to the United Nations to support 
        peacekeeping operations. This subparagraph does not 
        apply to--
                  [(i) assistance having a value of less than 
                $3,000,000 in the case of nonreimburseable 
                assistance or less than $14,000,000 in the case 
                of reimburseable assistance, or
                  [(ii) assistance provided under the emergency 
                drawdown authority of sections 506(a)(1) and 
                552(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
                (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)(1) and 2348a(c)(2)).
          [(B) The President shall submit quarterly reports to 
        the designated congressional committees on all 
        assistance provided by the United States during the 
        preceding calendar quarter to the United Nations to 
        support peacekeeping operations. Each report shall 
        describe the assistance provided for each such 
        operation, listed by category of assistance. The report 
        for the fourth calendar quarter of each year shall be 
        submitted as part of the annual report required by 
        section 4(d) of the United Nations Participation Act of 
        1945 (as added by subsection (b) of this section) and 
        shall include cumulative information for the preceding 
        calendar year.]
          * * * * * * *
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
             ADDITIONAL VIEWS SUBMITTED BY ROSCOE BARTLETT

    I am very pleased that the National Security Committee 
reported out H.R. 7 with overwhelming bipartisan support. 
Although this legislation is only a first step, I believe it 
will go a long way toward restoring our armed services to the 
prominence they recently enjoyed.
    I am particularly pleased with Title II of this bill 
dealing with ballistic missile defense. I am very concerned 
that the United States currently has no anti-ballistic missile 
defense system and will not have one if President Clinton's 
plan succeeds. Some of my colleagues on the committee have 
suggested that the previous threat of a large scale ballistic 
missile attack no longer exists because of the breakup of the 
former Soviet Union. I believe that this is an underestimation 
of the perceived threat.
    The breakup of the former Soviet Union has resulted in the 
world's second, third and fourth largest nuclear powers 
(Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) in a state of economic chaos 
and unrest. This unrest could lead to the possible sale of a 
large number of nuclear warheads to ``rogue countries'' (i.e. 
North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Lybia) or China which would 
immediately restore the real possibility of a large scale 
attack against the United States. Also, General Sergeyev, 
director of the Russia Strategic Rocket Forces recently stated 
on 60 Minutes, that the more than 20,000 nuclear warheads in 
these republics could once again be targeted at the United 
States in less than two minutes by a simple turn of a dial.
    With this in mind I believe that title II of H.R. 7 is 
essential to our national security. This provision will provide 
continued support for the development and deployment of highly 
effective national missile defense systems. While I agree that 
it is premature for the Congress to pick and choose among 
competing systems, I would hope that the Secretary's plan and 
our upcoming authorization bill would not overlook the need for 
a space based system such as Brilliant Eyes or Brilliant 
Pebbles.
    Lastly, I fully concur with Section 508 of Title V that 
prohibits the use of Department of Defense funds for 
peacekeeping activities without prior Congressional 
authorization. I believe that any funds used for peacekeeping 
purposes should come from non-defense accounts. Had this 
provision been the law of the land, I do not believe the 
Congress would have allowed the President to proceed with the 
operation in Haiti.
    These two provisions are crucial if we are truly committed 
to providing the necessary means of protecting the national 
security of the United States.
                                                   Roscoe Bartlett.
            ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CONGRESSMAN ROBERT K. DORNAN

    The bipartisan passage of H.R. 7, the ``National Security 
Restoration Act,'' by the House National Security Committee, is 
a watershed event in addressing the real national security 
requirements of our nation.
    As one of the first members to join efforts in developing 
this legislation last fall as part of the ``Contract with 
America,'' I take great pride in what I truly believe is a 
foundation for the future in terms of readdressing the defense 
budget proposed by the current administration. I would briefly 
like to comment on just three aspects of the bill which I 
strongly support but have become somewhat controversial.
