[Senate Executive Report 104-33]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



104th Congress                                             Exec. Report
                                 SENATE

 2d Session                                                      104-33
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                    THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

                                _______
                                

               September 11, 1996.--Ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


   Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                      MAJORITY and MINORITY VIEWS

                   [To accompany Treaty Doc. 103-21]

    The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred 
the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, opened for signature and signed by the United 
States at Paris on January 13, 1993, including the following 
documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Annex on 
Chemicals; the Annex on Implementation and Verification; and 
the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information, having 
considered the same, reports favorably thereon and recommends 
that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification 
thereof subject to 7 conditions and 11 declarations as set 
forth in this report and the accompanying resolution of 
ratification.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. Purpose..........................................................2
 II. Treaty Terms.....................................................2
III. Treaty Obligations...............................................7
 IV. Background......................................................12
  V. Committee Action................................................17
 VI. Resolution of Ratification......................................19
VII. Article-by-Article Analysis.....................................32
VIII.Majority Views.................................................162

 IX. Minority Views.................................................241

                               I. Purpose

    The purpose of the Convention on the Prohibition of 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction (The Chemical Weapons 
Convention or ``CWC'') is to create a global ban on the use, 
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, or transfer 
of chemical weapons. The Convention seeks to reinforce the 
international norm against the use of chemical weapons by 
reaffirming and building upon the principles, objectives, and 
obligations assumed under two other international agreements: 
(1) the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare; and (2) the 1972 Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, or the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
    The United States has been engaged in negotiations for the 
elimination of weapons for chemical and biological warfare for 
more than 70 years. The Geneva Protocol and the BWC are the two 
basic treaties now in force. Most countries, including the 
United States, are parties to both. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 
prohibits the use in war by a Party against another Party of 
chemical and biological weapons, but places no restriction on 
production or possession of such weapons. In addition, 
reservations attached to the Protocol by many countries, 
including the United States, preserve the right to use chemical 
weapons in retaliation. The Biological Weapons Convention, on 
the other hand, outlaws the development, production, 
stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of biological and toxin 
weapons and provides for their destruction. (Toxins are 
considered both chemical and biological weapons in that they 
are biologically derived but act in a chemical manner. Thus, 
toxins are also covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention.) 
However, the BWC does not contain verification provisions. The 
administration is currently working with other nations to 
expand the BWC drawing upon the verification regime contained 
in the CWC.
    As noted, the CWC goes beyond both the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
and the BWC by prohibiting any use of chemical weapons in war--
including retaliatory use--as well as military preparations for 
the use of chemical weapons, and by establishing a verification 
regime to monitor compliance with the Convention. The CWC 
requires member states to declare all of their existing 
chemical weapons and chemical weapons storage and production 
facilities, requires their indigenous commercial chemical 
industries to declare their production activities and to allow 
an international inspectorate to examine those declarations and 
to have access to both military and commercial facilities, and 
to completely eliminate all of their chemical weapons within 10 
years of the Convention's entry into force. The goals of the 
CWC are to eliminate the possession of chemical weapons, to 
reverse chemical weapons proliferation, and to preclude any 
future use of these weapons.

                            II. Treaty Terms

    The Chemical Weapons Convention consists of the main Treaty 
text and three annexes, together with two documents, formally 
transmitted to the Senate by the President on November 23, 
1993, for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification. The 
CWC is a treaty with a preamble and 24 Articles with an 
unlimited duration, and three annexes as follows:
          the Annex on Chemicals;
          the Annex on Implementation and Verification (the 
        ``Verification Annex''); and
          the Annex on the Protection of Confidential 
        Information (the ``Confidentiality Annex'').
    The President also transmitted documents associated with, 
but not integral parts of, the Annexes or the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. These documents embody legally binding commitments 
regarding the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and 
on privileges, immunities, practical arrangements, and 
commitments undertaken with respect to the hosting of the 
Preparatory Commission. These documents are relevant to the 
consideration of the CWC by the Senate. No new U.S. security 
assurances or guarantees are associated with any of these 
documents.

                           a. the treaty text

    Article I contains the principal obligations undertaken by 
countries that become parties to the Convention. Parties are 
prohibited from:
          (a) Developing, producing, otherwise acquiring, 
        stockpiling or retaining chemical weapons or 
        transferring them, directly or indirectly, to anyone;
          (b) Using chemical weapons under any circumstances, 
        including retaliatory use;
          (c) Engaging in any military preparations to use 
        chemical weapons or assisting, encouraging, or inducing 
        anyone to engage in any activity prohibited by the CWC; 
        and
          (d) Using riot control agents as a ``method of 
        warfare.''
    Article II provides the definitions used in the Articles 
and Annexes and the criteria used to determine what is included 
within the scope of the Convention's controls. The definition 
of ``chemical weapons'' is specifically broad to encompass all 
known, unknown and future toxic chemicals, so that novel, as 
well as traditional chemical agents, will be prohibited in 
types and quantities that cannot be justified for permitted 
purposes. Article II also defines what is meant by the phrase 
``purposes not prohibited under this Convention.'' (Additional 
definitions are found in paragraph 1 of Article X, Part I of 
the Verification Annex, and paragraph 12 of Part IV(A) of the 
Verification Annex.)
    Article III requires all States Parties to declare whether 
or not they possess chemical weapons, including old and/or 
abandoned chemical weapons, chemical weapons production 
facilities and facilities or establishments that have been 
designed, constructed or used primarily for chemical weapons 
since January 1, 1946. States Parties are also required to 
report any chemical weapons on its territory that are owned and 
possessed by another State and located in any place under the 
jurisdiction or control of another State. Article III also 
requires States to declare any shipments, direct or indirect, 
of any chemical weapons, or chemical weapons production 
equipment, to or from its territory since January 1, 1946.
    Article IV describes the obligations of States Parties 
regarding destruction of chemical weapons, including the scope 
of the obligation, verification procedures, destruction, 
reporting of destruction activities, safety and environmental 
standards for destruction, bilateral and multilateral 
verification arrangements and costs of verification and 
destruction. Article IV also specifies that duplication of 
bilateral verification activities should be avoided, provided 
that the bilateral efforts are consistent with the Convention's 
provisions and that the States Parties involved keep the 
Organization fully informed of their verification activities. 
This provision was added to limit the duplicative cost of 
verification in instances in which States are already planning 
bilateral destruction and verification activities, namely 
between the United States and the Russian Federation.
    Article V describes the obligation by States Parties to 
destroy chemical weapons production facilities. This article 
specifies that each State Party immediately cease all 
production of chemical weapons and that all chemical weapon 
production facilities must be closed within 90 days of the 
Convention's entry into force for a State Party. Each State 
Party is responsible for the destruction of all chemical 
weapons production facilities on its territory or any other 
place under its jurisdiction or control, regardless of 
ownership. As with Article IV, this article specifies that 
duplication of verification efforts of bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements should be avoided as long as those 
bilateral or multilateral arrangements are consistent with the 
Convention's requirements.
    Article VI describes activities that are not prohibited 
under the Convention. It establishes an international 
verification regime for States Parties' chemical industries in 
order to allow legitimate commercial chemical production while 
guarding against clandestine chemical weapon production. 
Article VI also states that the Technical Secretariat shall 
avoid undue intrusion into the State Party's chemical 
activities while conducting verification activities. Further, 
the article applies the prohibition on hampering a State 
Party's economic or technological development in Article XI 
specifically to chemical industry verification.
    Article VII requires States Parties to develop implementing 
legislation. This is to make sure that private individuals and 
nongovernmental organizations anywhere on a State Party's 
territory or under its jurisdiction are prohibited from the 
same activities as the State Party. Article VII requires each 
State Party to establish or designate a National Authority to 
be the national focal point for liaison with the Organization 
and other States Parties. Article VII also requires each State 
Party to treat all information and data received from the 
Organization as confidential to protect information gathered 
during inspections from being used for purposes not related to 
the Convention, such as for commercial advantage.
    Article VIII establishes the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Conference of the States 
Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, 
and details the general provisions regarding the Organization. 
This article also sets forth the rules for financing the 
Organization.
    Article IX gives States Parties the right to request 
challenge inspections. However, Article IX also declares that 
States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every 
effort to clarify and resolve any compliance issues before 
requesting an inspection. The State Party receiving the request 
is required to provide sufficient information to clarify the 
concern to the requesting State Party as soon as possible, but 
in any case within 10 days of receiving the request. Article IX 
also requires an inspected State Party to make every reasonable 
effort to allow the inspection team to fulfill its mandate, 
while giving the inspected party the right to prevent 
disclosure of confidential information and data not related to 
the Convention. Article IX also gives the Executive Council the 
power, in limited circumstances, to cancel an inspection if it 
considers the inspection request to be frivolous, abusive, or 
clearly beyond the scope of the Convention.
    Article X establishes procedures for assistance to States 
Parties that are attacked or threatened with the attack by 
chemical weapons. ``Assistance'' is defined as the coordination 
and delivery to the threatened State Party of protection 
against chemical weapons, including detection equipment, 
protective equipment, decontamination equipment, medical 
antidotes and advice on any of these measures. Article X also 
gives States Parties the right to chemical weapons defenses, as 
long as they are for purposes not prohibited under the 
Convention. States Parties can choose the type of assistance 
they wish to provide.
    Article XI seeks to balance free trade in legitimate 
chemicals with preventing the proliferation of chemical 
weapons. This article sets the broad principle that the 
Convention should not be implemented in a manner that hampers 
the economic and technological development of States Parties or 
international cooperation in chemical activities for purposes 
not prohibited under the Convention.
    Article XII sets forth general measures that may be taken 
to address noncompliance. These measures include the 
possibility of restricting or suspending a State Party's rights 
and privileges, recommending sanctions, or bringing the issue 
before the United Nations.
    Article XIII states that nothing in the Convention shall 
limit or detract from any obligations assumed by a State under 
the Geneva Protocol of 1925 or the Biological Weapons 
Convention.
    Article XIV sets general mechanisms for settling disputes 
between States Parties or between the States Parties and the 
Organization.
    Article XV provides two methods for modifying the 
Convention: a formal amendment process and a ``simplified'' 
procedure for making minor administrative or technical changes 
which is listed to most provisions of the Annexes. The former 
requires ratification by States Parties without dissent and the 
latter requires neither ratification nor consensus.
    Article XVI states that the Convention shall be of 
unlimited duration and sets forth the conditions for 
withdrawal.
    Article XVII states that the Annexes form an integral part 
of the Convention and that any reference to the Convention 
includes the Annexes. The purpose of this article is to make 
clear that the Annexes have the same legal status as the 
Articles to the Convention.
    Article XVIII states that the Convention shall be open for 
signature for all States before its entry into force in order 
to allow for universal acceptance of the Convention.
    Article XIX states that the Convention shall be subject to 
ratification by States Signatories according to their 
respective constitutional processes.
    Article XX states that any State which does not sign the 
Convention prior to its entry into force may sign it at any 
time thereafter.
    Article XXI sets the date for the Convention's entry into 
force. This article specifies that the Convention shall enter 
into force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the 65th 
instrument of ratification, but not earlier than 2 years after 
its opening for signature. Article XXI also specifies that the 
States who sign the Convention after its entry into force, it 
shall enter into force for that State on the 30th day following 
the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or 
accession.
    Article XXII states that the Articles of the Convention 
shall not be subject to reservations by States Parties and that 
any reservations to the Annexes must be compatible with the 
object and purpose of the Convention.
    Article XXIII designates the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations as the depositary for the Convention and sets 
forth the responsibilities of the depositary.
    Article XXIV states that the Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian, and Spanish texts of the Convention are all 
equally authentic and shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.

                    B. INTEGRAL ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS

    The Treaty includes other documents which the President and 
the Secretary indicated are ``integral'' parts of the Treaty, 
and are submitted for consideration as legally binding parts of 
the Treaty.
    The Annex on Chemicals sets forth the criteria by which 
toxic chemicals and precursors are to be evaluated for 
inclusion in the schedules and the three Schedules of chemicals 
and chemical families themselves. The first part is designed so 
that new or currently unknown chemicals that meet the criteria 
may be proposed for addition to the Schedules in the future. 
The annex states that these Schedules do not constitute a 
definitive definition of chemical weapons. Schedule 1 is a list 
of chemicals that have actually been developed, produced, 
stockpiled or used as chemical weapons, chemicals that are 
immediate precursors to such chemical weapons and all other 
chemicals that are a high risk for use as chemical weapon 
precursors and have not significant civilian use. Schedule 2 
lists toxic chemicals and their immediate precursors that are 
produced, typically in small quantities, for peaceful purposes 
by industry, but which still pose a significant risk to the 
objectives of the Convention because of their potential to be 
used as chemical weapons. Schedule 3 lists chemicals that are 
usually produced in large commercial quantities but which 
either have been used in the past for chemical weapons or pose 
a risk to the objectives of the Convention because of their 
toxicity or importance as precursors to Schedule 1 or 2 
chemicals.
    The Annex on Implementation and Verification details how 
the inspections are to be conducted by stating the guidelines 
to be used in the declaration, monitoring, and inspection 
provisions of the Convention. This annex includes definitions; 
general rules of verification; general provisions for 
verification measures for chemical weapons, chemical weapons 
production facilities, and permitted Schedule 1 production; 
specific provisions for destruction and verification of 
destruction of chemical weapons; specific provisions for 
destruction or conversion, and verification of destruction or 
conversion, or chemical weapons production facilities; specific 
provisions regarding permitted production and use of Schedule 1 
chemicals; specific provisions for declaration and verification 
of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals and related facilities; 
specific provisions for declaration and anticipated 
verification of other chemical production facilities; 
procedures for challenge inspections; and procedures for 
investigations of alleged use on chemical weapons.
    The Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information 
obliges the Organization, the inspectors and the inspection 
observers not to reveal information gathered in the course of 
an inspection that is not relevant to a violation of the 
Convention.

                        c. associated documents

    Associated with the CWC are two separate document and three 
annexes to the documents. The Resolution Establishing the 
Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons was adopted by the conference on 
Disarmament at Geneva on September 3, 1992. The Resolution 
approves the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory 
Commission. The Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory 
Commission (and its Three Annexes) sets forth the details on 
arranging the Preparatory Commission.

                        III. Treaty Obligations

                        destruction obligations

    The Convention obligates each State Party to destroy all of 
its chemical weapons, and chemical weapons it abandoned on the 
territory of another State Party, and all of its chemical 
weapons production facilities. The CWC outlines a destruction 
schedule in specified categories of chemical weapons and 
requires completion of the destruction process by 10 years 
after the Convention's entry-into-force (EIF). The Convention 
does allow flexibility in the destruction process, permitting 
extension of the 10-year timeframe for up to 5 years.
    The CWC identifies two special categories of chemical 
weapons--namely old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical 
weapons. All chemical weapons produced before 1925 may be 
destroyed or otherwise disposed of as ``toxic waste.'' In the 
case of ``old chemical weapons,'' the Executive Council of the 
international organization created to implement the CWC can 
modify time-limits and order of destruction for chemical 
weapons produced between 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated 
to such an extent that they are no longer usable as chemical 
weapons.
    With regard to ``abandoned chemical weapons,'' the 
abandoning State Party is required to provide all necessary 
financial, technical, expert, facility and other resources to 
ensure appropriate destruction or disposal. The 10-year 
destruction time-line applies, through the Executive Council 
may approve the modification or suspension of the time-limits 
and/or order of destruction.
    All chemical weapons that do not fall into these categories 
will be subject to the full verification and destruction 
regimes of the CWC. Chemical weapons are broadly defined by 
Article II the CWC to be:
          (a) Toxic chemicals--any chemical which through 
        chemical action on life processes can case death, 
        temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or 
        animals--and their precursors, except when used for:
                  (i) Industrial, agricultural, research, 
                medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful 
                purposes;
                  (ii) Purposes directly related to protection 
                against toxic chemicals and to protection 
                against chemical weapons;
                  (iii) Military purposes not connected with 
                the use of chemical weapons and not dependent 
                on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals 
                as a method of warfare; and
                  (iv) Law enforcement, including some domestic 
                riot control purposes.
          (b) Munitions and devices specifically designed to 
        release toxic chemicals; and
          (c) Any equipment specifically designed for use 
        directly in connection with the employment of those 
        munitions or devices.
    The CWC also requires the destruction of chemical weapons 
production facilities within 10 years of EIF. However, chemical 
weapons production facilities may be converted temporarily for 
use as destruction facilities. In addition, States Parties may 
request approval from the Conference to convert chemical 
weapons production facilities to purposes not prohibited under 
the Convention. Approval is contingent on the State Party's 
acceptance of conditions specified in the CWC which, inter 
alia, preclude the use of a converted facility to produce, 
process, or consume Schedule 1 or 2 chemicals (with some 
exceptions), require the declaration of activities, provide for 
international monitoring of such activities, and set parameters 
for the conduct of such activities (e.g., very limited 
production of Schedule 1 chemicals for protective purposes, 
very limited Schedule 1 production capacity, and the use of 
only two Schedule 1 production facilities for protective 
purposes).
    The CWC defines chemical weapons production facilities as 
any equipment, or any building housing such equipment, that was 
designed, constructed or used at any time since January 1, 
1946:
          (a) As part of the stage in the production of 
        chemicals where the material flows would contain, when 
        the equipment is in operation:
                  (i) Any Schedule 1 chemical; or
                  (ii) Any other chemical that has no use, 
                above 1 metric ton per year, for purposes not 
                prohibited under the Convention, but can be 
                used for chemical weapons purposes; or
          (b) For filling chemical weapons, devices, or bulk 
        storage containers. This includes the filling of 
        chemicals into containers that form part of assembled 
        binary munitions/devices or into chemical submunitions 
        that form part of assembled unitary munitions/devices, 
        and the loading of the containers and chemical 
        submunitions into the respective munitions and devices.
    The CWC specifically excludes from the definition of 
``chemical weapons production facilities:'' (1) any facility 
having a productive capacity of less than 1 metric ton; (2) any 
facility in which a scheduled chemical is or was produced as an 
avoidable by-product of activities for nonprohibited purposes 
(provided that the chemical does not exceed 3% of the total 
production at that facility and that the facility is subject to 
CWC data declarations and inspection); or (3) the single small-
scale facility permitted for the production of chemicals listed 
in Schedule 1 for nonprohibited purposes.
    The Committee notes that regardless of whether any or all 
specialized production equipment has been removed, prior to 
entry into force of the Treaty, from a facility previously used 
at anytime since January 1, 1946, for chemical weapons 
production, such a facility must be declared pursuant to 
Article III of the Treaty and Part V of the Verification Annex.

                         financial obligations

    Article VIII of the CWC specifies that the costs of the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
that will be established to implement the CWC be paid in 
accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments 
adjusted to take into account differences in membership between 
the U.N. and the OPCW. According to Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher's April 19, 1996, responses to questions asked by 
the Chairman, the United States is expected to pay 24.96 
percent of the OPCWs operating costs. The next five highest 
contributors after the United States are expected to be Japan 
(13.92 percent), Germany (8.93 percent), France (6.31 percent), 
Russia (5.67 percent), and the United Kingdom (5.26 percent).
    Each State Party must also pay for the costs of destruction 
of its chemical weapons and for verification of the chemical 
weapons storage and destruction process. However, the CWC also 
allows for the conclusion of bilateral verification 
arrangements under which the parties involved assume the 
bilateral costs, and other members are apportioned percentages 
of the cost of monitoring the bilateral agreement by the 
international inspectorate. The United States proposed the 
bilateral verification provision based on a desire for direct 
involvement in monitoring the Russian chemical weapons 
destruction effort, the pre-existence of the 1990 U.S.-Russian 
Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA), and a mutual desire with 
the Russian Federation to minimize costs where possible.

           Obligations to Provide assistance under article X

    The CWC obligates each State Party to provide either 
monetary contributions to the Voluntary Fund of the OPCW, 
contribute protective equipment to an OPCW stockpile, or to 
identify assistance that will be provided upon demand or in 
response to an appeal by the OPCW.
    The PrepCom agreed in 1993 that the Voluntary Fund would 
comprise monetary contributions from States Parties as well as 
from nongovernmental organizations, institutions, private 
parties, and individuals. Conditions on the use of these funds 
would need to be consistent with the aims and purpose of the 
Convention and approved by the Executive Council. The Voluntary 
Fund is to be used for the creation, maintenance and periodic 
replenishment of a stockpile of equipment for emergency 
assistance.
    In the case of an emergency request, each State Party has 
the right to request and receive assistance, in general, if:
          (1) chemical weapons have been used against it;
          (2) riot control agents have been used against it as 
        a ``method of warfare;'' or
          (3) it is threatened by the actions or activities of 
        any State that are prohibited under Article I.
    The CWC defines assistance as ``the co-ordination and 
delivery to States Parties of protection against chemical 
weapons.'' Types of assistance are further defined inter alia 
as detection equipment, alarm systems, protective equipment, 
medical antidotes and treatments, decontamination equipment and 
decontaminants, and advice on protective measures. The CWC 
outlines procedures for requesting assistance and the ways in 
which the OPCW should respond.
    The Committee understands that, as a matter of practice, 
any request for assistance will be submitted to the Director-
General who will then bring it to the attention of the 
Executive Council and all States Parties. States Parties that 
are so committed should be in a position to provide voluntary 
emergency assistance within 12 hours of the receipt of such a 
request. After the Director-General has initiated an 
investigation, the Executive Council will meet and decide if 
supplementary assistance should be provided. In cases where the 
investigation is not finished, but it is obvious that chemical 
weapons have been used, the Director-General may provide 
emergency assistance by using the Voluntary Fund. Under such 
circumstances, protective equipment from the OPCW's stockpile 
can be dispatched and equipment from other donor States Parties 
can be used.
    Finally, Article X mandates that each State Party submit 
annual information on its national chemical weapons defense 
programs ``for purposes of increasing the transparency of 
national programs related to protective purposes * * *.'' The 
extent to which countries may be required to divulge 
information about their defensive chemical programs is unclear, 
and some on the Committee find this ambiguity troubling.
    The Expert Group has discussed lists of categories of 
information to be provided by States Parties on national 
programs related to protective purposes. At this stage, the 
Preparatory Commission for the OPCW conceptualizes mandatory 
data to include information on the existence and general 
elements of a national program, information on the training of 
specialists in chemical weapons protection, and information on 
protection units. However, final agreement has not been reached 
on the extent of information to be provided.

      creation and funding of the organizational bodies of the cwc

    The Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
and the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission 
both were adopted by acclamation by Signatory States on January 
13, 1993. Together they provide the basis for the Preparatory 
Commission for the OPCW--the organization responsible for 
preparing the necessary procedures for implementing the 
Convention and for laying the groundwork for the international 
organization created by the Convention.
    The OPCW will consist of the following: the Conference of 
the States Parties, the overall governing body made up of all 
States Parties; a 41-member Executive Council; and the 
Technical Secretariat, which will be the international body 
responsible for actually conducting the verification 
activities, including the on-site inspections.

                   creation of the national authority

    In ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, a country 
agrees to the basic provisions of the Convention in Article I, 
and to implement those obligations by taking the necessary 
national legal and administrative measures required by Article 
VII. States Parties must provide the declarations and 
information required under Articles I, IV, V and VI and this 
information will be subject to the verification provisions of 
these articles using the machinery of Article VIII. The State 
Party also agrees to accept challenge inspection under Article 
IX if the need arises.
    While States Parties are required to take measures to 
adhere to the Convention, Article VII is generally worded, 
leaving it to individual States Parties to determine who they 
will implement the provisions of the Convention and comply with 
their obligations.
    The primary function of the National Authority under the 
Convention is to establish a system to meet the CWC's 
obligations, and in so doing to minimize the disclosure of 
confidential business information in the process of providing 
information to the OPCW. Compliance with the CWC entails data-
reporting on scheduled chemicals, some unscheduled discrete 
organic chemicals including ``PSF'' chemicals and on research 
activities under the Convention. The National Authority will be 
responsible for three different types of data reporting: (a) 
the initial declarations of the State Party after entry into 
force of the Convention, (b) annual data reporting and (c) 
reporting on anticipated activities and changes in activities 
reported previously. Such data must be retrievable, authorized, 
and assessable at the National Authority level, and will 
contain information on chemical trade (both export and import) 
for chemical listed under the Schedules.
    More specifically, a U.S. National Authority would be 
required to:
          (1) assess U.S. producers of chemicals of concern 
        under the Convention;
          (2) process data declarations by firms under Articles 
        III, IV, V and VI;
          (3) process annual declarations under Articles IV, V 
        and VI;
          (4) escort OPCW inspection teams under Articles IV, 
        V, VI, IX and X;
          (5) accredit OPCW Inspectors;
          (6) develop Facility Agreements;
          (7) oversee closure and destruction activities 
        relating to chemical weapons and chemical weapons 
        production facilities;
          (8) coordinate the provision of national assistance 
        under Article X;
          (9) analyze chemical export and import activities;
          (10) review national regulations in international 
        trade in chemicals; and
          (11) manage issues relating to old and abandoned 
        chemical weapons.
    Beyond this, the National Authority will be called upon to 
represent the United States at the Conference of States 
Parties, the Executive Council, and to undertake other 
activities. Thus the National Authority must have both a 
domestic and an international focus.

                             IV. Background

    In 1925, at the Geneva Conference for the Supervision of 
the International Traffic in Arms, the United States proposed a 
prohibition on the export of gases for use in war; France 
broadened the proposal to include a ban on the use of poisonous 
gas in war. At the suggestion of Poland, the proposed 
prohibition was further extended to include bacteriological 
weapons. The result was the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which 
prohibits the use in war--though not internally, as in the 
instance of Iraqi gassing of Kurds--of chemical and biological 
weapons, but not the production or stockpiling of such weapons. 
The Committee on Foreign Relations favorably reported the 
treaty in 1926, but the Senate did not act on it in that 
period.
    In the post-World War II period, there were a number of 
discussions of the possibility of multilateral chemical and 
biological weapons bans, but no significant progress was made 
until the late 1960's. In 1969, President Nixon announced that 
he would resubmit the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate. He 
reaffirmed U.S. renunciation of first use of lethal chemical 
weapons, as well as incapacitating chemicals.
    In 1970, the President resubmitted the protocol with a 
reservation that the United States could retaliate with 
chemical weapons. He also declared that the protocol would not 
apply to the use in war of riot-control agents and herbicides. 
The Committee on Foreign Relations disagreed with the narrow 
coverage and deferred action. 1971, the Soviets accepted the 
U.S. view that a ban on biological weapons presented less 
intractable problems and should not be held up awaiting 
agreement in the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical 
weapons ban. As a result, the Biological Weapons Convention was 
negotiated quickly, opened for signature and submitted to the 
Senate in 1972. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee deferred 
action pending resolution of the U.S. commitment under the 
Geneva Protocol.
    In 1974, the Ford administration reopened the issue, and 
the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
indicated that the President, while reaffirming the scope of 
the protocol, was prepared ``to renounce as a matter of 
national policy: (1) first use of herbicides in war except use, 
under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control 
of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around 
their immediate defensive perimeters; and (2) first use of 
riot-control agents in war except in defensive military modes 
to save lives * * *.'' Moreover, Dr. Ikle, testified, ``The 
President, under an earlier directive still in force, must 
approve in advance any use of riot-control agents and chemical 
herbicides in war.'' With that and related understandings, the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously 2 days 
later to report the Convention and the protocol favorably. Four 
days later, the Senate approved the protocol and the Convention 
unanimously.

                          recent developments

    In recent years, the issue of chemical weapons 
proliferation has gained more immediacy as a result of a number 
of allegations of chemical and biological weapons use. In the 
mid 1960's, Egypt was accused of using chemical weapons with 
Soviet help in the Yemeni civil war. North Vietnam was accused 
of using chemical weapons and toxins in Laos and Cambodia. The 
Ethiopian government was suspected of using chemicals against 
rebels in 1980. The United States has also charged that the 
Soviet Union used chemical weapons and toxins in Afghanistan.
    However, the event which provoked the sharpest response 
from the U.S. Congress was Iraq's repeated use of chemical 
weapons in the Iran-Iraq War, prompting Iranian retaliation 
with chemical weapons and use of poison gas against its own 
Kurdish citizens in 1988. Congress responded by passing the 
Pell-Helms Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Welfare 
Elimination Act, which imposed sanctions on nations using 
chemical weapons and against companies aiding the chemical 
weapons programs in certain countries. President Bush vetoed 
the legislation in 1990, however, because it did not allow a 
Presidential waiver of sanctions. The Bush administration 
subsequently established controls and sanctions by Executive 
order, but with complete leeway on waivers of penalties. The 
legislation was passed again by Congress and became law in 
1991.
    Additionally, progress was made during the 1980's in 
achieving international cooperation on nonproliferation issues. 
In 1984, Vice President Bush introduced at the Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva a draft treaty calling for a 
comprehensive ban with extensive verification procedures. In 
the following years, a number of key issues were resolved, and 
an early agreement in principle on the basic approach a ban 
would take emerged. The Reagan administration had favored very 
strict ``anytime, anywhere'' verification regime which the 
Soviet Union ultimately accepted. While some argued that this 
may constitute an unacceptable level of intrusiveness, further 
negotiation to reach of common ground resulted in a 
modification of the earlier approach and resulted in the 
``managed access'' system of inspections.
    In June 1990 Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed a 
bilateral Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of 
Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral 
Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons. This agreement:
          Banned the production of chemical weapons agents;
          Required reduction in chemical weapons stocks to 
        5,000 tons by 2002, necessitating cuts of 83% in U.S. 
        stocks and 90% in Russian stocks;
          Provided for on-site inspections of storage, 
        destruction and production facilities, combined with 
        data declarations.
    In March 1993, the United States and Russian delegations 
agreed ad referendum on detailed implementing procedures and 
updated provisions to finalize the Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement. Russia has yet to formally agree to these detailed 
procedures and provisions, however, citing problems with the 
provisions on conversion of former chemical weapons facilities 
to peaceful uses and with the costs of stockpile destruction.
    On the multilateral front, the late 1980's saw a slowdown 
in progress on an international chemical weapons agreement, as 
states debated the extensive verification procedures proposed 
by the United States. Also, many nations opposed a U.S.-Soviet 
formulation whereby those two countries could keep 500 tons of 
chemical weapons for at least another 8 years, pending an 
assessment of participation in the Convention.
    The experience of the Gulf War, in which the United States 
faced the possibility of chemical weapons attack, apparently 
precipitated a change in the Bush administration's thinking in 
the matter. The administration decided that the need for a 
chemical weapons ban outweighed the need to maintain a chemical 
retaliatory capability. Thus, the United States decided that in 
the context of a multilateral convention, it would be willing 
to abide by a total chemical weapons ban even if other 
countries maintained chemical weapons stockpiles and programs.
    This led to accelerated progress in multilateral talks. The 
result was the opening for signature on January 13, 1993, of 
The Convention on the Prohibition of Development Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, or the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention Ratifications: 62 as of 
                                 9/6/96

Afghanistan
Albania--Ratified 5/11/94
Algeria--Ratified 8/14/95
Argentina--Ratified 10/2/95
Armenia--Ratified 1/27/95
Australia--Ratified 5/6/94
Austria--Ratified 8/17/95
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belarus--Ratified 7/11/96
Belgium
Benin
Bolivia
Brazil--Ratified 3/13/96
Brunei Darussalem
Bulgaria--Ratified 8/10/94
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada--Ratified 9/26/95
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile--Ratified 7/11/96
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Cook Islands--Ratified 7/15/94
Costa Rica--Ratified 5/31/96
Cote d'Ivoire--Ratified 12/15/95
Croatia--Ratified 5/23/95
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic--Ratified 3/6/96
Denmark--Ratified 7/13/95
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador--Ratified 9/6/95
El Salvador--Ratified 10/30/95
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Ethiopia--Ratified 5/24/96
Fiji--Ratified 1/20/93
Finland--Ratified 2/7/95
France--Ratified 3/2/95
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia--Ratified 11/27/95
Germany--Ratified 8/12/94
Ghana
Greece--Ratified 12/22/94
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Holy See
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India--Ratified 9/3/96
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland--Ratified 6/24/96
Israel
Italy--Ratified 12/8/95
Japan--Ratified 9/15/95
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia--Ratified 7/23/96
Lesotho--Ratified 12/7/94
Liberia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives--Ratified 5/31/94
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius--Ratified 2/9/93
Mexico--Ratified 8/29/94
Micronesia
Moldova--Ratified 7/8/96
Monaco--Ratified 6/1/95
Mongolia--Ratified 1/17/95
Morocco--Ratified 12/28/95
Myanmar
Namibia--Ratified 11/27/95
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands--Ratified 6/30/95
New Zealand--Ratified 7/15/96
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway--Ratified 4/7/94
Oman--Ratified 2/8/95
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea--Ratified 4/17/96
Paraguay--Ratified 23/1/94
Peru--Ratified 7/20/95
Philippines
Poland--Ratified 8/23/95
Portugal
Qatar
Romania--Ratified 2/15/95
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and
  the Grenadines
Samoa
San Marino
Saudi Arabia--Ratified 8/9/96
Senegal
Seyechelles--Ratified 4/7/93
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic--Ratified 10/27/95
Slovenia
South Africa--Ratified 9/13/95
South Korea
Spain--Ratified 8/3/94
Sri Lanka--Ratified 8/19/94
Swaziland
Sweden--Ratified 6/17/93
Switzerland--Ratified 3/10/95
Tajikistan--Ratified 1/11/95
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan--Ratified 9/29/94
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom--Ratified 5/13/96
United States
Uruguay--Ratified 10/6/94
Uzbekistan--Ratified 7/23/96
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Yemen
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

    Total=160 Members.
    Last updated: July 24, 1996.

                          V. Committee Action

    Senator Pell chaired the first hearing on the Chemical 
Weapons Convention on March 22, 1994, when the Committee heard 
from the Honorable Warren Christopher, Secretary of State and 
the Honorable John D. Holum, Director of the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. Additionally, Mr. Holum was 
heard in closed session in the afternoon of March 22.
    A second hearing was held on April 13, 1994. Witnesses 
included the Honorable Stephen J. Ledogar, U.S. Representative 
to the Conference on Disarmament; Sherry S. Mannix, Chairman, 
Interagency Chemical Weapons Ratification Task Force and Former 
Senior ACDA Representative to the U.S. Delegation to the 
Conference on Disarmament; and Bernard L. Seward, Jr., Attorney 
Advisor, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Former 
Legal Advisor to the U.S. Conference on Disarmament.
    A third hearing was held on May 13, 1994, with witnesses 
from the Department of Defense. Witnesses included the 
Honorable Walter B. Slocombe, Deputy Under Secretary for 
Policy; Major General David W. McIlvoy, USAF, Deputy Director 
for International Negotiations, Directorate for Strategic Plans 
and Policy (J-5), Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Dr. Harold P. 
Smith, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic 
Energy, Department of Defense.
    On May 17, 1994, the Committee met briefly in open session 
and moved to closed session with representatives of the 
Intelligence Community. Witnesses included Major General 
(retired) John Landry, USA, National Intelligence Officer for 
General Forces, National Intelligence Council; John Lauder, 
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff for the Director of 
Central Intelligence; and Donald Mahley, Acting Assistant 
Director, Bureau of Multilateral Affairs, U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency.
    On June 9, 1994, the Committee heard from several outside 
experts. Witnesses included Will B. Carpenter, Chemical 
Industry Consultant, Salt Lake City, Utah; Amoretta Hoeber, 
Former Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, Arlington, Virginia; 
Dr. Matthew Meselson, Department of Biochemistry and Molecular 
Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts; the 
Honorable Michael Moodie, President, Chemical and Biological 
Arms Control Institute, Alexandria, Virginia; the Honorable 
Ronald F. Lehman, Former Director, United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, Livermore, California; Frank Gaffney, 
Jr., Director, Center for Security Policy, Washington, D.C.; 
the Honorable Kathleen Bailey, Former Assistant Director, 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Livermore, 
California; and Amy Smithson, Director, Chemical Weapons 
Convention Implementation Project, Henry L. Stimson Center, 
Washington, D.C.
    On June 16, 1994, the Committee met in closed session to 
hear Intelligence Community witnesses.
    On June 23, 1994, the Committee met in open session with 
General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff; the Honorable John D. Holum, Director, United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and the Honorable R. James 
Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence.
    On March 13, 1996, the Committee held the first in the 
final round of hearings. Witnesses include: Ms. Amoretta 
Hoeber, President of AMH Consulting; Mr. Baker Spring, a Senior 
Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation; The Honorable 
Michael Moodie, President of the Chemical and Biological Arms 
Control Institute; Dr. J.D. Crouch, professor of Defense and 
Strategic Studies at Southwest Missouri State.
    The Committee's eighth hearing was held on March 21, 1996. 
Witnesses included: Dr. Brad Roberts, Defense Institute of 
Analysis; Frederick Webber, President and CEO, Chemical 
Manufacturers Association; The Honorable Kathleen Bailey, 
Senior Fellow on the Staff of the Director at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory; Douglas J. Feith, Senior 
Founding Partner of Feith and Zell, P.C.
    On March 26, 1996, the Committee met in closed session to 
hear Intelligence Community witnesses.
    The final hearing was held on March 28, 1996. Witnesses 
included: The Honorable Warren Christopher, Secretary of State; 
The Honorable William Perry, Secretary of Defense; Lt. General 
Wesley Clark, the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy in the 
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
    On April 25, 1996, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
met for a business meeting, where among other things, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention was on the agenda. The Chairman, 
under an agreement reached during the State Department 
Reorganization debate, introduced a resolution of ratification 
for the Chemical Weapons Convention. A substitute offered by 
Senator Lugar, Senator Pell, Senator Kassebaum, Senator Biden, 
Senator Dodd, and Senator Kerry was agreed to by a vote of 12 
to 6. Senator Lugar, Senator Kassebaum, Senator Snowe, Senator 
Thomas, Senator Pell, Senator Biden, Senator Sarbanes, Senator 
Dodd, Senator Kerry, Senator Robb, Senator Feingold, and 
Senator Feinstein voted in favor of the substitute. Chairman 
Helms, Senator Brown, Senator Coverdell, Senator Thompson, 
Senator Grams, and Senator Ashcroft voted against the 
substitute. On the question of reporting the Chemical Weapons 
Convention to the full Senate, the committee voted in favor, by 
a vote of 13 to 5. Senator Lugar, Senator Kassebaum, Senator 
Snowe, Senator Thompson, Senator Thomas, Senator Pell, Senator 
Biden, Senator Sarbanes, Senator Dodd, Senator Kerry, Senator 
Robb, Senator Feingold, and Senator Feinstein voted in favor of 
reporting the Convention to the full Senate. Chairman Helms, 
Senator Brown, Senator Coverdell, Senator Grams, and Senator 
Ashcroft voted against the Convention's report to the full 
Senate.
    The substitute resolution of ratification adopted was the 
result of a bi-partisan effort to report a resolution of 
ratification to the full Senate which if approved by a two-
thirds majority would allow U.S. instruments of ratification to 
be deposited and U.S. participation in the Convention. The 
substitute received the support of the Administration. The 
resolution of ratification was submitted to the Senate on April 
30, 1996, pursuant to a unanimous consent agreement entered 
into on December 7, 1995.

                     VI. Resolution of Ratification

                     1. Resolution of Ratification

    Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
therein), That (a) the Senate advise and consent to the 
ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature and 
signed by the United States at Paris on January 13, 1993, 
including the following annexes and associated documents, all 
such documents being integral parts of and collectively 
referred to in this resolution as the ``Convention'' (contained 
in Treaty Document 103-21), subject to the conditions of 
subsection (b) and the declarations of subsection (c):
           (1) The Annex on Chemicals.
          (2) The Annex on Implementation and Verification 
        (also known as the ``Verification Annex'').
          (3) The Annex on the Protection of Confidential 
        Information (also known as the ``Confidentiality 
        Annex'').
          (4) The Resolution Establishing the Preparatory 
        Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of 
        Chemical Weapons.
          (5) The Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory 
        Commission.
    (b) Conditions.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
the ratification of the Convention is subject to the following 
conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:
          (1) Amendment conferences.--The United States will be 
        present and participate fully in all Amendment 
        Conferences and will cast its vote, either 
        affirmatively or negatively, on all proposed amendments 
        made at such conferences, to ensure that--
                  (A) the United States has an opportunity to 
                consider any and all amendments in accordance 
                with its Constitutional processes; and
                  (B) no amendment to the Convention enters 
                into force without the approval of the United 
                States.
          (2) Presidential certification on data 
        declarations.--(A) Not later than 10 days after the 
        Convention enters into force, or not later than 10 days 
        after the deposit of the Russian instrument of 
        ratification of the Convention, whichever is later, the 
        President shall either--
                  (i) certify to the Senate that Russia has 
                complied satisfactorily with the data 
                declaration requirements of the Wyoming 
                Memorandum of Understanding; or
                  (ii) submit to the Senate a report on 
                apparent discrepancies in Russia's data under 
                the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and the 
                results of any bilateral discussions regarding 
                those discrepancies.
          (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term 
        ``Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding'' means the 
        Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of 
        the United States of America and the Government of the 
        Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a 
        Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange 
        Related to Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, signed at 
        Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989.
          (3) Presidential certification on the bilateral 
        destruction agreement.--Before the deposit of the 
        United States instrument of ratification of the 
        Convention, the President shall certify in writing to 
        the Senate that--
                  (A) a United States-Russian agreement on 
                implementation of the Bilateral Destruction 
                Agreement has been or will shortly be 
                concluded, and that the verification procedures 
                under that agreement will meet or exceed those 
                mandated by the Convention, or
                  (B) the Technical Secretariat of the 
                Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
                Weapons will be prepared, when the Convention 
                enters into force, to submit a plan for meeting 
                the Organization's full monitoring 
                responsibilities that will include United 
                States and Russian facilities as well as those 
                of other parties to the Convention.
          (4) Noncompliance.--If the President determines that 
        a party to the Convention is in violation of the 
        Convention and that the actions of such party threaten 
        the national security interests of the United States, 
        the President shall--
                  (A) consult with, and promptly submit a 
                report to, the Senate detailing the effect of 
                such actions on the Convention;
                  (B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the 
                highest diplomatic level with the Organization 
                for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (in 
                this resolution referred to as the 
                ``Organization'') and the noncompliant party 
                with the objective of bringing the noncompliant 
                party into compliance;
                  (C) in the event that a party to the 
                Convention is determined not to be in 
                compliance with the Convention, request 
                consultations with the Organization on whether 
                to--
                          (i) restrict or suspend the 
                        noncompliant party's rights and 
                        privileges under the Convention until 
                        the party complies with its 
                        obligations;
                          (ii) recommend collective measures in 
                        conformity with international law; or
                          (iii) bring the issue to the 
                        attention of the United Nations General 
                        Assembly and Security Council; and
                  (D) in the event that noncompliance 
                continues, determine whether or not continued 
                adherence to the Convention is in the national 
                security interests of the United States and so 
                inform the Senate.
          (5) Financing implementation.--The United States 
        understands that in order to ensure the commitment of 
        Russia to destroy its chemical stockpiles, in the event 
        that Russia ratifies the Convention, Russia must 
        maintain a substantial stake in financing the 
        implementation of the Convention. The costs of 
        implementing the Convention should be borne by all 
        parties to the Convention. The deposit of the United 
        States instrument of ratification of the Convention 
        shall not be contingent upon the United States 
        providing financial guarantees to pay for 
        implementation of commitments by Russia or any other 
        party to the Convention.
          (6) Implementation arrangements.--If the Convention 
        does not enter into force or if the Convention comes 
        into force with the United States having ratified the 
        Convention but with Russia having taken no action to 
        ratify or accede to the Convention, then the President 
        shall, if he plans to implement reductions of United 
        States chemical forces as a matter of national policy 
        or in a manner consistent with the Convention--
                  (A) consult with the Senate regarding the 
                effect of such reductions on the national 
                security of the United States; and
                  (B) take no action to reduce the United 
                States chemical stockpile at a pace faster than 
                that currently planned and consistent with the 
                Convention until the President submits to the 
                Senate his determination that such reductions 
                are in the national security interests of the 
                United States.
          (7) Presidential certification and report on national 
        technical means.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        deposit of the United States instrument of ratification 
        of the Convention, the President shall certify that the 
        United States National Technical Means and the 
        provisions of the Convention on verification of 
        compliance, when viewed together, are sufficient to 
        ensure effective verification of compliance with the 
        provisions of the Convention. This certification shall 
        be accompanied by a report, which may be supplemented 
        by a classified annex, indicating how the United States 
        National Technical Means, including collection, 
        processing and analytic resources, will be marshalled, 
        together with the Convention's verification provisions, 
        to ensure effective verification of compliance. Such 
        certification and report shall be submitted to the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and 
        the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
    (c) Declarations.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
ratification of the Convention is subject to the following 
declarations, which express the intent of the Senate:
          (1) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
        applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally 
        based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in 
        Condition (1) of the Resolution of Ratification with 
        respect to the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on 
        May 27, 1988. For purposes of this declaration, the 
        term ``INF Treaty'' refers to the Treaty Between the 
        United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
        Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their 
        Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together 
        with the related memorandum of understanding and 
        protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
          (2) Further arms reduction obligations.--The Senate 
        declares its intention to consider for approval 
        international agreements that would obligate the United 
        States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments 
        of the United States in a militarily significant manner 
        only pursuant to the treaty power set forth in Article 
        II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.
          (3) Retaliatory policy.--The Senate declares that the 
        United States should strongly reiterate its retaliatory 
        policy that the use of chemical weapons against United 
        States military forces or civilians would result in an 
        overwhelming and devastating response, which may 
        include the whole range of available weaponry.
          (4) Chemical defense program.--The Senate declares 
        that ratification of the Convention will not obviate 
        the need for a robust, adequately funded chemical 
        defense program, together with improved national 
        intelligence capabilities in the nonproliferation area, 
        maintenance of an effective deterrent through capable 
        conventional forces, trade-enabling export controls, 
        and other capabilities. In giving its advice and 
        consent to ratification of the Convention, the Senate 
        does so with full appreciation that the entry into 
        force of the Convention enhances the responsibility of 
        the Senate to ensure that the United States continues 
        an effective and adequately funded chemical defense 
        program. The Senate futher declares that the United 
        States should continue to develop theater missile 
        defense to intercept ballistic missiles that might 
        carry chemical weapons and should enhance defenses of 
        the United States Armed Forces against the use of 
        chemical weapons in the field.
          (5) Enforcement policy.--The Senate urges the 
        President to pursue compliance questions under the 
        Convention vigorously and to seek international 
        sanctions if a party to the Convention does not comply 
        with the Convention, including the ``obligation to make 
        every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance 
        with this Convention'', pursuant to paragraph 11 of 
        Article IX. It should not be necessary to prove the 
        noncompliance of a party to the Convention before the 
        United States raises issues bilaterally or in 
        appropriate international fora and takes appropriate 
        actions.
          (6) Approval of inspectors.--The Senate expects that 
        the United States will exercise its right to reject a 
        proposed inspector or inspection assistant when the 
        facts indicate that this person is likely to seek 
        information to which the inspection team is not 
        entitled or to mishandle information that the team 
        obtains.
          (7) Assistance to Russia.--The Senate declares that, 
        if the United States provides limited financial 
        assistance for the destruction of Russian chemical 
        weapons, the United States should, in exchange for such 
        assistance, require Russia to destroy its chemical 
        weapons stocks at a proportional rate to the 
        destruction of United States chemical weapons stocks 
        and to take the action before the Convention deadline. 
        In addition, the Senate urges the President to request 
        Russia to allow inspections of former military 
        facilities that have been converted to commercial 
        production, given the possibility that these plants 
        could one day be reconverted to military use, and that 
        any United States assistance for the destruction of the 
        Russian chemical stockpile be apportioned according to 
        Russia's openness to these broad based inspections.
          (8) Expanding chemical arsenals in countries not 
        party to the chemical weapons convention.--It is the 
        sense of the Senate that, if during the time the 
        Convention remains in force the President determines 
        that there has been an expansion of the chemical 
        weapons arsenals of any country not a party to the 
        Convention so as to jeopardize the supreme national 
        interests of the United States, then the President 
        should consult on an urgent basis with the Senate to 
        determine whether adherence to the Convention remains 
        in the national interest of the United States.
          (9) Compliance.--Concerned by the clear pattern of 
        Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements and 
        continued cases of noncompliance by Russia, the Senate 
        declares the following:
                  (A) The Convention is in the interest of the 
                United States only if both the United States 
                and Russia, among others, are in strict 
                compliance with the terms of the Convention as 
                submitted to the Senate for its advice and 
                consent to ratification, such compliance being 
                measured by performance and not by efforts, 
                intentions, or commitments to comply.
                  (B)(i) Given its concern about compliance 
                issues, the Senate expects the President to 
                offer regular briefings, but not less than 
                several times a year, to the Committees on 
                Foreign Relations and Armed Services and the 
                Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
                on compliance issues related to the Convention. 
                Such briefings shall include a description of 
                all United States efforts in diplomatic 
                channels and bilateral as well as the 
                Multilateral Organization fora to resolve the 
                compliance issues and shall include, but not 
                necessarily be limited to a description of--
                          (I) any compliance issues, other than 
                        those requiring challenge inspections, 
                        that the United States plans to raise 
                        with the Organization; and
                          (II) any compliance issues raised at 
                        the Organization, within 30 days.
                  (ii) Any Presidential determination that 
                Russia is in noncompliance with the Convention 
                shall be transmitted to the committees 
                specified in clause (i) within 30 days of such 
                a determination, together with a written 
                report, including an unclassified summary, 
                explaining why it is in the national security 
                interests of the United States to continue as a 
                party to the Convention.
          (10) Submission of future agreements as treaties.--
        The Senate declares that after the Senate gives its 
        advice and consent to ratification of the Convention, 
        any agreement or understanding which in any material 
        way modifies, amends, or reinterprets United States and 
        Russian obligations, or those of any country, under the 
        Convention, including the time frame for implementation 
        of the Convention, should be submitted to the Senate 
        for its advice and consent to ratification.
          (11) Riot control agents.--(A) The Senate, 
        recognizing that the Convention's prohibition on the 
        use of riot control agents as a ``method of warfare'' 
        precludes the use of such agents against combatants, 
        including use for humanitarian purposes where 
        combatants and noncombatants intermingled, urges the 
        President--
                  (i) to give high priority to continuing 
                efforts to develop effective nonchemical, 
                nonlethal alternatives to riot control agents 
                for use in situations where combatants and 
                noncombatants are intermingled; and
                  (ii) to ensure that the United States 
                actively participates with other parties to the 
                Convention in any reassessment of the 
                appropriateness of the prohibition as it might 
                apply to such situations as the rescue of 
                downed air crews and passengers and escaping 
                prisoners or in situations in which civilians 
                are being used to mask or screen attacks.
          (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``riot 
        control agents'' is used within the meaning of Article 
        II (4) of the Convention.

            2. Description of the Resolution of Ratification

    Article XXII states that the Articles of the Convention are 
not subject to reservations. The Committee has expressed the 
view that the President's agreement to such a prohibition 
cannot constrain the Senate's constitutional right and 
obligation to give its advice and consent to a treaty subject 
to any reservation it might determine is required by the 
national interest. This principle must apply even if the Senate 
agrees to treaties when no reservations are necessary.
    The Annexes of the Convention are subject to reservations, 
as long as they are not incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the Convention. The Administration has informed the 
Senate that Article XXII represents a compromise between 
countries that wanted no reservations and the United States, 
which wanted to preserve the rights of the executive and 
legislative branches to make reservations. This compromise 
reflects the position of most countries that the basic 
requirements of the Convention, which are found in the 
Articles, should not be subject to reservations. The Annexes, 
however, contain detailed implementation measures which may not 
be suitable or necessary for all countries. Reservations to the 
Annexes, therefore, should be allowed, unless they contradict 
the object and purpose of the Convention.
    Although the Senate may accede to the President's request 
not to make its advice and consent to this Convention subject 
to a reservation, the Senate is still in a position to give its 
declarations or provisions as it might deem necessary, short of 
a reservation that would be deemed a change in specific U.S. 
obligations.
    The first condition of the substitute resolution of 
ratification responds to paragraph 3 of Article XV of the 
Convention. It states that ``3. Amendments shall enter into 
force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of the 
instruments of ratification or acceptance by all the States 
parties referred to under subparagraph (b) below: (a) When 
adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a 
majority of all States Parties with no State Party casting a 
negative vote; and (b) Ratified or accepted by all those States 
parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.''
    Pursuant to this provision, if the United States were to 
abstain, or simply not to vote, when a matter was decided in 
the Amendment Conference, it could be possible for an amendment 
to be adopted without being submitted to the Senate for advice 
and consent--or, indeed, over the objection of the Senate. By 
contrast, a U.S. vote in favor of an amendment would make U.S. 
ratification a precondition to entry into force--and a U.S. 
vote against an amendment would defeat the proposal before any 
States Parties could ratify it.
    The Executive Branch provided the Senate with the following 
assurance:

          On this point, it should be stressed that the United 
        States will be present at all Amendment Conferences and 
        will cast its vote, either positive or negative, on all 
        proposed amendments made at such conferences, thus 
        ensuring the opportunity for the Senate to consider any 
        amendment approved by the Amendment Conference.

    The Executive Branch's assurance is intended to remove any 
concern regarding the constitutional role of the Senate. The 
Committee on Foreign Relations would make the Senate's consent 
to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention conditioned 
upon a binding obligation upon the President to abide by this 
commitment.
    Condition 2. In the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) of September 23, 1989, the Soviet Union and the United 
States agreed to ``conduct a bilateral verification experiment 
and data exchange related to the prohibition of chemical 
weapons.'' This agreement was to be carried out in two phases. 
In Phase I, the sides agreed to ``exchange general data on 
their chemical weapons capabilities and carry out a series of 
visits to relevant facilities.'' In Phase II, the sides agreed 
to ``exchange detailed data and perform on-site inspections to 
verify the accuracy of those data.'' The overall intent of the 
Wyoming MOU was ``to facilitate the process of negotiation, 
signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively 
verifiable and truly global convention on the prohibition and 
destruction of chemical weapons.''
    Pursuant to the Wyoming MOU, the United States and the 
Soviet Union signed on June 1, 1990, an ``Agreement on 
Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on 
Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning 
Chemical Weapons'' (known as the Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement or BDA).
    When the Wyoming MOU and the BDA were signed, there was 
still a Soviet Union. There was little expectation that a 
Chemical Weapons Convention could be negotiated in the near 
term. Today, there is no Soviet Union but there is a Chemical 
Weapons Convention. To the extent, however, that Russia impedes 
the implementation of the Wyoming MOU and the Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement or submits questionable data 
declarations, her good faith must be questioned.
    Data Declarations under the Wyoming MOU. Phase I of the 
Wyoming MOU appears to have been carried out as planned. The 
Phase II data exchange, which should have occurred in the 
spring of 1992, did not take place until fully 2 years later, 
pursuant to implementing procedures that were agreed in Moscow 
on January 14, 1994. A review of the Russia's Wyoming MOU Phase 
I and Phase II data declarations suggests significant 
shortcomings in those declarations. Those shortcomings account 
for the Committee's concern over Russia's failure to comply 
fully with the data declaration provisions of the Wyoming MOU 
and its implementing procedures.
    Moreover, the failure to implement all the on-site 
inspections originally agreed to in the Wyoming MOU is another 
cause of concern. The inspections under Phase II of the MOU are 
no longer likely to make a significant contribution to 
compliance monitoring or verification. Rather, as pared down in 
1993 and in the final implementing procedures, they will 
continue the confidence-building process and help the two sides 
prepare for later inspections under the Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement and/or the Chemical Weapons Convention. But the 
Russian refusal to permit a full suite of technical inspection 
equipment, even after most inspections and all challenge 
inspections or nondeclared sites were eliminated, suggests the 
Russians may have something to hide.
    The Committee believes that the President must make full 
Russian implementation of the Wyoming MOU and the Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement an issue of high priority in U.S.- 
Russian relations and must raise the matter personally at the 
highest levels. Therefore, the committee has added a condition 
to the resolution of ratification of the CWC requiring the 
President, 10 days after the CWC enters into force or 10 days 
after the Russian Federation deposits instruments of 
ratification of the CWC, whichever is later, either (A) to 
certify to the Senate that the Russian Federation has complied 
satisfactorily with the data declaration requirements of the 
Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding; or (B) to submit to the 
Senate a report on apparent discrepancies in the Russian 
Federation's Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding data and the 
results of any bilateral discussions regarding those 
discrepancies.
    Condition 3. The Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) of 
1990 calls for the immediate cessation of CW production, for 
the destruction by December 31, 2002, of all U.S. and Russian 
chemical weapons except for up to 5,000 metric tons, and, if 
the CWC should enter into force, for destruction of all but 500 
metric tons within 8 years of that date--reflecting the U.S. 
negotiating position as of 1990. The BDA also mandates annual 
updates to the 1989 Wyoming MOU data exchange.
    At the time the BDA was signed, there was no exception that 
in just over 2 years the Chemical Weapons Convention would be 
initialed. The BDA was intended to set a good example for the 
rest of the world, to move the CWC negotiations along, and to 
mesh with a CWC that had not yet been completed. To deal with a 
future CWC, the Parties adopted Paragraph 1 of Article VIII of 
the BDA that reads:

          After the multilateral convention enters into force, 
        the provisions of the multilateral convention shall 
        take precedence over the provisions of this Agreement 
        (the BDA) in cases of compatible obligations therein. 
        Otherwise, the provisions of the (BDA) Agreement shall 
        supplement the provisions of the multilateral 
        convention in its operation between the Parties. After 
        the multilateral convention is signed, the Parties to 
        this (BDA) Agreement shall consult with each other in 
        order to resolve any questions concerning the 
        relationship of this (BDA) Agreement to the 
        multilateral convention.

    However, Russia has yet to agree to a date for further 
bilateral negotiations on BDA implementation. Given the passage 
of more than 3 years since Russia and the United States reached 
agreement ad referendum on BDA implementation, and given the 
fact that the BDA mandates extensive on-site inspection by U.S. 
personnel, there is a real risk that the BDA will never enter 
into force, notwithstanding Russia's economic incentive to 
accept bilateral verification.
    In the absence of agreement on BDA implementation, 
verification of Russian compliance would likely be based upon a 
smaller number of inspections than originally anticipated, that 
the inspections of Russian sites would be conducted by the OPCW 
inspectorate rather than by U.S. personnel, and there would be 
no guaranteed U.S. access to the detailed inspection data. On 
the other hand, the OPCW is unlikely to exempt Russia from the 
requirements set forth in the CWC's provisions.
    OPCW budget planning has proceeded on the assumption that 
the United States and the Russian Federation would handle the 
bulk of the monitoring of each other's CWC facilities. If the 
BDA should not come into force by the time the CWC comes into 
force, then the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW might not be 
able to field enough international inspectors to handle this 
significant task. At minimum, OPCW planning assumptions may 
need to be revised so that the organization can prepare for the 
possible need to monitor U.S. and Russian CW facilities.
    Therefore, the Committee has added a condition to the 
resolution of ratification of the CWC, barring the deposit of 
the instruments of ratification until the President certifies 
to Congress either (A) that the U.S.-Russian agreement on 
implementation of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement has been 
or will shortly be achieved, and that the agreed verification 
procedures will meet or exceed those mandated by the Chemical 
Weapons Convention; or (B) that the Technical Secretariat of 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will 
be prepared, when the Convention enters into force, to submit a 
plan for meeting the organization's full monitoring 
responsibilities that will include U.S. and Russian facilities 
as well as those of other States Parties.
    Condition 4. The enforcement of arms control agreements 
serves two basic functions: it is essential to the correction 
of violations, be they inadvertent or intentional; and it can 
serve to deter potential violators, by establishing a real 
penalty for noncompliance. The penalty for noncompliance may be 
tangible or largely political--i.e., public exposure of the 
violator. But without some penalty, deterrence is minimal and 
enforcement can at best correct those violations that the 
international community happens to discover. Without the will 
to enforce an agreement in the face of violations, moreover, an 
agreement can gradually or precipitously lose its force.
    The basic enforcement powers of the OPCW are set forth in 
Article XII of the Convention. But collective measures in 
defense of the CWC will likely require both firm OPCW 
leadership and strong support from the major powers. 
Specifically, it is hard to imagine any such collective 
measures being adopted unless the United States asserts itself 
to build the necessary consensus for such action.
    The Committee believes that the deterrent effect of the CWC 
is extremely difficult to predict. Countries that are uncertain 
about the value of chemical weapons may well be both reassured 
by wide ratification of the CWC and loath to risk discovery of 
a CW posture that they see as providing only marginal gain. 
Given the nature and secrecy of many of the states of greatest 
concern, however, the CWC may not deter those most committed to 
having an offensive CW capability, although it will likely be 
more effective in deterring the actual use of chemical weapons.
    The Committee also believes that a strong U.S. commitment 
to the enforcement of the CWC will be essential to the 
effectiveness of the Convention. It may, in fact, be possible 
to achieve a measure of both enforcement and deterrence, but 
only if the United States is prepared to make compliance with 
the CWC a major element of its foreign policy stance toward 
each State Party to the Convention.
    Therefore, the Committee has added a condition to the 
resolution of ratification of the CWC that establishes the 
framework by which the President may seek to bring a 
noncompliant Party into compliance and, failing that, the 
President's actions with respect to determining whether 
continued adherence to the CWC remains in the national security 
interests of the United States.
    Condition 5. There is inevitably a tension between the 
desire to maintain the best possible monitoring and 
verification capabilities and the need to limit expenditures 
and enforce budget discipline on international organizations to 
which the United States contributes. The OPCW has not been 
immune to this cost-benefit dilemma. Questions have been raised 
regarding the OPCW budget, and these are legitimate in light of 
the U.S. agreement to cover 25% of that budget.
    By the same token, the Executive Branch believes that there 
are major economic incentives for the Russians to implement the 
Bilateral Destruction Agreement, since the United States would 
contribute funds for CW destruction under that agreement. 
Indeed, various Russian officials have argued that the rest of 
the world should share in the cost of Russian CW destruction, 
as they will share in the security benefits which flow from 
such destruction.
    The United States has agreed to provide assistance to the 
Russian chemical weapons destruction program, including the 
provision of a U.S. contractor to aid in the development of a 
comprehensive destruction plan and the equipping of a central 
analytical laboratory for monitoring to ensure safe destruction 
activities. Moreover, the Russian government has asked that 
additional support focus on efforts to develop one or two 
nerve-agent destruction facilities.
    Notwithstanding such limited U.S. assistance and the 
Committee view that the BDA may never enter into force, despite 
Russia's economic incentive to accept bilateral verification, 
the Committee believes that in order to ensure Russian 
commitment to destruction of its chemical stockpiles, Russia 
must maintain a substantial stake in financing the 
implementation of the CWC and share a substantial portion--if 
not all--of the burden of Russian implementation of the CWC. 
Therefore, the Committee has added a condition to the 
resolution of ratification of the CWC that the deposit of the 
instruments of ratification of the CWC shall not be contingent 
upon the United States providing financial guarantees to pay 
for implementation of commitments by Russia and other States 
Parties under the Convention.
    Condition 6. This instructs the President that if the CWC 
does not come into force or it comes into force with the U.S. 
having ratified the Treaty but Russia having taken no action, 
and the President plans to implement U.S. chemical reductions 
anyway, he must consult with the Senate. He can take no action 
to reduce the U.S. stockpile at a pace faster than currently 
planned and consistent with the CWC until he submits to the 
Senate his determination that such reductions are in the 
national security interests of the United States. This 
provision allows the Administration to meet its CW destruction 
obligation in full consultation with the Senate.
    Condition 7. The United States will rely upon a combination 
of capabilities--including imagery, signals intelligence, human 
intelligence, open-source information, and the verification 
provisions of the CWC. Monitoring the CWC will be a difficult 
task and the Intelligence Community has poor confidence in its 
ability to monitor the most stressing aspects of the CWC for 
three primary reasons:
          the large number of sites worldwide involved in 
        chemical production subject to the Convention;
          most of the products and production facilities 
        subject to the agreement are dual-use, with legitimate 
        commercial applications; and
          most activity prohibited by the CWC is easily 
        concluded or disguised.
    Nonetheless, the Intelligence Community has testified that 
the CWC is a net plus in its efforts to assess and warn of 
potential chemical warfare threats to the United States and 
that the accumulation of data provided by the OPCW over the 
years will assist in its monitoring tasks.
    The Committee shares the view with the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency that the verification provisions of the CWC, 
in combination with national intelligence means are 
insufficient to detect, with a high degree of confidence, all 
activities prohibited under the Convention. Nonetheless, the 
larger and more systematic the violations, the higher the 
possibility that, over time, evidence of these would surface. 
The existence of a program with the scope and size of the 
former Soviet Union's would be difficult to completely conceal 
under the Convention. Thus, the Committee does not believe that 
a single-all-encompassing judgment can be made regarding the 
verifiability of the CWC or U.S. capability to monitor 
compliance with the Convention. In some areas, our confidence 
will be significantly higher than others. However, the 
Committee accepts the Intelligence Community's pessimistic 
assessment of U.S. capability to detect and identify a 
sophisticated and determined violation of the Convention, 
especially on a small scale.
    For that reason, the Committee has added a condition to the 
resolution of ratification of the CWC requiring the president, 
within 90 days of depositing the instruments of ratification, 
to certify that a combination of U.S. National Technical Means 
and the verification provisions of the Convention itself are 
sufficient to ensure effective verification of compliance with 
the provisions of the Treaty. That certification shall be 
accompanied by a report indicating how U.S. National Technical 
Means, including collection, processing. and analytical 
resources, will be marshaled in combination with the 
Convention's verification provisions.
    Declaration 1 is an affirmation of Condition 1 of the INF 
Treaty Resolution of Ratification.
    Declaration 2 is a statement of the intention of the Senate 
to continue to reduce the Armed Forces or armaments of the 
United States in a manner pursuant to the Constitution.
    Declaration 3 states the U.S. Senate's policy to respond to 
chemical weapons use on U.S. troops or civilians with an 
overwhelming and devastating response, which may include the 
whole range of available weaponry.
    Declaration 4 states the Senate's view that the U.S. must 
continue to field a robust, adequately funded chemical defense 
program, combined with improved national intelligence 
capabilities. The Senate states the United States should 
continue to develop missile theater defense.
    Declaration 5 urges the President to seek sanctions 
bilaterally or in appropriate international fora if a state 
party does not abide by the Convention.
    Declaration 6 states the Senate's expectation that the U.S. 
will exercise its right to reject a proposed inspector or 
inspection assistant when there is an indication that the 
person is seeking information the inspection team is not 
entitled or to mishandle information that the team obtains.
    Declaration 7 states that if the U.S. provides assistance 
to Russia for chemical weapon destruction the U.S. should, in 
exchange for such assistance, require Russia to destroy stocks 
at a proportional rate to U.S. destruction, and before the CWC 
deadline. The Senate also urges the U.S. to require inspections 
of former Russian military facilities that have been converted 
to commercial production, given the possibility that these 
plants could be reconverted, and U.S. assistance should be 
apportioned to Russia's openness to these broad-based 
inspections.
    Declaration 8 states that if the President at any time 
while the CWC is in force determines the supreme national 
interests of the United States are in jeopardy due to an 
expansion of the chemical weapons arsenals of any country not 
party to the CWC, the President should consult with the Senate 
to determine whether adherence to the CWC remains in the 
national security interests of the United States.
    Declaration 9 states that the CWC is in the interest of the 
United States only if both the United States and Russia, among 
others, are in strict compliance. The Senate expects Russia, 
among others, to be in strict compliance with the CWC. The 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence are 
to be offered regular briefings on compliance issues including: 
challenge inspections, compliance issues raised at the OPCW 
within 30 days, and any Presidential determination that Russia 
is in noncompliance.
    Declaration 10 states that any agreement or understanding 
to the CWC which modifies, amends, or reinterprets U.S., 
Russian, or any other state's obligations should be submitted 
to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
    Declaration 11 urges the President to give high priority to 
continuing efforts to develop effective non-chemical, non-
lethal alternatives to riot control agents. The Senate urges 
the President to ensure that the United States actively 
participates with other Parties to the Convention in any 
reassessment of the appropriateness of the prohibition as it 
might apply to such situation as the rescue of downed air crews 
and passengers and escaping prisoners or in situations in which 
civilians are being used to mask or screen attacks.

 VII. Article-by-Article Analysis of the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
                        and on Their Destruction

                        table of contents

                                                                   Page
Preamble.........................................................    36

                             Articles

   I. General Obligations............................................37
  II. Definitions and Criteria.......................................37
 III. Declarations...................................................39
  IV. Chemical Weapons...............................................41
   V. Chemical Weapons Production Facilities.........................43
  VI. Activities not Prohibited Under this Convention................46
 VII. National Implementation Measures...............................47
VIII. The Organization...............................................48
  IX. Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding....................56
   X. Assistance and Protection Against Chemical Weapons.............60
  XI. Economic and Technological Development.........................62
 XII. Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, 
      including Sanctions............................................62
XIII. Relation to Other International Agreements.....................63
 XIV. Settlement of Disputes.........................................63
  XV. Amendments.....................................................64
 XVI. Duration and Withdrawal........................................65
XVII. Status of the Annexes..........................................66
XVIII.Signature......................................................66

 XIX. Ratification...................................................66
  XX. Accession......................................................66
 XXI. Entry into Force...............................................66
XXII. Reservations...................................................66
XXIII.Depositary.....................................................66

XXIV.  Authenic Texts................................................67

                        Annex on chemicals

A. Guidelines for schedules of chemicals:
    Guidelines for Schedule 1....................................    67
    Guidelines for Schedule 2....................................    67
    Guidelines for Schedule 3....................................    67
B. Schedules of chemicals:
    Guidelines for Schedule 1....................................    68
    Guidelines for Schedule 2....................................    69
    Guidelines for Schedule 3....................................    69

     Annex on implementation and verification (``verification 
                             annex'')

Part I: Definitions..............................................    70
Part II: General rules of verification:
     A. Designation of inspectors and inspection assistants......    73
     B. Privileges and immunities................................    74
     C. Standing arrangements:
        Points of entry..........................................    76
        Arrangements for use of non-scheduled aircraft...........    77
        Administrative arrangements..............................    78
        Approved equipment.......................................    78
    D. Pre-inspection activities:
        Notification.............................................    79
        Entry into the territory of the inspected State Party or 
          Host State and transfer to the inspection site.........    79
        Pre-inspection briefing..................................    80
    E. Conduct of inspections:
        General rules............................................    80
        Safety...................................................    80
        Communications...........................................    81
        Inspection team and inspected State Party rights.........    81
        Collection, handling and analysis of samples.............    82
        Extension of inspection duration.........................    83
        Debriefing...............................................    83
    F. Departure.................................................    83
    G. Reports...................................................    83
    H. Application of general provisions.........................    84
Part III: General provisions for verification measures pursuant 
  to articles IV, V and VI, paragraph 3:
    A. Initial inspections and facility agreements...............    84
    B. Standing arrangements.....................................    85
    C. Pre-inspection activities.................................    86
Part IV (A): Destruction of chemical weapons and its verification 
  pursuant to article IV:
    A. Declarations:
        Chemical Weapons.........................................    86
        Declarations of chemical weapons pursuant to Article III, 
          paragraph 1 (a) (iii)..................................    88
        Declarations of past transfers and receipts..............    88
        Submission of the general plan for destruction of 
          chemical weapons.......................................    88
    B. Measures to secure the storage facility and storage 
      facility preparation.......................................    89
    C. Destruction:
        Principles and methods for destruction of chemical 
          weapons................................................    89
        Order of destruction.....................................    89
        Modification of intermediate destruction deadlines.......    91
        Extension of the deadline for completion of destruction..    92
        Detailed annual plans for destruction....................    92
        Annual reports on destruction............................    94
    D. Verification:
        Verification of declarations of chemical weapons through 
          on-site inspection.....................................    94
        Systematic verification of storage facilities............    94
        Inspection and visits....................................    95
        Systematic verification of the destruction of chemical 
          weapons................................................    96
        Chemical weapons storage facilities at chemical weapons 
          destruction facilities.................................    98
        Systematic on-site verification measures at chemical 
          weapons destruction facilities.........................    98
Part IV (B): Old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical weapons:
    A. General...................................................    99
    B. Regime for old chemical weapons...........................    99
    C. Regime for abandoned chemical weapons.....................   100
Part V: Destruction of chemical weapons production facilities and 
  its verification pursuant to article V:
    A. Declarations:
        Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities...   102
        Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities 
          pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1(c) (iii)..........   103
        Declarations of past transfers and receipts..............   104
        Submission of general plans for destruction..............   104
        Submission of annual plans for destruction and annual 
          reports on destruction.................................   104
    B. Destruction:
        General principles for destruction of chemical weapons 
          production facilities..................................   105
        Principles and methods for closure of a chemical weapons 
          production facility....................................   105
        Technical maintenance of chemical weapons production 
          facilities prior to their destruction..................   106
        Principles and methods for temporary conversion of 
          chemical weapons production facilities into chemical 
          weapons destruction facilities.........................   106
        Principles and methods related to destruction of a 
          chemical weapons production facility...................   107
        Order of destruction.....................................   107
        Detailed plans for destruction...........................   108
        Review of detailed plans.................................   109
    C. Verification:
        Verification of declarations of chemical weapons 
          production facilities through on-site inspection.......   110
        Systematic verification of chemical weapons production 
          facilities and cessation of their activities...........   111
        Verification of destruction of chemical weapons 
          production facilities..................................   112
        Verification of temporary conversion of a chemical 
          weapons production facility into a chemical weapons 
          destruction facility...................................   112
    D. Conversion of chemical weapons production facilities to 
      purposes not prohibited under this convention:
        Procedures for requesting conversion.....................   113
        Actions pending a decision...............................   114
        Conditions for conversion................................   115
        Decision by the Executive Council and the Conference.....   115
        Detailed plans for conversion............................   116
        Review of detailed plans.................................   116
Part VI: Activities not prohibited under this convention in 
  accordance with article VI: Regime for schedule 1 chemicals and 
  facilities related to such chemicals:
    A. General provisions........................................   118
    B. Transfers.................................................   118
    C. Production:
        General principles for production........................   118
        Single small-scale facility..............................   119
        Other facilities.........................................   119
    D. Declarations:
        Single small-scale facility..............................   119
        Other facilities referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11.....   120
    E. Verification:
        Single small-scale facility..............................   121
        Other facilities referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11.....   122
Part VII: Activities not prohibited under this convention in 
  accordance with article VI: Regime for schedule 2 chemicals and 
  facilities related to such chemicals:
    A. Declarations:
        Declarations of aggregate national data..................   123
        Declarations of plant sites producing, processing or 
          consuming Schedule 2 Chemicals.........................   123
        Declarations on past production of Schedule 2 chemicals 
          for chemical weapons purposes..........................   125
        Information to States Parties............................   125
    B. Verification:
        General..................................................   125
        Inspection aims..........................................   126
        Initial inspections......................................   126
        Inspections..............................................   126
        Inspection procedures....................................   127
        Notification of inspection...............................   128
    C. Transfers to States not party to this convention..........   128
Part VIII: Activities not prohibited under this convention in 
  accordance with article VI: Regime for schedule 3 chemicals and 
  facilities related to such chemicals:
    A. Declarations:
        Declarations of aggregate national data..................   128
        Declarations of plant sites producing Schedule 3 
          chemicals..............................................   129
        Declarations on past production of Schedule 3 chemicals 
          for chemical weapons purposes..........................   130
        Information to States Parties............................   130
    B. Verification:
        General..................................................   130
        Inspection aims..........................................   131
        Inspection procedures....................................   131
        Notification of inspection...............................   132
    C. Transfers to States not party to this convention:.........   132
Part IX: Activities not prohibited under this convention in 
  accordance with article VI: Regime for other chemical 
  production facilities:
    A. Declarations:
        List of other chemical production facilities.............   132
         Information to States Parties...........................   132
        Assistance by the Technical Secretariat..................   133
    B. Verification:
        General..................................................   134
        Inspection aims..........................................   134
        Inspection procedures....................................   134
        Notification of inspection...............................   135
    C. Implementation and review of section B:
        Implementation...........................................   135
        Review...................................................   135
Part X: Challenge inspections pursuant to article IX:
    A. Designation and selection of inspectors and inspection 
      assistants.................................................   136
    B. Pre-inspection activities:
        Notification.............................................   136
        Entry into the territory of the inspected State Party or 
          the Host State.........................................   137
        Alternative determination of final perimeter.............   138
        Verification of location.................................   139
        Securing the site, exit monitoring.......................   139
        Pre-inspection briefing and inspection plan..............   140
        Perimeter activities.....................................   141
    C. Conduct of inspections:
        General rules............................................   141
        Managed access...........................................   142
        Observer.................................................   143
        Duration of inspection...................................   144
    D. Post-inspection activities:
        Departure................................................   144
        Reports..................................................   144
Part XI: Investigation in cases of alleged use of chemical 
  weapons:
    A. General...................................................   145
    B. Pre-inspection activities:
        Request for an investigation.............................   145
        Notification.............................................   145
        Assignment of inspection team............................   146
        Dispatch of inspection team..............................   146
        Briefings................................................   146
    C. Conduct of inspections:
        Access...................................................   146
        Sampling.................................................   147
        Extension of inspection site.............................   147
        Extension of inspection duration.........................   147
        Interviews...............................................   147
    D. Reports:
        Procedures...............................................   148
        Contents.................................................   148
    E. States not party to this convention.......................   148

       Annex on the protection of confidential information

A. General principles for the handling of confidential 
  information....................................................   148
B. Employment and conduct of personnel in the technical 
  secretariat....................................................   150
C. Measures to protect sensitive installations and prevent 
  disclosure of confidential data in the course of on-site 
  verification activities........................................   151
D. Procedures in case of breaches or alleged breaches of 
  confidentiality................................................   152

          Other documents associated with the convention

Resolution establishing the preparatory commission for the 
  organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons...........   152
Text on the establishment of a preparatory commission:
    Annex 1: Privileges, immunities and practical arrangements in 
      connection with the hosting of the Preparatory Commission..   157
    Annex 2: Privileges, immunities, and practical arrangements 
      to be laid down in the Headquarters Agreement..............   157
    Annex 3: Information submitted and commitments undertaken by 
      the Netherlands and by the City of The Hague...............
        Privileges and Immunities................................   158
        Building and Equipment...................................   159
        Laboratory/training......................................   160
        Social Security..........................................   161
        Employment...............................................   161
        General conditions relating to the Netherlands bid.......   161

                                Preamble

    The States Parties to this Convention,
    Determined to act with a view to achieving effective 
progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict 
and effective international control, including the prohibition 
and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,
    Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
    Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations 
has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles 
and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use 
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 
1925 (the Geneva Protocol of 1925),
    Recognizing that this Convention reaffirms principles and 
objectives of and obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol 
of 1925, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction signed 
at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,
    Bearing in mind the objective contained in Article IX of 
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
    Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude 
completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, 
through the implementation of the provisions of this 
Convention, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under 
the Geneva Protocol of 1925,
    Recognizing the prohibition, embodied in the pertinent 
agreements and relevant principles of international law, of the 
use of herbicides as a method of warfare,
    Considering that achievements in the field of chemistry 
should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind,
    Desiring to promote free trade in chemicals as well as 
international cooperation and exchange of scientific and 
technical information in the field of chemical activities for 
purposes not prohibited under this Convention in order to 
enhance the economic and technological development of all 
States Parties,
    Convinced that the complete and effective prohibition of 
the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, 
retention, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and their 
destruction, represent a necessary step towards the achievement 
of these common objectives,
    Have agreed as follows:

                               Article I

                          general obligations

    1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never 
under any circumstances:
          (a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile 
        or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or 
        indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
          (b) To use chemical weapons;
          (c) To engage in any military preparations to use 
        chemical weapons;
          (d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, 
        anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State 
        Party under this Convention.
    2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons 
it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under 
its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions 
of this Convention.
    3. Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical 
weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party, 
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
    4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical 
weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are 
located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
    5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control 
agents as a method of warfare.

                               Article II

                        definitions and criteria

    For the purposes of this Convention:
    1. ``Chemical Weapons'' means the following, together or 
separately:
          (a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except 
        where intended for purposes not prohibited under this 
        Convention, as long as the types and quantities are 
        consistent with such purposes;
          (b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to 
        cause death or other harm through the toxic properties 
        of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), 
        which would be released as a result of the employment 
        of such munitions and devices;
          (c) Any equipment specifically designed for use 
        directly in connection with the employment of munitions 
        and devices specified in subparagraph (b).
    2. ``Toxic Chemical'' means: Any chemical which through its 
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary 
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This 
includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of 
their method of production, and regardless of whether they are 
produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.
    (For the purpose of implementing this Convention, toxic 
chemicals which have been identified for the application of 
verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the 
Annex on Chemicals.)
    3. ``Precursor'' means: Any chemical reactant which takes 
part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a 
toxic chemical. This includes any key component of a binary or 
multicomponent chemical system.
    (For the purpose of implementing this Convention, 
precursors which have been identified for the application of 
verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the 
Annex on Chemicals.)
    4. ``Key Component of Binary or Multicomponent Chemical 
Systems'' (hereinafter referred to as ``key component'') means: 
The precursor which plays the most important role in 
determining the toxic properties of the final product and 
reacts rapidly with other chemicals in the binary or 
multicomponent system.
    5. ``Old Chemical Weapons'' means:
          (a) Chemical weapons which were produced before 1925; 
        or
          (b) Chemical weapons produced in the period between 
        1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to such extent 
        that they can no longer be used as chemical weapons.
    6. ``Abandoned Chemical Weapons'' means: Chemical weapons, 
including old chemical weapons, abandoned by a State after 1 
January 1925 on the territory of another State without the 
consent of the latter.
    7. ``Riot Control Agent'' means: Any chemical not listed in 
a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory 
irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within 
a short time following termination of exposure.
    8. ``Chemical Weapons Production Facility'':
          (a) Means any equipment, as well as any building 
        housing such equipment, that was designed, constructed 
        or used at any time since 1 January 1946:
                  (i) As part of the stage in the production of 
                chemicals (``final technological stage'') where 
                the material flows would contain, when the 
                equipment is in operation:
                          (1) Any chemical listed in Schedule 1 
                        in the Annex on Chemicals; or
                          (2) Any other chemical that has no 
                        use, above 1 tonne per year on the 
                        territory of a State Party or in any 
                        other place under the jurisdiction or 
                        control of a State Party, for purposes 
                        not prohibited under this Convention, 
                        but can be used for chemical weapons 
                        purposes; or
                  (ii) For filling chemical weapons, including, 
                inter alia, the filling of chemicals listed in 
                Schedule 1 into munitions, devices or bulk 
                storage containers; the filling of chemicals 
                into containers that form part of assembled 
                binary munitions and devices or into chemical 
                submunitions that form part of assembled 
                unitary munitions and devices, and the loading 
                of the containers and chemical submunitions 
                into the respective munitions and devices;
          (b) Does not mean:
                  (i) Any facility having a production capacity 
                for synthesis of chemicals specified in 
                subparagraph (a) (i) that is less than 1 tonne;
                  (ii) Any facility in which a chemical 
                specified in subparagraph (a) (i) is or was 
                produced as an unavoidable by-product of 
                activities for purposes not prohibited under 
                this Convention, provided that the chemical 
                does not exceed 3 per cent of the total product 
                and that the facility is subject to declaration 
                and inspection under the Annex on 
                Implementation and Verification (hereinafter 
                referred to as ``Verification Annex''); or
                  (iii) The single small-scale facility for 
                production of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 
                for purposes not prohibited under this 
                Convention as referred to in Part VI of the 
                Verification Annex.
    9. ``Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention'' means:
          (a) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, 
        pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes;
          (b) Protective purposes, namely those purposes 
        directly related to protection against toxic chemicals 
        and to protection against chemical weapons;
          (c) Military purposes not connected with the use of 
        chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the 
        toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare;
          (d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control 
        purposes.
    10. ``Production Capacity'' means: The annual quantitative 
potential for manufacturing a specific chemical based on the 
technological process actually used or, if the process is not 
yet operational, planned to be used at the relevant facility. 
It shall be deemed to be equal to the nameplate capacity or, if 
the nameplate capacity is not available, to the design 
capacity. The nameplate capacity is the product output under 
conditions optimized for maximum quantity for the production 
facility, as demonstrated by one or more test-runs. The design 
capacity is the corresponding theoretically calculated product 
output.
    11. ``Organization'' means the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons established pursuant to Article 
VIII of this Convention.
    12. For the purposes of Article VI:
          (a) ``Production'' of a chemical means its formation 
        through chemical reaction;
          (b) ``Processing'' of a chemical means a physical 
        process, such as formulation, extraction and 
        purification, in which a chemical is not converted into 
        another chemical;
          (c) ``Consumption'' of a chemical means its 
        conversion into another chemical via a chemical 
        reaction.

                              Article III

                              DECLARATIONS

    1. Each State Party shall submit to the Organization, not 
later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for 
it, the following declarations, in which it shall:
          (a) With respect to chemical weapons:
                  (i) Declare whether it owns or possesses any 
                chemical weapons, or whether there are any 
                chemical weapons located in any place under its 
                jurisdiction or control;
                  (ii) Specify the precise location, aggregate 
                quantity and detailed inventory of chemical 
                weapons it owns or possesses, or that are 
                located in any place under its jurisdiction or 
                control, in accordance with Part IV (A), 
                paragraphs 1 to 3, of the Verification Annex, 
                except for those chemical weapons referred to 
                in sub-subparagraph (iii);
                  (iii) Report any chemical weapons on its 
                territory that are owned and possessed by 
                another State and located in any place under 
                the jurisdiction or control of another State, 
                in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 4, of 
                the Verification Annex;
                  (iv) Declare whether it has transferred or 
                received, directly or indirectly, any chemical 
                weapons since 1 January 1946 and specify the 
                transfer or receipt of such weapons, in 
                accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 5, of 
                the Verification Annex;
                  (v) Provide its general plan for destruction 
                of chemical weapons that it owns or possesses, 
                or that are located in any place under its 
                jurisdiction or control, in accordance with 
                Part IV (A), paragraph 6, of the Verification 
                Annex;
    (b) With respect to old chemical weapons and abandoned 
chemical weapons:
          (i) Declare whether it has on its territory old 
        chemical weapons and provide all available information 
        in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 3, of the 
        Verification Annex;
          (ii) Declare whether there are abandoned chemical 
        weapons on its territory and provide all available 
        information in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 
        8, of the Verification Annex;
          (iii) Declare whether it has abandoned chemical 
        weapons on the territory of other States and provide 
        all available information in accordance with Part IV 
        (B), paragraph 10, of the Verification Annex;
    (c) With respect to chemical weapons production facilities:
          (i) Declare whether it has or has had any chemical 
        weapons production facility under its ownership or 
        possession, or that is or has been located in any place 
        under its jurisdiction or control at any time since 1 
        January 1946;
          (ii) Specify any chemical weapons production facility 
        it has or has had under its ownership or possession or 
        that is or has been located in any place under its 
        jurisdiction or control at any time since 1 January 
        1946, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 1, of the 
        Verification Annex, except for those facilities 
        referred to in sub-subparagraph (iii);
          (iii) Report any chemical weapons production facility 
        on its territory that another State has or has had 
        under its ownership and possession and that is or has 
        been located in any place under the jurisdiction or 
        control of another State at any time since 1 January 
        1946, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 2, of the 
        Verification Annex;
          (iv) Declare whether it has transferred or received, 
        directly or indirectly, any equipment for the 
        production of chemical weapons since 1 January 1946 and 
        specify the transfer or receipt of such equipment, in 
        accordance with Part V, paragraphs 3 to 5, of the 
        Verification Annex;
          (v) Provide its general plan for destruction of any 
        chemical weapons production facility it owns or 
        possesses, or that is located in any place under its 
        jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part V, 
        paragraph 6, of the Verification Annex;
          (vi) Specify actions to be taken for closure of any 
        chemical weapons production facility it owns or 
        possesses, or that is located in any place under its 
        jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part V, 
        paragraph 1 (i), of the Verification Annex;
          (vii) Provide its general plan for any temporary 
        conversion of any chemical weapons production facility 
        it owns or possesses, or that is located in any place 
        under its jurisdiction or control, into a chemical 
        weapons destruction facility, in accordance with Part 
        V, paragraph 7, of the Verification Annex;
    (d) With respect to other facilities: Specify the precise 
location, nature and general scope of activities of any 
facility or establishment under its ownership or possession, or 
located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, and 
that has been designed, constructed or used since 1 January 
1946 primarily for development of chemical weapons. Such 
declaration shall include, inter alia, laboratories and test 
and evaluation sites;
    (e) With respect to riot control agents: Specify the 
chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts 
Service (CAS) registry number, if assigned, of each chemical it 
holds for riot control purposes. This declaration shall be 
updated not later than 30 days after any change becomes 
effective.
    2. The provisions of this Article and the relevant 
provisions of Part IV of the Verification Annex shall not, at 
the discretion of a State Party, apply to chemical weapons 
buried on its territory before 1 January 1977 and which remain 
buried, or which had been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985.

                               Article IV

                            CHEMICAL WEAPONS

    1. The provisions of this Article and the detailed 
procedures for its implementation shall apply to all chemical 
weapons owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are 
located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, except 
old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical weapons to which 
Part IV (B) of the Verification Annex applies.
    2. Detailed procedures for the implementation of this 
Article are set forth in the Verification Annex.
    3. All locations at which chemical weapons specified in 
paragraph 1 are stored or destroyed shall be subject to 
systematic verification through on-site inspection and 
monitoring with on-site instruments, in accordance with Part IV 
(A) of the Verification Annex.
    4. Each State Party shall, immediately after the 
declaration under Article III, paragraph 1 (a), has been 
submitted, provide access to chemical weapons specified in 
paragraph 1 for the purpose of systematic verification of the 
declaration through on-site inspection. Thereafter, each State 
Party shall not remove any of these chemical weapons, except to 
a chemical weapons destruction facility. It shall provide 
access to such chemical weapons, for the purpose of systematic 
on-site verification.
    5. Each State Party shall provide access to any chemical 
weapons destruction facilities and their storage areas, that it 
owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its 
jurisdiction or control, for the purpose of systematic 
verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-
site instruments.
    6. Each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons 
specified in paragraph 1 pursuant to the Verification Annex and 
in accordance with the agreed rate and sequence of destruction 
(hereinafter referred to as ``order of destruction''). Such 
destruction shall begin not later than two years after this 
Convention enters into force for it and shall finish not later 
than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. A 
State Party is not precluded from destroying such chemical 
weapons at a faster rate.
    7. Each State Party shall:
          (a) Submit detailed plans for the destruction of 
        chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 not later 
        than 60 days before each annual destruction period 
        begins, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 29, 
        of the Verification Annex; the detailed plans shall 
        encompass all stocks to be destroyed during the next 
        annual destruction period;
          (b) Submit declarations annually regarding the 
        implementation of its plans for destruction of chemical 
        weapons specified in paragraph 1, not later than 60 
        days after the end of each annual destruction period; 
        and
          (c) Certify, not later than 30 days after the 
        destruction process has been completed, that all 
        chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 have been 
        destroyed.
    8. If a State ratifies or accedes to this Convention after 
the 10-year period for destruction set forth in paragraph 6, it 
shall destroy chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 as soon 
as possible. The order of destruction and procedures for 
stringent verification for such a State Party shall be 
determined by the Executive Council.
    9. Any chemical weapons discovered by a State Party after 
the initial declaration of chemical weapons shall be reported, 
secured and destroyed in accordance with Part IV (A) of the 
Verification Annex.
    10. Each State Party, during transportation, sampling, 
storage and destruction of chemical weapons, shall assign the 
highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to 
protecting the environment. Each State Party shall transport, 
sample, store and destroy chemical weapons in accordance with 
its national standards for safety and emissions.
    11. Any State Party which has on its territory chemical 
weapons that are owned or possessed by another State, or that 
are located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of 
another State, shall make the fullest efforts to ensure that 
these chemical weapons are removed from its territory not later 
than one year after this Convention enters into force for it. 
If they are not removed within one year, the State Party may 
request the Organization and other States Parties to provide 
assistance in the destruction of these chemical weapons.
    12. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with other 
States Parties that request information or assistance on a 
bilateral basis or through the Technical Secretariat regarding 
methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction 
of chemical weapons.
    13. In carrying out verification activities pursuant to 
this Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex, the 
Organization shall consider measures to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on 
verification of chemical weapons storage and their destruction 
among States Parties.
    To this end, the Executive Council shall decide to limit 
verification to measures complementary to those undertaken 
pursuant to such a bilateral or multilateral agreement, if it 
considers that:
          (a) Verification provisions of such an agreement are 
        consistent with the verification provisions of this 
        Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex;
          (b) Implementation of such an agreement provides for 
        sufficient assurance of compliance with the relevant 
        provisions of this Convention; and
          (c) Parties to the bilateral or multilateral 
        agreement keep the Organization fully informed about 
        their verification activities.
    14. If the Executive Council takes a decision pursuant to 
paragraph 13, the Organization shall have the right to monitor 
the implementation of the bilateral or multilateral agreement.
    15. Nothing in paragraphs 13 and 14 shall affect the 
obligation of a State Party to provide declarations pursuant to 
Article III, this Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification 
Annex.
    16. Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of 
chemical weapons it is obliged to destroy. It shall also meet 
the costs of verification of storage and destruction of these 
chemical weapons unless the Executive Council decides 
otherwise. If the Executive Council decides to limit 
verification measures of the Organization pursuant to paragraph 
13, the costs of complementary verification and monitoring by 
the Organization shall be paid in accordance with the United 
Nations scale of assessment, as specified in Article VIII, 
paragraph 7.
    17. The provisions of this Article and the relevant 
provisions of Part IV of the Verification Annex shall not, at 
the discretion of a State Party, apply to chemical weapons 
buried on its territory before 1 January 1977 and which remain 
buried, or which had been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985.

                               Article V

                 CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

    1. The provisions of this Article and the detailed 
procedures for its implementation shall apply to any and all 
chemical weapons production facilities owned or possessed by a 
State Party, or that are located in any place under its 
jurisdiction or control.
    2. Detailed procedures for the implementation of this 
Article are set forth in the Verification Annex.
    3. All chemical weapons production facilities specified in 
paragraph 1 shall be subject to systematic verification through 
on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in 
accordance with Part V of the Verification Annex.
    4. Each State Party shall cease immediately all activity at 
chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 
1, except activity required for closure.
    5. No State Party shall construct any new chemical weapons 
production facilities or modify any existing facilities for the 
purpose of chemical weapons production or for any other 
activity prohibited under this Convention.
    6. Each State Party shall, immediately after the 
declaration under Article III, paragraph 1 (c), has been 
submitted, provide access to chemical weapons production 
facilities specified in paragraph 1, for the purpose of 
systematic verification of the declaration through on-site 
inspection.
    7. Each State Party shall:
          (a) Close, not later than 90 days after this 
        Convention enters into force for it, all chemical 
        weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, 
        in accordance with Part V of the Verification Annex, 
        and give notice thereof; and
          (b) Provide access to chemical weapons production 
        facilities specified in paragraph 1, subsequent to 
        closure, for the purpose of systematic verification 
        through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site 
        instruments in order to ensure that the facility 
        remains closed and is subsequently destroyed.
    8. Each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons 
production facilities specified in paragraph 1 and related 
facilities and equipment, pursuant to the Verification Annex 
and in accordance with an agreed rate and sequence of 
destruction (hereinafter referred to as ``order of 
destruction''). Such destruction shall begin not later than one 
year after this Convention enters into force for it, and shall 
finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of this 
Convention. A State Party is not precluded from destroying such 
facilities at a faster rate.
    9. Each State Party shall:
          (a) Submit detailed plans for destruction of chemical 
        weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, 
        not later than 180 days before the destruction of each 
        facility begins;
          (b) Submit declarations annually regarding the 
        implementation of its plans for the destruction of all 
        chemical weapons production facilities specified in 
        paragraph 1, not later than 90 days after the end of 
        each annual destruction period; and
          (c) Certify, not later than 30 days after the 
        destruction process has been completed, that all 
        chemical weapons production facilities specified in 
        paragraph 1 have been destroyed.
    10. If a State ratifies or accedes to this Convention after 
the 10-year period for destruction set forth in paragraph 8, it 
shall destroy chemical weapons production facilities specified 
in paragraph 1 as soon as possible. The order of destruction 
and procedures for stringent verification for such a State 
Party shall be determined by the Executive Council.
    11. Each State Party, during the destruction of chemical 
weapons production facilities, shall assign the highest 
priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the 
environment. Each State Party shall destroy chemical weapons 
production facilities in accordance with its national standards 
for safety and emissions.
    12. Chemical weapons production facilities specified in 
paragraph 1 may be temporarily converted for destruction of 
chemical weapons in accordance with Part V, paragraphs 18 to 
25, of the Verification Annex. Such a converted facility must 
be destroyed as soon as it is no longer in use for destruction 
of chemical weapons but, in any case, not later than 10 years 
after entry into force of this Convention.
    13. A State Party may request, in exceptional cases of 
compelling need, permission to use a chemical weapons 
production facility specified in paragraph 1 for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention. Upon the recommendation of 
the Executive Council, the Conference of the States Parties 
shall decide whether or not to approve the request and shall 
establish the conditions upon which approval is contingent in 
accordance with Part V, Section D, of the Verification Annex.
    14. The chemical weapons production facility shall be 
converted in such a manner that the converted facility is not 
more capable of being reconverted into a chemical weapons 
production facility than any other facility used for 
industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or 
other peaceful purposes not involving chemicals listed in 
Schedule 1.
    15. All converted facilities shall be subject to systematic 
verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-
site instruments in accordance with Part V, Section D, of the 
Verification Annex.
    16. In carrying out verification activities pursuant to 
this Article and Part V of the Verification Annex, the 
Organization shall consider measures to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on 
verification of chemical weapons production facilities and 
their destruction among States Parties.
    To this end, the Executive Council shall decide to limit 
the verification to measures complementary to those undertaken 
pursuant to such a bilateral or multilateral agreement, if it 
considers that:
          (a) Verification provisions of such an agreement are 
        consistent with the verification provisions of this 
        Article and Part V of the Verification Annex;
          (b) Implementation of the agreement provides for 
        sufficient assurance of compliance with the relevant 
        provisions of this Convention; and
          (c) Parties to the bilateral or multilateral 
        agreement keep the Organization fully informed about 
        their verification activities.
    17. If the Executive Council takes a decision pursuant to 
paragraph 16, the Organization shall have the right to monitor 
the implementation of the bilateral or multilateral agreement.
    18. Nothing in paragraphs 16 and 17 shall affect the 
obligation of a State Party to make declarations pursuant to 
Article III, this Article and Part V of the Verification Annex.
    19. Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of 
chemical weapons production facilities it is obliged to 
destroy. It shall also meet the costs of verification under 
this Article unless the Executive Council decides otherwise. If 
the Executive Council decides to limit verification measures of 
the Organization pursuant to paragraph 16, the costs of 
complementary verification and monitoring by the Organization 
shall be paid in accordance with the United Nations scale of 
assessment, as specified in Article VIII, paragraph 7.

                              Articles VI

            ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION

    1. Each State Party has the right, subject to the 
provisions of this Convention, to develop, produce, otherwise 
acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their 
precursors for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.
    2. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to 
ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only 
developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, 
or used within its territory or in any other place under its 
jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention. To this end, and in order to verify that activities 
are in accordance with obligations under this Convention, each 
State Party shall subject toxic chemicals and their precursors 
listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the Annex on Chemicals, 
facilities related to such chemicals, and other facilities as 
specified in the Verification Annex, that are located on its 
territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or 
control, to verification measures as provided in the 
Verification Annex.
    3. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in 
Schedule 1 (hereinafter referred to as ``Schedule 1 
chemicals'') to the prohibitions on production, acquisition, 
retention, transfer and use as specified in Part VI of the 
Verification Annex. It shall subject Schedule 1 chemicals and 
facilities specified in Part VI of the Verification Annex to 
systematic verification through on-site inspection and 
monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with that 
Part of the Verification Annex.
    4. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in 
Schedule 2 (hereinafter referred to as ``Schedule 2 
chemicals'') and facilities specified in Part VII of the 
Verification Annex to data monitoring and on-site verification 
in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex.
    5. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in 
Schedule 3 (hereinafter referred to as ``Schedule 3 
chemicals'') and facilities specified in Part VIII of the 
Verification Annex to data monitoring and on-site verification 
in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex.
    6. Each State Party shall subject facilities specified in 
Part IX of the Verification Annex to data monitoring and 
eventual on-site verification in accordance with that Part of 
the Verification Annex unless decided otherwise by the 
Conference of the States Parties pursuant to Part IX, paragraph 
22, of the Verification Annex.
    7. Not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into 
force for it, each State Party shall make an initial 
declaration on relevant chemicals and facilities in accordance 
with the Verification Annex.
    8. Each State Party shall make annual declarations 
regarding the relevant chemicals and facilities in accordance 
with the Verification Annex.
    9. For the purpose of on-site verification, each State 
Party shall grant to the inspectors access to facilities as 
required in the Verification Annex.
    10. In conducting verification activities, the Technical 
Secretariat shall avoid undue intrusion into the State Party's 
chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention and, in particular, abide by the provisions set 
forth in the Annex on the Protection of Confidential 
Information (hereinafter referred to as ``Confidentiality 
Annex'').
    11. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in 
a manner which avoids hampering the economic or technological 
development of States Parties, and international cooperation in 
the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited 
under this Convention including the international exchange of 
scientific and technical information and chemicals and 
equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals 
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

                              Article VII

                    NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES

General undertakings

    1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to 
implement its obligations under this Convention. In particular, 
it shall:
          (a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on 
        its territory or in any other place under its 
        jurisdiction as recognized by international law from 
        undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party 
        under this Convention, including enacting penal 
        legislation with respect to such activity;
          (b) Not permit in any place under its control any 
        activity prohibited to a State Party under this 
        Convention; and
          (c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under 
        subparagraph (a) to any activity prohibited to a State 
        Party under this Convention undertaken anywhere by 
        natural persons, possessing its nationality, in 
        conformity with international law.
    2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States 
Parties and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to 
facilitate the implementation of the obligations under 
paragraph 1.
    3. Each State Party, during the implementation of its 
obligations under this Convention, shall assign the highest 
priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the 
environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with other 
States Parties in this regard.

Relations between the State party and the organization

    4. In order to fulfil its obligations under this 
Convention, each State Party shall designate or establish a 
National Authority to serve as the national focal point for 
effective liaison with the Organization and other States 
Parties. Each State Party shall notify the Organization of its 
National Authority at the time that this Convention enters into 
force for it.
    5. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the 
legislative and administrative measures taken to implement this 
Convention.
    6. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford 
special handling to information and data that it receives in 
confidence from the Organization in connection with the 
implementation of this Convention. It shall treat such 
information and data exclusively in connection with its rights 
and obligations under this Convention and in accordance with 
the provisions set forth in the Confidentiality Annex.
    7. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the 
Organization in the exercise of all its functions and in 
particular to provide assistance to the Technical Secretariat.

                              Article VIII

                            the organization

A. General provisions

    1. The States Parties to this Convention hereby establish 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to 
achieve the object and purpose of this Convention, to ensure 
the implementation of its provisions, including those for 
international verification of compliance with it, and to 
provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States 
Parties.
    2. All States Parties to this Convention shall be members 
of the Organization. A State Party shall not be deprived of its 
membership in the Organization.
    3. The seat of the Headquarters of the Organization shall 
be The Hague, Kingdom of the Netherlands.
    4. There are hereby established as the organs of the 
Organization: the Conference of the States Parties, the 
Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat.
    5. The Organization shall conduct its verification 
activities provided for under this Convention in the least 
intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and 
efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request 
only the information and data necessary to fulfil its 
responsibilities under this Convention. It shall take every 
precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on 
civil and military activities and facilities coming to its 
knowledge in the implementation of this Convention and, in 
particular, shall abide by the provisions set forth in the 
Confidentiality Annex.
    6. In undertaking its verification activities the 
Organization shall consider measures to make use of advances in 
science and technology.
    7. The costs of the Organization's activities shall be paid 
by States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale 
of assessment adjusted to take into account differences in 
membership between the United Nations and this Organization, 
and subject to the provisions of Articles IV and V. Financial 
contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission 
shall be deducted in an appropriate way from their 
contributions to the regular budget. The budget of the 
Organization shall comprise two separate chapters, one relating 
to administrative and other costs, and one relating to 
verification costs.
    8. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the 
payment of its financial contribution to the Organization shall 
have no vote in the Organization if the amount of its arrears 
equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it 
for the preceding two full years. The Conference of the States 
Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it 
is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions 
beyond the control of the member.

B. The Conference of the States Parties

            Composition, procedures and decision-making
    9. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter 
referred to as ``the Conference'') shall be composed of all 
members of this Organization. Each member shall have one 
representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by 
alternates and advisers.
    10. The first session of the Conference shall be convened 
by the depositary not later than 30 days after the entry into 
force of this Convention.
    11. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions which 
shall be held annually unless it decides otherwise.
    12. Special sessions of the Conference shall be convened:
          (a) When decided by the Conference;
          (b) When requested by the Executive Council;
          (c) When requested by any member and supported by one 
        third of the members; or
          (d) In accordance with paragraph 22 to undertake 
        reviews of the operation of this Convention.
    Except in the case of subparagraph (d), the special session 
shall be convened not later than 30 days after receipt of the 
request by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, 
unless specified otherwise in the request.
    13. The Conference shall also be convened in the form of an 
Amendment Conference in accordance with Article XV, paragraph 
2.
    14. Sessions of the Conference shall take place at the seat 
of the Organization unless the Conference decides otherwise.
    15. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At 
the beginning of each regular session, it shall elect its 
Chairman and such other officers as may be required. They shall 
hold office until a new Chairman and other officers are elected 
at the next regular session.
    16. A majority of the members of the Organization shall 
constitute a quorum for the Conference.
    17. Each member of the Organization shall have one vote in 
the Conference.
    18. The Conference shall take decisions on questions of 
procedure by a simple majority of the members present and 
voting. Decisions on matters of substance should be taken as 
far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable 
when an issue comes up for decision, the Chairman shall defer 
any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall 
make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and 
shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. 
If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the 
Conference shall take the decision by a two-thirds majority of 
members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this 
Convention. When the issue arises as to whether the question is 
one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a 
matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the Conference 
by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.
            Powers and functions
    19. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the 
Organization. It shall consider any questions, matters or 
issues within the scope of this Convention, including those 
relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council 
and the Technical Secretariat. It may make recommendations and 
take decisions on any questions, matters or issues related to 
this Convention raised by a State Party or brought to its 
attention by the Executive Council.
    20. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of this 
Convention, and act in order to promote its object and purpose. 
The Conference shall review compliance with this Convention. It 
shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and 
the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines in 
accordance with this Convention to either of them in the 
exercise of their functions.
    21. The Conference shall:
          (a) Consider and adopt at its regular sessions the 
        report, programme and budget of the Organization, 
        submitted by the Executive Council, as well as consider 
        other reports;
          (b) Decide on the scale of financial contributions to 
        be paid by States Parties in accordance with paragraph 
        7;
          (c) Elect the members of the Executive Council;
          (d) Appoint the Director-General of the Technical 
        Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as ``the Director-
        General'');
          (e) Approve the rules of procedure of the Executive 
        Council submitted by the latter;
          (f) Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds 
        necessary for the exercise of its functions in 
        accordance with this Convention;
          (g) Foster international cooperation for peaceful 
        purposes in the field of chemical activities;
          (h) Review scientific and technological developments 
        that could affect the operation of this Convention and, 
        in this context, direct the Director-General to 
        establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him, in 
        the performance of his functions, to render specialized 
        advice in areas of science and technology relevant to 
        this Convention, to the Conference, the Executive 
        Council or States Parties. The Scientific Advisory 
        Board shall be composed of independent experts 
        appointed in accordance with terms of reference adopted 
        by the Conference;
          (i) Consider and approve at its first session any 
        draft agreements, provisions and guidelines developed 
        by the Preparatory Commission;
          (j) Establish at its first session the voluntary fund 
        for assistance in accordance with Article X;
          (k) Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance 
        with this Convention and to redress and remedy any 
        situation which contravenes the provisions of this 
        Convention, in accordance with Article XII.
    22. The Conference shall not later than one year after the 
expiry of the fifth and the tenth year after the entry into 
force of this Convention, and at such other times within that 
time period as may be decided upon, convene in special sessions 
to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention. Such 
reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific and 
technological developments. At intervals of five years 
thereafter, unless otherwise decided upon, further sessions of 
the Conference shall be convened with the same objective.

C. The Executive Council

            Composition, procedure and decision-making
    23. The Executive Council shall consist of 41 members. Each 
State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the 
principle of rotation, to serve on the Executive Council. The 
members of the Executive Council shall be elected by the 
Conference for a term of two years. In order to ensure the 
effective functioning of this Convention, due regard being 
specially paid to equitable geographical distribution, to the 
importance of chemical industry, as well as to political and 
security interests, the Executive Council shall be composed as 
follows:
          (a) Nine States Parties from Africa to be designated 
        by States Parties located in this region. As a basis 
        for this designation it is understood that, out of 
        these nine States Parties, three members shall, as a 
        rule, be the States Parties with the most significant 
        national chemical industry in the region as determined 
        by internationally reported and published data; in 
        addition, the regional group shall agree also to take 
        into account other regional factors in designating 
        these three members;
          (b) Nine States Parties from Asia to be designated by 
        States Parties located in this region. As a basis for 
        this designation it is understood that, out of these 
        nine States Parties, four members shall, as a rule, be 
        the States Parties with the most significant national 
        chemical industry in the region as determined by 
        internationally reported and published data; in 
        addition, the regional group shall agree also to take 
        into account other regional factors in designating 
        these four members;
          (c) Five States Parties from Eastern Europe to be 
        designated by States Parties located in this region. As 
        a basis for this designation it is understood that, out 
        of these five States Parties, one member shall, as a 
        rule, be the State Party with the most significant 
        national chemical industry in the region as determined 
        by internationally reported and published data; in 
        addition, the regional group shall agree also to take 
        into account other regional factors in designating this 
        one member;
          (d) Seven States Parties from Latin America and the 
        Caribbean to be designated by States Parties located in 
        this region. As a basis for this designation it is 
        understood that, out of these seven States Parties, 
        three members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties 
        with the most significant national chemical industry in 
        the region as determined by internationally reported 
        and published data; in addition, the regional group 
        shall agree also to take into account other regional 
        factors in designating these three members;
          (e) Ten States Parties from among Western European 
        and other States to be designated by States Parties 
        located in this region. As a basis for this designation 
        it is understood that, out of these 10 States Parties, 
        5 members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with 
        the most significant national chemical industry in the 
        region as determined by internationally reported and 
        published data; in addition, the regional group shall 
        agree also to take into account other regional factors 
        in designating these five members;
          (f) One further State Party to be designated 
        consecutively by States Parties located in the regions 
        of Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. As a basis 
        for this designation it is understood that this State 
        Party shall be a rotating member from these regions.
    24. For the first election of the Executive Council 20 
members shall be elected for a term of one year, due regard 
being paid to the established numerical proportions as 
described in paragraph 23.
    25. After the full implementation of Articles IV and V the 
Conference may, upon the request of a majority of the members 
of the Executive Council, review the composition of the 
Executive Council taking into account developments related to 
the principles specified in paragraph 23 that are governing its 
composition.
    26. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of 
procedure and submit them to the Conference for approval.
    27. The Executive Council shall elect its Chairman from 
among its members.
    28. The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. 
Between regular sessions it shall meet as often as may be 
required for the fulfillment of its powers and functions.
    29. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one 
vote. Unless otherwise specified in this Convention, the 
Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of substance 
by a two-thirds majority of all its members. The Executive 
Council shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a 
simple majority of all its members. When the issue arises as to 
whether the question is one of substance or not, that question 
shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise 
decided by the Executive Council by the majority required for 
decisions on matters of substance.
            Powers and functions
    30. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of 
the Organization. It shall be responsible to the Conference. 
The Executive Council shall carry out the powers and functions 
entrusted to it under this Convention, as well as those 
functions delegated to it by the Conference. In so doing, it 
shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and 
guidelines of the Conference and assure their proper and 
continuous implementation.
    31. The Executive Council shall promote the effective 
implementation of, and compliance with, this Convention. It 
shall supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat, 
cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party and 
facilitate consultations and cooperation among States Parties 
at their request.
    32. The Executive Council shall:
          (a) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft 
        programme and budget of the Organization;
          (b) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft 
        report of the Organization on the implementation of 
        this Convention, the report on the performance of its 
        own activities and such special reports as it deems 
        necessary or which the Conference may request;
          (c) Make arrangements for the sessions of the 
        Conference including the preparation of the draft 
        agenda.
    33. The Executive Council may request the convening of a 
special session of the Conference.
    34. The Executive Council shall:
          (a) Conclude agreements or arrangements with States 
        and international organizations on behalf of the 
        Organization, subject to prior approval by the 
        Conference;
          (b) Conclude agreements with States Parties on behalf 
        of the Organization in connection with Article X and 
        supervise the voluntary fund referred to in Article X;
          (c) Approve agreements or arrangements relating to 
        the implementation of verification activities, 
        negotiated by the Technical Secretariat with States 
        Parties.
    35. The Executive Council shall consider any issue or 
matter within its competence affecting this Convention and its 
implementation, including concerns regarding compliance, and 
cases of non-compliance, and, as appropriate, inform States 
Parties and bring the issue or matter to the attention of the 
Conference.
    36. In its consideration of doubts or concerns regarding 
compliance and cases of non-compliance, including, inter alia, 
abuse of the rights provided for under this Convention, the 
Executive Council shall consult with the States Parties 
involved and, as appropriate, request the State Party to take 
measures to redress the situation within a specified time. To 
the extent that the Executive Council considers further action 
to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the 
following measures:
          (a) Inform all States Parties of the issue or matter;
          (b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the 
        Conference;
          (c) Make recommendations to the Conference regarding 
        measures to redress the situation and to ensure 
        compliance.
    The Executive Council shall, in cases of particular gravity 
and urgency, bring the issue or matter, including relevant 
information and conclusions, directly to the attention of the 
United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security 
Council. It shall at the same time inform all States Parties of 
this step.

D. The Technical Secretariat

    37. The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference 
and the Executive Council in the performance of their 
functions. The Technical Secretariat shall carry out the 
verification measures provided for in this Convention. It shall 
carry out the other functions entrusted to it under this 
Convention as well as those functions delegated to it by the 
Conference and the Executive Council.
    38. The Technical Secretariat shall:
          (a) Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the 
        draft programme and budget of the Organization;
          (b) Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the 
        draft report of the Organization on the implementation 
        of this Convention and such other reports as the 
        Conference or the Executive Council may request;
          (c) Provide administrative and technical support to 
        the Conference, the Executive Council and subsidiary 
        organs;
          (d) Address and receive communications on behalf of 
        the Organization to and from States Parties on matters 
        pertaining to the implementation of this Convention;
          (e) Provide technical assistance and technical 
        evaluation to States Parties in the implementation of 
        the provisions of this Convention, including evaluation 
        of scheduled and unscheduled chemicals.
    39. The Technical Secretariat shall:
          (a) Negotiate agreements or arrangements relating to 
        the implementation of verification activities with 
        States Parties, subject to approval by the Executive 
        Council;
          (b) Not later than 180 days after entry into force of 
        this Convention, coordinate the establishment and 
        maintenance of permanent stockpiles of emergency and 
        humanitarian assistance by States Parties in accordance 
        with Article X, paragraphs 7 (b) and (c). The Technical 
        Secretariat may inspect the items maintained for 
        serviceability. Lists of items to be stockpiled shall 
        be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant 
        to paragraph 21 (i) above;
          (c) Administer the voluntary fund referred to in 
        Article X, compile declarations made by the States 
        Parties and register, when requested, bilateral 
        agreements concluded between States Parties or between 
        a State Party and the Organization for the purposes of 
        Article X.
    40. The Technical Secretariat shall inform the Executive 
Council of any problem that has arisen with regard to the 
discharge of its functions, including doubts, ambiguities or 
uncertainties about compliance with this Convention that have 
come to its notice in the performance of its verification 
activities and that it has been unable to resolve or clarify 
through its consultations with the State Party concerned.
    41. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-
General, who shall be its head and chief administrative 
officer, inspectors and such scientific, technical and other 
personnel as may be required.
    42. The Inspectorate shall be a unit of the Technical 
Secretariat and shall act under the supervision of the 
Director-General.
    43. The Director-General shall be appointed by the 
Conference upon the recommendation of the Executive Council for 
a term of four years, renewable for one further term, but not 
thereafter.
    44. The Director-General shall be responsible to the 
Conference and the Executive Council for the appointment of the 
staff and the organization and functioning of the Technical 
Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the employment of 
the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service 
shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of 
efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States 
Parties shall serve as the Director-General, as inspectors or 
as other members of the professional and clerical staff. Due 
regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff 
on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall 
be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to a 
minimum necessary for the proper discharge of the 
responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat.
    45. The Director-General shall be responsible for the 
organization and functioning of the Scientific Advisory Board 
referred to in paragraph 21 (h). The Director-General shall, in 
consultation with States Parties, appoint members of the 
Scientific Advisory Board, who shall serve in their individual 
capacity. The members of the Board shall be appointed on the 
basis of their expertise in the particular scientific fields 
relevant to the implementation of this Convention. The 
Director-General may also, as appropriate, in consultation with 
members of the Board, establish temporary working groups of 
scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific 
issues. In regard to the above, States Parties may submit lists 
of experts to the Director-General.
    46. In the performance of their duties, the Director-
General, the inspectors and the other members of the staff 
shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or 
from any other source external to the Organization. They shall 
refrain from any action that might reflect on their positions 
as international officers responsible only to the Conference 
and the Executive Council.
    47. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively 
international character of the responsibilities of the 
Director-General, the inspectors and the other members of the 
staff and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their 
responsibilities.

E. Privileges and Immunities

    48. The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in 
any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State 
Party such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as 
are necessary for the exercise of its functions.
    49. Delegates of States Parties, together with their 
alternates and advisers, representatives appointed to the 
Executive Council together with their alternates and advisers, 
the Director-General and the staff of the Organization shall 
enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the 
independent exercise of their functions in connection with the 
Organization.
    50. The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred 
to in this Article shall be defined in agreements between the 
Organization and the States Parties as well as in an agreement 
between the Organization and the State in which the 
headquarters of the Organization is seated. These agreements 
shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to 
paragraph 21 (i).
    51. Notwithstanding paragraphs 48 and 49, the privileges 
and immunities enjoyed by the Director-General and the staff of 
the Technical Secretariat during the conduct of verification 
activities shall be those set forth in Part II, Section B, of 
the Verification Annex.

                               ARTICLE IX

              CONSULTATIONS, COOPERATION AND FACT-FINDING

    1. States Parties shall consult and cooperate, directly 
among themselves, or through the Organization or other 
appropriate international procedures, including procedures 
within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance 
with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to 
the object and purpose, or the implementation of the 
provisions, of this Convention.
    2. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to 
request a challenge inspection, States Parties should, whenever 
possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, 
through exchange of information and consultations among 
themselves, any matter which may cause doubt about compliance 
with this Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a 
related matter which may be considered ambiguous. A State Party 
which receives a request from another State Party for 
clarification of any matter which the requesting State Party 
believes causes such a doubt or concern shall provide the 
requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case not 
later than 10 days after the request, with information 
sufficient to answer the doubt or concern raised along with an 
explanation of how the information provided resolves the 
matter. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of 
any two or more States Parties to arrange by mutual consent for 
inspections or any other procedures among themselves to clarify 
and resolve any matter which may cause doubt about compliance 
or gives rise to a concern about a related matter which may be 
considered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not affect the 
rights and obligations of any State Party under other 
provisions of this Convention.

Procedure for requesting clarification

    3. A State Party shall have the right to request the 
Executive Council to assist in clarifying any situation which 
may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern 
about the possible non-compliance of another State Party with 
this Convention. The Executive Council shall provide 
appropriate information in its possession relevant to such a 
concern.
    4. A State Party shall have the right to request the 
Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State 
Party on any situation which may be considered ambiguous or 
which gives rise to a concern about its possible non-compliance 
with this Convention. In such a case, the following shall 
apply:
          (a) The Executive Council shall forward the request 
        for clarification to the State Party concerned through 
        the Director-General not later than 24 hours after its 
        receipt;
          (b) The requested State Party shall provide the 
        clarification to the Executive Council as soon as 
        possible, but in any case not later than 10 days after 
        the receipt of the request;
          (c) The Executive Council shall take note of the 
        clarification and forward it to the requesting State 
        Party not later than 24 hours after its receipt;
          (d) If the requesting State Party deems the 
        clarification to be inadequate, it shall have the right 
        to request the Executive Council to obtain from the 
        requested State Party further clarification;
          (e) For the purpose of obtaining further 
        clarification requested under subparagraph (d), the 
        Executive Council may call on the Director-General to 
        establish a group of experts from the Technical 
        Secretariat, or if appropriate staff are not available 
        in the Technical Secretariat, from elsewhere, to 
        examine all available information and data relevant to 
        the situation causing the concern. The group of experts 
        shall submit a factual report to the Executive Council 
        on its findings;
          (f) If the requesting State Party considers the 
        clarification obtained under subparagraphs (d) and (e) 
        to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to 
        request a special session of the Executive Council in 
        which States Parties involved that are not members of 
        the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part. 
        In such a special session, the Executive Council shall 
        consider the matter and may recommend any measure it 
        deems appropriate to resolve the situation.
    5. A State Party shall also have the right to request the 
Executive Council to clarify any situation which has been 
considered ambiguous or has given rise to a concern about its 
possible non-compliance with this Convention. The Executive 
Council shall respond by providing such assistance as 
appropriate.
    6. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties 
about any request for clarification provided in this Article.
    7. If the doubt or concern of a State Party about a 
possible non-compliance has not been resolved within 60 days 
after the submission of the request for clarification to the 
Executive Council, or it believes its doubts warrant urgent 
consideration, notwithstanding its right to request a challenge 
inspection, it may request a special session of the Conference 
in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 12 (c). At such a 
special session, the Conference shall consider the matter and 
may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to resolve the 
situation.

Procedures for challenge inspections

    8. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site 
challenge inspection of any facility or location in the 
territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or 
control of any other State Party for the sole purpose of 
clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-
compliance with the provisions of this Convention, and to have 
this inspection conducted anywhere without delay by an 
inspection team designated by the Director-General and in 
accordance with the Verification Annex.
    9. Each State Party is under the obligation to keep the 
inspection request within the scope of this Convention and to 
provide in the inspection request all appropriate information 
on the basis of which a concern has arisen regarding possible 
non-compliance with this Convention as specified in the 
Verification Annex. Each State Party shall refrain from 
unfounded inspection requests, care being taken to avoid abuse. 
The challenge inspection shall be carried out for the sole 
purpose of determining facts relating to the possible non-
compliance.
    10. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the 
provisions of this Convention, each State Party shall permit 
the Technical Secretariat to conduct the on-site challenge 
inspection pursuant to paragraph 8.
    11. Pursuant to a request for a challenge inspection of a 
facility or location, and in accordance with the procedures 
provided for in the Verification Annex, the inspected State 
Party shall have:
          (a) The right and the obligation to make every 
        reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with 
        this Convention and, to this end, to enable the 
        inspection team to fulfil its mandate;
          (b) The obligation to provide access within the 
        requested site for the sole purpose of establishing 
        facts relevant to the concern regarding possible non-
        compliance; and
          (c) The right to take measures to protect sensitive 
        installations, and to prevent disclosure of 
        confidential information and data, not related to this 
        Convention.
    12. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply:
          (a) The requesting State Party may, subject to the 
        agreement of the inspected State Party, send a 
        representative who may be a national either of the 
        requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to 
        observe the conduct of the challenge inspection.
          (b) The inspected State Party shall then grant access 
        to the observer in accordance with the Verification 
        Annex.
          (c) The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, 
        accept the proposed observer, but if the inspected 
        State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be 
        recorded in the final report.
    13. The requesting State Party shall present an inspection 
request for an on-site challenge inspection to the Executive 
Council and at the same time to the Director-General for 
immediate processing.
    14. The Director-General shall immediately ascertain that 
the inspection request meets the requirements specified in Part 
X, paragraph 4, of the Verification Annex, and, if necessary, 
assist the requesting State Party in filing the inspection 
request accordingly. When the inspection request fulfils the 
requirements, preparations for the challenge inspection shall 
begin.
    15. The Director-General shall transmit the inspection 
request to the inspected State Party not less than 12 hours 
before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point 
of entry.
    16. After having received the inspection request, the 
Executive Council shall take cognizance of the Director-
General's actions on the request and shall keep the case under 
its consideration throughout the inspection procedure. However, 
its deliberations shall not delay the inspection process.
    17. The Executive Council may, not later than 12 hours 
after having received the inspection request, decide by a 
three-quarter majority of all its members against carrying out 
the challenge inspection, if it considers the inspection 
request to be frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of 
this Convention as described in paragraph 8. Neither the 
requesting nor the inspected State Party shall participate in 
such a decision. If the Executive Council decides against the 
challenge inspection, preparations shall be stopped, no further 
action on the inspection request shall be taken, and the States 
Parties concerned shall be informed accordingly.
    18. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate 
for the conduct of the challenge inspection. The inspection 
mandate shall be the inspection request referred to in 
paragraphs 8 and 9 put into operational terms, and shall 
conform with the inspection request.
    19. The challenge inspection shall be conducted in 
accordance with Part X or, in the case of alleged use, in 
accordance with Part XI of the Verification Annex. The 
inspection team shall be guided by the principle of conducting 
the challenge inspection in the least intrusive manner 
possible, consistent with the effective and timely 
accomplishment of its mission.
    20. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection 
team throughout the challenge inspection and facilitate its 
task. If the inspected State Party proposes, pursuant to Part 
X, Section C, of the Verification Annex, arrangements to 
demonstrate compliance with this Convention, alternative to 
full and comprehensive access, it shall make every reasonable 
effort, through consultations with the inspection team, to 
reach agreement on the modalities for establishing the facts 
with the aim of demonstrating its compliance.
    21. The final report shall contain the factual findings as 
well as an assessment by the inspection team of the degree and 
nature of access and cooperation granted for the satisfactory 
implementation of the challenge inspection. The Director-
General shall promptly transmit the final report of the 
inspection team to the requesting State Party, to the inspected 
State Party, to the Executive Council and to all other States 
Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit promptly 
to the Executive Council the assessments of the requesting and 
of the inspected States Parties, as well as the views of other 
States Parties which may be conveyed to the Director-General 
for that purpose, and then provide them to all States Parties.
    22. The Executive Council shall, in accordance with its 
powers and functions, review the final report of the inspection 
team as soon as it is presented, and address any concerns as 
to:
          (a) Whether any non-compliance has occurred;
          (b) Whether the request had been within the scope of 
        this Convention; and
          (c) Whether the right to request a challenge 
        inspection had been abused.
    23. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in 
keeping with its powers and functions, that further action may 
be necessary with regard to paragraph 22, it shall take the 
appropriate measures to redress the situation and to ensure 
compliance with this Convention, including specific 
recommendations to the Conference. In the case of abuse, the 
Executive Council shall examine whether the requesting State 
Party should bear any of the financial implications of the 
challenge inspection.
    24. The requesting State Party and the inspected State 
Party shall have the right to participate in the review 
process. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties 
and the next session of the Conference of the outcome of the 
process.
    25. If the Executive Council has made specific 
recommendations to the Conference, the Conference shall 
consider action in accordance with Article XII.

                               Article X

           assistance and protection against chemical weapons

    1. For the purposes of this Article, ``Assistance'' means 
the coordination and delivery to States Parties of protection 
against chemical weapons, including, inter alia, the following: 
detection equipment and alarm systems; protective equipment; 
decontamination equipment and decontaminants; medical antidotes 
and treatments; and advice on any of these protective measures.
    2. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as 
impeding the right of any State Party to conduct research into, 
develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of protection 
against chemical weapons, for purposes not prohibited under 
this Convention.
    3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall 
have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange 
of equipment, material and scientific and technological 
information concerning means of protection against chemical 
weapons.
    4. For the purposes of increasing the transparency of 
national programmes related to protective purposes, each State 
Party shall provide annually to the Technical Secretariat 
information on its programme, in accordance with procedures to 
be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to 
Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    5. The Technical Secretariat shall establish, not later 
than 180 days after entry into force of this Convention and 
maintain, for the use of any requesting State Party, a data 
bank containing freely available information concerning various 
means of protection against chemical weapons as well as such 
information as may be provided by States Parties.
    The Technical Secretariat shall also, within the resources 
available to it, and at the request of a State Party, provide 
expert advice and assist the State Party in identifying how its 
programmes for the development and improvement of a protective 
capacity against chemical weapons could be implemented.
    6. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as 
impeding the right of States Parties to request and provide 
assistance bilaterally and to conclude individual agreements 
with other States Parties concerning the emergency procurement 
of assistance.
    7. Each State Party undertakes to provide assistance 
through the Organization and to this end to elect to take one 
or more of the following measures:
          (a) To contribute to the voluntary fund for 
        assistance to be established by the Conference at its 
        first session;
          (b) To conclude, if possible not later than 180 days 
        after this Convention enters into force for it, 
        agreements with the Organization concerning the 
        procurement, upon demand, of assistance;
          (c) To declare, not later than 180 days after this 
        Convention enters into force for it, the kind of 
        assistance it might provide in response to an appeal by 
        the Organization. If, however, a State Party 
        subsequently is unable to provide the assistance 
        envisaged in its declaration, it is still under the 
        obligation to provide assistance in accordance with 
        this paragraph.
    8. Each State Party has the right to request and, subject 
to the procedures set forth in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, to 
receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of 
use of chemical weapons if it considers that:
          (a) Chemical weapons have been used against it;
          (b) Riot control agents have been used against it as 
        a method of warfare; or
          (c) It is threatened by actions or activities of any 
        State that are prohibited for States Parties by Article 
        I.
    9. The request, substantiated by relevant information, 
shall be submitted to the Director-General, who shall transmit 
it immediately to the Executive Council and to all States 
Parties. The Director-General shall immediately forward the 
request to States Parties which have volunteered, in accordance 
with paragraphs 7 (b) and (c), to dispatch emergency assistance 
in case of use of chemical weapons or use of riot control 
agents as a method of warfare, or humanitarian assistance in 
case of serious threat of use of chemical weapons or serious 
threat of use of riot control agents as a method of warfare to 
the State Party concerned not later than 12 hours after receipt 
of the request. The Director-General shall initiate, not later 
than 24 hours after receipt of the request, an investigation in 
order to provide foundation for further action. He shall 
complete the investigation within 72 hours and forward a report 
to the Executive Council. If additional time is required for 
completion of the investigation, an interim report shall be 
submitted within the same time-frame. The additional time 
required for investigation shall not exceed 72 hours. It may, 
however, be further extended by similar periods. Reports at the 
end of each additional period shall be submitted to the 
Executive Council. The investigation shall, as appropriate and 
in conformity with the request and the information accompanying 
the request, establish relevant facts related to the request as 
well as the type and scope of supplementary assistance and 
protection needed.
    10. The Executive Council shall meet not later than 24 
hours after receiving an investigation report to consider the 
situation and shall take a decision by simple majority within 
the following 24 hours on whether to instruct the Technical 
Secretariat to provide supplementary assistance. The Technical 
Secretariat shall immediately transmit to all States Parties 
and relevant international organizations the investigation 
report and the decision taken by the Executive Council. When so 
decided by the Executive Council, the Director-General shall 
provide assistance immediately. For this purpose, the Director-
General may cooperate with the requesting State Party, other 
States Parties and relevant international organizations. The 
States Parties shall make the fullest possible efforts to 
provide assistance.
    11. If the information available from the ongoing 
investigation or other reliable sources would give sufficient 
proof that there are victims of use of chemical weapons and 
immediate action is indispensable, the Director-General shall 
notify all States Parties and shall take emergency measures of 
assistance, using the resources the Conference has placed at 
his disposal for such contingencies. The Director-General shall 
keep the Executive Council informed of actions undertaken 
pursuant to this paragraph.

                               Article XI

                 economic and technological development

    1. The provisions of this Convention shall be implemented 
in a manner which avoids hampering the economic or 
technological development of States Parties, and international 
cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes 
not prohibited under this Convention including the 
international exchange of scientific and technical information 
and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or 
use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention.
    2. Subject to the provisions of this Convention and without 
prejudice to the principles and applicable rules of 
international law, the States Parties shall:
          (a) Have the right, individually or collectively, to 
        conduct research with, to develop, produce, acquire, 
        retain, transfer, and use chemicals;
          (b) Undertake to facilitate, and have the right to 
        participate in, the fullest possible exchange of 
        chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical 
        information relating to the development and application 
        of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this 
        Convention;
          (c) Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, 
        including those in any international agreements, 
        incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this 
        Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and 
        the development and promotion of scientific and 
        technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for 
        industrial, agricultural, research, medical, 
        pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes;
          (d) Not use this Convention as grounds for applying 
        any measures other than those provided for, or 
        permitted, under this Convention nor use any other 
        international agreement for pursuing an objective 
        inconsistent with this Convention;
          (e) Undertake to review their existing national 
        regulations in the field of trade in chemicals in order 
        to render them consistent with the object and purpose 
        of this Convention.

                              Article XII

  measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including 
                               sanctions

    1. The Conference shall take the necessary measures, as set 
forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, to ensure compliance with this 
Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which 
contravenes the provisions of this Convention. In considering 
action pursuant to this paragraph, the Conference shall take 
into account all information and recommendations on the issues 
submitted by the Executive Council.
    2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the 
Executive Council to take measures to redress a situation 
raising problems with regard to its compliance, and where the 
State Party fails to fulfill the request within the specified 
time, the Conference may, inter alia, upon the recommendation 
of the Executive Council, restrict or suspend the State Party's 
rights and privileges under this Convention until it undertakes 
the necessary action to conform with its obligations under this 
Convention.
    3. In cases where serious damage to the object and purpose 
of this Convention may result from activities prohibited under 
this Convention, in particular by Article I, the Conference may 
recommend collective measures to States Parties in conformity 
with international law.
    4. The Conference shall, in cases of particular gravity, 
bring the issue, including relevant information and 
conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations General 
Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.

                              Article XIII

               relation to other international agreements

    Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any 
way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any 
State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War 
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 
1925, and under the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed 
at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972.

                              Article XIV

                         settlement of disputes

    1. Disputes that may arise concerning the application or 
the interpretation of this Convention shall be settled in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of this Convention and 
in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations.
    2. When a dispute arises between two or more States 
Parties, or between one or more States Parties and the 
Organization, relating to the interpretation or application of 
this Convention, the parties concerned shall consult together 
with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by 
negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties' choice, 
including recourse to appropriate organs of this Convention 
and, by mutual consent, referral to the International Court of 
Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court. The States 
Parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed of 
actions being taken.
    3. The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement 
of a dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including 
offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties to a 
dispute to start the settlement process of their choice and 
recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
    4. The Conference shall consider questions related to 
disputes raised by States Parties or brought to its attention 
by the Executive Council. The Conference shall, as it finds 
necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to 
the settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article 
VIII, paragraph 21 (f).
    5. The Conference and the Executive Council are separately 
empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, to request the International Court of 
Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question 
arising within the scope of the activities of the Organization. 
An agreement between the Organization and the United Nations 
shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with Article 
VIII, paragraph 34 (a).
    6. This Article is without prejudice to Article IX or to 
the provisions on measures to redress a situation and to ensure 
compliance, including sanctions.

                               Article XV

                               amendments

    1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this 
Convention. Any State Party may also propose changes, as 
specified in paragraph 4, to the Annexes of this Convention. 
Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures in 
paragraphs 2 and 3. Proposals for changes, as specified in 
paragraph 4, shall be subject to the procedures in paragraph 5.
    2. The text of a proposed amendment shall be submitted to 
the Director-General for circulation to all States Parties and 
to the Depositary. The proposed amendment shall be considered 
only by an Amendment Conference. Such an Amendment Conference 
shall be convened if one third or more of the States Parties 
notify the Director-General not later than 30 days after its 
circulation that they support further consideration of the 
proposal. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately 
following a regular session of the Conference unless the 
requesting States Parties ask for an earlier meeting. In no 
case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days 
after the circulation of the proposed amendment.
    3. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 
30 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification or 
acceptance by all the States Parties referred to under 
subparagraph (b) below:
          (a) When adopted by the Amendment Conference by a 
        positive vote of a majority of all States Parties with 
        no State Party casting a negative vote; and
          (b) Ratified or accepted by all those States Parties 
        casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.
    4. In order to ensure the viability and the effectiveness 
of this Convention, provisions in the Annexes shall be subject 
to changes in accordance with paragraph 5, if proposed changes 
are related only to matters of an administrative or technical 
nature. All changes to the Annex on Chemicals shall be made in 
accordance with paragraph 5. Sections A and C of the 
Confidentiality Annex, Part X of the Verification Annex, and 
those definitions in Part I of the Verification Annex which 
relate exclusively to challenge inspections, shall not be 
subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 5.
    5. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 4 shall be 
made in accordance with the following procedures:
          (a) The text of the proposed changes shall be 
        transmitted together with the necessary information to 
        the Director-General. Additional information for the 
        evaluation of the proposal may be provided by any State 
        Party and the Director-General. The Director-General 
        shall promptly communicate any such proposals and 
        information to all States Parties, the Executive 
        Council and the Depositary;
          (b) Not later than 60 days after its receipt, the 
        Director-General shall evaluate the proposal to 
        determine all its possible consequences for the 
        provisions of this Convention and its implementation 
        and shall communicate any such information to all 
        States Parties and the Executive Council;
          (c) The Executive Council shall examine the proposal 
        in the light of all information available to it, 
        including whether the proposal fulfils the requirements 
        of paragraph 4. Not later than 90 days after its 
        receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its 
        recommendation, with appropriate explanations, to all 
        States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall 
        acknowledge receipt within 10 days;
          (d) If the Executive Council recommends to all States 
        Parties that the proposal be adopted, it shall be 
        considered approved if no State Party objects to it 
        within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If 
        the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be 
        rejected, it shall be considered rejected if no State 
        Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after 
        receipt of the recommendation;
          (e) If a recommendation of the Executive Council does 
        not meet with the acceptance required under 
        subparagraph (d), a decision on the proposal, including 
        whether it fulfils the requirements of paragraph 4, 
        shall be taken as a matter of substance by the 
        Conference at its next session;
          (f) The Director-General shall notify all States 
        Parties and the Depositary of any decision under this 
        paragraph;
          (g) Changes approved under this procedure shall enter 
        into force for all States Parties 180 days after the 
        date of notification by the Director-General of their 
        approval unless another time period is recommended by 
        the Executive Council or decided by the Conference.

                              Article XVI

                        duration and withdrawal

    1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
    2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national 
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention if 
it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-
matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme 
interests of its country. It shall give notice of such 
withdrawal 90 days in advance to all other States Parties, the 
Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations 
Security Council. Such notice shall include a statement of the 
extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its 
supreme interests.
    3. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention 
shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue 
fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of 
international law, particularly the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

                              Article XVII

                         status of the annexes

    The Annexes form an integral part of this Convention. Any 
reference to this Convention includes the Annexes.

                             Article XVIII

                               signature

    This Convention shall be open for signature for all States 
before its entry into force.

                              Article XIX

                              ratification

    This Convention shall be subject to ratification by States 
Signatories according to their respective constitutional 
processes.

                               Article XX

                               accession

    Any State which does not sign this Convention before its 
entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter.

                              Article XXI

                            entry into force

    1. This Convention shall enter into force 180 days after 
the date of the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, 
but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for 
signature.
    2. For States whose instruments of ratification or 
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of 
this Convention, it shall enter into force on the 30th day 
following the date of deposit of their instrument of 
ratification or accession.

                              Article XXII

                              reservations

    The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to 
reservations. The Annexes of this Convention shall not be 
subject to reservations incompatible with its object and 
purpose.

                             Article XXIII

                               depositary

    The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby 
designated as the Depositary of this Convention and shall, 
inter alia:
          (a) Promptly inform all signatory and acceding States 
        of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of 
        each instrument of ratification or accession and the 
        date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of 
        the receipt of other notices;
          (b) Transmit duly certified copies of this Convention 
        to the Governments of all signatory and acceding 
        States; and
          (c) Register this Convention pursuant to Article 102 
        of the Charter of the United Nations.

                              Article XXIV

                            authentic texts

    This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall 
be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
    In Witness Whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized 
to that effect, have signed this Convention.
    Done at Paris on the thirteenth day of January, one 
thousand nine hundred and ninety-three.

                           ANNEX ON CHEMICALS

                A. GUIDELINES FOR SCHEDULES ON CHEMICALS

Guidelines for schedule 1

    1. The following criteria shall be taken into account in 
considering whether a toxic chemical or precursor should be 
included in Schedule 1:
          (a) It has been developed, produced, stockpiled or 
        used as a chemical weapon as defined in Article II;
          (b) It poses otherwise a high risk to the object and 
        purpose of this Convention by virtue of its high 
        potential for use in activities prohibited under this 
        Convention because one or more of the following 
        conditions are met:
                  (i) It possesses a chemical structure closely 
                related to that of other toxic chemicals listed 
                in Schedule 1, and has, or can be expected to 
                have, comparable properties;
                  (ii) It possesses such lethal or 
                incapacitating toxicity as well as other 
                properties that would enable it to be used as a 
                chemical weapon;
                  (iii) It may be used as a precursor in the 
                final single technological stage of production 
                of a toxic chemical listed in Schedule 1, 
                regardless of whether this stage takes place in 
                facilities, in munitions or elsewhere;
          (c) It has little or no use for purposes not 
        prohibited under this Convention.

Guidelines for schedule 2

    2. The following criteria shall be taken into account in 
considering whether a toxic chemical not listed in Schedule 1 
or a precursor to a Schedule 1 chemical or to a chemical listed 
in Schedule 2, part A, should be included in Schedule 2:
          (a) It poses a significant risk to the object and 
        purpose of this Convention because it possesses such 
        lethal or incapacitating toxicity as well as other 
        properties that could enable it to be used as a 
        chemical weapon;
          (b) It may be used as a precursor in one of the 
        chemical reactions at the final stage of formation of a 
        chemical listed in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2, part A;
          (c) It poses a significant risk to the object and 
        purpose of this Convention by virtue of its importance 
        in the production of a chemical listed in Schedule 1 or 
        Schedule 2, part A;
          (d) It is not produced in large commercial quantities 
        for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

Guidelines for schedule 3

    3. The following criteria shall be taken into account in 
considering whether a toxic chemical or precursor, not listed 
in other Schedules, should be included in Schedule 3:
          (a) It has been produced, stockpiled or used as a 
        chemical weapon;
          (b) It poses otherwise a risk to the object and 
        purpose of this Convention because it possesses such 
        lethal or incapacitating toxicity as well as other 
        properties that might enable it to be used as a 
        chemical weapon;
          (c) It poses a risk to the object and purpose of this 
        Convention by virtue of its importance in the 
        production of one or more chemicals listed in Schedule 
        1 or Schedule 2, part B;
          (d) It may be produced in large commercial quantities 
        for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

                       B. SCHEDULES OF CHEMICALS

    The following Schedules list toxic chemicals and their 
precursors. For the purpose of implementing this Convention, 
these Schedules identify chemicals for the application of 
verification measures according to the provisions of the 
Verification Annex. Pursuant to Article II, subparagraph 1 (a), 
these Schedules do not constitute a definition of chemical 
weapons.
    (Whenever reference is made to groups of dialkylated 
chemicals, followed by a list of alkyl groups in parentheses, 
all chemicals possible by all possible combinations of alkyl 
groups listed in the parentheses are considered as listed in 
the respective Schedule as long as they are not explicitly 
exempted. A chemical marked ``*'' on Schedule 2, part A, is 
subject to special thresholds for declaration and verification, 
as specified in Part VII of the Verification Annex.)

                               Schedule 1

                                                   (CAS registry number)
A. Toxic chemicals:
    (1) O-Alkyl (10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl 
      (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates:
        e.g. Sarin: O-Isopropyl 
          methylphosphonofluoridate.....................      (107-44-8)
        Soman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate....       (96-64-0)
    (2) O-Alkyl (>C10, incl. cycloalkyl) N,N-
      dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) 
      phosphoramidocyanidates:
        e.g. Tabun: O-Ethyl N,N-dimethyl 
          phosphoramidocyanidate........................       (77-81-6)
    (3) O-Alkyl (H or >C10, incl. cycloalkyl) S-2-
      dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl 
      (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonothiolates and 
      corresponding alkylated or protonated salts:
        e.g. VX: O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl 
          methyl phosphonothiolate......................    (50782-69-9)
    (4) Sulfur mustards:
        2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulfide................     (2625-76-5)
        Mustard gas: Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide..........      (505-60-2)
        Bis(2-chloroethylthio)methane...................    (63869-13-6)
        Sesquimustard: 1,2-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)ethane.     (3563-36-8)
        1,3-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane............    (63905-10-2)
        1,4-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane.............   (142868-93-7)
        1,5-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-pentane............   (142868-94-8)
        Bis(2-chloroethylthiomethyl)ether...............    (63918-90-1)
         O-Mustard: Bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether....    (63918-89-8)
    (5) Lewisites:
        Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine.........      (541-25-3)
         Lewisite 2: Bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine.....    (40334-69-8)
         Lewisite 3: Tris(2-chlorovinyl)arsine..........    (40334-70-1)
    (6) Nitrogen mustards:
        HN1: Bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine...............      (538-07-8)
        HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine..............       (51-75-2)
        HN3: Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine...................      (555-77-1)
    (7) Saxitoxin.......................................    (35523-89-8)
    (8) Ricin...........................................     (9009-86-3)
B. Precursors:
    (9) Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) 
      phosphonyldifluorides:
        e.g. DF: Methylphosphonyldifluoride.............      (676-99-3)
    (10) O-Alkyl (H or >C10, incl. cycloalkyl) O-2-
      dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl 
      (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites and 
      corresponding alkylated or protonated salts:
        e.g. QL: O-Ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl 
          methylphosphonite.............................    (57856-11-8)
    (11) Chlorosarin: O-Isopropyl 
      methylphosphonochloridate.........................     (1445-76-7)
    (12) Chlorosoman: O-Pinacolyl 
      methylphosphonochloridate.........................     (7040-57-5)

                               Schedule 2

A. Toxic chemicals:
    (1) Amiton: O,O-Diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] 
      phosphorothiolate and corresponding alkylated or 
      protonated salts..................................       (78-53-5)
    (2)PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)-
      1-propene.........................................      (382-21-8)
    (3) BZ: 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (*)...............     (6581-06-2)
B. Precursors:
    (4) Chemicals, except for those listed in Schedule 
      1, containing a phosphorus atom to which is bonded 
      one methyl, ethyl or propyl (normal or iso) group 
      but not further carbon atoms:
        e.g. Methylphosphonyl dichloride................      (676-97-1)
        Dimethyl methylphosphonate......................      (756-79-6)
        Exemption: Fonofos: O-Ethyl S-phenyl 
          ethylphosphonothiolothionate..................      (944-22-9)
    (5) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) 
      phosphoramidic dihalides:
    (6) Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl (Me, 
      Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates:
    (7) Arsenic trichloride.............................     (7784-34-1)
    (8) 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid...............       (76-93-7)
    (9) Quinuclidine-3-ol...............................     (1619-34-7)
    (10) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethyl-
      2-chlorides and corresponding protonated salts:
    (11) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-
      2-ols and corresponding protonated salts:
        Exemptions: N,N-Dimethylaminoethanol and 
          corresponding protonated salts................      (108-01-0)
        N,N-Diethylaminoethanol and corresponding 
          protonated salts..............................      (100-37-8)
    (12) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-
      2-thiols and corresponding protonated salts:
    (13) Thiodiglycol: Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulfide.......      (111-48-8)
    (14) Pinacolyl alcohol: 3,3-Dimethylbutane-2-ol.....      (464-07-3)

                               Schedule 3

A. Toxic chemicals:
    (1) Phosgene: Carbonyl dichloride...................       (75-44-5)
    (2) Cyanogen chloride...............................      (506-77-4)
    (3) Hydrogen cyanide................................       (74-90-8)
    (4) Chloropicrin: Trichloronitromethane.............       (76-06-2)
B. Precursors:
    (5) Phosphorus oxychloride..........................    (10025-87-3)
    (6) Phosphorus trichloride..........................     (7719-12-2)
    (7) Phosphorus pentachloride........................    (10026-13-8)
    (8) Trimethyl phosphite.............................      (121-45-9)
    (9) Triethyl phosphite..............................      (122-52-1)
    (10) Dimethyl phosphite.............................      (868-85-9)
    (11) Diethyl phosphite..............................      (762-04-9)
    (12) Sulfur monochloride............................    (10025-67-9)
    (13) Sulfur dichloride..............................    (10545-99-0)
    (14) Thionyl chloride...............................     (7719-09-7)
    (15) Ethyldiethanolamine............................      (139-87-7)
    (16) Methyldiethanolamine...........................      (105-59-9)
    (17) Triethanolamine................................      (102-71-6)

                ANNEX ON IMPLEMENTATION AND VERIFICATION

                        (``VERIFICATION ANNEX'')

                                 Part I

                              DEFINITIONS

    1. ``Approved Equipment'' means the devices and instruments 
necessary for the performance of the inspection team's duties 
that have been certified by the Technical Secretariat in 
accordance with regulations prepared by the Technical 
Secretariat pursuant to Part II, paragraph 27 of this Annex. 
Such equipment may also refer to the administrative supplies or 
recording materials that would be used by the inspection team.
    2. ``Building'' as referred to in the definition of 
chemical weapons production facility in Article II comprises 
specialized buildings and standard buildings.
          (a) ``Specialized Building'' means:
                  (i) Any building, including underground 
                structures, containing specialized equipment in 
                a production or filling configuration;
                  (ii) Any building, including underground 
                structures, which has distinctive features 
                which distinguish it from buildings normally 
                used for chemical production or filling 
                activities not prohibited under this 
                Convention.
          (b) ``Standard Building'' means any building, 
        including underground structures, constructed to 
        prevailing industry standards for facilities not 
        producing any chemical specified in Article II, 
        paragraph 8 (a) (i), or corrosive chemicals.
    3. ``Challenge Inspection'' means the inspection of any 
facility or location in the territory or in any other place 
under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party requested by 
another State Party pursuant to Article IX, paragraphs 8 to 25.
    4. ``Discrete Organic Chemical'' means any chemical 
belonging to the class of chemical compounds consisting of all 
compounds of carbon except for its oxides, sulfides and metal 
carbonates, identifiable by chemical name, by structural 
formula, if known, and by Chemical Abstracts Service registry 
number, if assigned.
    5. ``Equipment'' as referred to in the definition of 
chemical weapons production facility in Article II comprises 
specialized equipment and standard equipment.
          (a) ``Specialized Equipment'' means:
                  (i) The main production train, including any 
                reactor or equipment for product synthesis, 
                separation or purification, any equipment used 
                directly for heat transfer in the final 
                technological stage, such as in reactors or in 
                product separation, as well as any other 
                equipment which has been in contact with any 
                chemical specified in Article II, paragraph 8 
                (a) (i), or would be in contact with such a 
                chemical if the facility were operated;
                  (ii) Any chemical weapon filling machines;
                  (iii) Any other equipment specially designed, 
                built or installed for the operation of the 
                facility as a chemical weapons production 
                facility, as distinct from a facility 
                constructed according to prevailing commercial 
                industry standards for facilities not producing 
                any chemical specified in Article II, paragraph 
                8(a)(i), or corrosive chemicals, such as: 
                equipment made of high-nickel alloys or other 
                special corrosion-resistant material; special 
                equipment for waste control, waste treatment, 
                air filtering, or solvent recovery; special 
                containment enclosures and safety shields; non-
                standard laboratory equipment used to analyze 
                toxic chemicals for chemical weapons purposes; 
                custom-designed process control panels; or 
                dedicated spares for specialized equipment.
          (b) ``Standard Equipment'' means:
                  (i) Production equipment which is generally 
                used in the chemical industry and is not 
                included in the types of specialized equipment;
                  (ii) Other equipment commonly used in the 
                chemical industry, such as: fire-fighting 
                equipment; guard and security/safety 
                surveillance equipment; medical facilities, 
                laboratory facilities; or communications 
                equipment.
    6. ``Facility'' in the context of Article VI means any of 
the industrial sites as defined below (``plant site'', 
``plant'' and ``unit'').
          (a) ``Plant Site'' (Works, Factory) means the local 
        integration of one or more plants, with any 
        intermediate administrative levels, which are under one 
        operational control, and includes common 
        infrastructure, such as:
                  (i) Administration and other offices;
                  (ii) Repair and maintenance shops;
                  (iii) Medical center;
                  (iv) Utilities;
                  (v) Central analytical laboratory;
                  (vi) Research and development laboratories;
                  (vii) Central effluent and waste treatment 
                area; and
                  (viii) Warehouse storage.
          (b) ``Plant'' (Production facility, Workshop) means a 
        relatively self-contained area, structure or building 
        containing one or more units with auxiliary and 
        associated infrastructure, such as:
                  (i) Small administrative section;
                  (ii) Storage/handling areas for feedstock and 
                products;
                  (iii) Effluent/waste handling/treatment area;
                  (iv) Control/analytical laboratory;
                  (v) First aid service/related medical 
                section; and
                  (vi) Records associated with the movement 
                into, around and from the site, of declared 
                chemicals and their feedstock or product 
                chemicals formed from them, as appropriate.
          (c) ``Unit'' (Production unit, Process unit) means 
        the combination of those items of equipment, including 
        vessels and vessel set up, necessary for the 
        production, processing or consumption of a chemical.
    7. ``Facility Agreement'' means an agreement or arrangement 
between a State Party and the Organization relating to a 
specific facility subject to on-site verification pursuant to 
Articles IV, V and VI.
    8. ``Host State'' means the State on whose territory lie 
facilities or areas of another State, Party to this Convention, 
which are subject to inspection under this Convention.
    9. ``In-Country Escort'' means individuals specified by the 
inspected State Party and, if appropriate, by the Host State, 
if they so wish, to accompany and assist the inspection team 
during the in-country period.
    10. ``In-Country Period'' means the period from the arrival 
of the inspection team at a point of entry until its departure 
from the State at a point of entry.
    11. ``Initial Inspection'' means the first on-site 
inspection of facilities to verify declarations submitted 
pursuant to Articles III, IV, V and VI and this Annex.
    12. ``Inspected State Party'' means the State Party on 
whose territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or 
control an inspection pursuant to this Convention takes place, 
or the State Party whose facility or area on the territory of a 
Host State is subject to such an inspection; it does not, 
however, include the State Party specified in Part II, 
paragraph 21 of this Annex.
    13. ``Inspection Assistant'' means an individual designated 
by the Technical Secretariat as set forth in Part II, Section 
A, of this Annex to assist inspectors in an inspection or 
visit, such as medical, security and administrative personnel 
and interpreters.
    14. ``Inspection Mandate'' means the instructions issued by 
the Director-General to the inspection team for the conduct of 
a particular inspection.
    15. ``Inspection Manual'' means the compilation of 
additional procedures for the conduct of inspections developed 
by the Technical Secretariat.
    16. ``Inspection Site'' means any facility or area at which 
an inspection is carried out and which is specifically defined 
in the respective facility agreement or inspection request or 
mandate or inspection request as expanded by the alternative or 
final perimeter.
    17. ``Inspection Team'' means the group of inspectors and 
inspection assistants assigned by the Director-General to 
conduct a particular inspection.
    18. ``Inspector'' means an individual designated by the 
Technical Secretariat according to the procedures as set forth 
in Part II, Section A, of this Annex, to carry out an 
inspection or visit in accordance with this Convention.
    19. ``Model Agreement'' means a document specifying the 
general form and content for an agreement concluded between a 
State Party and the Organization for fulfilling the 
verification provisions specified in this Annex.
    20. ``Observer'' means a representative of a requesting 
State Party or a third State Party to observe a challenge 
inspection.
    21. ``Perimeter'' in case of challenge inspection means the 
external boundary of the inspection site, defined by either 
geographic coordinates or description on a map.
          (a) ``Requested Perimeter'' means the inspection site 
        perimeter as specified in conformity with Part X, 
        paragraph 8, of this Annex;
          (b) ``Alternative Perimeter'' means the inspection 
        site perimeter as specified, alternatively to the 
        requested perimeter, by the inspected State Party; it 
        shall conform to the requirements specified in Part X, 
        paragraph 17, of this Annex;
          (c) ``Final Perimeter'' means the final inspection 
        site perimeter as agreed in negotiations between the 
        inspection team and the inspected State Party, in 
        accordance with Part X, paragraphs 16 to 21, of this 
        Annex;
          (d) ``Declared Perimeter'' means the external 
        boundary of the facility declared pursuant to Articles 
        III, IV, V and VI.
    22. ``Period of Inspection'', for the purposes of Article 
IX, means the period of time from provision of access to the 
inspection team to the inspection site until its departure from 
the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on briefings 
before and after the verification activities.
    23. ``Period of Inspection'', for the purposes of Articles 
IV, V and VI, means the period of time from arrival of the 
inspection team at the inspection site until its departure from 
the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on briefings 
before and after the verification activities.
    24. ``Point of Entry''/''Point of Exit'' means a location 
designated for the in-country arrival of inspection teams for 
inspections pursuant to this Convention or for their departure 
after completion of their mission.
    25. ``Requesting State Party'' means a State Party which 
has requested a challenge inspection pursuant to Article IX.
    26. ``Tonne'' means metric ton, i.e. 1,000 kg.