    First, it is imperative that we immediately address the 
ballistic missile threat that endangers American lives, both 
military and civilian, here in the U.S. and abroad. This threat 
is not new. Hitler's V-2 attacks against Great Britain 50 years 
ago in World War II marked the first use of ballistic missiles 
in combat; missiles that have recently become much more 
accurate and deadly with nuclear, biological and chemical 
warheads. The difference between today and then is that we have 
the technology available to detect, intercept, and destroy 
incoming missiles.
    While we possess the technology to defeat this threat, we 
still have not deployed a ballistic missile defense system. In 
other words, we still have no ability to prevent a ballistic 
missile attack against our allies, our forward deployed forces, 
or the civilian population of the United States. There is no 
excuse for another American to lose his or her life in a 
ballistic missile attack, such as the SCUD attack against our 
forces in Desert Storm, because Congress and the administration 
failed to fund and develop an effective missile defense system.
    Next, it is very important to get a new and independent 
assessment of the current and future state of the security of 
our nation through the ``Advisory Commission on Revitalization 
on National Security.'' After the Reagan-rebuilt U.S. military 
achieved one of the most decisive victories in the history of 
warfare in Desert Storm, the current administration decided to 
conduct the now infamous ``Bottom-Up Review.'' Besides being 
totally unnecessary, this review became an excuse for the 
administration to quickly dismantle the force rebuilt under 
Reagan through additional defense cuts. Recent reports have 
indicated that the ``Bottom-Up Review'' defense plan has been 
underfunded by as much as $150 billion!
    If the administration has underfunded its own defense plan 
by as much as $150 billion, I can see absolutely no reason not 
to support an independent commission to review defense 
requirements.
    Finally, I would like to express my strong support for 
provisions limiting foreign/U.N. command of U.S. troops. This 
provision is nearly identical to a bill, H.R. 3334, that John 
Doolittle and I introduced last session of Congress. We all 
witnessed the dangers of such command arrangements during 
operations in Somalia when U.S. special forces had to wait 
almost 10 hours for U.N. command forces to reach their 
position. As the lone superpower remaining in world, we have 
both the capability and the responsibility to maintain U.S. 
command and control of U.S. troops deployed overseas in combat 
operations.
    H.R. 7 is good start, but just a start, towards 
revitalizing the national security of our nation which has been 
dangerously eroded under the Clinton administration. it will 
still be up to members of Congress and the House National 
Security Committee to fully address the national security 
requirements of the U.S. in the FY96 defense authorization 
bill.
                                   R.K. Dornan.
DISSENTING VIEWS OF RONALD V. DELLUMS, PATRICIA SCHROEDER, LANE EVANS, 
   NEIL ABERCROMBIE, MARTIN MEEHAN, ROBERT UNDERWOOD, PETE PETERSON, 
    WILLIAM JEFFERSON, ROSA DeLAURO, MIKE WARD, AND PATRICK KENNEDY

    The world has changed dramatically since five years ago. 
The Warsaw Pact has disappeared and the Soviet Union has 
disintegrated. Regional conflict and humanitarian crises 
properly seize our attention, while even Russia--the inheritor 
of much of the forces and power of the former Soviet Union--
continues to face the reality of its dramatically reduced 
capabilities. Against this backdrop, H.R. 7 calls for 
significant new and potentially costly initiatives to meet the 
challenges of the future without defining what those challenges 
may be. It assumes away the dramatic changes in the world 
political and military environment within which United States 
forces might be used. It ignores the potential contributions of 
allies, and discounts the current assessments of responsible 
senior military officials who must also live with the 
consequences of their assessments.
    Procedurally, we find two fundamental problems with the 
manner in which H.R. 7 has been brought to the Floor. First, 
for those areas that were defined to be within the jurisdiction 
of the Committee on National Security, we have had insufficient 
time to study the issues, and to take testimony in subcommittee 
and at the full committee regarding the context and impact of 
these legislative proposals. Notwithstanding the efforts of the 
Chairman to seek to illuminate these matters by holding some 
hearings at the full Committee level, matters this weighty 
deserve more consideration. By working the issues through the 
subcommittee process and in dialogue with the Department of 
Defense, Members and staff would have been able to better 
assess the manner in which the policies and purposes of H.R. 7 
will contribute to or detract from our national security.