                                Part II

                     general rules of verification

A. Designation of inspectors and inspection assistants

    1. Not later than 30 days after entry into force of this 
Convention the Technical Secretariat shall communicate, in 
writing, to all States Parties the names, nationalities and 
ranks of the inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for 
designation, as well as a description of their qualifications 
and professional experiences.
    2. Each State Party shall immediately acknowledge receipt 
of the list of inspectors and inspection assistants, proposed 
for designation communicated to it. The State Party shall 
inform the Technical Secretariat in writing of its acceptance 
of each inspector and inspection assistant, not later than 30 
days after acknowledgement of receipt of the list. Any 
inspector and inspection assistant included in this list shall 
be regarded as designated unless a State Party, not later than 
30 days after acknowledgement of receipt of the list, declares 
its non-acceptance in writing. The State Party may include the 
reason for the objection.
    In the case of non-acceptance, the proposed inspector or 
inspection assistant shall not undertake or participate in 
verification activities on the territory or in any other place 
under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party which has 
declared its non-acceptance. The Technical Secretariat shall, 
as necessary, submit further proposals in addition to the 
original list.
    3. Verification activities under this Convention shall only 
be performed by designated inspectors and inspection 
assistants.
    4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5, a State Party 
has the right at any time to object to an inspector or 
inspection assistant who has already been designated. It shall 
notify the Technical Secretariat of its objection in writing 
and may include the reason for the objection. Such objection 
shall come into effect 30 days after receipt by the Technical 
Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately inform 
the State Party concerned of the withdrawal of the designation 
of the inspector or inspection assistant.
    5. A State Party that has been notified of an inspection 
shall not seek to have removed from the inspection team for 
that inspection any of the designated inspectors or inspection 
assistants named in the inspection team list.
    6. The number of inspectors or inspection assistants 
accepted by and designated to a State Party must be sufficient 
to allow for availability and rotation of appropriate numbers 
of inspectors and inspection assistants.
    7. If, in the opinion of the Director-General, the non-
acceptance of proposed inspectors or inspection assistants 
impedes the designation of a sufficient number of inspectors or 
inspection assistants or otherwise hampers the effective 
fulfillment of the tasks of the Technical Secretariat, the 
Director-General shall refer the issue to the Executive 
Council.
    8. Whenever amendments to the above-mentioned lists of 
inspectors and inspection assistants are necessary or 
requested, replacement inspectors and inspection assistants 
shall be designated in the same manner as set forth with 
respect to the initial list.
    9. The members of the inspection team carrying out an 
inspection of a facility of a State Party located on the 
territory of another State Party shall be designated in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in this Annex as 
applied both to the inspected State Party and the Host State 
Party.

B. Privileges and immunities

    10. Each State Party shall, not later than 30 days after 
acknowledgement of receipt of the list of inspectors and 
inspection assistants or of changes thereto, provide multiple 
entry/exit and/or transit visas and other such documents to 
enable each inspector or inspection assistant to enter and to 
remain on the territory of that State Party for the purpose of 
carrying out inspection activities. These documents shall be 
valid for at least two years after their provision to the 
Technical Secretariat.
    11. To exercise their functions effectively, inspectors and 
inspection assistants shall be accorded privileges and 
immunities as set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (i). Privileges 
and immunities shall be granted to members of the inspection 
team for the sake of this Convention and not for the personal 
benefit of the individuals themselves. Such privileges and 
immunities shall be accorded to them for the entire period 
between arrival on and departure from the territory of the 
inspected State Party or Host State, and thereafter with 
respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their 
official functions.
          (a) The members of the inspection team shall be 
        accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents 
        pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on 
        Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961.
          (b) The living quarters and office premises occupied 
        by the inspection team carrying out inspection 
        activities pursuant to this Convention shall be 
        accorded the inviolability and protection accorded to 
        the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 
        30, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
        Relations.
          (c) The papers and correspondence, including records, 
        of the inspection team shall enjoy the inviolability 
        accorded to all papers and correspondence of diplomatic 
        agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 2, of the 
        Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The 
        inspection team shall have the right to use codes for 
        their communications with the Technical Secretariat.
          (d) Samples and approved equipment carried by members 
        of the inspection team shall be inviolable subject to 
        provisions contained in this Convention and exempt from 
        all customs duties. Hazardous samples shall be 
        transported in accordance with relevant regulations.
          (e) The members of the inspection team shall be 
        accorded the immunities accorded to diplomatic agents 
        pursuant to Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, of the 
        Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
          (f) The members of the inspection team carrying out 
        prescribed activities pursuant to this Convention shall 
        be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded 
        to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the 
        Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
          (g) The members of the inspection team shall be 
        permitted to bring into the territory of the inspected 
        State Party or Host State Party, without payment of any 
        customs duties or related charges, articles for 
        personal use, with the exception of articles the import 
        or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled 
        by quarantine regulations.
          (h) The members of the inspection team shall be 
        accorded the same currency and exchange facilities as 
        are accorded to representatives of foreign Governments 
        on temporary official missions.
          (i) The members of the inspection team shall not 
        engage in any professional or commercial activity for 
        personal profit on the territory of the inspected State 
        Party or the Host State.
    12. When transiting the territory of non-inspected States 
Parties, the members of the inspection team shall be accorded 
the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents 
pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations. Papers and correspondence, including 
records, and samples and approved equipment, carried by them, 
shall be accorded the privileges and immunities set forth in 
paragraph 11 (c) and (d).
    13. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities 
the members of the inspection team shall be obliged to respect 
the laws and regulations of the inspected State Party or Host 
State and, to the extent that is consistent with the inspection 
mandate, shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal 
affairs of that State. If the inspected State Party or Host 
State Party considers that there has been an abuse of 
privileges and immunities specified in this Annex, 
consultations shall be held between the State Party and the 
Director-General to determine whether such an abuse has 
occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such 
an abuse.
    14. The immunity from jurisdiction of members of the 
inspection team may be waived by the Director-General in those 
cases when the Director-General is of the opinion that immunity 
would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived 
without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of 
this Convention. Waiver must always be express.
    15. Observers shall be accorded the same privileges and 
immunities accorded to inspectors pursuant to this section, 
except for those accorded pursuant to paragraph 11 (d).

C. Standing arrangements

            Points of entry
    16. Each State Party shall designate the points of entry 
and shall supply the required information to the Technical 
Secretariat not later than 30 days after this Convention enters 
into force for it. These points of entry shall be such that the 
inspection team can reach any inspection site from at least one 
point of entry within 12 hours. Locations of points of entry 
shall be provided to all States Parties by the Technical 
Secretariat.
    17. Each State Party may change the points of entry by 
giving notice of such change to the Technical Secretariat. 
Changes shall become effective 30 days after the Technical 
Secretariat receives such notification to allow appropriate 
notification to all States Parties.
    18. If the Technical Secretariat considers that there are 
insufficient points of entry for the timely conduct of 
inspections or that changes to the points of entry proposed by 
a State Party would hamper such timely conduct of inspections, 
it shall enter into consultations with the State Party 
concerned to resolve the problem.
    19. In cases where facilities or areas of an inspected 
State Party are located on the territory of a Host State Party 
or where the access from the point of entry to the facilities 
or areas subject to inspection requires transit through the 
territory of another State Party, the inspected State Party 
shall exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations concerning 
such inspections in accordance with this Annex. The Host State 
Party shall facilitate the inspection of those facilities or 
areas and shall provide for the necessary support to enable the 
inspection team to carry out its tasks in a timely and 
effective manner. States Parties through whose territory 
transit is required to inspect facilities or areas of an 
inspected State Party shall facilitate such transit.
    20. In cases where facilities or areas of an inspected 
State Party are located on the territory of a State not Party 
to this Convention, the inspected State Party shall take all 
necessary measures to ensure that inspections of those 
facilities or areas can be carried out in accordance with the 
provisions of this Annex. A State Party that has one or more 
facilities or areas on the territory of a State not Party to 
this Convention shall take all necessary measures to ensure 
acceptance by the Host State of inspectors and inspection 
assistants designated to that State Party. If an inspected 
State Party is unable to ensure access, it shall demonstrate 
that it took all necessary measures to ensure access.
    21. In cases where the facilities or areas sought to be 
inspected are located on the territory of a State Party, but in 
a place under the jurisdiction or control of a State not Party 
to this Convention, the State Party shall take all necessary 
measures as would be required of an inspected State Party and a 
Host State Party to ensure that inspections of such facilities 
or areas can be carried out in accordance with the provisions 
of this Annex. If the State Party is unable to ensure access to 
those facilities or areas, it shall demonstrate that it took 
all necessary measures to ensure access. This paragraph shall 
not apply where the facilities or areas sought to be inspected 
are those of the State Party.
            Arrangements for use of nonscheduled aircraft
    22. For inspections pursuant to Article IX and for other 
inspections where timely travel is not feasible using scheduled 
commercial transport, an inspection team may need to utilize 
aircraft owned or chartered by the Technical Secretariat. Not 
later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for 
it, each State Party shall inform the Technical Secretariat of 
the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled 
aircraft transporting inspection teams and equipment necessary 
for inspection into and out of the territory in which an 
inspection site is located. Aircraft routings to and from the 
designated point of entry shall be along established 
international airways that are agreed upon between the States 
Parties and the Technical Secretariat as the basis for such 
diplomatic clearance.
    23. When a non-scheduled aircraft is used, the Technical 
Secretariat shall provide the inspected State Party with a 
flight plan, through the National Authority, for the aircraft's 
flight from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of 
the State in which the inspection site is located to the point 
of entry, not less than six hours before the scheduled 
departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be filed 
in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. For its 
owned or chartered flights, the Technical Secretariat shall 
include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing 
diplomatic clearance number and the appropriate notation 
identifying the aircraft as an inspection aircraft.
    24. Not less than three hours before the scheduled 
departure of the inspection team from the last airfield prior 
to entering the airspace of the State in which the inspection 
is to take place, the inspected State Party or Host State Party 
shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with 
paragraph 23 is approved so that the inspection team may arrive 
at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time.
    25. The inspected State Party shall provide parking, 
security protection, servicing and fuel as required by the 
Technical Secretariat for the aircraft of the inspection team 
at the point of entry when such aircraft is owned or chartered 
by the Technical Secretariat. Such aircraft shall not be liable 
for landing fees, departure tax, and similar charges. The 
Technical Secretariat shall bear the cost of such fuel, 
security protection and servicing.
            Administrative arrangements
    26. The inspected State Party shall provide or arrange for 
the amenities necessary for the inspection team such as 
communication means, interpretation services to the extent 
necessary for the performance of interviewing and other tasks, 
transportation, working space, lodging, meals and medical care. 
In this regard, the inspected State Party shall be reimbursed 
by the Organization for such costs incurred by the inspection 
team.
            Approved equipment
    27. Subject to paragraph 29, there shall be no restriction 
by the inspected State Party on the inspection team bringing 
onto the inspection site such equipment, approved in accordance 
with paragraph 28, which the Technical Secretariat has 
determined to be necessary to fulfil the inspection 
requirements. The Technical Secretariat shall prepare and, as 
appropriate, update a list of approved equipment, which may be 
needed for the purposes described above, and regulations 
governing such equipment which shall be in accordance with this 
Annex. In establishing the list of approved equipment and these 
regulations, the Technical Secretariat shall ensure that safety 
considerations for all the types of facilities at which such 
equipment is likely to be used, are taken fully into account. A 
list of approved equipment shall be considered and approved by 
the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    28. The equipment shall be in the custody of the Technical 
Secretariat and be designated, calibrated and approved by the 
Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall, to the 
extent possible, select that equipment which is specifically 
designed for the specific kind of inspection required. 
Designated and approved equipment shall be specifically 
protected against unauthorized alteration.
    29. The inspected State Party shall have the right, without 
prejudice to the prescribed time-frames, to inspect the 
equipment in the presence of inspection team members at the 
point of entry, i.e., to check the identity of the equipment 
brought in or removed from the territory of the inspected State 
Party or the Host State. To facilitate such identification, the 
Technical Secretariat shall attach documents and devices to 
authenticate its designation and approval of the equipment. The 
inspection of the equipment shall also ascertain to the 
satisfaction of the inspected State Party that the equipment 
meets the description of the approved equipment for the 
particular type of inspection. The inspected State Party may 
exclude equipment not meeting that description or equipment 
without the above-mentioned authentication documents and 
devices. Procedures for the inspection of equipment shall be 
considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article 
VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    30. In cases where the inspection team finds it necessary 
to use equipment available on site not belonging to the 
Technical Secretariat and requests the inspected State Party to 
enable the team to use such equipment, the inspected State 
Party shall comply with the request to the extent it can.

D. Preinspection activities

            Notification
    31. The Director-General shall notify the State Party 
before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point 
of entry and within the prescribed time-frames, where 
specified, of its intention to carry out an inspection.
    32. Notifications made by the Director-General shall 
include the following information:
          (a) The type of inspection;
          (b) The point of entry;
          (c) The date and estimated time of arrival at the 
        point of entry;
          (d) The means of arrival at the point of entry;
          (e) The site to be inspected;
          (f) The names of inspectors and inspection 
        assistants;
          (g) If appropriate, aircraft clearance for special 
        flights.
    33. The inspected State Party shall acknowledge the receipt 
of a notification by the Technical Secretariat of an intention 
to conduct an inspection, not later than one hour after receipt 
of such notification.
    34. In the case of an inspection of a facility of a State 
Party located on the territory of another State Party, both 
States Parties shall be simultaneously notified in accordance 
with paragraphs 31 and 32.
            Entry into the territory of the inspected State party or 
                    host State and transfer to the inspection site
    35. The inspected State Party or Host State Party which has 
been notified of the arrival of an inspection team, shall 
ensure its immediate entry into the territory and shall through 
an in-country escort or by other means do everything in its 
power to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team and its 
equipment and supplies, from its point of entry to the 
inspection site(s) and to a point of exit.
    36. The inspected State Party or Host State Party shall, as 
necessary, assist the inspection team in reaching the 
inspection site not later than 12 hours after the arrival at 
the point of entry.
            Pre-inspection briefing
    37. Upon arrival at the inspection site and before the 
commencement of the inspection, the inspection team shall be 
briefed by facility representatives, with the aid of maps and 
other documentation as appropriate, on the facility, the 
activities carried out there, safety measures and 
administrative and logistic arrangements necessary for the 
inspection. The time spent for the briefing shall be limited to 
the minimum necessary and in any event not exceed three hours.

E. Conduct of Inspections

            General rules
    38. The members of the inspection team shall discharge 
their functions in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention, as well as rules established by the Director-
General and facility agreements concluded between States 
Parties and the Organization.
    39. The inspection team shall strictly observe the 
inspection mandate issued by the Director-General. It shall 
refrain from activities going beyond this mandate.
    40. The activities of the inspection team shall be so 
arranged as to ensure the timely and effective discharge of its 
functions and the least possible inconvenience to the inspected 
State Party or Host State and disturbance to the facility or 
area inspected. The inspection team shall avoid unnecessarily 
hampering or delaying the operation of a facility and avoid 
affecting its safety. In particular, the inspection team shall 
not operate any facility. If inspectors consider that, to 
fulfil their mandate, particular operations should be carried 
out in a facility, they shall request the designated 
representative of the inspected facility to have them 
performed. The representative shall carry out the request to 
the extent possible.
    41. In the performance of their duties on the territory of 
an inspected State Party or Host State, the members of the 
inspection team shall, if the inspected State Party so 
requests, be accompanied by representatives of the inspected 
State Party, but the inspection team must not thereby be 
delayed or otherwise hindered in the exercise of its functions.
    42. Detailed procedures for the conduct of inspections 
shall be developed for inclusion in the inspection manual by 
the Technical Secretariat, taking into account guidelines to be 
considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article 
VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
            Safety
    43. In carrying out their activities, inspectors and 
inspection assistants shall observe safety regulations 
established at the inspection site, including those for the 
protection of controlled environments within a facility and for 
personal safety. In order to implement these requirements, 
appropriate detailed procedures shall be considered and 
approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 
21 (i).
            Communications
    44. Inspectors shall have the right throughout the in-
country period to communicate with the Headquarters of the 
Technical Secretariat. For this purpose they may use their own, 
duly certified, approved equipment and may request that the 
inspected State Party or Host State Party provide them with 
access to other telecommunications. The inspection team shall 
have the right to use its own two-way system of radio 
communications between personnel patrolling the perimeter and 
other members of the inspection team.
            Inspection team and inspected State party rights
    45. The inspection team shall, in accordance with the 
relevant Articles and Annexes of this Convention as well as 
with facility agreements and procedures set forth in the 
inspection manual, have the right to unimpeded access to the 
inspection site. The items to be inspected will be chosen by 
the inspectors.
    46. Inspectors shall have the right to interview any 
facility personnel in the presence of representatives of the 
inspected State Party with the purpose of establishing relevant 
facts. Inspectors shall only request information and data which 
are necessary for the conduct of the inspection, and the 
inspected State Party shall furnish such information upon 
request. The inspected State Party shall have the right to 
object to questions posed to the facility personnel if those 
questions are deemed not relevant to the inspection. If the 
head of the inspection team objects and states their relevance, 
the questions shall be provided in writing to the inspected 
State Party for reply. The inspection team may note any refusal 
to permit interviews or to allow questions to be answered and 
any explanations given, in that part of the inspection report 
that deals with the cooperation of the inspected State Party.
    47. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect 
documentation and records they deem relevant to the conduct of 
their mission.
    48. Inspectors shall have the right to have photographs 
taken at their request by representatives of the inspected 
State Party or of the inspected facility. The capability to 
take instant development photographic prints shall be 
available. The inspection team shall determine whether 
photographs conform to those requested and, if not, repeat 
photographs shall be taken. The inspection team and the 
inspected State Party shall each retain one copy of every 
photograph.
    49. The representatives of the inspected State Party shall 
have the right to observe all verification activities carried 
out by the inspection team.
    50. The inspected State Party shall receive copies, at its 
request, of the information and data gathered about its 
facility(ies) by the Technical Secretariat.
    51. Inspectors shall have the right to request 
clarifications in connection with ambiguities that arise during 
an inspection. Such requests shall be made promptly through the 
representative of the inspected State Party. The representative 
of the inspected State Party shall provide the inspection team, 
during the inspection, with such clarification as may be 
necessary to remove the ambiguity. If questions relating to an 
object or a building located within the inspection site are not 
resolved, the object or building shall, if requested, be 
photographed for the purpose of clarifying its nature and 
function. If the ambiguity cannot be removed during the 
inspection, the inspectors shall notify the Technical 
Secretariat immediately. The inspectors shall include in the 
inspection report any such unresolved question, relevant 
clarifications, and a copy of any photographs taken.
            Collection, handling and analysis of samples
    52. Representatives of the inspected State Party or of the 
inspected facility shall take samples at the request of the 
inspection team in the presence of inspectors. If so agreed in 
advance with the representatives of the inspected State Party 
or of the inspected facility, the inspection team may take 
samples itself.
    53. Where possible, the analysis of samples shall be 
performed on-site. The inspection team shall have the right to 
perform on-site analysis of samples using approved equipment 
brought by it. At the request of the inspection team, the 
inspected State Party shall, in accordance with agreed 
procedures, provide assistance for the analysis of samples on-
site. Alternatively, the inspection team may request that 
appropriate analysis on-site be performed in its presence.
    54. The inspected State Party has the right to retain 
portions of all samples taken or take duplicate samples and be 
present when samples are analyzed on-site.
    55. The inspection team shall, if it deems it necessary, 
transfer samples for analysis off-site at laboratories 
designated by the Organization.
    56. The Director-General shall have the primary 
responsibility for the security, integrity and preservation of 
samples and for ensuring that the confidentiality of samples 
transferred for analysis off-site is protected. The Director-
General shall do so in accordance with procedures, to be 
considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article 
VIII, paragraph 21 (i), for inclusion in the inspection manual. 
He shall:
          (a) Establish a stringent regime governing the 
        collection, handling, transport and analysis of 
        samples;
           (b) Certify the laboratories designated to perform 
        different types of analysis;
          (c) Oversee the standardization of equipment and 
        procedures at these designated laboratories, mobile 
        analytical equipment and procedures, and monitor 
        quality control and overall standards in relation to 
        the certification of these laboratories, mobile 
        equipment and procedures; and
          (d) Select from among the designated laboratories 
        those which shall perform analytical or other functions 
        in relation to specific investigations.
    57. When off-site analysis is to be performed, samples 
shall be analysed in at least two designated laboratories. The 
Technical Secretariat shall ensure the expeditious processing 
of the analysis. The samples shall be accounted for by the 
Technical Secretariat and any unused samples or portions 
thereof shall be returned to the Technical Secretariat.
    58. The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of 
the laboratory analysis of samples relevant to compliance with 
this Convention and include them in the final inspection 
report. The Technical Secretariat shall include in the report 
detailed information concerning the equipment and methodology 
employed by the designated laboratories.
            Extension of inspection duration
    59. Periods of inspection may be extended by agreement with 
the representative of the inspected State Party.
            Debriefing
    60. Upon completion of an inspection the inspection team 
shall meet with representatives of the inspected State Party 
and the personnel responsible for the inspection site to review 
the preliminary findings of the inspection team and to clarify 
any ambiguities. The inspection team shall provide to the 
representatives of the inspected State Party its preliminary 
findings in written form according to a standardized format, 
together with a list of any samples and copies of written 
information and data gathered and other material to be taken 
off-site. The document shall be signed by the head of the 
inspection team. In order to indicate that he has taken notice 
of the contents of the document, the representative of the 
inspected State Party shall countersign the document. This 
meeting shall be completed not later than 24 hours after the 
completion of the inspection.

F. Departure

    61. Upon completion of the post-inspection procedures, the 
inspection team shall leave, as soon as possible, the territory 
of the inspected State Party or the Host State.

G. Reports

    62. Not later than 10 days after the inspection, the 
inspectors shall prepare a factual, final report on the 
activities conducted by them and on their findings. It shall 
only contain facts relevant to compliance with this Convention, 
as provided for under the inspection mandate. The report shall 
also provide information as to the manner in which the State 
Party inspected cooperated with the inspection team. Differing 
observations made by inspectors may be attached to the report. 
The report shall be kept confidential.
    63. The final report shall immediately be submitted to the 
inspected State Party. Any written comments, which the 
inspected State Party may immediately make on its findings 
shall be annexed to it. The final report together with annexed 
comments made by the inspected State Party shall be submitted 
to the Director-General not later than 30 days after the 
inspection.
    64. Should the report contain uncertainties, or should 
cooperation between the National Authority and the inspectors 
not measure up to the standards required, the Director-General 
shall approach the State Party for clarification.
    65. If the uncertainties cannot be removed or the facts 
established are of a nature to suggest that obligations 
undertaken under this Convention have not been met, the 
Director-General shall inform the Executive Council without 
delay.

H. Application of general provisions

    66. The provisions of this Part shall apply to all 
inspections conducted pursuant to this Convention, except where 
the provisions of this Part differ from the provisions set 
forth for specific types of inspections in Parts III to XI of 
this Annex, in which case the latter provisions shall take 
precedence.

                                Part III

GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR VERIFICATION MEASURES PURSUANT TO ARTICLES IV, V 
                          AND VI, PARAGRAPH 3

A. Initial inspections and facility agreements

    1. Each declared facility subject to on-site inspection 
pursuant to Articles IV, V, and VI, paragraph 3, shall receive 
an initial inspection promptly after the facility is declared. 
The purpose of this inspection of the facility shall be to 
verify information provided and to obtain any additional 
information needed for planning future verification activities 
at the facility, including on-site inspections and continuous 
monitoring with on-site instruments, and to work on the 
facility agreements.
    2. States Parties shall ensure that the verification of 
declarations and the initiation of the systematic verification 
measures can be accomplished by the Technical Secretariat at 
all facilities within the established time-frames after this 
Convention enters into force for them.
    3. Each State Party shall conclude a facility agreement 
with the Organization for each facility declared and subject to 
on-site inspection pursuant to Articles IV, V, and VI, 
paragraph 3.
    4. Facility agreements shall be completed not later than 
180 days after this Convention enters into force for the State 
Party or after the facility has been declared for the first 
time, except for a chemical weapons destruction facility to 
which paragraphs 5 to 7 shall apply.
    5. In the case of a chemical weapons destruction facility 
that begins operations more than one year after this Convention 
enters into force for the State Party, the facility agreement 
shall be completed not less than 180 days before the facility 
begins operation.
    6. In the case of a chemical weapons destruction facility 
that is in operation when this Convention enters into force for 
the State Party, or begins operation not later than one year 
thereafter, the facility agreement shall be completed not later 
than 210 days after this Convention enters into force for the 
State Party, except that the Executive Council may decide that 
transitional verification arrangements, approved in accordance 
with Part IV (A), paragraph 51, of this Annex and including a 
transitional facility agreement, provisions for verification 
through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site 
instruments, and the time-frame for application of the 
arrangements, are sufficient.
    7. In the case of a facility, referred to in paragraph 6, 
that will cease operations not later than two years after this 
Convention enters into force for the State Party, the Executive 
Council may decide that transitional verification arrangements, 
approved in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 51, of this 
Annex and including a transitional facility agreement, 
provisions for verification through on-site inspection and 
monitoring with on-site instruments, and the time-frame for 
application of the arrangements, are sufficient.
    8. Facility agreements shall be based on models for such 
agreements and provide for detailed arrangements which shall 
govern inspections at each facility. The model agreements shall 
include provisions to take into account future technological 
developments and shall be considered and approved by the 
Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    9. The Technical Secretariat may retain at each site a 
sealed container for photographs, plans and other information 
that it may wish to refer to in the course of subsequent 
inspections.

B. Standing arrangements

    10. Where applicable, the Technical Secretariat shall have 
the right to have continuous monitoring instruments and systems 
and seals installed and to use them, in conformity with the 
relevant provisions in this Convention and the facility 
agreements between States Parties and the Organization.
    11. The inspected State Party shall, in accordance with 
agreed procedures, have the right to inspect any instrument 
used or installed by the inspection team and to have it tested 
in the presence of representatives of the inspected State 
Party. The inspection team shall have the right to use the 
instruments that were installed by the inspected State Party 
for its own monitoring of the technological process of the 
destruction of chemical weapons. To this end, the inspection 
team shall have the right to inspect those instruments that it 
intends to use for purposes of verification of the destruction 
of chemical weapons and to have them tested in its presence.
    12. The inspected State Party shall provide the necessary 
preparation and support for the establishment of continuous 
monitoring instruments and systems.
    13. In order to implement paragraphs 11 and 12, appropriate 
detailed procedures shall be considered and approved by the 
Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    14. The inspected State Party shall immediately notify the 
Technical Secretariat if an event occurs or may occur at a 
facility where monitoring instruments are installed, which may 
have an impact on the monitoring system. The inspected State 
Party shall coordinate subsequent actions with the Technical 
Secretariat with a view to restoring the operation of the 
monitoring system and establishing interim measures, if 
necessary, as soon as possible.
    15. The inspection team shall verify during each inspection 
that the monitoring system functions correctly and that 
emplaced seals have not been tampered with. In addition, visits 
to service the monitoring system may be required to perform any 
necessary maintenance or replacement of equipment, or to adjust 
the coverage of the monitoring system as required.
    16. If the monitoring system indicates any anomaly, the 
Technical Secretariat shall immediately take action to 
determine whether this resulted from equipment malfunction or 
activities at the facility. If, after this examination, the 
problem remains unresolved, the Technical Secretariat shall 
immediately ascertain the actual situation, including through 
immediate on-site inspection of, or visit to, the facility if 
necessary. The Technical Secretariat shall report any such 
problem immediately after its detection to the inspected State 
Party which shall assist in its resolution.

C. Pre-inspection activities

    17. The inspected State Party shall, except as specified in 
paragraph 18, be notified of inspections not less than 24 hours 
in advance of the planned arrival of the inspection team at the 
point of entry.
    18. The inspected State Party shall be notified of initial 
inspections not less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated 
time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.

                              Part IV (A)

   destruction of chemical weapons and its verification pursuant to 
                               article iv

A. Declarations

            Chemical weapons
    1. The declaration of chemical weapons by a State Party 
pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (ii), shall include 
the following:
          (a) The aggregate quantity of each chemical declared;
          (b) The precise location of each chemical weapons 
        storage facility, expressed by:
                  (i) Name;
                  (ii) Geographical coordinates; and
                  (iii) A detailed site diagram, including a 
                boundary map and the location of bunkers/
                storage areas within the facility.
          (c) The detailed inventory for each chemical weapons 
        storage facility including:
                  (i) Chemicals defined as chemical weapons in 
                accordance with Article II;
                  (ii) Unfilled munitions, sub-munitions, 
                devices and equipment defined as chemical 
                weapons;
                  (iii) Equipment specially designed for use 
                directly in connection with the employment of 
                munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment 
                specified in sub-subparagraph (ii);
                  (iv) Chemicals specifically designed for use 
                directly in connection with the employment of 
                munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment 
                specified in sub-subparagraph (ii).
    2. For the declaration of chemicals referred to in 
paragraph 1 (c) (i) the following shall apply:
          (a) Chemicals shall be declared in accordance with 
        the Schedules specified in the Annex on Chemicals;
          (b) For a chemical not listed in the Schedules in the 
        Annex on Chemicals the information required for 
        possible assignment of the chemical to the appropriate 
        Schedule shall be provided, including the toxicity of 
        the pure compound. For a precursor, the toxicity and 
        identity of the principal final reaction product(s) 
        shall be provided;
          (c) Chemicals shall be identified by chemical name in 
        accordance with current International Union of Pure and 
        Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) nomenclature, structural 
        formula and Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, 
        if assigned. For a precursor, the toxicity and identity 
        of the principal final reaction product(s) shall be 
        provided;
          (d) In cases involving mixtures of two or more 
        chemicals, each chemical shall be identified and the 
        percentage of each shall be provided, and the mixture 
        shall be declared under the category of the most toxic 
        chemical. If a component of a binary chemical weapon 
        consists of a mixture of two or more chemicals, each 
        chemical shall be identified and the percentage of each 
        provided;
          (e) Binary chemical weapons shall be declared under 
        the relevant end product within the framework of the 
        categories of chemical weapons referred to in paragraph 
        16. The following supplementary information shall be 
        provided for each type of binary chemical munition/
        device:
                  (i) The chemical name of the toxic end-
                product;
                  (ii) The chemical composition and quantity of 
                each component;
                  (iii) The actual weight ratio between the 
                components;
                  (iv) Which component is considered the key 
                component;
                  (v) The projected quantity of the toxic end-
                product calculated on a stoichiometric basis 
                from the key component, assuming 100 per cent 
                yield. A declared quantity (in tonnes) of the 
                key component intended for a specific toxic 
                end-product shall be considered equivalent to 
                the quantity (in tonnes) of this toxic end-
                product calculated on a stoichiometric basis 
                assuming 100 per cent yield.
          (f) For multicomponent chemical weapons, the 
        declaration shall be analogous to that envisaged for 
        binary chemical weapons;
          (g) For each chemical the form of storage, i.e. 
        munitions, sub-munitions, devices, equipment or bulk 
        containers and other containers shall be declared. For 
        each form of storage the following shall be listed:
                  (i) Type;
                  (ii) Size or calibre;
                  (iii) Number of items; and
                  (iv) Nominal weight of chemical fill per 
                item.
          (h) For each chemical the total weight present at the 
        storage facility shall be declared;
          (i) In addition, for chemicals stored in bulk, the 
        percentage purity shall be declared, if known.
    3. For each type of unfilled munitions, sub-munitions, 
devices or equipment, referred to in paragraph 1 (c) (ii), the 
information shall include:
          (a) The number of items;
          (b) The nominal fill volume per item;
          (c) The intended chemical fill.
            Declarations of chemical weapons pursuant to article III, 
                    paragraph 1 (a) (iii)
    4. The declaration of chemical weapons pursuant to Article 
III, paragraph 1 (a) (iii), shall contain all information 
specified in paragraphs 1 to 3 above. It is the responsibility 
of the State Party on whose territory the chemical weapons are 
located to make appropriate arrangements with the other State 
to ensure that the declarations are made. If the State Party on 
whose territory the chemical weapons are located is not able to 
fulfil its obligations under this paragraph, it shall state the 
reasons therefor.
            Declarations of past transfers and receipts
    5. A State Party that has transferred or received chemical 
weapons since 1 January 1946 shall declare these transfers or 
receipts pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (iv), 
provided the amount transferred or received exceeded 1 tonne 
per chemical per year in bulk and/or munition form. This 
declaration shall be made according to the inventory format 
specified in paragraphs 1 and 2. This declaration shall also 
indicate the supplier and recipient countries, the dates of the 
transfers or receipts and, as precisely as possible, the 
current location of the transferred items. When not all the 
specified information is available for transfers or receipts of 
chemical weapons for the period between 1 January 1946 and 1 
January 1970, the State Party shall declare whatever 
information is still available to it and provide an explanation 
as to why it cannot submit a full declaration.
            Submission of the general plan for destruction of chemical 
                    weapons
    6. The general plan for destruction of chemical weapons 
submitted pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (v), shall 
provide an overview of the entire national chemical weapons 
destruction programme of the State Party and information on the 
efforts of the State Party to fulfil the destruction 
requirements contained in this Convention. The plan shall 
specify:
          (a) A general schedule for destruction, giving types 
        and approximate quantities of chemical weapons planned 
        to be destroyed in each annual destruction period for 
        each existing chemical weapons destruction facility 
        and, if possible, for each planned chemical weapons 
        destruction facility;
          (b) The number of chemical weapons destruction 
        facilities existing or planned to be operated over the 
        destruction period;
          (c) For each existing or planned chemical weapons 
        destruction facility:
                  (i) Name and location; and
                  (ii) The types and approximate quantities of 
                chemical weapons, and the type (for example, 
                nerve agent or blister agent) and approximate 
                quantity of chemical fill, to be destroyed;
          (d) The plans and programmes for training personnel 
        for the operation of destruction facilities;
          (e) The national standards for safety and emissions 
        that the destruction facilities must satisfy;
          (f) Information on the development of new methods for 
        destruction of chemical weapons and on the improvement 
        of existing methods;
          (g) The cost estimates for destroying the chemical 
        weapons; and
          (h) Any issues which could adversely impact on the 
        national destruction programme.
            B. Measures to secure the storage facility and storage 
                    facility preparation
    7. Not later than when submitting its declaration of 
chemical weapons, a State Party shall take such measures as it 
considers appropriate to secure its storage facilities and 
shall prevent any movement of its chemical weapons out of the 
facilities, except their removal for destruction.
    8. A State Party shall ensure that chemical weapons at its 
storage facilities are configured to allow ready access for 
verification in accordance with paragraphs 37 to 49.
    9. While a storage facility remains closed for any movement 
of chemical weapons out of the facility other than their 
removal for destruction, a State Party may continue at the 
facility standard maintenance activities, including standard 
maintenance of chemical weapons; safety monitoring and physical 
security activities; and preparation of chemical weapons for 
destruction.
    10. Maintenance activities of chemical weapons shall not 
include:
          (a) Replacement of agent or of munition bodies;
          (b) Modification of the original characteristics of 
        munitions, or parts or components thereof.
    11. All maintenance activities shall be subject to 
monitoring by the Technical Secretariat.

C. Destruction

            Principles and methods for destruction of chemical weapons
    12. ``Destruction of chemical weapons'' means a process by 
which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible 
way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons, 
and which in an irreversible manner renders munitions and other 
devices unusable as such.
    13. Each State Party shall determine how it shall destroy 
chemical weapons, except that the following processes may not 
be used: dumping in any body of water, land burial or open-pit 
burning. It shall destroy chemical weapons only at specifically 
designated and appropriately designed and equipped facilities.
    14. Each State Party shall ensure that its chemical weapons 
destruction facilities are constructed and operated in a manner 
to ensure the destruction of the chemical weapons; and that the 
destruction process can be verified under the provisions of 
this Convention.
            Order of destruction
    15. The order of destruction of chemical weapons is based 
on the obligations specified in Article I and the other 
Articles, including obligations regarding systematic on-site 
verification. It takes into account interests of States Parties 
for undiminished security during the destruction period; 
confidence-building in the early part of the destruction stage; 
gradual acquisition of experience in the course of destroying 
chemical weapons; and applicability irrespective of the actual 
composition of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the 
destruction of the chemical weapons. The order of destruction 
is based on the principle of levelling out.
    16. For the purpose of destruction, chemical weapons 
declared by each State Party shall be divided into three 
categories:
          Category 1: Chemical weapons on the basis of Schedule 
        1 chemicals and their parts and components;
          Category 2: Chemical weapons on the basis of all 
        other chemicals and their parts and components;
          Category 3: Unfilled munitions and devices, and 
        equipment specifically designed for use directly in 
        connection with employment of chemical weapons.
    17. A State Party shall start:
          (a) The destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons 
        not later than two years after this Convention enters 
        into force for it, and shall complete the destruction 
        not later than 10 years after entry into force of this 
        Convention. A State Party shall destroy chemical 
        weapons in accordance with the following destruction 
        deadlines:
                  (i) Phase 1: Not later than two years after 
                entry into force of this Convention, testing of 
                its first destruction facility shall be 
                completed. Not less than 1 per cent of the 
                Category 1 chemical weapons shall be destroyed 
                not later than three years after the entry into 
                force of this Convention;
                  (ii) Phase 2: Not less than 20 per cent of 
                the Category 1 chemical weapons shall be 
                destroyed not later than five years after the 
                entry into force of this Convention;
                  (iii) Phase 3: Not less than 45 per cent of 
                the Category 1 chemical weapons shall be 
                destroyed not later than seven years after the 
                entry into force of this Convention;
                  (iv) Phase 4: All Category 1 chemical weapons 
                shall be destroyed not later than 10 years 
                after the entry into force of this Convention.
          (b) The destruction of Category 2 chemical weapons 
        not later than one year after this Convention enters 
        into force for it and shall complete the destruction 
        not later than five years after the entry into force of 
        this Convention. Category 2 chemical weapons shall be 
        destroyed in equal annual increments throughout the 
        destruction period. The comparison factor for such 
        weapons is the weight of the chemicals within Category 
        2; and
          (c) The destruction of Category 3 chemical weapons 
        not later than one year after this Convention enters 
        into force for it, and shall complete the destruction 
        not later than five years after the entry into force of 
        this Convention. Category 3 chemical weapons shall be 
        destroyed in equal annual increments throughout the 
        destruction period. The comparison factor for unfilled 
        munitions and devices is expressed in nominal fill 
        volume (m\3\) and for equipment in number of items.
    18. For the destruction of binary chemical weapons the 
following shall apply:
          (a) For the purposes of the order of destruction, a 
        declared quantity (in tonnes) of the key component 
        intended for a specific toxic end-product shall be 
        considered equivalent to the quantity (in tonnes) of 
        this toxic end-product calculated on a stoichiometric 
        basis assuming 100 per cent yield.
          (b) A requirement to destroy a given quantity of the 
        key component shall entail a requirement to destroy a 
        corresponding quantity of the other component, 
        calculated from the actual weight ratio of the 
        components in the relevant type of binary chemical 
        munition/device.
          (c) If more of the other component is declared than 
        is needed, based on the actual weight ratio between 
        components, the excess shall be destroyed over the 
        first two years after destruction operations begin.
          (d) At the end of each subsequent operational year a 
        State Party may retain an amount of the other declared 
        component that is determined on the basis of the actual 
        weight ratio of the components in the relevant type of 
        binary chemical munition/device.
    19. For multicomponent chemical weapons the order of 
destruction shall be analogous to that envisaged for binary 
chemical weapons.
            Modification of intermediate destruction deadlines
    20. The Executive Council shall review the general plans 
for destruction of chemical weapons, submitted pursuant to 
Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (v), and in accordance with 
paragraph 6, inter alia, to assess their conformity with the 
order of destruction set forth in paragraphs 15 to 19. The 
Executive Council shall consult with any State Party whose plan 
does not conform, with the objective of bringing the plan into 
conformity.
    21. If a State Party, due to exceptional circumstances 
beyond its control, believes that it cannot achieve the level 
of destruction specified for Phase 1, Phase 2 or Phase 3 of the 
order of destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons, it may 
propose changes in those levels. Such a proposal must be made 
not later than 120 days after the entry into force of this 
Convention and shall contain a detailed explanation of the 
reasons for the proposal.
    22. Each State Party shall take all necessary measures to 
ensure destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons in accordance 
with the destruction deadlines set forth in paragraph 17 (a) as 
changed pursuant to paragraph 21. However, if a State Party 
believes that it will be unable to ensure the destruction of 
the percentage of Category 1 chemical weapons required by an 
intermediate destruction deadline, it may request the Executive 
Council to recommend to the Conference to grant an extension of 
its obligation to meet that deadline. Such a request must be 
made not less than 180 days before the intermediate destruction 
deadline and shall contain a detailed explanation of the 
reasons for the request and the plans of the State Party for 
ensuring that it will be able to fulfil its obligation to meet 
the next intermediate destruction deadline.
    23. If an extension is granted, the State Party shall still 
be under the obligation to meet the cumulative destruction 
requirements set forth for the next destruction deadline. 
Extensions granted pursuant to this Section shall not, in any 
way, modify the obligation of the State Party to destroy all 
Category 1 chemical weapons not later than 10 years after the 
entry into force of this Convention.
            Extension of the deadline for completion of destruction
    24. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to 
ensure the destruction of all Category 1 chemical weapons not 
later than 10 years after the entry into force of this 
Convention, it may submit a request to the Executive Council 
for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction 
of such chemical weapons. Such a request must be made not later 
than nine years after the entry into force of this Convention.
    25. The request shall contain:
          (a) The duration of the proposed extension;
          (b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the 
        proposed extension; and
          (c) A detailed plan for destruction during the 
        proposed extension and the remaining portion of the 
        original 10-year period for destruction.
    26. A decision on the request shall be taken by the 
Conference at its next session, on the recommendation of the 
Executive Council. Any extension shall be the minimum 
necessary, but in no case shall the deadline for a State Party 
to complete its destruction of all chemical weapons be extended 
beyond 15 years after the entry into force of this Convention. 
The Executive Council shall set conditions for the granting of 
the extension, including the specific verification measures 
deemed necessary as well as specific actions to be taken by the 
State Party to overcome problems in its destruction programme. 
Costs of verification during the extension period shall be 
allocated in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 16.
    27. If an extension is granted, the State Party shall take 
appropriate measures to meet all subsequent deadlines.
    28. The State Party shall continue to submit detailed 
annual plans for destruction in accordance with paragraph 29 
and annual reports on the destruction of Category 1 chemical 
weapons in accordance with paragraph 36, until all Category 1 
chemical weapons are destroyed. In addition, not later than at 
the end of each 90 days of the extension period, the State 
Party shall report to the Executive Council on its destruction 
activity. The Executive Council shall review progress towards 
completion of destruction and take the necessary measures to 
document this progress. All information concerning the 
destruction activities during the extension period shall be 
provided by the Executive Council to States Parties, upon 
request.
            Detailed annual plans for destruction
    29. The detailed annual plans for destruction shall be 
submitted to the Technical Secretariat not less than 60 days 
before each annual destruction period begins pursuant to 
Article IV, paragraph 7 (a), and shall specify:
          (a) The quantity of each specific type of chemical 
        weapon to be destroyed at each destruction facility and 
        the inclusive dates when the destruction of each 
        specific type of chemical weapon will be accomplished;
          (b) The detailed site diagram for each chemical 
        weapons destruction facility and any changes to 
        previously submitted diagrams; and
          (c) The detailed schedule of activities for each 
        chemical weapons destruction facility for the upcoming 
        year, identifying time required for design, 
        construction or modification of the facility, 
        installation of equipment, equipment check-out and 
        operator training, destruction operations for each 
        specific type of chemical weapon, and scheduled periods 
        of inactivity.
    30. A State Party shall provide, for each of its chemical 
weapons destruction facilities, detailed facility information 
to assist the Technical Secretariat in developing preliminary 
inspection procedures for use at the facility.
    31. The detailed facility information for each destruction 
facility shall include the following information:
          (a) Name, address and location;
          (b) Detailed, annotated facility drawings;
          (c) Facility design drawings, process drawings, and 
        piping and instrumentation design drawings;
          (d) Detailed technical descriptions, including design 
        drawings and instrument specifications, for the 
        equipment required for: removing the chemical fill from 
        the munitions, devices, and containers; temporarily 
        storing the drained chemical fill; destroying the 
        chemical agent; and destroying the munitions, devices, 
        and containers;
          (e) Detailed technical descriptions of the 
        destruction process, including material flow rates, 
        temperatures and pressures, and designed destruction 
        efficiency;
          (f) Design capacity for each specific type of 
        chemical weapon;
          (g) A detailed description of the products of 
        destruction and the method of their ultimate disposal;
          (h) A detailed technical description of measures to 
        facilitate inspections in accordance with this 
        Convention;
          (i) A detailed description of any temporary holding 
        area at the destruction facility that will be used to 
        provide chemical weapons directly to the destruction 
        facility, including site and facility drawings and 
        information on the storage capacity for each specific 
        type of chemical weapon to be destroyed at the 
        facility;
          (j) A detailed description of the safety and medical 
        measures in force at the facility;
          (k) A detailed description of the living quarters and 
        working premises for the inspectors; and
          (l) Suggested measures for international 
        verification.
    32. A State Party shall provide, for each of its chemical 
weapons destruction facilities, the plant operations manuals, 
the safety and medical plans, the laboratory operations and 
quality assurance and control manuals, and the environmental 
permits that have been obtained, except that this shall not 
include material previously provided.
    33. A State Party shall promptly notify the Technical 
Secretariat of any developments that could affect inspection 
activities at its destruction facilities.
    34. Deadlines for submission of the information specified 
in paragraphs 30 to 32 shall be considered and approved by the 
Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    35. After a review of the detailed facility information for 
each destruction facility, the Technical Secretariat, if the 
need arises, shall enter into consultation with the State Party 
concerned in order to ensure that its chemical weapons 
destruction facilities are designed to assure the destruction 
of chemical weapons, to allow advanced planning on how 
verification measures may be applied and to ensure that the 
application of verification measures is consistent with proper 
facility operation, and that the facility operation allows 
appropriate verification.
            Annual reports on destruction
    36. Information regarding the implementation of plans for 
destruction of chemical weapons shall be submitted to the 
Technical Secretariat pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 7 (b), 
not later than 60 days after the end of each annual destruction 
period and shall specify the actual amounts of chemical weapons 
which were destroyed during the previous year at each 
destruction facility. If appropriate, reasons for not meeting 
destruction goals should be stated.

D. Verification

            Verification of declarations of chemical weapons through 
                    on-site inspection
    37. The purpose of the verification of declarations of 
chemical weapons shall be to confirm through on-site inspection 
the accuracy of the relevant declarations made pursuant to 
Article III.
    38. The inspectors shall conduct this verification promptly 
after a declaration is submitted. They shall, inter alia, 
verify the quantity and identity of chemicals, types and number 
of munitions, devices and other equipment.
    39. The inspectors shall employ, as appropriate, agreed 
seals, markers or other inventory control procedures to 
facilitate an accurate inventory of the chemical weapons at 
each storage facility.
    40. As the inventory progresses, inspectors shall install 
such agreed seals as may be necessary to clearly indicate if 
any stocks are removed, and to ensure the securing of the 
storage facility during the inventory. After completion of the 
inventory, such seals will be removed unless otherwise agreed.
            Systematic verification of storage facilities
    41. The purpose of the systematic verification of storage 
facilities shall be to ensure that no undetected removal of 
chemical weapons from such facilities takes place.
    42. The systematic verification shall be initiated as soon 
as possible after the declaration of chemical weapons is 
submitted and shall continue until all chemical weapons have 
been removed from the storage facility. It shall in accordance 
with the facility agreement, combine on-site inspection and 
monitoring with on-site instruments.
    43. When all chemical weapons have been removed from the 
storage facility, the Technical Secretariat shall confirm the 
declaration of the State Party to that effect. After this 
confirmation, the Technical Secretariat shall terminate the 
systematic verification of the storage facility and shall 
promptly remove any monitoring instruments installed by the 
inspectors.
            Inspections and visits
    44. The particular storage facility to be inspected shall 
be chosen by the Technical Secretariat in such a way as to 
preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be 
inspected. The guidelines for determining the frequency of 
systematic on-site inspections shall be elaborated by the 
Technical Secretariat, taking into account the recommendations 
to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to 
Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    45. The Technical Secretariat shall notify the inspected 
State Party of its decision to inspect or visit the storage 
facility 48 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection 
team at the facility for systematic inspections or visits. In 
cases of inspections or visits to resolve urgent problems, this 
period may be shortened. The Technical Secretariat shall 
specify the purpose of the inspection or visit.
    46. The inspected State Party shall make any necessary 
preparations for the arrival of the inspectors and shall ensure 
their expeditious transportation from their point of entry to 
the storage facility. The facility agreement will specify 
administrative arrangements for inspectors.
    47. The inspected State Party shall provide the inspection 
team upon its arrival at the chemical weapons storage facility 
to carry out an inspection, with the following data on the 
facility:
          (a) The number of storage buildings and storage 
        locations;
          (b) For each storage building and storage location, 
        the type and the identification number or designation, 
        shown on the site diagram; and
          (c) For each storage building and storage location at 
        the facility, the number of items of each specific type 
        of chemical weapon, and, for containers that are not 
        part of binary munitions, the actual quantity of 
        chemical fill in each container.
    48. In carrying out an inventory, within the time 
available, inspectors shall have the right:
          (a) To use any of the following inspection 
        techniques:
                  (i) inventory all the chemical weapons stored 
                at the facility;
                  (ii) inventory all the chemical weapons 
                stored in specific buildings or locations at 
                the facility, as chosen by the inspectors; or
                  (iii) inventory all the chemical weapons of 
                one or more specific types stored at the 
                facility, as chosen by the inspectors; and
          (b) To check all items inventoried against agreed 
        records.
    49. Inspectors shall, in accordance with facility 
agreements:
          (a) Have unimpeded access to all parts of the storage 
        facilities including any munitions, devices, bulk 
        containers, or other containers therein. While 
        conducting their activity, inspectors shall comply with 
        the safety regulations at the facility. The items to be 
        inspected will be chosen by the inspectors; and
          (b) Have the right, during the first and any 
        subsequent inspection of each chemical weapons storage 
        facility, to designate munitions, devices, and 
        containers from which samples are to be taken, and to 
        affix to such munitions, devices, and containers a 
        unique tag that will indicate an attempt to remove or 
        alter the tag. A sample shall be taken from a tagged 
        item at a chemical weapons storage facility or a 
        chemical weapons destruction facility as soon as it is 
        practically possible in accordance with the 
        corresponding destruction programmes, and, in any case, 
        not later than by the end of the destruction 
        operations.
            Systematic verification of the destruction of chemical 
                    weapons
    50. The purpose of verification of destruction of chemical 
weapons shall be:
          (a) To confirm the identity and quantity of the 
        chemical weapons stocks to be destroyed; and
          (b) To confirm that these stocks have been destroyed.
    51. Chemical weapons destruction operations during the 
first 390 days after the entry into force of this Convention 
shall be governed by transitional verification arrangements. 
Such arrangements, including a transitional facility agreement, 
provisions for verification through on-site inspection and 
monitoring with on-site instruments, and the time-frame for 
application of the arrangements, shall be agreed between the 
Organization and the inspected State Party. These arrangements 
shall be approved by the Executive Council not later than 60 
days after this Convention enters into force for the State 
Party, taking into account the recommendations of the Technical 
Secretariat, which shall be based on an evaluation of the 
detailed facility information provided in accordance with 
paragraph 31 and a visit to the facility. The Executive Council 
shall, at its first session, establish the guidelines for such 
transitional verification arrangements, based on 
recommendations to be considered and approved by the Conference 
pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). The transitional 
verification arrangements shall be designed to verify, 
throughout the entire transitional period, the destruction of 
chemical weapons in accordance with the purposes set forth in 
paragraph 50, and to avoid hampering ongoing destruction 
operations.
    52. The provisions of paragraphs 53 to 61 shall apply to 
chemical weapons destruction operations that are to begin not 
earlier than 390 days after the entry into force of this 
Convention.
    53. On the basis of this Convention and the detailed 
destruction facility information, and as the case may be, on 
experience from previous inspections, the Technical Secretariat 
shall prepare a draft plan for inspecting the destruction of 
chemical weapons at each destruction facility. The plan shall 
be completed and provided to the inspected State Party for 
comment not less than 270 days before the facility begins 
destruction operations pursuant to this Convention. Any 
differences between the Technical Secretariat and the inspected 
State Party should be resolved through consultations. Any 
unresolved matter shall be forwarded to the Executive Council 
for appropriate action with a view to facilitating the full 
implementation of this Convention.
    54. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial 
visit to each chemical weapons destruction facility of the 
inspected State Party not less than 240 days before each 
facility begins destruction operations pursuant to this 
Convention, to allow it to familiarize itself with the facility 
and assess the adequacy of the inspection plan.
    55. In the case of an existing facility where chemical 
weapons destruction operations have already been initiated, the 
inspected State Party shall not be required to decontaminate 
the facility before the Technical Secretariat conducts an 
initial visit. The duration of the visit shall not exceed five 
days and the number of visiting personnel shall not exceed 15.
    56. The agreed detailed plans for verification, with an 
appropriate recommendation by the Technical Secretariat, shall 
be forwarded to the Executive Council for review. The Executive 
Council shall review the plans with a view to approving them, 
consistent with verification objectives and obligations under 
this Convention. It should also confirm that verification 
schemes for destruction are consistent with verification aims 
and are efficient and practical. This review should be 
completed not less than 180 days before the destruction period 
begins.
    57. Each member of the Executive Council may consult with 
the Technical Secretariat on any issues regarding the adequacy 
of the plan for verification. If there are no objections by any 
member of the Executive Council, the plan shall be put into 
action.
    58. If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council 
shall enter into consultations with the State Party to 
reconcile them. If any difficulties remain unresolved they 
shall be referred to the Conference.
    59. The detailed facility agreements for chemical weapons 
destruction facilities shall specify, taking into account the 
specific characteristics of the destruction facility and its 
mode of operation:
          (a) Detailed on-site inspection procedures; and
          (b) Provisions for verification through continuous 
        monitoring with on-site instruments and physical 
        presence of inspectors.
    60. Inspectors shall be granted access to each chemical 
weapons destruction facility not less than 60 days before the 
commencement of the destruction, pursuant to this Convention, 
at the facility. Such access shall be for the purpose of 
supervising the installation of the inspection equipment, 
inspecting this equipment and testing its operation, as well as 
for the purpose of carrying out a final engineering review of 
the facility. In the case of an existing facility where 
chemical weapons destruction operations have already been 
initiated, destruction operations shall be stopped for the 
minimum amount of time required, not to exceed 60 days, for 
installation and testing of the inspection equipment. Depending 
on the results of the testing and review, the State Party and 
the Technical Secretariat may agree on additions or changes to 
the detailed facility agreement for the facility.
    61. The inspected State Party shall notify, in writing, the 
inspection team leader at a chemical weapons destruction 
facility not less than four hours before the departure of each 
shipment of chemical weapons from a chemical weapons storage 
facility to that destruction facility. This notification shall 
specify the name of the storage facility, the estimated times 
of departure and arrival, the specific types and quantities of 
chemical weapons being transported, whether any tagged items 
are being moved, and the method of transportation. This 
notification may include notification of more than one 
shipment. The inspection team leader shall be promptly 
notified, in writing, of any changes in this information.
            Chemical weapons storage facilities at chemical weapons 
                    destruction facilities
    62. The inspectors shall verify the arrival of the chemical 
weapons at the destruction facility and the storing of these 
chemical weapons. The inspectors shall verify the inventory of 
each shipment, using agreed procedures consistent with facility 
safety regulations, prior to the destruction of the chemical 
weapons. They shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, 
markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an 
accurate inventory of the chemical weapons prior to 
destruction.
    63. As soon and as long as chemical weapons are stored at 
chemical weapons storage facilities located at chemical weapons 
destruction facilities, these storage facilities shall be 
subject to systematic verification in conformity with the 
relevant facility agreements.
    64. At the end of an active destruction phase, inspectors 
shall make an inventory of the chemical weapons, that have been 
removed from the storage facility, to be destroyed. They shall 
verify the accuracy of the inventory of the chemical weapons 
remaining, employing inventory control procedures as referred 
to in paragraph 62.
            Systematic on-site verification measures at chemical 
                    weapons destruction facilities
    65. The inspectors shall be granted access to conduct their 
activities at the chemical weapons destruction facilities and 
the chemical weapons storage facilities located at such 
facilities during the entire active phase of destruction.
    66. At each chemical weapons destruction facility, to 
provide assurance that no chemical weapons are diverted and 
that the destruction process has been completed, inspectors 
shall have the right to verify through their physical presence 
and monitoring with on-site instruments:
          (a) The receipt of chemical weapons at the facility;
          (b) The temporary holding area for chemical weapons 
        and the specific type and quantity of chemical weapons 
        stored in that area;
          (c) The specific type and quantity of chemical 
        weapons being destroyed;
          (d) The process of destruction;
          (e) The end-product of destruction;
          (f) The mutilation of metal parts; and
          (g) The integrity of the destruction process and of 
        the facility as a whole.
    67. Inspectors shall have the right to tag, for sampling, 
munitions, devices, or containers located in the temporary 
holding areas at the chemical weapons destruction facilities.
    68. To the extent that it meets inspection requirements, 
information from routine facility operations, with appropriate 
data authentication, shall be used for inspection purposes.
    69. After the completion of each period of destruction, the 
Technical Secretariat shall confirm the declaration of the 
State Party, reporting the completion of destruction of the 
designated quantity of chemical weapons.
    70. Inspectors shall, in accordance with facility 
agreements:
          (a) Have unimpeded access to all parts of the 
        chemical weapons destruction facilities and the 
        chemical weapons storage facilities located at such 
        facilities, including any munitions, devices, bulk 
        containers, or other containers, therein. The items to 
        be inspected shall be chosen by the inspectors in 
        accordance with the verification plan that has been 
        agreed to by the inspected State Party and approved by 
        the Executive Council;
          (b) Monitor the systematic on-site analysis of 
        samples during the destruction process; and
          (c) Receive, if necessary, samples taken at their 
        request from any devices, bulk containers and other 
        containers at the destruction facility or the storage 
        facility thereat.

                              Part IV (B)

          OLD CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ABANDONED CHEMICAL WEAPONS

A. General

    1. Old chemical weapons shall be destroyed as provided for 
in Section B.
    2. Abandoned chemical weapons, including those which also 
meet the definition of Article II, paragraph 5 (b), shall be 
destroyed as provided for in Section C.

B. Regime for old chemical weapons

    3. A State Party which has on its territory old chemical 
weapons as defined in Article II, paragraph 5 (a), shall, not 
later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for 
it, submit to the Technical Secretariat all available relevant 
information, including, to the extent possible, the location, 
type, quantity and the present condition of these old chemical 
weapons.
    In the case of old chemical weapons as defined in Article 
II, paragraph 5 (b), the State Party shall submit to the 
Technical Secretariat a declaration pursuant to Article III, 
paragraph 1 (b) (i), including, to the extent possible, the 
information specified in Part IV (A), paragraphs 1 to 3, of 
this Annex.
    4. A State Party which discovers old chemical weapons after 
this Convention enters into force for it shall submit to the 
Technical Secretariat the information specified in paragraph 3 
not later than 180 days after the discovery of the old chemical 
weapons.
    5. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial 
inspection, and any further inspections as may be necessary, in 
order to verify the information submitted pursuant to 
paragraphs 3 and 4 and in particular to determine whether the 
chemical weapons meet the definition of old chemical weapons as 
specified in Article II, paragraph 5. Guidelines to determine 
the usability of chemical weapons produced between 1925 and 
1946 shall be considered and approved by the Conference 
pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    6. A State Party shall treat old chemical weapons that have 
been confirmed by the Technical Secretariat as meeting the 
definition in Article II, paragraph 5 (a), as toxic waste. It 
shall inform the Technical Secretariat of the steps being taken 
to destroy or otherwise dispose of such old chemical weapons as 
toxic waste in accordance with its national legislation.
    7. Subject to paragraphs 3 to 5, a State Party shall 
destroy old chemical weapons that have been confirmed by the 
Technical Secretariat as meeting the definition in Article II, 
paragraph 5 (b), in accordance with Article IV and Part IV (A) 
of this Annex. Upon request of a State Party, the Executive 
Council may, however, modify the provisions on time-limit and 
order of destruction of these old chemical weapons, if it 
determines that doing so would not pose a risk to the object 
and purpose of this Convention. The request shall contain 
specific proposals for modification of the provisions and a 
detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed 
modification.

C. Regime for abandoned chemical weapons

    8. A State Party on whose territory there are abandoned 
chemical weapons (hereinafter referred to as the ``Territorial 
State Party'') shall, not later than 30 days after this 
Convention enters into force for it, submit to the Technical 
Secretariat all available relevant information concerning the 
abandoned chemical weapons. This information shall include, to 
the extent possible, the location, type, quantity and the 
present condition of the abandoned chemical weapons as well as 
information on the abandonment.
    9. A State Party which discovers abandoned chemical weapons 
after this Convention enters into force for it shall, not later 
than 180 days after the discovery, submit to the Technical 
Secretariat all available relevant information concerning the 
discovered abandoned chemical weapons. This information shall 
include, to the extent possible, the location, type, quantity 
and the present condition of the abandoned chemical weapons as 
well as information on the abandonment.
    10. A State Party which has abandoned chemical weapons on 
the territory of another State Party (hereinafter referred to 
as the ``Abandoning State Party'') shall, not later than 30 
days after this Convention enters into force for it, submit to 
the Technical Secretariat all available relevant information 
concerning the abandoned chemical weapons. This information 
shall include, to the extent possible, the location, type, 
quantity as well as information on the abandonment, and the 
condition of the abandoned chemical weapons.
    11. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial 
inspection, and any further inspections as may be necessary, in 
order to verify all available relevant information submitted 
pursuant to paragraphs 8 to 10 and determine whether systematic 
verification in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraphs 41 to 
43, of this Annex is required. It shall, if necessary, verify 
the origin of the abandoned chemical weapons and establish 
evidence concerning the abandonment and the identity of the 
Abandoning State.
    12. The report of the Technical Secretariat shall be 
submitted to the Executive Council, the Territorial State 
Party, and to the Abandoning State Party or the State Party 
declared by the Territorial State Party or identified by the 
Technical Secretariat as having abandoned the chemical weapons. 
If one of the States Parties directly concerned is not 
satisfied with the report it shall have the right to settle the 
matter in accordance with provisions of this Convention or 
bring the issue to the Executive Council with a view to 
settling the matter expeditiously.
    13. Pursuant to Article I, paragraph 3, the Territorial 
State Party shall have the right to request the State Party 
which has been established as the Abandoning State Party 
pursuant to paragraphs 8 to 12 to enter into consultations for 
the purpose of destroying the abandoned chemical weapons in 
cooperation with the Territorial State Party. It shall 
immediately inform the Technical Secretariat of this request.
    14. Consultations between the Territorial State Party and 
the Abandoning State Party with a view to establishing a 
mutually agreed plan for destruction shall begin not later than 
30 days after the Technical Secretariat has been informed of 
the request referred to in paragraph 13. The mutually agreed 
plan for destruction shall be transmitted to the Technical 
Secretariat not later than 180 days after the Technical 
Secretariat has been informed of the request referred to in 
paragraph 13. Upon the request of the Abandoning State Party 
and the Territorial State Party, the Executive Council may 
extend the time-limit for transmission of the mutually agreed 
plan for destruction.
    15. For the purpose of destroying abandoned chemical 
weapons, the Abandoning State Party shall provide all necessary 
financial, technical, expert, facility as well as other 
resources. The Territorial State Party shall provide 
appropriate cooperation.
    16. If the Abandoning State cannot be identified or is not 
a State Party, the Territorial State Party, in order to ensure 
the destruction of these abandoned chemical weapons, may 
request the Organization and other States Parties to provide 
assistance in the destruction of these abandoned chemical 
weapons.
    17. Subject to paragraphs 8 to 16, Article IV and Part IV 
(A) of this Annex shall also apply to the destruction of 
abandoned chemical weapons. In the case of abandoned chemical 
weapons which also meet the definition of old chemical weapons 
in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), the Executive Council, upon the 
request of the Territorial State Party, individually or 
together with the Abandoning State Party, may modify or in 
exceptional cases suspend the application of provisions on 
destruction, if it determines that doing so would not pose a 
risk to the object and purpose of this Convention. In the case 
of abandoned chemical weapons which do not meet the definition 
of old chemical weapons in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), the 
Executive Council, upon the request of the Territorial State 
Party, individually or together with the Abandoning State 
Party, may in exceptional circumstances modify the provisions 
on the time-limit and the order of destruction, if it 
determines that doing so would not pose a risk to the object 
and purpose of this Convention. Any request as referred to in 
this paragraph shall contain specific proposals for 
modification of the provisions and a detailed explanation of 
the reasons for the proposed modification.
    18. States Parties may conclude between themselves 
agreements or arrangements concerning the destruction of 
abandoned chemical weapons. The Executive Council may, upon 
request of the Territorial State Party, individually or 
together with the Abandoning State Party, decide that selected 
provisions of such agreements or arrangements take precedence 
over provisions of this Section, if it determines that the 
agreement or arrangement ensures the destruction of the 
abandoned chemical weapons in accordance with paragraph 17.

                                 Part V

     DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND ITS 
                   VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE V

A. Declarations

            Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities
    1. The declaration of chemical weapons production 
facilities by a State Party pursuant to Article III, paragraph 
1 (c) (ii), shall contain for each facility:
          (a) The name of the facility, the names of the 
        owners, and the names of the companies or enterprises 
        operating the facility since 1 January 1946;
          (b) The precise location of the facility, including 
        the address, location of the complex, location of the 
        facility within the complex including the specific 
        building and structure number, if any;
          (c) A statement whether it is a facility for the 
        manufacture of chemicals that are defined as chemical 
        weapons or whether it is a facility for the filling of 
        chemical weapons, or both;
          (d) The date when the construction of the facility 
        was completed and the periods during which any 
        modifications to the facility were made, including the 
        installation of new or modified equipment, that 
        significantly changed the production process 
        characteristics of the facility;
          (e) Information on the chemicals defined as chemical 
        weapons that were manufactured at the facility; the 
        munitions, devices, and containers that were filled at 
        the facility; and the dates of the beginning and 
        cessation of such manufacture or filling:
                  (i) For chemicals defined as chemical weapons 
                that were manufactured at the facility, such 
                information shall be expressed in terms of the 
                specific types of chemicals manufactured, 
                indicating the chemical name in accordance with 
                the current International Union of Pure and 
                Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) nomenclature, 
                structural formula, and the Chemical Abstracts 
                Service registry number, if assigned, and in 
                terms of the amount of each chemical expressed 
                by weight of chemical in tonnes;
                  (ii) For munitions, devices and containers 
                that were filled at the facility, such 
                information shall be expressed in terms of the 
                specific type of chemical weapons filled and 
                the weight of the chemical fill per unit;
          (f) The production capacity of the chemical weapons 
        production facility:
                  (i) For a facility where chemical weapons 
                were manufactured, production capacity shall be 
                expressed in terms of the annual quantitative 
                potential for manufacturing a specific 
                substance on the basis of the technological 
                process actually used or, in the case of 
                processes not actually used, planned to be used 
                at the facility;
                  (ii) For a facility where chemical weapons 
                were filled, production capacity shall be 
                expressed in terms of the quantity of chemical 
                that the facility can fill into each specific 
                type of chemical weapon a year;
          (g) For each chemical weapons production facility 
        that has not been destroyed, a description of the 
        facility, including:
                  (i) A site diagram;
                  (ii) A process flow diagram of the facility; 
                and
                  (iii) An inventory of buildings at the 
                facility, and specialized equipment at the 
                facility and of any spare parts for such 
                equipment;
          (h) The present status of the facility, stating:
                  (i) The date when chemical weapons were last 
                produced at the facility;
                  (ii) Whether the facility has been destroyed, 
                including the date and manner of its 
                destruction; and
                  (iii) Whether the facility has been used or 
                modified before entry into force of this 
                Convention for an activity not related to the 
                production of chemical weapons, and if so, 
                information on what modifications have been 
                made, the date such non-chemical weapons 
                related activity began and the nature of such 
                activity, indicating, if applicable, the kind 
                of product;
          (i) A specification of the measures that have been 
        taken by the State Party for closure of, and a 
        description of the measures that have been or will be 
        taken by the State Party to inactivate the facility;
          (j) A description of the normal pattern of activity 
        for safety and security at the inactivated facility; 
        and
          (k) A statement as to whether the facility will be 
        converted for the destruction of chemical weapons and, 
        if so, the dates for such conversions.
            Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities 
                    pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (iii)
    2. The declaration of chemical weapons production 
facilities pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (iii), 
shall contain all information specified in paragraph 1 above. 
It is the responsibility of the State Party on whose territory 
the facility is or has been located to make appropriate 
arrangements with the other State to ensure that the 
declarations are made. If the State Party on whose territory 
the facility is or has been located is not able to fulfil this 
obligation, it shall state the reasons therefor.
            Declarations of past transfers and receipts
    3. A State Party that has transferred or received chemical 
weapons production equipment since 1 January 1946 shall declare 
these transfers and receipts pursuant to Article III, paragraph 
1 (c) (iv), and in accordance with paragraph 5 below. When not 
all the specified information is available for transfer and 
receipt of such equipment for the period between 1 January 1946 
and 1 January 1970, the State Party shall declare whatever 
information is still available to it and provide an explanation 
as to why it cannot submit a full declaration.
    4. Chemical weapons production equipment referred to in 
paragraph 3 means:
          (a) Specialized equipment;
          (b) Equipment for the production of equipment 
        specifically designed for use directly in connection 
        with chemical weapons employment; and
          (c) Equipment designed or used exclusively for 
        producing non-chemical parts for chemical munitions.
    5. The declaration concerning transfer and receipt of 
chemical weapons production equipment shall specify:
          (a) Who received/transferred the chemical weapons 
        production equipment;
          (b) The identity of such equipment;
          (c) The date of transfer or receipt;
          (d) Whether the equipment was destroyed, if known; 
        and
          (e) Current disposition, if known.
            Submission of general plans for destruction
    6. For each chemical weapons production facility, a State 
Party shall supply the following information:
          (a) Envisaged time-frame for measures to be taken; 
        and
          (b) Methods of destruction.
    7. For each chemical weapons production facility that a 
State Party intends to convert temporarily into a chemical 
weapons destruction facility, the State Party shall supply the 
following information:
          (a) Envisaged time-frame for conversion into a 
        destruction facility;
          (b) Envisaged time-frame for utilizing the facility 
        as a chemical weapons destruction facility;
          (c) Description of the new facility;
          (d) Method of destruction of special equipment;
          (e) Time-frame for destruction of the converted 
        facility after it has been utilized to destroy chemical 
        weapons; and
          (f) Method of destruction of the converted facility.
            Submission of annual plans for destruction and annual 
                    reports on destruction
    8. The State Party shall submit an annual plan for 
destruction not less than 90 days before the beginning of the 
coming destruction year. The annual plan shall specify:
          (a) Capacity to be destroyed;
          (b) Name and location of the facilities where 
        destruction will take place;
          (c) List of buildings and equipment that will be 
        destroyed at each facility; and
          (d) Planned method(s) of destruction.
    9. A State Party shall submit an annual report on 
destruction not later than 90 days after the end of the 
previous destruction year. The annual report shall specify:
          (a) Capacity destroyed;
          (b) Name and location of each facility where 
        destruction took place;
          (c) List of buildings and equipment that were 
        destroyed at each facility;
          (d) Methods of destruction.
    10. For a chemical weapons production facility declared 
pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (iii), it is the 
responsibility of the State Party on whose territory the 
facility is or has been located to make appropriate 
arrangements to ensure that the declarations specified in 
paragraphs 6 to 9 above are made. If the State Party on whose 
territory the facility is or has been located is not able to 
fulfil this obligation, it shall state the reasons therefor.

B. Destruction

            General principles for destruction of chemical weapons 
                    production facilities
    11. Each State Party shall decide on methods to be applied 
for the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, 
according to the principles laid down in Article V and in this 
Part.
            Principles and methods for closure of a chemical weapons 
                    production facility
    12. The purpose of the closure of a chemical weapons 
production facility is to render it inactive.
    13. Agreed measures for closure shall be taken by a State 
Party with due regard to the specific characteristics of each 
facility. Such measures shall include, inter alia:
          (a) Prohibition of occupation of the specialized 
        buildings and standard buildings of the facility except 
        for agreed activities;
          (b) Disconnection of equipment directly related to 
        the production of chemical weapons, including, inter 
        alia, process control equipment and utilities;
          (c) Decommissioning of protective installations and 
        equipment used exclusively for the safety of operations 
        of the chemical weapons production facility;
          (d) Installation of blind flanges and other devices 
        to prevent the addition of chemicals to, or the removal 
        of chemicals from, any specialized process equipment 
        for synthesis, separation or purification of chemicals 
        defined as a chemical weapon, any storage tank, or any 
        machine for filling chemical weapons, the heating, 
        cooling, or supply of electrical or other forms of 
        power to such equipment, storage tanks, or machines; 
        and
          (e) Interruption of rail, road and other access 
        routes for heavy transport to the chemical weapons 
        production facility except those required for agreed 
        activities.
    14. While the chemical weapons production facility remains 
closed, a State Party may continue safety and physical security 
activities at the facility.
            Technical maintenance of chemical weapons production 
                    facilities prior to their destruction
    15. A State Party may carry out standard maintenance 
activities at chemical weapons production facilities only for 
safety reasons, including visual inspection, preventive 
maintenance, and routine repairs.
    16. All planned maintenance activities shall be specified 
in the general and detailed plans for destruction. Maintenance 
activities shall not include:
          (a) Replacement of any process equipment;
          (b) Modification of the characteristics of the 
        chemical process equipment;
          (c) Production of chemicals of any type.
    17. All maintenance activities shall be subject to 
monitoring by the Technical Secretariat.
            Principles and methods for temporary conversion of chemical 
                    weapons production facilities into chemical weapons 
                    destruction facilities
    18. Measures pertaining to the temporary conversion of 
chemical weapons production facilities into chemical weapons 
destruction facilities shall ensure that the regime for the 
temporarily converted facilities is at least as stringent as 
the regime for chemical weapons production facilities that have 
not been converted.
    19. Chemical weapons production facilities converted into 
chemical weapons destruction facilities before entry into force 
of this Convention shall be declared under the category of 
chemical weapons production facilities.
    They shall be subject to an initial visit by inspectors, 
who shall confirm the correctness of the information about 
these facilities. Verification that the conversion of these 
facilities was performed in such a manner as to render them 
inoperable as chemical weapons production facilities shall also 
be required, and shall fall within the framework of measures 
provided for the facilities that are to be rendered inoperable 
not later than 90 days after entry into force of this 
Convention.
    20. A State Party that intends to carry out a conversion of 
chemical weapons production facilities shall submit to the 
Technical Secretariat, not later than 30 days after this 
Convention enters into force for it, or not later than 30 days 
after a decision has been taken for temporary conversion, a 
general facility conversion plan, and subsequently shall submit 
annual plans.
    21. Should a State Party have the need to convert to a 
chemical weapons destruction facility an additional chemical 
weapons production facility that had been closed after this 
Convention entered into force for it, it shall inform the 
Technical Secretariat thereof not less than 150 days before 
conversion. The Technical Secretariat, in conjunction with the 
State Party, shall make sure that the necessary measures are 
taken to render that facility, after its conversion, inoperable 
as a chemical weapons production facility.
    22. A facility converted for the destruction of chemical 
weapons shall not be more fit for resuming chemical weapons 
production than a chemical weapons production facility which 
has been closed and is under maintenance. Its reactivation 
shall require no less time than that required for a chemical 
weapons production facility that has been closed and is under 
maintenance.
    23. Converted chemical weapons production facilities shall 
be destroyed not later than 10 years after entry into force of 
this Convention.
    24. Any measures for the conversion of any given chemical 
weapons production facility shall be facility-specific and 
shall depend upon its individual characteristics.
    25. The set of measures carried out for the purpose of 
converting a chemical weapons production facility into a 
chemical weapons destruction facility shall not be less than 
that which is provided for the disabling of other chemical 
weapons production facilities to be carried out not later than 
90 days after this Convention enters into force for the State 
Party.
            Principles and methods related to destruction of a chemical 
                    weapons production facility
    26. A State Party shall destroy equipment and buildings 
covered by the definition of a chemical weapons production 
facility as follows:
          (a) All specialized equipment and standard equipment 
        shall be physically destroyed;
          (b) All specialized buildings and standard buildings 
        shall be physically destroyed.
    27. A State Party shall destroy facilities for producing 
unfilled chemical munitions and equipment for chemical weapons 
employment as follows:
           (a) Facilities used exclusively for production of 
        non-chemical parts for chemical munitions or equipment 
        specifically designed for use directly in connection 
        with chemical weapons employment, shall be declared and 
        destroyed. The destruction process and its verification 
        shall be conducted according to the provisions of 
        Article V and this Part of this Annex that govern 
        destruction of chemical weapons production facilities;
          (b) All equipment designed or used exclusively for 
        producing non-chemical parts for chemical munitions 
        shall be physically destroyed. Such equipment, which 
        includes specially designed molds and metal-forming 
        dies, may be brought to a special location for 
        destruction;
          (c) All buildings and standard equipment used for 
        such production activities shall be destroyed or 
        converted for purposes not prohibited under this 
        Convention, with confirmation, as necessary, through 
        consultations and inspections as provided for under 
        Article IX;
          (d) Activities for purposes not prohibited under this 
        Convention may continue while destruction or conversion 
        proceeds.
            Order of destruction
    28. The order of destruction of chemical weapons production 
facilities is based on the obligations specified in Article I 
and the other Articles of this Convention, including 
obligations regarding systematic on-site verification. It takes 
into account interests of States Parties for undiminished 
security during the destruction period; confidence-building in 
the early part of the destruction stage; gradual acquisition of 
experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons 
production facilities; and applicability irrespective of the 
actual characteristics of the facilities and the methods chosen 
for their destruction. The order of destruction is based on the 
principle of levelling out.
    29. A State Party shall, for each destruction period, 
determine which chemical weapons production facilities are to 
be destroyed and carry out the destruction in such a way that 
not more than what is specified in paragraphs 30 and 31 remains 
at the end of each destruction period. A State Party is not 
precluded from destroying its facilities at a faster pace.
    30. The following provisions shall apply to chemical 
weapons production facilities that produce Schedule 1 
chemicals:
          (a) A State Party shall start the destruction of such 
        facilities not later than one year after this 
        Convention enters into force for it, and shall complete 
        it not later than 10 years after entry into force of 
        this Convention. For a State which is a Party at the 
        entry into force of this Convention, this overall 
        period shall be divided into three separate destruction 
        periods, namely, years 2-5, years 6-8, and years 9-10. 
        For States which become a Party after entry into force 
        of this Convention, the destruction periods shall be 
        adapted, taking into account paragraphs 28 and 29;
          (b) Production capacity shall be used as the 
        comparison factor for such facilities. It shall be 
        expressed in agent tonnes, taking into account the 
        rules specified for binary chemical weapons;
          (c) Appropriate agreed levels of production capacity 
        shall be established for the end of the eighth year 
        after entry into force of this Convention. Production 
        capacity that exceeds the relevant level shall be 
        destroyed in equal increments during the first two 
        destruction periods;
          (d) A requirement to destroy a given amount of 
        capacity shall entail a requirement to destroy any 
        other chemical weapons production facility that 
        supplied the Schedule 1 facility or filled the Schedule 
        1 chemical produced there into munitions or devices; 
        and
          (e) Chemical weapons production facilities that have 
        been converted temporarily for destruction of chemical 
        weapons shall continue to be subject to the obligation 
        to destroy capacity according to the provisions of this 
        paragraph.
    31. A State Party shall start the destruction of chemical 
weapons production facilities not covered in paragraph 30 not 
later than one year after this Convention enters into force for 
it, and complete it not later than five years after entry into 
force of this Convention.
            Detailed plans for destruction
    32. Not less than 180 days before the destruction of a 
chemical weapons production facility starts, a State Party 
shall provide to the Technical Secretariat the detailed plans 
for destruction of the facility, including proposed measures 
for verification of destruction referred to in paragraph 33 
(f), with respect to, inter alia:
          (a) Timing of the presence of the inspectors at the 
        facility to be destroyed; and
          (b) Procedures for verification of measures to be 
        applied to each item on the declared inventory.
    33. The detailed plans for destruction of each chemical 
weapons production facility shall contain:
          (a) Detailed time schedule of the destruction 
        process;
          (b) Layout of the facility;
          (c) Process flow diagram;
          (d) Detailed inventory of equipment, buildings and 
        other items to be destroyed;
          (e) Measures to be applied to each item on the 
        inventory;
          (f) Proposed measures for verification;
          (g) Security/safety measures to be observed during 
        the destruction of the facility; and
          (h) Working and living conditions to be provided for 
        inspectors.
    34. If a State Party intends to convert temporarily a 
chemical weapons production facility into a chemical weapons 
destruction facility, it shall notify the Technical Secretariat 
not less than 150 days before undertaking any conversion 
activities. The notification shall:
          (a) Specify the name, address, and location of the 
        facility;
          (b) Provide a site diagram indicating all structures 
        and areas that will be involved in the destruction of 
        chemical weapons and also identify all structures of 
        the chemical weapons production facility that are to be 
        temporarily converted;
          (c) Specify the types of chemical weapons, and the 
        type and quantity of chemical fill to be destroyed;
          (d) Specify the destruction method;
          (e) Provide a process flow diagram, indicating which 
        portions of the production process and specialized 
        equipment will be converted for the destruction of 
        chemical weapons;
          (f) Specify the seals and inspection equipment 
        potentially affected by the conversion, if applicable; 
        and
          (g) Provide a schedule identifying: The time 
        allocated to design, temporary conversion of the 
        facility, installation of equipment, equipment check-
        out, destruction operations, and closure.
    35. In relation to the destruction of a facility that was 
temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons, 
information shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 32 
and 33.
            Review of detailed plans
    36. On the basis of the detailed plan for destruction and 
proposed measures for verification submitted by the State 
Party, and on experience from previous inspections, the 
Technical Secretariat shall prepare a plan for verifying the 
destruction of the facility, consulting closely with the State 
Party. Any differences between the Technical Secretariat and 
the State Party concerning appropriate measures should be 
resolved through consultations. Any unresolved matters shall be 
forwarded to the Executive Council for appropriate action with 
a view to facilitating the full implementation of this 
Convention.
    37. To ensure that the provisions of Article V and this 
Part are fulfilled, the combined plans for destruction and 
verification shall be agreed upon between the Executive Council 
and the State Party. This agreement should be completed, not 
less than 60 days before the planned initiation of destruction.
    38. Each member of the Executive Council may consult with 
the Technical Secretariat on any issues regarding the adequacy 
of the combined plan for destruction and verification. If there 
are no objections by any member of the Executive Council, the 
plan shall be put into action.
    39. If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council 
shall enter into consultations with the State Party to 
reconcile them. If any difficulties remain unresolved they 
shall be referred to the Conference. The resolution of any 
differences over methods of destruction shall not delay the 
execution of other parts of the destruction plan that are 
acceptable.
    40. If agreement is not reached with the Executive Council 
on aspects of verification, or if the approved verification 
plan cannot be put into action, verification of destruction 
shall proceed through continuous monitoring with on-site 
instruments and physical presence of inspectors.
    41. Destruction and verification shall proceed according to 
the agreed plan. The verification shall not unduly interfere 
with the destruction process and shall be conducted through the 
presence of inspectors on-site to witness the destruction.
    42. If required verification or destruction actions are not 
taken as planned, all States Parties shall be so informed.

C. Verification

            Verification of declarations of chemical weapons production 
                    facilities through on-site inspection
    43. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial 
inspection of each chemical weapons production facility in the 
period between 90 and 120 days after this Convention enters 
into force for the State Party.
    44. The purposes of the initial inspection shall be:
          (a) To confirm that the production of chemical 
        weapons has ceased and that the facility has been 
        inactivated in accordance with this Convention;
          (b) To permit the Technical Secretariat to 
        familiarize itself with the measures that have been 
        taken to cease production of chemical weapons at the 
        facility;
          (c) To permit the inspectors to install temporary 
        seals;
          (d) To permit the inspectors to confirm the inventory 
        of buildings and specialized equipment;
          (e) To obtain information necessary for planning 
        inspection activities at the facility, including use of 
        tamper-indicating seals and other agreed equipment, 
        which shall be installed pursuant to the detailed 
        facility agreement for the facility; and
          (f) To conduct preliminary discussions regarding a 
        detailed agreement on inspection procedures at the 
        facility.
    45. Inspectors shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, 
markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an 
accurate inventory of the declared items at each chemical 
weapons production facility.
    46. Inspectors shall install such agreed devices as may be 
necessary to indicate if any resumption of production of 
chemical weapons occurs or if any declared item is removed. 
They shall take the necessary precaution not to hinder closure 
activities by the inspected State Party. Inspectors may return 
to maintain and verify the integrity of the devices.
    47. If, on the basis of the initial inspection, the 
Director-General believes that additional measures are 
necessary to inactivate the facility in accordance with this 
Convention, the Director-General may request, not later than 
135 days after this Convention enters into force; for a State 
Party, that such measures be implemented by the inspected State 
Party not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into 
force for it. At its discretion, the inspected State Party may 
satisfy the request. If it does not satisfy the request, the 
inspected State Party and the Director-General shall consult to 
resolve the matter.
            Systematic verification of chemical weapons production 
                    facilities and cessation of their activities
    48. The purpose of the systematic verification of a 
chemical weapons production facility shall be to ensure that 
any resumption of production of chemical weapons or removal of 
declared items will be detected at this facility.
    49. The detailed facility agreement for each chemical 
weapons production facility shall specify:
          (a) Detailed on-site inspection procedures, which may 
        include:
                  (i) Visual examinations;
                  (ii) Checking and servicing of seals and 
                other agreed devices; and
                  (iii) Obtaining and analyzing samples;
          (b) Procedures for using tamper-indicating seals and 
        other agreed equipment to prevent the undetected 
        reactivation of the facility, which shall specify:
                  (i) The type, placement, and arrangements for 
                installation; and
                  (ii) The maintenance of such seals and 
                equipment; and
          (c) Other agreed measures.
    50. The seals or other approved equipment provided for in a 
detailed agreement on inspection measures for that facility 
shall be placed not later than 240 days after this Convention 
enters into force for a State Party. Inspectors shall be 
permitted to visit each chemical weapons production facility 
for the installation of such seals or equipment.
    51. During each calendar year, the Technical Secretariat 
shall be permitted to conduct up to four inspections of each 
chemical weapons production facility.
    52. The Director-General shall notify the inspected State 
Party of his decision to inspect or visit a chemical weapons 
production facility 48 hours before the planned arrival of the 
inspection team at the facility for systematic inspections or 
visits. In the case of inspections or visits to resolve urgent 
problems, this period may be shortened. The Director-General 
shall specify the purpose of the inspection or visit.
    53. Inspectors shall, in accordance with the facility 
agreements, have unimpeded access to all parts of the chemical 
weapons production facilities. The items on the declared 
inventory to be inspected shall be chosen by the inspectors.
    54. The guidelines for determining the frequency of 
systematic on-site inspections shall be considered and approved 
by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). 
The particular production facility to be inspected shall be 
chosen by the Technical Secretariat in such a way as to 
preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be 
inspected.
            Verification of destruction of chemical weapons production 
                    facilities
    55. The purpose of systematic verification of the 
destruction of chemical weapons production facilities shall be 
to confirm that the facility is destroyed in accordance with 
the obligations under this Convention and that each item on the 
declared inventory is destroyed in accordance with the agreed 
detailed plan for destruction.
    56. When all items on the declared inventory have been 
destroyed, the Technical Secretariat shall confirm the 
declaration of the State Party to that effect. After this 
confirmation, the Technical Secretariat shall terminate the 
systematic verification of the chemical weapons production 
facility and shall promptly remove all devices and monitoring 
instruments installed by the inspectors.
    57. After this confirmation, the State Party shall make the 
declaration that the facility has been destroyed.
            Verification of temporary conversion of a chemical weapons 
                    production facility into a chemical weapons 
                    destruction facility
    58. Not later than 90 days after receiving the initial 
notification of the intent to convert temporarily a production 
facility, the inspectors shall have the right to visit the 
facility to familiarize themselves with the proposed temporary 
conversion and to study possible inspection measures that will 
be required during the conversion.
    59. Not later than 60 days after such a visit, the 
Technical Secretariat and the inspected State Party shall 
conclude a transition agreement containing additional 
inspection measures for the temporary conversion period. The 
transition agreement shall specify inspection procedures, 
including the use of seals, monitoring equipment, and 
inspections, that will provide confidence that no chemical 
weapons production takes place during the conversion process. 
This agreement shall remain in force from the beginning of the 
temporary conversion activity until the facility begins 
operation as a chemical weapons destruction facility.
    60. The inspected State Party shall not remove or convert 
any portion of the facility, or remove or modify any seal or 
other agreed inspection equipment that may have been installed 
pursuant to this Convention until the transition agreement has 
been concluded.
    61. Once the facility begins operation as a chemical 
weapons destruction facility, it shall be subject to the 
provisions of Part IV (A) of this Annex applicable to chemical 
weapons destruction facilities. Arrangements for the pre-
operation period shall be governed by the transition agreement.
    62. During destruction operations the inspectors shall have 
access to all portions of the temporarily converted chemical 
weapons production facilities, including those that are not 
directly involved with the destruction of chemical weapons.
    63. Before the commencement of work at the facility to 
convert it temporarily for chemical weapons destruction 
purposes and after the facility has ceased to function as a 
facility for chemical weapons destruction, the facility shall 
be subject to the provisions of this Part applicable to 
chemical weapons production facilities.

D. Conversion of chemical weapons production facilities to purposes not 
        prohibited under this convention

            Procedures for requesting conversion
    64. A request to use a chemical weapons production facility 
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention may be made 
for any facility that a State Party is already using for such 
purposes before this Convention enters into force for it, or 
that it plans to use for such purposes.
    65. For a chemical weapons production facility that is 
being used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention 
when this Convention enters into force for the State Party, the 
request shall be submitted to the Director-General not later 
than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for the 
State Party. The request shall contain, in addition to data 
submitted in accordance with paragraph 1 (h) (iii), the 
following information:
          (a) A detailed justification for the request;
          (b) A general facility conversion plan that 
        specifies:
                  (i) The nature of the activity to be 
                conducted at the facility;
                  (ii) If the planned activity involves 
                production, processing, or consumption of 
                chemicals: the name of each of the chemicals, 
                the flow diagram of the facility, and the 
                quantities planned to be produced, processed, 
                or consumed annually;
                  (iii) Which buildings or structures are 
                proposed to be used and what modifications are 
                proposed, if any;
                  (iv) Which buildings or structures have been 
                destroyed or are proposed to be destroyed and 
                the plans for destruction;
                  (v) What equipment is to be used in the 
                facility;
                  (vi) What equipment has been removed and 
                destroyed and what equipment is proposed to be 
                removed and destroyed and the plans for its 
                destruction;
                  (vii) The proposed schedule for conversion, 
                if applicable; and
                  (viii) The nature of the activity of each 
                other facility operating at the site; and
          (c) A detailed explanation of how measures set forth 
        in subparagraph (b), as well as any other measures 
        proposed by the State Party, will ensure the prevention 
        of standby chemical weapons production capability at 
        the facility.
    66. For a chemical weapons production facility that is not 
being used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention 
when this Convention enters into force for the State Party, the 
request shall be submitted to the Director-General not later 
than 30 days after the decision to convert, but in no case 
later than four years after this Convention enters into force 
for the State Party. The request shall contain the following 
information:
         (a) A detailed justification for the request, 
        including its economic needs;
         (b) A general facility conversion plan that specifies:
                  (i) The nature of the activity planned to be 
                conducted at the facility;
                  (ii) If the planned activity involves 
                production, processing, or consumption of 
                chemicals: the name of each of the chemicals, 
                the flow diagram of the facility, and the 
                quantities planned to be produced, processed, 
                or consumed annually;
                  (iii) Which buildings or structures are 
                proposed to be retained and what modifications 
                are proposed, if any;
                  (iv) Which buildings or structures have been 
                destroyed or are proposed to be destroyed and 
                the plans for destruction;
                  (v) What equipment is proposed for use in the 
                facility;
                  (vi) What equipment is proposed to be removed 
                and destroyed and the plans for its 
                destruction;
                  (vii) The proposed schedule for conversion; 
                and
                  (viii) The nature of the activity of each 
                other facility operating at the site; and
          (c) A detailed explanation of how the measures set 
        forth in subparagraph (b), as well as any other 
        measures proposed by the State Party, will ensure the 
        prevention of standby chemical weapons production 
        capability at the facility.
    67. The State Party may propose in its request any other 
measures it deems appropriate to build confidence.
            Actions pending a decision
    68. Pending a decision of the Conference, a State Party may 
continue to use for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention a facility that was being used for such purposes 
before this Convention enters into force for it, but only if 
the State Party certifies in its request that no specialized 
equipment and no specialized buildings are being used and that 
the specialized equipment and specialized buildings have been 
rendered inactive using the methods specified in paragraph 13.
    69. If the facility, for which the request was made, was 
not being used for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention before this Convention enters into force for the 
State Party, or if the certification required in paragraph 68 
is not made, the State Party shall cease immediately all 
activity pursuant to Article V, paragraph 4. The State Party 
shall close the facility in accordance with paragraph 13 not 
later than 90 days after this Convention enters into force for 
it.
            Conditions for conversion
    70. As a condition for conversion of a chemical weapons 
production facility for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention, all specialized equipment at the facility must be 
destroyed and all special features of buildings and structures 
that distinguish them from buildings and structures normally 
used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention and not 
involving Schedule 1 chemicals must be eliminated.
    71. A converted facility shall not be used:
          (a) For any activity involving production, 
        processing, or consumption of a Schedule 1 chemical or 
        a Schedule 2 chemical; or
          (b) For the production of any highly toxic chemical, 
        including any highly toxic organophosphorus chemical, 
        or for any other activity that would require special 
        equipment for handling highly toxic or highly corrosive 
        chemicals, unless the Executive Council decides that 
        such production or activity would pose no risk to the 
        object and purpose of this Convention, taking into 
        account criteria for toxicity, corrosiveness and, if 
        applicable, other technical factors, to be considered 
        and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article 
        VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    72. Conversion of a chemical weapons production facility 
shall be completed not later than six years after entry into 
force of this Convention.
            Decisions by the Executive Council and the Conference
    73. Not later than 90 days after receipt of the request by 
the Director-General, an initial inspection of the facility 
shall be conducted by the Technical Secretariat. The purpose of 
this inspection shall be to determine the accuracy of the 
information provided in the request, to obtain information on 
the technical characteristics of the proposed converted 
facility, and to assess the conditions under which use for 
purposes not prohibited under this Convention may be permitted. 
The Director-General shall promptly submit a report to the 
Executive Council, the Conference, and all States Parties 
containing his recommendations on the measures necessary to 
convert the facility to purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention and to provide assurance that the converted facility 
will be used only for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention.
    74. If the facility has been used for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention before this Convention enters 
into force for the State Party, and is continuing to be in 
operation, but the measures required to be certified under 
paragraph 68 have not been taken, the Director-General shall 
immediately inform the Executive Council, which may require 
implementation of measures it deems appropriate, inter alia, 
shut-down of the facility and removal of specialized equipment 
and modification of buildings or structures. The Executive 
Council shall stipulate the deadline for implementation of 
these measures and shall suspend consideration of the request 
pending their satisfactory completion. The facility shall be 
inspected promptly after the expiration of the deadline to 
determine whether the measures have been implemented. If not, 
the State Party shall be required to shut down completely all 
facility operations.
    75. As soon as possible after receiving the report of the 
Director-General, the Conference, upon recommendation of the 
Executive Council, shall decide, taking into account the report 
and any views expressed by States Parties, whether to approve 
the request, and shall establish the conditions upon which 
approval is contingent. If any State Party objects to approval 
of the request and the associated conditions, consultations 
shall be undertaken among interested States Parties for up to 
90 days to seek a mutually acceptable solution. A decision on 
the request and associated conditions, along with any proposed 
modifications thereto, shall be taken, as a matter of 
substance, as soon as possible after the end of the 
consultation period.
    76. If the request is approved, a facility agreement shall 
be completed not later than 90 days after such a decision is 
taken. The facility agreement shall contain the conditions 
under which the conversion and use of the facility is 
permitted, including measures for verification. Conversion 
shall not begin before the facility agreement is concluded.
            Detailed plans for conversion
    77. Not less than 180 days before conversion of a chemical 
weapons production facility is planned to begin, the State 
Party shall provide the Technical Secretariat with the detailed 
plans for conversion of the facility, including proposed 
measures for verification of conversion, with respect to, inter 
alia:
          (a) Timing of the presence of the inspectors at the 
        facility to be converted; and
          (b) Procedures for verification of measures to be 
        applied to each item on the declared inventory.
    78. The detailed plan for conversion of each chemical 
weapons production facility shall contain:
          (a) Detailed time schedule of the conversion process;
          (b) Layout of the facility before and after 
        conversion;
          (c) Process flow diagram of the facility before, and 
        as appropriate, after the conversion;
          (d) Detailed inventory of equipment, buildings and 
        structures and other items to be destroyed and of the 
        buildings and structures to be modified;
          (e) Measures to be applied to each item on the 
        inventory, if any;
          (f) Proposed measures for verification;
          (g) Security/safety measures to be observed during 
        the conversion of the facility; and
          (h) Working and living conditions to be provided for 
        inspectors.
            Review of detailed plans
    79. On the basis of the detailed plan for conversion and 
proposed measures for verification submitted by the State 
Party, and on experience from previous inspections, the 
Technical Secretariat shall prepare a plan for verifying the 
conversion of the facility, consulting closely with the State 
Party. Any differences between the Technical Secretariat and 
the State Party concerning appropriate measures shall be 
resolved through consultations. Any unresolved matters shall be 
forwarded to the Executive Council for appropriate action with 
a view to facilitate the full implementation of this 
Convention.
    80. To ensure that the provisions of Article V and this 
Part are fulfilled, the combined plans for conversion and 
verification shall be agreed upon between the Executive Council 
and the State Party. This agreement shall be completed not less 
than 60 days before conversion is planned to begin.
    81. Each member of the Executive Council may consult with 
the Technical Secretariat on any issue regarding the adequacy 
of the combined plan for conversion and verification. If there 
are no objections by any member of the Executive Council, the 
plan shall be put into action.
    82. If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council 
should enter into consultations with the State Party to 
reconcile them. If any difficulties remain unresolved, they 
should be referred to the Conference. The resolution of any 
differences over methods of conversion should not delay the 
execution of other parts of the conversion plan that are 
acceptable.
    83. If agreement is not reached with the Executive Council 
on aspects of verification, or if the approved verification 
plan cannot be put into action, verification of conversion 
shall proceed through continuous monitoring with on-site 
instruments and physical presence of inspectors.
    84. Conversion and verification shall proceed according to 
the agreed plan. The verification shall not unduly interfere 
with the conversion process and shall be conducted through the 
presence of inspectors to confirm the conversion.
    85. For the 10 years after the Director-General certifies 
that conversion is complete, the State Party shall provide to 
inspectors unimpeded access to the facility at any time. The 
inspectors shall have the right to observe all areas, all 
activities, and all items of equipment at the facility. The 
inspectors shall have the right to verify that the activities 
at the facility are consistent with any conditions established 
under this Section, by the Executive Council and the 
Conference. The inspectors shall also have the right, in 
accordance with provisions of Part II, Section E, of this Annex 
to receive samples from any area of the facility and to analyze 
them to verify the absence of Schedule 1 chemicals, their 
stable by-products and decomposition products and of Schedule 2 
chemicals and to verify that the activities at the facility are 
consistent with any other conditions on chemical activities 
established under this Section, by the Executive Council and 
the Conference. The inspectors shall also have the right to 
managed access, in accordance with Part X, Section C, of this 
Annex, to the plant site at which the facility is located. 
During the 10-year period, the State Party shall report 
annually on the activities at the converted facility. Upon 
completion of the 10-year period, the Executive Council, taking 
into account recommendations of the Technical Secretariat, 
shall decide on the nature of continued verification measures.
    86. Costs of verification of the converted facility shall 
be allocated in accordance with Article V, paragraph 19.

                                PART VI

  ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
                               ARTICLE VI

    REGIME FOR SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS AND FACILITIES RELATED TO SUCH 
                               CHEMICALS

A. General Provisions

    1. A State Party shall not produce, acquire, retain or use 
Schedule 1 chemicals outside the territories of States Parties 
and shall not transfer such chemicals outside its territory 
except to another State Party.
    2. A State Party shall not produce, acquire, retain, 
transfer or use Schedule 1 chemicals unless:
          (a) The chemicals are applied to research, medical, 
        pharmaceutical or protective purposes; and
          (b) The types and quantities of chemicals are 
        strictly limited to those which can be justified for 
        such purposes; and
          (c) The aggregate amount of such chemicals at any 
        given time for such purposes is equal to or less than 1 
        tonne; and
          (d) The aggregate amount for such purposes acquired 
        by a State Party in any year through production, 
        withdrawal from chemical weapons stocks and transfer is 
        equal to or less than 1 tonne.

B. Transfers

    3. A State Party may transfer Schedule 1 chemicals outside 
its territory only to another State Party and only for 
research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes in 
accordance with paragraph 2.
    4. Chemicals transferred shall not be retransferred to a 
third State.
    5. Not less than 30 days before any transfer to another 
State Party both States Parties shall notify the Technical 
Secretariat of the transfer.
    6. Each State Party shall make a detailed annual 
declaration regarding transfers during the previous year. The 
declaration shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the 
end of that year and shall for each Schedule 1 chemical that 
has been transferred include the following information:
          (a) The chemical name, structural formula and 
        Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if 
        assigned;
          (b) The quantity acquired from other States or 
        transferred to other States Parties. For each transfer 
        the quantity, recipient and purpose shall be included.

C. Production

            General principles for production
    7. Each State Party, during production under paragraphs 8 
to 12, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety 
of people and to protecting the environment. Each State Party 
shall conduct such production in accordance with its national 
standards for safety and emissions.
            Single small-scale facility
    8. Each State Party that produces Schedule 1 chemicals for 
research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes shall 
carry out the production at a single small-scale facility 
approved by the State Party, except as set forth in paragraphs 
10, 11 and 12.
    9. The production at a single small-scale facility shall be 
carried out in reaction vessels in production lines not 
configurated for continuous operation. The volume of such a 
reaction vessel shall not exceed 100 liters, and the total 
volume of all reaction vessels with a volume exceeding 5 liters 
shall not be more than 500 liters.
            Other facilities
    10. Production of Schedule 1 chemicals in aggregate 
quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year may be carried out for 
protective purposes at one facility outside a single small-
scale facility. This facility shall be approved by the State 
Party.
    11. Production of Schedule 1 chemicals in quantities of 
more than 100 g per year may be carried out for research, 
medical or pharmaceutical purposes outside a single small-scale 
facility in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year 
per facility. These facilities shall be approved by the State 
Party.
    12. Synthesis of Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical 
or pharmaceutical purposes, but not for protective purposes, 
may be carried out at laboratories in aggregate quantities less 
than 100 g per year per facility. These facilities shall not be 
subject to any obligation relating to declaration and 
verification as specified in Sections D and E.

D. Declarations

            Single small-scale facility
    13. Each State Party that plans to operate a single small-
scale facility shall provide the Technical Secretariat with the 
precise location and a detailed technical description of the 
facility, including an inventory of equipment and detailed 
diagrams. For existing facilities, this initial declaration 
shall be provided not later than 30 days after this Convention 
enters into force for the State Party. Initial declarations on 
new facilities shall be provided not less than 180 days before 
operations are to begin.
    14. Each State Party shall give advance notification to the 
Technical Secretariat of planned changes related to the initial 
declaration. The notification shall be submitted not less than 
180 days before the changes are to take place.
    15. A State Party producing Schedule 1 chemicals at a 
single small-scale facility shall make a detailed annual 
declaration regarding the activities of the facility for the 
previous year. The declaration shall be submitted not later 
than 90 days after the end of that year and shall include:
          (a) Identification of the facility;
          (b) For each Schedule 1 chemical produced, acquired, 
        consumed or stored at the facility, the following 
        information:
                  (i) The chemical name, structural formula and 
                Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if 
                assigned;
                  (ii) The methods employed and quantity 
                produced;
                  (iii) The name and quantity of precursors 
                listed in Schedules 1, 2, or 3 used for 
                production of Schedule 1 chemicals;
                  (iv) The quantity consumed at the facility 
                and the purpose(s) of the consumption;
                  (v) The quantity received from or shipped to 
                other facilities in the State Party. For each 
                shipment the quantity, recipient and purpose 
                should be included;
                  (vi) The maximum quantity stored at any time 
                during the year; and
                  (vii) The quantity stored at the end of the 
                year; and
          (c) Information on any changes at the facility during 
        the year compared to previously submitted detailed 
        technical descriptions of the facility including 
        inventories of equipment and detailed diagrams.
    16. Each State Party producing Schedule 1 chemicals at a 
single small-scale facility shall make a detailed annual 
declaration regarding the projected activities and the 
anticipated production at the facility for the coming year. The 
declaration shall be submitted not less than 90 days before the 
beginning of that year and shall include:
          (a) Identification of the facility;
          (b) For each Schedule 1 chemical anticipated to be 
        produced, consumed or stored at the facility, the 
        following information:
                  (i) The chemical name, structural formula and 
                Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if 
                assigned;
                  (ii) The quantity anticipated to be produced 
                and the purpose of the production; and
          (c) Information on any anticipated changes at the 
        facility during the year compared to previously 
        submitted detailed technical descriptions of the 
        facility including inventories of equipment and 
        detailed diagrams.
            Other facilities referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11
    17. For each facility, a State Party shall provide the 
Technical Secretariat with the name, location and a detailed 
technical description of the facility or its relevant part(s) 
as requested by the Technical Secretariat. The facility 
producing Schedule 1 chemicals for protective purposes shall be 
specifically identified. For existing facilities, this initial 
declaration shall be provided not later than 30 days after this 
Convention enters into force for the State Party. Initial 
declarations on new facilities shall be provided not less than 
180 days before operations are to begin.
    18. Each State Party shall give advance notification to the 
Technical Secretariat of planned changes related to the initial 
declaration. The notification shall be submitted not less than 
180 days before the changes are to take place.
    19. Each State Party shall, for each facility, make a 
detailed annual declaration regarding the activities of the 
facility for the previous year. The declaration shall be 
submitted not later than 90 days after the end of that year and 
shall include:
          (a) Identification of the facility;
          (b) For each Schedule 1 chemical the following 
        information:
                  (i) The chemical name, structural formula and 
                Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if 
                assigned;
                  (ii) The quantity produced and, in case of 
                production for protective purposes, methods 
                employed;
                  (iii) The name and quantity of precursors 
                listed in Schedules 1, 2, or 3, used for 
                production of Schedule 1 chemicals;
                  (iv) The quantity consumed at the facility 
                and the purpose of the consumption;
                  (v) The quantity transferred to other 
                facilities within the State Party. For each 
                transfer the quantity, recipient and purpose 
                should be included;
                  (vi) The maximum quantity stored at any time 
                during the year; and
                  (vii) The quantity stored at the end of the 
                year; and
          (c) Information on any changes at the facility or its 
        relevant parts during the year compared to previously 
        submitted detailed technical description of the 
        facility.
    20. Each State Party shall, for each facility, make a 
detailed annual declaration regarding the projected activities 
and the anticipated production at the facility for the coming 
year. The declaration shall be submitted not less than 90 days 
before the beginning of that year and shall include:
          (a) Identification of the facility;
          (b) For each Schedule 1 chemical the following 
        information:
                  (i) The chemical name, structural formula and 
                Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if 
                assigned; and
                  (ii) The quantity anticipated to be produced, 
                the time periods when the production is 
                anticipated to take place and the purposes of 
                the production; and
          (c) Information on any anticipated changes at the 
        facility or its relevant parts, during the year 
        compared to previously submitted detailed technical 
        descriptions of the facility.

E. Verification

            Single small-scale facility
    21. The aim of verification activities at the single small-
scale facility shall be to verify that the quantities of 
Schedule 1 chemicals produced are correctly declared and, in 
particular, that their aggregate amount does not exceed 1 
tonne.
    22. The facility shall be subject to systematic 
verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-
site instruments.
    23. The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of 
inspections for a particular facility shall be based on the 
risk to the object and purpose of this Convention posed by the 
relevant chemicals, the characteristics of the facility and the 
nature of the activities carried out there. Appropriate 
guidelines shall be considered and approved by the Conference 
pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    24. The purpose of the initial inspection shall be to 
verify information provided concerning the facility, including 
verification of the limits on reaction vessels set forth in 
paragraph 9.
    25. Not later than 180 days after this Convention enters 
into force for a State Party, it shall conclude a facility 
agreement, based on a model agreement, with the Organization, 
covering detailed inspection procedures for the facility.
    26. Each State Party planning to establish a single small-
scale facility after this Convention enters into force for it 
shall conclude a facility agreement, based on a model 
agreement, with the Organization, covering detailed inspection 
procedures for the facility before it begins operation or is 
used.
    27. A model for agreements shall be considered and approved 
by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
            Other facilities referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11
    28. The aim of verification activities at any facility 
referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11 shall be to verify that:
          (a) The facility is not used to produce any Schedule 
        1 chemical, except for the declared chemicals;
          (b) The quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals produced, 
        processed or consumed are correctly declared and 
        consistent with needs for the declared purpose; and
          (c) The Schedule 1 chemical is not diverted or used 
        for other purposes.
    29. The facility shall be subject to systematic 
verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-
site instruments.
    30. The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of 
inspections for a particular facility shall be based on the 
risk to the object and purpose of this Convention posed by the 
quantities of chemicals produced, the characteristics of the 
facility and the nature of the activities carried out there. 
Appropriate guidelines shall be considered and approved by the 
Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    31. Not later than 180 days after this Convention enters 
into force for a State Party, it shall conclude facility 
agreements with the Organization, based on a model agreement 
covering detailed inspection procedures for each facility.
    32. Each State Party planning to establish such a facility 
after entry into force of this Convention shall conclude a 
facility agreement with the Organization before the facility 
begins operation or is used.

                                Part VII

  ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
                               ARTICLE VI

    REGIME FOR SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS AND FACILITIES RELATED TO SUCH 
                               CHEMICALS

A. Declarations

            Declarations of aggregate national data
    1. The initial and annual declarations to be provided by 
each State Party pursuant to Article VI, paragraphs 7 and 8, 
shall include aggregate national data for the previous calendar 
year on the quantities produced, processed, consumed, imported 
and exported of each Schedule 2 chemical, as well as a 
quantitative specification of import and export for each 
country involved.
    2. Each State Party shall submit:
          (a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 1 not 
        later than 30 days after this Convention enters into 
        force for it; and, starting in the following calendar 
        year,
          (b) Annual declarations not later than 90 days after 
        the end of the previous calendar year.
            Declarations of plant sites producing, processing or 
                    consuming Schedule 2 chemicals
    3. Initial and annual declarations are required for all 
plant sites that comprise one or more plant(s) which produced, 
processed or consumed during any of the previous three calendar 
years or is anticipated to produce, process or consume in the 
next calendar year more than:
          (a) 1 kg of a chemical designated ``*'' in Schedule 
        2, part A;
          (b) 100 kg of any other chemical listed in Schedule 
        2, part A; or
          (c) 1 tonne of a chemical listed in Schedule 2, part 
        B.
    4. Each State Party shall submit:
          (a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 not 
        later than 30 days after this Convention enters into 
        force for it; and, starting in the following calendar 
        year;
          (b) Annual declarations on past activities not later 
        than 90 days after the end of the previous calendar 
        year;
          (c) Annual declarations on anticipated activities not 
        later than 60 days before the beginning of the 
        following calendar year. Any such activity additionally 
        planned after the annual declaration has been submitted 
        shall be declared not later than five days before this 
        activity begins.
    5. Declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 are generally not 
required for mixtures containing a low concentration of a 
Schedule 2 chemical. They are only required, in accordance with 
guidelines, in cases where the ease of recovery from the 
mixture of the Schedule 2 chemical and its total weight are 
deemed to pose a risk to the object and purpose of this 
Convention. These guidelines shall be considered and approved 
by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    6. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 
shall include:
          (a) The name of the plant site and the name of the 
        owner, company, or enterprise operating it;
          (b) Its precise location including the address; and
          (c) The number of plants within the plant site which 
        are declared pursuant to Part VIII of this Annex.
    7. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 
shall also include, for each plant which is located within the 
plant site and which falls under the specifications set forth 
in paragraph 3, the following information:
          (a) The name of the plant and the name of the owner, 
        company, or enterprise operating it;
          (b) Its precise location within the plant site 
        including the specific building or structure number, if 
        any;
          (c) Its main activities;
          (d) Whether the plant:
                  (i) Produces, processes, or consumes the 
                declared Schedule 2 chemical(s);
                  (ii) Is dedicated to such activities or 
                multi-purpose; and
                  (iii) Performs other activities with regard 
                to the declared Schedule 2 chemical(s), 
                including a specification of that other 
                activity (e.g. storage); and
          (e) The production capacity of the plant for each 
        declared Schedule 2 chemical.
    8. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 
shall also include the following information on each Schedule 2 
chemical above the declaration threshold:
          (a) The chemical name, common or trade name used by 
        the facility, structural formula, and Chemical 
        Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned;
          (b) In the case of the initial declaration: the total 
        amount produced, processed, consumed, imported and 
        exported by the plant site in each of the three 
        previous calendar years;
          (c) In the case of the annual declaration on past 
        activities: the total amount produced, processed, 
        consumed, imported and exported by the plant site in 
        the previous calendar year;
          (d) In the case of the annual declaration on 
        anticipated activities: the total amount anticipated to 
        be produced, processed or consumed by the plant site in 
        the following calendar year, including the anticipated 
        time periods for production, processing or consumption; 
        and
          (e) The purposes for which the chemical was or will 
        be produced, processed or consumed:
                  (i) Processing and consumption on site with a 
                specification of the product types;
                  (ii) Sale or transfer within the territory or 
                to any other place under the jurisdiction or 
                control of the State Party, with a 
                specification whether to other industry, trader 
                or other destination and, if possible, of final 
                product types;
                  (iii) Direct export, with a specification of 
                the States involved; or
                  (iv) Other, including a specification of 
                these other purposes.
            Declarations on past production of Schedule 2 chemicals for 
                    chemical weapons purposes
    9. Each State Party shall, not later than 30 days after 
this Convention enters into force for it, declare all plant 
sites comprising plants that produced at any time since 1 
January 1946 a Schedule 2 chemical for chemical weapons 
purposes.
    10. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 9 
shall include:
          (a) The name of the plant site and the name of the 
        owner, company, or enterprise operating it;
          (b) Its precise location including the address;
          (c) For each plant which is located within the plant 
        site, and which falls under the specifications set 
        forth in paragraph 9, the same information as required 
        under paragraph 7, subparagraphs (a) to (e); and
          (d) For each Schedule 2 chemical produced for 
        chemical weapons purposes:
                  (i) The chemical name, common or trade name 
                used by the plant site for chemical weapons 
                production purposes, structural formula, and 
                Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if 
                assigned;
                  (ii) The dates when the chemical was produced 
                and the quantity produced; and
                  (iii) The location to which the chemical was 
                delivered and the final product produced there, 
                if known.
            Information to States Parties
    11. A list of plant sites declared under this Section 
together with the information provided under paragraphs 6, 7 
(a), 7 (c), 7 (d) (i), 7 (d) (iii), 8 (a) and 10 shall be 
transmitted by the Technical Secretariat to States Parties upon 
request.

B. Verification

            General
    12. Verification provided for in Article VI, paragraph 4, 
shall be carried out through on-site inspection at those of the 
declared plant sites that comprise one or more plants which 
produced, processed or consumed during any of the previous 
three calendar years or are anticipated to produce, process or 
consume in the next calendar year more than:
          (a) 10 kg of a chemical designated ``*'' in Schedule 
        2, part A;
          (b) 1 tonne of any other chemical listed in Schedule 
        2, part A; or
          (c) 10 tonnes of a chemical listed in Schedule 2, 
        part B.
    13. The programme and budget of the Organization to be 
adopted by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 
21 (a) shall contain, as a separate item, a programme and 
budget for verification under this Section. In the allocation 
of resources made available for verification under Article VI, 
the Technical Secretariat shall, during the first three years 
after the entry into force of this Convention, give priority to 
the initial inspections of plant sites declared under Section 
A. The allocation shall thereafter be reviewed on the basis of 
the experience gained.
    14. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct initial 
inspections and subsequent inspections in accordance with 
paragraphs 15 to 22.
            Inspection aims
    15. The general aim of inspections shall be to verify that 
activities are in accordance with obligations under this 
Convention and consistent with the information to be provided 
in declarations. Particular aims of inspections at plant sites 
declared under Section A shall include verification of:
          (a) The absence of any Schedule 1 chemical, 
        especially its production, except if in accordance with 
        Part VI of this Annex;
          (b) Consistency with declarations of levels of 
        production, processing or consumption of Schedule 2 
        chemicals; and
          (c) Non-diversion of Schedule 2 chemicals for 
        activities prohibited under this Convention.
            Initial inspections
    16. Each plant site to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 
12 shall receive an initial inspection as soon as possible but 
preferably not later than three years after entry into force of 
this Convention. Plant sites declared after this period shall 
receive an initial inspection not later than one year after 
production, processing or consumption is first declared. 
Selection of plant sites for initial inspections shall be made 
by the Technical Secretariat in such a way as to preclude the 
prediction of precisely when the plant site is to be inspected.
    17. During the initial inspection, a draft facility 
agreement for the plant site shall be prepared unless the 
inspected State Party and the Technical Secretariat agree that 
it is not needed.
    18. With regard to frequency and intensity of subsequent 
inspections, inspectors shall during the initial inspection 
assess the risk to the object and purpose of this Convention 
posed by the relevant chemicals, the characteristics of the 
plant site and the nature of the activities carried out there, 
taking into account, inter alia, the following criteria:
          (a) The toxicity of the scheduled chemicals and of 
        the end-products produced with it, if any;
          (b) The quantity of the scheduled chemicals typically 
        stored at the inspected site;
          (c) The quantity of feedstock chemicals for the 
        scheduled chemicals typically stored at the inspected 
        site;
          (d) The production capacity of the Schedule 2 plants; 
        and
          (e) The capability and convertibility for initiating 
        production, storage and filling of toxic chemicals at 
        the inspected site.
            Inspections
    19. Having received the initial inspection, each plant site 
to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 shall be subject to 
subsequent inspections.
    20. In selecting particular plant sites for inspection and 
in deciding on the frequency and intensity of inspections, the 
Technical Secretariat shall give due consideration to the risk 
to the object and purpose of this Convention posed by the 
relevant chemical, the characteristics of the plant site and 
the nature of the activities carried out there, taking into 
account the respective facility agreement as well as the 
results of the initial inspections and subsequent inspections.
    21. The Technical Secretariat shall choose a particular 
plant site to be inspected in such a way as to preclude the 
prediction of exactly when it will be inspected.
    22. No plant site shall receive more than two inspections 
per calendar year under the provisions of this Section. This, 
however, shall not limit inspections pursuant to Article IX.
            Inspection procedures
    23. In addition to agreed guidelines, other relevant 
provisions of this Annex and the Confidentiality Annex, 
paragraphs 24 to 30 below shall apply.
    24. A facility agreement for the declared plant site shall 
be concluded not later than 90 days after completion of the 
initial inspection between the inspected State Party and the 
Organization unless the inspected State Party and the Technical 
Secretariat agree that it is not needed. It shall be based on a 
model agreement and govern the conduct of inspections at the 
declared plant site. The agreement shall specify the frequency 
and intensity of inspections as well as detailed inspection 
procedures, consistent with paragraphs 25 to 29.
    25. The focus of the inspection shall be the declared 
Schedule 2 plant(s) within the declared plant site. If the 
inspection team requests access to other parts of the plant 
site, access to these areas shall be granted in accordance with 
the obligation to provide clarification pursuant to Part II, 
paragraph 51, of this Annex and in accordance with the facility 
agreement, or, in the absence of a facility agreement, in 
accordance with the rules of managed access as specified in 
Part X, Section C, of this Annex.
    26. Access to records shall be provided, as appropriate, to 
provide assurance that there has been no diversion of the 
declared chemical and that production has been consistent with 
declarations.
    27. Sampling and analysis shall be undertaken to check for 
the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals.
    28. Areas to be inspected may include:
          (a) Areas where feed chemicals (reactants) are 
        delivered or stored;
          (b) Areas where manipulative processes are performed 
        upon the reactants prior to addition to the reaction 
        vessels;
          (c) Feed lines as appropriate from the areas referred 
        to in subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) to the 
        reaction vessels together with any associated valves, 
        flow meters, etc.;
          (d) The external aspect of the reaction vessels and 
        ancillary equipment;
          (e) Lines from the reaction vessels leading to long- 
        or short-term storage or to equipment further 
        processing the declared Schedule 2 chemicals;
          (f) Control equipment associated with any of the 
        items under subparagraphs (a) to (e);
          (g) Equipment and areas for waste and effluent 
        handling;
          (h) Equipment and areas for disposition of chemicals 
        not up to specification.
    29. The period of inspection shall not last more than 96 
hours; however, extensions may be agreed between the inspection 
team and the inspected State Party.
            Notification of inspection
    30. A State Party shall be notified by the Technical 
Secretariat of the inspection not less than 48 hours before the 
arrival of the inspection team at the plant site to be 
inspected.

C. Transfers to States not party to this convention

    31. Schedule 2 chemicals shall only be transferred to or 
received from States Parties. This obligation shall take effect 
three years after entry into force of this Convention.
    32. During this interim three-year period, each State Party 
shall require an end-use certificate, as specified below, for 
transfers of Schedule 2 chemicals to States not Party to this 
Convention. For such transfers, each State Party shall adopt 
the necessary measures to ensure that the transferred chemicals 
shall only be used for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention. Inter alia, the State Party shall require from the 
recipient State a certificate stating, in relation to the 
transferred chemicals:
          (a) That they will only be used for purposes not 
        prohibited under this Convention;
          (b) That they will not be re-transferred;
          (c) Their types and quantities;
          (d) Their end-use(s); and
          (e) The name(s) and address(es) of the end-user(s).

                               Part VIII

  ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
                               ARTICLE VI

    REGIME FOR SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS AND FACILITIES RELATED TO SUCH 
                               CHEMICALS

A. Declarations

            Declarations of aggregate national data
    1. The initial and annual declarations to be provided by a 
State Party pursuant to Article VI, paragraphs 7 and 8, shall 
include aggregate national data for the previous calendar year 
on the quantities produced, imported and exported of each 
Schedule 3 chemical, as well as a quantitative specification of 
import and export for each country involved.
    2. Each State Party shall submit:
          (a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 1 not 
        later than 30 days after this Convention enters into 
        force for it; and, starting in the following calendar 
        year,
          (b) Annual declarations not later than 90 days after 
        the end of the previous calendar year.
            Declarations of plant sites producing Schedule 3 chemicals
    3. Initial and annual declarations are required for all 
plant sites that comprise one or more plants which produced 
during the previous calendar year or are anticipated to produce 
in the next calendar year more than 30 tonnes of a Schedule 3 
chemical.
    4. Each State Party shall submit:
          (a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 not 
        later than 30 days after this Convention enters into 
        force for it; and, starting in the following calendar 
        year;
          (b) Annual declarations on past activities not later 
        than 90 days after the end of the previous calendar 
        year;
          (c) Annual declarations on anticipated activities not 
        later than 60 days before the beginning of the 
        following calendar year. Any such activity additionally 
        planned after the annual declaration has been submitted 
        shall be declared not later than five days before this 
        activity begins.
    5. Declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 are generally not 
required for mixtures containing a low concentration of a 
Schedule 3 chemical. They are only required, in accordance with 
guidelines, in such cases where the ease of recovery from the 
mixture of the Schedule 3 chemical and its total weight are 
deemed to pose a risk to the object and purpose of this 
Convention. These guidelines shall be considered and approved 
by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    6. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 
shall include:
          (a) The name of the plant site and the name of the 
        owner, company, or enterprise operating it;
          (b) Its precise location including the address; and
          (c) The number of plants within the plant site which 
        are declared pursuant to Part VII of this Annex.
    7. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 
shall also include, for each plant which is located within the 
plant site and which falls under the specifications set forth 
in paragraph 3, the following information:
          (a) The name of the plant and the name of the owner, 
        company, or enterprise operating it;
          (b) Its precise location within the plant site, 
        including the specific building or structure number, if 
        any;
          (c) Its main activities.
    8. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 
shall also include the following information on each Schedule 3 
chemical above the declaration threshold:
          (a) The chemical name, common or trade name used by 
        the facility, structural formula, and Chemical 
        Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned;
          (b) The approximate amount of production of the 
        chemical in the previous calendar year, or, in case of 
        declarations on anticipated activities, anticipated for 
        the next calendar year, expressed in the ranges: 30 to 
        200 tonnes, 200 to 1,000 tonnes, 1,000 to 10,000 
        tonnes, 10,000 to 100,000 tonnes, and above 100,000 
        tonnes; and
          (c) The purposes for which the chemical was or will 
        be produced.
            Declarations on past production of Schedule 3 chemicals for 
                    chemical weapons purposes
    9. Each State Party shall, not later than 30 days after 
this Convention enters into force for it, declare all plant 
sites comprising plants that produced at any time since 1 
January 1946 a Schedule 3 chemical for chemical weapons 
purposes.
    10. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 9 
shall include:
          (a) The name of the plant site and the name of the 
        owner, company, or enterprise operating it;
          (b) Its precise location including the address;
          (c) For each plant which is located within the plant 
        site, and which falls under the specifications set 
        forth in paragraph 9, the same information as required 
        under paragraph 7, subparagraphs (a) to (c); and
          (d) For each Schedule 3 chemical produced for 
        chemical weapons purposes:
                  (i) The chemical name, common or trade name 
                used by the plant site for chemical weapons 
                production purposes, structural formula, and 
                Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if 
                assigned;
                  (ii) The dates when the chemical was produced 
                and the quantity produced; and
                  (iii) The location to which the chemical was 
                delivered and the final product produced there, 
                if known.
            Information to States Parties
    11. A list of plant sites declared under this Section 
together with the information provided under paragraphs 6, 7 
(a), 7 (c), 8 (a) and 10 shall be transmitted by the Technical 
Secretariat to States Parties upon request.

B. Verification

            General
    12. Verification provided for in paragraph 5 of Article VI 
shall be carried out through on-site inspections at those 
declared plant sites which produced during the previous 
calendar year or are anticipated to produce in the next 
calendar year in excess of 200 tonnes aggregate of any Schedule 
3 chemical above the declaration threshold of 30 tonnes.
    13. The programme and budget of the Organization to be 
adopted by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 
21 (a), shall contain, as a separate item, a programme and 
budget for verification under this Section taking into account 
Part VII, paragraph 13, of this Annex.
    14. Under this Section, the Technical Secretariat shall 
randomly select plant sites for inspection through appropriate 
mechanisms, such as the use of specially designed computer 
software, on the basis of the following weighting factors:
          (a) Equitable geographical distribution of 
        inspections; and
          (b) The information on the declared plant sites 
        available to the Technical Secretariat, related to the 
        relevant chemical, the characteristics of the plant 
        site and the nature of the activities carried out 
        there.
    15. No plant site shall receive more than two inspections 
per year under the provisions of this Section. This, however, 
shall not limit inspections pursuant to Article IX.
    16. In selecting plant sites for inspection under this 
Section, the Technical Secretariat shall observe the following 
limitation for the combined number of inspections to be 
received by a State Party per calendar year under this Part and 
Part IX of this Annex: the combined number of inspections shall 
not exceed three plus 5 percent of the total number of plant 
sites declared by a State Party under both this Part and Part 
IX of this Annex, or 20 inspections, whichever of these two 
figures is lower.
            Inspection aims
    17. At plant sites declared under Section A, the general 
aim of inspections shall be to verify that activities are 
consistent with the information to be provided in declarations. 
The particular aim of inspections shall be the verification of 
the absence of any Schedule 1 chemical, especially its 
production, except if in accordance with Part VI of this Annex.
            Inspection procedures
    18. In addition to agreed guidelines, other relevant 
provisions of this Annex and the Confidentiality Annex, 
paragraphs 19 to 25 below shall apply.
    19. There shall be no facility agreement, unless requested 
by the inspected State Party.
    20. The focus of the inspections shall be the declared 
Schedule 3 plant(s) within the declared plant site. If the 
inspection team, in accordance with Part II, paragraph 51, of 
this Annex, requests access to other parts of the plant site 
for clarification of ambiguities, the extent of such access 
shall be agreed between the inspection team and the inspected 
State Party.
    21. The inspection team may have access to records in 
situations in which the inspection team and the inspected State 
Party agree that such access will assist in achieving the 
objectives of the inspection.
    22. Sampling and on-site analysis may be undertaken to 
check for the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals. In 
case of unresolved ambiguities, samples may be analyzed in a 
designated off-site laboratory, subject to the inspected State 
Party's agreement.
    23. Areas to be inspected may include:
          (a) Areas where feed chemicals (reactants) are 
        delivered or stored;
          (b) Areas where manipulative processes are performed 
        upon the reactants prior to addition to the reaction 
        vessel;
          (c) Feed lines as appropriate from the areas referred 
        to in subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) to the 
        reaction vessel together with any associated valves, 
        flow meters, etc.;
          (d) The external aspect of the reaction vessels and 
        ancillary equipment;
          (e) Lines from the reaction vessels leading to long- 
        or short-term storage or to equipment further 
        processing the declared Schedule 3 chemicals;
          (f) Control equipment associated with any of the 
        items under subparagraphs (a) to (e);
          (g) Equipment and areas for waste and effluent 
        handling;
          (h) Equipment and areas for disposition of chemicals 
        not up to specification.
    24. The period of inspection shall not last more than 24 
hours; however, extensions may be agreed between the inspection 
team and the inspected State Party.
            Notification of inspection
    25. A State Party shall be notified by the Technical 
Secretariat of the inspection not less than 120 hours before 
the arrival of the inspection team at the plant site to be 
inspected.

C. Transfers to states not party to this convention

    26. When transferring Schedule 3 chemicals to States not 
Party to this Convention, each State Party shall adopt the 
necessary measures to ensure that the transferred chemicals 
shall only be used for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention. Inter alia, the State Party shall require from the 
recipient State a certificate stating, in relation to the 
transferred chemicals:
          (a) That they will only be used for purposes not 
        prohibited under this Convention;
          (b) That they will not be re-transferred;
          (c) Their types and quantities;
          (d) Their end-use(s); and
          (e) The name(s) and address(es) of the end-user(s).
    27. Five years after entry into force of this Convention, 
the Conference shall consider the need to establish other 
measures regarding transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to States 
not Party to this Convention.

                                Part IX

  activities not prohibited under this convention in accordance with 
                               article vi

            regime for other chemical production facilities

A. Declarations

            List of other chemical production facilities
    1. The initial declaration to be provided by each State 
Party pursuant to Article VI, paragraph 7, shall include a list 
of all plant sites that:
          (a) Produced by synthesis during the previous 
        calendar year more than 200 tonnes of unscheduled 
        discrete organic chemicals; or
          (b) Comprise one or more plants which produced by 
        synthesis during the previous calendar year more than 
        30 tonnes of an unscheduled discrete organic chemical 
        containing the elements phosphorus, sulfur or fluorine 
        (hereinafter referred to as ``PSF-plants'' and ``PSF-
        chemical'').
    2. The list of other chemical production facilities to be 
submitted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall not include plant sites 
that exclusively produced explosives or hydrocarbons.
    3. Each State Party shall submit its list of other chemical 
production facilities pursuant to paragraph 1 as part of its 
initial declaration not later than 30 days after this 
Convention enters into force for it. Each State Party shall, 
not later than 90 days after the beginning of each following 
calendar year, provide annually the information necessary to 
update the list.
    4. The list of other chemical production facilities to be 
submitted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall include the following 
information on each plant site:
          (a) The name of the plant site and the name of the 
        owner, company, or enterprise operating it;
          (b) The precise location of the plant site including 
        its address;
          (c) Its main activities; and
           (d) The approximate number of plants producing the 
        chemicals specified in paragraph 1 in the plant site.
    5. With regard to plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 
1 (a), the list shall also include information on the 
approximate aggregate amount of production of the unscheduled 
discrete organic chemicals in the previous calendar year 
expressed in the ranges: under 1,000 tonnes, 1,000 to 10,000 
tonnes and above 10,000 tonnes.
    6. With regard to plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 
1 (b), the list shall also specify the number of PSF-plants 
within the plant site and include information on the 
approximate aggregate amount of production of PSF-chemicals 
produced by each PSF-plant in the previous calendar year 
expressed in the ranges: under 200 tonnes, 200 to 1,000 tonnes, 
1,000 to 10,000 tonnes and above 10,000 tonnes.
            Assistance by the Technical Secretariat
    7. If a State Party, for administrative reasons, deems it 
necessary to ask for assistance in compiling its list of 
chemical production facilities pursuant to paragraph 1, it may 
request the Technical Secretariat to provide such assistance. 
Questions as to the completeness of the list shall then be 
resolved through consultations between the State Party and the 
Technical Secretariat.
            Information to States Parties
    8. The lists of other chemical production facilities 
submitted pursuant to paragraph 1, including the information 
provided under paragraph 4, shall be transmitted by the 
Technical Secretariat to States Parties upon request.

B. Verification

            General
    9. Subject to the provisions of Section C, verification as 
provided for in Article VI, paragraph 6, shall be carried out 
through on-site inspection at:
          (a) Plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 1 (a); 
        and
          (b) Plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 1 (b) 
        that comprise one or more PSF-plants which produced 
        during the previous calendar year more than 200 tonnes 
        of a PSF-chemical.
    10. The programme and budget of the Organization to be 
adopted by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 
21 (a), shall contain, as a separate item, a programme and 
budget for verification under this Section after its 
implementation has started.
    11. Under this Section, the Technical Secretariat shall 
randomly select plant sites for inspection through appropriate 
mechanisms, such as the use of specially designed computer 
software, on the basis of the following weighting factors:
          (a) Equitable geographical distribution of 
        inspections;
          (b) The information on the listed plant sites 
        available to the Technical Secretariat, related to the 
        characteristics of the plant site and the activities 
        carried out there; and
          (c) Proposals by States Parties on a basis to be 
        agreed upon in accordance with paragraph 25.
    12. No plant site shall receive more than two inspections 
per year under the provisions of this Section. This, however, 
shall not limit inspections pursuant to Article IX.
    13. In selecting plant sites for inspection under this 
Section, the Technical Secretariat shall observe the following 
limitation for the combined number of inspections to be 
received by a State Party per calendar year under this Part and 
Part VIII of this Annex: the combined number of inspections 
shall not exceed three plus 5 per cent of the total number of 
plant sites declared by a State Party under both this Part and 
Part VIII of this Annex, or 20 inspections, whichever of these 
two figures is lower.
            Inspection aims
    14. At plant sites listed under Section A, the general aim 
of inspections shall be to verify that activities are 
consistent with the information to be provided in declarations. 
The particular aim of inspections shall be the verification of 
the absence of any Schedule 1 chemical, especially its 
production, except if in accordance with Part VI of this Annex.
            Inspection procedures
    15. In addition to agreed guidelines, other relevant 
provisions of this Annex and the Confidentiality Annex, 
paragraphs 16 to 20 below shall apply.
    16. There shall be no facility agreement, unless requested 
by the inspected State Party.
    17. The focus of inspection at a plant site selected for 
inspection shall be the plant(s) producing the chemicals 
specified in paragraph 1, in particular the PSF-plants listed 
pursuant to paragraph 1 (b). The inspected State Party shall 
have the right to manage access to these plants in accordance 
with the rules of managed access as specified in Part X, 
Section C, of this Annex. If the inspection team, in accordance 
with Part II, paragraph 51, of this Annex, requests access to 
other parts of the plant site for clarification of ambiguities, 
the extent of such access shall be agreed between the 
inspection team and the inspected State Party.
    18. The inspection team may have access to records in 
situations in which the inspection team and the inspected State 
Party agree that such access will assist in achieving the 
objectives of the inspection.
    19. Sampling and on-site analysis may be undertaken to 
check for the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals. In 
cases of unresolved ambiguities, samples may be analyzed in a 
designated off-site laboratory, subject to the inspected State 
Party's agreement.
    20. The period of inspection shall not last more than 24 
hours; however, extensions may be agreed between the inspection 
team and the inspected State Party.
            Notification of inspection
    21. A State Party shall be notified by the Technical 
Secretariat of the inspection not less than 120 hours before 
the arrival of the inspection team at the plant site to be 
inspected.

C. Implementation and review of Section B

            Implementation
    22. The implementation of Section B shall start at the 
beginning of the fourth year after entry into force of this 
Convention unless the Conference, at its regular session in the 
third year after entry into force of this Convention, decides 
otherwise.
    23. The Director-General shall, for the regular session of 
the Conference in the third year after entry into force of this 
Convention, prepare a report which outlines the experience of 
the Technical Secretariat in implementing the provisions of 
Parts VII and VIII of this Annex as well as of Section A of 
this Part.
    24. At its regular session in the third year after entry 
into force of this Convention, the Conference, on the basis of 
a report of the Director-General, may also decide on the 
distribution of resources available for verification under 
Section B between ``PSF-plants'' and other chemical production 
facilities. Otherwise, this distribution shall be left to the 
expertise of the Technical Secretariat and be added to the 
weighting factors in paragraph 11.
    25. At its regular session in the third year after entry 
into force of this Convention, the Conference, upon advice of 
the Executive Council, shall decide on which basis (e.g. 
regional) proposals by States Parties for inspections should be 
presented to be taken into account as a weighting factor in the 
selection process specified in paragraph 11.
            Review
    26. At the first special session of the Conference convened 
pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 22, the provisions of this 
Part of the Verification Annex shall be re-examined in the 
light of a comprehensive review of the overall verification 
regime for the chemical industry (Article VI, Parts VII to IX 
of this Annex) on the basis of the experience gained. The 
Conference shall then make recommendations so as to improve the 
effectiveness of the verification regime.

                                 Part X

              challenge inspections pursuant to article ix

A. Designation and selection of inspectors and inspection assistants

    1. Challenge inspections pursuant to Article IX shall only 
be performed by inspectors and inspection assistants especially 
designated for this function. In order to designate inspectors 
and inspection assistants for challenge inspections pursuant to 
Article IX, the Director-General shall, by selecting inspectors 
and inspection assistants from among the inspectors and 
inspection assistants for routine inspection activities, 
establish a list of proposed inspectors and inspection 
assistants. It shall comprise a sufficiently large number of 
inspectors and inspection assistants having the necessary 
qualification, experience, skill and training, to allow for 
flexibility in the selection of the inspectors, taking into 
account their availability, and the need for rotation. Due 
regard shall be paid also to the importance of selecting 
inspectors and inspection assistants on as wide a geographical 
basis as possible. The designation of inspectors and inspection 
assistants shall follow the procedures provided for under Part 
II, Section A, of this Annex.
    2. The Director-General shall determine the size of the 
inspection team and select its members taking into account the 
circumstances of a particular request. The size of the 
inspection team shall be kept to a minimum necessary for the 
proper fulfillment of the inspection mandate. No national of 
the requesting State Party or the inspected State Party shall 
be a member of the inspection team.

B. Pre-inspection activities

    3. Before submitting the inspection request for a challenge 
inspection, the State Party may seek confirmation from the 
Director-General that the Technical Secretariat is in a 
position to take immediate action on the request. If the 
Director-General cannot provide such confirmation immediately, 
he shall do so at the earliest opportunity, in keeping with the 
order of requests for confirmation. He shall also keep the 
State Party informed of when it is likely that immediate action 
can be taken. Should the Director-General reach the conclusion 
that timely action on requests can no longer be taken, he may 
ask the Executive Council to take appropriate action to improve 
the situation in the future.
            Notification
    4. The inspection request for a challenge inspection to be 
submitted to the Executive Council and the Director-General 
shall contain at least the following information:
          (a) The State Party to be inspected and, if 
        applicable, the Host State;
          (b) The point of entry to be used;
          (c) The size and type of the inspection site;
          (d) The concern regarding possible non-compliance 
        with this Convention including a specification of the 
        relevant provisions of this Convention about which the 
        concern has arisen, and of the nature and circumstances 
        of the possible non-compliance as well as all 
        appropriate information on the basis of which the 
        concern has arisen; and
          (e) The name of the observer of the requesting State 
        Party.
The requesting State Party may submit any additional 
information it deems necessary.
    5. The Director-General shall within one hour acknowledge 
to the requesting State Party receipt of its request.
    6. The requesting State Party shall notify the Director-
General of the location of the inspection site in due time for 
the Director-General to be able to provide this information to 
the inspected State Party not less than 12 hours before the 
planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.
    7. The inspection site shall be designated by the 
requesting State Party as specifically as possible by providing 
a site diagram related to a reference point with geographic 
coordinates, specified to the nearest second if possible. If 
possible, the requesting State Party shall also provide a map 
with a general indication of the inspection site and a diagram 
specifying as precisely as possible the requested perimeter of 
the site to be inspected.
    8. The requested perimeter shall:
          (a) Run at least a 10 meter distance outside any 
        buildings or other structures;
          (b) Not cut through existing security enclosures; and
          (c) Run at least a 10 meter distance outside any 
        existing security enclosures that the requesting State 
        Party intends to include within the requested 
        perimeter.
    9. If the requested perimeter does not conform with the 
specifications of paragraph 8, it shall be redrawn by the 
inspection team so as to conform with that provision.
    10. The Director-General shall, not less than 12 hours 
before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point 
of entry, inform the Executive Council about the location of 
the inspection site as specified in paragraph 7.
    11. Contemporaneously with informing the Executive Council 
according to paragraph 10, the Director-General shall transmit 
the inspection request to the inspected State Party including 
the location of the inspection site as specified in paragraph 
7. This notification shall also include the information 
specified in Part II, paragraph 32, of this Annex.
    12. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the point of 
entry, the inspected State Party shall be informed by the 
inspection team of the inspection mandate.
            Entry into the territory of the inspected State Party or 
                    the Host State
    13. The Director-General shall, in accordance with Article 
IX, paragraphs 13 to 18, dispatch an inspection team as soon as 
possible after an inspection request has been received. The 
inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry specified in 
the request in the minimum time possible, consistent with the 
provisions of paragraphs 10 and 11.
    14. If the requested perimeter is acceptable to the 
inspected State Party, it shall be designated as the final 
perimeter as early as possible, but in no case later than 24 
hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the point of 
entry. The inspected State Party shall transport the inspection 
team to the final perimeter of the inspection site. If the 
inspected State Party deems it necessary, such transportation 
may begin up to 12 hours before the expiry of the time period 
specified in this paragraph for the designation of the final 
perimeter. Transportation shall, in any case, be completed not 
later than 36 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at 
the point of entry.
    15. For all declared facilities, the procedures in 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall apply. (For the purposes of 
this Part, ``declared facility'' means all facilities declared 
pursuant to Articles III, IV, and V. With regard to Article VI, 
``declared facility'' means only facilities declared pursuant 
to Part VI of this Annex, as well as declared plants specified 
by declarations pursuant to Part VII, paragraphs 7 and 10 (c), 
and Part VIII, paragraphs 7 and 10 (c), of this Annex.)
           (a) If the requested perimeter is contained within 
        or conforms with the declared perimeter, the declared 
        perimeter shall be considered the final perimeter. The 
        final perimeter may, however, if agreed by the 
        inspected State Party, be made smaller in order to 
        conform with the perimeter requested by the requesting 
        State Party.
           (b) The inspected State Party shall transport the 
        inspection team to the final perimeter as soon as 
        practicable, but in any case shall ensure their arrival 
        at the perimeter not later than 24 hours after the 
        arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.
            Alternative determination of final perimeter
    16. At the point of entry, if the inspected State Party 
cannot accept the requested perimeter, it shall propose an 
alternative perimeter as soon as possible, but in any case not 
later than 24 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at 
the point of entry. In case of differences of opinion, the 
inspected State Party and the inspection team shall engage in 
negotiations with the aim of reaching agreement on a final 
perimeter.
    17. The alternative perimeter should be designated as 
specifically as possible in accordance with paragraph 8. It 
shall include the whole of the requested perimeter and should, 
as a rule, bear a close relationship to the latter, taking into 
account natural terrain features and man-made boundaries. It 
should normally run close to the surrounding security barrier 
if such a barrier exists. The inspected State Party should seek 
to establish such a relationship between the perimeters by a 
combination of at least two of the following means:
           (a) An alternative perimeter that does not extend to 
        an area significantly greater than that of the 
        requested perimeter;
           (b) An alternative perimeter that is a short, 
        uniform distance from the requested perimeter;
           (c) At least part of the requested perimeter is 
        visible from the alternative perimeter.
    18. If the alternative perimeter is acceptable to the 
inspection team, it shall become the final perimeter and the 
inspection team shall be transported from the point of entry to 
that perimeter. If the inspected State Party deems it 
necessary, such transportation may begin up to 12 hours before 
the expiry of the time period specified in paragraph 16 for 
proposing an alternative perimeter. Transportation shall, in 
any case, be completed not later than 36 hours after the 
arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.
    19. If a final perimeter is not agreed, the perimeter 
negotiations shall be concluded as early as possible, but in no 
case shall they continue more than 24 hours after the arrival 
of the inspection team at the point of entry. If no agreement 
is reached, the inspected State Party shall transport the 
inspection team to a location at the alternative perimeter. If 
the inspected State Party deems it necessary, such 
transportation may begin up to 12 hours before the expiry of 
the time period specified in paragraph 16 for proposing an 
alternative perimeter. Transportation shall, in any case, be 
completed not later than 36 hours after the arrival of the 
inspection team at the point of entry.
    20. Once at the location, the inspected State Party shall 
provide the inspection team with prompt access to the 
alternative perimeter to facilitate negotiations and agreement 
on the final perimeter and access within the final perimeter.
    21. If no agreement is reached within 72 hours after the 
arrival of the inspection team at the location, the alternative 
perimeter shall be designated the final perimeter.
            Verification of location
    22. To help establish that the inspection site to which the 
inspection team has been transported corresponds to the 
inspection site specified by the requesting State Party, the 
inspection team shall have the right to use approved location-
finding equipment and have such equipment installed according 
to its directions. The inspection team may verify its location 
by reference to local landmarks identified from maps. The 
inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team in this 
task.
            Securing the site, exit monitoring
    23. Not later than 12 hours after the arrival of the 
inspection team at the point of entry, the inspected State 
Party shall begin collecting factual information of all 
vehicular exit activity from all exit points for all land, air, 
and water vehicles of the requested perimeter. It shall provide 
this information to the inspection team upon its arrival at the 
alternative or final perimeter, whichever occurs first.
    24. This obligation may be met by collecting factual 
information in the form of traffic logs, photographs, video 
recordings, or data from chemical evidence equipment provided 
by the inspection team to monitor such exit activity. 
Alternatively, the inspected State Party may also meet this 
obligation by allowing one or more members of the inspection 
team independently to maintain traffic logs, take photographs, 
make video recordings of exit traffic, or use chemical evidence 
equipment, and conduct other activities as may be agreed 
between the inspected State Party and the inspection team.
    25. Upon the inspection team's arrival at the alternative 
perimeter or final perimeter, whichever occurs first, securing 
the site, which means exit monitoring procedures by the 
inspection team, shall begin.
    26. Such procedures shall include: the identification of 
vehicular exits, the making of traffic logs, the taking of 
photographs, and the making of video recordings by the 
inspection team of exits and exit traffic. The inspection team 
has the right to go, under escort, to any other part of the 
perimeter to check that there is no other exit activity.
    27. Additional procedures for exit monitoring activities as 
agreed upon by the inspection team and the inspected State 
Party may include, inter alia:
           (a) Use of sensors;
           (b) Random selective access;
           (c) Sample analysis.
    28. All activities for securing the site and exit 
monitoring shall take place within a band around the outside of 
the perimeter, not exceeding 50 meters in width, measured 
outward.
    29. The inspection team has the right to inspect on a 
managed access basis vehicular traffic exiting the site. The 
inspected State Party shall make every reasonable effort to 
demonstrate to the inspection team that any vehicle, subject to 
inspection, to which the inspection team is not granted full 
access, is not being used for purposes related to the possible 
non-compliance concerns raised in the inspection request.
    30. Personnel and vehicles entering and personnel and 
personal passenger vehicles exiting the site are not subject to 
inspection.
    31. The application of the above procedures may continue 
for the duration of the inspection, but may not unreasonably 
hamper or delay the normal operation of the facility.
            Pre-inspection briefing and inspection plan
    32. To facilitate development of an inspection plan, the 
inspected State Party shall provide a safety and logistical 
briefing to the inspection team prior to access.
    33. The pre-inspection briefing shall be held in accordance 
with Part II, paragraph 37, of this Annex. In the course of the 
pre-inspection briefing, the inspected State Party may indicate 
to the inspection team the equipment, documentation, or areas 
it considers sensitive and not related to the purpose of the 
challenge inspection. In addition, personnel responsible for 
the site shall brief the inspection team on the physical layout 
and other relevant characteristics of the site. The inspection 
team shall be provided with a map or sketch drawn to scale 
showing all structures and significant geographic features at 
the site. The inspection team shall also be briefed on the 
availability of facility personnel and records.
    34. After the pre-inspection briefing, the inspection team 
shall prepare, on the basis of the information available and 
appropriate to it, an initial inspection plan which specifies 
the activities to be carried out by the inspection team, 
including the specific areas of the site to which access is 
desired. The inspection plan shall also specify whether the 
inspection team will be divided into subgroups. The inspection 
plan shall be made available to the representatives of the 
inspected State Party and the inspection site. Its 
implementation shall be consistent with the provisions of 
Section C, including those related to access and activities.
            Perimeter activities
    35. Upon the inspection team's arrival at the final or 
alternative perimeter, whichever occurs first, the team shall 
have the right to commence immediately perimeter activities in 
accordance with the procedures set forth under this Section, 
and to continue these activities until the completion of the 
challenge inspection.
    36. In conducting the perimeter activities, the inspection 
team shall have the right to:
          (a) Use monitoring instruments in accordance with 
        Part II, paragraphs 27 to 30, of this Annex;
          (b) Take wipes, air, soil or effluent samples; and
          (c) Conduct any additional activities which may be 
        agreed between the inspection team and the inspected 
        State Party.
    37. The perimeter activities of the inspection team may be 
conducted within a band around the outside of the perimeter up 
to 50 meters in width measured outward from the perimeter. If 
the inspected State Party agrees, the inspection team may also 
have access to any building or structure within the perimeter 
band. All directional monitoring shall be oriented inward. For 
declared facilities, at the discretion of the inspected State 
Party, the band could run inside, outside, or on both sides of 
the declared perimeter.

C. Conduct of inspections

            General rules
    38. The inspected State Party shall provide access within 
the requested perimeter as well as, if different, the final 
perimeter. The extent and nature of access to a particular 
place or places within these perimeters shall be negotiated 
between the inspection team and the inspected State Party on a 
managed access basis.
    39. The inspected State Party shall provide access within 
the requested perimeter as soon as possible, but in any case 
not later than 108 hours after the arrival of the inspection 
team at the point of entry in order to clarify the concern 
regarding possible non-compliance with this Convention raised 
in the inspection request.
    40. Upon the request of the inspection team, the inspected 
State Party may provide aerial access to the inspection site.
    41. In meeting the requirement to provide access as 
specified in paragraph 38, the inspected State Party shall be 
under the obligation to allow the greatest degree of access 
taking into account any constitutional obligations it may have 
with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures. The 
inspected State Party has the right under managed access to 
take such measures as are necessary to protect national 
security. The provisions in this paragraph may not be invoked 
by the inspected State Party to conceal evasion of its 
obligations not to engage in activities prohibited under this 
Convention.
    42. If the inspected State Party provides less than full 
access to places, activities, or information, it shall be under 
the obligation to make every reasonable effort to provide 
alternative means to clarify the possible non-compliance 
concern that generated the challenge inspection.
    43. Upon arrival at the final perimeter of facilities 
declared pursuant to Articles IV, V and VI, access shall be 
granted following the pre-inspection briefing and discussion of 
the inspection plan which shall be limited to the minimum 
necessary and in any event shall not exceed three hours. For 
facilities declared pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1(d), 
negotiations shall be conducted and managed access commenced 
not later than 12 hours after arrival at the final perimeter.
    44. In carrying out the challenge inspection in accordance 
with the inspection request, the inspection team shall use only 
those methods necessary to provide sufficient relevant facts to 
clarify the concern about possible non-compliance with the 
provisions of this Convention, and shall refrain from 
activities not relevant thereto. It shall collect and document 
such facts as are related to the possible non-compliance with 
this Convention by the inspected State Party, but shall neither 
seek nor document information which is clearly not related 
thereto, unless the inspected State Party expressly requests it 
to do so. Any material collected and subsequently found not to 
be relevant shall not be retained.
    45. The inspection team shall be guided by the principle of 
conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive 
manner possible, consistent with the effective and timely 
accomplishment of its mission. Wherever possible, it shall 
begin with the least intrusive procedures it deems acceptable 
and proceed to more intrusive procedures only as it deems 
necessary.
            Managed access
    46. The inspection team shall take into consideration 
suggested modifications of the inspection plan and proposals 
which may be made by the inspected State Party, at whatever 
stage of the inspection including the pre-inspection briefing, 
to ensure that sensitive equipment, information or areas, not 
related to chemical weapons, are protected.
    47. The inspected State Party shall designate the perimeter 
entry/exit points to be used for access. The inspection team 
and the inspected State Party shall negotiate: the extent of 
access to any particular place or places within the final and 
requested perimeters as provided in paragraph 48; the 
particular inspection activities, including sampling, to be 
conducted by the inspection team; the performance of particular 
activities by the inspected State Party; and the provision of 
particular information by the inspected State Party.
    48. In conformity with the relevant provisions in the 
Confidentiality Annex the inspected State Party shall have the 
right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and 
prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not 
related to chemical weapons. Such measures may include, inter 
alia:
          (a) Removal of sensitive papers from office spaces;
          (b) Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and 
        equipment;
          (c) Shrouding of sensitive pieces of equipment, such 
        as computer or electronic systems;
          (d) Logging off of computer systems and turning off 
        of data indicating devices;
          (e) Restriction of sample analysis to presence or 
        absence of chemicals listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 or 
        appropriate degradation products;
          (f) Using random selective access techniques whereby 
        the inspectors are requested to select a given 
        percentage or number of buildings of their choice to 
        inspect; the same principle can apply to the interior 
        and content of sensitive buildings;
          (g) In exceptional cases, giving only individual 
        inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection 
        site.
    49. The inspected State Party shall make every reasonable 
effort to demonstrate to the inspection team that any object, 
building, structure, container or vehicle to which the 
inspection team has not had full access, or which has been 
protected in accordance with paragraph 48, is not used for 
purposes related to the possible non-compliance concerns raised 
in the inspection request.
    50. This may be accomplished by means of, inter alia, the 
partial removal of a shroud or environmental protection cover, 
at the discretion of the inspected State Party, by means of a 
visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed space from its 
entrance, or by other methods.
    51. In the case of facilities declared pursuant to Articles 
IV, V and VI, the following shall apply:
          (a) For facilities with facility agreements, access 
        and activities within the final perimeter shall be 
        unimpeded within the boundaries established by the 
        agreements;
          (b) For facilities without facility agreements, 
        negotiation of access and activities shall be governed 
        by the applicable general inspection guidelines 
        established under this Convention;
          (c) Access beyond that granted for inspections under 
        Articles IV, V and VI shall be managed in accordance 
        with procedures of this section.
    52. In the case of facilities declared pursuant to Article 
III, paragraph 1 (d), the following shall apply: if the 
inspected State Party, using procedures of paragraphs 47 and 
48, has not granted full access to areas or structures not 
related to chemical weapons, it shall make every reasonable 
effort to demonstrate to the inspection team that such areas or 
structures are not used for purposes related to the possible 
non-compliance concerns raised in the inspection request.
            Observer
    53. In accordance with the provisions of Article IX, 
paragraph 12, on the participation of an observer in the 
challenge inspection, the requesting State Party shall liaise 
with the Technical Secretariat to coordinate the arrival of the 
observer at the same point of entry as the inspection team 
within a reasonable period of the inspection team's arrival.
    54. The observer shall have the right throughout the period 
of inspection to be in communication with the embassy of the 
requesting State Party located in the inspected State Party or 
in the Host State or, in the case of absence of an embassy, 
with the requesting State Party itself. The inspected State 
Party shall provide means of communication to the observer.
    55. The observer shall have the right to arrive at the 
alternative or final perimeter of the inspection site, wherever 
the inspection team arrives first, and to have access to the 
inspection site as granted by the inspected State Party. The 
observer shall have the right to make recommendations to the 
inspection team, which the team shall take into account to the 
extent it deems appropriate. Throughout the inspection, the 
inspection team shall keep the observer informed about the 
conduct of the inspection and the findings.
    56. Throughout the in-country period, the inspected State 
Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for 
the observer such as communication means, interpretation 
services, transportation, working space, lodging, meals and 
medical care. All the costs in connection with the stay of the 
observer on the territory of the inspected State Party or the 
Host State shall be borne by the requesting State Party.
            Duration of inspection
    57. The period of inspection shall not exceed 84 hours, 
unless extended by agreement with the inspected State Party.

D. Post-inspection activities

            Departure
    58. Upon completion of the post-inspection procedures at 
the inspection site, the inspection team and the observer of 
the requesting State Party shall proceed promptly to a point of 
entry and shall then leave the territory of the inspected State 
Party in the minimum time possible.
            Reports
    59. The inspection report shall summarize in a general way 
the activities conducted by the inspection team and the factual 
findings of the inspection team, particularly with regard to 
the concerns regarding possible non-compliance with this 
Convention cited in the request for the challenge inspection, 
and shall be limited to information directly related to this 
Convention. It shall also include an assessment by the 
inspection team of the degree and nature of access and 
cooperation granted to the inspectors and the extent to which 
this enabled them to fulfil the inspection mandate. Detailed 
information relating to the concerns regarding possible non-
compliance with this Convention cited in the request for the 
challenge inspection shall be submitted as an Appendix to the 
final report and be retained within the Technical Secretariat 
under appropriate safeguards to protect sensitive information.
    60. The inspection team shall, not later than 72 hours 
after its return to its primary work location, submit a 
preliminary inspection report, having taken into account, inter 
alia, paragraph 17 of the Confidentiality Annex, to the 
Director-General. The Director-General shall promptly transmit 
the preliminary inspection report to the requesting State 
Party, the inspected State Party and to the Executive Council.
    61. A draft final inspection report shall be made available 
to the inspected State Party not later than 20 days after the 
completion of the challenge inspection. The inspected State 
Party has the right to identify any information and data not 
related to chemical weapons which should, in its view, due to 
its confidential character, not be circulated outside the 
Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall consider 
proposals for changes to the draft final inspection report made 
by the inspected State Party and, using its own discretion, 
wherever possible, adopt them. The final report shall then be 
submitted not later than 30 days after the completion of the 
challenge inspection to the Director-General for further 
distribution and consideration in accordance with Article IX, 
paragraphs 21 to 25.