    Secondly, with regard to those areas either of shared 
jurisdiction or which were beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Committee--sections regarding command and control, United 
Nations operations, NATO and the budget firewalls, the bill 
that will be brought to the Floor would have benefitted if 
issues of common concern among Members and staff across 
Committee lines could have been formally addressed.
    Substantively, our concerns are several.
    Title I, Findings, Policy and Purposes Title, sets the 
context and provides the rationale for all that follows in the 
bill. Therefore, it is imperative that this Title be balanced 
and accurate. If it is not, then the rest of the bill, and the 
law that would result, would not represent good public policy.
    Despite improvements in Title I of the bill, we believe 
that the assertions made therein understate the unmatched 
quality and capability of our military forces at this time, and 
the enormous scale of our continuing investments in force-
structure, modernization and readiness as compared to those of 
other nations. It will always be the case that some will look 
at a glass and see it half full while others will view the 
glass as half empty. In this regard, Title I adopts findings 
that suggest problems where none might exist, and fails to 
highlight areas that are equally factual but which may suggest 
other solutions to the funding-forces imbalance that all 
acknowledge does exist, but which are not embraced in H.R. 7.
    The effort to soften Title II's mandate to proceed to the 
deployment of a ballistic missile defense programs as soon as 
is practicable, rather than as soon as is possible, will guard 
against the worst excesses of expenditures in the already-
expensive ballistic missile defense programs.
    However, what remains is a dramatic reversal of program 
priorities. The bill would have national ballistic missile 
defense programs take precedence over theater missile defense 
programs. This ignores current threat assessments, the present 
maturity and feasibility of technology in this area, and the 
budget realities we must deal with today. Moreover, the 
evidence suggests that current priorities which put the 
development and deployment of effective theater missile defense 
ahead of national missile defense programs are correct and 
should not be reversed. What remains in the bill is a mandate 
to pursue an aggressive ballistic missile defense agenda with 
neither any regard for the already substantial investment that 
is being made in theater and national ballistic missile defense 
programs, nor with regard to the role of ballistic missile 
defenses in our overall strategy and priorities.
    Such an effort promises to be expensive, crowding out other 
defense programs more relevant to the Post-Cold War World as 
well as generating demand for further resources that are 
required to meet other urgent national needs.
    In addition, Title II (especially when read in conjunction 
with the findings in Title I) would jeopardize our commitment 
to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between Russia and the 
United States. The ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of any 
effort to further reduce the numbers of ballistic missiles that 
threaten the United States. It is therefore important that we 
not press ahead so quickly, and in directions that threaten to 
undermine the ABM Treaty, before we can reach an understanding 
with the Russians that would be acceptable to both nations 
regarding their needs for theater missile defense programs. In 
the end, we believe that negotiated outcomes will prove to be 
more effective, reliable and less expensive solutions to our 
security needs, than technical fixes, which will always be at 
risk of countermeasures.
    In addition, we believe that rushing forward to develop a 
ballistic national missile defense program will upset the 
already delicate process leading to the hoped for ratification 
of the START II Treaty.
    Finally, Title II states at the outset that it "shall be" 
the policy of the United States to embrace what follows in that 
Title. This language requires us to embrace a policy before we 
study the issues and fully understand the impact of that policy 
on our larger national security needs. We submit this is 
putting the cart before the horse. It is incumbent upon us as 
legislators to work first toward understanding, and then toward 
adopting policy.
    Title III's requirement that a commission be established to 
generate a new national security strategy, and a new military 
strategy to implement that policy, removes the responsibility 
for such an undertaking from where it rightfully rests, with 
the President and the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with 
other members the National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of 
Staff on the one hand and in the congressional defense 
committees on the other.