                                Part XI

       INVESTIGATIONS IN CASES OF ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

A. General

    1. Investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons, or of 
alleged use of riot control agents as a method of warfare, 
initiated pursuant to Articles IX or X, shall be conducted in 
accordance with this Annex and detailed procedures to be 
established by the Director-General.
    2. The following additional provisions address specific 
procedures required in cases of alleged use of chemical 
weapons.

B. Pre-inspection activities

            Request for an investigation
    3. The request for an investigation of an alleged use of 
chemical weapons to be submitted to the Director-General, to 
the extent possible, should include the following information:
          (a) The State Party on whose territory use of 
        chemical weapons is alleged to have taken place;
          (b) The point of entry or other suggested safe routes 
        of access;
          (c) Location and characteristics of the areas where 
        chemical weapons are alleged to have been used;
          (d) When chemical weapons are alleged to have been 
        used;
          (e) Types of chemical weapons believed to have been 
        used;
          (f) Extent of alleged use;
          (g) Characteristics of the possible toxic chemicals;
          (h) Effects on humans, animals and vegetation;
          (i) Request for specific assistance, if applicable.
    4. The State Party which has requested an investigation may 
submit at any time any additional information it deems 
necessary.
            Notification
    5. The Director-General shall immediately acknowledge 
receipt to the requesting State Party of its request and inform 
the Executive Council and all States Parties.
    6. If applicable, the Director-General shall notify the 
State Party on whose territory an investigation has been 
requested. The Director-General shall also notify other States 
Parties if access to their territories might be required during 
the investigation.
            Assignment of inspection team
    7. The Director-General shall prepare a list of qualified 
experts whose particular field of expertise could be required 
in an investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons and 
constantly keep this list updated. This list shall be 
communicated, in writing, to each State Party not later than 30 
days after entry into force of this Convention and after each 
change to the list. Any qualified expert included in this list 
shall be regarded as designated unless a State Party, not later 
than 30 days after its receipt of the list, declares its non-
acceptance in writing.
    8. The Director-General shall select the leader and members 
of an inspection team from the inspectors and inspection 
assistants already designated for challenge inspections taking 
into account the circumstances and specific nature of a 
particular request. In addition, members of the inspection team 
may be selected from the list of qualified experts when, in the 
view of the Director-General, expertise not available among 
inspectors already designated is required for the proper 
conduct of a particular investigation.
    9. When briefing the inspection team, the Director-General 
shall include any additional information provided by the 
requesting State Party, or any other sources, to ensure that 
the inspection can be carried out in the most effective and 
expedient manner.
            Dispatch of inspection team
    10. Immediately upon the receipt of a request for an 
investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons the Director-
General shall, through contacts with the relevant States 
Parties, request and confirm arrangements for the safe 
reception of the team.
    11. The Director-General shall dispatch the team at the 
earliest opportunity, taking into account the safety of the 
team.
    12. If the inspection team has not been dispatched within 
24 hours from the receipt of the request, the Director-General 
shall inform the Executive Council and the States Parties 
concerned about the reasons for the delay.
            Briefings
    13. The inspection team shall have the right to be briefed 
by representatives of the inspected State Party upon arrival 
and at any time during the inspection.
    14. Before the commencement of the inspection the 
inspection team shall prepare an inspection plan to serve, 
inter alia, as a basis for logistic and safety arrangements. 
The inspection plan shall be updated as need arises.

C. Conduct of inspections

            Access
    15. The inspection team shall have the right of access to 
any and all areas which could be affected by the alleged use of 
chemical weapons. It shall also have the right of access to 
hospitals, refugee camps and other locations it deems relevant 
to the effective investigation of the alleged use of chemical 
weapons. For such access, the inspection team shall consult 
with the inspected State Party.
            Sampling
    16. The inspection team shall have the right to collect 
samples of types, and in quantities it considers necessary. If 
the inspection team deems it necessary, and if so requested by 
it, the inspected State Party shall assist in the collection of 
samples under the supervision of inspectors or inspection 
assistants. The inspected State Party shall also permit and 
cooperate in the collection of appropriate control samples from 
areas neighboring the site of the alleged use and from other 
areas as requested by the inspection team.
    17. Samples of importance in the investigation of alleged 
use include toxic chemicals, munitions and devices, remnants of 
munitions and devices, environmental samples (air, soil, 
vegetation, water, snow, etc.) and biomedical samples from 
human or animal sources (blood, urine, excreta, tissue etc.).
    18. If duplicate samples cannot be taken and the analysis 
is performed at off-site laboratories, any remaining sample 
shall, if so requested, be returned to the inspected State 
Party after the completion of the analysis.
            Extension of inspection site
    19. If the inspection team during an inspection deems it 
necessary to extend the investigation into a neighboring State 
Party, the Director-General shall notify that State Party about 
the need for access to its territory and request and confirm 
arrangements for the safe reception of the team.
            Extension of inspection duration
    20. If the inspection team deems that safe access to a 
specific area relevant to the investigation is not possible, 
the requesting State Party shall be informed immediately. If 
necessary, the period of inspection shall be extended until 
safe access can be provided and the inspection team will have 
concluded its mission.
            Interviews
    21. The inspection team shall have the right to interview 
and examine persons who may have been affected by the alleged 
use of chemical weapons. It shall also have the right to 
interview eyewitnesses of the alleged use of chemical weapons 
and medical personnel, and other persons who have treated or 
have come into contact with persons who may have been affected 
by the alleged use of chemical weapons. The inspection team 
shall have access to medical histories, if available, and be 
permitted to participate in autopsies, as appropriate, of 
persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of 
chemical weapons.

D. Reports

            Procedures
    22. The inspection team shall, not later than 24 hours 
after its arrival on the territory of the inspected State 
Party, send a situation report to the Director-General. It 
shall further throughout the investigation send progress 
reports as necessary.
    23. The inspection team shall, not later than 72 hours 
after its return to its primary work location, submit a 
preliminary report to the Director-General. The final report 
shall be submitted to the Director-General not later than 30 
days after its return to its primary work location. The 
Director-General shall promptly transmit the preliminary and 
final reports to the Executive Council and to all States 
Parties.
            Contents
    24. The situation report shall indicate any urgent need for 
assistance and any other relevant information. The progress 
reports shall indicate any further need for assistance that 
might be identified during the course of the investigation.
    25. The final report shall summarize the factual findings 
of the inspection, particularly with regard to the alleged use 
cited in the request. In addition, a report of an investigation 
of an alleged use shall include a description of the 
investigation process, tracing its various stages, with special 
reference to:
          (a) The locations and time of sampling and on-site 
        analyses; and
          (b) Supporting evidence, such as the records of 
        interviews, the results of medical examinations and 
        scientific analyses, and the documents examined by the 
        inspection team.
    26. If the inspection team collects through, inter alia, 
identification of any impurities or other substances during 
laboratory analysis of samples taken, any information in the 
course of its investigation that might serve to identify the 
origin of any chemical weapons used, that information shall be 
included in the report.

E. States not party to this convention

    27. In the case of alleged use of chemical weapons 
involving a State not Party to this Convention or in territory 
not controlled by a State Party, the Organization shall closely 
cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If 
so requested, the Organization shall put its resources at the 
disposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

ANNEX ON THE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION (``CONFIDENTIALITY 
                                ANNEX'')

   A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE HANDLING OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

    1. The obligation to protect confidential information shall 
pertain to the verification of both civil and military 
activities and facilities. Pursuant to the general obligations 
set forth in Article VIII, the Organization shall:
          (a) Require only the minimum amount of information 
        and data necessary for the timely and efficient 
        carrying out of its responsibilities under this 
        Convention;
          (b) Take the necessary measures to ensure that 
        inspectors and other staff members of the Technical 
        Secretariat meet the highest standards of efficiency, 
        competence, and integrity;
          (c) Develop agreements and regulations to implement 
        the provisions of this Convention and shall specify as 
        precisely as possible the information to which the 
        Organization shall be given access by a State Party.
    2. The Director-General shall have the primary 
responsibility for ensuring the protection of confidential 
information. The Director-General shall establish a stringent 
regime governing the handling of confidential information by 
the Technical Secretariat, and in doing so, shall observe the 
following guidelines:
          (a) Information shall be considered confidential if:
                  (i) It is so designated by the State Party 
                from which the information was obtained and to 
                which the information refers; or
                  (ii) In the judgement of the Director-
                General, its unauthorized disclosure could 
                reasonably be expected to cause damage to the 
                State Party to which it refers or to the 
                mechanisms for implementation of this 
                Convention;
          (b) All data and documents obtained by the Technical 
        Secretariat shall be evaluated by the appropriate unit 
        of the Technical Secretariat in order to establish 
        whether they contain confidential information. Data 
        required by States Parties to be assured of the 
        continued compliance with this Convention by other 
        States Parties shall be routinely provided to them. 
        Such data shall encompass:
                  (i) The initial and annual reports and 
                declarations provided by States Parties under 
                Articles III, IV, V and VI, in accordance with 
                the provisions set forth in the Verification 
                Annex;
                  (ii) General reports on the results and 
                effectiveness of verification activities; and
                  (iii) Information to be supplied to all 
                States Parties in accordance with the 
                provisions of this Convention;
          (c) No information obtained by the Organization in 
        connection with the implementation of this Convention 
        shall be published or otherwise released, except, as 
        follows:
                  (i) General information on the implementation 
                of this Convention may be compiled and released 
                publicly in accordance with the decisions of 
                the Conference or the Executive Council;
                  (ii) Any information may be released with the 
                express consent of the State Party to which the 
                information refers;
                  (iii) Information classified as confidential 
                shall be released by the Organization only 
                through procedures which ensure that the 
                release of information only occurs in strict 
                conformity with the needs of this Convention. 
                Such procedures shall be considered and 
                approved by the Conference pursuant to Article 
                VIII, paragraph 21 (i);
          (d) The level of sensitivity of confidential data or 
        documents shall be established, based on criteria to be 
        applied uniformly in order to ensure their appropriate 
        handling and protection. For this purpose, a 
        classification system shall be introduced, which by 
        taking account of relevant work undertaken in the 
        preparation of this Convention shall provide for clear 
        criteria ensuring the inclusion of information into 
        appropriate categories of confidentiality and the 
        justified durability of the confidential nature of 
        information. While providing for the necessary 
        flexibility in its implementation the classification 
        system shall protect the rights of States Parties 
        providing confidential information. A classification 
        system shall be considered and approved by the 
        Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i);
          (e) Confidential information shall be stored securely 
        at the premises of the Organization. Some data or 
        documents may also be stored with the National 
        Authority of a State Party. Sensitive information, 
        including, inter alia, photographs, plans and other 
        documents required only for the inspection of a 
        specific facility may be kept under lock and key at 
        this facility;
          (f) To the greatest extent consistent with the 
        effective implementation of the verification provisions 
        of this Convention, information shall be handled and 
        stored by the Technical Secretariat in a form that 
        precludes direct identification of the facility to 
        which it pertains;
          (g) The amount of confidential information removed 
        from a facility shall be kept to the minimum necessary 
        for the timely and effective implementation of the 
        verification provisions of this Convention; and
          (h) Access to confidential information shall be 
        regulated in accordance with its classification. The 
        dissemination of confidential information within the 
        Organization shall be strictly on a need-to-know basis.
    3. The Director-General shall report annually to the 
Conference on the implementation of the regime governing the 
handling of confidential information by the Technical 
Secretariat.
    4. Each State Party shall treat information which it 
receives from the Organization in accordance with the level of 
confidentiality established for that information. Upon request, 
a State Party shall provide details on the handling of 
information provided to it by the Organization.

  B. EMPLOYMENT AND CONDUCT OF PERSONNEL IN THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

    5. Conditions of staff employment shall be such as to 
ensure that access to and handling of confidential information 
shall be in conformity with the procedures established by the 
Director-General in accordance with Section A.
    6. Each position in the Technical Secretariat shall be 
governed by a formal position description that specifies the 
scope of access to confidential information, if any, needed in 
that position.
    7. The Director-General, the inspectors and the other 
members of the staff shall not disclose even after termination 
of their functions to any unauthorized persons any confidential 
information coming to their knowledge in the performance of 
their official duties. They shall not communicate to any State, 
organization or person outside the Technical Secretariat any 
information to which they have access in connection with their 
activities in relation to any State Party.
    8. In the discharge of their functions inspectors shall 
only request the information and data which are necessary to 
fulfil their mandate. They shall not make any records of 
information collected incidentally and not related to 
verification of compliance with this Convention.
    9. The staff shall enter into individual secrecy agreements 
with the Technical Secretariat covering their period of 
employment and a period of five years after it is terminated.
    10. In order to avoid improper disclosures, inspectors and 
staff members shall be appropriately advised and reminded about 
security considerations and of the possible penalties that they 
would incur in the event of improper disclosure.
    11. Not less than 30 days before an employee is given 
clearance for access to confidential information that refers to 
activities on the territory or in any other place under the 
jurisdiction or control of a State Party, the State Party 
concerned shall be notified of the proposed clearance. For 
inspectors the notification of a proposed designation shall 
fulfil this requirement.
    12. In evaluating the performance of inspectors and any 
other employees of the Technical Secretariat, specific 
attention shall be given to the employee's record regarding 
protection of confidential information.

 C. MEASURES TO PROTECT SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS AND PREVENT DISCLOSURE 
 OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA IN THE COURSE OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

    13. States Parties may take such measures as they deem 
necessary to protect confidentiality, provided that they fulfil 
their obligations to demonstrate compliance in accordance with 
the relevant Articles and the Verification Annex. When 
receiving an inspection, the State Party may indicate to the 
inspection team the equipment, documentation or areas that it 
considers sensitive and not related to the purpose of the 
inspection.
    14. Inspection teams shall be guided by the principle of 
conducting on-site inspections in the least intrusive manner 
possible consistent with the effective and timely 
accomplishment of their mission. They shall take into 
consideration proposals which may be made by the State Party 
receiving the inspection, at whatever stage of the inspection, 
to ensure that sensitive equipment or information, not related 
to chemical weapons, is protected.
    15. Inspection teams shall strictly abide by the provisions 
set forth in the relevant Articles and Annexes governing the 
conduct of inspections. They shall fully respect the procedures 
designed to protect sensitive installations and to prevent the 
disclosure of confidential data.
    16. In the elaboration of arrangements and facility 
agreements, due regard shall be paid to the requirement of 
protecting confidential information. Agreements on inspection 
procedures for individual facilities shall also include 
specific and detailed arrangements with regard to the 
determination of those areas of the facility to which 
inspectors are granted access, the storage of confidential 
information on-site, the scope of the inspection effort in 
agreed areas, the taking of samples and their analysis, the 
access to records and the use of instruments and continuous 
monitoring equipment.
    17. The report to be prepared after each inspection shall 
only contain facts relevant to compliance with this Convention. 
The report shall be handled in accordance with the regulations 
established by the Organization governing the handling of 
confidential information. If necessary, the information 
contained in the report shall be processed into less sensitive 
forms before it is transmitted outside the Technical 
Secretariat and the inspected State Party.

       D. PROCEDURES IN CASE OF BREACHES OR ALLEGED BREACHES OF 
                            CONFIDENTIALITY

    18. The Director-General shall establish necessary 
procedures to be followed in case of breaches or alleged 
breaches of confidentiality, taking into account 
recommendations to be considered and approved by the Conference 
pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    19. The Director-General shall oversee the implementation 
of individual secrecy agreements. The Director-General shall 
promptly initiate an investigation if, in his judgement, there 
is sufficient indication that obligations concerning the 
protection of confidential information have been violated. The 
Director-General shall also promptly initiate an investigation 
if an allegation concerning a breach of confidentiality is made 
by a State Party.
    20. The Director-General shall impose appropriate punitive 
and disciplinary measures on staff members who have violated 
their obligations to protect confidential information. In cases 
of serious breaches, the immunity from jurisdiction may be 
waived by the Director-General.
    21. States Parties shall, to the extent possible, cooperate 
and support the Director-General in investigating any breach or 
alleged breach of confidentiality and in taking appropriate 
action in case a breach has been established.
    22. The Organization shall not be held liable for any 
breach of confidentiality committed by members of the Technical 
Secretariat.
    23. For breaches involving both a State Party and the 
Organization, a ``Commission for the settlement of disputes 
related to confidentiality'', set up as a subsidiary organ of 
the Conference, shall consider the case. This Commission shall 
be appointed by the Conference. Rules governing its composition 
and operating procedures shall be adopted by the Conference at 
its first session.

             OTHER DOCUMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONVENTION

RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE ORGANIZATION 
                FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

     The States signatories of the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the 
Conference on Disarmament At Geneva on 3 September 1992,
     Having decided to take all necessary measures to ensure 
the rapid and effective establishment of the future 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
     Having decided to this end to establish a Preparatory 
Commission.
     1. Approve the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory 
Commission, as annexed to the present resolution;
     2. Request the Secretary-General, in accordance with 
paragraph 5 of resolution A/RES/47/39, adopted by the General 
Assembly on 30 November 1992, on the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, to provide the 
services required to initiate the work of the Preparatory 
Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons.

         TEXT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PREPARATORY COMMISSION

    1. There is hereby established the Preparatory Commission 
for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(hereinafter referred to as ``the Commission'') for the purpose 
of carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective 
implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction, and for preparing for the 
first session of the Conference of the States Parties to that 
Convention.
    2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall 
convene the Commission for its first session at The Hague, 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, not later than 30 days after the 
Convention has been signed by 50 States.
    3. The Seat of the Commission shall be The Hague, Kingdom 
of the Netherlands.
    4. The Commission shall be composed of all States which 
sign the Convention. Each signatory State shall have one 
representative in the Commission, who may be accompanied by 
alternates and advisers.
    5. The expenses of the Commission, including those of the 
provisional Technical Secretariat, shall be met by the States 
signatories to the Convention, participating in the Commission, 
in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, 
adjusted to take into account differences between the United 
Nations membership and the participation of States signatories 
in the Commission and timing of signature. The Commission and 
the provisional Technical Secretariat may also benefit from 
voluntary contributions.
    6. All decisions of the Commission should be taken by 
consensus. If, notwithstanding the efforts of representatives 
to achieve consensus, an issue comes up for voting, the 
Chairman of the Commission shall defer the vote for 24 hours 
and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to 
facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the 
Commission before the end of the period. If consensus is not 
possible at the end of 24 hours, the Commission shall take 
decision on questions of procedure by a simple majority of the 
members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance 
shall be taken by two-thirds majority of the members present 
and voting. When the issue arises as to whether the question is 
one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a 
matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the Commission 
by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.
    7. The Commission shall have such legal capacity as 
necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment 
of its purposes.
    8. The Commission shall:
          (a) Elect its Chairman and other officers, adopt its 
        rules of procedure, meet as often as necessary and 
        establish such committees as it deems useful;
          (b) Appoint its Executive Secretary;
          (c) Establish a provisional Technical Secretariat to 
        assist the Commission in its activity and to exercise 
        such functions as the Commission may determine, and 
        appoint the necessary staff in charge of preparatory 
        work concerning the main activities to be carried out 
        by the Technical Secretariat to be established by the 
        Convention. Only nationals of signatory States shall be 
        appointed to the provisional Technical Secretariat;
          (d) Establish administrative and financial 
        regulations in respect of its own expenditure and 
        accounts.
    9. The Commission shall make arrangements for the first 
session of the Conference of the States Parties, including the 
preparation of a draft agenda and draft rules of procedure.
    10. The Commission shall undertake, inter alia, the 
following tasks concerning the organization and work of the 
Technical Secretariat and requiring immediate attention after 
entry into force of the Convention:
          (a) Elaboration of a detailed staffing pattern of the 
        Technical Secretariat, including decision-making flow 
        charts;
          (b) Assessments of personnel requirements;
          (c) Staff rules for recruitment and service 
        conditions;
          (d) Recruitment and training of technical personnel 
        and support staff;
          (e) Organization of office and administrative 
        services;
          (f) Preparation of administrative and financial 
        regulations;
          (g) Purchase and standardization of equipment.
    11. The Commission shall undertake, inter alia, the 
following tasks on matters of the organization requiring 
immediate attention after the entry into force of the 
Convention:
          (a) Preparation of programme of work and budget of 
        the first year of activities of the Organization;
          (b) Preparation of detailed budgetary provisions for 
        the Organization taking into account that the budget 
        shall comprise two separate chapters, one relating to 
        administrative and other costs, and one relating to 
        verification costs;
          (c) Preparation of the scale of financial 
        contributions to the Organization;
          (d) Preparation of administrative and financial 
        regulations for the Organization providing for inter 
        alia:
                  (i) Proper financial control and accounting 
                by the Organization;
                  (ii) Preparation and approval of periodic 
                financial statements by the Organization;
                  (iii) Independent audit of the Organization's 
                financial statements;
                  (iv) Annual presentation of the audited 
                financial statements to a regular session of 
                the Conference of the States Parties for formal 
                acceptance;
          (e) Development of arrangements to facilitate the 
        election of 20 members for a term of one year for the 
        first election of the Executive Council.
    12. The Commission shall develop, inter alia, the following 
draft agreements, provisions and guidelines for consideration 
and approval by the Conference of the States Parties pursuant 
to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i) of the Convention:
          (a) Guidelines on detailed procedures for 
        verification and for the conduct of inspections, in 
        accordance with, inter alia, Part II, paragraph 42, of 
        the Verification Annex;
          (b) Lists of items to be stockpiled for emergency and 
        humanitarian assistance in accordance with Article 
        VIII, paragraph 39 (b);
          (c) Agreements between the Organization and the 
        States Parties in accordance with Article VIII, 
        paragraph 50;
          (d) Procedures for the provision of information by 
        States Parties on their programmes related to 
        protective purposes, in accordance with Article X, 
        paragraph 4;
          (e) A list of approved equipment, in accordance with 
        Part II, paragraph 27, of the Verification Annex;
          (f) Procedures for the inspection of equipment, in 
        accordance with Part II, paragraph 29, of the 
        Verification Annex;
          (g) Procedures concerning the implementation of 
        safety requirements for activities of inspectors and 
        inspection assistants, in accordance with Part II, 
        paragraph 43, of the Verification Annex;
          (h) Procedures for inclusion in the inspection manual 
        concerning the security, integrity and preservation of 
        samples and for ensuring the protection of the 
        confidentiality of samples transferred for analysis 
        off-site, in accordance with Part II, paragraph 56, of 
        the Verification Annex;
          (i) Models for facility agreements in accordance with 
        Part III, paragraph 8, of the Verification Annex;
          (j) Appropriate detailed procedures to implement Part 
        III, paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Verification Annex, in 
        accordance with paragraph 13 of that Part;
          (k) Deadlines for submission of the information 
        specified in Part IV (A), paragraphs 30 to 32 of the 
        Verification Annex, in accordance with paragraph 34 of 
        that Part;
          (l) Recommendations for determining the frequency of 
        systematic on-site inspection of storage facilities, in 
        accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 44, of the 
        Verification Annex;
          (m) Recommendations for guidelines for transitional 
        verification arrangements, in accordance with Part IV 
        (A), paragraph 51, of the Verification Annex;
          (n) Guidelines to determine the usability of chemical 
        weapons produced between 1925 and 1946, in accordance 
        with Part IV (B), paragraph 5, of the Verification 
        Annex;
          (o) Guidelines for determining the frequency of 
        systematic on-site inspections of chemical weapons 
        production facilities, in accordance with Part V, 
        paragraph 54, of the Verification Annex;
          (p) Criteria for toxicity, corrosiveness and, if 
        applicable, other technical factors, in accordance with 
        Part V, paragraph 71 (b), of the Verification Annex;
          (q) Guidelines to assess the risk to the object and 
        purpose of the Convention posed by the relevant 
        chemicals, the characteristics of the facility and the 
        nature of the activities carried out there, in 
        accordance with Part VI, paragraph 23, of the 
        Verification Annex;
          (r) Models for facility agreements covering detailed 
        inspection procedures, in accordance with Part VI, 
        paragraph 27, of the Verification Annex;
          (s) Guidelines to assess the risk to the object and 
        purpose of the Convention posed by the quantities of 
        chemicals produced, the characteristics of the facility 
        and the nature of the activities carried out there, in 
        accordance with Part VI, paragraph 30, of the 
        Verification Annex;
          (t) Guidelines for provisions regarding scheduled 
        chemicals in low concentrations, including in mixtures, 
        in accordance with Part VII, paragraph 5, and Part 
        VIII, paragraph 5, of the Verification Annex;
          (u) Guidelines for procedures on the release of 
        classified information by the Organization, in 
        accordance with paragraph 2 (c) (iii) of the 
        Confidentiality Annex;
          (v) A classification system for levels of sensitivity 
        of confidential data and documents, taking into account 
        relevant work undertaken in the preparation of the 
        Convention, in accordance with paragraph 2 (d) of the 
        Confidentiality Annex;
          (w) Recommendations for procedures to be followed in 
        case of breaches or alleged breaches of 
        confidentiality, in accordance with paragraph 18 of the 
        Confidentiality Annex.
    13. Pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 50, of the 
Convention, the Commission shall develop the Headquarters 
Agreement with the Host Country, based, inter alia, on the 
privileges, immunities and practical arrangements as specified 
in Annex 2 to this text.
    14. The Commission shall:
          (a) Facilitate the exchange of information between 
        signatory States concerning legal and administrative 
        measures for the implementation of the Convention and, 
        if requested, give advice to signatory States on these 
        matters;
          (b) Prepare such studies, reports and records as it 
        deems necessary.
    15. The Commission shall prepare a final report on all 
matters within its mandate for the first session of the 
Conference of the States Parties and the first meeting of the 
Executive Council.
    16. The property, functions and recommendations of the 
Commission shall be transferred to the Organization at the 
first session of the Conference of the States Parties. The 
Commission shall make recommendations to the Conference of the 
States Parties on this matter.
    17. The Commission shall remain in existence until the 
conclusion of the first session of the Conference of the States 
Parties.
    18. The Host Country undertakes to accord the Commission, 
its staff, as well as the delegates of signatory States such 
legal status, privileges and immunities as are necessary for 
the independent exercise of their functions in connection with 
the Commission and the fulfillment of its object and purpose, 
as outlined in Annex 1 to this text.

                                Annex 1

 PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES AND PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH 
               THE HOSTING OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION

    1. The Government of the Netherlands is prepared to grant 
to the delegates to the Preparatory Commission, who have been 
notified as such by the sending State, and who reside in The 
Hague, privileges and immunities similar to those granted by 
the Government of the Netherlands to diplomats of comparable 
rank of diplomatic missions accredited to the Netherlands.
    2. The Government of the Netherlands is prepared to apply 
Article V of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the Specialized Agencies of 21 November 1947 to nonresiding 
delegates to the Preparatory Commission while exercising their 
function and during their journeys to and from the place of 
meeting.
    3. The Government of the Netherlands is prepared to grant 
to the Executive Secretary and staff members of the Preparatory 
Commission privileges and immunities similar to those which the 
Government of the Netherlands has undertaken to grant to the 
Director-General and staff members of the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, as set out under Annex 3, 
``Privileges and Immunities'', points 1, 2, and 3, ``Social 
Security'', point 13, and ``Employment'', points 14 and 15.
    4. It is understood that the above will be elaborated in an 
agreement to be concluded with the Government of the 
Netherlands.
    5. The practical arrangements for the hosting for the 
Preparatory Commission shall be based on the information 
submitted and commitments undertaken by the Netherlands and by 
the City of The Hague as contained in Annex 3 on the 
Netherlands bid, under ``Building and Equipment''.

                                Annex 2

 privileges, immunities and practical arrangements to be laid down in 
                       the headquarters agreement

    1. The Headquarters Agreement between the Organization and 
the Netherlands, where the seat of the Organization is located, 
shall be based on the information submitted and commitments 
undertaken by the Netherlands and by the City of The Hague as 
contained in Annex 3 on the Netherlands bid.
    2. In order to ensure the effective functioning of the 
Organization, the privileges and immunities to be laid down in 
the Headquarters Agreement shall be in conformity with the 
regime of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the Specialized Agencies of 21 November 1947 (United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 179/II).
    3. In order to ensure the effective functioning of the 
Organization, the Headquarters Agreement shall also include 
provisions for:
          3.1 the granting to Heads of Delegations to the 
        Organization of ambassadorial rank the title of 
        Permanent Representative and the privileges and 
        immunities to which Ambassadors to the Netherlands are 
        entitled;
          3.2 the establishment of a tax-free commissary for 
        the officials of the Organization entitled to duty free 
        privileges;
          3.3 the exemption from tax on or in respect of 
        salaries and emoluments paid by the Organization; the 
        Host Country shall not take into account the salaries 
        and emoluments thus exempted when assessing the amount 
        of tax to be applied to income from other sources.

                                Annex 3

information submitted and commitments undertaken by the netherlands and 
                        by the city of the hague

    The following information is given and commitments are 
undertaken by the Netherlands and by the City of The Hague with 
respect to arrangements for the hosting of the Preparatory 
Commission as well as for the Headquarters Agreement. These are 
reflected in:
          The Annex to Paper No. 1 of 28 April 1992 of the 
        ``Friend of the Chair on the Seat of the 
        Organization'';
          The Bidbook of 18 May 1992 presented by the 
        Netherlands;
          The statement of 2 June 1992, made by Mr. Martini, 
        Acting Burgomaster of The Hague, to the Ad Hoc 
        Committee on Chemical Weapons;
          The statement of 2 June 1992 made by Mr. M. van Zelm, 
        Programme Director of the Prins Maurits Laboratory, to 
        the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.
    These documents are filed with the Secretariat of the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
    Other aspects may be included in the Headquarters Agreement 
by mutual agreement.

Privileges and Immunities

    1. Full diplomatic privileges will be granted to those 
staff members of the Organization and their dependents who 
qualify under the relevant provisions of the Agreement. 
Pursuant to Annex 1, the Netherlands is prepared to extend 
diplomatic privileges to personnel with ranks comparable to P-5 
and above in conformity with the regime of the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of 21 
November 1947 (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 179/
II).
    2. Other staff members will enjoy:
          (a) immunity from legal proceedings of any kind with 
        respect to words spoken or written and all acts 
        performed by them in their official capacity;
          (b) in any event, immunity shall not extend to a 
        civil action by a third party for damage arising from 
        an accident caused by a motor vehicle belonging to, 
        driven by or operated on behalf of a staff member or in 
        respect of a traffic offense involving such a vehicle;
          (c) inviolability of all their official papers and 
        documents;
          (d) immunity from inspection of official baggage;
          (e) exemption from Netherlands income tax on salaries 
        and emoluments paid to them by the Organization.
    Moreover, staff members who do not have the Dutch 
nationality will:
          (f) enjoy exemption with respect to themselves and 
        members of their families who are part of their 
        households from all measures restricting entry and 
        alien registration. Any visas which may be required 
        shall be issued without charge as promptly as possible;
          (g) be given the same repatriation facilities in the 
        time of international crisis as officials of diplomatic 
        missions, together with members of their families who 
        form part of their households;
          (h) not require a work permit for their official 
        duties with the Organization;
          (i) in accordance with the regulations in force, have 
        relief from import duties and taxes, except payments 
        for services, in respect of their furniture and 
        personal effects and the right to export furniture and 
        personal effects with relief from duty on termination 
        of their duties in the Netherlands. Personal effects 
        may include a reasonable number of cars that have been 
        in use in the household and are older than six months.
    3. In addition, persons who have lived outside the 
Netherlands for at least 12 months before taking up a position 
with the Organization will be allowed to import one motor 
vehicle tax-free. The vehicle should be imported within 12 
months after they take up their position and can be sold tax-
free after 12 months.
    4. Pursuant to Annex 2, the Netherlands is furthermore 
prepared to grant to the Heads of Delegation with ambassadorial 
rank, accredited to the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons, the title of Permanent Representatives and 
the privileges and immunities to which Ambassadors to the 
Netherlands are entitled.

Building and equipment

    5. An office building of 3,300 square meters will be 
supplied free of charge during the preparatory phase (maximum 
of five years). The building is located at the center of The 
Hague near the Peace Palace and several embassies. The 
Netherlands Congress Center is 1 km away. The modern office 
building was built in 1986 and consists of 3,300 square meters 
of office space divided over five floors. Office space can be 
made available immediately as soon as the Organization begins 
working in The Hague. The building offers sufficient 
flexibility to allow the Organization to grow in stages up to a 
maximum of 200 people. The Hague and the Netherlands will pay 
for the rent of the office space, parking places for the 
Organization, maintenance costs of the building and the 
installations energy costs (heating, cooling, electricity, 
water) and turnkey costs (carpeting, partitioning) during the 
preparatory phase.
    6. Before the full implementation phase, office space with 
a maximum of 18,000 square meters is foreseen to be made 
available for the Organization in a new purpose-built office 
building, to be known as the ``Peace Tower''. Construction can 
be started as soon as the Organization can specify the required 
volume and further details. The building is expected to be 
completed two and a half years later. The Tower will be 
situated in the city center business district next to Central 
Station.
    For a period of 3 years during the full implementation 
phase, The Hague and the Netherlands will pay for the rent of 
the office space, 110 parking places for the Organization 
inside the building, maintenance costs of the building and the 
installations, energy costs (heating, cooling, electricity, 
water) and turnkey costs (carpeting, partitioning).
    The building is flexible enough to allow space to be made 
available to the Organization in proportion to the number of 
staff, up to a maximum of 18,000 square meters. After the 
period in which the Netherlands Government will pay for the 
office space as described above, office space can be leased by 
the Organization at a guaranteed price of US$ 250 per square 
meter (indexed on the basis of the 1992 price level, basic 
rent).
    If required expansion needs of the Organization are known 
before the end of 1993, the building can be expanded to a 
maximum of 22,000 square meters. This expansion can be leased 
by the Organization at a guaranteed price of US$ 250 per square 
meter (indexed on the basis of 1992 price levels, basic rent).
    7. When needed, a conference room for approximately 170 
delegations will be made available, free of charge, during the 
maximum eight year period of the Netherlands bid at the nearby 
Peace Palace or Netherlands Congress Center.
    8. Subject to the promise that all office supplies, service 
contracts and other office materials for which the Organization 
will pay, shall be purchased at the normal going rates from a 
supplier designated by The Hague, the Netherlands offer during 
the preparatory phase (maximum of five years) includes:
          Providing all necessary office furniture according to 
        official European standards, free of charge;
          Providing all the reasonably necessary office 
        equipment, free of charge;
    During the preparatory phase (maximum of five years) the 
Netherlands offer also includes:
          Providing a fully integrated digital telephone 
        switchboard, telephones on every desk and 10 fax 
        machines free of charge.
    9. After the preparatory phase during a period of three 
years office furniture (according to official European 
standards) and reasonably necessary office equipment will be 
supplied free of charge on a one-time basis, provided that all 
office supplies, service contracts and other office materials 
for which the Organization will pay, shall be purchased at the 
normal going rates from a supplier designated by The Hague.

Laboratory/training

    10. The Prins Maurits Laboratory (PML) of the Netherlands 
Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), a fully 
independent not-for-profit research organization, will grant 
the Organization access to its database with analytical 
chemical data, free of charge. This database contains 
spectrometric and chromatographic data of a large number of 
compounds relevant to the Convention.
    11. PML is also prepared to provide a technical training 
programme for 100-150 candidate inspectors of the future 
Organization drawn from developing countries mainly. The 
training programme will be free of charge for the participants.
    12. Finally PML, if needed in cooperation with other TNO 
institutes, could carry out a number of technical functions of 
the Organization, such as analyses of samples, development of 
analytical chemical methods, synthesis of reference compounds, 
calibration and development of verification equipment, advice 
on and development of detection and protection equipment, 
sampling equipment, seals and markers, etc., at a price 
determined by the integral costs of its activities.

Social security

    13. If the Organization establishes its own social security 
system with comparable coverage to Dutch schemes, the 
Netherlands Government will exempt the Organization, its 
Director and staff members/personnel from compulsory insurance 
under national social security schemes. The exemption rules 
will be laid down in the Headquarters Agreement. For persons 
who are not exempt, compulsory insurance schemes will apply and 
the Organization will be responsible for paying contributions.

Employment

    14. Non-Dutch employees of international organizations in 
the Netherlands who do not carry diplomatic status, will be--as 
a matter of routine--granted work and residence permits for the 
duration of their employment in the Netherlands.
    15. Family members of persons working at the Organization 
who have the nationality of one of the member States of the 
European Community may take up employment in the Netherlands. 
Members of the family who do not have the nationality of one of 
the member States of the European Community may take up 
employment subject to the requirements of the labor market.

General conditions relating to the Netherlands bid

    16. The Dutch bid applies if the Organization is to remain 
in The Hague throughout its existence.
    17. Property, furniture, equipment and other items that are 
made available will remain the property of the supplier and/or 
the Netherlands.
                          VIII. MAJORITY VIEWS

                                                                   Page
  I. Background.....................................................163
      A. Historical background...................................   164
      B. Recent developments.....................................   165
 II. The Chemical Weapons Threat....................................167
      A. Description.............................................   167
      B. Delivery................................................   167
      C. Destructive effects.....................................   168
      D. Utility.................................................   168
      E. Proliferant countries...................................   169
      F. Implications of proliferation...........................   170
      G. Purpose and provisions of the Chemical Weapons 
        Convention...............................................   171
III. Issues Considered in Resolution of Ratification................173
      A. Verification and implementation issues..................   173
          1. Verifiability.......................................   173
          2. Universality and effectiveness......................   179
          3. Costs...............................................   182
          4. Enforcement/sanctions...............................   184
          5. Destruction of stockpiles...........................   185
          6.  ``Rogue'' inspectors...............................   190
          7. Chemical Weapons Convention funding.................   191
          8. Chemical Weapons Convention costs...................   192
          9. The Chemical Weapons Convention preparatory 
            commission...........................................   192
          10. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
            Weapons..............................................   194
      B. Security and Military Implications......................   194
          1. Retaliatory capability..............................   194
          2. Deterrence..........................................   196
          3. Defenses............................................   197
          4. Riot control agents.................................   198
          5. Russia and cheating.................................   200
          6. Non-lethal weapons development......................   207
          7. Protecting national security information............   208
          8. The impact on anti-terrorism efforts................   209
      C. Commercial considerations...............................   211
          1. Constitutional issues...............................   211
          2. U.S. industry and the CWC...........................   214
          3. Repercussions on U.S. industry if the U.S. does not 
            ratify the CWC.......................................   219
      D. Popular misconceptions of the CWC.......................   220
 IV. Conclusions....................................................224
      A. Bipartisan support......................................   224
      B. Summary.................................................   225
      C. Continuing concerns.....................................   227
      D. Judgment................................................   228
  V. Appendices.....................................................229
      Letter of support from George Bush.........................   229
      Letters of support from the chemical industry:
          1. The Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA)........   230
          2. The Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers 
            Association (SOCMA)..................................   235
          3. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
            America (PhRMA)......................................   235
          4. The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO).......   236
          5. The American Chemical Society (ACS).................   237
          6. 53 senior chemical industry executives..............   238

                             1. Background

    Several developments in recent years have led to an 
increased concern over the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. Economic and technological development around the 
world has led to a greater diffusion of the technology needed 
to produce such weapons. Meanwhile, the end of the cold war has 
been followed by the reemergence of regional conflicts, in 
which weapons of mass destruction are most likely to be used if 
available. The breakup of the Soviet Union has spawned new 
states with advanced unconventional weapons capabilities. 
Accordingly, the Clinton administration has stated repeatedly 
that nonproliferation is one of the primary objectives of its 
foreign policy.
    Some 20 nations are now suspected of having chemical 
weapons or developing a chemical weapons capability. Among 
these states are Iraq, Syria, North Korea, and Libya--countries 
not known for their restraint. Chemical weapons have been 
termed the ``poor man's nuclear bomb'' because they can be 
manufactured cheaply from chemicals that, although they are in 
many cases controlled, are nevertheless available for 
commercial purposes. And now, the dangers from chemical weapons 
are aggravated by the production and potential proliferation of 
ballistic missiles that can hurl a CW warhead hundreds of 
miles. Moreover, unlike the nuclear threshold, the chemical 
weapons threshold has proved all too easy to cross.
    In the twentieth century, nuclear weapons have been used 
but once, when they were employed to end the Pacific war. 
During this same time, however, nations repeatedly have 
unleashed chemical weapons to achieve their military or 
political goals. Soldiers on both sides, including U.S. troops, 
were gassed in World War I. Chemical weapons were used in 
Ethiopia in the 1930's, in Manchuria in the 1940's, and in 
Yemen in the 1960's. During the Iran/Iraq war, chemical attacks 
became commonplace. Saddam Hussein dropped chemical bombs on 
the Kurds in order to suppress their rebellion in 1989. As 
recently as the Persian Gulf war, our own troops faced a 
potential chemical weapons threat from Iraq.
    It is important to note that two-thirds of the some 20 
countries identified as having chemical weapons or developing a 
chemical weapons capability have signed the CWC. The United 
States wants those nations to ratify it as well, and ultimately 
to attain universal adherence to the Convention.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention represents the most far-
reaching multilateral chemical weapons regime in history. Since 
it was opened for signature in January 1993, 160 countries, 
including the United States, have signed the agreement, and 50, 
as of April 1996, have ratified it. The Convention bans for the 
first time the development, production, and possession of 
chemical weapons, and reinforces the international norm against 
the use of such weapons. The Convention enters into force 180 
days after the 65th country has ratified it, allowing parties 
time to enact implementing legislation and for the Preparatory 
Commission to conclude detailed implementation procedures. As 
of this writing in August 1996, more than 60 had already 
ratified. President Clinton transmitted the Convention to the 
U.S. Senate on November 23, 1993, for its consent to 
ratification. The Convention was then referred to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.

                        A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    In 1925, at the Geneva Conference for the Supervision of 
the International Traffic in Arms, the United States proposed a 
prohibition on the export of gases for use in war and the 
French proposed a ban on the use of poisonous gas in war. At 
Poland's suggestion, the prohibition was extended to 
bacteriological weapons. The Geneva Protocol was the result. It 
bans the use in war (thus avoiding prohibiting a country's 
internal use, as in the instance of Iraqi gassing of Kurds) of 
chemical and biological weapons, but not the production, 
stockpiling, or transfer of such weapons. The Committee on 
Foreign Relations favorably reported the treaty in 1926, but 
the Senate did not act on it in that period.
    In the post-World War II period, there were a number of 
discussions of the possibility of multilateral chemical and 
biological weapons bans, but no significant progress was made 
until the late 1960's. In 1969, President Nixon announced that 
he would resubmit the protocol to the Senate. He reaffirmed 
U.S. renunciation of first use of lethal chemical weapons, as 
well as incapacitating chemicals.
    In 1970, the President resubmitted the protocol with a 
reservation that the United States could retaliate with 
chemical weapons in the event that it was attacked by such 
weapons. He also declared that the protocol would not apply to 
the use in war of riot-control agents and herbicides. The 
Committee on Foreign Relations disagreed with the narrow 
coverage and deferred action. In 1971, the Soviets accepted the 
U.S. view that a ban on biological weapons presented less 
intractable problems and should not be held up awaiting 
agreement in the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical 
weapons ban. As a result, the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention was negotiated quickly, opened for signature and 
submitted to the Senate in 1972. The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee deferred action pending resolution of the U.S. 
commitment under the Geneva Protocol.
    In 1974, the Ford administration reopened the issue with 
the committee, and Dr. Fred Ikle, the Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency said that the President, while 
reaffirming the scope of the Geneva Protocol, was prepared ``to 
renounce as a matter of national policy: (1) first use of 
herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to 
their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases 
and installations or around their immediate defensive 
perimeters; and (2) first use of riot-control agents in war 
except in defensive military modes to save lives * * *.'' 
Moreover, Dr. Ikle testified, ``The President, under an earlier 
directive still in force, must approve in advance any use of 
riot-control agents and chemical herbicides in war.'' With that 
and related understandings, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee voted unanimously 2 days later to report the 
Convention and the protocol favorably. Four days later, the 
Senate approved the protocol and the Convention unanimously.

                         B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

    In recent years, the issue of chemical weapons 
proliferation has gained more immediacy as a result of a number 
of allegations of chemical and biological weapons use. The 
United States used riot-control agents and herbicides in 
Vietnam, but denied charges it had used lethal chemicals or 
biological agents. In the mid 1960's, Egypt was accused of 
using chemical weapons with Soviet help in the Yemeni civil 
war. North Vietnam was accused of using chemical weapons and 
toxins in Laos and Cambodia. The Ethiopian government was 
suspected of using chemicals against rebels in 1980. The United 
States charged that the Soviets used chemical weapons and 
toxins in Afghanistan.
    The event which provoked the sharpest response from the 
international community, and from the U.S. Congress, was Iraq's 
repeated use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, which 
led to Iranian retaliation with chemical weapons, subsequently 
Iraq callously used poison gas against its own Kurdish citizens 
in 1988. Congress responded by passing the Pell-Helms Chemical 
and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act, 
which imposed sanctions on nations using chemical weapons and 
against companies aiding the chemical weapons programs in 
certain countries. President Bush vetoed the legislation in 
1990, however, because it did not allow a Presidential waiver 
of sanctions. The Bush administration subsequently established 
controls and sanctions by Executive order, but with complete 
leeway on waivers of penalties. The legislation was modified to 
permit a Presidential waiver of sanctions against countries 
using chemical weapons, but with a congressional right to 
override the waiver specified with executive branch support, 
passed again by Congress and became law in 1991.
    Meanwhile, progress has been made in recent years on the 
multilateral front, especially since the end of the cold war, 
which has led to greater opportunities for international 
cooperation on nonproliferation issues. In 1984, Vice President 
Bush introduced at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a 
draft treaty calling for a comprehensive chemical weapons ban 
with extensive verification procedures. In the following years, 
substantial progress was made on a number of key issues, and 
there was early agreement in principle on the basic approach a 
ban would take. The Reagan administration had favored very 
strict ``anytime, anywhere'' verification procedures. Some 
believed that this U.S. demand could scuttle prospects for 
agreement, but a breakthrough came when the Soviet side did an 
about face and essentially decided to accept ``anytime, 
anywhere'' inspections.
    The late 1980's saw a slowdown in progress on an 
international chemical weapons agreement, as states debated the 
extensive verification procedures proposed by the United 
States. Also, many nations opposed a U.S.-Soviet formulation 
whereby those two countries could keep 500 tons of chemical 
weapons for at least another 8 years, pending an assessment of 
states' participation in the Convention.
    The experience of the gulf war, in which the United States 
faced the possibility of chemical weapons attack, apparently 
precipitated a change in the Bush administration's thinking on 
the matter. The United States decided that it would not use 
chemical weapons even if Iraq did so, but made it clear that 
any Iraqi use of chemical weapons would bring an overwhelming 
and devastating response. Subsequently, the executive branch 
determined that the value of a chemical weapons ban outweighed 
the utility of a chemical capability in the remote eventuality 
that conventional forces could not adequately retaliate against 
a chemical attack. Thus, the United States decided that in the 
context of a multilateral convention, it would be willing to 
abide by a total chemical weapons ban even if other countries 
did not initially adhere to such a global ban and maintained 
chemical weapons stockpiles and programs. This development led 
to accelerated progress in multilateral talks.
    In September 1989, the United States and Soviet Union 
signed a memorandum of understanding in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 
for a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange 
Related to the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Known as the 
Wyoming MOU, the 1989 agreement provided for activities in two 
phases:
          Phase I of the MOU obligated the Parties to provide 
        general data on their chemical weapons capabilities and 
        provides for a series of visits to relevant military 
        and civilian facilities.
          Phase II of the MOU obligated the Parties to provide 
        detailed data on their chemical weapons capabilities 
        and to permit on-site inspections of relevant military 
        and civilian facilities to verify the accuracy of data 
        declarations.
    The stated purpose of the Wyoming MOU when it was signed by 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union in 1989 was to build confidence 
in each country's commitment to banning chemical weapons 
capabilities and thus facilitates completion of the 
multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention.
    The multilateral talks subsequently were moved forward by 
another U.S.-Soviet/Russian chemical weapons agreement. In June 
1990 Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed a bilateral Agreement 
on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on 
Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning 
Chemical Weapons. This agreement:
          banned the production of chemical weapons agents;
          required a reduction in chemical weapons stocks to 
        5000 tons by 2002, necessitating cuts of 83% in U.S. 
        stocks and 90% in Russian stocks;
          provided for on-site inspections of storage, 
        destruction and production facilities, combined with 
        data declarations.
    On January 13, 1993, The Convention on the Prohibition of 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, known as the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, was opened for signature. The Convention went far 
beyond the bilateral agreement by requiring all parties to 
destroy all chemical stocks over a 10-year period.
    In March 1993, the United States and Russian delegations 
agreed ad referendum on detailed implementing procedures and 
updated provisions to finalize the Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement. Russia has yet to agree formally to these detailed 
procedures and provisions, however, citing problems with the 
provisions on conversion of former chemical weapons production 
facilities to peaceful uses and with the costs of stockpile 
destruction.
    The administration maintains that the delay in reaching 
final agreement on all provisions of the Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement should not delay the Senate's ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. All provisions of the Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement are consistent with the Convention. In 
effect, the bilateral agreement has fostered useful technical 
exchanges and will continue to do so. Many of the provisions in 
the Convention with regard to the destruction of weapons will 
complement those of the bilateral agreement.

                    II. The Chemical Weapons Threat

                             A. Description

    Three types of weapons are grouped under the term ``weapons 
of mass destruction'': nuclear weapons, biological weapons, and 
chemical weapons. They are given special attention because they 
are capable of killing and injuring more people at one time 
than conventional weapons can. Many chemical weapons can also 
cause suffering long after they are introduced. Moreover, 
weapons of mass destruction are primarily designed for use 
against civilian populations, making them potentially 
psychologically devastating weapons of terror.

                              B. Delivery

    Several methods have been used for deploying and delivering 
chemical weapons, which were first used extensively during 
World War I. Such methods include releasing airborne gaseous 
agents from ground-based tanks; artillery shells; mortar 
shells; aerial spray tanks; chemical warheads for short-range 
ballistic missiles; rockets; land mines; and bombs. However, 
chemical weapons do not require sophisticated military delivery 
systems. Indeed, a human agent can introduce chemical weapons 
against a target.
    The three principal types of advanced delivery vehicles are 
aircraft, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The now 
defunct Office of Technology Assessment reported in 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Assessing the 
Risks, August 1993, that, ``though few proliferant states 
have--or are likely soon to acquire--military delivery systems 
capable of reaching the United States, unconventional delivery 
methods could still put U.S. territory at risk. U.S. allies 
abroad or deployed U.S. forces are already threatened by 
shorter range systems.''
    Efforts at controlling the proliferation of chemical 
weapons must be accompanied by controls on the means used to 
deliver such weapons. Most proliferant states have or are in 
the process of developing ballistic missile and/or advanced 
aircraft capabilities which could be used to deliver 
unconventional weapons. While short-range delivery systems 
remain a problem, the Office of Technical Assessment suggested 
that, ``because advanced systems * * * are in many cases 
technically more demanding, there is greater hope * * * of 
imposing international controls on their further 
proliferation.''

                         C. Destructive Effects

    Chemical weapons are designed to kill or incapacitate enemy 
personnel by causing such effects as skin blistering, 
blindness, lung damage, choking, nervous system disruption, 
paralysis, or oxygen starvation. The destructive effects of 
chemical weapons are highly variable and generally less lethal 
than those of other unconventional weapons. The Office of 
Technology Assessment reports that, ``because they are so 
dependent on weather and the degree of defensive protection, 
the consequences of chemical and biological weapons are much 
less predictable than those of nuclear weapons.'' Such forms of 
protection as gas masks, clothing and shelters can greatly 
reduce the effectiveness of chemical weapons.
    In addition, the Office of Technology Assessment concluded, 
``chemical weapons must be delivered in great quantities to 
approach the potential lethality of nuclear and biological 
weapons; against well-protected troops or civilians, they will 
be less lethal than even conventional explosives.'' For 
example, the ratio of deaths to injuries from chemical attacks 
seems to have been low in conflicts beginning with World War I 
and extending through the Iran-Iraq War.

                               D. Utility

    While there are major political and military constraints 
that may severely restrict the willingness to use chemical 
weapons (indeed, cases have been relatively rare in history), 
chemical weapons have several military and terroristic uses.
    On a purely military level, chemical weapons can be used to 
kill or injure enemy troops. They may also force the enemy to 
take measures, such as troop dispersal or decontamination 
efforts, or donning of protective gear, to protect against the 
harmful effects of the weapons, thereby reducing the combat 
effectiveness of the enemy forces. In addition, the use of 
chemical weapons may overburden an enemy's medical services.
    Just as chemical weapons can be used to undermine military 
morale, so can they be used to terrorize entire populations. 
Indeed, historical uses of such weapons have been against 
civilians. The Office of Technology Assessment reported that, 
``Medium- to large-scale attacks with chemical weapons (e.g. 
tens of tons) on civilians may kill many more unprotected 
people (e.g. thousands) than would equivalent amounts of high 
explosives.'' The 1995 sarin gas attacks in Tokyo, provides an 
excellent case in point. Although only small amounts of 
chemicals were used and a relatively small number of persons 
were killed or injured, it does not take an active imagination 
to surmise the amount of damage and deaths which could have 
been caused if the religious cult responsible had enlarged the 
scope of their attack.
    There are certain drawbacks or limitations to the use of 
chemical weapons. Perhaps most importantly, a chemical attack 
does not damage or destroy economic infrastructure or military 
facilities, although contamination of a certain area may slow 
down industrial activity temporarily. This, of course, is not 
necessarily a disadvantage for a force that intends to occupy 
the attacked territory, although, persistent agents may 
contaminate ground that the user wishes to cross or occupy. A 
chemical attack is more likely to be successful if it is used 
against a static force versus a mobile force and is used in 
large quantities. As mentioned earlier, chemical weapons can 
also be defended against fairly easily. Last, high winds may 
blow chemicals back onto the user's forces.

                        E. Proliferant Countries

    Since the end of World War II, only three countries--the 
United States, Russia and Iraq--have admitted having chemical 
weapons. The Office of Technology Assessment cited eleven 
countries which have been widely reported in the press as 
having undeclared chemical weapons capabilities: Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq, Israel, Libya, Syria, China, North Korea, Taiwan, Myanmar 
(Burma) and Vietnam. Others which have been mentioned in more 
than one report include Pakistan, South Korea, India, Ethiopia, 
Indonesia, Chile, Afghanistan, Thailand, South Africa, Laos and 
Brazil. (This list is not a list of known proliferants, but 
merely of nations reported in the press as suspected of 
developing chemical weapons.)
    While chemical weapons are much easier to develop than 
nuclear arms, many countries capable of producing chemical 
weapons are not suspected of having done so. Those countries 
which are suspected, however, are largely concentrated in three 
regions marked by international rivalries: the Middle East, 
South Asia, and East Asia. Thus, the Office of Technology 
Assessment concluded: ``on the one hand, proliferation is still 
limited enough to encourage hope that it can be contained. On 
the other hand, it is occurring in places where political 
conflicts pose a major complication to nonproliferation 
efforts.''
    Many of the countries widely reported as possessing some 
chemical weapons capability also have Scud-range or better 
ballistic missiles, including Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Libya, 
Israel, North Korea, and China. In addition, all of these 
nations, as well as Vietnam and Taiwan have fighter-bomber 
aircraft, most with ranges of 1,000 km or more and payloads of 
at least 3,000 kg. There have also been several publicly 
reported programs among proliferant countries to produce cruise 
missiles, which also could be used for delivering 
unconventional weapons.
    These proliferant countries are unlikely to threaten the 
United States directly in the near future, however. According 
to the Office of Technology Assessment report: ``Those emerging 
missile powers that might have the intent to strike at the 
United States (e.g. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya) will not be 
able to field long-range missiles or ICBMs over the next 10 
years, and those that could develop the capability (e.g. 
Israel, India, Taiwan) are not likely to have the intent. It is 
therefore unlikely that any country (other than China and the 
former Soviet republics that already possess intercontinental 
ballistic missiles or ICBM's) would pose a direct ballistic 
missile threat to the United States within the next 10 years.''
    Some critics argue that the United States should not ratify 
the CWC for it cannot guarantee that states it is most 
concerned about will join as well. We disagree, the United 
States has already decided to eliminate a large part of its 
chemical arsenal. Congress has directed the Department of 
Defense to destroy unitary chemical weapons stockpiles and to 
plan to destroy all other chemical weapons material that is 
banned by the CWC. As the United States unilaterally dismantles 
its chemical weapons, it makes sense to seek the destruction of 
other countries' chemical weapons as well. The Convention 
imposes binding obligations on all parties to do what the 
United States has already begun to do. So the Convention has 
great value even if a few radical states do not join at the 
outset.
    Second, the United States is convinced that the answer to 
the use of chemical weapons must not be retaliation in kind, 
but rather a full range of defensive measures--such as 
filtering systems for tanks and lightweight anti-chemical 
weapons gear--coupled with a strong deterrent. The Persian Gulf 
War provided a convincing, real-life demonstration that the 
United States military is highly capable of deterring or 
responding to a chemical weapons threat with superior 
conventional military force and strategy.
    The U.S. Government has long recognized that it must 
maintain its defensive chemical weapons program as well as give 
assistance to countries that are threatened or attacked with 
chemical weapons. The CWC explicitly allows both these 
measures. Many countries view these provisions as a significant 
incentive to join the Convention. The United States has 
developed and will continue to develop defensive, protective 
measures that fully protect its military forces against all 
chemical weapons threats. Regardless of CWC ratification, the 
Administration and Congress have a responsibility to maintain a 
robust chemical weapons defense program.
    Third, by establishing a global norm against chemical 
weapons, the Convention will give the United States and world 
community a more effective means of pressuring radical 
governments to abandon their CW capabilities. The CWC also 
contains specific provisions for penalizing countries that do 
not join. States remaining outside the Convention will be 
denied access to trade in specified chemicals that are 
important not only to CW production but also to industrial 
development and growth. These states will be viewed as pariahs 
and subjected to international pressure to abide by the 
Convention's global norm banning CW. Over time, the United 
States hopes that states will realize the high political and 
economic costs of remaining an outlaw and seek to become 
members.

                    F. Implications of Proliferation

    The proliferation of chemical weapons has had, and would 
have serious negative consequences for the international 
community. Proliferation undermines international stability by 
generally increasing the visibility and increasing pressures 
for further proliferation among states fearful of potential 
attackers who possess chemical weapons. Nations facing chemical 
weapons may feel impelled to maintain a chemical arsenal to 
deter attacks or to retaliate if they fear their conventional 
forces are inadequate.
    Proliferation can propel arms races, as the development of 
chemical weapons in one country leads its neighbors to develop 
their own capabilities in response. This has happened with 
regard to nuclear weapons, as India justifies its program by 
pointing to China, and Pakistan justifies its program by 
pointing to India. Also, the more countries which have chemical 
weapons, the more potential suppliers of chemical weapons 
technology there will be to still other nations, whether 
through overt sales, covert sales or smuggling. Furthermore, 
each use of chemical weapons weakens the international 
psychological and political taboo against their use. It should 
also be noted that proliferation in one category of weapons of 
mass destruction could undermine the norms against 
proliferation of others.
    Proliferation is dangerous even if chemical weapons are not 
used in war. Proliferation of chemical weapons increases the 
chances of a terrorist theft of such weapons. Political 
disintegration or secession could mean that weapons could fall 
into the hands of groups which are dangerous or poorly equipped 
to manage the weapons safely. Moreover, while chemical weapons 
are less costly than nuclear weapons, their development and 
deployment divert resources from other social or military 
programs. Last, production of chemical weapons increases the 
risk of inadvertent environmental contamination, especially in 
developing nations, which generally do not allocate scarce 
resources to environmental and health safeguards, as evidenced 
by the Iraqi chemical weapons program.
    Violating the Convention will carry with it a demonstrable 
political price. In cases of serious violations, the CWC 
organization can recommend the imposition of collective 
sanctions on a country engaging in illicit chemical weapons 
activities. In cases of particular gravity, it must bring the 
matter to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly 
and Security Council. Finally individuals and corporations are 
also subject to the prohibitions of the Convention and can be 
prosecuted in national courts.

      G. Purpose and Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention

    The Chemical Weapons Convention is a major step beyond the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925, which only banned the use in war of 
chemical agents and, given the number of states who reserved 
the right to retaliate in kind, was in effect little more than 
a ``no first use'' of chemical weapons pledge. Under the 
agreement signatories must declare, subject to international 
confirmation: all chemical weapons, locations of chemical 
weapons facilities, details of transfers of chemical weapons 
and production equipment since 1946, and a detailed plan for 
destruction of existing weapons--all chemical weapons are to be 
completely eliminated within 10 years after the Convention's 
entry into force--all chemical weapons production must cease 
within 30 days of the entry into force--all chemical weapons 
production facilities must be eliminated (or converted to 
peaceful purposes, if permitted by the other State Parties).
    In addition, the Convention forbids the use of riot control 
agents as methods of war and reaffirms the international law 
against the use of herbicides in war. It also provides for the 
possibility for protection and assistance in the event of a 
chemical weapons attack or threat of attack, for example 
through the provision of defensive equipment and supplies.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention provisions are as detailed 
as possible to avoid ambiguities which could create problems in 
verifying adherence or determining compliance. The Preparatory 
Commission is in the process of elaborating further detailed 
guidelines and provisions for declarations and inspections as 
well as other aspects of implementation.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention provides for resolution of 
potential problems associated with the CWC by: (a) containing 
provisions for the resolution of disputes between States 
Parties or between States Parties and the Organization over the 
application or interpretation of the CWC; (b) defining 
procedures for the resolution of ambiguities that may arise in 
the course of inspections, and; (c) providing provisions for 
amendments or technical changes. Most importantly, the CWC 
operates on the principle that a State Party must take action 
in the event concerns are raised about its compliance. It is 
not up to the Organization or State Party raising the 
compliance concern to prove noncompliance. This puts the burden 
of proof on the suspected State Party to alleviate the 
noncompliance concerns of others and leaves it to States 
Parties to judge for themselves if that State Party has 
demonstrated its compliance.
    During the negotiations, the United States proposed that 
reservations be permitted. However, it received no support for 
this position. The prohibition against imposing reservations 
against the Articles of the Convention is intended to prevent 
States Parties from undermining the basic obligations of the 
CWC and creating an unequal system of obligations as happened 
in the case of the Geneva Protocol. Reservations can be made to 
the Annexes of the CWC, as long as they are not incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the CWC.
    Modifications to the CWC Articles and key provisions of the 
Annexes (protection of confidential information, challenge 
inspection and related definitions) may be made only through a 
formal amendment process requiring three conditions: support of 
a majority of States Parties, no State Party casting a negative 
vote, and ratification by all the supporting States Parties. 
The Administration has assured the Senate that the United 
States will be present at all amendment conferences and cast 
its vote, thus ensuring the opportunity for the Senate to 
consider any future amendment approved by the conference.
    The United States and other negotiating countries 
recognized the need for possible technical and administrative 
changes to the Annexes, based on future technological 
development and practical experience. Thus, the CWC provides 
simplified procedures for making changes to the Annexes. These 
provisions were adapted from similar provisions found in other 
arms control and other agreements to which the United States is 
party, e.g., the Conventional Forces Europe.
    To prepare for implementation of the Convention, the CWC 
Preparatory Commission began work in February 1993 in The 
Hague. The Preparatory Commission will operate until the 
Convention enters into force, after which its recommendations 
will be approved by the Conference of States Parties.
    The Preparatory Commission has been tasked to develop very 
technical, detailed operating procedures. The Preparatory 
Commission participants understand that the Commission cannot 
revise the provisions of the Convention or develop procedures 
that undercut or change the basic provisions of the CWC. 
Therefore, the work of The Preparatory Commission will not 
substantially effect the CWC treaty text for which the 
Administration is seeking Senate advice and consent; nor will 
the U.S. ability to verify compliance with the CWC be affected 
to any greater or lesser degree by the work of The Preparatory 
Commission than by the provisions of the CWC.

          III. Issues Considered in Resolution of Ratification

    The Committee on Foreign Relations, while considering the 
benefits of the Convention for the United States, was concerned 
with several potential problems. Critics from the private 
sector raised a number of troubling issues. Among the most 
often-heard criticisms of the Convention are the following: it 
is not completely verifiable but the verification provisions it 
does contain could harm national security and proprietary 
information interests; it is not universal; it will not rid the 
world of all dangerous chemicals; it will lead to a reduction 
in chemical weapon defenses; current uses of riot control 
agents will no longer be permitted; not having chemical weapons 
erodes deterrence, and the Convention limits the President's 
options in the case or threat of war; it will be too expensive; 
Russia's history of compliance on chemical and biological 
weapons issues is in doubt, and ``loop-holes'' in the 
Convention will allow Russia to develop new and dangerous 
chemicals; and it poses Constitutional problems for U.S. 
industry. Questions were also raised regarding enforcement, the 
costs and safety of baseline destruction of U.S. chemical 
weapons stockpiles, the ability of ``rogue'' inspectors to use 
the inspection process in order to learn how to hide non-
compliance in their home countries from other inspectors, how 
the Convention might effect the development of non-lethal 
weapons development, and how the restriction on amendments to 
the Convention's articles would effect the Senate's 
constitutional right to make its advice and consent subject to 
any reservations it sees necessary.
    In order to explore these problems carefully and in detail, 
the Committee held a series of hearings in the 103d and 104th 
Congresses, at which Clinton administration and former Bush 
administration officials, and nongovernmental witnesses were 
invited to testify. A discussion of each issue follows.

 A. VERIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES CONSIDERED IN RESOLUTION OF 
                              RATIFICATION

1. Verifiability.

    Supporters and critics of the Convention alike agree that 
the Convention's verification regime is not perfect. The nature 
of chemical production makes it impossible to ensure that any 
and all cheaters will be caught by any reasonable verification 
regime. The Committee thus had to examine the risks of an 
imperfect convention versus the risks of not having a 
Convention at all.
    Critics argued that cheating would be easy and diverse. 
Chemical technology is relatively cheap, easy to acquire and 
easy to conceal. Rogue producers could hide their production 
and storage equipment in any number of natural or man-made 
facilities. Determined cheaters could divert chemicals from 
legitimate commercial production to covert weapons production 
sites. Critics often pointed to allegations by Vil Mirzayanov, 
a Russian scientist, about secret chemical weapons development 
work in the Soviet Union and then Russia.
    Competing U.S. interests had to be balanced in the 
verification provisions. The U.S. and others had to balance the 
need to protect sensitive non-chemical weapon national security 
assets, as well as constitutional rights and non-chemical 
weapon proprietary interests with the need for the access 
necessary to ensure effective verification and deterrence. 
During the negotiations, the U.S. sought to protect U.S. 
proprietary concerns, constitutional rights, and national 
security, while at the same time providing sufficient access 
for effective verification and deterrence. Both the Bush and 
Clinton Administrations and U.S. chemical industry are 
satisfied with the final balance in the Convention, which 
provides both sufficient provisions to protect that which needs 
protecting and to address compliance concerns.
    As James Woolsey, then Director of Central Intelligence, 
said in testimony before the Committee:

         * * * we in the intelligence community do not forget 
        that larger U.S. interests, both from a 
        counterintelligence perspective and in protecting 
        proprietary information and constitutional rights, 
        played a major role in shaping the scope and nature of 
        the [Convention's] inspection regime. Throughout the 
        many years of the [Convention's] negotiations, 
        representatives of the intelligence community were 
        fully consulted on these tradeoffs. The intelligence 
        community participated in and supported the choices 
        that were made.

    The U.S. need for protection of the rights guaranteed under 
the U.S. Constitution has been specifically included in the 
challenge inspection provisions, which state that ``in meeting 
the requirement to provide access * * *, the inspected State 
Party shall be under the obligation to allow the greatest 
degree of access taking into account any constitutional 
obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or 
searches or seizures.'' Thus, the United States. would not 
violate the Chemical Weapons Convention in the unlikely event 
access had to be limited or severely restricted because it 
proved impossible to obtain access in a constitutionally 
permissible manner.However, if a State Party restricts access, 
it is obligated to make every reasonable effort to provide 
alternate means to satisfy the compliance concern that 
instigated the inspection.
    Each nation that joins the Convention accepts the 
unambiguous obligation to grant challenge inspections in the 
event others suspect it is trying to violate the treaty's 
prohibitions. Challenge inspections will be governed by 
timeliness in order to thwart any attempts host officials might 
make to delay the proceedings. Within 36 hours after arrival in 
the challenged country, inspectors will begin monitoring 
activities at the perimeter of the challenged site. Initially 
they can only take photographs, examine traffic logs, and 
patrol the perimeter under escort, but once the dimensions of 
the perimeter are agreed the inspectors can take air, soil, and 
effluent samples and use other monitoring instruments.
    The guidelines for managing a challenge inspection are 
similar to those of a routine inspection. That is, inspection 
procedures are intended to allow the inspectors to assess the 
status of activities without forcing states and companies to 
forfeit unrelated security and business secrets. In that 
regard, the specific areas of a challenged facility that 
inspectors will examine will be subject to negotiation, and 
host officials can use such safeguards as shrouding equipment 
or logging off computers. Within 72 hours after inspectors 
arrive at the perimeter, the host country must provide access 
inside the perimeter to prove compliance. Instances where host 
officials do not satisfy inspectors' requests and make ``every 
reasonable effort to demonstrate'' its compliance will be duly 
recorded in the inspectors' report. While these reports will 
become the basis for subsequent action, compliance judgements 
will be made by governmental officials, not the inspectors of 
the international monitoring agency.
    As useful as these provisions are, however, challenge 
inspections are not a guarantee that all troubling situations 
will be quickly resolved. Inspectors may emerge from a 
challenge inspection with the ``smoking gun'' of proof, but, 
far more often, ambiguities will remain in situations of 
concern. Whether appropriate action is taken in these instances 
will depend upon the will of the international community, which 
in turn depends upon the political leadership of the U.S. and 
other leading countries. When it comes to treaty enforcement, 
there is simply no substitute for the international will to 
take punitive action if the country in question does not 
rectify its behavior. In other cases, the results of a 
challenge inspection may be ambiguous: the challenged sites may 
not receive a clean bill of health even though definitive 
evidence of noncompliance is lacking. Even in such 
circumstances, however, what the inspectors did or did not see 
will surely tell the international community more than it 
previously knew. This will initiate a process of ongoing 
attention to the situation; over time, an ambiguous situation 
will become clearer. As a result, concerned countries will be 
able to adjust their policies accordingly, including modifying 
export control policies and possibly adding other sanctions.
    The United Nation's Special Commission's experience in Iraq 
is a case in point. For the past 4 years, UNSCOM has worked 
hard to bring Iraq to a complete accounting of its weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) programs. UNSCOM's firm leadership, 
technical expertise, and inspection and monitoring activities--
and the Security Council's support for these activities--have 
achieved measurable progress toward neutralizing Iraq's ability 
to wage chemical, biological, or nuclear warfare.
    UNSCOM's efforts, and those of the IAEA in the nuclear 
field, have produced a steadily increasing volume of 
information on Iraqi WMD programs. UNSCOM and IAEA's periodic 
reports to the Security Council show how far we have come, 
compared to what was there is now a sizable volume of facts and 
data. However, the information was rarely provided in great 
chunks. UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors ferreted it out by 
persistent pressure on the Iraqis over an extended period, 
backed by the Security Council. Steady pressure over time, 
backed by international sanctions, has yielded impressive 
results.
    Some critics deride the Convention's monitoring 
requirements by characterizing them as utterly deficient. 
Ironically, during the 1980's these same critics touted these 
same provisions--detailed data reporting accompanied by routine 
and challenge inspections--as essential for success in 
verification. The critics of this treaty are ever mindful, as 
everyone should be, of the possibility that governments and 
individuals may try to circumvent the law. Their thoughts are 
mainly useful at this juncture for heightening vigilance, but 
they are no justification for dismissing a treaty built around 
the Ronald Reagan maxim that arms control is not about trust, 
it is about verification.
    Non-cooperation of rogue states will be taken into account 
in U.S. judgments about compliance. The inspection team report 
will contain not only the factual findings of the inspection 
but also an assessment of the degree and nature of access and 
cooperation granted. Judgment on the compliance of an inspected 
State Party will rest upon an accumulation of information, e.g. 
that provided by the challenging State Party, the nature of 
cooperation of the inspected State Party, information from the 
inspection and alternative means offered, and our own national 
intelligence means.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention also requires suspect 
violators to undertake measures to satisfy concerns about their 
compliance or face punitive measures. The Conference of States 
Parties can recommend to States Parties that they impose 
collective sanctions in the event of serious cases of non-
compliance, and must bring cases of particular gravity to the 
attention of the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council.
    The committee heard repeated testimony from government and 
non-government experts that the Convention creates the most 
comprehensive and intrusive verification regime in the history 
of arms control agreements. This regime requires detailed 
initial and annual declarations, access to declared chemical 
production facilities, access to undeclared but suspect 
facilities and access to other related locations through 
routine and challenge inspections. These declaration and 
verification provisions cover virtually every aspect of a 
chemical weapons program. Moreover, the Convention puts the 
burden of proof on suspected violators when there is sufficient 
doubt about their compliance. Suspected parties must either 
undertake specific, timely measures to satisfy any doubts or 
face punitive measures.
    The inspection regime cannot, however, guarantee that all 
cheating will be detected. But John Holum, Director of the U.S. 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), testified that this 
does not mean the Convention is not in that nation's interest. 
He argued that any significant chemical weapons program of 
concern for national security would have to go far beyond 
small-scale production and storage. Holum argued that:

          First, a significant [chemical weapons] program * * * 
        must include development, testing, production, 
        weaponization, storage, military training and other 
        activities. Each additional step increases the risk of 
        detection. The risk grows over time, as evidence from a 
        variety of potential sources accumulates. The 
        [Convention's] verification regime will heighten that 
        risk of discovery and potentially provide an additional 
        source of evidence. The larger, more systematic and 
        sustained the violation, the higher the probability 
        that we will obtain evidence of the illicit [chemical 
        weapons] activity. Clearly, a program of significant 
        size and scope would be difficult to conceal.

    No treaty is 100 percent verifiable; thus since the 
beginning of the negotiations, the United States has taken the 
position that the final agreement must be effectively 
verifiable. The administration believes that the CWC is 
effectively verifiable, and that it protects and enhances U.S. 
national security interests. This conclusion is reflected in 
the verification report required by Section 37 of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Act submitted to the Senate. That 
report reflects a consensus of the executive branch agencies 
and intelligence community. The key criteria taken into account 
in U.S. determination of effective verifiability were: (a) 
whether potential violations pose unacceptable risks to U.S. 
interests; (b) whether the CWC provides acceptable level of 
confidence that States Parties are in compliance with 
provisions; (c) whether the CWC facilitates the ability of the 
United States to detect significant violations in a timely 
manner; (d) whether the CWC serves to deter violations by 
increasing the political significance of violations, raising 
costs and risks associated with cheating; and (e) whether the 
CWC was comprehensive in scope, so when taken in the aggregate, 
the regime provides an interlocking web of information which 
promotes effective verification.
    This raises the issue of what constitutes ``significant.'' 
In his testimony before the committee, General John 
Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed 
the issue of what would be a significant amount of chemical 
weapons from a military perspective. Unfortunately, there is no 
one easy definition of ``significant'' as the quantity of 
chemical weapons needed to seriously impede an opposing force 
is dependent on the situation. While this issue is also 
discussed below, it is worth noting here that General 
Shalikashvili stated firmly that from:

        * * * a military perspective the Chemical Weapons 
        Convention is clearly in our national interest. The 
        Convention's advantages outweigh its shortcomings. The 
        United States and all other [chemical weapons] capable 
        state parties incur the same obligation to destroy 
        their chemical weapons stockpile. While less than 
        perfect, the verification regime allows for intrusive 
        inspections while protecting national security 
        concerns. The nonproliferation aspects of the 
        Convention will retard the spread of chemical weapons, 
        and in so doing, reduce the probability that U.S. 
        forces may encounter chemical weapons in a regional 
        conflict. Finally, while foregoing the ability to 
        retaliate in kind, the U.S. military retains the 
        wherewithal to deter and defend against a chemical 
        weapons attack. I strongly support this convention and 
        respectfully request your consent to ratification.

    The United States is faced with the problem of chemical 
weapon proliferation with or without the Convention. With or 
without it, the United States must try to detect foreign 
chemical weapons programs, distinguishing them from legitimate 
commercial activity and assess their threat to U.S. security. 
The United States now uses a variety of intelligence gathering 
methods toward this end. The key question is whether the 
Convention would help or hinder the current approach. The 
United States does not need chemical weapons to deter chemical 
weapon use against its forces because superior U.S. military 
force, coupled with a modern defense program, is quite adequate 
to deter or respond to chemical weapon use.
    CIA Director James Woolsey reinforced the point that, with 
or without the Convention, the intelligence community is tasked 
with detecting the existence of, and determining the threat to 
the United States from, other countries' chemical weapons 
programs. He stated that ``it is to this broader mission that 
the [Convention] can make a contribution'' by increasing the 
amount and type of information available to the intelligence 
community and by providing a basis for comparison with 
information the United States currently obtains by other means. 
This information could then be used either to build confidence 
where all the information is consistent or flag suspicions 
where there are inconsistencies or omissions. Wool- sey called 
the Convention another ``tool to add to our collection * * * 
with a broad applicability which can help resolve a wide 
variety of problems * * *. We will know more about the state of 
chemical warfare preparations in the world with the treaty than 
we would know without it.'' ``Entry into force'' of the 
Convention would not necessarily change the number or types of 
problems associated with the proliferation of chemical weapons 
programs around the world, but it would increase the ability of 
the United States to discover and challenge those programs. In 
short, the administration argues, the Convention does nothing 
to weaken existing national technical means of verification 
but, indeed, enhances them. The committee fully expects the 
administration to vigorously pursue access to information from 
the inspection process to ensure that the intelligence 
community does indeed have the information it needs to track 
and evaluate compliance.
    Many countries were sensitive to the possibility of U.S. or 
Western control of the CWC verification assets for national 
interests. They were concerned that they might be the targets 
of information or, at a minimum, that the CWC organization 
would use its inspection assets to satisfy Western security 
needs rather than their own. Thus, CWC provisions are drafted 
such that the United States could provide such information if 
it so desired. The provisions are also drafted such that their 
application will be nondiscriminatory. The verification 
resources of the OPCW are available to all States Parties on 
the same basis. If some states decide to supplement those 
resources with national assets, that is their prerogative.
    There are provisions in the CWC that allow for States 
Parties to receive information from national declarations of 
other states as well as from routine and challenge inspections. 
There are also provisions in the confidentiality annex for the 
protection of information provided by States Parties. The 
United States would have to ensure that any intelligence 
information it might provide to the CWC Organization is 
protected properly.
    Verification judgments should not be confused with 
monitoring assessments. The Intelligence Community monitoring 
effort is one element designed to provide evidence contributing 
to U.S. verification and compliance judgments. Compliance 
judgments incorporate policy judgments which consider other 
inputs such as the negotiating record, legal interpretations, 
and compliance analysis. Compliance judgments are based on the 
relationship of specific events to more generic treaty 
provisions and on whether, given the range of uncertainty in 
monitoring confidences, a violation can be determined to have 
concurred.
    It would be a difficult task to monitor all chemical 
facilities worldwide. However, the majority of chemical 
industry facilities declarable under the Convention are located 
in Western countries, where the likelihood of cheating is 
minimal if not totally absent. About three-fourths of the 
nations assessed to possess or have the capability to produce 
chemical weapons have already signed the CWC--and one would 
expect some focus of monitoring capability, especially 
challenge inspection requests, on the more likely prospects of 
concern.

2. Universality and Effectiveness

    Few people believe that all countries will ratify the 
Convention. Some of the countries that the United States 
worries already have or are acquiring chemical weapons 
programs--such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, or Syria--might well 
be the very ones which do not ratify it, at least for the 
foreseeable future. Not all chemicals that could be used in 
chemical weapons production will be banned either, as some of 
those chemicals have legitimate commercial use. It would be 
both impractical and harmful to industry to attempt to 
completely rid the world of dangerous chemicals. The committee 
was therefore concerned about the Convention's effectiveness, 
because as long as certain chemicals and the political will to 
use them as weapons remain, the threat of a chemical weapons 
attack also remains.
    The committee heard testimony from administration officials 
and outside experts that the Convention's strengths 
significantly outweigh its weaknesses. First, the Convention 
creates an internationally accepted political standard against 
which all countries can be measured and held accountable. Any 
country which refused to be held to that norm would immediately 
be seen as suspect and therefore subject to increased 
monitoring by the intelligence communities. Specifically, the 
Convention creates a legal regime prohibiting not just the use, 
but also the development, production, stockpiling, or 
transferring directly or indirectly of chemical weapons. There 
is currently no such internationally accepted law and therefore 
no legal basis on which to challenge chemical weapons 
development, production or trade. One witness likened chemical 
weapons to murder. Everyone can proclaim that murder is wrong, 
but unless there are laws against it, there is no legal ability 
to arrest murderers. The Convention will provide a basis for 
both challenge and punitive action.
    Second, the Convention creates a financial incentive for 
countries to join by controlling, and in some cases restricting 
international trade in certain chemicals for nonparties. The 
restrictions tighten significantly against nonparties in the 3 
to 5 years following the Convention's entry into force, making 
it increasingly in a country's commercial interest to join. 
Fourth, even for nonparties the Convention creates a deterrent 
to chemical weapons proliferation by making it harder and more 
costly to get the chemicals necessary for production. The 
Convention's trade restrictions force would-be proliferators to 
use more difficult, costly, circuitous paths that are arguably 
more detectable in the long run.
    Fifth, the Convention provides for some assistance to state 
parties that are attacked or threatened with attack from 
chemical weapons. This type of assistance could take the form 
of detection equipment and alarm systems, protective equipment, 
decontamination equipment and decontaminants, medical antidotes 
and treatments and advice on any of these measures. Some 
critics erroneously argued that this provision committed the 
developed nations to share their chemical defense technology 
with Third World countries thus permitting, in effect, 
technology transfers that would aid the potential development 
of more sophisticated Third World chemical weapons. Nothing in 
the Convention requires developed countries to share this type 
of information.
    Finally, as one witness pointed out, if the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty is any example, membership will likely 
increase over time as the political and cost-benefit 
calculations of nonparties change.
    While some witnesses pointed to the Convention's 
imperfections as reason for the Senate to deny ratification, 
supporters pointed out that no arms control agreement in 
history has been either completely global or completely 
effective. Michael Moodie, President of the Chemical and 
Biological Arms Control Institute, and a former Bush 
administration official, pointed out that expecting the 
Convention to make the world completely safe from the threat of 
chemical weapons all by itself is asking it to shoulder a 
burden it was never designed to carry. Only when the Convention 
works in concert with other policy tools, including national 
intelligence monitoring, a robust chemical defense program and 
an overwhelming conventional deterrent, will the United States 
be prepared to meet the challenge of chemical proliferation. 
Moodie also argued that the Convention's over-all effectiveness 
will ultimately depend, at least in part, on the political will 
of its members to act in the face of violations.
    General Shalikashvili also pointed out that while not all 
countries in the world have signed the Convention, and not all 
signatories will ratify the Convention, the

        * * * list of signatories includes the Russian 
        Federation, which possesses the world's largest 
        declared chemical weapons stockpile. The eventual 
        destruction of approximately 40,000 tons of declared 
        Russian chemical weapons will significantly reduce the 
        chemical threat faced by United States forces.

    In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 
argued: ``The best protection against these weapons [chemical] 
is to make it more difficult for hostile nations and groups to 
obtain and use them. By blocking the supply and demand for 
chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention does just 
that.''
    Lt. General Wesley Clark, the Director of Strategic Plans 
and Policy in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: ``The convention's 
imposition of an internationally recognizable obligation to 
destroy all chemical weapons essentially places all other CW 
capable state parties on an equal footing with the United 
States. Because of the convention's trade restrictions and 
provisions, deproliferators outside the convention will find it 
increasingly more difficult to acquire the chemical precursors 
essential to building a chemical weapons stockpile.''
    U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher added: ``The CWC 
will have a deterrent effect on CW proliferations and put new 
pressures on countries that remain outside the treaty. A 
country like Libya that requires foreign assistance to begin or 
further develop a CW program would find it more difficult since 
States Parties will be prohibited from assisting anyone in 
activities banned by the CWC and will also be required to ban 
trade with non-States Parties in certain chemicals that could 
be used to make chemical weapons.
    In addition, the CWC will establish an unprecedented 
international norm against virtually every aspect of an 
offensive CW program, providing a basis for international 
action against proliferators and enhancing political pressure 
against countries that continue to engage in such programs. 
Those outside the CWC will be subject to political isolation 
and intensified scrutiny for signs of CW activity.
    Finally, the CWC will afford better information on rogue 
states' efforts to acquire chemical weapons. It will increase 
our access to information about clandestine chemical weapons 
programs even in countries that do not join; the declaration 
and verification provisions of the CWC require unprecedented 
transparency regarding CW-relevant activities and provide the 
United States with otherwise unavailable information that will 
facilitate U.S. detection and monitoring of illicit CW 
activities.''
    Mr. John Holum, Director of the United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, clearly stated before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee: ``First, we have already decided 
to eliminate a large part of our chemical arsenal * * * . As we 
unilaterally dismantle our own chemical weapons, it makes sense 
to seek the destruction of other countries' chemical weapons as 
well. The Convention imposes binding obligations on all parties 
to do what the United States has already begun to do. So the 
Convention has great value even if a few radical states do not 
join at the outset.''
    ``Second, we are convinced that the answer to the use of 
chemical weapons must not be retaliation in kind, but rather a 
full range of defensive measures * * * . The Persian Gulf War 
provided a convincing, real life demonstration that the U.S. 
military is highly capable of deterring or responding to a 
chemical weapons threat with superior conventional military 
force and strategy.''
    Third, ``by establishing a global norm against chemical 
weapons, the Convention will give the United States and world 
community a more effective means of pressuring radical 
governments to abandon their CW capabilities.''
    Lt. General Wesley Clark, the Director of Strategic Plans 
and Policy in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
added: ``This treaty controls the sale of dangerous chemicals. 
And therefore, countries like Iran or Iraq or Libya will have a 
much more difficult time getting the chemicals to support their 
own domestic program.''
    To the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Director of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Project at the 
Henry L. Stimson Center, Amy Smithson testified: ``Foreign 
policy is not brewed like instant coffee: success in the 
international arena requires the identification of a worthy 
goal, the selection of a suitable course of action, and the 
fortitude to pursue that policy over the long-term * * * . Over 
155 nations have joined the United States in signing the 
Convention--an ample demonstration of just how strongly the 
global community feels that the Convention is the appropriate 
vehicle to establish a strong behavioral norm against chemical 
weapons proliferation and the legal foundation to curtail it.''

3. Costs

    Critics of the Convention argue that the costs of 
implementation outweigh the benefits to national security. 
These costs, they claim, are both direct and indirect. The 
direct costs include the creation and maintenance of 
international and domestic bureaucracies to carry out the 
inspection and monitoring regimes. Indirect costs include the 
potential loss of national security and proprietary 
information.
    The chemical industry in the United States, as represented 
by the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), understands 
and accepts the costs of the Convention and has been vocal in 
its support of the Convention. As Fred Webber, the President of 
CMA, wrote in the Washington Post in April 1995:

          The chemical industry has been an outspoken supporter 
        of * * * the Chemical Weapons Convention * * * the 
        unpleasant truth--last seen during the Persian Gulf 
        War--is that commercial facilities in Iraq were used 
        for military purposes. The best safeguard against that 
        happening again is to make all commercial chemical 
        plants subject to the scrutiny of international 
        investigators. Honest businesses have nothing to fear. 
        Anyone with other motives will run the risk of getting 
        caught in the act. The treaty is the best means 
        available to prevent legitimate chemicals from falling 
        into the wrong hands.

    The industry has been involved not only in negotiation of 
the Convention, but also in drafting implementing legislation 
for the Convention. Referring to the draft implementation 
legislation presented by the administration to Congress, Dr. 
Will Carpenter, a representative of the (CMA), testified that 
if ``the final regulatory package reflects the general intent 
behind much of the legislation, we [CMA] believe that the 
potential regulatory burden on, and intrusion in commercial 
facilities should be minimal.''
    In his testimony, General Shalikashvili also addressed the 
issue of potential loss of national security information. He 
cited mock chemical weapons inspections done by the services 
with the assistance of the On Site Inspection Agency. General 
Shalikashvili claimed that the inspections ``have proven that 
while the Convention's inspections may be costly in terms of 
personnel and resources, U.S. facilities can still protect 
themselves against the disclosure of national security 
information and information on sensitive equipment and 
facilities * * * .'' He concluded that, on balance, the 
Convention's advantages outweighed its disadvantages, saying 
the ``verification regime allows for intrusive inspections 
while protecting national security concerns.''
    In an answer to questions for the record the administration 
addressed the issue of the potential loss of proprietary 
information. While this issue is also addressed below, it is 
worth noting here that the Confidentiality Annex contains 
procedures for States Parties to designate sensitive 
information that requires special handling and to have any 
concerns about breaches of confidentiality investigated. Also, 
the Annex will establish different levels of sensitivity of 
confidentiality for data or documents, to be based on 
universally applied criteria. Access to confidential 
information will be regulated according to classification, and 
dissemination of such information within the Organization will 
be handled on a ``need to know'' basis. The Annex mandates that 
the Preparatory Commission develop the classification system 
for the Conference of the States Parties to approve after the 
Convention enters into force. The Annex further sets up rules 
for how information is to be protected and under what 
circumstances it may be released. Finally, it provides 
procedures for punitive action against employees who violate 
those rules.
    At committee request, the General Accounting Office 
prepared a report in 1994 on the Status of U.S.-Russian 
Agreements and the CWC. The report's key conclusions and 
recommendations with regard to costs are as follows:

          U.S. plans call for $85 million more to be spent on 
        research and development efforts designed primarily to 
        refine and improve the convention's verification 
        regime. These unilateral expenditures are voluntary and 
        are aimed mainly at supporting the OPCW, although they 
        also support the bilateral destruction agreement with 
        Russia. A key question to consider now is whether the 
        United States should continue paying for all such 
        efforts without first seeking to obtain support funding 
        from the OPCW. We recognize that member states may not 
        be able to support the entire U.S. research effort. 
        Given that the OPCW is a multilateral organization 
        whose efforts will benefit all members, it appears 
        reasonable to expect that significantly greater cost 
        sharing of OPCW activities should be undertaken by 
        other member countries. By seeking OPCW funding 
        support, the United States would also obtain some 
        evidence as to whether the international organization 
        deems the planned U.S. research to be of substantive 
        value to the verification process.
          We recommend that the Director, ACDA, and the 
        Secretary of Defense reach an agreement with the 
        Preparatory Commission (and subsequently the OPCW) on 
        how the United States can be reimbursed for some of the 
        costs of U.S. research and development efforts which 
        directly support the chemical weapons verification 
        regime.
          With regard to U.S. compliance efforts, the Navy and 
        Army have chosen to pursue a site diagram program which 
        costs millions of dollars to develop and will require 
        millions of dollars to maintain and keep operational. 
        The Air Force has chosen to use a low-cost option for 
        transmitting site diagrams to Washington. The Army and 
        Navy could save about $5.6 million over the next 6 
        years by adopting the Air Force system.
          We recommend that the Secretary of Defense review the 
        treaty compliance program of the military services with 
        the view of determining and implementing the most cost-
        effective system for generating and transmitting site-
        diagrams in the event of a challenge inspection.

    U.S. Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, argued before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: ``While it is true that 
this will be a complex and a costly process, I want to point 
out that Congress has already directed the Executive Branch to 
undertake the major part of this obligation without regard to 
the CWC treaty.''
    In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Dr. Brad Roberts, a Member of the Research Staff at 
the Institute for Defense Analysis maintained: ``The cost to 
the United States of sustaining the OPCW will be far lower than 
the cost of sustaining a CW stockpile, equal to or lower than 
what it invests in other arms control measures, and a pittance 
compared to what it spends on chemical defense.''
    Dr. Brad Roberts added: ``The costs to the U.S. Treasury 
and to U.S. industry are within reasonable bounds. Measured in 
relative as opposed to absolute terms, they are minimal. The 
regulatory burden on industry that will be created by the CWC 
is relatively modest, given the burdens already falling on 
industry, and is far preferable to jeopardizing industry's 
long-term competitiveness by failing to create agreed trading 
rules.''

4. Enforcement/sanctions

    The Committee also considered the issue of penalties for 
noncompliance with the Convention. Critics pointed out that 
there is little in the way of punitive measures and that those 
that are in the Convention are too vague to be an effective 
deterrent.
    The question of penalties for misbehavior was addressed 
late in the negotiations. The lack of specificity regarding 
both what sanctions would be appropriate and how to apply them 
is indicative of the difficulty of these negotiations. That 
said, the Convention's sanctions and provisions are more 
comprehensive than those of any other similar agreement. Minor 
violations would be handled within the Executive Council of the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In the 
case of more serious violations, the Conference of State 
Parties can, upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, 
restrict or suspend a State Party's rights and privileges under 
the Convention or recommend that States Parties impose 
unspecified collective measures. The U.N. General Assembly and 
the Security Council would consider violations of ``particular 
gravity.''
    Supporters of the Convention argue that this lack of 
specificity gives a degree of flexibility and raises a 
potential violators uncertainty about penalties. In the end, 
the effectiveness of the prospective arrangements may only 
become clear if there are violations, the violations are 
discovered, and the international political will exists to 
counter them.

5. Destruction of stockpiles

     The committee had several questions regarding the 
destruction of the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons, 
including the estimated costs, where the United States is in 
the process and how much money has already been spent, the 
safety of baseline incineration, and what other countries think 
of incineration as a method of destruction.
    According to the administration the life-cycle cost for 
destroying U.S. chemical stocks is currently estimated as $12.4 
billion over the period of destruction. The cost of destroying 
the nonstockpile items the Convention requires, such as 
chemical weapon production equipment, is approximately $1 
billion. These figures do not include the costs of 
verification. As of the end of March 1996, the Defense 
Department had spent approximately $3.1 billion on the Chemical 
Stockpile Destruction Program. The administration pointed out 
that the United States will be paying these costs regardless of 
whether or not the Convention enters into force.
    In 1969 the United States stopped producing unitary 
chemical weapons agents and munitions. Since then the stockpile 
has become increasingly old, and in some cases unsafe. 
Following a report of the Chemical Warfare Review Commission in 
1985, Congress mandated in the Defense Authorization Act of 
1986 (P.L. 99-145) that the Defense Department dispose of the 
unitary chemical weapons stockpile by September 30, 1994. The 
deadline was extended twice, and in the 1993 Defense 
Authorization Act (P.L. 102-484), the destruction deadline was 
extended to December 31, 2004, a date nearly identical to the 
deadline required by the Convention. Yet, with or without the 
Convention, U.S. law already requires the most difficult 
aspects of destruction--that of the chemical weapons agents 
themselves--to be destroyed on a 10-year timetable. A key 
advantage of the Convention is that it requires other countries 
to destroy their chemical weapons on the same timetable.
    In fiscal year 1996, the Chemical Demilitarization Program 
has a budget of roughly $854 million. To date, the United 
States has completed construction of two disposal facilities: 
Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System in the Pacific 
Ocean and the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in 
Tooele, Utah. Johnston Atoll began full-scale operations in 
January 1994 and has destroyed over 120,000 individual 
munitions and 1,000 tons of chemical agent so far. This 
includes over 45,000 105 mm artillery projectiles, over 72,000 
M55 rockets, and some 3,000 MC-1 bombs. Other destruction 
facilities are being planned at the seven remaining chemical 
weapons stockpile storage sites in the United States. The 
administration provided the following update on the status of 
specific aspects of the destruction program:
    Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS). 
JACADS has fully recovered from the damage done by Hurricane 
John in 1994 and has completed destroying the MC-1 and MK-94 
bombs previously stored on Johnston Island. JACADS is currently 
preparing for the upcoming GB 155 mm Projectile Campaign. An 
application for renewal of the JACADS operating permit has been 
submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency and is 
expected to be acted upon by the summer of 1996. Destruction 
operations at the facility are scheduled to be completed in 
1999.
    Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF). Tooele has 
completed systemization testing, in which the individual 
process components (e.g. disassembly equipment, conveyors and 
incinerators) were tested as a complete process line using 
simulated chemical items. Surrogate burns mandated by the State 
of Utah for four of the facility's furnaces were completed as 
has the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) R&D burn for the 
deactivation furnace. Toxic disposal operations are scheduled 
to begin in early 1996 and to be completed in 2002.
     Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF). The 
ANCDF's updated application for the necessary environmental 
permits were submitted to the State of Alabama in February 1995 
and are expected to be acted upon in the fourth quarter of FY 
1996, pending receipt of the necessary environmental permits 
from the State of Alabama. Destruction operations are currently 
scheduled to begin in the second quarter of FY 2001 and to be 
completed by 2004.
     Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF) and Pine 
Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (PBCDF). Umatilla and 
Pine Bluff's applications for the necessary environmental 
permits were transmitted to the State of Oregon and the State 
of Arkansas, respectively, in March 1995 and June 1995, 
respectively. Construction is expected to begin in the fourth 
quarter of FY 1996, pending receipt of the necessary 
environmental permits.
     Remaining CONUS sites. The remaining CONUS sites (Pueblo, 
Aberdeen, Blue Grass, and Newport) are still in various stages 
of design. Pueblo's required environmental permit application 
was transmitted to the State of Colorado in October 1995. 
Lexington's environmental permit application was transmitted to 
the State of Kentucky in December 1995. Permit applications for 
Aberdeen and Newport are expected to be transmitted to State 
authorities in November 1996 and July 1997, respectively.
    The administration anticipates that the United States will 
be able to meet the 2004 deadline, provided that environmental 
issues can be resolved in a ``timely manner.''
    With regard to safety issues the administration stated that 
the Department of Defense's position is that the chemical 
stockpiles can be safely destroyed using the baseline 
incineration destruction process. The National Research Council 
(VX) of the National Academy of Sciences concluded that 
baseline incineration is a safe and effective process for 
destroying chemical agents and munitions. The [National 
Research Council] also concluded that the risks increase over 
time as stockpile deterioration inevitably progresses, thus 
making the weapons more dangerous to store or to destroy.
    The U.S. Army concurs with the National Research Council's 
conclusions that the baseline destruction process is safe and 
effective and should proceed without delay, and that the risks 
from continued long-term storage of the agents outweigh the 
potential risks from incineration. While the Army plans to move 
ahead on destruction, it also plans to research two alternative 
technologies: stand-alone neutralization and neutralization 
followed by biological treatment. The National Research Council 
recommended that both methods receive further study. These two 
methods are fundamentally different from incineration and other 
destruction methods in that they operate at low temperatures 
and low pressure. The administration leaves open the 
possibility that it may adopt one of these two methods at low-
volume bulk-agent sites, depending on the results of the study. 
The Army is also following some of the National Research 
Council's other recommendations on safety and cost-
effectiveness.
    The administration believes that the risk of storing 
chemical weapons increases over time as the stockpile 
inevitably deteriorates and the weapons become more dangerous 
to store or destroy. In sum, it believes that the ``present 
program can ensure environmentally safe destruction within the 
10-year timeline of the [Convention].''
    As to other counties' views of the incineration process, 
the administration reported that Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and Canada have all used incineration-based technologies to 
destroy chemical weapons. Germany has built an incineration 
facility near Munster, for the destruction of mustard-agent 
munitions, and plans to build a second incineration facility 
for agents containing arsenic. The administration pointed out 
that the ``German government considers incineration technology 
to be environmentally safe, even given its stringent 
environmental regulations.'' After the United Kingdom used 
incineration to destroy mustard-containing munitions, it 
determined that negligible toxic emissions were released into 
the atmosphere as a result of the process. The Canadian 
government used incineration to destroy mustard gas and the 
neutralized waste from nerve agent. The Russian Federation, 
however, has not yet decided on the technology it plans to use 
to destroy its chemical weapon stockpile.
    Steven R. Bowman, an analyst in National Defense for the 
Congressional Research Service, prepared, at Committee request, 
a study of ratification and implementation issues in 1994. This 
study is attached.
    Mr. Bowman writes with regard to the United States 
destruction program:

          The United States is by far the country most advanced 
        in its [chemical weapons] destruction program. In the 
        early 1980's, the Department of Defense (DOD) declared 
        approximately 90% of the U.S. chemical stockpile 
        (28,000 agent tons) obsolete. This decision, coupled 
        with a 1985 congressional directive to destroy these 
        munitions by 1999 (now amended to 2004), led DOD to 
        begin planning a destruction program over a decade ago. 
        Nevertheless, it is not entirely assured that the 
        United States will be able to meet the 2005 Convention 
        deadline. Current DOD estimates call for completing 
        destruction on time, but a number of factors could 
        intervene.
          The most unpredictable factor is the length of time 
        it will require to obtain the necessary federal and 
        state permits to build and operate the destruction 
        facilities. The current plan calls for destruction 
        facilities to be built at each of the eight [chemical 
        weapons] storage depots. For each site, the U.S. Army 
        must obtain separate permits under the Resource 
        Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Clean Air 
        Act Amendments of 1977. In addition, environmental 
        impact statements are required under the National 
        Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The General 
        Accounting Office has expressed doubt that current 
        estimates allow sufficient time for fulfilling existing 
        permit application requirements.
          Adding to the federal requirements, it is clear that 
        the destruction program will face additional obstacles 
        at the state level. In the last two years, public 
        concern in the regions where destruction facilities 
        will be built has heightened considerably. The primary 
        fears are of toxic emissions from the destruction 
        process and the possibility of catastrophic accident. 
        Public interest groups have arisen and been influential 
        in getting state governments to consider or enact 
        highly restrictive standards for any [chemical weapons] 
        destruction facility. In fact, Kentucky and Indiana 
        have passed legislation that could significantly delay, 
        or even prevent, building destruction incinerators, 
        while Colorado and Maryland are considering such 
        legislation. Even if federal and state permits are 
        granted, public challenges, either judicially or 
        politically, could also bring delays. If Convention 
        deadlines are to be met, Congress may have to address 
        the extent to which state legislation or the courts can 
        impede the United States' fulfillment of international 
        treaty obligations.
          Another potential obstacle to meeting Convention 
        deadlines is the question of method of destruction. The 
        Army's chosen method (called baseline) is to drain the 
        munitions and then incinerate the chemical agent and 
        munitions parts. Though the choice of this method came 
        after extensive study of alternatives, incineration has 
        still raised strong public objection. As a consequence, 
        Congress directed the Army to reconsider alternative 
        technologies. As part of this effort, the National 
        Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences 
        has completed a review of potential alternative 
        methods. The Army is to study this review and provide 
        Congress by December 31, 1993, a detailed report on how 
        alternative technologies compare to the baseline method 
        in terms of safety, environmental protection, and cost 
        effectiveness.
          The National Research Council report observes that 
        there are possible alternative technologies, but they 
        are untested. The Council estimates that the necessary 
        research and development could take a minimum of five 
        years before a pilot plant could be operational for 
        evaluation. The Council's report also noted that 
        additional pollution control devices could be added to 
        the baseline technology to reduce further the 
        possibility of toxic emissions. In looking at the 
        Council's report, no alternative technology appears to 
        surpass the current approach with regard to safety, 
        environmental protection, and cost. The cost could be 
        particularly prohibitive given the delay that new 
        research and development would entail. Nevertheless, 
        the House Appropriations Committee believes that the 
        Council's report will cause significant changes to the 
        destruction program's budget and structure, and 
        consequently has recommended adding $25 million to the 
        program's FY 1994 appropriation in anticipation of 
        additional research and development, and deferred $50.7 
        million in procurement funds.
          If these potential problems do prevent the United 
        States from meeting Convention deadlines, it can apply 
        to the OPCW for an extension. The political 
        consequences of doing so, however, may be undesirable. 
        Any delay on the part of the United States would 
        probably result in an equal or greater delay on the 
        part of Russia * * *. In addition, in the eyes of many, 
        the status of the United States as a major proponent of 
        the Convention and arguably the most technologically 
        advanced Nation places a greater responsibility on its 
        adherence to Convention provisions. This dynamic could 
        lead to other nations with smaller, though politically 
        more destabilizing stockpiles, also to plead 
        difficulties and request extensions of the destruction 
        deadlines.

    With regard to the Russian destruction program, Mr. Bowman 
writes:

          Russia possesses the world's largest chemical weapons 
        stockpile, estimated to be 40,000 to 50,000 tons. Its 
        plans for a destruction program are embryonic, and the 
        country's on-going political and economic turmoil leads 
        most observers to believe it will not be able to meet 
        Convention deadlines on its own. Russia has established 
        a commission * * * to oversee the destruction program * 
        * * and has made it clear that Russia will require both 
        technological and financial assistance to destroy its 
        chemical weapons. In addition to direct foreign 
        assistance, Russia is considering establishing an 
        investment bank to encourage commercial participation, 
        and hopes to recycle some commercially valuable 
        compounds from the destruction process for sale * * *.
          Congress has responded to Russia's call for 
        assistance, appropriating $55 million in aid to be used 
        for the initial planning and evaluation stages of the 
        Russian program. In addition, the United States has 
        agreed to share destruction technology and participate 
        in the exchange of technical experts. To facilitate 
        these efforts, the United States has opened a Chemical 
        Weapons Destruction Support Office (CWDSO) in Moscow. 
        The questions that remain unanswered, and are perhaps 
        unanswerable for the time being, are what additional 
        assistance Russia will request or require, and whether 
        it will be able to meet Convention timetables, even 
        with additional assistance.
          Aside from financial concerns, Russia faces other 
        obstacles that could substantially delay its 
        destruction program. With the continuing governmental 
        disarray, Russia has been unable to establish a 
        managerial structure with sufficient authority to carry 
        out a program. Government bureaucracies shunning 
        responsibilities, less than full cooperation from the 
        military, and uncertainties about the tenure of central 
        authority have all contributed to the problem.
          Secondly, as democratization proceeds fitfully, and 
        the central government no longer has overriding 
        authority, public opinion has begun to play a stronger 
        role. As in the United States, communities where 
        destruction facilities may be built have started to 
        voice concerns about public safety. One facility, 
        completed over two years ago, has been closed and will 
        not be utilized owing to local protests.
          Through both the OPCW and the CWDSO in Moscow, the 
        United States should be able to follow closely the 
        progress of the Russian destruction program. Russia's 
        solicitation of assistance, both technical and 
        financial, from the United States and other Western 
        nations will also provide opportunities to monitor the 
        destruction program.

    The Administration has stated that meeting the CW 
destruction time lines mandated in the CWC presents a challenge 
for Russia. However, as discussed below, the U.S. is working 
with Russia in a number of areas to help it establish a 
realistic and executable CW destruction program. In addition to 
the CWDSO in Moscow and the destruction planning assistance, 
the U.S. is also working with Russia on a joint evaluation of 
the Russian nerve agent destruction process to determine, among 
other things, whether it meets CWC requirements.

6. ``Rogue'' Inspectors

    The Committee was concerned with the possibility of 
``rogue'' inspectors who might use their participation in the 
Organization's international inspection process as a way to 
learn how to ``cheat'' on inspections and then pass that 
information on to their national governments. Critics pointed 
out that Iraqi participants in International Atomic Energy 
Agency inspections had done just that. They used the inspection 
process to learn how to hide critical information about Iraq's 
nuclear program from inspectors in Iraq.
    In a response to a question for the record, the 
administration stated that it was unlikely that any information 
an individual inspector was able to obtain could be more than 
marginal help to a determined cheater. The administration 
stated that there is nothing particularly unique about the 
inspection process, that most of the procedures are specified 
in the treaty itself or will be detailed in the Organization's 
inspection manuals and negotiated facility agreements, and all 
of this information is readily available to States' Parties. 
While acknowledging the point that an experienced corrupt 
inspector could gain some additional information that could 
make it easier for a State Party to hide its illicit 
activities, the administration claimed that the advantages 
would be slight. The administration went on to state that the 
``viability of the [Convention] will depend on the reasonable 
assumption that the vast majority of international inspectors 
are honest and dedicated to the goals of the regime.'' Finally, 
the Technical Secretariat will have the responsibility of 
ensuring that inspectors are ``appropriately advised and 
reminded'' of security requirements.

7. Chemical weapons convention (CWC) funding

    The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW) will be funded through signatories' contributions. In 
addition, there will be the costs associated with domestic 
implementation.
    The CWC is both a disarmament and non-proliferation treaty. 
In view of the contribution of the CWC to U.S. national 
security, the Administration believes the Convention is worth 
its relatively modest price. The United States and a number of 
other countries pay the largest percentage of the overall cost, 
based upon the United Nations formula of cost assessment 
adjusted to take into account differences in membership. This 
formula is specified in the CWC and applies to all signatories' 
contributions to the Preparatory Commission and States Parties 
assessments under the CWC. The U.S. assessed contribution to 
the overall cost will be approximately 25 percent.
    Additionally, a State Party with chemical weapons and 
chemical weapons production facilities (CWPF) is expected to 
pay not only for their destruction, but also for verification 
activities associated with the monitoring and destruction of 
these CW and CWPF.
    The CWC is different than other multilateral arms control 
agreements in that it requires certain detailed procedures for 
verification be developed and an international organization to 
conduct verification activities be established in the two year 
time period between opening for signature and entry into force. 
This is necessary to ensure that compliance can be monitored 
from the moment the Convention enters into force.
    As of July 31, 1995, 93.9 percent of the 1994 budget 
assessment had been paid. More than half of the Member States 
had paid their contributions in full or made payments on 
account. Also, for the same time period, 76.3 percent of the 
assessed contributions for the CY 1995 budget have been paid. 
Both of these are higher percentages than international 
organizations normally are able to collect, indicating a great 
deal of support for this Convention.
    Costs for a full-year of PREPCOM activities in 1996 are 
budgeted at 55.3 million Dutch Guilders (approximately $33.5 
million). Following is a presentation of the 1996 U.S. costs in 
support of the CWC. Also presented are CW related costs which 
occur whether or not there is a Chemical Weapons Convention.

8. Chemical weapons convention costs

                        [In millions of dollars]                        
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Fiscal year--            
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                    1993      1994      1995      1996  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CWC-related Costs:                                                      
    State (CIO).................        NA        NA        NA  \1\ 8.63
    ACDA:                                                               
        PrepCom/OPCW Assessment.      2.20      9.40      14.0      0.00
        Admin/PrepCom Support...      2.24      0.98      1.00      1.00
        Industry Outreach.......      0.20      0.20      0.30      0.00
        ONA Requirements........      0.00      0.25      0.96      0.00
                                 ---------------------------------------
          Total.................      4.64     10.83     16.26  \2\ 1.00
                                 =======================================
    DOD:                                                                
        OSIA....................     11.09     17.74     25.36     26.28
        Services................     17.45     26.00     39.29     38.19
        DNA (Verif. RDT&E)......     21.65     18.96     17.60     12.61
                                 ---------------------------------------
          Total.................     50.19     62.70     82.25     77.08
    DOC                                  0         0      0.00      0.00
    Industry....................        NA        NA        NA        NA
Non-CWC dependent costs:                                                
    DOD:                                                                
        Chemical stockpile                                              
         disposal program.......    533.60    503.80    851.30    670.00
        CW stockpile maintenance     93.80     98.40     99.40     76.60
        Defensive/protective                                            
         posture................    576.20    584.16    508.60    453.50
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Amount in President's FY 97 budget request for FY 96. Final amount  
  under review pending determination of allocations received in FY 96   
  Omnibus CR Appropriation.                                             
\2\ In addition, $5.84 of FY 94-95 carryover funds will be spent on     
  PrepCom/OPCW and ONA requirements.                                    

9. The Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission

    Concerns have been raised that the work of the CWC 
Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) will undercut the CWC 
verification regime. Questions were also asked about U.S. 
influence over the PrepCom's work.
    The CWC PrepCom is composed of states that sign the CWC. 
Since February 1993, it has been in continuous session in The 
Hague, the future headquarters site for the Organization for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which will 
implement the treaty after entry into force. The purpose of the 
PrepCom is to carry out the necessary preparations for the 
effective implementation of the CWC.
    The PrepCom was tasked to develop very technical, detailed 
implementing procedures as well as the staff structure of the 
OPCW, financial and staff regulations and other administrative 
requirements. PrepCom participants understand that the 
Commission cannot revise the provisions of the Convention or 
develop procedures that undercut or change the basic provisions 
of the CWC. Therefore, the work of the PrepCom will not 
substantively effect the CWC text; nor will the U.S. ability to 
verify compliance with the CWC be affected to any greater or 
lesser degree by the work of the PrepCom than by the provisions 
of the CWC.
    The PrepCom has established a provisional support 
organization, known as the Provisional Technical Secretariat 
(PTS), which is the predecessor of the administrative and 
operational arm of the OPCW. Upon the approval of States 
Parties, the PTS will become the Technical Secretariat of the 
OPCW shortly after entry force of the Convention.
    The PrepCom's Program of Work is designed to reach 
decisions effectively on issues necessary for implementation of 
the Convention. These issues are placed in two broad 
categories. One covers the administration of the PrepCom, PTS 
and future OPCW. The other includes all subjects related to the 
CWC's verification regime and the provision of technological 
cooperation and assistance. The PrepCom has made substantial 
progress on many issues in each of these categories.
    The PrepCom has discussed all major areas of the Convention 
through a process of establishing groups of experts to focus on 
specific issues. All decisions made thus far have been made by 
consensus. The PrepCom has a voting mechanism for reaching 
decisions when a consensus cannot be reached, but this has been 
avoided in an effort to resolve issues to the satisfaction of 
all members.
    With regard to administrative matters, the PrepCom has 
established rules of procedure, staff and financial regulations 
for the PTS, and has signed an agreement with the Host 
Government regarding privileges and immunities for PTS staff. 
Progress has also been made on staff and financial regulations 
for the OPCW and on an agreement with the Host Government 
regarding privileges and immunities for the OPCW staff. Fifty-
nine professionals are currently on the PTS staff, six of which 
are U.S. citizens, including the Head of the Administration 
Division. Other U.S. citizens are in key positions on the 
Executive Secretary's personal staff and in the Verification 
Division.
    With regard to verification, the PrepCom has, for example, 
developed declaration formats, guidelines for equipment 
procurement, inspector training requirements and programs, and 
procedures regarding confidentially. The PrepCom has also made 
progress in establishing the OPCW Laboratory and in developing 
the OPCW information management system.
    The United States is the most active delegation in the 
PrepCom. Based on the extensive research and development work 
done in the United States and experience gained through various 
bilateral arms control agreements, the United States has 
submitted technical and procedural papers on almost every 
subject under discussion. The United States maintains a 
permanent delegation to the PrepCom and rotates experts through 
the delegation as they are needed. The United States has also 
provided cost-free experts to the PTS staff to assist in their 
internal administrative, long-range, and inspection planning.
    The administration believes that U.S. ratification of the 
CWC will provide an important impetus to the PrepCom's efforts 
to prepare for entry into force of the Convention. U.S. 
ratification will spark momentum internationally toward entry 
into force and, by implication, more active participation by 
CWC signatories in The Hague. This will help ensure that the 
necessary administrative and verification procedures are ready 
for approval and immediate implementation by the OPCW following 
entry into force of the Convention.

10. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

    Responsibility for implementing the Chemical Weapons 
Convention will rest with the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons, known as the OPCW. The CWC outlines the 
structure of the OPCW and its bodies, and defines their 
relationships, general operating procedures, and areas of 
responsibility. The OPCW will come into existence upon entry 
into force of the CWC and will be headquartered in The Hague.
    The OPCW consists of three main bodies; the Conference of 
States Parties (CSP), the Executive Council (EC), and the 
Technical Secretariat (TS).
          The CSP, consisting of all States Parties, is the 
        principal decisionmaking body of the Organization, 
        responsible for overseeing implementation of the 
        Convention and the activities of the EC and the TS. The 
        Conference of States Parties meets annually, unless it 
        decides otherwise. In addition, the CSP is to meet no 
        later than the end of the 6 and 11 year after entry 
        into force of the CWC, to review the operation of the 
        CWC regime. CSP responsibilities also include approving 
        the annual OPCW budget, deciding on the scale of 
        financial contributions, electing the members of the 
        EC, and dealing with concerns about compliance.
          The EC serves as the executive body for the OPCW, 
        overseeing day-to-day activities. It is a political 
        body, consisting of 41 rotating members. Each of the 
        five regional groups is allocated a specific number of 
        seats. Representation takes into account whether State 
        Parties have a significant chemical industry. This 
        criterion, along with a Western Group political 
        agreement, essentially ensures the United States a 
        permanent seat. It also ensures that those States 
        Parties upon whose chemical industry the impact is 
        greatest will have an important role in the operation 
        of the CWC regime.
          The TS consists of a chief administrator (the 
        Director General), inspectors and scientific, technical 
        and administrative personnel. The TS is responsible for 
        carrying out the verification provisions of the 
        Convention as well as related administrative functions.

   B. SECURITY AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS CONSIDERED IN RESOLUTION OF 
                              RATIFICATION

1. Retaliatory capability

    The Department of Defense, even though recognizing that the 
CWC may not be universal or universally complied with, believes 
that the ability to retaliate in kind is no longer a necessary 
element in countering chemical weapons.
    Fundamentally, DOD supports giving up the ability to 
retaliate with CW because the United States has an effective 
range of alternative retaliatory capabilities. U.S. chemical 
protective capabilities continue to be improved, partly as a 
result of the gulf war experiences. But the United States would 
not rely on protection alone. For obvious reasons, the DOD does 
not choose to specify in detail what responses the United 
States would make to a chemical attack. However, as DOD stated 
during the gulf war, if any country were foolish enough to use 
chemical weapons against the United States the response will be 
``absolutely overwhelming'' and ``devastating''. The United 
States does not need chemical weapons to deliver an effective 
response to a chemical attack.
    General John Shalikashvilli, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, addressed this issue directly in testimony before the 
Senate in August 1994. At that time, General Shalikashvilli 
said:

          The U.S. military's ability to deter chemical weapons 
        in a post CWC world will be predicated upon both a 
        robust chemical weapons defense capability, and the 
        ability to rapidly bring to bear superior and 
        overwhelming military force in retaliation against a 
        chemical attack * * * Desert Storm proved that 
        retaliation in kind is not required to deter the use of 
        chemical weapons.

    Another nation's first use of chemical weapons against the 
United States, its forces overseas, or its allies would be a 
violation of customary international law. If a nation were to 
join the Chemical Weapons Convention, development, stockpiles, 
storage, and use of chemical weapons would be a violation of 
international law.
    The point has been made by administration officials that, 
under customary international law as seen in the doctrine of 
belligerent reprisal, the United States would be relieved from 
certain international obligations in order to respond to a 
chemical weapons attack. Essentially, the doctrine allows a 
country to retaliate to an attack that is in violation of 
international law in a manner that is appropriate, 
proportionate and necessary to restore the status quo ante.
    Accordingly, the doctrine of belligerent reprisal must not 
be taken to mean that the United States will treat lightly 
obligations and assurances provided to other nations that it 
will not use nuclear weapons against them or threaten to do so, 
most notably in protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the 
South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, and the African 
Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. The United States has ratified the 
protocols to Tlatelolco and signed the others.
    Comparable assurances to the international community have 
been the express policy of the United States in succeeding 
years. The committee believes that it would be extremely 
unfortunate if other nations were to conclude at this juncture 
that the United States is in any way frivolous with regard to 
its adherence to its commitments and obligations.
    Forgoing an offensive chemical weapons capability allows 
the United States to pursue, with strong international backing, 
DOD's long-held goal of a complete ban, and eventually saves us 
the cost and controversy that were associated increasingly with 
maintaining a chemical stockpile for retaliation.
    In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, U.S. Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, argued: 
``we [the U.S. military] do not need chemical weapons to 
provide an effective deterrent or to deliver an effective 
response to the use of chemical weapons against our forces.''
    U.S. Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, added: ``U.S. 
forces are equipped and trained to effectively and oppose an 
aggressor armed with chemical weapons.''
    U.S. Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, continued: 
``The Department of Defense will maintain a robust chemical 
weapons defensive capability supported by aggressive 
intelligence collection efforts. This commitment to protecting 
our forces, combined with an ability rapidly to bring to bear 
the overwhelming power of our military capabilities, will form 
the backbone of military deterrence against any aggressor in 
the CWC world. Nothing in the treaty restricts our activities 
in this regard.''
    In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Lt. General Wesley Clark, the Director of Strategic 
Plans and Policy in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs maintained: ``banning chemical weapons is more important 
to national and international security than the possible threat 
of retaliatory use.''
    Lt. General Wesley Clark, the Director of Strategic Plans 
and Policy in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
added: ``The United States military's ability to deter chemical 
weapons in a post-CWC world will be predicated upon a robust 
chemical weapons defense and the ability to rapidly bring to 
bear superior and overwhelming military force should chemical 
use be initiated by an adversary. Our military demonstrated in 
Desert Storm that retaliation in kind is not required to deter 
the use of chemical weapons. U.S. forces are the best equipped 
and trained forces in the world.''
    Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dr. Brad 
Roberts, a Member of the Research Staff at the Institute for 
Defense Analysis, stated: ``For the kind of military threat 
that remains, the U.S. does not need chemical weapons. They are 
not helpful for either deterring or defeating the use of such 
weapons against U.S. forces in the kinds of interstate wars 
likely in the post-cold war era.''

2. Deterrence

    Several civilian critics of the Convention have argued 
against the philosophy of giving up the use of chemical weapons 
for retaliatory purposes. These civilians argue that the threat 
of potential U.S. use of chemical agents in a retaliatory 
capacity serves as an important deterrent by creating 
uncertainty in the mind of potential aggressors. They argue 
that denying a retaliation-in-kind capability unfairly limits 
the President's options to respond to a chemical attack.
    In May 1991, President Bush stated that the United States 
was ``formally forswearing the use of chemical weapons for any 
reason, including retaliation, against any state, effective 
when the Convention enters into force.'' General Shalikashvili 
testified that this decision was based on the belief that 
banning chemical weapons was more important for national 
security than the benefits of the threat of retaliatory use. He 
further testified that the ability of the U.S. military to 
deter chemical weapons after the Convention enters into force:

          * * * will be predicated upon both a robust chemical 
        weapons defense capability, and the ability to rapidly 
        bring to bear superior and overwhelming military force 
        in retaliation against a chemical attack. * * * while 
        the U.S. will forego [chemical weapon] retaliation in 
        kind upon the Convention's entry into force it still 
        retains a retaliatory capability second to none. Desert 
        Storm proved that retaliation in kind is not required 
        to deter the use of chemical weapons. Should deterrence 
        fail, a chemical attack against U.S. forces would be 
        regarded as an extremely grave action subject to an 
        appropriate non-chemical response of our choosing. As 
        was stated by Secretary Cheney during the Gulf War the 
        U.S. response to a chemical weapons attack would be 
        ``absolutely overwhelming'' and ``devastating.''
    Other Defense Department officials testified before the 
Committee that the Department of Defense recognizes that the 
Convention will not be universal in coverage or universally 
complied with, at least at the beginning. But it believes that 
the ability to retaliate with chemical weapons is no longer an 
essential element in countering the possibility of possession 
of chemical weapons by other States. * * * Fundamentally, the 
Defense Department supports giving up the right to retaliate 
with chemical weapons because we have an effective range of 
alternative retaliatory capabilities.
    Civilian critics argue that if the United States is 
determined to give up retaliation-in-kind as a deterrent, it 
would be better to do it unilaterally so that the decision 
could be easily reversed if necessary. Yet this would entirely 
undercut the purpose of the Convention which is to eliminate 
chemical weapons for all time. Such a stance would also limit 
the ability of the United States to encourage others to join 
the Convention.
    Matthew Meselson, of the Department of Biochemistry and 
Molecular Biology at Harvard University, testified that a U.S. 
Government interagency study concluded that like-for-like 
deterrence ``does nothing to prevent proliferation and, if 
anything, encourages it.'' He testified that it was on the 
basis of this study that U.S. policy on using chemical and 
biological weapons as a deterrent began to change.
    Finally, then Director of Central Intelligence Woolsey 
testified that in the CIA's judgment, the Convention would 
serve a second type of deterrence purpose, that of discouraging 
some nations which might otherwise have begun or maintained 
chemical weapons programs from doing so. He argued that 
countries that might have begun or continued a chemical weapons 
program out of fear of a regional chemical weapons threat may 
be reassured by potential adversaries' ratification of the 
Convention and/or by the Convention's guarantees of 
international assistance if they are threatened or attacked 
with chemical weapons. He argued that other nations might 
simply decide that the risks and costs of cheating outweigh the 
marginal strategic advantage.

3. Defenses

    What will the United States do to protect its troops? The 
Department of Defense has made it clear that it will maintain a 
robust chemical defense capability supported by aggressive 
intelligence collection efforts. This commitment to protecting 
U.S. forces combined with an ability to rapidly bring to bear 
the overwhelming power of U.S. military capabilities will form 
the backbone of military deterrence against any aggressor in 
the post-CWC world.
    The treaty recognizes the need for States Party to the 
Convention to continue with CW defense programs. This right is 
clearly and unambiguously provided in Article X of the 
Convention--which states, ``Nothing in this Convention shall be 
interpreted as impeding the right of any State Party to conduct 
research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means 
of protection against chemical weapons, for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention.'' Also Article II includes in 
its definitions of purposes not prohibited the protection 
against chemical weapons. The Convention also subjects these 
programs to monitoring and verification which helps ensure that 
such activities cannot be used to hide offensive programs. To 
ensure that U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are the 
best protected and best equipped fighting force for operations 
on a nuclear, chemical or biological (NBC) battlefield, DOD has 
developed a centralized management process that serves to 
coordinate the Services requirements in these areas.
    U.S. NBC defensive programs will continue in accordance 
with the provisions of the treaty and the DOD will continue to 
provide U.S. forces the best protection available. Nothing in 
the treaty restricts U.S. activities in this regard.
    General Shalikashvilli emphasized his view of the 
importance of a robust chemical defense program:

          * * * not only to protect U.S. forces but also to 
        ensure their combat effectiveness in a chemical 
        environment. A well trained and protected force is not 
        as vulnerable to a chemical weapons attack as a force 
        lacking these essential attributes. These factors would 
        naturally impact the decision of any would be aggressor 
        when contemplating the use of chemical weapons against 
        U.S. forces.

    So long as the United States and its allies face 
significant chemical warfare threats, it will be incumbent upon 
the Government, including the Congress, to ensure that funding 
for chemical defense programs remain at a realistic and 
appropriate level.

4. Riot control agents

    One of the more contentious areas of debate is that of riot 
control agents. The Convention bans the use of riot control 
agents as a ``method of warfare,'' but does not ban their use 
for law enforcement purposes. The committee devoted 
considerable time and attention to this issue, as it did in 
1975 with regard to the ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 
1925.
    U.S. policy regarding the use of riot control agents is 
currently governed by Executive Order 11850 which came as the 
result of a 1975 agreement between the committee and the Ford 
administration. The administration has stated that during 
negotiations on the Convention, it tried to secure an 
interpretation of riot control agents that would be consistent 
with Executive Order 11850. Several countries, including 
``key'' U.S. allies, opposed the United States on this issue 
and negotiators were unable to get the U.S. position formally 
adopted.
    After the Convention was signed by President Bush, the 
Clinton administration conducted an interagency review of the 
riot control issue. The administration decided that the current 
international interpretation of the phrase ``method of 
warfare'' precludes two uses of riot control agents outlined in 
Executive Order 11850. Those prohibited uses, both of which 
involve situations in which combatants and noncombatants are 
intermingled, are where civilians are used to screen attacks 
and in rescuing downed aircrew. The Clinton administration has 
stated that if the current international interpretation were to 
change, U.S. policy could also change. The Administration has 
also stated that it will issue a new Executive order outlining 
the new policy upon receiving the Senate's advice and consent 
to ratify the Convention.
    The Convention's list of purposes that are not prohibited 
specifically includes ``Military purposes not connected with 
the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the 
toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare'' and 
``Law enforcement and domestic riot control'' Art.II(9). Thus, 
the use of riot control agents is permitted for the following 
uses deemed essential by the U.S. military: normal peacekeeping 
operations, law enforcement operations, humanitarian and 
disaster relief operations, counter-terrorist and hostage 
rescue operations or noncombatant rescue operations. The 
Convention also allows the use of riot control agents in riot 
control situations in areas under direct U.S. military control, 
including against rioting prisoners of war, and to protect 
convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary 
organizations in rear areas outside the zone of immediate 
combat.
    In a response to a question for the record, Chairman 
Shalikashvili said that, although he and the Joint Chiefs 
believe that several arguments can be made for using riot 
control agents in all cases permitted by Executive Order 11850, 
they

          * * * also recognize that a unilateral U.S. decision 
        to adopt this position could cause serious divisions 
        with key allies whose cooperation is essential to 
        effective implementation of the [Convention.]
          Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs decided that the 
        benefits of the [Convention] outweighed the importance 
        of preserving the ability to use riot control agents in 
        the prohibited cases, and that they would support the 
        consensus reached within the Administration on the 
        [riot control agents] issue.

    The claim that riot control agents are exempt from all 
parts of the Convention except its prohibition against actual 
use as a method of warfare is incorrect, unnecessary, and 
dangerous to U.S. security.
    Riot control agents are not exempt. The status of riot 
control agents is clearly spelled out in Article II of the 
Convention. They are defined as ``Any chemical not listed in a 
schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory 
irritations or disabling physical effects which disappear 
within a short time following termination of exposure.'' Art. 
II(7).
    This would include, for example, the widely used irritant 
CS and also, if present development programs succeed, powerful 
narcotic-like (opioid) chemicals intended to cause temporary 
paralysis and other chemicals intended to cause temporary 
disorientation.
    Every riot control agent, as defined above, is also a 
``toxic chemical,'' defined in the Convention as ``Any chemical 
which through its chemical action on life processes can cause 
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or 
animals.'' Art. II(2).
    The Convention's definition of ``chemical weapons,'' to 
which its prohibitions of development, possession, and transfer 
apply, is ``Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where 
intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as 
long as the types and quantities are consistent with such 
purposes.'' Art.II(1).
    It follows that the status of riot control agents, like any 
other toxic chemicals and munitions designed for their delivery 
depends on their intended purpose, so long as their types and 
quantities are consistent with such purpose.
    The Convention's definition of chemical weapons, based on 
purpose rather than on the chemical identity of a substance, 
underlies the entire Convention. It enables the Convention to 
deal with dual-use chemicals and with chemicals that have not 
yet been discovered, protecting peaceful uses and accommodating 
the inevitable advance of science.
    The specific inclusion of ``law enforcement including 
domestic riot control purposes'' in the list of purposes 
permitted by the Convention underscores the fact that riot 
control agents are subject to the same definition of chemical 
weapons as all other toxic chemicals.

5. Russia and cheating

    The committee had several questions regarding Russian 
compliance and reports of continued Russian clandestine 
chemical weapons activities. Specifically, the committee was 
concerned with allegations made by the Russian scientist, Dr. 
Vil Mirzayanov, that the Russians had continued to develop and 
store binary chemical weapons and that loopholes in the treaty 
would allow the Russians (or anyone else) to continue 
developing new chemical agents. The committee was also 
concerned with Russia's ability to meet its obligation under 
the Convention to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile within 
10 years after the Convention enters into force.
    Charges that a new generation of nerve agents has been 
developed and that Russia has been covertly disposing of 
chemical weapons are deeply disturbing. The Russian government 
must satisfactorily answer those allegations. Also, it must 
remove carryovers from the Soviet era that may be responsible 
for these activities and infuse its chemical weapons 
destruction program with a sense of purpose by appointing 
officials who are committed to chemical disarmament and have 
the authority to make difficult decisions. For its part, the 
Convention can be an impetus to keep Russia headed down the 
path toward chemical weapons disarmament. Without the 
Convention, the United States and the West will not have the 
verification tools needed to clarify matters such as those 
currently in question. The Convention, in short, can provide 
additional leverage to induce accountability on the part of the 
Russian government.
    In an article published in October 1995, Russian scientist 
Vil Mirzayanov stated: ``To the best of my knowledge, the 
development, testing and production of chemical weapons has 
stopped in Russia, partly because of * * * economic 
circumstances and partly as a result of the attention I drew to 
the situation.'' Mirzayanov went on to emphasize that, contrary 
to his initial assessment, he now understood ``that the CWC 
provides the means to bring the Russian chemical weapons 
complex under international monitoring.'' Mirzayanov concluded 
that ``the key to confronting all these [chemical weapons] 
problems lies in the CWC; there is no time to waste in 
ratifying and implementing this important treaty.''
    In response to questions for the record, ACDA stated that 
the U.S. government has ``voiced its concerns to the highest 
levels of the Russian government * * *'' and that the U.S. 
Government expects the Russians to clarify the nature of their 
chemical activities and to ``adhere to the spirit of the 
agreements'' even though they are not in force yet. The 
administration also promised to submit a report to the 
committee on Russian compliance with existing bilateral 
chemical and biological weapons agreements. The United States 
has also stressed to the Russian Government that it expects 
Russia to clarify the nature of its chemical weapons activists 
and to adhere to the spirit of the agreements it has signed 
banning development and production of such weapons, even though 
they are not yet in force.
    On its part, the Russian Government committed to 
ratification of the CWC as rapidly as possible and its entry 
into force at the earliest possible date at the 1994 Moscow 
Summit. As part of its commitment to early ratification, the 
Duma began hearings on the CWC on March 24, 1994. President 
Yeltsin reaffirmed Russia's commitment to CWC ratification in a 
meeting with the U.N. Secretary General in October 1995.
    As far as ``loop holes'' are concerned, Mirzayanov's claims 
are mistaken. In fact, the Convention does provide for the 
schedules to be amended and the definition of ``chemical 
weapons'' was specifically written to include unknown or future 
chemicals of concern. States Parties are required to make 
declarations in detail of any chemicals that meet the 
Convention's definition of chemical weapons, whether those 
chemicals are listed on the Schedules or not. The Schedules 
themselves are designed to be open-ended, not a final, 
definitive list. Thus the Convention is designed to grow with 
scientific developments and the declaration and inspection 
provisions of the Convention cover almost every aspect of a 
chemical weapons program. Moreover, States Parties have the 
right to request a challenge inspection of any location or 
facility located in any place under the jurisdiction or control 
of any other State Party if they have cause to believe illicit 
chemical activities are being conducted there, whether the 
location or facility was declared or not. Thus if the United 
States, or any other State Party, has reason to suspect that 
the Russians are developing new chemical weapons, a challenge 
inspection can be requested.
    In October 1995, Vil Mirzayanov acknowledged that his 
claims regarding the CWC were in fact mistaken:

          Initially, I too objected to the CWC, which I 
        assessed as being inadequate for the task of 
        eliminating chemical weapons * * * What I did not 
        understand when I first spoke out on these issues is 
        that the CWC's negotiators build flexibility into the 
        CWC to permit it to adapt to new scientific and 
        technical developments. This adaptability was prudent 
        because science does not stand still. The treaty 
        contains provisions to permit additions to the list of 
        banned and controlled chemicals and to improve 
        inspection techniques and technologies to keep pace 
        with such developments.''

    The CWC is clear with regard to obligations regarding 
chemical weapons. A State Party is required to declare in 
detail all chemical weapons it owns or possesses as well as any 
other chemical weapons located in any place under its 
jurisdiction or control. It must also provide inspectors access 
to such weapons for initial inspection to verify the 
declarations, routine inspections of storage until destruction, 
and monitoring of actual destruction.
    States Parties must make declarations on chemicals that 
meet the CWC definition of chemical weapons, whether or not 
such chemicals are listed in the Schedules of chemicals 
contained in the Convention. The Schedules of chemicals in the 
CWC are not intended to be exclusive, but open-ended.
    The operative provision for CWC coverage of chemicals of 
concern is the definition of chemical weapons. This definition 
was designed to facilitate verifications and to preclude 
loopholes with regard to unknown or future chemicals of 
possible concern. Thus, ``chemical weapons'' applies, inter 
alia, to ``toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where 
intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as 
long as the types and quantities are consistent with such 
purposes.'' A toxic chemical is defined as ``any chemical which 
through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, 
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or 
animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their 
origin or their method of production, and regardless of whether 
they are produced in facilities, in munitions [e.g. binary] or 
elsewhere.'' Nonprohibited purposes specified in the CWC are: 
``(a) industrial, agricultural, research, medical, 
pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; (b) protective 
purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection 
against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical 
weapons; (c) military purposes not connected with the use of 
chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic 
properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; and (d) law 
enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.''
    The definition of chemical weapons, in particular, which 
allows for use of toxic chemicals for nonprohibited purposes 
``as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such 
purposes,'' is intended to provide the basis for inspectors to 
question findings of chemicals which seem to be inconsistent 
with their use for nonprohibited purposes. In other words, 
States Parties must be able to justify the types and quantities 
of such chemicals or face suspicion and potential follow-on 
action from the CWC organization.
    A further note of explanation on the open-ended schedule of 
chemicals may be useful. The Annex on Chemicals contained in 
the CWC contains three categories of treaty controlled 
chemicals (designated Schedules 1, 2, and 3 in decreasing order 
of perceived risk) based, inter alia, on the toxicity of the 
chemicals, whether they have been stockpiled as chemical 
weapons, their potential role in the production of chemical 
weapons, and the degree to which they are used in industry. 
This Annex also provides criteria to be taken into account in 
future placement or rearrangement of chemicals on the 
schedules. To allow for potential future chemicals of concern, 
the Annex is flexible, permitting additions or changes without 
a formal amendment process.
    The obligations of the CWC will require States Parties to 
make detailed declarations on chemical weapon-relevant 
facilities and activities, subject declared facilities to 
routine inspection and subject all facilities and locations to 
challenge inspections. Thus the CWC will put Russian activities 
under international scrutiny and provide the international 
community with mechanisms to respond to noncompliant action 
with punitive measures or possible sanctions.
    At the January 1994 summit, Russia signed the 
implementation documents for Phase II of the 1989 Wyoming 
Memorandum of Understanding [MOU]. This new phase committed the 
United States and Russia to a very detailed data exchange on 
chemical weapons stocks and facilities, followed by on-site 
inspections of five declared facilities in their respective 
countries.
    The Russians provided their Phase II data in the spring of 
1994. After receipt of the Russian data, the United States 
submitted questions to the Russians asking for clarification of 
their data declaration. Russian answers provided some 
clarification of the Russian data, although several key 
questions and concerns were not resolved.
    Between August and December 1994, the United States 
conducted five MOU-mandated inspections in the Russian 
Federation, three of which were challenge inspections. These 
inspections were carried out at three Russian chemical weapons 
storage facilities, one Russian chemical weapons production 
facility, and one Russian chemical weapons development 
facility.
    The administration believes that the Wyoming MOU has 
provided valuable practical experience which will be useful in 
implementing the CWC. This applies to the declaration and 
inspection of both chemical weapons and chemical weapons-
related facilities. As a consequence of the MOU, Russia and the 
United States have identified and resolved numerous practical 
problems that could arise during implementation of the 
Convention. Indeed, the two sides have based several of their 
recommendations at the CWC Preparatory Commission on the 
Wyoming MOU experience. This includes, for example, the 
development of standardized formats for declarations on 
chemical weapons and chemical weapons-related facilities.
    Although many issues that have arisen during MOU 
implementation have been resolved successfully, the United 
States and Russia are continuing to discuss several MOU issues. 
The administration acknowledges that Russian implementation of 
the MOU has been problematic. The United States believes that 
this can be explained, in part, by substantive differences 
within the Russian interagency process over how to handle their 
data declaration. In addition, the 1994 firing of Anatoliy 
Kuntsevich, former Chairman of the President's Committee on 
Convention-related Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 
left a vacuum, creating a certain amount of confusion within 
the Russian government regarding chemical weapons policy.
    The administration has had and continues to have an ongoing 
dialog at high levels of the Russian Government on Wyoming MOU 
issues. Senior U.S. officials continue to discuss Russian 
implementation of the Wyoming MOU with various senior-level 
Russian officials. Moreover, President Yeltsin has agreed on 
the importance of resolving outstanding issues related to 
implementation of the MOU. U.S. officials believe that their 
dialog with the Russians has helped resolve a number of MOU 
issues, and that continuing that dialog offers the best 
opportunity for resolving those issues that remain.
    Obtaining more detailed data about Russian stockpiles is 
one of the objectives of Phase II of the 1989 MOU. The United 
States provided the Russians with our data and we have now 
received all of the Russian's Phase II data. The United States 
is in the process of translating and analyzing this data. If 
the United States detects discrepancies in Russian 
declarations, these discrepancies will be pursued with the 
Russian Federation. U.S. officials believe that a continuing 
dialog with the Russian Federation offers the best opportunity 
to resolve any such discrepancies.
    The implementing documents for the June 1990 ``Agreement on 
the Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and 
Measures to Facilitate and Multilateral Chemical Weapons 
Convention'' (known as the Bilateral Destruction Agreement or 
BDA) have yet to be agreed by Russia. As a consequence, the BDA 
is not yet in force. Key remaining issues with the BDA concern 
the conversion of their former chemical weapon production 
facilities to permitted commercial use. The ongoing dialog with 
Russia makes clear that any chemical weapon production 
facilities which are to be converted are to be done so in 
accordance with CWC provisions. Additionally, if a State 
Party's request to the CWC organization for approval of convert 
facilities is approved, such facilities will be restricted in 
their chemical activities and subject to very stringent 
verification.
    It should be noted that the administration strongly 
supports ratification of the CWC, even if the BDA is not yet in 
force. The BDA is important in its own right and the United 
States is continuing to work to resolve Russian concerns 
regarding its provisions on conversion. However, the BDA is 
less relevant that it was four years ago, when the United 
States believed the CWC to be years away. The purpose of the 
BDA, at that time, was to commit Russia to chemical weapon 
destruction as early as possible and to facilitate progress on 
the CWC. Unlike the CWC, the BDA does not require total 
destruction of chemical weapon stocks nor provide an 
international process for resolving compliance concerns. The 
United States is also concerned about the acquisition and 
potential use of chemical weapons by other countries as well as 
Russia and believes the CWC should not be delayed.
    In anticipation of the BDA, the CWC specifically provides 
for such bilateral agreements to operate under the CWC, as long 
as their provisions are consistent with the CWC. The BDA is 
expected to meet this criteria, since relevant CWC provisions 
were drawn from the BDA and the BDA implementing documents were 
completed after the CWC was finished and signed.
    As far as chemical weapon destruction is concerned, U.S. 
insistence, first in the U.S./Soviet BDA of 1990 and later in 
the CWC, that destruction of chemical weapons stocks be done in 
a safe and environmentally sound manner has contributed to 
grassroots political process of ``NIMBY''--``not in my 
backyard'' which has complicated agreement on a Russian 
chemical weapons destruction plan but also complicates a return 
of the old system.
    The administration believes that Russia will have trouble 
meeting the 10 year destruction deadline. The Russians made it 
clear to the United States during the final months of chemical 
negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament that this might 
be the case. Therefore, the Convention contains provisions that 
allow for a State Party to request and have approved under 
certain conditions, an extension of the destruction period of 
up to five years. Additionally, the United States has started 
cooperation programs to help the Russians complete the 
destruction process within the Convention's time frames.
    Several Senators have recognized the effect that Russia's 
internal turmoil is having on its ability to carry out its arms 
control commitments. They have spearheaded the development of a 
policy of cooperative threat reduction that seeks to increase 
U.S. security by constructively addressing the problems 
presented by Russia's weapons of mass destruction. However, the 
bulk of the Nunn-Lugar funds has been earmarked for nuclear 
arms. Using the same carrot-and-stick approach followed in the 
nuclear sphere, the United States should redouble its efforts 
to assist the Russia chemical weapons destruction program. This 
argument would hold true even if the Convention were not before 
the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
    The administration is working with the Russian Government 
in a number of areas to help them establish a realistic, 
executable CW destruction program. The United States has thus 
far identified $55 million for this assistance, selected the 
Bechtel Corporation to help the Russians develop a 
Comprehensive Implementation Plan (CIP), and is setting up a 
Central Analytical Laboratory (CAL) to process environmental 
samples, provide training, and perform other essential chemical 
weapon destruction functions.
    Subject to Congressional approval and funding, U.S. 
assistance is expected to transition from planning and 
preparation support to assistance directly supporting the 
design, construction, and equipping of Russia's first nerve 
agent filled munitions destruction facility. During 1995, 
Russia and the United States moved forward with the Joint 
Evaluation Project, a technical evaluation of the Russian two-
step (neutralization/bituminization) chemical destruction 
process. During the first phase, which was successfully 
completed in a U.S. laboratory using U.S. nerve agent, the 
Russian process was found to be 99.9999 effective against 
sarin, soman and VX. The second phase is now proceeding in a 
Russian laboratory, using actual Russian munitions grade agent.
    Also during 1995, a series of executive-level U.S.-Russian 
meetings were held to better define United States and Russian 
roles and responsibilities as well as to clarify the scope and 
form of possible future U.S. assistance. As a result of these 
discussions, a decision was made to narrow the scope of the CIP 
to a single site specific implementation plan for the 
Shchuch'ye site. It is anticipated that the Shchuch'ye 
Feasibility Study and CIP will serve as a model for the 
remaining nerve agent munitions storage sites in Russia. Other 
U.S.-Russian discussions have focused on a master schedule for 
the entire Russian destruction program out to the year 2001, 
and the CAL. DOD also moved forward in procuring three mobile 
analytical laboratories that will provide Russia the ability to 
conduct chemical agent monitoring at chemical weapons storage 
sites and chemical weapon destruction sites.
    During the past year, Russia has taken a number of steps to 
facilitate progress toward destruction of its chemical weapons. 
In 1995, President Yeltsin signed a Presidential decree which, 
inter alia, directed that CW destruction would occur within the 
republics in which the weapons were stored; an interagency 
commission for chemical weapons destruction headed by the 
President's national security advisor was established; the 
President's Committee (PC) was designated overall coordinator 
for the Russian CW destruction program; the Ministry of Defense 
was designated executive agent for CW destruction; Shchuch'ye 
was selected as the location for Russia's first nerve-agent 
destruction facility; and, the Moscow State Scientific Research 
Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIOKhT) was 
selected as the location for the Central Analytical Laboratory.
    Also during 1995, the President's Committee submitted a 
draft plan to the government establishing a framework to speed 
preparations for Russian chemical weapons destruction; a 
separate line item for chemical weapons destruction was 
established in the government's budget; and, a protocol was 
signed between Kurgan officials and the Ministry of Defense to 
begin the site selection process for the Shchuch'ye destruction 
facility. The signing of the protocol provides MOD approval to 
begin in earnest preparations for the construction of the pilot 
chemical weapons destruction facility. These developments are 
clear indications of increased Russian awareness of, and 
preparations for, meeting its chemical weapons destruction 
obligations under the CWC.
    The Russian Government has formally stated its commitment 
to become a Party to the CWC, as recently as July 22 at the 
Plenary meeting of the CWC Preparatory Commission. Russia 
announced that it is seeking the speedy submission of the 
Convention to the Russian parliament for ratification.
    In the administration's view, the Russians have also 
reflected concern about being left behind. The administration 
believes that the best way to promote Russian ratification is 
to proceed with our own ratification, as all our major NATO 
allies have done, and to bring the CWC into force as soon as 
possible, while at the same time trying to address Russian 
concerns in a manner consistent with our own interests.
    Although Russian officials recently stated they believe the 
bilateral agreements have fulfilled their useful role, which, 
in large part, paved the way for the successful conclusion of 
the CWC, they have also assured the administration that they 
will not renege on the agreements they have made. The 
administration continues to press Russia at the highest levels 
on the need to resolve all outstanding CW issues. It was agreed 
at the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meeting in July to have a 
special group address CW issues. ACDA Director John Holum is 
head of the U.S. side and Yuri Baturin, head of the 
Interdepartmental Commission on Chemical Disarmament (ICCD), is 
head of the Russian side. The Russians have also agreed to host 
a visit to Volgograd to address specifically the issue of 
conversion of CW production facilities.
    Secretary of State Christopher argued before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee that: ``Ratification of this 
Convention not only represents a remarkable opportunity to 
strength our own security, it denies us no option that we would 
ever wish to exercise. With the dramatic changes of the past 
decade, the threat of a massive chemical attack from the 
nations of the former Soviet Union has been drastically 
reduced. Under American law, the United States is already 
required to destroy the vast majority of our chemical weapons 
stockpile by 2003. By imposing an international legal 
obligation to destroy chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention puts all other states capable of deploying chemical 
weapons--including Russia--on the same footing as we are.''
    Secretary of State Christopher added: ``By ratifying the 
Convention, we will add the force and weight of the entire 
international community to our efforts to assure the 
destruction of Russian chemical stocks. Our action will also 
spur other nations such as China to ratify and joining the 
regime.''
    In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Mr. Michael Moodie, President of the Chemical and 
Biological Arms Control Institute, said: ``ratifying the 
Convention [puts] pressure on Moscow--provides us more 
leverage. Until the United States acts, hardliners in Moscow 
will feel no pressure to do anything, and are free to postpone 
action indefinitely. Unless we act, we give nothing to those in 
Russia, such as President Yeltsin, who have publicly committed 
Russia to implementing the Convention.''

6. Non-lethal weapons development.

    The administration indicated that the Convention does not 
restrict nonlethal weapons ``that exert their effects by 
nonchemical means.'' The Convention's definition of chemical 
weapons is ``toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where 
intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as 
long as the types and quantities are consistent with such 
purposes.'' Toxic chemicals themselves are defined as ``any 
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes 
can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to 
humans or animals.'' The development of nonlethal weapons which 
function on their physical properties, such as stickiness or 
slipperiness, and not through chemical action on life 
processes, will not be prevented by the Convention. The 
administration has made clear that it will ensure that any 
nonlethal programs it undertakes are in conformity with U.S. 
treaty obligations, including those under the CWC.
    Moreover, in the committee's judgment, the United States 
would be well advised to explore vigorously the workability and 
applicability of various kinds of nonlethal weapons and 
devices. Considerable research has been done with regard to the 
value of nonlethal equipment and materials to meet various 
military objectives. Developments in recent years appear 
promising. The committee believes the President should give 
high priority to the development of nonchemical, nonlethal 
alternatives to riot control agents in military situations in 
which combatants and noncombatants are intermingled.

7. Protecting national security information

    Can the United States protect the privacy of our people and 
businesses, and our national security information and 
industrial technology, from compromise through the CWC's 
verification system? Within the Convention, the intrusiveness 
of many of the verification provisions had to be balanced 
against legitimate national security, and Constitutional 
concerns. Also, the transparency called for in the declaration 
and verification regimes had to be balanced with the need to 
protect national security information. In DOD's view, the 
balance between effective verification of the Convention and 
the protection of DOD's national security concerns has been 
achieved.
    Safeguards are provided against frivolous inspection 
demands. An inspection team must strictly observe its 
inspection mandate. The team is not allowed to collect or 
retain information that is not related or relevant to the 
object and purpose of the Convention. Many of the declared 
facilities that are subject to routine inspection will 
negotiate facility agreements. Consistent with the CWC, these 
agreements will address in detail the degree of access, the 
scope of information provided and any sample taking or 
monitoring that is to be conducted at the particular 
facilities.
    These protections apply particularly to challenge 
inspections. Under a challenge inspection, a State is allowed 
up to 120 hours from the time it is notified of an inspection 
until it must provide access to the requested inspection site. 
During this time, the inspected state and inspection team 
negotiate the nature and extent of access within the inspection 
site. The inspected State also, as stated in the Convention, `` 
* * * has the right under managed access to take such measures 
as are necessary to protect national security.'' Such measures 
could include but are not limited to shrouding, removing 
sensitive papers from the area, or restricting sample analysis. 
The inspected State may also take into account, ``any 
constitutional obligations it may have with regard to 
proprietary rights or searches and seizures.'' These powerful 
protections are balanced with the obligation not to use them to 
evade compliance. Accordingly, if a State provides less than 
full access it must `` * * * make every reasonable effort to 
provide alternative means to clarify the possible non-
compliance concern * * * ''
    It is quite possible that Department of Defense facilities, 
both government sites and civilian plants with DOD contracts, 
could be challenged under the CWC. In such cases, DOD has the 
ability to inform officials those sites quickly and to prepare 
them properly for inspection through the Defense Treaty 
Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP), which is managed by the 
On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA).
    Escort teams provided by OSIA will accompany the 
international CWC inspection teams to DOD-related facilities 
for the duration of their stay on U.S. territory. OSIA 
personnel have experience from other treaties and the agency is 
fully staffed with linguists and treaty experts who will ensure 
that officials from the inspected DOD facility are fully 
cognizant of the rights and obligations mandated by the CWC.
    In the event of a challenge inspection, DoD feels that the 
provisions for negotiated or ``managed access,'' which have 
been crafted into the CWC by U.S. negotiators will enable 
inspected facilities to satisfy any concerns about treaty 
compliance while simultaneously ensuring that U.S. national 
security is not jeopardized or compromised in any way. Managed 
access will give officials at the challenged site the right to 
offer reasonable alternatives to full access and to negotiate 
levels of access in areas which may contain classified or 
proprietary information not related to the CWC.
    Like DOD, industry was closely involved in developing plans 
for compliance. Given this background, the Administration 
believes the risk of industrial espionage and compromise of 
national security information is very small.

8. The impact on anti-terrorism efforts

    The U.S. Government's antiterrorism efforts must include 
prohibiting terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction.
    The cowardly act in Atlanta during this summer's Olympic 
games reminded us once again that the United States is not 
immune to terrorism and that it must be the leader in the 
international fight against terrorism. Our effort must include 
doing everything we can to meet one of the most urgent emerging 
threats to the national security of the U.S.--future terrorist 
attacks which involve weapons of mass destruction.
    In this regard, the CWC is a useful and readily available 
tool in the fight against terrorism. Together with the 
implementing legislation, required of every party, the CWC will 
serve as a major deterrent against chemical terrorism, where 
for the first time in many countries, the production and 
possession of chemical weapons will be a crime.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention is both an arms control and 
nonproliferation treaty. The CWC bans the development, 
production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and 
use of chemical weapons. Although the CWC was not designed to 
prevent chemical terrorism, certain aspects of the Convention, 
including its law enforcement requirements and nonproliferation 
provisions, will strengthen existing efforts to fight chemical 
terrorism.
    If the CWC were in force today, it would be both more 
difficult and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use 
chemical weapons.
    One of the key tools in combating terrorism is early 
intelligence. The CWC will provide access to international 
declaration and inspection information and will strengthen the 
intelligence links between the United States and the 
international community that will help us detect and prevent 
chemical attacks.
    Furthermore, implementing legislation required by the CWC 
will enhance our authority to investigate and prosecute CW-
related activities. The implementing legislation will broaden 
this authority to include development, production, transfer or 
acquisition of a chemical weapons agent. Under current law, our 
law enforcement authorities investigate on the basis of 
suspicion of conspiracy to use a chemical weapon. The CWC 
implementing legislation will, consequently, improve the 
prospects for detection, and early prosecution.
    Moreover, the significant penalties that will be imposed on 
any person who knowingly engages in this broader range of 
prohibited CW-related activities will aid in deterring criminal 
activities.
    The CWC also requires parties to eliminate their CW 
stockpiles and to control transfers of certain dual-use 
chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons. This will 
help deny terrorists easy access to chemical weapons.
    Japan serves as an example of the importance of this treaty 
and its implementing legislation in combating the terrorist 
threat. Within 10 days of the poison gas attacks in the Tokyo 
subways, the Japanese launched the effort to ratify the CWC by 
enacting the CWC implementing legislation. The Japanese 
completed ratification of the CWC a month later.
            Law enforcement benefits
    Implementing legislation required by the CWC will 
strengthen legal authority to investigate and prosecute 
violations of the treaty. It will also make the public more 
aware of the threat of chemical weapons and of the fact that 
the acquisition of such weapons is illegal.
    Investigation. For example, the proposed U.S. implementing 
legislation contains the clearest, most comprehensive and 
internationally recognized definition of a chemical weapon 
available. It is far more precise than the term ``poison gas'' 
contained in Title 18 of the Criminal Code. The definition 
contained in the implementing legislation will enable an 
investigator to request a search warrant on the basis of 
suspicion of illegal chemical weapons activity (such as 
production of chemical agent), rather than suspicion of 
conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, as under 
current U.S. law. By providing law enforcement officials and 
prosecutors a more precise legal basis for investigating the 
development, production, transfer or acquisition of chemical 
weapons. CWC implementing legislation improves prospects for 
detection, early prosecution and possibly even prevention of 
chemical terrorism in the U.S.
    Prosecution. The proposed U.S. implementing legislation 
will also aid prosecution. Because possession of a chemical 
weapon (whether or not it is intended to be used) would be a 
violation of the Convention, it would also be illegal under the 
CWC implementing legislation and thus a sufficient basis for 
prosecution. In contrast, under existing U.S. legislation, 
possession of a chemical device that could produce poison gas 
without the use of explosives or a detonator might not offer 
sufficient grounds for prosecution. In this case, prosecutors 
would have to rely on legislation intended for other purposes, 
such as a law against conspiracy to use a weapon of mass 
destruction.
    Penalties. Under the proposed U.S. implementing legislation 
any person who knowingly engaged in prohibited CW-related 
activities short of actual use of a chemical weapon could be 
subject to the maximum punishment of life in prison or any term 
of years. In contrast, existing U.S. legislation would require 
proof of involvement in an attempt or conspiracy to use poison 
gas; these criteria are much less precise and thus more 
difficult to fulfill than those in the implementing 
legislation.
    Trade Controls. Proposed U.S. implementing legislation 
would also supplement existing export/import control laws and 
regulations by strictly controlling the import and export of 
those chemicals posing the greatest risk (listed in Schedule 1 
of the CWC) and also regulating the production, acquisition, 
retention, transfer or use of such chemicals within the U.S. 
Fines of up to $50,000 could be imposed for unlawful 
production, acquisition, transfer, etc. of such chemicals.
    Emergency Authorities. The proposed U.S. implementing 
legislation contains authority to seize, forfeit, and destroy 
chemical weapons. This important provision protects the 
constitutional rights of property owners while allowing law 
enforcement officials to seize and destroy a chemical weapon 
under exigent circumstances (i.e. where harm is imminent or 
likely). This provides additional authority to prevent a 
potential catastrophe and save lives.
    Public Awareness. Finally tips by concerned private 
citizens are the lifeblood of successful police investigations. 
Enactment of the CWC and its implementing legislation will 
ensure, due to reporting and inspection requirements and 
penalties for violations, that private companies and concerned 
citizens are more alert to and more likely to report any 
suspected chemical weapons-related activities.
            Nonproliferation benefits
    Nonproliferation provisions of the CWC will deny terrorists 
easy access to chemical weapons by requiring Parties to 
eliminate national stockpiles and by controlling transfers of 
certain chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons. In 
particular, the CWC requires Parties to cease transfers of 
certain CW agents and CW precursor chemicals to non-Parties and 
restrict such transfers to Parties. In addition, reporting is 
required on anticipated production levels of all listed 
chemicals and anticipated imports and exports of Schedule 1 and 
2 chemicals. These measures will help restrict access to key 
chemicals, while also helping to alert law enforcement and 
other government officials to suspicious activities.