    While we agree that it is important to study the forward 
looking issues in Title III, it should not be done by a 
commission that is interposed between the legislative and 
executive branches. It is not just that we do not need another 
level of bureaucracy, it is that we should not be abdicating 
our responsibilities in this area. The establishment of a 
commission with such broad-ranging authority as is granted in 
Title III amounts to a vote of no-confidence in our ability--
and in the Secretary of Defense's ability--to study, develop 
and implement our national security policies. This is quite 
unlike the situation with the Roles and Missions Commission, 
for example, in which a group of outside experts is tasked to 
offer their expert advise on a relatively narrow range of 
issues within the broader national security context. 
Establishing a commission whose job it is to propose an entire 
national security strategy and all that fits within its rubric, 
as is proposed in Title III, is to invite experts to make the 
types of political judgements which are properly left to our 
elected officials and those accountable to the people through 
the confirmation process.
    Title IV seeks to prevent the placement of United States 
forces under the command of non-United States officers when our 
troops are deployed in United Nations peacekeeping forces. In 
Section 401, it uses the power of purse to accomplish that 
goal.
    This is a short-sighted policy that ignores the long 
tradition--dating back to our War of Independence and extending 
forward to Operation Desert Storm--of United States forces 
serving under foreign command. It also improperly interferes 
with this President's--and future presidents'--authority as 
commander in chief to establish those chains of command that 
best meet the exigencies and the requirements of the military 
situations into which our forces would be deployed.
    As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John 
Shalikashvili, said in testimony received before the committee 
on this Title of the bill, ``Our forces will always remain 
under the command of our commander-in-chief, and we already 
have a sound policy that applies very rigorous standards 
regarding when we will pass even the most limited authorities 
of our forces to a foreign commander.''
    While there may be substantial disagreement concerning when 
U.S. forces should be deployed--and the proper Congressional 
role--in their deployment, Title IV deals only with command and 
control. On this issue, the Constitution's Framers were clear: 
The President is the commander in chief.
    Finally, in Title V, we are troubled with provisions that 
we see are antithetical to United States security interests. By 
taking the steps proposed in Title V to impede United States 
involvement and participation in United Nations peacekeeping 
activities, we are creating policy that will leave us with the 
choice between no action and unilateral action.
    In financial terms as well as in respect to the well-being 
of those who serve in uniform under United States colors, it is 
imperative that we seek to perfect international and multi-
national operations to deter violence and prevent the outbreak 
of large-scale or regional wars. By erecting impediments which 
seem to serve narrow, U.S. self-interest in the short run, we 
believe strongly that we are inflicting long-term damage on our 
national security strategy to promote regional cooperation and 
stability, and the development of democracy and the respect for 
human rights.
    United States involvement in U.N. peacekeeping is critical 
to the well-being of both the United Nations and the United 
States.
    Finally, it bears repeating, this bill represents a 
dramatic change in national security policy and its 
consideration was handled outside of the normal, careful and 
deliberative process by which these important matters have been 
considered in the past, and should be considered in the future. 
In our opinion, all of the issues addressed in H.R. 7 belong 
within the annual defense authorization process, as it is 
coupled with the annual budget process. By rushing a bill to 
passage in only half the target 100 days, we have foregone a 
significant opportunity to have a much more informed debate on 
the bill and the issues and priorities underlying it. Instead, 
it was brought before the committee for markup after no 
subcommittee hearings and with only three full committee 
hearings--one of which was not directly related to any title of 
the bill. As part of the majority party's campaign pledge to 
push major legislation through on a short deadline, the 
national security policy of this country has been caught up in 
a calendar-driven thrust to make good on that pledge. However, 
as we move from campaign promise to legislative initiative, the 
process must become deliberative, substantive and thoughtful. 
To do less represents a dangerous departure both from the non-
partisan history and tradition of our important committee and 
its determination to undertake a careful and deliberative--
time-consuming though it may be--rendering of national security 
policy.
    Because of these and other concerns, and because of a 
desire that the committees of jurisdiction be allowed the 
opportunity to work more fully the important issues contained 
in H.R. 7, we dissented from the reporting of this bill.
                                   Ronald V. Dellums.
                                   Patricia Schroeder.
                                   Lane Evans.
                                   Neil Abercrombie.
                                   Martin Meehan.
                                   Robert Underwood.
                                   Rosa L. DeLauro.
                                   Mike Ward.
                                   William J. Jefferson.
                                   Pete Peterson.
                                   Patrick J. Kennedy.
                            DISSENTING VIEWS

    As advocates of a strong defense, we have worked in a 
bipartisan spirit in the past, and we want to continue in this 
spirit as the committee takes up the Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1996.
    We are grateful for the effort the Chairman and staff made 
to accommodate concerns that we and other Democratic members 
expressed with respect to H.R. 7 as introduced. The changes 
agreed to were helpful, but they did not go far enough, and we 
reluctantly concluded that we could not support H.R. 7 as 
reported.
    Our concerns start literally with the title of the bill: 
``The National Security Revitalization Act.'' The title implies 
that our military lacks ``vitality,'' that our forces are not 
up to the task of defending our national interests. This theme 
is amplified throughout Title I, which sets forth dire 
``Findings'' warning of ``a return to the 'hollow forces' of 
the 1970's.'' This accusation was toned down by amendment to 
the original finding. We believe that Secretary of Defense 
Perry properly assessed the effects of such language when he 
warned our committee that ``is a dangerous statement; it 
misleads the American people and it may confuse potential 
aggressors of the United States.''
    We also had major objections to Titles II and III of the 
bill, and we are disappointed that our amendments to strengthen 
these titles were rejected. In Title II, we agree with the 
basic proposition that the Department of Defense (DoD) should 
move toward development of a National Missile Defense (``NMD'') 
system capable of intercepting incoming ballistic missiles. The 
Spratt Amendment to Title II was offered not so much as a 
substitute but as a perfecting amendment to H.R. 7, to make it 
more clear and more certain that Theater Missile Defense 
(``TMD'') has priority over NMD.
    The Spratt Amendment calls for:
          developing and testing an NMD system based on a 
        ground-based interceptor, so that we do not waste 
        further billions on a space-based interceptor system; 
        and
          assurances that spending on NMD will not impair other 
        important national security priorities, such as 
        readiness, force structure, and modernization.
    In its present form, Title II is so broad and so vague that 
it is not even clear that TMD has priority over NMD. In fact, 
by including guidance on NMD which calls for deployment ``at 
the earliest practical date'' ahead of guidance on TMD, one 
could plausibly argue that H.R. 7 calls for subordinating TMD 
to NMD. Such an interpretation would further delay systems like 
the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), or PAC-3, which 
uses Extended Range Intercept (ERINT) technology. THAAD and 
ERINT are coming to the end of the development phase and are 
not far from deployment.
     The Spratt Amendment states that TMD shall have priority 
over NMD unless the threat of a ballistic missile attack 
against the United States warrants a reversal of these 
priorities. It also lists its policy objectives in order of 
priority so there is no chance for misinterpretation. Title II 
can be interpreted any number of ways, and the lack of clarity 
could delay or harm our TMD programs. As Secretary Perry put it 
in his testimony last week, TMD is on a ``fast track.'' We 
should not sidetrack it.
     Another problem with H.R. 7's loose verbiage comes in 
Section 201(2), which says the U.S. will ``provide * * * highly 
effective theater missile defenses,'' not only for our forces 
but for ``friendly forces and allies.''
    ``Provide'' is a simple choice of words, but it has 
ambiguous implications. Does ``provide'' mean that Congress is 
authorizing DoD--
          to share the BMD technology, no matter how sensitive 
        it may be, with allies and friendly forces?
          to give the technology or the systems away, with no 
        reimbursement or joint funding?
          to ``provide'' missile defense through U.S. units 
        when allies are in danger and want it for their 
        protection?
          to ``provide'' systems such as Arrow, now being 
        jointly funded, to allies like Israel at an 
        undetermined cost?