                      C. COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Constitutional issues

    Several questions were raised regarding how U.S. citizens' 
Fourth Amendment (protection against unreasonable search and 
seizure) and Fifth Amendment (self-incrimination) rights would 
be affected by the Convention's inspection provisions.
    In an answer to a question for the record, the 
administration stated that both the routine and the challenge 
inspections of private facilities will be initiated on the 
basis of consent. However, in the presumably rare case in 
which, consent is denied, most inspections would then be 
conducted using search warrants obtained on the basis of 
administrative probable cause, i.e., the Government 
demonstrates that the facility fits within a reasonable 
legislatively mandated inspection scheme. This is the procedure 
used in similar inspections pursuant to domestic legislation, 
such as toxic substance emissions. Some inspections of 
facilities that produce Schedule 1 chemicals may be conducted 
without any warrants, but those inspections will comply with 
the conditions of the Supreme Court exception to the warrant 
requirement of inspections of ``pervasively regulated 
industries.''
    The United States expects to conduct challenge inspections 
of other private facilities pursuant to administrative search 
warrants in order to ``allow the greatest degree of access,'' 
as required by the Convention. But the U.S. negotiated the 
addition of a corollary right to ``take into account any 
constitutional obligations it may have with regard to * * * 
searches and seizures'' in relation to the Convention's 
challenge inspections. Thus, the U.S. will not be in violation 
of the Convention if access is limited or severely restricted 
because it proved impossible to obtain that access in a 
constitutionally permissible manner. This specific right to 
take constitutional obligations into account regarding searches 
and seizures also applies to routine inspections of ``other 
chemical production facilities,'' since the rules for routine 
inspections of these facilities incorporate this right by 
reference.
    Regarding Fifth Amendment rights, the Administration stated 
that:

          The Fifth Amendment rights of personnel at U.S. 
        facilities subject to inspection are also protected. 
        While the [Convention's] Verification Annex provides 
        that inspectors have the right to interview any 
        facility personnel in the presence of representatives 
        of the inspected State Party the [Convention] does not 
        require that facility personnel answer the inspectors' 
        questions, and therefore their Fifth Amendment rights 
        are protected. The Administration's proposed draft 
        [Convention] implementing legislation does provide for 
        the issuance of a subpoena to require testimony of a 
        witness and provisions of answers in order to meet the 
        U.S. Governments' obligations under the [Convention.] 
        However, the proposed legislation contains no 
        provisions for compelling facility personnel to be 
        interviewed or to provide answers to inspectors' 
        questions.

    In addition to the constitutional difficulties, some 
companies also fear the potential loss of trade secrets through 
espionage or inadvertent leaks. Industry will also be affected 
by the Convention requirement that civilian industries report 
production, stockpiles and transfers of controlled chemicals, 
and by Convention restrictions on the export of controlled 
chemicals and technology to non-signatories.
    The Chemical Manufacturers Associations (CMA), the 
Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association (SOCMA), 
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA), the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), the 
American Chemical Society (ACS), and other trade associations 
representing the international chemical industry were active 
participants in developing provisions to protect confidential 
business information during the treaty negotiations. The 
Convention contains several provisions to protect against the 
loss of proprietary information, namely Article VI (Activities 
Not Prohibited Under the Convention) and its related parts in 
the Verification Annex (Part II: General Rules of Verification, 
Part III: General Provisions for Verification Measures Pursuant 
to Articles IV, V and VI, Parts VI-VIII: Regimes for 
Declarations, Inspections and Transfers of Schedules 1, 2 and 
3, respectively, and Part IX: Regime for Declaration and 
Verification of Other Chemical Production Facilities). 
Additionally, certain provisions in Article IX and the 
Verification Annex Part X on challenge inspections provide 
protection against loss of sensitive non-chemical weapons 
related information. Finally, the Annex on the Protection of 
Confidential Information, the ``Confidentiality Annex'', 
stipulates the treatment of confidential information, relevant 
aspects of employment and conduct of personnel, measures to 
protect sensitive installations and to prevent unauthorized 
disclosure of data during on-site inspections, and procedures 
in case of breaches or suspected breaches of confidentiality. 
These provisions are for both routine and challenge 
inspections.
    During routine inspections, confidential business 
information can be safeguarded first through the facility's 
opportunity to have a facility agreement negotiated with the 
Organization specifying the type of access and the information 
to be collected. Plant officials do not have to grant the 
inspection team access to commercially sensitive areas 
unrelated to the Convention or to data that do not directly 
affect verification. Information that is not within the scope 
of the routine inspection regime includes proprietary 
information regarding the technical details of the production 
process (e.g. temperature, pressure or catalysts) and marketing 
information. Inspected facilities can store sensitive documents 
that the inspection team must consult repeatedly (e.g., 
photographs, process flow charts, or notebooks) in a safe 
located at the facility. The inspected facility can take any 
requested photographs or samples instead of allowing the 
inspection team to do it. The inspected State Party is also 
allowed to inspect any instrument used or installed by the 
inspection team and to have it tested in the presence of 
representatives of the inspected State Party.
    Under challenge inspections, States Parties have the right 
and ability to manage access to their facilities by negotiating 
the extent and nature of that access within the site (beyond 
that provided under routine inspections at declared 
facilities). The inspected facility can also negotiate the 
activities of the inspection team and the information it 
provides. States Parties also have the right to take steps to 
prevent disclosure of sensitive information unrelated to 
chemical weapons, such as shrouding, turning off computers and 
covering or putting away papers or documents. States Parties 
must, however, take steps to provide alternative means to 
clarify any compliance concerns if the inspectors' access is 
restricted.
    Moreover, the Convention contains provisions for the 
Executive Council (on which the U.S. is expected to have a 
permanent seat) to prevent a challenge inspection from being 
carried out if it determines that the inspection is 
``frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of this 
Convention.'' The Executive Council can also review the final 
report of the inspection to determine if ``the right to request 
a challenge inspection had been abused.''

2. U.S. Industry and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

    Interest has been expressed in the reaction of chemical 
industry to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the impact of 
its provisions on the industry, notably with regard to 
protection of nonchemical weapons proprietary information, 
liability and avenues to redress concerns, and costs to 
industry.
    The CWC will have some negative repercussions on the U.S. 
chemical industry. There are costs associated with the 
industry's compliance with the convention, in the form of 
reporting requirements, and verification activities. The 
industry will have to educate and assign personnel to address 
those requirements. The chemical industry will have to work 
with a National Authority, a new governmental body, to 
implement the Convention. Commercial chemical facilities will 
be subject to inspections by international teams on relatively 
short notice. And individual chemical plants are at risk of 
losing proprietary information or their standing in the 
community.
    Nonetheless, the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), 
the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association 
(SOCMA), the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA), the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), 
the American Chemical Society (ACS), and other trade 
association support the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and 
believe that treaty compliance will not pose an undue burden on 
industry. U.S. chemical manufacturers do not make chemical 
weapons. The industry does produce commercial chemicals that 
can be illegally converted into weapons. An effective CWC could 
have the positive effect of liberalizing the existing system of 
export controls applicable to the industry's products, 
technologies, and processes.
    Fred Webber, the President and CEO of CMA, summed up the 
industry position in September 1995:

          * * * the U.S. chemical industry has long supported 
        the Chemical Weapons Convention. We helped negotiate 
        that treaty, we've helped draft implementing 
        legislation for it, and we're prepared to live by it * 
        * * The United States must be a leader in stamping out 
        chemical weapons once and for all, and the U.S. must be 
        on of the original ratifying countries.

In March 1996, Mr. Webber continued by saying:

          Fewer than 2000 American companies will be directly 
        affected. Of that number, less than 200 are likely to 
        ever have an on-site inspection * * * It won't put 
        companies out of business. And it won't keep lifesaving 
        pharmaceuticals off the market.
          Chemical manufacturers are America's single largest 
        exporting sector. We exported over $60 billion in 
        products and technology last year, with a $20 billion 
        trade surplus * * * If the U.S. does not ratify the 
        treaty, that status will change. Our largest trading 
        partners are also party to the Convention, and will be 
        forced to apply trade restrictions to chemicals that 
        originate here, or that are being shipped here * * * 
        Potentially hundreds of millions of dollars of lost 
        sales, for no other reason than the U.S. is not part of 
        the CWC.
          Honest businesses have nothing to fear. Anyone with 
        other motives will run the risk of getting caught in 
        the act. The treaty is the best means available to 
        prevent legitimate chemicals from falling into the 
        wrong hands.

    The hallmark of the CWC is the degree to which the private 
sector is included in the effort to ban CW production, storage 
and use. Members of the chemical industry have worked closely 
with U.S. CWC negotiators for many years to develop treaty 
provisions designed to safeguard proprietary and confidential 
business information during inspection and handling of 
information provided by industry to the CWC organization as 
well as to deal with a wide range of other issues of concern to 
industry. This close working relationship has resulted in CWC 
provisions generally acceptable to and supported by the 
affected industry. U.S. industry representatives consulted with 
U.S. Government negotiators on provisions affecting chemical 
industry, participated in international industry meetings with 
the chemical weapons negotiators in Geneva, and hosted national 
trial inspections at chemical and pharmaceutical facilities. 
They have continued to participate in CWC Preparatory 
Commission meetings, U.S. Government sponsored industry 
seminars, in trial inspections and in testing draft CWC 
declaration formats.
    The CWC protects against the loss of proprietary 
information through a number of provisions. These include 
inspection procedures designed to allow facilities to protect 
information unrelated to chemical weapons and the ability to 
negotiate facility agreements outlining inspection procedures 
at particular facilities.
    Specifically, the provisions for routine inspections 
protect industry by limiting the number of routine inspections 
a facility can receive in a year, providing advance 
notification of inspector arrival, limiting the duration of 
inspections, and restricting the scope of inspection to the 
minimum necessary. Additionally, the CWC requires inspections 
to be carried out in a manner designed to minimize the impact 
on facility operations.
    Additionally, the CWC contains detailed procedures for 
safeguarding information collected by the international 
chemical weapons organization. A separate Confidentiality Annex 
provides procedures governing the protection and release of 
information and procedures for punitive action against 
employees who violate these rules.
    The administration's proposed Chemical Weapons Convention 
Implementation Act provides, with limited exceptions, for a 
blanket prohibition on the disclosure of information or 
materials obtained from declarations or inspections required 
under the CWC. In particular, this provision is intended to 
allow the U.S. Government to withhold such CWC-related 
information from requests for disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act.
    The proposed U.S. implementing legislation contains further 
provisions for safeguarding confidential business information 
provided by industry to the USG for communication to the 
international chemical weapon organization.
    The provisions of the CWC and the U.S. proposed 
implementing legislation address the issue of liability by 
seeking to prevent liability in the first place. For example, 
the CWC's verification regime contains a number of provisions 
for protecting sensitive information unrelated to the CWC from 
being compromised. These include: the right of the inspected 
facility to have a facility agreement specifying the nature of 
access and the information to be collected in routine 
inspections; the right of the United States to manage access in 
challenge inspections; and the right of the inspected facility 
to take requested photographs or samples instead of the 
inspection team.
    Similarly, the CWC protects against damage by the 
inspectors by, e.g., prohibiting their operation of facility 
equipment. The CWC Confidentiality Annex also provides for the 
protection of information designated confidential by States 
Parties, establishes procedures to address concerns or 
allegations of breaches of such obligations, and provides for 
punitive measures where appropriate.
    The PrepCom has also recognized that an increased burden on 
the chemical industry means a substantial administrative burden 
for the OPCW. The U.S. chemical industry has seen considerable 
progress in reducing the potential reporting burden through 
simplified declaration formats. Following a small test of the 
revised formats by some 25 U.S. companies, the reporting burden 
should be manageable. Proprietary information should be 
protected, and the burden should be manageable.
    The declaration forms are simple to complete and most firms 
will not have to reveal any sensitive information. These data 
declaration forms have been field tested with industry and 
edited based on comments received. In addition, the forms have 
been carefully reviewed by the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association (CMA) and its comments have been incorporated as 
well.
    Commerce estimates that about 2,000 plant sites will be 
required to file data declaration forms. Of these 2,000 plant 
sites, Commerce estimates that over 90% belong to a basket 
category called ``Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals'' 
(DOC's). The DOC data declaration is a very simple form that 
asks the company to specify the location of the plant site and 
its general range of production (i.e., This plant site produced 
over 2,000 metric tons of DOC's last year.) No other 
information is requested and the form can therefore be 
completed quickly.
    Note that the DOC form does not ask for information on 
acquisition, imports, exports or processing. The DOC form does 
not require that a company even identify the specific DOC 
chemical produced. All that is required for most DOC's, is a 
check mark in a box that identifies the aggregate production 
range. If the plant site produced any DOC's containing 
phosphorus, sulphur, or fluorine (PSF), then the name of the 
PSF plant is also required.
    Critics allege that such limited information on DOC's 
certainly won't reveal anything regarding possible CW programs, 
and although the reporting burden appears rather modest, it is 
just administrative harassment since the data serves no useful 
purpose.
    The information is requested to identify states that have 
the technical capability to produce organic chemicals. Many 
facilities that can produce DOC's not listed on any of the 
three CWC Schedules may have the capability to switch 
production to different product lines, possibly even to CWC 
Scheduled chemicals. Accordingly, this limited information is 
requested to keep abreast of facilities that have such 
potential.
    The OPCW will only commence inspections of facilities that 
produce DOC's at the beginning of the fourth year after entry-
into-force (EIF). In the third year after EIF, the Conference 
of States Parties will decide on the ``distribution of 
resources available'' for inspections between facilities that 
produce DOC's and PSF-Chemicals (DOC's that contain 
phosphorous, sulfur, or fluorine).
    The United States chemical industry is one of the most 
widely and deeply regulated industrial sectors. The CWC has not 
been, and must not be, seen as an opportunity to regulate the 
industry for other policy reasons. The risk of such an 
expansion is that the costs to industry, and the government, of 
CWC compliance will be increased, while the treaty compliance 
effort is reduced. Ultimately, if the U.S. Government imposes a 
CWC regulatory regime that is significantly more onerous in 
nature and scope from that adopted by other governments, there 
are substantial adverse competitiveness implications.
    One area of uncertainty arises from the likelihood that the 
Department of Commerce will be responsible for working with 
industry to ensure CWC compliance. Unless the Department of 
Commerce is given the appropriate budget and manpower 
resources, U.S. regulations and administrative responsibilities 
under the CWC compliance may fall far short of the intended 
goal.
    The Commerce Department will play the lead role within the 
U.S. Government for industry compliance with the CWC. As part 
of this role, Commerce will collect information required by the 
treaty so that it can be forwarded to the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Commerce is committed 
to minimizing costs and to maximizing protections of company 
confidential information.
    With regard to data declarations, Commerce:
          developed user-friendly forms and instructions to 
        complete them. These materials have been field tested 
        and refined based on industry comments. No information 
        is requested that is not specifically required by the 
        CWC.
          will provide substantial assistance to industry in 
        the data declaration process. Specifically, Commerce 
        will offer timely assistance to help firms determine if 
        they have a reporting requirement. If they do have to 
        report, Commerce will assist them in completing the 
        forms.
          is developing an automated system that will enable 
        firms to submit declarations electronically.
          will protect the confidentiality of information that 
        is submitted. The information management system is in a 
        secure location and will only be operated by staff with 
        appropriate security clearances.
          is working as a member of the U.S. delegation to the 
        CWC PREPCOM to narrow the scope of products that will 
        be reported as ``Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals 
        (DOC's). Accordingly, we expect to exclude a wide range 
        of commercial facilities from any data declaration 
        requirements.
    The Commerce Department's CWC Information Management System 
will be in a secure location that requires a special key card 
for access. The system itself will be operated only by staff 
with appropriate security clearances. Commerce has extensive 
experience protecting CBI as part of its overall export 
licensing operations and will be equally vigilant protecting 
CWC-related Confidential Business Information (CBI).
    Commerce plans to identify firms that are likely to be 
subject to a routine inspections and work with them to develop 
draft ``facility agreements'' to protect CBI. Commerce's 
objective is to develop draft ``facility agreements'' before 
inspections take place so that the equities of U.S. firms are 
fully protected. Although the formal ``facility agreement'' is 
between the State Party (Commerce serving as USG 
representative) and the international organization, Commerce 
intends to rely heavily on input from the facility being 
subject to inspection.
    In developing the ``facility agreement'', Commerce will 
rely on a firm's determination regarding what constitutes CBI 
and will protect U.S. firms against frivolous request that may 
be made by international inspectors. The formal ``facility 
agreements'' will set forth the site-specific ground rules for 
the conduct of inspections and, if carefully crafted, will 
effectively preclude the loss of CBI and limit frivolous 
requests made by international inspectors.
    Commerce estimates that approximately 140 U.S. plant sites 
will be subject to routine inspections during the first three 
years. Routine inspections will focus initially on producers of 
Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 chemicals.
    Challenge inspections are conducted based on an allegation 
of noncompliance. These inspections may only be requested by a 
State Party to the CWC and can be directed at declared and 
undeclared facilities.
    Commerce anticipates that there will be very few challenge 
inspections. If there are any, Commerce expects that they will 
be directed at U.S. military facilities who are experienced in 
protecting their sites against espionage. In the event that 
there is a challenge inspection of a non-Defense facility, 
Commerce will ensure that the inspection is based on the CWC 
principle of ``managed access.'' The Commerce approach will be 
to ensure that the international inspectors pursue the least 
intrusive means possible to obtain reasonable answers to 
reasonable questions. Unreasonable questions need not be 
answered at all.
    Finally, it should be noted that there are some legal 
avenues for redress available in case of loss of confidential 
business information. U.S. firms and individuals may be able to 
bring a lawsuit against inspectors and other Technical 
Secretariat personnel for their unlawful action if the 
Director-General of the Technical Secretariat waives their 
immunity from suit in U.S. courts for their official acts, as 
provided for in the CWC. In addition, these firms might pursue 
a lawsuit against the United States under the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution (Takings 
Clause).
    Given the protection inherent in the CWC and the proposed 
Act and the extent of potential U.S. Government liability for 
actions over which it may have little or no control, the 
Administration believes that specific provisions for U.S. 
Government liability for the wrongful acts of Technical 
Secretariat personnel are not required. However, the 
administration is continuing to review possible changes to 
existing law for providing remedies in this area.
    Exact costs to industry as a result of their compliance 
with the CWC are not yet known, but will depend on: the number 
of affected companies, number of inspections per year (taking 
into account quotas on inspections and resources of the 
international inspectorate); the exact formats for 
declarations; and the amount of preparation each company 
undertakes for implementation. If one assumes the existence of 
roughly 2000 CW Convention-related plant sites in the U.S., a 
total of 30-60 routine inspections per year, as well as use of 
the existing draft declaration forms and prudent preparations 
for implementation, the administration estimates the cost to 
industry to be under $5 million in the first year with 
decreased annual costs thereafter.
    In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Secretary of State Christopher, said: ``If the U.S. 
is not a State Party, we will be subject to trade restrictions 
levied by States Parties against non-States Parties. This could 
have significant economic consequences for U.S. industry.''
    Mr. Michael Moodie, told the Committee: ``if the U.S. is 
not a party to the CWC, such a situation would have an 
immediate and chilling effect on commercial trade in chemicals 
with the U.S. chemical industry branded as a potentially 
unreliable supplier of chemicals to the global market. The 
result would be a devastating impact on the U.S. chemical 
industry's positive balance of trade, which, in 1994, amounted 
to a trade surplus of $18 billion on exports of $51 billion 
dollars.''
    In a letter sent to Senator Lugar on July 18, 1994, former 
President Bush stated: ``My long-standing commitment to banning 
chemical weapons has been shared by many others on both sides 
of the aisle * * * I am convinced that the Convention we signed 
served both objectives, effectively banning chemical weapons 
without creating an unnecessary burden on legitimate 
(commercial) activities.''

3. Repercussions on U.S. industry if the U.S. does not ratify the CWC

    There is a cost to U.S. industry if the United States fails 
to ratify the treaty. The CWC imposes trade controls on 
countries that do not participate.
    Upon the CWC's entry into force, exports of Schedule 1 
chemicals may be made only to another State Party and then only 
for research, pharmaceutical, medical or protective purposes. 
The CWC also mandates that, for the first 3 years, trade in 
Schedule 2 chemicals with non-States Parties is permitted only 
with ``end-user certificates'' certifying that the chemicals 
will not be used for CW purposes. After 3 years, all trade 
(imports and exports) of Schedule 2 chemicals is prohibited 
with countries outside of the CWC. Although Schedule 2 
chemicals account for a relatively small portion of the U.S. 
chemicals, the impact on U.S. firms will likely affect trade in 
other chemicals as well. Companies tend to shop where there are 
no restrictions and prohibitions, therefore restrictions/
prohibitions on trade in Schedule 2 chemicals will likely have 
a cascading effect on the overall chemical industry. Since 
there is ample foreign availability of chemicals in the 
industrialized world, Japanese and European companies will 
undoubtedly move to fill the gap in authorized supply that the 
absence of U.S. availability would create.
    The U.S. is the only G-7 country yet to ratify. All of 
America's major trading partners have already done so.
    The Australia Group (AG) and even non-AG countries who 
ratify the CWC will be required to impose trade restrictions on 
the United States and a total embargo on exports to the U.S. of 
Schedule 1 chemicals immediately and on all trade in Schedule 2 
chemicals after 3 years. Failure to ratify will effectively 
place the U.S. in opposition to the principal global agreement 
to prohibit CW and end America's leadership position in all 
areas of CW nonproliferation. There will be a heavy price to 
pay for U.S. industry and for American foreign policy.
    Some have suggested that the U.S. wait for a year and see 
how the CWC is actually implemented before the Senate ratifies. 
If the Senate waits, the U.S. will not get a seat on the 41 
member Executive Council that decides how the CWC is 
implemented. Membership is particularly critical in the initial 
stages of the program since the rules of the road will be 
established in the early years. If the Senate ratifies the CWC 
in September, the U.S. will be part of the initial club and are 
assured a seat on the Council. If the Senate ratifies after all 
the seats are assigned, there will not be another chance for 
two years. In essence, coming too late to the table ensures 
that the U.S. will have to comply with operating decisions made 
without American involvement.
    Challenge inspections of small businesses involved in 
legitimate chemical work are not likely to happen. Requests for 
challenge inspections will likely be directed at U.S. military 
facilities or major companies with significant CBI equities at 
stake. In the unlikely event that a frivolous challenge 
inspection does occur at small business, Commerce will apply 
all of the ``managed access'' protections described above.

                  D. Popular Misconceptions of the CWC

    A popular argument against U.S. ratification of the CWC is 
that the Convention will not be universal and that some of the 
signatories and ratifiers will seek to cheat and break the 
rules and norms set by the Convention to their advantage. That 
not all members of the international community will sign the 
CWC and that some of those who do may not abide by their 
obligations are facts of international life. While these 
assertions may be true, in and of themselves they are not 
necessarily reasons to reject the treaty.
    First, not all holdouts to signing the treaty are doing so 
for the same reason. Some may indeed be seeking a CW capability 
and do not want to have their options closed out by joining the 
Convention. One could argue that the countries of most serious 
concern with respect to CW--Iraq, Libya, North Korea--fall into 
this category. Other holdouts, however, may have different 
reasons for doing so. Egypt, for example, as well as some other 
Arab states, have not signed because they believe it gives them 
some bargaining leverage in the ongoing Middle East 
negotiations. Other states may just be adopting a wait and see 
attitude, looking to the success and speed of putting the new 
agreement into place before acting.
    The different reasons that states may currently be holdouts 
in the CWC process suggest that not all of them will remain 
outside the treaty in perpetuity. As the NPT demonstrated, 
adherence increases over time as politics and cost-benefit 
calculations change. The entry into force of the CWC itself 
will change the context within which states make their 
decisions regarding adherence. For some states, the tangible 
benefits of membership could ultimately override their current 
political decision to remain outside the regime. For others, 
the prospect of concrete penalties may have a similar impact.
    It must be recognized, however, that even as adherence 
progresses toward universality, not all states are likely to 
join the Convention. Is this sufficient reason for the U.S. not 
to join the Convention? In light of the treaty's benefits, the 
answer is no, particularly in light of the fact that the CWC 
itself will help to limit the number of problem cases, and help 
to bring the CW proliferation problem down to more manageable 
proportions.
    If holdouts do not provide sufficient reason to withhold 
support for the CWC, what about cheaters? Just as some holdouts 
must be anticipated, some violations of the CWC must be 
expected. If it were not a possibility, then there would be no 
need for the elaborate verification measures that have been 
designed.
    Why should the U.S. be concerned about cheaters? In short, 
they represent a potential problem because their CW 
capabilities could pose a threat to U.S. military operations in 
support of our interests overseas. To pose such a danger, 
however, those CW capabilities must be militarily significant. 
Military significance is in part a function of the quantity of 
toxic agent available. The amount of agent that must be used to 
have a significant impact on the battlefield, however, is often 
underestimated. One analysis, for example, argued that Iraq 
might have had 2,000 tons of chemical agent, which translates 
roughly into 500,000 artillery rounds. Such stocks are not 
sufficient to sustain a protracted conflict. The problem of 
limited supply is important because offensive chemical warfare 
requires the use of large amounts of agent; contaminated 
targets must be reattacked steadily.
    CW programs of military significance to the United States, 
of course, are a function of many factors other than just the 
amount of agent. Analysts such as Brad Roberts argue that with 
the CWC in place, these activities--stockpiling agent over long 
periods, utilizing advanced delivery systems, and so on--which 
together might create a problem for the U.S. should be 
detectable.
    Less detectable programs, while not militarily 
inconsequential, should be manageable through chemical defense 
programs. This is an example of how the CWC and other policy 
instruments can and must work together. The CWC narrows the 
problem to a range within which other tools, such as defensive 
programs, can be effective. It also highlights the sometimes 
overlooked fact that, unlike nuclear programs, the impact of CW 
can be diminished through defensive programs. Understanding 
that the U.S. and others have continued their commitment to 
adequate defense capabilities could be an important factor in 
the calculations of a potential CW proliferator about choosing 
the CW path.
    Many CWC opponents believe that by foregoing chemical 
deterrence, the United States will deny itself an important 
policy option. A chemical retaliatory capability may indeed be 
useful in some theoretical scenarios, but it is likely to be 
marginal, especially in light of the overwhelming conventional 
power the U.S. can bring to bear against an adversary. As 
Victor Utgoff of the Institute of Defense Analyses argues, 
``the United States and its allies have such overwhelming 
military power that, even without offensive CW capabilities, 
they can match or exceed any level of violence that a CW armed 
state could offer.'' Moreover, even if the U.S. retained 
chemical weapons, it is questionable whether the U.S. 
leadership would make the political decision to use them, 
particularly given available high-technology conventional 
options.
    It has sometimes been argued that Saddam Hussein's 
reluctance to use his CW stocks was a result of the ambiguous 
nature of the promised U.S. response in the event of such use. 
U.S. spokesmen were not specific about how they would respond, 
implying any measure, including chemical retaliation, was 
possible. No one can be certain why the Iraqi leader did not 
use his CW, but his concern over possible chemical retaliation 
is not the only answer. Some commentators argue that his 
principal delivery systems--aircraft--were destroyed. Others 
suggest that Iraqi troops were equally if not more vulnerable 
to CW given their poor defensive equipment and prevailing 
winds. Still others propose that Iraq was unable to deliver its 
CW stocks to forward commanders. Finally, the ambiguous nature 
of the certain U.S. response to CW use also included the 
prospect of nuclear or conventional options. Saddam ultimately 
may have decided that using CW would have changed the character 
of the coalition's war aims from removing Iraq from Kuwait to 
eliminating the Iraqi regime. At least some of these 
explanations have an equal if not greater value in elucidating 
Saddam Hussein's decision not to use CW than the prospect of 
chemical retaliation.
    In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary of Defense 
Perry, argued ``while we recognize that detecting illicit 
production of small quantities of CW will be extremely 
difficult, we also recognize that would be even more difficult 
without a CWC. In fact, the CWC verification regime, through 
its declaration, routine inspection, fact-finding, consultation 
and challenge inspections, should prove effective in providing 
a wealth of information on possible CW programs that simply 
would not be available without the convention.''
    Dr. Brad Roberts told the Committee that ``CWC cannot rid 
the world of chemical weapons, but it can effectively eliminate 
them as a threat of operations significance to the U.S. * * * 
it will narrow the range of scenarios in which the CW arsenals 
of states will make a difference to the national security of 
the U.S., by keeping the number of CW-armed states few and 
their arsenals and war fighting skills relatively 
unsophisticated. Absent the CWC, a much larger number of states 
capable of using a much broader range of CW assets seems likely 
to emerge, given proliferation trends.''
    Dr. Roberts added: ``the regime promises to meet U.S. needs 
with regard to verification. It will not detect all cheating 
but should detect all militarily significant cheating, at least 
in timely fashion * * * [the U.S.] has an impressive national 
capability to monitor the military disposition of potential 
adversaries and the proliferation problem more generally. The 
monitoring inspections and on-site challenge inspections made 
possible under the CWC will add a valuable dimension to U.S. 
verification capabilities.''
    Dr. Roberts continued: ``from the point of view of the 
U.S., verification requirements are surprisingly modest. The 
U.S. should not and cannot concern itself with illicit behavior 
in every building or tunnel in the world. Rather, it should 
concern itself with illicit behavior that is militarily 
significant''
    In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary of State 
Christopher maintained that: ``The Convention's export-control 
requirements and its prohibitions on assistance to chemical 
weapons programs in other countries will support our global 
strategy of curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 
They also will complement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and the Biological Weapons Convention.''
    Mr. John Holum, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency stated before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee: ``while no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, the CWC 
will increase the risk of detection and therefore help deter 
illicit chemical weapons activities. Its declaration and 
inspection provisions will help build a web of deterrence, 
detection, and possible sanctions that reduces the incentives 
for states to build chemical weapons.''
    In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, the U.S. representative 
to the Conference on Disarmament at the Department of State: 
``the Convention further provides for national security through 
provisions allowing for the maintenance of defensive programs 
with the provision of assistance and protection in the event of 
the use or threat of use of chemical weapons against states 
parties.''
    Still other opponents of the CWC believe that the 
Convention is not verifiable. This contention arises perhaps 
out of a misconception of verification. Three points should be 
made in response. First, verification is not a mechanistic, cut 
and dried process that produces unambiguous evidence of 
noncompliance. As with other elements of arms control, 
verification is at its core a political process. It is a 
process of making judgments about information not in isolation, 
but in a context. The information itself is not generated by 
treaty-related activities alone, but by a range of sources, 
including national means--technical and otherwise. A single 
inspection indeed may not uncover a ``smoking gun'' to confirm 
conclusively a cheater's noncompliance. This does not mean that 
the treaty is ineffective, however. Rather, judgments regarding 
noncompliance are formed on the basis of a mosaic of evidence 
created over time from a range of activities including multiple 
inspections, interviews, evaluations, and nontreaty related 
inputs. The CWC's verification provisions create critical 
opportunities for forming such a mosaic and noting quickly when 
particular pieces do not seem to fit, prompting yet further 
scrutiny.
    Second, verification is not synonymous with monitoring. The 
task of monitoring the evolution of CW programs will be a 
challenge for the intelligence community whether there is a CWC 
or not. The CWC, however, will supplement national 
capabilities, not diminish them. In particular, it will 
generate more data from more sources, some of which our 
intelligence may not be able to secure through national means.
    Third, the number of activities prohibited by the CWC are 
not drawbacks to the treaty but verification opportunities. 
Acquiring a CW program includes many stages--research and 
development, production (somewhere), agent storage (either in 
bulk or weaponized), filling munitions, incorporation into 
offensive military doctrine, and training. Some of these 
activities are more detectable than others. By including all of 
them in its ban, the CWC creates opportunities to identify a 
range of possible irregularities in a state's behavior. If one 
piece of the mosaic does not seem to fit, then other pieces can 
also be more closely examined for corroborative evidence.
    Finally, how important are the admitted shortcomings of the 
CWC's verification regime? In addition to the points already 
made about military significance, there are at least two 
mitigating considerations. First, CWC verification must be 
judged not only against a standard of detection, but of 
deterrence. The CWC will raise the costs of cheating to 
potential proliferators. It also enhances the prospect of 
detecting military significant programs. Together these factors 
bolster deterrence. Second, some limits to intrusiveness are 
needed to protect both national security and proprietary 
business information. During the talks the U.S. negotiated hard 
for a balanced approach, against those who wanted either 
unfettered access that would put such information at risk or 
those who preferred a greatly more restrictive approach. Such a 
balance has been achieved.

                            IV. Conclusions

                         A. BIPARTISAN SUPPORT

    The ratification effort is a strong example of 
bipartisanship and continuity. It was President Bush's deep 
personal commitment to the cause of banning chemical weapons 
that led the U.S. finally to conclude this treaty, which the 
U.S. signed seven days before he left office. President Bush 
reiterated his strong support for the CWC in a letter to 
Senators Pell and Lugar in July 1994:

          My longstanding commitment to banning chemical 
        weapons has been shared by many others, on both sides 
        of the aisle. Indeed, your own efforts and those of 
        your Senate colleagues were instrumental both in 
        completing the negotiations successfully and in 
        ensuring that the Convention itself was the very best 
        that could be achieved * * * . The Convention clearly 
        serves the best interests of the United States in a 
        world in which the proliferation and use of chemical 
        weapons is a real and growing threat * * * . I urge the 
        Senate to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to abolishing 
        chemical weapons by promptly giving its advice and 
        consent to ratification.

    President Clinton has made the Convention a foreign policy 
priority of his Administration as well.
    The Convention also enjoys strong support from affected 
constituencies. The final text of the Convention reflected the 
views of the U.S. military, the intelligence community, the 
chemical industry and the Congress--all of which have a 
compelling interest in the treaty and especially its 
verification provisions. Prior to signing the CWC, the U.S. 
Government conducted a thorough interagency review of the 
entire treaty, and decided that the balances it struck 
adequately protect U.S. interests. The Chemical Manufacturers 
Association, the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers 
Association, the Pharmaceutical and Research Manufacturers of 
America, the Biotechnology Industry Organization, and the 
American Chemical Society have fully endorsed the Convention on 
behalf of its members and other trade associations have 
expressed their support.

                               B. SUMMARY

    The CWC seeks to deter the use of chemical weapons as a 
military option through establishing a global norm against 
their use, verification of compliance, establishing mechanisms 
for alleviating concerns about suspected non-compliance and 
applying punitive measures, and by providing assistance to the 
victims of chemical weapons attack.
    The CWC prohibits all chemical weapon use, including 
retaliation in kind. However, the CWC specifically allows for 
Parties to maintain CW defensive programs and does not 
constrain non-CW military responses to chemical weapon attack. 
Upon entry into force of the CWC, the United States, with its 
superior military force, will no longer need an in-kind 
retaliatory deterrent. The United States superior individual 
protection and training program, detection capabilities and 
medical support further reduce both the effectiveness of a CW 
attack and an aggressor's incentive to use chemical weapons 
against U.S. forces.
    On May 13, 1994, the Department of Defense testified before 
the Senate that ``DOD supports giving up the ability to 
retaliate with CW because we have an effective range of 
alternative retaliatory capabilities. Our protective 
capabilities have been improved * * * We do not need chemical 
weapons to deliver an effective response to CW.''
    The CWC complements the U.S. CW deterrence posture by 
reducing the probability of CW use through the following:

          It ensures that each State Party has access to 
        assistance against CW to include individual protection 
        equipment, detection capabilities, and medical support. 
        The availability of such assistance can reduce the 
        effectiveness of a CW attack and therefore cause the 
        would-be aggressor to consider a less politically 
        costly option.
          Unlike the Geneva Protocol, which only prohibited use 
        of CW, the CWC establishes a new and very significant 
        global norm prohibiting all offensive CW related 
        activities. The CWC not only bans the use of CW but it 
        will make it politically costly for a State Party to 
        develop or maintain a CW capability. The norm will 
        serve as a basis for international pressure against 
        non-Parties who have or are seeking to acquire CW 
        programs.
          By banning the development, production, stockpiling, 
        and use of CW; the CWC seeks to remove the ability of 
        State Parties to openly prepare, deploy, and use 
        chemical weapons. Renegade countries choosing to 
        acquire CW will have to conduct these activities in a 
        secretive and therefore more expensive manner.

    A militarily significant quantity of CW is situationally 
dependent. Such variables as the aggressor's military 
objectives, the level of protection and training of the 
targeted force, environmental conditions, and the type of CW 
used all affect the quantity of CW needed. Small amounts such 
as one ton could suffice as a weapon of terror to cause panic 
in a civilian population. Hundreds of thousands of tons may be 
needed to interdict logistic nodes or have an impact on a 
large-scale engagement.
    The offensive use, or threat of use of CW against U.S. 
forces will have a military impact. Merely operating in a 
chemical threat environment causes U.S. forces to assume a 
protective posture that may have a negative impact upon their 
performance; however, the impact is mitigated as the force's 
level of training and familiarity with their protective 
equipment increases. The U.S. military's ability to 
successfully engage the aggressor in a chemical environment and 
to continue its mission is among the best in the world. This 
ability is, has been, and will continue to be, a major factor 
deterring aggressors from using chemical weapons against U.S. 
forces.
    The CWC specifically allows for Parties to maintain 
defensive programs and does not constrain a Party's non-CW 
military response. Superior U.S. military force, coupled with a 
robust defensive program, will reduce the likelihood of CW use 
against U.S. forces and the effectiveness of an attack, should 
deterrence fail.
    The CWC also complements the U.S. chemical weapons 
deterrence strategy by providing a mechanism to focus global 
attention on countries that violate its provisions and by 
promoting nonproliferation of these weapons of mass 
destruction. The CWC's provisions raise the economic and 
political costs to produce, maintain, or use chemical weapons.
    U.S.-CW deterrence is predicated upon the ability to 
effectively retaliate with superior military force and maintain 
a robust CW defense program. This deterrence posture will 
dampen any potential aggressor's belief that a chemical weapons 
program is worth the expense and the political risk.
    In response to the allegation that the Chemical Weapons 
Convention is not in the national security interests of the 
U.S., Chairman Shallikashvilli argued before the Committee 
that: ``The Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly in our 
national interest. The Convention's advantages outweigh its 
shortcomings. The United States and all other CW-capable state 
parties incur the same obligation to destroy their chemical 
weapons stockpiles.''
    Lt. General Wesley Clark, the Director of Strategic Plans 
and Policy in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
argued before the Committee: ``From a military perspective, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly in our national 
interest. The convention's advantages outweigh its 
shortcomings.''
    In letters to Senators Lugar and Pell on July 18, 1994, 
former U.S. President Bush argued: ``This Convention clearly 
serves the best interests of the United States in a world in 
which the proliferation and use of chemical weapons is a real 
and growing threat.''
    In a statement to the Henry L. Stimson Center, former 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger remarked: ``The 
Chemical Weapons Convention is an important part of an 
international structure that would increase U.S. and global 
security in the next century. If we do not lead this effort to 
curb the proliferation of chemical weapons and initiate their 
global elimination, we increase the chances that we will 
encounter disasters in the 21st century reminiscent of those 
that occurred in the first fifty years of the 20th century.''
    Some critics argue that the U.S. will lose its autonomy and 
jeopardize its national security by ratifying the CWC. In his 
testimony before the Committee, Secretary of State Christopher 
argued: ``If the United States is among the first 65 parties to 
ratify the Convention, we will retain our critical leadership 
role in the global fight against chemical weapons. If we are 
not, we will lose the chance to ensure that our views are fully 
reflected in the final preparations for entry into force. We 
will not be able to participate immediately in the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which monitors 
compliance. We will not be able to join immediately in 
international inspections.''
    Secretary of Defense Perry told the Committee: ``In the 
Defense Department's view, a proper balance has been achieved 
between effective verification of the Convention on the one 
hand, and the protection of DOD's national security on the 
other.''
    Lt. General Wesley Clark, testified to the Committee that: 
``While less than perfect, the verification regime allows for 
intrusive inspections while protecting our national security 
concerns.''

                         C. CONTINUING CONCERNS

    Meeting the destruction schedule laid out in the CWC will 
be a major challenge. Important political, environmental, and 
economic barriers lie ahead. If the destruction effort does not 
keep pace with implementation of other provisions of the CWC, 
however, the credibility of the entire Convention will be 
undermined.
    A second question is the relationship between the CWC and 
other aspects of CW nonproliferation policy. It is the 
contention of some analysts that it is not only a possibility 
but a likelihood that, following CWC ratification, the U.S. 
will ``overcomply'' by setting aside its defensive programs as 
a consequence of insufficient funding. If correct, this 
observation is disturbing. The CWC will not obviate the need 
for a robust chemical defense program which must be retained as 
a hedge against the uncertainties of noncompliance.
    Pursuit of defense programs should not be limited to 
passive measures. The extent to which the U.S. can defend 
against a range of advanced delivery vehicles will also bolster 
the web of deterrence against CW proliferation. For this 
reason, efforts to explore theater missile defense should be 
continued.
    Another critical area that must receive continued attention 
is conventional capabilities. Conventional preponderance, 
together with credible protective measures and active defense 
capabilities, are likely to be of far greater importance in 
defining the scope and intensity of the future CW threat.
    Yet another issue that must be addressed relates to 
assistance to a state that is subject to a CW attack or threat. 
This question of assistance--what the U.S. or others will 
provide, when, and under what conditions--requires more 
detailed and systematic attention by all of the signatories.
    So, too, does the problem of allegations of use. The bulk 
of the verification regime is directed toward detecting 
nonproduction of chemical weapons. That is as it should be 
given the open nature of the Convention. Recent experience has 
demonstrated, however, that evidence regarding alleged use of 
chemical weapons is often ambiguous. From the initial moment of 
entry into force, the parties to the Convention must do 
whatever is necessary to bolster confidence that the 
Convention's provisions for investigating allegations of use 
will be rapidly exploited to minimize that ambiguity.
    Finally, an important concern must be the question of what 
state parties will do in the event they are confronted--as they 
undoubtedly will be--with noncompliance. The United States 
insisted during the negotiations that the decision on 
determining a state's compliance was a sovereign right of 
individual state parties. With that right, however, comes the 
responsibility of a state party to know what it will do if 
violations are detected. These sound like easy judgments, but 
they are not. Past experience has demonstrated how contentious 
the issue of possible treaty violations can be even among close 
friends and allies.
    Ultimately, the willingness of state parties to act in the 
face of noncompliance, more than the sophistication of its 
inspection provisions or the extent of its data reporting 
requirements, will determine the CWC's effectiveness. If the 
political will does not exist to make these agreements 
important instruments of international policy, they are not 
worth the paper on which they are written. If the political 
commitment to action is absent, all of the inspections they 
mandate are so much unproductive frenzy. If the political 
strength to take on those who will not abide by the rules has 
vanished, the penalties have the impact of a mosquito--
inconvenient and irritating perhaps, but no deterrent.

                              D. JUDGMENT

    With all of these factors in mind, the majority of the 
members of the committee have concluded that ratification of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention is decidedly in the national 
interests of the United States, its friends and allies, and the 
world community. We reached this judgment in full awareness 
that questions remain as to the ultimate effectiveness of the 
Convention.
    We are very much concerned as to what the alternative might 
be. A United States decision not to join the Chemical Weapons 
Convention would not stop it from entering into force, but 
would surely undermine the effectiveness of the treaty and 
would be harmful to critically important U.S. interests in 
identifying and dealing with chemical weapons threats in 
various parts of the world. It is not in our interest to be on 
the outside looking in as the Chemical Weapons Convention is 
set up.
    Questions have been raised as to the effectiveness of the 
verification of this Convention. A very careful balance was 
struck at the United States insistence between intrusiveness 
sufficient to gain knowledge and reassurance and possible 
encroachments on individual rights and possible risks to 
national security. Verification cannot be perfect, as would be 
wished in ideal circumstances, but it will serve as a valuable 
tool in helping American officials keep up with potential 
threats. It will not substitute for our existing means of 
gathering information but it will provide a valuable 
augmentation.
    Concerns have been expressed as to possible onerous burdens 
the Convention might place upon American business. Having 
closely investigated how the routine and challenge inspection 
procedures might be implemented, we believe there is every 
reason to conclude that this treaty will not constitute an 
onerous burden for American business. It is important to 
understand that representatives of the chemical industry were 
involved from the outset in development of the testing 
procedures and field testing and evaluation of various optional 
approaches. The end result was achieved with the industry being 
regulated as a major and decisive participant.
    We understand fully that entry into force of the Convention 
will not remove the threat of chemical warfare from the world. 
Nonetheless, it will move us from the present circumstances in 
which various nations can contemplate the use of chemical 
weapons and even use such weapons without international 
punishment, to a norm in which nations are expected to and are 
under pressure to eschew the development, production, storage 
or use of chemical weapons. Those who violate this norm will be 
pariah states, and justifiably so. Over time, under this 
Convention, the nations of the world are likely to move away 
from toleration of chemical weapons, and that will constitute a 
substantial boon for all mankind.

                             V. Appendices

                   LETTER OF SUPPORT FROM GEORGE BUSH

                                                     July 18, 1994.
Hon. Claiborne Pell,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: I understand that the Senate will be 
voting on the Chemical Weapons Convention soon, and I wanted to 
ensure that you and our colleagues were aware of my strong 
support for the earliest possible ratification and entry into 
force of this landmark agreement.
    As you know, my own involvement in efforts to ban chemical 
weapons began in 1984, when I presented the initial U.S. draft 
treaty next to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. 
Convinced of the threat posed by chemical weapons proliferation 
and of the importance of banning these weapons from the face of 
the earth, I made completion of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
one of the top foreign policy priorities of my Administration. 
It was, therefore, particularly gratifying to be able to send 
Security of State Eagleburger to Paris in January 1993 to sign 
the Convention on behalf of the United States.
    My longstanding commitment to banning chemical weapons has 
been shared by many others, on both sides of the aisle. Indeed, 
your own efforts and those of your Senate colleagues were 
instrumental both in completing the negotiations successfully 
and in ensuring that the Convention itself was the very best 
that could be achieved.
    The United States worked hard to ensure that the Convention 
could be effectively verified. At the same time, we sought the 
means to protect both United States security interests and 
commercial capabilities. I am convinced that the Convention we 
signed served both objectives, effectively banning chemical 
weapons without creating an unnecessary burden on legitimate 
activities.
    The Convention clearly serves the best interests of the 
United States in a world in which the proliferations and use of 
chemical weapons is a real and growing threat. United States 
leadership played a critical role in the successful conclusion 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention. United States leadership is 
required once again to bring this historic agreement into 
force. I urge the Senate to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to 
abolishing chemical weapons by promptly giving its advice and 
consent to ratification.
            Sincerely,
                                                       George Bush.
                                ------                                


             Letters of Support from the Chemical Industry

            1. The Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA)

                         Chemical Manufactures Association,
                                        Arlington, VA, May 9, 1996.
Hon. Richard Lugar,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Senator Lugar: The Chemical Manufacturers Association 
(CMA) wishes to reiterate its strong support for the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) now before the Senate. In CMA's view, 
the CWC is a reasonable, effective mechanism to eliminate the 
threat of chemical weapons on a global basis.
    CMA's support for the CWC is based on our long involvement 
in the negotiation and implementation of the agreement. The CWC 
provides a unique balance between verification and deterrence 
needs, and the legitimate commercial interests of American 
business. Indeed, CMA has carefully weighed the costs and 
benefits of the CWC's reporting and inspection provisions. In 
every instance, the benefits of the treaty far outweigh the 
potential costs to industry.
    A great deal of attention has been focused recently on the 
number and type of facilities affected by the CWC. CMA's 
analysis indicates that the CWC compliance burden on affected 
facilities is both reasonable and manageable. Furthermore, 
implementation decisions have already narrowed the scope of the 
CWC significantly, and future decisions are likely to further 
reduce the number of potentially affected U.S. commercial 
facilities. The number of companies affected by the CWC is 
lower than the number of affected facilities, as many affected 
companies own multiple facilities across the U.S.

Schedule 1 requirements

    As you know, the CWC imposes the most stringent 
requirements on facilities producing or consuming Schedule 1 
chemicals--materials with direct weapons applications. The 
information CMA has indicates that there are 11 U.S. facilities 
consuming Schedule 1 materials, all in the pharmaceutical area 
[See Attachments 1 and 2]. The CWC does not prohibit the use of 
Schedule 1 materials for pharmaceutical purposes, of course. 
The CWC's reporting and inspection requirements for Schedule 1 
facilities entail completing a two to three page declarations. 
CMA is working with the Department of Commerce's Bureau of 
Export Administration to design declaration forms for Schedule 
1, 2 and 3 facilities in order to achieve overall U.S. 
compliance with CWC while minimizing the administrative burden 
on industry. The CWC's reporting and inspection requirements 
for Schedule 1 facilities are likely to be no more burdensome 
that those already imposed by the federal Occupational Safety 
and Health Act.

Schedule 2 requirements

    The CWC also imposes declaration and inspection obligations 
on the producers, processors and consumers of Schedule 2 
chemicals--the direct precursors of weapons agents. There are 
relatively few affected Schedule 2 facilities in the United 
States. Although at one point CMA believed there may be as many 
as 200 Schedule 2 facilities in the U.S., more recent 
information indicates that there are only some 30 to 35 
facilities that will be subject to the initial and thereafter 
annual declaration requirements, in addition to, routine 
inspections to verify the accuracy of declarations and declared 
activities [See Attachments 1 and 2].
    There are several reasons for the lower number of affected 
U.S. Schedule 2 facilities. The scope of the Schedule 2 
provisions has been narrowed by determinations that it does not 
apply to materials such as brominated fire retardants, for 
example. In addition, there are only a handful of U.S. 
producers of Schedule 2 chemicals, and few commercial consumers 
of these materials in quantities above the CWC thresholds [See 
Attachment 1].

Schedule 3 requirements

    The CWC provisions for Schedule 3 chemicals--the high-
volume indirect precursors of weapons agents--affect 
approximately 60 U.S. facilities. The Schedule 3 provisions 
apply only to the production, import and export of the 
materials in quantities in excess of the CWC threshold; 
consumption or processing of these substances are not affected 
by the CWC. Compared to Schedule 2 facilities, Schedule 3 
facilities pose a relatively lower risk to the object and 
purpose of the CWC. This is reflected in the less detail 
reporting and less frequent inspection requirements applied to 
Schedule 3 facilities [See Attachments 1 and 2].

Requirements for discrete organic chemicals
    The majority of U.S. producers of ``discrete organic 
chemicals'' will be impacted by the CWC. It is important to 
note that the requirements only apply to producers of these 
materials, and do not affect consumers, processors, importers 
or exporters. As many as 1,800 U.S. facilities may produce 
discrete organics in excess of the CWC thresholds. These 
facilities face no threat of routine inspections under the CWC, 
and will only be expected to file a one-page annual report with 
the U.S. government. This requirement is significantly less 
than the compliance burden already associated with U.S. 
environmental regulations [See Attachment 1].
    The potential scope of the discrete organic reporting 
burden has been narrowed as exceptions in the CWC have been 
clarified. For example, facilities producing polymers and 
oligomers will have no reporting obligations, as it is 
recognized that these materials pose no risk of weapons-related 
activities. Work is currently underway to clarify the scope of 
the CWC's exemption of hydrocarbon facilities. CMA expects 
that, at a minimum, U.S. oil refineries and closely related 
processes will be exempt from the discrete organic reporting 
obligation.
Requirements for chemical mixtures
    The scope of the CWC will also be narrowed as the 
signatories address the application of the reporting and 
inspection provisions to mixtures of the Scheduled chemicals. 
There are chemicals mixtures containing precursors from which 
it is impractical (and at times, chemically impossible) to 
separate out usable amounts of the precursor material. As these 
mixtures present little threat of diversion to chemical weapons 
production, they are likely candidates for exemption from the 
CWC. CMA has been working closely with the U.S. government on 
this issue.
Conclusion
    It should be apparent that the primary impact of the CWC is 
indeed on chemical manufacturers, and not on the downstream 
consumers of chemical products. Chemical manufacturing is 
already one of the most-regulated sectors of American commerce, 
and the CWC imposes no compliance burden that is different in 
nature or scope from those already imposed by U.S. law.
    In field tests of the proposed U.S. declaration formats, 
potentially affected facilities reported that the time required 
to complete a declaration ranged from 2 to 8 hours for a 
Schedule 2 facility, which requires more detail than a Schedule 
3 or discrete organic facility. The time required to complete 
the declaration can be expected to go down as facilities gain 
experience with the CWC.
    The important point is that the CWC is an effective means 
of assuring that commercial chemicals are not diverted to 
illegal weapons uses. Our industry is committed to eradicating 
the threat of chemical weapons; the CWC is the best way of 
achieving that goal.
    If we can provide any additional information on the CWC and 
commercial chemicals, please contact me or Claude Boudrias, 
Legislative Representative, at 703/741-5915.
            Sincerely,
                            Frederick L. Webber, President and CEO.
    Attachment.
    
    
  2. The Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association (SOCMA)

                         Synthetic Organic Chemical
                           manufacturers Association, Inc.,
                                   Washington, DC, August 12, 1996.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
    Dear Senator Lugar: The Synthetic Organic Chemical 
Manufacturers Association (SOCMA) would like to take this 
opportunity to express its position on the ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). SOCMA is supportive of the 
overall goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention and supports 
Senate ratification of the treaty and prompt passage of the 
necessary implementing legislation.
    SOCMA is the leading association representing the batch and 
custom chemical industry. This industry produces 95 percent of 
the 50,000 chemicals manufactured in the U.S. while making a 
$60 billion annual contribution to the economy. SOCMA's 260 
member companies are representative of the industry and are 
typically small businesses with fewer than 50 employees and 
less than $50 million in annual sales.
    In order for a ratified CWC to be effective, Congress will 
need to pass implementing legislation that: 1) produces the 
least burdensome reporting requirements that do not exceed the 
objectives of the treaty; 2) contains adequate protection for 
proprietary information; and 3) does not damage the domestic 
chemical industry's competitive position.
    Since it appears that the CWC is on the verge of obtaining 
the 65 signatories necessary to begin the implementation 
process, SOCMA believes that it is both in the best interest of 
its members and also the best economic interest of the United 
States for Congress to address these issues in a timely 
fashion.
    I am attaching a detailed paper on SOCMA's position on the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. I welcome any questions you may 
have regarding SOCMA's position.
            Sincerely,
                                      Graydon R. Powers, President.
                                ------                                


  3. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PHRMA)

                                                     PhRMA,
                                    Washington, DC, August 7, 1996.
Hon. Richard Lugar,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Senator Lugar: The Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) represents this country's 
leading research-based pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies. Investing nearly $16 billion a year in discovering 
and developing new medicines, PhRMA companies are the source of 
nearly all new drug developments in the United States.
    PhRMA has had a long and continued interest in the 
development of an international Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC). As an industry we believe that while there are many 
dual-use chemical technologies being used for legitimate 
purposes, their use for the development and propagation of 
chemical weapon should be strongly discouraged by the United 
States and the world. Since 1990, we have worked with the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) in their efforts to 
help the U.S. Government develop a CWC which is effective, but 
that also protects our industries' legitimate confidential 
business information. PhRMA was represented on the CMA Chemical 
Weapons Work Group and we congratulate CMA on the constructive 
efforts that they have made on behalf of our industries to 
explain the technologies and why some processes should be 
protected as proprietary. We believe that the CWC now up for 
ratification is a good attempt to balance the conflicting 
concerns of enabling the intelligence community to catch 
violators while not exposing our companies to more intrusive 
declarations and inspections than is absolutely necessary. As 
such we believe that the U.S. Government should ratify the CWC, 
and make domestic implementing legislation a priority.
    PhRMA is concerned that our support for the CWC is being 
misconstrued, and confused with our concerns over the 
development of a verification protocol for the already-approved 
1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). We see the BWC and 
CWC as entirely separate issues, both due to the nature of the 
technologies and the status of the conventions. While the U.S. 
Government does not yet have a position on the BWC Protocol 
negotiations, we anticipate that PhRMA and our member companies 
will be contributing as fully and constructively to the BWC 
Protocol as CMA has done for CWC.
            Sincerely,
                                            Alan F. Holmer.
                                ------                                


            4. The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO)

                 Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO),
                                 Washington, DC, September 5, 1996.
Hon. Richard Lugar,
U.S. Senate,
306 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
    Dear Senator Lugar: The Biotechnology Industry Organization 
(BIO) represents over 650 companies and affiliated 
organizations. Our members are developing products in variety 
of sectors including health care, agriculture, and 
environmental remediation. We would like to take this 
opportunity to go on record in support of ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
    As you are aware, the Chemical Manufacturers Association 
(CMA) took the lead in addressing industrial concerns 
throughout the treaty negotiations. BIO followed these 
negotiations since a small subset of Schedule One chemicals 
might be used by our industry in the development of new 
products. We have been briefed by CMA staff and believe that 
concerns about the protection of proprietary information during 
inspections under the convention are resolved. Reporting and 
record keeping requirements appear not to be overly burdensome, 
even in the case where certain Schedule One chemicals may be 
used during production.
    BIO's principal ongoing concern is with the emerging 
discussions regarding development of inspection and 
verification protocols under the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC). We continue the active discussions with our U.S. 
negotiators that began three years ago. We do not believe that 
ratification of the CWC will set any precedent as to the final 
form of the BWC.
            Sincerely,
                               Carl B. Feldbaum, President.
                                ------                                


                 5. The American Chemical Society (ACS)

                                 American Chemical Society,
                                    Washington, DC, August 9, 1996.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Senator Lugar: The American Chemical Society (ACS) is 
the world's largest scientific organization with over 150,000 
chemical scientists and engineers employed in industry, 
academia, and government. In view of the current debate on 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Society 
offers its perspective.
    The American Chemical Society strongly supports the overall 
goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention and urges immediate 
ratification of the treaty. Further, the Society believes that, 
after treaty ratification, the Congress should expedite 
consideration and passage of the needed implementing 
legislation.
    For over a decade, the U.S. chemical industry has worked 
with the negotiators to craft the treaty. The industry 
continues to work to ensure that the treaty and its 
implementation are not unduly burdensome on American business. 
The U.S. chemical industry, with its positive trade balance and 
a $60 billion per year export business, has generated thousands 
of jobs. Without U.S. ratification, a treaty in force will 
adversely affect this industry as overseas customers start 
switching to suppliers in countries that have ratified the 
Convention.
    The ACS's congressional charter imposes a responsibility to 
provide assistance to the government in matters of national 
concern related to its areas of expertise. The American 
Chemical Society has a long history of discussion on chemical 
warfare policies and of advising the government in this area. 
As the Senate deliberates on the treaty and its implementation, 
the Society offers its support and expertise. If we can provide 
assistance on this important issue, please call on us.
            Sincerely yours,
                                            Ronald Breslow,
                                                         President.
                                ------                                


               6. 53 Senior Chemical Industry Executives

                                                   August 29, 1996.
Hon. Claiborne Pell,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Senator Pell: The undersigned senior executives of 
chemical companies urge your vote in support of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), and quick Senate action on 
legislation to implement this important treaty.
    The chemical industry has long supported the CWC. Our 
industry participated in negotiating the agreement, and in U.S. 
and international implementation efforts. The treaty contains 
substantial protections for confidential business information 
(CBI). We know, because industry helped to draft the CBI 
provisions. Chemical companies also help test the draft CWC 
reporting system, and we tested the on-site inspection 
procedures that will help verify compliance with the treaty. In 
short, our industry has thoroughly examined and tested this 
Convention. We have concluded that the benefits of the CWC far 
outweigh the costs.
    Indeed, the real price to pay would come from not ratifying 
the CWC. The treaty calls for strict restrictions on trade with 
nations which are not party to the Convention. The chemical 
industry is America's largest export industry, posting $60 
billion in export sales last year. But our industry's status as 
the world's preferred supplier of chemical products may be 
jeopardized if the United States does not ratify the 
Convention. If the Senate does not vote in favor of the CWC, we 
stand to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in overseas 
sales, putting at risk thousands of good-paying American jobs.
    The U.S. chemical industry has spent more than 15 years 
working on this agreement, and we long ago decided that 
ratifying the CWC is the right thing to do.
    We urge you to vote in support of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
            Sincerely,
    J. Lawrence Wilson, Chairman & CEO, Rohm and Has Company, 
Chairman, Board of Directors, Chemical Manufacturers 
Association.
    Alan R. Hirsig, President & CEO, ARCO Chemical Company, 
Chairman, Executive Committee, Chemical Manufacturers 
Association.
    H.A. Wagner, Chairman, President & CEO, Air Products & 
Chemicals, Inc.
    D.J. D'Antoni, President, Ashland Chemical Company.
    Helge H. Wehmeier, President and CEO, Bayer Corporation.
    John D. Ong, Chairman & CEO, The BF Goodrich Company.
    Robert R. Mesel, President, BP Chemicals, Inc.
    Charles M. Donohue, Vice President, Alkzo Nobel Chemicals, 
Inc.
    J. Dieter Stein, Chairman & CEO, BASF Corporation.
    W.R. Cook, Chairman, President & CEO, Betz Dearborn, Inc.
    Joseph M. Saggese, President & CEO, Borden Chemicals and 
Plastics, LP.
    Dr. Aziz I. Asphahani, President & CEO, Carus Chemical 
Company.
    Vincent A. Calarco, Chairman, President & CEO, Crompton & 
Knowles Corporation.
    Richard A. Hazleton, Chairman & CEO, Dow Corning 
Corporation.
    Howard J. Rudge, Senior Vice President & General Counsel, 
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Company.
    Richard G. Fanelli, President & CEO, Enthone-OMI Inc.
    J.E. Akitt, Executive Vice President, Exxon Chemical 
Company.
    William S. Stavropoulos, President & CEO, The Dow Chemical 
Company.
    Earnest W. Deavenport, Jr., Chairman of the Board & CEO, 
Eastman Chemical Company.
    Bernard Azoulay, President & CEO, Elf Atochem North 
America.
    Bruce C. Gottwald, CEO, Ethyl Corporation.
    Ron W. Haddock, President & CEO, FINA, Inc.
    Robert N. Burt, Chairman & CEO, FMC Corporation.
    Otto Furuta, V.P. Global Logistics & Materials Management, 
Great Lakes Chemical Corporation.
    R. Keith Elliott, President & CEO, Hercules, Inc.
    Hans C. Noetzli, President & CEO, Lonza Inc.
    Robert G. Potter, Executive Vice President, Monsanto 
Company.
    Dr. William L. Orton, Senior Vice President, Chemical 
Operations, Givaudan-Roure Corporation.
    Michael R. Boyce, President & CEO, Harris Chemical Group.
    Thomas F. Kennedy, President & CEO, Hoechst Celanese 
Corporation.
    Mack G. Nichols, President & CEO, Mallinckrodt Group, Inc.
    S. Jay Stewart, Chairman & CEO, Morton International, Inc.
    E.J. Mooney, Chairman & CEO, Nalco Chemical Company.
    Jeffrey M. Lipton, President, NOVA Corporation.
    Donald W. Griffin, Chairman, President & CEO, Olin 
Corporation.
    Peter R. Heinze, Senior Vice President, Chemicals, PPG 
Industries, Inc.
    Phillip D. Ashkettle, President & CEO, Reichhold Chemicals, 
Inc.
    Ronald L. Spraetz, V.P., External Affairs & Quality, 
National Starch & Chemical Company.
    J. Roger Hirl, President & CEO, Occidental Chemical 
Corporation.
    David Wolf, President, Perstorp Polyola, Inc.
    Ronald H. Yocum, Chairman, President & CEO, Quantrum 
Chemical Company.
    Thomas E. Reilly, Jr., Chairman, Reilly Industries, Inc.
    Peter J. Neff, President & CEO, Rhone-Poulenc, Inc.
    Nicholas P. Trainer, President, Sartomer Company.
    J. Virgil Waggoner, President & CEO, Sterling Chemicals, 
Inc.
    W.H. Joyce, Chairman, President & CEO, Union Carbide 
Corporation.
    Arthur R. Sigel, President & CEO, Velsicol Chemical 
Corporation.
    Roger K. Price, Senior V.P., Mining & Manufacturing, R.T. 
Vanderbilt Company, Inc.
    F. Quinn Stepan, Chairman & President, Stepan Company.
    William H. Barlow, Vice President, Business Development, 
Texas Brine Corporation.
    Robert J. Mayaika, President, CEO & Chairman, Uniroyal 
Chemical Company, Inc.
    John Wilkinson, Director of Government Affairs, Vulcan 
Chemicals.
    Albert J. Costello, Chairman, President & CEO, W.R. Grace & 
Company.
                           IX. MINORITY VIEWS

                              introduction

    It became clear over the course of the committee's 
consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention that there 
existed unanimous agreement that a verifiable treaty 
accomplishing real reductions in chemical weapons clearly would 
be in the national security interests of the United States. 
However, we do not believe that the treaty submitted to the 
Senate is verifiable. Nor will it reduce the arsenals of 
terrorist countries and other nations hostile to the United 
States. Several countries identified by our government as 
possessing chemical weapons have not even signed the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, let alone ratified it. Yet those 
countries--among them Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea--are 
the countries most likely to use chemical weapons against 
America or our allies. Moreover, not one country of concern to 
the United States has ratified this Convention. Neither the 
People's Republic of China nor Iran, for example, have 
ratified.
    Furthermore, Russia--the country that possesses the largest 
and most sophisticated chemical weapons arsenal in the world--
has consistently refused to agree to implement its commitments 
to eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile, despite the 1990 
U.S.-Russian Bilateral Destruction Agreement. To the contrary, 
we are concerned that Russia consistently has refused to 
accurately declare the size of its chemical weapons stockpile, 
and to provide information on the status of its binary chemical 
weapons program. We believe this portends ominous things to 
come in terms of Russia's compliance with the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC).
    With respect to verifiability, we note that even senior-
most administration officials have conceded that the Convention 
submitted to the Senate is not verifiable. The then-Director of 
Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, declared in testimony 
before this Committee on June 23, 1994, that ``the chemical 
weapons problem is so difficult from an intelligence 
perspective, that I cannot state that we have high confidence 
in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a small 
scale.''
    Furthermore, not one country that is pursuing chemical 
weapons--with the exception of the United States and its 
allies--can be expected to abide by the CWC, whether or not 
they ratify. Too many chemicals are dual-use in nature. 
Chemicals used to make ball point pens can be used to make 
deadly nerve agent. It is impossible to monitor every soap, 
detergent, cosmetic, electronics, varnish, paint, 
pharmaceutical, and chemical plant around the world to ensure 
that they are not producing chemical weapons, or that toxic 
chemicals are not being diverted to the production of weapons 
elsewhere. Countries are well aware that if they ratify the 
CWC, they can cheat with impunity.
    What the Chemical Weapons Convention will do, however, is 
have a major impact upon industry. According to a database 
supplied to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, at least 3,000 U.S. firms that 
consume, process, or manufacture chemicals will have data 
declaration and/or inspection obligations under the CWC. Our 
review of ACDA's information persuades us that as many as 8,000 
companies potentially may be affected. Firms that manufacture 
anything from dyes and pigments, insecticides, pharmaceuticals, 
ceramics, nylon, paint and varnish, electronics, textiles, and 
soap and detergent--just to name a few--all will be subject to 
multinational regulation under the CWC.
    These companies will be forced to spend more money to hire 
more people to fill out more government forms. Some will be 
forced to submit to routine inspections. Others may be subject 
to intrusive challenge inspections by an international 
inspectorate. In fact, we fully expect some of those foreign 
inspectors to practice economic espionage against our 
companies. And a small number of companies, comprised largely 
of biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms, may find their 
access to certain chemicals constrained or shut off. The most 
troubling fact about all of this is that the overwhelming 
number of these firms are not even aware of the implications of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
    The CWC also will undo decades of arms control efforts at 
stemming the tide of chemical weapons proliferation. First, 
Russia has withdrawn from a much older bilateral commitment to 
the United States to destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles, 
citing the less intrusive, less-effective CWC as a preferable 
alternative. Second, the CWC papers over the fact that the 
international community has consistently refused to enforce a 
far more verifiable ban on the use of chemical weapons--the 
1925 Geneva Protocol. In fact, the preamble of the CWC falsely 
claims that ``the General Assembly of the United Nations has 
repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and 
objectives of the Protocol * * *'' In fact, after Iraq's 
repeated use of poison gas against its Kurdish population, the 
United States could not even secure within the United Nations a 
resolution mentioning Iraq by name.
    Third, the CWC seeks to eliminate trade restrictions on 
toxic chemicals, threatening to undermine a 29-nation agreement 
(the Australia Group) to restrict trade in dangerous chemicals 
to nonmembers. Yet the Australia Group maintains tighter 
controls on 20 more chemical weapons precursors than does the 
CWC. We must think carefully about the consequences of 
undercutting the most stringent barrier to chemical weapons 
proliferation in existence. Despite the fact that the 
international chemical industry supports the CWC because it 
sees new market opportunities, the United States should be 
leery of providing countries that may ratify, such as Iran and 
India, with qualitative and quantitative increases in chemical 
weapons-related technology.
    In view of these serious concerns with the CWC, we cannot 
support ratification of the treaty at this time. The Senate 
should insist that the United States become party only to a 
verifiable treaty that is binding on those nations most likely 
to threaten our national security. In our judgment, approving 
this treaty will prove counterproductive--accelerating the 
spread of chemical weapons rather than slowing it--and will 
have disastrous consequences for thousands of U.S. businesses.
    The following assessment, concluded by the majority staff 
of the Foreign Relations Committee, details the CWC's likely 
impact upon our national security, its implications for 
thousands of U.S. businesses, its verifiability, its cost, 
constitutionality, and other related issues. Included are our 
specific recommendations to the Senate.

                        A. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

    Certainly major domestic political constraints have shaped 
debate in the United States over the use of chemical weapons. 
However, the moral opprobrium attached to chemical weapons 
should not give rise to unrealistic expectations regarding the 
CWC's impact upon future conflicts, or prompt anyone to dismiss 
the willingness of other countries to use such weapons.
    Not only can chemical weapons be used as instruments of 
terror, blackmail, and intimidation, but they also may be used 
by several countries in war-fighting functions. In fact, the 
possibility is heightened in the post-cold-war era that 
chemical weapons will be used in an increasing number of 
military capacities: to quell internal ethnic conflicts, as 
Iraq sought to do with its Kurdish population in 1988; in the 
context of regional disputes (as countries to seek to offset 
one another's capabilities through a variety of means, 
including chemical weapons); or as a means of deterring or 
rendering more costly U.S. intervention in regions in defense 
of its vital national interests.
    During Operation Desert Storm, allied air attacks were 
focused upon facilities associated with Iraq's chemical weapons 
program. Muthanna, a facility 65 miles north of Baghdad, was 
the nucleus of Iraq's chemical weapons program and a priority 
target during the early days of the Gulf War. Discussing the 
U.S. military's concern with Iraq's chemical weapons program, 
General Norman Swarzkopf remarked during a press briefing in 
Riyad, Saudi Arabia, on February 27, 1991, that:

          The nightmare scenario for all of us would have been 
        to go through [the Iraqi tank barrier], get hung up in 
        this breach right here, and then have the enemy 
        artillery rain chemical weapons down on the troops that 
        were in the gaggle in the breach right here.

Most recently, on March 18, 1996, the Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, 
forwarded to the Chairman a DIA assessment of North Korea's 
military capabilities which underscored U.S. concerns with the 
warfighting uses to which chemical weapons can be put. 
According to the study:

          In any attack on the South, Pyongyang could use 
        chemical weapons to attack forces deployed near the 
        DMZ, suppress allied airpower, and isolate the 
        peninsula from strategic reinforcement.

Types of chemical weapons and riot control agents

    Chemical weapons can be classified according to a number of 
physical and chemical properties:
          (a) lethality/nonlethality;
          (b) mode of action (such as inhalation, skin-contact, 
        or oral ingestion);
          (c) speed of action (the delay between exposure and 
        effect);
          (d) toxicity (the quantity of substance required to 
        achieve a given effect);
          (e) persistency (the length of time the agent remains 
        a hazard); and
          (f) physical state (solid, liquid, or gas).
    The military uses of a given chemical weapon will vary 
according to its unique combination of these properties. The 
following information on the various types of chemical and riot 
control agents and their field employment is extracted from the 
Central Intelligence Agency's ``The Chemical and Biological 
Warfare Threat.''
    Choking Agents, such as chlorine and phosgene, are ``first-
generation chemical weapons'' and are the oldest chemical 
weapons agents. Heavy gases that remain near to ground level, 
these agents are non-persistent--dissipating rapidly in a 
breeze--and are militarily useful only for creating a short-
term respiratory hazard on territory to be quickly seized.
    Blood Agents, such as hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen 
chloride, are also first-generation agents. They are highly 
volatile and dissipate rapidly, but can rapidly degrade the 
effectiveness of a gas mask filter. Blood agents, therefore, 
may be used in conjunction with other agents to defeat chemical 
defenses.
    Blister Agents, such as sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, 
and lewisite, are persistent and act on contact with skin as 
well as through respiration. These first-generation agents have 
been used in the past to cause casualties and to slow military 
operations. By forcing military personnel to don protective 
clothing and gas masks, mustard can hinder and reduce military 
effectiveness. Moreover, this agent is--according to the CIA--
``simple to produce, even by Third World standards.''
    G-Series Nerve Agents, such as tabun, sarin, soman, and GF, 
are second-generation compounds that were accidentally 
discovered in the 1930's by German chemists seeking to develop 
new types of pesticides. Relatively nonpersistent, these agents 
act rapidly and may be absorbed through the skin or by 
respiration.
    V-Series Nerve Agents, such as VE, VG, VM, VS, and VX are 
more advanced, third-generation compounds designed to be more 
toxic and persistent than G-Series agents. Posing a greater 
skin hazard, these agents can be used to contaminate territory 
for long periods of time.
    Tear Gas Agents, such as CS, CN, PS, and BBC, are nonlethal 
in all but the most extreme concentrations, and are used in 
riot control or to disrupt tactical operations. These agents 
are also used by the U.S. military in a variety of other 
circumstances, such as in the rescue of downed pilots or in 
ongoing operations in proximity to friendly troops. In the 
parlance of the Convention, tear gas agents are riot control 
agents (RCA's)--not chemical weapons.
    Vomiting Agents, such as Adamsite and diphenyl 
chloroarsine, are also nonlethal in most cases and are used in 
situations similar to those well-suited for the use of Tear Gas 
Agents. In addition, vomiting agents may defeat or make 
impossible the use of masks, and thus may be used in 
conjunction with other lethal chemical weapons agents. Again, 
these agents should be considered RCA's.
    Psychochemicals, such as LSD, BZ, and benactyzine, can be 
used to incapacitate both military and civilian personnel for a 
short period of time with a very low chance of fatalities. As 
incapacitants, these chemicals are akin to other RCA's.

Modes of chemical weapons dissemination

    Several methods of dissemination have been used for the 
delivery of chemical weapons, including release of airborne 
gaseous agents from ground-based aerosol generators; artillery 
shells; mortar rounds; aerial spray tanks; missile warheads; 
artillery rockets; land mines; grenades; and aerial bombs. The 
most simple munitions among these contain a bulk-fill of agent 
surrounded by explosive charges. These charges detonate over 
the target, rupturing the munition and dispensing the agent as 
a stream or cloud of droplets. In the case of unitary agents, 
the munition contains the actual chemical weapon itself. Binary 
munitions, on the other hand, contain two precursors which mix 
beforehand or during flight to form the chemical weapons agent. 
Binary munitions are safer since the precursors are generally 
less toxic, but carry a smaller volume of agent once mixed.
    Of course, chemical weapons do not require sophisticated 
delivery systems. Agent can be introduced against a target by a 
``crop-duster'' or even by a single individual.

Warfighting uses of chemical weapons

    Chemical weapons have several military uses. In particular, 
they can be used to kill or injure enemy troops. They may also 
force the enemy to take countermeasures--such as troop 
dispersal or decontamination--to protect against the harmful 
effects of the weapons, thereby reducing the combat 
effectiveness of enemy forces. In addition, the use of chemical 
weapons may be deliberately calculated to overburden an enemy's 
medical services or to disrupt logistical operations. The 
following chart provides a number of illustrative uses for 
chemical weapons. It is drawn from a 1993 Congressional Office 
of Technology Assessment study, ``Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks.''

              TYPICAL WAR-FIGHTING USES OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS             
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Mission                             Quantity          
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attack an infantry position:                                            
Cover 1.3 square kilometers of territory    216 240-mm rockets (e.g.,   
 with a ``surprise dosage'' attack of GB     delivered by 18 12-tube    
 (Sarin) to kill 50% of exposed troops.      Soviet BM-24 rocket        
                                             launchers, each carrying 8 
                                             kilograms of agent and     
                                             totaling 1,728 kg of       
                                             agent).                    
Prevent launch of enemy mobile missiles:                                
Contaminate a 25-square-kilometer missile   8 F-16s or MiG-23s, each    
 unit operating area with 0.3 tons of a      delivering 0.9 tons of VX  
 persistent nerve gas, such as VX, per       (totaling 7.2 tons).       
 square km.                                                             
Immobilize an air base:                                                 
Contaminate a 2-square-kilometer air base   1 MiG-23, or any similar    
 with 0.3 tons of persistent nerve agent     attack aircraft, with six  
 (VX) twice a day for 3 days.                sorties.                   
Defend a broad front against large-scale                                
 attack:                                                                
Maintain a 300-meter-deep strip of          65 metric tons of agent     
 persistent nerve agent contamination in     delivered by approximately 
 front of a position defending a 60          13,000 155-mm artillery    
 kilometer wide area for 3 days.             rounds.                    
Terrorize populations:                                                  
Kill approximately 125,000 unprotected      8 MiG-23s, each delivering  
 civilians in a densely populated (10,000    0.9 tons of VX (totaling   
 per square km) city.                        7.2 tons) under optimum    
                                             conditions.                
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    From these illustrative examples, it is apparent that in 
many instances a small quantity of chemical agent is all that 
is required to achieve a militarily significant objective. Less 
than 2 tons of persistent nerve agent would be required to 
immobilize an airfield. Just 65 tons of VX, used to effect, 
could immobilize a 60 kilometer front for three days.
    Moreover, a number of trends continue to lessen the 
quantity required for ``military significance.'' First, with 
developments in the field of precision-guided munitions 
(PGM's), much less chemical agent will be required. Common 
artillery shells and many other non-precision systems have a 
circular error probable of more than several hundred meters. In 
order to ensure adequate coverage of a military objective--for 
example, using persistent nerve agent to close down an 
airfield--a far greater number of weapons and agent would be 
required than with ``smart'' munitions.
    Second, technology itself drives the development of toxins 
and chemicals that are increasingly deadly in ever smaller 
quantities. We are very concerned over mounting evidence that 
Russia continues to pursue the development of new chemical 
agents in its binary chemical weapons program. In mid-February, 
1995, Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, former chief of counterintelligence 
at the State Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic 
Chemistry and Technology, alleged that the Soviet Union 
developed, tested, and produced a new class of nerve agents 
five to eight times more lethal than any other known chemical 
agent. The Russian government has not been forthcoming about 
either ``Substance A-230,'' ``Substance 33,'' or ``Substance A-
232.'' According to Mirzayanov, the Russian Federation may 
continue work on these programs. Clearly, in some cases, 
smaller quantities of a novel, highly lethal agent would be 
required to achieve a militarily significant objective than 
would be the case with a more traditional agent.
    Third, use of chemical weapons as a method of warfare does 
not necessarily depend upon chemical saturation of military 
targets. While progress has been made in the development of 
chemical protection equipment, such gear remains bulky and 
debilitating, restricts movement and work, and causes 
identification problems, heat stress, dehydration, sweat build-
up, and breathing resistance. Chemical rounds interspersed 
judiciously with other conventional rounds would require the 
donning of protective gear and would degrade significantly an 
opponent's capability. At the dawn of an age of ``information 
warfare''--where computers shape the modern battlefield--the 
difficulty of typing on a computer keyboard while wearing 
protective gloves illustrates the potential military 
significance of chemical weapons.