     The Spratt Amendment avoids these problems by simply 
stating that we should ``complete the development and 
deployment at the earliest practicable date of more effective 
theater missile defenses (TMDs) by adequately funding current 
TMD programs.''
     Billions have been sunk into ballistic missile defense 
because there were never any realistic end-goals. R & D for NMD 
needs a focal point, and it should be focused on developing a 
ground-based interceptor (``GBI''). At the least, we should 
carry such a system to the point where its validity can be 
tested. The GBI would be complemented with ground-based radar 
and space-based or ground-launched sensors.
     By specifically stating the type of interceptor to be 
used, we set a realistic goal that can be met within a 
reasonable time. There are advantages--militarily, politically 
and financially--to pursuing prototype development of a ground-
based interceptor:
     1. GBI is the system closest to realization.
     2. GBI is the least expensive system to deploy.
     3. GBI is invulnerable to anti-satellite (ASAT) counter-
measures.
    4. GBI can be upgraded incrementally because it is ground 
based; space-based systems cannot be.
     5. GBI technology is based on the same technology as TMD, 
so the sensors, rocket engines, and processors are on the same 
continuum with TMD sub-systems.
     6. GBI would not abrogate the ABM Treaty, though it would 
leave open the possibility of renegotiating provisions of the 
ABM Treaty as necessary to test and deploy a GBI-based NMD 
system.
     Secretary Perry told us last week that he thinks GBI is 
the best technology to pursue if ``the objective of the program 
is to reach the readiness for a deployment decision.'' But H.R. 
7 does not provide the Secretary of Defense any guidance on NMD 
whatsoever. H.R. 7 states: ``deploy at the earliest practical 
date an anti-ballistic missile system that is capable of 
providing a highly effective defense of the United States 
against ballistic missile attacks.''
     At face value, the term ``highly effective'' seems 
reasonable, but it too is a vague term--highly effective 
against what threat? If we are talking about an attack from a 
rogue submarine commander, who can launch a boatload of 
missiles, each with shrouds, decoys and jamming devices, then a 
``highly effective'' defense will probably require space-based 
systems costing tens of billions of dollars, which are years, 
probably decades, away from fielding. If we are talking about 
being ``highly effective'' against a limited, accidental 
launch, or against an emerging third world country unlikely to 
have sophisticated decoys and no jamming capability, then a 
much more modest and technically feasible ground-based system 
would be ``highly effective.''
     By not re-writing H.R. 7, we raise the risk of having 
proponents of space-based interceptors claim a significant 
portion of what will surely be limited funding. This will only 
delay development and deployment of a ground-based system, and 
encroach on critical priorities like readiness and 
modernization.
     By calling for a GBI system to be proved before it is 
deployed, we are pushing some Members of this Committee further 
than they stand on the subject of ballistic missile defense, 
but the Spratt Amendment stops short of mandating deployment. 
In contrast, Title II of H.R. 7 says ``deploy'' without 
qualification. It makes no sense to mandate a deployment unless 
we prove the feasibility of an NMD system. The Spratt Amendment 
simply calls for the development of a prototype--actual 
hardware, not engineering view-graphs, which is mostly what we 
have to show for our $30 billion investment in SDI--and then 
the President and Congress can make a prudent decision about 
deployment.
     The Spratt Amendment to Title II has been circulated in 
the Pentagon, and while it has no formal endorsement as yet, 
General Malcolm O'Neill, Director of the BMD Office, and Paul 
Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, are in 
general accord with the amendment and prefer it to the version 
of Title II in the chairman's mark. Both would prefer to have 
the President provide Congress a deployment plan instead of 
deployment options, and Secretary Kaminski believes that the 
threat to the U.S. should be validated before deployment of an 
NMD system. But overall, both agree with the thrust of the 
amendment.
     Under the Spratt Amendment, we would make the decision 
about NMD deployment knowing--
          that we have a system whose technology has been 
        proven,
          that the cost of each deployment option laid out 
        before us;
          what threats each deployment option will be able to 
        counter; and
          exactly what provisions of the ABM Treaty would have 
        to be re-negotiated to deploy each option.
     There is also clear logic to having GBI be accompanied by 
space-based sensors. The problem with many of the directed 
energy, space-based platforms is that they would be vulnerable 
to ASATs and counter-measures. Any country capable of launching 
intercontinental ballistic missile against the United States is 
potentially capable of producing an effective ASAT weapon. This 
is why the SDI program conceived ``Brilliant Pebbles,'' 
circling the earth's orbit with small space-based weapon 
platforms. The sheer number of these platforms theoretically 
makes them invulnerable to ASATs. However, the limiting factor 
to Brilliant Pebbles, aside from technology, is cost--it costs 
a lot to place and keep enough such interceptors in space. By 
developing space based sensors as an adjunct to GBIs, 
technologies like cryo-coolers which determine the lifespan of 
sensors in space, will be developed, and these same 
technologies could eventually lead to affordable space-based 
interceptors capable of boost phase intercept.
    The Spratt Amendment contains caveats making it clear that 
NMD is not to be pursued at the expense of other important 
priorities--like force structure, readiness, and weapon system 
modernization. NMD must compete for funding on its own merits. 
These last points seem so obvious that one may question the 
need to restate them, but the lack of specificity in Title II 
as it now stands could lead to the wrong interpretation. These 
caveats are necessary to dispel any notion that an NMD system 
is to be pursued at the expense of more pressing priorities, 
such as readiness and modernization.
    The Spratt Amendment keeps the NMD program sensible and 
focused. H.R. 7 as currently worded does not do that--it 
invites disruptions to the program.
    Title III was also the subject of strong, even passionate, 
testimony by Secretary Perry. The Secretary emphatically stated 
that ``the proposed commission usurps the responsibilities of 
the Secretary of Defense. At the same time * * * this 
independent commission would interfere with the ability of this 
committee to fulfill its responsibilities.''
    In addition to usurping the prerogative of the Secretary of 
Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and congressional defense 
committees, another advisory commission will only duplicate 
internal DoD studies and the Commission on Roles and Missions. 
Its timetable for reporting is absurdly short, and its $1.5 
million estimated budget is a waste of taxpayer money, better 
spent on readiness or quality of life for our troops and their 
families. The challenge in this economic environment is to 
reduce wasteful government expenditures, not increase them.
    We believe that the important issues H.R. 7 does raise--
such as the adequacy of funding for readiness and 
modernization, funding for a deployable NMD, and the gap 
between defense funding and the force structure called for by 
the Bottom-Up Review--are best left to the authorization 
process, where the trade-offs have to be faced and deliberation 
has to be thorough.
                                   John Spratt.
                                   Jane Harman.
                     ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MS. HARMAN

    Though Mr. Spratt and I have submitted joint dissenting 
views, I want to share with the Committee some additional 
thoughts on National Missile Defense (NMD).
    The Spratt Amendment--which I supported--would limit R&D 
and NMD to developing ground-based interceptor (GBI). I think 
this limitation is unnecessary.
    Since 1983, approximately $35 billion has been appropriated 
for BMD technology, resulting in truly significant 
breakthroughs in advanced technologies, including 
microprocessors, propulsion, guidance, and sensors. The goal 
now should be to pull the pieces together into a working system 
that responds to current and future threats against the U.S. 
and its allies. A Global Protection Against Limited Strikes 
(GPALS) system should be reconsidered, including burdensharing. 
For TMD or NMD, space-based systems may well have a role in the 
evolving architecture of an effective system. But the design 
can and should be far more modest, affordable and 
technologically feasible than the old Star Wars concept. For 
the present, our R&D can be carefully tailored to maintain a 
technological base, and keep our future options open, while 
remaining treaty-compliant.
    As introduced, Title II of H.R. 7 is an inadequate vehicle 
to take us to the right answer. We need good intelligence, good 
science, clear thinking and bipartisan cooperation to define 
the best course.

                                                       Jane Harman.