Riot control agents

    Some chemicals--such as tear gas, vomiting agents, and 
psychochemicals--are used as riot control agents (RCA). In 
1975, President Ford signed Executive Order 11850, which 
defines current U.S. policy on the use of RCA's. Pursuant to 
the current executive order, military authorities are 
authorized to use RCA's to minimize military and civilian 
casualties under four broad scenarios, which include the 
following specific circumstances:
          Where combatants use civilians as shields (U.S. 
        forces in Mogadishu used tear gas in such an 
        environment);
          Against rioting enemy prisoners of war;
          During search-and-rescue operations involving 
        hostages, U.S. POWs, and downed aircrews;
          In support of rear area operations;
          In support of base defense;
          In support of non-combatant evacuation operations;
          In support of crowd control; and
          In support of operations to protect or recover 
        nuclear weapons.
    The Clinton administration, however, intends to rewrite 
Executive Order 11850 to exclude two of the four scenarios. On 
June 23, 1994, President Clinton declared that:

          * * * according to the current international 
        understanding, the CWC's prohibition on the use of RCAs 
        as a ``method of warfare'' also precludes the use of 
        RCAs even for humanitarian purposes in situations where 
        combatants and noncombatants are intermingled, such as 
        the rescue of downed air crews, passengers and escaping 
        prisoners and situations where civilians are being used 
        to mask or screen attacks.

    While Article I of the CWC certainly prohibits the use of 
riot control agents (RCA) as a ``method of warfare,'' we are at 
a loss to see how the administration can cite a ``current 
international understanding'' as justification for further 
restriction of the U.S. military's ability to use tear gas. 
Both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John 
Shalikashvilli, and then-Deputy Secretary of Defense, John 
Deutch, admitted in testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on August 11, 1994, that ``neither the CWC nor the 
formal negotiating record define method of warfare.''
    We reject the notion that any ``international 
understanding'' on this issue could have existed at the time of 
the CWC's signing. Indeed the negotiating record is 
deliberately silent because of a lack of international 
agreement. According to General Shalikashvilli, who provided a 
written response for the record to a question posed by Senator 
Nunn on August 11, 1994:

          During the CWC negotiations, the U.S. delegation in 
        Geneva believed that the phrase ``method of warfare'' 
        could be interpreted as permitting all the uses of 
        RCA's provided in Executive Order 11850. In Washington, 
        some agencies were concerned that the delegation's 
        interpretation was ``easily contested,'' and that a 
        clear statement in the negotiating record preserving 
        all four uses was ``essential.'' However, such a 
        statement was not supported by our close allies, some 
        of whom made clear that if the U.S. view was put 
        forward, their view that the CWC prohibited all 
        battlefield uses of RCA's would also be placed on the 
        record. At that point, ``to best protect our position'' 
        against a more damaging negotiating record, the U.S. 
        delegation was directed to accept the provision without 
        a negotiating record statement.

We agree with Senator Nunn, who stated in a written question on 
August 11, 1994:

          Dr. Deutch, the CWC does not prohibit the use of Riot 
        Control Agents (RCA's) as defined in Executive Order 
        11850, in fact, the committee understands that the 
        phrase ``method of warfare'' was chosen because of its 
        constructive ambiguity--that is, there is no commonly 
        accepted definition for ``method of warfare.'' The 
        committee also understands that the U.S. signed the CWC 
        in Paris with the understanding that the treaty allowed 
        for the use of RCAs as defined in Executive Order 
        11850.

    The administration has justified its decision to issue a 
new Executive order on RCA's by citing concerns over a negative 
reaction from U.S. allies. General Shalikashvilli told the 
Armed Services Committee on July 11, 1994, that a new Executive 
order must be issued since a unilateral U.S. decision to retain 
E.O. 11850 ``could cause serious divisions with key allies 
whose cooperation is essential to the CWC.'' Yet when the 
Department of Defense queried the British Embassy in June 1995 
on the extent to which U.S. retention of the current Executive 
order would affect British ratification of the CWC, the Embassy 
responded emphatically in a letter on July 6, 1995, from Hugh 
Philpott:

          I understand that the RCA issue in the context of the 
        CWC is still live. I would like to take this 
        opportunity to restate the position of the U.S. 
        Government, which has not changed since correspondence 
        between HM Chief of Defence Staff and General Powell in 
        1992 and Ministry of Defence Undersecretary Omand and 
        Mr. Slocombe last June. The enclosed speaking note 
        covers the ground.

The talking points supplied by Mr. Philpott further stated that 
``Although we cannot rule out Parliamentary interest in the 
U.S. debate when our bill is introduced, [there is] no question 
of any linkage by HMG between U.S. position and our own 
ratification process.'' In light of this letter, we cannot but 
conclude that differences in interpretation of the RCA issue, 
while marked, would not have contributed to a ``serious'' 
crisis in cooperation on CWC issues between the United States 
and the United Kingdom.
    More importantly, we are concerned that the Clinton 
administration has adopted an interpretation on RCAs that is 
contrary to that held by the Bush administration during the 
final negotiation and signing of the Convention, and contrary 
to the views of the U.S. military leadership. Again, according 
to General Shalikashvilli:

          Nevertheless, during the negotiations and at the time 
        the CWC was signed in January 1993, it was the 
        understanding of the service Chiefs that Executive 
        Order 11850 would be preserved intact, and that a 
        statement to this effect would be made by the 
        administration during the ratification. In July 1993, 
        the CINC's were informed of the review of the impact of 
        the CWC on E.O. 11850 and were asked for their 
        requirements for the use of RCAs. The CINC responses 
        remained consistent and they insisted on preserving the 
        ability of field commanders to use RCAs in accordance 
        with the provisions contained in Executive Order 11850.

Despite this determination, made by senior U.S. military 
leaders, the Clinton administration decided that two of the 
four scenarios in the executive order--rescue of a downed pilot 
and civilians screening combatants--were inconsistent with the 
``current international understanding.'' According to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ``the CINC's were informed of 
this decision.''
    The administration's interpretation of the CWC, against the 
advice of the CINC's, will reduce U.S. capabilities in several 
types of military operations, such as search and rescue 
missions (where tear gas is used to protect helicopters from 
ground fire and surface-to-air missile threats), may 
consequently endanger the lives of U.S. personnel, and may 
force the United States to resort to lethal responses in other 
circumstances. We urge the Senate to reject ratification of the 
Convention unless the resolution of ratification contains a 
provision affirming and preserving the right to use RCA's in 
all circumstances currently permitted under Executive Order 
11850. This was the intent of the Bush administration, and the 
understanding held by the CINC's at the time of the signing of 
the CWC in 1993.

Nonlethal weapons

    Additionally, we are concerned that the CWC may restrict 
the development and employment of nonlethal weapons. Some 
nonlethal weapons currently envisioned are chemical compounds, 
though they are not traditional chemical warfare agents or riot 
control agents. For example, several novel, immobilizing agents 
may be developed from opioids derived from the fentanyl or 
medetomidine families.
    The CWC defines chemical weapons as ``toxic chemicals and 
their precursors, except where intended for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and 
quantities are consistent with such purposes.'' A toxic 
chemical is further defined as ``any chemical which through its 
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary 
incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or animals.'' As a 
result of this definition, we are concerned that the 
development of nonlethal weapons that produce temporary 
incapacitation through chemical processes, rather than physical 
properties, will be constrained under the CWC. We urge the 
Senate to ensure that this will not be the case.

Deterrence in the post-cold-war world

    The United States will abandon, with the CWC, the ability 
to deter the use of chemical weapons against the United States 
and its allies with the threat of retaliation-in-kind. General 
William Burns, then-Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, stated in testimony before the Committee on 
January 24, 1989:

          It is very difficult to prove when a deterrent works, 
        but in this particular case, the United States has not 
        been attacked by chemical weapons since it has had its 
        stockpile. So, that one must at least suggest that this 
        is due, to some extent, to having a stockpile.
          The problem I see right now in eliminating our 
        stockpile unilaterally is the signal that would give to 
        the rest of the world. Now, you could argue that it is 
        a very positive signal--the United States has taken the 
        lead in eliminating stockpiles unilaterally. You could 
        also take it as a sign of weakness, a sign that the 
        United States, for reasons not germane to arms control, 
        not germane to a ban on chemical weapons, decided not 
        to pursue binaries.

J.D. Crouch, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Policy during the Bush administration, 
echoed the view put forward by General Burns in his testimony 
before the Committee on March 13, 1996:

          Indeed, the historical evidence of where CW was used 
        and where it was not used since the Geneva Protocol 
        went into force strongly suggests that the ability to 
        retaliate in kind is the best deterrent of chemical 
        attack. Only once since World War I have chemical 
        weapons been used in any significant way by states that 
        both possessed a CW capability: the Iran-Iraq war. In 
        this case, Iraq quite probably felt it had a major 
        advantage over the Iranians in its offensive CW 
        capability, in terms of numbers, sophistication of its 
        agents, deployment means, and protection equipment and 
        training.

Until 1991, the U.S. relied upon a defensive doctrine which 
incorporated two elements: (1) maintenance of a chemical 
weapons stockpile for use in retaliation and to ensure that 
potential users of chemical weapons would be forced to adopt 
defensive measures that would degrade their operational 
capabilities; and (2) reliance upon a robust defense 
capability. With respect to the former, the U.S. position in 
multilateral negotiations on a chemical weapons ban reflected 
the desire to maintain a chemical deterrent as a pillar of the 
U.S. defense doctrine.
    Indeed, the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement with 
Russia specifically allowed retention of 5,000 metric tons (500 
metric tons if the CWC were ratified) of chemical agent for use 
as a deterrent. Similarly, the U.S. had favored in negotiations 
on the CWC retention of the 500 metric ton deterrent until all 
chemical weapons-capable countries had joined the Convention. 
That deterrent, it was decided, would be comprised of binary 
weapons. According to information on the U.S. chemical weapons 
stockpile declassified on January 22, 1996, the United States 
currently possesses 680.19 metric tons of binary components 
(roughly approximating a 500 ton, binary deterrent) and 
30,599.55 metric tons of unitary agent.
    However, after the Gulf war, President Bush altered U.S. 
policy and committed to the elimination of the U.S. unitary 
chemical weapon stockpile. The Bush administration also adopted 
an initiative to forswear any chemical weapons retaliatory 
capability if and when the CWC entered into force. Walter 
Slocombe, Deputy Undersecretary for Policy, Department of 
Defense, elaborated the U.S. policy to the Committee on May 13, 
1994:

          In March, 1991, the United States reenergized those 
        negotiations [on the CWC] by announcing that to 
        demonstrate United States commitment to banning 
        chemical weapons, we are formally forswearing the use 
        of chemical weapons for any reason, including 
        retaliation, against any State, effective when the 
        convention enters into force, and will propose that all 
        States follow suit.

    During testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
on August 11, 1994, the Administration further clarified the 
current U.S. position:

          Under current policy, U.S. forces may use chemical 
        agents or weapons only in retaliation to chemical 
        weapons use against the United States or its allies. 
        Upon entry into force of the CWC, the United States 
        obligates itself to forswear retaliation-in-kind and 
        adopt a policy of no use under any circumstances.

We are concerned that the Clinton administration, in explaining 
the rationale for the policy shift during the Bush 
administration, cited the U.S. experience during the Gulf war 
as proving that retaliation-in-kind was not required to deter 
Iraqi use of chemical weapons. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General John Shalikashvilli, testified before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee on August 11, 1994:

          Desert Storm proved that retaliation in kind is not 
        required to deter the use of chemical weapons. Should 
        deterrence fail, a chemical attack against U.S. forces 
        would be regarded as an extremely grave action subject 
        to an appropriate non-chemical response of our 
        choosing.

The same testimony was given before the Foreign Relations 
Committee. On August 11, 1994, General Shalikashvilli further 
clarified the nature of the deterrent communicated to Iraq 
during Desert Storm in a response to a question asked by 
Senator Exon:

          I agree that the Iraqis may not have been sure what 
        type of force would have been used in retaliation of 
        their use of chemical weapons. Only Saddam Hussein can 
        tell why he chose not to use chemical weapons.
          * * * The type of retaliation we threatened was left 
        deliberately vague, although advanced conventional 
        weapons were the most credible deterrent.

However, we note that Walter Slocombe, Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy, had testified before the Foreign 
Relations Committee on May 13, 1994 that:

          The position of the United States at that time [of 
        the Gulf war] was not to specify how we would retaliate 
        but to make clear that it would be a very powerful and 
        effective response. At that point it could, in 
        principle, have included chemical weapons. We did not 
        rule out that possibility. The convention, of course, 
        would rule out the possibility. [emphasis added].

Because the Bush administration had not removed chemical 
weapons from the list of available retaliatory options at the 
time of the Gulf war, we believe it is incorrect to suggest 
that Desert Storm serves as proof that the U.S. has no need for 
a chemical weapons retaliatory capability. Moreover, the 
security environment is no longer such that deterrence can be 
postulated in a consistent, reliable framework--regardless of 
the U.S. experience during the Gulf war.
            An advanced conventional deterrent?
    During testimony before both the Senate Committees on 
Foreign Relations and Armed Services, the administration 
suggested that advanced conventional weapons were the most 
credible deterrent available to the United States. Aside from 
such assertions, however, few convincing explanations on how 
conventional capabilities might supplant other deterrent 
options were forthcoming.
    First, the very concept of deterrence implies that 
capabilities are held in reserve for the purpose of punishing a 
proscribed action. If the United States is to rely upon 
capabilities such as precision-guided munitions to deter a 
future aggressor from using chemical weapons, we wonder what 
conventional capabilities the U.S. would truly be willing to 
hold in reserve in a future conflict.
    The assertion that the United States could mount a 
devastating conventional retaliation for the use of chemical or 
biological weapons may be belied by mounting evidence that 
budgetary cuts have seriously eroded the ability of the Armed 
Services to fulfill the national military strategy. On February 
15, 1995, General George Joulwan, Commander in Chief of U.S. 
European Command, noted that the wargame ``Nimble Dancer'' 
conducted by the Pentagon demonstrated that the U.S. could 
successfully prosecute two major regional conflicts (MRC's), 
but only if all of the maximum force requirements specified in 
the Bottom-Up Review were available. Significantly, Nimble 
Dancer relied upon the availability of force enhancements, such 
as precision-guided munitions, which will not be available for 
another decade--at the earliest.
    Other wargames conducted by the military services have 
raised even more troubling questions as to whether, in the 
event of two MRC's, the United States would be able to hold any 
advanced conventional weaponry in reserve for use as a 
deterrent. The Naval Logistics 2001 wargame conducted in the 
spring of 1994 raised the specter of ordinance shortfalls in 
the event of two nearly simultaneous conflicts. Using a model 
for U.S. force structure based upon current expenditure 
profiles, the wargame was designed to determine the extent to 
which two MRC's could be supported, the impact that industrial 
preparedness would have upon the conduct of the conflicts, and 
the amount of time required for regeneration and reconstitution 
of military forces following the termination of conflict.
    Notably, the U.S. military suffered from insufficient 
numbers of stand-off weaponry and shortages in ground force 
munitions. As a result of a number of factors which included 
funding limitations, cold production lines, delivery lag times 
of between 13 to 36 months, limits on productive capacity, and 
a general decline in the defense industrial base, both the 
sustainability of operations and the ability of the industrial 
base to reconstitute forces within a 7-year time frame were 
called into question.
    Most recently, in connection with concerns associated with 
an underground Libyan chemical weapons plant, it was widely 
reported in the press that the U.S. military does not currently 
possess nonnuclear, Earth-penetrating munitions capable of 
destroying the facility. A series of tests conducted at White 
Sands Missile Range revealed that new, void-penetrating smart 
fuse weapons were incapable of destroying underground targets 
such as the Libyan chemical weapons plant. Without such a 
capability, according to Harold Smith, Assistant to the 
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological 
Programs, nuclear weapons remain the only available option to 
totally destroy Tarhunah. Smith recently stated in an interview 
with the press that ``it is not clear we have the capability 
today to literally take that plant out of action for the 
indefinite future.''
    In sum, the suggestion that the United States has the 
capability, under any and all circumstances, to hold in reserve 
a punishing advanced conventional deterrent ignores growing 
evidence that the U.S. military does not have enough advanced 
conventional weaponry to fulfill the national military 
strategy, let alone to deter use of weapons of mass 
destruction. Shortfalls in force enhancements, particularly in 
PGM's, render likely the fact that one major regional 
contingency would absorb the lion's share--if not all--of the 
active U.S. military inventory. Even the relatively robust 
industrial base of the early 1990's was unable to provide 
sufficient numbers of some specific munitions throughout the 
course of the air campaign over Kuwait. By the end of the war, 
the cupboards were bare.
    Second, we are concerned to know what additional target 
sets might be attacked if conventional forces are to be used in 
response to a chemical or biological attack. Would conventional 
forces be used against nonmilitary targets? How could such a 
threat be communicated to a future aggressor prior to their use 
of weapons of mass destruction? It would seem open to question 
as to whether a state would be deterred from using such 
capabilities if the United States is already using its 
deterrent against it in a conflict, or if the United States has 
already targeted the country's infrastructure on a large scale.
    The United States will continue to be posed with a context-
specific problem of determining who is to be deterred and how. 
National objectives and strategic cultures will prove critical 
variables affecting such determinations. These variables will 
ultimately shape the utility of a conventional deterrent. Some 
countries inclined to use chemical and biological weapons may 
not be deterred by the threat of massive conventional 
retaliation directed against its conventional order of battle. 
Indeed, the number of main battle tanks, armored fighting 
vehicles, and artillery that an aggressor fields may be less 
important to a future opponent than other imponderables. 
Finally, the way a country seeks to shield its valued 
capabilities from the United States--presumably among civilians 
or hostages--will also create problems for any deterrent. We 
believe that, in the future, deterrence will require additional 
flexibility rather than less. Unless the U.S. possesses 
flexibility in its options, we may find ourselves unable to 
deter countries under some circumstances.
    In an April 19, 1996 response to a question submitted for 
the record, the administration stated that the United States 
has had a long-standing policy ``not to specify in advance what 
response we would make to CW [chemical weapons] use against the 
United States, its forces or its allies; however, we would 
consider all options and our response would be absolutely 
overwhelming and devastating.''
    While we are heartened by such a declaration, we do not 
believe the Senate should agree to any arms control treaty 
which effectively forecloses retaliatory options to the United 
States but not to other countries, either because they have not 
signed on to the treaty or because they are not abiding by it. 
Accordingly, we urge the Senate to insist that unless and until 
the United States may be assured that chemical weapons will not 
be used against our troops, citizens, or our allies, the U.S. 
should retain the option to retaliate-in-kind. The Senate 
should stipulate, in no uncertain terms, that in the event that 
another States Party to the Convention uses chemical weapons 
against the United States or its allies, the Convention shall 
cease to be binding upon the United States with respect to use.
    The U.S. Senate first adopted such a reservation to the 
1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare (the 1925 Geneva Protocol). That proviso, 
still in effect today, generally states that if another Party 
to the Geneva Protocol uses chemical weapons against the United 
States or its allies, the Protocol will cease to be binding on 
the United States. Such an approach, taken with the CWC, would 
recognize the contribution made to deterrence and to our 
national security by the maintenance of options and strategic 
ambiguity.
    Because we are concerned that a number of chemical weapons 
possessor states have neither signed nor ratified the 
Convention, we also believe it advisable for the Senate to 
require Presidential certification, prior to the destruction of 
the last 500 metric tons of binary agent, that all states that 
have ever possessed or sought to develop chemical weapons have 
ratified and are abiding by the terms of the Convention. In the 
event that such a certification is impossible, we believe the 
administration should consult urgently with the Senate over the 
fact that countries still continue to possess chemical weapons 
while the United States is contemplating complete elimination 
of its stockpile.
            A nuclear deterrent?
    There is no question that U.S. ratification of the CWC 
ultimately will void the U.S. formally of a capability to 
respond in kind. Debate in the Committee centered over the 
advisability of doing so, and the efficacy of alternative means 
of deterrence. During the Committee's consideration of the CWC, 
the administration did not clearly articulate how a new U.S. 
deterrence policy would work. On March 28, 1996, Senator Pell 
questioned Secretary of Defense William Perry about what the 
U.S. response would be to a chemical weapons attack upon the 
United States military. Senator Pell indicated that the U.S. 
had but two alternatives: ``conventional and nuclear. There is 
not much else.'' Secretary Perry responded by saying: ``The 
whole range would be considered; that is correct.''
    We are concerned that this statement suggests a far greater 
range of options than actually may be available. In the first 
instance, biological weapons are no longer an option--having 
been foresworn with U.S. ratification of the Biological Weapons 
Convention. Nor would chemical weapons be an option with 
ratification of the CWC. The third option--an advanced 
conventional deterrent--would seem to have a number of 
liabilities. This would seem to point to nuclear weapons as the 
most likely retaliatory option at the disposal of the United 
States.
    Certainly the administration refused to either rule in or 
rule out reliance upon a nuclear deterrent in written responses 
to questions submitted by the committee for the record. The 
ambiguous response submitted to the committee on April 19, 1996 
stated:

          There has been no change in U.S. policy on negative 
        security assurances * * * Secretary Perry's March 28 
        statement simply reaffirmed that the United States 
        would consider all options in response to a CW attack 
        upon the United States, its forces or allies, and that 
        our response would be absolutely overwhelming and 
        devastating. This statement and others made by 
        Administration witnesses during testimony in support of 
        the CWC ratification was meant to make clear that U.S. 
        renunciation of chemical weapons does not diminish our 
        ability to deliver a devastating response to the use of 
        chemical weapons against the United States, its forces, 
        or allies.

But if the administration truly contemplates nuclear 
retaliation for chemical weapons use, such might be at odds 
with a long-standing U.S. commitment to not use nuclear weapons 
against a non-nuclear weapons state. On August 4, 1994, the 
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reiterated 
U.S. policy on negative security assurances to the Conference 
on Disarmament, saying:

          The U.S. presidential commitment stands. Our 
        unilateral commitment stresses that assurances will be 
        provided to non-nuclear states that are parties to the 
        NPT or any comparable internationally binding 
        commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, 
        such as the Tlatelolco Treaty, unless the U.S. is 
        attacked by that non-nuclear weapon state in alliance 
        with a nuclear weapon state.

According to such a political commitment, the U.S. will not 
threaten use of nuclear weapons against any country that does 
not have nuclear weapons and is not allied to a nuclear weapon 
state. For instance, a nuclear deterrent may not be 
communicated to Iran, which is a party to the NPT.
    Furthermore, in signing the Protocols to the African 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, the administration has set 
upon a course that would legally prevent the United States from 
threatening or using nuclear weapons against any country in the 
zone. In such a web of international agreements, the U.S. could 
very well find itself unable to deter with the threat of 
nuclear retaliation a country such as Libya--which has neither 
signed nor ratified the CWC--from using chemical or biological 
weapons.
    How can the U.S. consider a ``whole range'' of options if 
it has foregone two--chemical and biological--because of 
treaties, does not possess enough of one--conventional--because 
of budgetary constrains, and foresworn the last--nuclear--
because of a political commitment? It may be more accurate to 
state that, with the CWC, the U.S. will have but one, as of yet 
undeveloped, means by which to deter attack by chemical 
weapons. That is, unless the U.S. is to reconsider a long-
standing negative security assurances policy. In sum, the 
United States may be forgoing flexibility in its deterrent 
posture at the very time that such latitude may prove 
increasingly vital.
    We believe, in order to communicate a credible deterrent, 
the Administration must reevaluate its negative security 
assurance policy to determine whether the United States should 
still provide guarantees that it will not use nuclear weapons 
against a nonnuclear weapons state, even if that state uses 
chemical weapons against the U.S. military, U.S. citizens, or 
allies. The Senate should require the administration to resolve 
these concerns by requiring the President to submit a clearly 
defined deterrence strategy to the Congress before the U.S. 
accedes to the CWC and forgoes one more option.
            Credibility of the nuclear deterrent
    Additionally, we are concerned that domestic constraints 
also may rule out nuclear retaliation under some circumstances. 
This is troubling since, in order to deter attack upon the 
United States or our allies, the U.S. must be willing to use 
its deterrent if attacked. Moreover, that willingness must be 
perceived by any would-be aggressor contemplating the use of 
chemical weapons. The fundamental concern in this regard 
relates to the willingness of any U.S. President to consider 
the full range of options available for retaliation. The 
comparative effects of nuclear weapons use are so much greater 
than chemical weapons use, in orders of magnitude, that under 
many circumstances nuclear retaliation would prove far 
disproportionate to a chemical weapons attack.
    An April, 1996, assessment by the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense entitled ``Proliferation: Threat and Response,'' 
provides a comparison of nuclear, biological, and chemical 
damage contours which demonstrate the dramatic differences in 
effect between each type of weapon:


    Put into a regional context, the differences in effect 
between nuclear and chemical retaliation are marked. According 
to Anthony Cordesman, using a SCUD-sized delivery vehicle with 
a maximum payload of 1,000 kg against a target with a 
population density of between 3,000 and 10,000 people per 
square kilometer (a density typical, for example, to urban 
centers in the Middle East), the following effects would be 
had:

    COMPARATIVE EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS    
            [From Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention]            
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Area covered                       
                                        (km\2\)          Fatalities     
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chemical: 300 kg of Sarin nerve                                         
 agent with a density of 70                                             
 milligrams per cubic meter.......            0.22                60-200
Biological: 30 kg of anthrax                                            
 spores with a density of 0.1                                           
 milligrams per cubic meter.......              10        30,000-100,000
Nuclear (tactical): One 12.5                                            
 kiloton nuclear device achieving                                       
 5 pounds per cubic inch of over-                                       
 pressure.........................             7.8         23,000-80,000
Nuclear (Strategic): One 1 megaton                                      
 hydrogen bomb....................             190     570,000-1,900,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the disproportionality of a nuclear deterrent, we are 
concerned that even in the worst-case scenario, there may be a 
tremendous reluctance on the part of the United States to even 
threaten the use of nuclear weapons. While any nuclear response 
truly would be ``absolutely overwhelming and devastating,'' 
that very fact raises the possibility that domestic political 
constraints may limit exercise of this option.
    On March 13, 1996, J.D. Crouch, former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy during 
the Bush Administration, testified that:
    I recall the difficulty that the Bush Administration had 
during the Gulf War to make clear publicly and privately to the 
Hussein regime that any use of Iraqi CW or BW could result in a 
U.S. nuclear response.
    The difficulty associated with threatening nuclear 
retaliation for chemical weapons use derives from the fact that 
use of nuclear weapons would represent a quantum leap up the 
escalatory ladder. In ratifying the CWC, the United States 
would, in effect, remove another link from the chain reaction 
of nuclear deterrence. In conflict, escalation control will 
prove correspondingly difficult because all flexibility will 
have been removed from the U.S. retaliatory response.
    We believe the lack of an extended deterrent capability may 
become exceedingly dangerous as the United States finds itself 
facing opponents armed not just with chemical weapons, but with 
their own nuclear capability. A number of countries with 
aggressive chemical weapons programs are also actively seeking 
nuclear weapons. Iran and North Korea are but two countries 
that may possess both in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the 
Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China already 
possess nuclear and chemical weapons capability, and both have 
ongoing biological programs as well. We wonder how effective a 
nuclear deterrent may be if the United States finds itself 
engaging even a minimally armed nuclear power.
            Capability of the nuclear deterrent
    If the United States places greater demands upon our 
nuclear force by expanding the scope of its deterrence 
missions, it will do so at a time when the U.S. Navy 
essentially has been tactically denuclearized and the U.S. Army 
has been completely divested of a battlefield nuclear 
capability. The then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General 
Colin Powell, stated in 1993 that ``The Navy, the Marine Corps, 
and the Army now totally rely on the Air Force for any 
potential nuclear weapons they need on the battlefield.'' As a 
result of General Powell's initiative, the only latent tactical 
nuclear capability residing in the U.S. Navy is aboard 
submarines, which carry Tomahawk cruise missiles. At the same 
time, NATO's tactical nuclear stockpile has been reduced from 
10,500 to 1,500 weapons.
    These trends led J.D. Crouch to observe in testimony before 
the Committee on March 13, 1996:

          * * * it is unlikely that we would deploy those 
        tactical nuclear assets with our conventional forces in 
        a crisis, leaving us, I think, a very inappropriate 
        threat of strategic nuclear forces, which would raise a 
        serious concern about a Russian or Chinese reaction to 
        a launch, or even the threat of the use of those 
        forces.

    The United States has vastly scaled back its strategic 
nuclear capabilities. The United States has already committed 
to the START II Treaty, which will require deep reductions in 
U.S. strategic forces. Secretary of Defense William Perry 
testified before the committee that the U.S. allocation of 
3,500 warheads under START II:

          * * * will be divided among ICBM, SLBMs and the bombs 
        and warheads on our bombers. An approximate disposition 
        of this force would be 500 ICBM warheads, fewer than 
        1,700 SLBM warheads, and approximately 1,300 warheads 
        on bombers * * * Based on present planning, that is the 
        way we would distribute our forces under START II. I 
        believe this would be, of course, entirely capable of 
        carrying out our mission of strategic deterrence.

    We are troubled that, with no new strategic systems under 
development, the United States now may be forced to call upon 
an aging fleet of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 
respond to chemical weapons attack, as well as to serve as a 
nuclear deterrent. Moreover, the creation of a new deterrence 
mission for the U.S. strategic force creates the potential for 
an expansion in the number of targeting requirements at 
precisely the same time that the U.S. strategic arsenal is 
being dramatically reduced, thereby threatening the START II 
equilibrium between targets and strategic capability.

The need for robust passive and active chemical defenses

    As has been noted, the United States has long relied upon a 
defensive doctrine which included as paramount the need for a 
robust chemical defense capability. In testimony before the 
Committee on June 23, 1994, General Shalikashvilli stated:

          First, a chemical weapons defense program is 
        essential not only to protect U.S. forces but also to 
        ensure their combat effectiveness in a chemical 
        environment. A well trained and protected force is not 
        as vulnerable to a chemical weapons attack as a force 
        lacking these essential attributes.

Amoretta Hoeber, former Deputy Undersecretary of the Army 
during the Reagan Administration, testified on March 13, 1996, 
that:

          Today, I think our defense capability is adequate. I 
        am very concerned, however, about the trends. The 
        trends are negative. They are towards the direction of 
        reducing the adequacy of our defensive posture. Let me 
        make three points on that:
          First off, financially. It requires not a great deal. 
        It requires perhaps about half a billion dollars a year 
        out of the entire defense budget to maintain an 
        adequate defense capability. The trend is towards 
        reducing that amount. The Pentagon is asking for less 
        because they believe that the [CWC] Treaty will solve 
        part of their problem * * *
          Secondly, our training capability is going down with 
        the loss of Fort McClellan.
          And, thirdly, of course, the intelligence capability 
        will need to be beefed up considerably, in order to 
        keep the defense up-to-date. Because you have to keep 
        abreast of new developments in agents and capabilities.
          * * * If we do not, I think we are encouraging any 
        opponent to develop a capability and use it against us.
            Passive chemical and biological defenses
    We are concerned that, despite Administration testimony 
indicating commitment by the Department of Defense to a robust 
chemical defense capability, a March 1996 study by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) found that some elements of the U.S. 
military may not be adequately prepared, trained, or equipped 
to protect against the use of chemical or biological agents.
    Some of the most significant findings of the study were 
that none of the Army's five active divisions which made up the 
crisis response force, nor any of the early deploying reserve 
units in the Gulf war, were properly equipped to deal with a 
chemical or biological threat. All had shortages of critical 
equipment. In fact, three of the divisions had 50 percent or 
greater shortages of protective clothing. Shortages of other 
critical gear ran as high as 84 percent, depending on the item 
in question.
    During the Gulf war, many Army medical units had on hand 
only about 50 to 60 percent of authorized patient treatment 
kits and decontamination kits. Some of the kits that they did 
have were missing such critical components such as drugs for 
treating chemical casualties. They further lacked the equipment 
needed to treat patients in a chemically or biologically 
contaminated area.
    The March 1996 study also found serious training and 
readiness problems in both the Army and Marine Corps. Analysis 
of Army readiness evaluations revealed a wide variety of 
problems, including inability to properly don protective gear, 
improper deployment of detection equipment, and failure to 
integrate chemical and biological issues into operational 
plans. Marine Corps units are affected by many similar 
problems, including untimely submission or warning reports, 
inexperience with detection equipment, and improper response to 
chemical attacks. Under the Joint Staffs Status of Resources 
and Training System (SORTS) each unit in the U.S. Armed 
Services is required to report on its readiness, as well as 
extent to which they possess the required resources and are 
trained to complete their wartime mission. The reports are 
troubling. One early deploying Army division, for instance, has 
been rated C-4 in terms of chemical and biological equipment 
readiness. The following table is drawn from the GAO 
assessment:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              2d Army        5th Army   
                                          (percentage of  (percentage of
                  Task                         units           units    
                                           inadequately    inadequately 
                                             trained)        trained)   
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Donning protective masks:                                               
    Active..............................              39              50
    National Guard......................              57              88
    U.S. Army Reserve...................              84              81
Decontamination:                                                        
    Active..............................              33              10
    National Guard......................              61              60
    U.S. Army Reserve...................              48              75
School-trained NBC officer                                              
    Active..............................               5              17
    National Guard......................              31              34
    U.S. Army Reserve...................              35              19
Preparing for a chemical attack:                                        
    Active..............................              67              23
    National Guard......................              77              50
    U.S. Army Reserve...................              50              60
Responding to a chemical attack                                         
    Active..............................              63              15
    National Guard......................              53              67
    U.S. Army Reserve...................              56              60
Integrating chemical and biological                                     
 tasks into training:                                                   
    Active..............................              26               0
    National Guard......................              31              35
    U.S. Army Reserve...................              29              40
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The 2d Army was subsequently consolidated with the 1st Army, as   
  the 5th Army was consolidated with the 6th Army.                      

    In light of these findings, we are concerned that a future 
conflict could expose U.S. forces'' lack of preparedness to 
defend against chemical and biological agent attacks and what 
seems to be a pattern of reliance on post-mobilization 
activities to overcome chemical and biological defense 
readiness problems. U.S. forces are not fully prepared to 
defend against the use of chemical weapons, and needless 
casualties and a degradation of U.S. operational capability may 
result from any such use.
    These problems, first brought to light in 1991, are likely 
to continue given contemplated reductions in funding and an 
inadequate military emphasis on chemical and biological 
defense. The Department of Defense allocates less than 1 
percent of its budget to chemical and biological weapon defense 
activities, and yet annual funding for this area has decreased 
by over 30 percent during the Clinton administration, from $750 
million in fiscal year 1992 to $504 million in fiscal year 
1995. Moreover, we are troubled with the recent plan put 
forward by the then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Admiral William Owens, to cut another $805 million from 
counter-proliferation support and chemical and biological 
defense programs through fiscal year 2001. Such a reduction 
would cripple planned chemical and biological research and 
development efforts, and delay the procurement of critical 
technologies. Even though that initiative was defeated, at the 
time of the committee's consideration of the CWC the Department 
of Defense was nevertheless contemplating a reduction of at 
least $33 million.
    Such initiatives do not bode well for the maintenance of 
robust chemical defenses. History suggests that Admiral Owens' 
proposal may prove an opening salvo in an effort by some in the 
military to redeploy funds for chemical weapons defense to 
other priorities. Following ratification of the BWC, for 
example, the United States cut research and development on 
protection against biological agents by one-half. Regardless of 
the CWC's entry-into-force, however, the U.S. military will 
remain in need of improved protective gear, equipment, 
decontamination capabilities, and training. This will remain 
critical for the U.S. military given the fact that a number of 
chemical weapons possessor states have not even signed the CWC, 
and most other ratifiers are expected to keep their programs.
    Finally, we are concerned that the CWC will constrain U.S. 
protective efforts by limiting the production of chemicals 
weapons for research on defenses to a single, small-scale 
facility which cannot produce agent in large quantities or on a 
continuous basis. Furthermore, this facility--and all areas 
where U.S. Government research on protective measures using 
Schedule 1 chemicals is occurring--will be subject to 
inspections the number, intensity, duration, timing, and mode 
of which are open-ended and based upon the OPCW's judgement of 
``risk to the object and purpose of the Convention.'' This 
raises the likelihood that ``routine'' Schedule 1 inspections 
may be used by countries with active chemical weapons programs 
to pursue intelligence collection about U.S. chemical weapons 
defenses.
    At a minimum, we urge the Senate to require the President 
to detail annually to the Congress the administration's 
priorities for the maintenance of robust, active and passive 
chemical and biological defenses.
            Active chemical and biological defenses
    The chemical and biological weapons threat to the United 
States is evolving and growing. The role of active defensive 
systems in responding to this challenge deserves some comment. 
J.D. Crouch, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Policy during the Bush Administration, 
testified on March 13, 1996, that he believed chemical weapons 
defenses were ``adequate''

          * * * at least as far as passive defenses are 
        concerned. I think that there is another realm here, 
        and that is active defense. The CW threat in many of 
        these states will be combined in the future with a 
        ballistic missile proliferation threat. And it seems to 
        me that this threat will begin to threaten our allies 
        first, and then, eventually, may threaten the United 
        States directly.
          We do not have the ability to deal with this at 
        either the theater missile defense or the strategic 
        missile defense level. And I would say that, in that 
        case, we are woefully unprepared.

At the theater level, chemical weapons proliferation and the 
spread of missile delivery vehicles will make the use of 
forward-basing for U.S. forces increasingly difficult. The 
likelihood will continue to grow that future potential 
aggressors will seek to detect and engage U.S. crisis response 
forces at their points of entry into theater. Indeed, several 
countries may be seeing to acquire missile capability, missile 
inventories, and chemical weapons with an eye to precluding the 
U.S. military from any forward deployment that is unprotected 
by active defenses, such as theater missile defenses. The 
ultimate objective of some states may be to deter the U.S. from 
intervening at all in a region in defense of its national 
security interests.
    We therefore view as critical the development of effective 
theater missile defenses (TMD) to protect U.S. troops, and 
continue to be concerned that the effectiveness and 
capabilities of programs such as the Theater High Altitude Area 
Defense, Navy Upper Tier, and Brilliant Eyes are being 
constrained in such a way as to render U.S. troops more 
vulnerable than need be the case, or than is acceptable, in the 
turbulent post-cold war environment. In particular, some on the 
committee are concerned that the administration is considering 
an expansion of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty's 
limitations to include TMD systems through a joint declaration 
with the Russian Federation.
    We are further concerned that the proliferation of WMD and 
ballistic missile technology has become so pronounced that the 
possibility of a direct attack upon the United States 
constitutes a present and growing danger. The then-Director of 
Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, testified before Congress 
in 1993 that more than twenty-five countries either possess or 
are in the process of acquiring nuclear, chemical, or 
biological weapons. In addition, he testified that thirty or so 
countries already possess ballistic missiles, and nine Third 
World countries, such as Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, 
and Argentina, produce such missiles. Four more--Brazil, Libya, 
Pakistan, and Syria--are seeking a productive capability. 
Accordingly, it seems clear that the number of states with 
ballistic missile arsenals continues to grow, and that a few 
countries are looking to acquire large inventories.
    The evidence also suggests that countries engaged in the 
development of ballistic missiles are alarmingly willing to 
collaborate with one another. There seems to be no other 
convincing explanation for the fact that fourteen countries 
around the globe field some type of Soviet-made missile. Both 
Libya and Egypt, for example, have transferred missiles to 
other countries. China has sold intermediate range missiles to 
Saudi Arabia and missile technology to Iran, Syria, and North 
Korea. Iran is collaborating with North Korea and Syria on 
various missiles. It was widely reported in the press that 
Russia had transferred whole ballistic missile components to 
Iraq. Finally, North Korea reportedly is willing to supply both 
missiles and missile production facilities.
    Accordingly, we believe the United States urgently needs a 
national missile defense. Limitations imposed by the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, however, prohibit the U.S. from 
deploying a system capable of defending America against even 
the most limited of ballistic missile attack.

                      B. IMPLICATIONS FOR INDUSTRY

    The CWC is unprecedented in its requirement for data 
declarations and intrusive, on-site inspections of private 
facilities that produce dual-use chemicals. In assessing the 
impact of the CWC upon U.S. businesses, it is most helpful to 
begin with a review of the chemicals covered by the treaty. By 
examining the types of chemicals to be regulated, it will 
become readily apparent that the CWC will impose controls and 
require information from a sizeable number of companies engaged 
in a variety of industrial enterprises. The CWC will affect 
chemical, automotive, biotechnology, pharmaceutical, paint and 
varnish, electronics, textiles, food processing, soap and 
detergent, and cosmetic companies, among many others.

What Substances Are Covered By the CWC?

    Those toxic chemicals and biological agents regulated by 
the CWC are identified in the three schedules (lists) contained 
in the annex on chemicals. Chemicals are arranged according to 
their importance to chemical weapons production and the extent 
to which they are have legitimate, commercial applications. 
Schedule 1 of the CWC lists chemicals developed for use as 
chemical weapons, or for use as a precursor in the final stage 
of development of a chemical weapon. Schedule 2 identifies 
chemicals which are not produced in large commercial 
quantities, and which could be used as a chemical weapon, or as 
a chemical weapon precursor. Schedule 3 lists other chemicals 
which have large commercial applications and which also have 
been produced, stockpiled, or used as either a chemical weapon 
or a chemical weapon precursor. Finally, the CWC will also 
affect companies producing ``discrete organic chemicals'' 
(which is, essentially, any carbon compound).
    Companies involved in the production (and in some cases, 
use or consumption) of chemicals listed in Schedules 1, 2, 3 
and discrete organic chemicals in quantities above the 
thresholds specified in the CWC will be required to report 
annually to the federal government. Most of these companies 
must also be prepared to receive visits from foreign 
inspectors.

                               Schedule 1

    Schedule 1 lists chemicals and chemical compounds 
presumably with few commercial applications. Item 1 of Schedule 
1 is not simply the toxic chemicals Sarin and Soman, but rather 
a formula which includes those two chemical weapons, along with 
149 other compounds. Another item on Schedule 1, for example, 
is a formula containing more than 5,000 compounds.
    Even if their uses are limited, these chemicals and toxins 
are essential for certain commercial applications. Some of 
them, such as saxitoxin and ricin, are important research tools 
for biochemical, pharmaceutical and toxicological research. 
Advanced studies of nerve signal transmission would be 
extremely difficult without access to saxitoxin. Other Schedule 
1 chemicals may also have important medical applications. One 
of the nitrogen mustards, HN2, has already been used under 
names such as Caryolysine, Embichen and Nitrogranulogen for the 
treatment of certain forms of cancer.
    According to the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), other chemicals on Schedule 1 have 
uses in pesticide and insecticide development and as flame 
retardant additives to plastics, resins, and fibers. 
Additionally, Ethylphosphonyl difluoride and Methylphosphonyl 
difluoride have industrial uses in organic synthesis.

                               Schedule 2

    Schedule 2 contains a significant number of chemicals that, 
beside their possible use as precursors for chemical weapons, 
have some commercial applications. Schedule 2 contains 7 
individual compounds and 7 families of compounds. One item on 
Schedule 2, for example, covers nearly 24,000 different 
chemicals. The first listing on Schedule 2B contains all 
compounds not on Schedule 1 which contain a phosphorous atom to 
which is bonded one methyl, ethyl, or propyl group but no 
further carbon atoms. This covers dozens--if not hundreds--of 
chemicals, some of which have legitimate commercial 
applications. The following table identifies just a few such 
chemicals under this heading which have direct commercial 
applications:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Schedule 2B (4) Chemical              Commercial Application   
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Diethyl ethylphosphonate..................  Antifoaming agent, Heavy    
                                             metal extraction, gasoline 
                                             additive, plasticizer      
Diethyl methylphosphonite, Dimethyl         Organic synthesis           
 ethylphosphonate, Ethylphosphonous                                     
 dichloride, Ethylphosphonyl dichloride,                                
 Methylphosphonous dichloride,                                          
 Methylphosphonous difluoride,                                          
 Methylphosphonyl dichloride.                                           
Dimethyl methylphosphonate................  Flame retardant             
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Also, Methylphosphonic acid and its derivatives all belong 
to the first family of chemicals listed on Schedule 2B (4). 
These chemicals are important starting materials for many 
widely used products, such as glyphosate, which is used to 
combat the water hyacinth, and glyphosine, which is used as a 
chemical ripener for sugar cane. The dimethyl ester is used for 
the production of flame retardant impregnations of textiles and 
other items.
    Schedule 2B (7), Arsenic trichloride, has many applications 
as a starting material in organic synthesis, including the 
production of some pharmaceuticals and insecticides. It is also 
used in the ceramic industry. If it is not available some types 
of ceramics cannot be produced.
    Schedule 2B (8), 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid is used 
in organic synthesis.
    Schedule 2B (9), 3-Quinuclidinol, is used as a hypotensive 
agent, and in the synthesis of pharmaceuticals.
    One of the more versatile chemicals is thiodiglycol, 
Schedule 2B (9). It is extensively used, under various brand 
names, as a carrier for dyes in the textile printing industry. 
It has further applications in the manufacturing of some types 
of plastics as well as a lubricant additive. Thiodiglycol is 
also used as a solvent in ball-point pen ink.
            Schedule 3
    The main commercial use of most of Schedule 3 chemicals is 
for production of various organic chemicals, ranging from 
gasoline additives to pharmaceuticals, from detergents to 
pesticides, and from flame retardants to dyestuffs. There are 
17 compounds on Schedule 3.
    Schedule 3A(4), Chloropicrin, has important uses for the 
disinfection of cereals and grains, considerably increasing the 
possible storage life. It is also used as a soil insecticide to 
sterilize the soil before the planting of crops that are very 
sensitive to weed competition.
    Schedule 3B (5), Phosphorous oxychloride, is used as an 
insecticide, as a chlorinating agent, flame retardant, gasoline 
additive, hydraulic fluid, organic synthesis, plasticizer, and 
as dopant for semiconductors.
    Phosphorous trichloride, Schedule 3B(6), is used in 
dyestuffs, surfactants, plasticizers, gasoline additives, 
insecticides, and in organic synthesis.
    Phosphorous pentachloride, Schedule 3B(7), is used as a 
pesticide, in plastics, and in organic synthesis.
    Trimethyl phosphite, Schedule 3B(8), is used in 
insecticides, organic synthesis, veterinary drugs.
    Triethyl phosphite, Schedule 3B(9), is used in insecticide 
synthesis, as a lubricant additive, in organic synthesis, and 
as a plasticizer.
    Schedule 3B(10), Dimethyl phosphite, is used in insecticide 
production, as a lubricant additive, in organic synthesis, and 
as a veterinary drug.
    Diethyl phosphite (Schedule 3B(11)) is used in the 
production of insecticides, as a gasoline additive, as a paint 
solvent, in the synthesis of pharmaceuticals, and in organic 
synthesis.
    Sulfur monochloride (Schedule 3B(12)) is used extensively 
as an intermediate and chlorinating agent in the production of 
dyes and insecticides. It is also used for cold vulcanisation 
of rubber, in the treatment of vegetable oils and for hardening 
soft woods, in pharmaceuticals, organic synthesis, as a 
polymerization catalyst, and in the extraction of gold from 
ores.
    Thionyl chloride, Schedule 3B(14), is used in batteries, 
engineering plastics, pesticides, as a catalyst, surfactant, 
chlorinating agent, and in organic synthesis of herbicides, 
drugs, vitamins, and dyestuffs. Common agricultural products 
involving this chemical are: Fenvalerate, Endosulfan, 
Methidathion, Flucythrinate, Fluvalinate, Lethane, Diphenamit, 
Napromaide, Propamide, Tridiphane, Topan, and Pipertain.
    Schedule 3B(17), Triethanolamine, is another chemical with 
a widespread use. Because of its surface active properties it 
is added to waxes and polishes and is used as a solvent for 
herbicides, shellac and various dyes. It is also used for 
producing emulsions of various oils, paraffins and waxes, as 
well as for breaking up emulsion. It is an important ingredient 
of the cutting oil used for metal shaping. Further uses include 
in detergents, cosmetics, corrosion inhibitors, as a 
plasticizer, rubber accelerator, and in organic synthesis.
            Discrete Organic Chemicals (DOC's)
    There is no list of DOC's or PSF chemicals to be found in 
the CWC. Instead, the CWC generally defines DOC's as:

          * * * any chemical belonging to the class of chemical 
        compounds consisting of all compounds of carbon except 
        for its oxides, sulfides and metal carbonates, 
        identifiable by chemical name, by structural formula, 
        if known, and by Chemical Abstracts Service registry 
        number if assigned.

This definition excepts plant sites that exclusively produce 
explosives or hydrocarbons (including all the normal processes, 
chemical and physical, carried out in petroleum refining to 
produce chemicals containing only carbon and hydrogen). At the 
time of this writing, polymers from monomers, beverages from a 
fermentation process, rocket propellants, and high sulfur 
crude, however, are not excepted. PSF's are DOC's with a 
phosphorous, sulfur, or fluorine atom attached.

    As can be seen, this definition captures thousands of 
chemical compounds--so many that it is impossible to list them 
here. The OPCW has recommended that countries use Chapter 29 of 
the Harmonized System for export controls as the basis for 
identifying DOC's.

How many businesses will be affected by the CWC?

    Our review of information provided by the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency persuades us that between 3,000 and 8,000 
companies will be required to submit annual data declarations 
to the Federal Government and receive annual, routine 
inspections of their facilities by teams of foreign inspectors. 
While it is clear that thousands of U.S. companies, large and 
small, will be affected by the CWC, we understand that an exact 
estimate is impossible at this time since companies are under 
no legal obligation to submit information to the Federal 
Government. However, we are concerned that recent estimates 
provided to the Committee by the Administration may understate 
the number of companies that will be subject to the regulatory 
burdens of the CWC.
    In 1993, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA) published a study suggesting that the CWC would affect 
over 11,200 plants. Citing information provided by the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) during a December 23, 
1992 interview with an ACDA consultant, the OTA reported that:
          Only a few pharmaceutical companies that produce 
        toxic anti-cancer drugs are covered under Schedule 1;
          Between 200 and 300 U.S. plants produce, process, or 
        consume more than the threshold quantity of Schedule 2 
        chemicals;
          Roughly 1,000 produce more than the threshold of 
        Schedule 3 chemicals; and
          At least 10,000 plants are believed to produce more 
        than the threshold quantity of discrete organic 
        chemicals.
In October 1994, the Department of Commerce and ACDA published 
a refined assessment of the CWC's impact. In outreach mailers 
to industry, Commerce and ACDA concluded that roughly 6,300 
facilities would be covered under the CWC:
          We anticipate that up to 15 U.S. industrial sites 
        will be affected;
          About 100 U.S. industrial sites will be affected;
          About 200 U.S. industrial sites will be affected; and
          We estimate that up to 6,000 facilities could be 
        affected.
In 1996, ACDA again reduced its estimate. On May 14, 1996, the 
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 
John Holum, wrote to the Chairman stating that ``we are 
operating on the assumption that up to 3,000 companies could 
potentially be affected in some manner by the CWC.'' At that 
time, ACDA provided the committee with a list of companies that 
it deemed likely to be affected by the CWC. That list contained 
11 Schedule 1 facilities, 31 Schedule 2 sites, roughly 100 
Schedule 3 sites, and approximately 2,000 discrete organic 
chemical producers.
    However, the information forwarded to the Foreign Relations 
Committee seems to be just the tip of the iceberg. On May 17, 
1996, Senator Kyl was told by ACDA that 81 industry sites in 
Arizona may have ``some involvement with implementation of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.'' Yet ACDA had identified for the 
Committee only 9 such facilities in Arizona. In general, the 
ACDA list does not appear to include many firms that produce 
discrete organic chemicals.
    In response to further questions by Chairman Helms on May 
24, 1996, ACDA released to the committee a second list of 
companies on June 21, 1996. This one contained 8,715 new 
industry sites. Although ACDA contended that the subsequent 
list consisted solely of companies ``unlikely'' to be affected 
by the CWC, this list contained the additional sites which 
Senator Kyl was told may have some involvement with the CWC.
    In fact, the second list identifies additional facilities 
which were included in the database in 1993 because of their 
``work with organic chemicals.'' Since 1993, it seems that ACDA 
has developed no new information about 5,583 of these 
facilities to confirm or deny that they would be affected by 
the CWC. Accordingly, we believe it inappropriate to simply 
``rule them out.'' Indeed, as Senators have contacted these 
additional companies to ask them to review the CWC, it has 
become apparent that several of these companies, too, will be 
affected.
    This would seem most probable when companies on the second 
ACDA list engage in the same industrial activities as companies 
on the May 14, 1996, list. For example, in the first list, ACDA 
identified Goodyear Tire, the Kelly-Moore Paint Company, and 
Strohs Brewery as likely to be affected by the CWC. Therefore 
it would seem possible that Robbins Tire, Ellis Paint, and the 
Coors Brewing Company (all on the second list) might also be 
affected.
    The following chart provides state-by-state totals for 
companies likely (the May 14, 1996 list) and possibly (the June 
21, 1996 list) affected:

                    STATE-BY-STATE IMPACT OF THE CWC                    
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Likely      Possible   State total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska...........................            2            4            6
Alabama..........................           41           64          105
Arkansas.........................           23           43           66
Arizona..........................            9           48           57
California.......................          142          672          814
Colorado.........................           11           61           72
Connecticut......................           42          105          147
Delaware.........................           21           18           39
Florida..........................           41          292          333
Georgia..........................           60          165          225
Hawaii...........................            3           13           16
Iowa.............................           25           59           84
Idaho............................           --           11           11
Illinois.........................          133          300          433
Indiana..........................           34          111          145
Kansas...........................           22           69           91
Kentucky.........................           44           58          102
Louisiana........................           91           64          155
Massachusetts....................           52          142          194
Maryland.........................           23           58           81
Maine............................            3           40           43
Michigan.........................           55          187          242
Minnesota........................           21          104          125
Missouri.........................           41          138          179
Mississippi......................           20           51           71
Montana..........................            3            7           10
North Carolina...................           79          114          193
North Dakota.....................            4            3            7
Nebraska.........................            8           19           27
New Hampshire....................            6           10           16
New Jersey.......................          206          391          597
New Mexico.......................            3           14           17
Nevada...........................            1           11           12
New York.........................          104          456          560
Ohio.............................          140          263          403
Oklahoma.........................           19           43           62
Oregon...........................           20           75           95
Pennsylvania.....................          119          210          329
Puerto Rico......................           15           61           76
Rhode Island.....................           15           49           64
South Carolina...................           66           56          122
South Dakota.....................            2            6            8
Tennessee........................           48          120          168
Texas............................          212          460          672
Utah.............................            6           42           48
Virginia.........................           32           79          111
Virgin Islands...................            2            3            5
Vermont..........................            1            9           10
Washington.......................           31           79          110
Washington, DC...................           --           12           12
Wisconsin........................           31           92          123
West Virginia....................           30           14           44
Wyoming..........................            6            8           14
      Total......................        2,168        5,583        7,751
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the basis of this analysis, we estimate that the CWC 
will affect between 3,000 and 8,000 companies. We note that on 
July 11, 1994, ACDA provided a written response to Senator 
DeConcini making cost projections for the treaty's impact upon 
6,300 inspectable sites.

Are businesses aware that they will be subject to new regulations under 
        the CWC?

    Most of the companies identified by ACDA are unaware that 
they will be affected by the CWC. Though ACDA attempted to 
notify many of these companies through industry survey 
questionnaires and by holding informational seminars, ACDA's 
industry database reveals that fewer than 3,800 facilities 
responded in any way (either in the affirmative or negative) to 
ACDA's questionnaires. Similarly, when ACDA invited 2,400 
companies to an informational seminar in 1994, they received 
feedback from only 110 businesses. In total, more than two-
thirds of the companies that will be affected by the CWC are 
unaware of the treaty's import.
    We find this a cause for concern. First, it suggests that 
the full range of industry views on the treaty have not been 
heard. Second, because the Federal Government in the past has 
found notifying small chemical companies of changes in 
regulations to be problematic (since most do not even subscribe 
to the Federal Register), many of these companies face the 
danger of substantial fines if they do not comply with CWC-
mandated regulations--regardless of whether or not they are 
aware of them. The majority staff of the Committee has found 
that small firms, in particular, and their respective trade 
associations (where applicable) have not fully assessed the 
implications of the CWC. Dr. Will Carpenter, a Chemical 
Manufacturers Association representative, admitted as much in 
the book Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention:

         The leaders of the chemical industry, through the 
        board of directors of the CMA, have always emphasized 
        support of the convention. There are, however, another 
        60 to 80 trade associations whose members will also be 
        regulated by the National Authority. People in both 
        government and industry are now discovering how 
        widespread the chemical industry really is. Automotive, 
        pharmaceutical, paint and varnish, electronics, 
        textiles, food processing, soap and detergent 
        companies--all will be participants. An overwhelming 
        number of these companies are not aware of the 
        implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention despite 
        a continuing effort by ACDA, the CMA, and other 
        organizations to get the word out.

    As has been noted, identification of companies subject to 
the CWC's data declaration and inspection regime is hampered by 
the fact that businesses are currently under no legal 
obligation to report the sorts of activities covered by the 
treaty. Additionally, some companies are waiting to learn about 
their new obligations until the Committee undertakes 
consideration of the CWC's implementing legislation. Finally, 
while the chemical and pharmaceutical industries have been 
appraised of the CWC's implications by their trade 
organizations, the CMA and Pharma are but 2 of 23 trade 
associations identified by the Congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment in 1993 as representing companies that 
will be affected by the CWC.
    Indeed, because CMA represents less than 40 percent of the 
facilities deemed by ACDA as likely to be affected by the CWC, 
it would be erroneous to assume that the remainder are aware of 
the potential regulatory burden posed by the Convention. In 
fact, only 668 facilities on ACDA's CWC Industry Database 
recognize that they might have new regulatory obligations under 
the CWC, indicating that even CMA-owned facilities have not 
responded to ACDA's industry survey questionnaire.
    Significantly, we have found that some CMA-member companies 
do not agree whatsoever with the position their trade 
association has taken in support of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. The Chief Executive Officer of the Dixie Chemical 
Company, Inc.--a CMA member--stated in a letter on September 3, 
1996:

         We greatly appreciate the opportunity to comment on 
        the upcoming ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
        Convention (CWC). While the intent of the CWC is of the 
        highest merit, the regulations appear to be very 
        onerous requiring increased reporting and record 
        keeping, foreign inspections of our facilities, and a 
        significant challenge to our ability to maintain 
        Confidential Business Information (CBI).
         Below are our responses to the questions asked in your 
        letter of 8/9/96:
         1. We are familiar with the CWC and what our 
        responsibilities would be under this treaty.
         2. We would incur a significant increase in data 
        reporting under the CWC. We do not produce, possess, or 
        use any schedule 1, 2, or 3 chemicals. However, we 
        produce many Discreet Organic Chemicals (DOC). The CWC 
        would apply to about 75% of our DOC production.
         3. I'm certain we could not comply with the CWC under 
        our current budget. The CWC would probably require an 
        increase in headcount at our plant.
         4. We are not prepared to have a foreign inspection 
        team in our plant. I doubt that CBI could be 
        safeguarded during such an inspection.
         One of the major problems with the CWC regulations is 
        that the DOC category is much too broad. As written, 
        nearly all petrochemicals and organic chemicals would 
        be pulled into the system. The chemicals listed in 
        Schedules 1, 2, and 3 are the chemicals that should be 
        of concern.
         It would be of little benefit for the U.S. to 
        rigorously participate in the CWC, if all the Nations 
        of the world don't also participate.
         Thank you again for allowing us this opportunity to 
        comment on a treaty ratification that could impact us 
        so greatly.

    On August 30, 1996, the President and CEO of another CMA 
company, Sterling Chemicals, stated:

         We are very concerned about control and cooperation of 
        other countries (Mexico, Columbia, North Korea, Iran, 
        Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Croatia, etc.). Since they 
        probably will not cooperate, how does this treaty 
        assure a ``worldwide ban?'
         * * * We are familiar with the Chemical Weapons 
        Convention and we understand our responsibilities (and 
        liabilities) should this treaty become U.S. law.
         * * * We cannot comply within our current annual 
        budget and personnel constraints. Our best estimates is 
        that this treaty will cost Sterling a minimum of 
        $100,000 per year and should an inspection occur at 
        least another $200,000-$300,000 will possibly be 
        required.

    The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment pointed 
out in 1993 that the Chemical Manufacturers Association 
``represents only a portion of the U.S. chemical industry.'' In 
light of the fact that the Chairman of the Board of Directors 
of the CMA wrote to us on August 29, 1996, claiming ``The 
chemical industry has long supported the CWC,'' we were 
concerned to discover that these companies, who are CMA 
members, are opposed to the treaty.
    In the spring of 1996, the Committee contacted 14 
specialized trade associations and received their membership 
lists. These lists were compared with ACDA's CWC Industry 
Database. All 14 associations have non-CMA members who will be 
subject to the new regulatory burdens and international 
inspection regime of the CWC. The following list of 
associations is provided to highlight the wide range of 
industrial activities that will be regulated under the treaty.
            Name of association
    American Coke and Coal Chemical Institute.
    American Crop Protection Association.
    American Wood Preservers Institute.
    Chlorine Institute.
    Color Pigments Manufacturers Association, Inc.
    Compressed Gas Association.
    Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Association.
    Drug Chemical & Allied Trades Association.
    National Paint & Coatings Association.
    Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.
    Powder Coatings Institute.
    Roof Coatings Manufacturers Association.
    Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc.
    Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association.

Types of companies affected

    Surprisingly, while one would expect the Chemical Weapons 
Convention to affect predominantly the chemical industry, 
ACDA's May 14, 1996, list contained over a thousand seemingly 
unlikely companies that would be subject to the new regulatory 
burdens of this arms control treaty. We were astounded to 
discover that the following companies are likely candidates for 
multinational regulation under the CWC:

         Kelly-Moore Paint Co.; D & L Paint Co.; Glidden Co.; 
        Sherwin-Williams Co.; Bell Flavors and Fragrances, 
        Inc.; Safeway Stores, Inc.; Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.; 
        Quaker Oats Co.; Nutrasweet Co.; Kraft Foods 
        Ingredients; Maxwell House Coffee Co.; Gillette Co.; 
        Eagle-Picher Industries; Pfizer, Inc.; Florida 
        Distillers Co.; Jim Beam Brands, Co.; Strohs Brewery 
        Co.; Virgin Islands Rum Industries; ADM Corn Processing 
        Division; Archer Daniels Midland Co.; Browning Seed 
        Inc.; Lever Brothers Co.; Kaiser Aluminum; Dial Corp.; 
        Colgate-Palmolive Co.; Hewitt Soap Co.; Armco Steel 
        Co.; Xerox Corp.; Crown Wire & Cable; Salem Oil & 
        Grease Co.; Castrol, Inc.; General Motors Corp.; 
        Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.; Missouri Portland Cement 
        Co.; Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.; Michelin Tire Corp.; 
        Citgo Petroleum Corp.; Dye Specialties, Inc.; Simpson 
        Timber Co.; Raytheon Co.; Lockheed-Martin Corp.; Bell-
        Textron, Inc.; Distrib U Toys, Inc.; Huish Detergents, 
        Inc.; and Trojan Corp.

    In reviewing ACDA's information, it became clear to us that 
the CWC will affect companies engaged in coke, coal, and steel 
production; mining; crop protection; fertilizers; paper 
production; wood preservation; chlorine manufacturing; color 
pigments, paint, ink and dyestuff production; specialty 
coatings; powder and roof coatings; plating and packaging; 
compressed gas; cosmetics, toiletries, and fragrances; drug 
chemicals manufacturing; pharmaceuticals; plastics; textiles; 
custom chemicals; food, wine, and beer processing; and 
electronics, among others.
    Thousands of companies will be required, every year, to 
fill out government forms and host routine international 
inspections. They also must be prepared to receive on short-
notice intrusive, challenge inspections by the Organization for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which will be 
established in The Hague, Netherlands. We are concerned that: 
(1) compliance costs associated with the CWC may prove 
burdensome to many industries, and are likely to be far higher 
than U.S. government officials currently assume; (2) that on-
site inspections and data declarations potentially may be used 
to compromise trade secrets and proprietary information, which 
are vital to the U.S. chemical, pharmaceutical, and 
biotechnology industries' competitive edge; and (3) that 
limitations on availability and production of Schedule 1 
chemicals may adversely affect some advanced biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical firms.
    In fact, Will Carpenter, a representative for the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association testified before the Committee on 
June 9, 1994, that ``there will be costs associated with the 
industry's compliance with the CWC. There will be reporting 
requirements, inspection of our facilities, new domestic and 
international regulations and the risk of losing proprietary 
information.'' During the same hearing, Dr. Carpenter also 
stated that ``the CWC will have a negative impact on the U.S. 
chemical industry.''
    A number of businesses and consumer groups do not support 
ratification of the CWC for these reasons. Significantly, the 
Vice President for Federal Governmental Relations of the 
National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), Dan Danner, 
wrote to both Senator Helms and Senator Lott on September 9, 
1996, stating:

         On behalf of the more than 600,000 members of the 
        National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), I 
        want to express serious concern regarding the 
        regulatory requirements and burdens that would be 
        placed on small businesses who ``produce, process, 
        consume, export or import'' certain regulated chemicals 
        with ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
         * * * The CWC reverses the trend of reducing the 
        growing regulatory burden on small business. According 
        to the Congressional Office of Technology [Assessment] 
        inspections of businesses required under the CWC will 
        cost small business $10,000-$20,000. The typical small 
        business owner takes home only $40,000 per year. The 
        Department of Commerce has estimated that a business 
        will spend from 2.5-9 hours on paperwork for each 
        chemical used depending on its classification.
         There is a great deal of disagreement on the number of 
        businesses which would be affected by the CWC. Numbers 
        have ranged from 3,000 to 10,000. The regulatory burden 
        of the CWC will hit small business harder than big 
        business. A 1995 Small Business Administration study 
        stated that while small business employs 53 percent of 
        the workforce, they bear 67 percent of business' total 
        regulatory expenses. Even if the number of small 
        businesses in the initial list of affected companies is 
        limited to a specific list, the fact that additional 
        businesses might be regulated by the CWC without 
        approval by the U.S. Congress will make small business 
        powerless to have any input as it does under the U.S. 
        regulatory system. For the first time, small businesses 
        would be subject to a foreign entity inspecting their 
        business.
         The CWC will continue to bury small businesses in 
        paperwork and regulations. Therefore, NFIB urges your 
        serious consideration of the effect of this Treaty on 
        the small businesses in this country.

    Other groups which have written the United States Senate to 
oppose the CWC include the Small Business Survival Committee, 
the Competitive Enterprise Institute, Americans for Tax Reform, 
The Eagle Forum, Coalitions for America, The Center for 
Security Policy, the National Center for Public Policy 
Research, 60 Plus, and Frontiers of Freedom. The chief 
economist for the Small Business Survival Committee, Raymond 
Keating, published an article in the Washington Times on July 
31, 1996, which found that:

         Of course, smaller businesses will be hit hardest by 
        these increased regulatory costs. Interestingly, the 
        Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) supports 
        ratification of the CWC and told the Senate Foreign 
        Relations Committee that the new regulations would not 
        be a burden. But the CMA is a group of generally large 
        chemical manufacturers, and reportedly more than 60 
        percent of the facilities likely affected by the CWC 
        are not CMA members.
         Large companies possess far greater resources and have 
        accrued significant experience in dealing with 
        regulators of all kinds. In fact, new regulatory 
        burdens can perversely give large firms a competitive 
        edge over smaller companies due to these resource and 
        experience factors. As economist Thomas Hopkins has 
        shown, the per-employee cost of federal regulation runs 
        almost 50 percent higher for firms with fewer than 500 
        employees versus companies with more than 500 
        employees.

    As a case in point, the President of Lomac, Inc. (a company 
with 150-200 employees) wrote Senator Abraham on August 21, 
1996:

         This letter is in response to your recent [staff] 
        request for information regarding the impact of the 
        Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on businesses such as 
        ours. It is not possible to estimate the amount of time 
        that it will take to fill out the various CWC forms, 
        but I can assure you that the total time will far 
        exceed the 2-10 hour estimate found in Section 1.A. [of 
        the Draft Department of Commerce Regulations]. The 
        instructions alone will require a substantial 
        commitment of time. After the data is gathered, it must 
        be checked thoroughly to assure accuracy, because an 
        honest mistake can (and most assuredly will in some 
        cases) lead to a $50,000 fine. Even if, however, we 
        estimate a 20-hour commitment per form, where can we 
        find the 20 hours? Our staff is already employed full-
        time filling out a host of forms and applications for 
        the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, the 
        U.S. EPA, and other government agencies. I have 
        enclosed, for your information, copies of the reports 
        that we are required to file annually. As you can see, 
        this is quite a bit of paperwork--and we are a 
        relatively small (150-200 employees) company.
         * * * I truly believe that this CWC will cost American 
        jobs without any benefit. The United States can be 
        trusted to refrain from making chemical weapons, but I 
        cannot believe that certain other countries will abide 
        by the treaty. Because of the adverse impact on 
        Michigan's chemical industry (with little or no off-
        setting benefit) I urge you to vote against 
        ratification of the treaty.

    Scores of other companies have also written to object to 
ratification of the CWC unless it brings with it a commensurate 
national security benefit. ISK Biosciences Corporation, an 
agricultural chemical company, wrote the Senate on September 5, 
1996, stating:

         In general, we believe that banning chemical weapons 
        is a laudable goal. Since those countries most likely 
        to instigate the use of chemical weapons are not among 
        the signatories of the CWC, it would seem that this 
        convention creates a lot of paper and does very little 
        to gain the goal of eliminating chemical weapons.

CWC reporting requirements

    Many U.S. companies already must provide extensive reports 
to the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration, the International Trade Commission, 
the Bureau of the Census, and a host of various State and local 
agencies. In a February 26, 1992 response to an OTA 
questionnaire, the Chemical Manufacturer's Association 
indicated that compliance with existing regulations cost the 
industry approximately $4.9 billion in 1992. According to the 
OTA, one major chemical manufacturer employs 1,700 of its 
50,000 personnel just for the purposes of satisfying Federal 
and State requirements for environmental and regulatory data.
    Diamond Shamrock indicated in an August 26, 1996 letter 
opposing the CWC that:

         * * * our costs have increased by an estimated $1 
        million per year over the last couple of years just to 
        meet new regulatory paperwork demands. We are incurring 
        these costs, but should assume that our customers are 
        paying for these in the long run.
         * * * awareness is often lacking when we approve 
        seemingly useful or innocuous regulatory or legislative 
        initiatives. On a simplistic basis, everything sounds 
        great in these programs, but when you add up all the 
        costs, the impact on our economy is enormous. The 
        negative implications for our domestic growth rate, and 
        on job and wage growth are often ignored in the 
        analysis.

    CITGO Petroleum Corporation echoed these concerns on August 
29, 1996, in a letter to Senator James Inhofe:

         We realize that the petroleum industry is not the 
        specific target of this treaty. Nevertheless it will be 
        affected because of the extensive list of chemicals 
        covered by the treaty. While the time and effort to 
        comply with the CWC proposed rule will be minor in 
        comparison to the tremendous number of other 
        regulations affecting our industry (120 federal 
        environmental regulations for refining alone), it will 
        unnecessarily add to the company's regulatory burden.

    Information required by the CWC verification regime differs 
quantitatively and qualitatively from that already collected 
for other regulatory purposes. As a result, the United States 
will be required to impose new regulations on businesses to 
force them to comply with the treaty.
    These regulations will differ from existing law in several 
ways. First, current environmental regulations do not cover all 
of the chemicals relevant to the CWC. Second, of those that are 
covered, the production thresholds triggering reporting 
requirements are set much higher, and some regulations require 
only prospective (rather than retroactive) reporting. Third, 
several environmental regulations apply solely to chemical 
producers, and not to companies that process or consume 
chemicals, such as the pharmaceutical industry. Finally, the 
reporting deadlines for the CWC are shorter, and will require 
more frequent updates than estimates currently required by the 
EPA.
    As a consequence of these differences with existing laws, 
if the CWC is ratified many companies will be faced with the 
challenge of filing detailed annual declarations for the first 
time. Additionally, because the CWC requires a company notify 
the federal government of any change in declared activities 5 
days before it occurs--and because many small firms will find 
it difficult, if not impossible, to predict all of their 
activities over the coming year--CWC regulations may prove a 
frequent burden.
    As CITGO indicated, for large firms these new regulations 
may add only incrementally to the cost of conducting business 
in the United States. Companies such as those represented by 
the Chemical Manufacturers Association will simply manage the 
new paperwork burden posed by the CWC by augmenting existing 
reporting systems. However, the CWC will be proportionately far 
more burdensome for small firms, and for companies that are not 
currently required to report similar data to federal, state, 
and local governments.
    These new costs will be particularly difficult to absorb 
for small chemical firms which use batch production techniques, 
or which ``custom'' synthesize complex intermediates or other 
``made-to-order'' products. According to the February 8, 1993, 
issue of Chemical Engineering News, these companies generally 
have fewer than 100 employees and have annual sales of less 
than $40 million each. These companies compete with large 
chemical manufacturers who also engage in some batch 
processing, and can ill afford the cost of new regulations. 
Notably, a 1993 Congressional Office of Technology Assessment 
concludes that ``small to medium-sized batch producers may have 
more difficulty in complying with CWC reporting requirements 
because they have smaller staffs and change their production 
processes more frequently.''
    The President of one such firm, Moon Chemical Products, 
Inc., stated the problem in an August 20, 1996 letter:

          The reporting requirements in this treaty are a 
        burden for any company not involved in weapons * * * We 
        are manufacturers of industrial, institutional, and 
        agricultural products. Several years ago we had to hire 
        an outside consultant to make sure we meet government 
        regulations for our business, our employees, and our 
        customers. Please do not add another burden to our 
        industry.

    Small businesses in other economic sectors are faced with 
the same problem. The President of South Hampton Refining 
Company stated in a letter on August 19, 1996, that:

          No, we could not comply with this treaty within our 
        current annual budget and personnel. The reason we are 
        in business as a small refiner is that we change the 
        operation quickly and often to meet the market. The 
        reporting alone would require additional personnel, 
        much less the cost of potential inspection, 
        interpreting the regulations, etc. We currently have 
        10% of our work force assigned to nothing but 
        regulatory functions, mostly environmental. At some 
        point these non-profit producing efforts will outweigh 
        the value of keeping the business operating.
           * * * There are months where the cost of compliance 
        with this treaty would completely eliminate the profit 
        for the month. You can explain to our employees how 
        this is more important to the nation than them getting 
        a paycheck, or having health coverage, or having a 
        retirement plan, or having a profit sharing check.

    We found this same sentiment reflected time and again in 
the responses of small companies to questions about the CWC. 
Another refining company--Valero Refining Company--noted on 
August 20, 1996, that ``Valero is an independent refinery with 
limited staff resources which are already overwhelmed with 
regulatory compliance record keeping and reporting.''
    A small plating company in Minnesota wrote to Senator Grams 
stating that the federal government has ``small business buried 
with regulations with all this paperwork that has to be 
submitted to different agencies * * * This treaty will not be 
worth the paper it is written on.''

The paperwork

    The Bureau of Export Administration of the Department of 
Commerce has prepared a handbook and declaration forms for 
companies subject to the CWC's regulations. The following 
charts summarize the number of forms currently contemplated:
            Schedule 1: Declarations
          Certification Form
          Form 1-1, Schedule 1 Facility or Trading Company 
        Identification
          Form 1-2, Annual Report of Schedule 1 Chemical 
        Activities at the Facility During the Previous Year
          Form 1-2A, Annual Report of Schedule 1, 2, and 3 
        Precursor Chemical(s) Used to Produce a Schedule 1 
        Chemical
          Form 1-2B, Annual Report of Purposes for Which a 
        Schedule 1 Chemical Was Consumed
          Form 1-2C, Annual Report on the Receipt and/or 
        Shipment of the Schedule 1 Chemical From or To Other 
        Schedule 1 Facilities in the United States
          Form 1-3, Annual Report of the Schedule 1 Chemicals 
        Imported or Exported to Other States Parties
          Form 1-4, Declaration on Schedule 1 Anticipated 
        Activities
          Form A, Attachments for Declared Plant Sites
          Form B, Optional Comments
            Schedule 2: Declarations
          Certification Form
          Form 2-1, Schedule 2 Plant Site or Trading Company 
        Identification
          Form 2-2, Declaration of Schedule 2 Plants at Plant 
        Site
          Form 2-3, Declaration of Schedule 2 Chemicals at 
        Plant Site
          Form 2-3A, Declaration of Schedule 2 Chemicals Sold 
        or Transferred Off the Plant Site in the United States
          Form 2-3B, Report of Detailed Data on Exports and 
        Imports of Schedule 2 Chemicals
          Form 2-3C, Declaration of Anticipated Activities or 
        Amended Plans for Schedule 2 Chemicals
          Form 2-4, Initial Declaration of Schedule 2 Chemicals 
        Produced Since 1 January 1946 for Chemical Weapons 
        Purposes
          Form A, Attachments for Declared Plant Sites
          Form B, Optional Comments
            Schedule 3: Declarations
          Certification Form
          Form 3-1, Schedule 3 Plant Site or Trading Company 
        Identification
          Form 3-2, Declaration of Schedule 3 Plants at Plant 
        Site
          Form 3-3, Declaration of Schedule 3 Chemicals at the 
        Plant Site
          Form 3-4, Initial Declaration of Schedule 3 Chemicals 
        Produced Since 1 January 1946 for Chemical Weapons 
        Purposes
          Form A, Attachments for Declared Plant Sites
          Form B, Optional Comments
            Discrete organic chemicals: Declarations
          Certification Form
          Form DOC, Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical (DOC) 
        Plant Site Identification (2 pages)
          Form A, Attachments for Declared Plant Sites
          Form B, Optional Comments
Needless to say, we are very concerned that the 
Administration's approach to declarations is complicated and 
far too burdensome for industry.

Who must submit paperwork?

    Declarations to the federal government will be mandatory 
for companies that produce, utilize in any way, or import or 
export chemicals listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 in quantities 
above the thresholds specified in the CWC. Furthermore, 
producers of discrete organic chemicals in quantities more than 
200 metric tons will also be required to declare their 
facilities. Companies must also declare facilities if their 
products contain phosphorus, sulphur or fluorine (PSF), and are 
produced in quantities greater than 30 metric tons. Only 
facilities that produce pure hydrocarbons or explosives are 
excluded from DOC and PSF declarations.
    The Verification Annex of the CWC empowers the OPCW's 
Technical Secretariat to determine a company's compliance by 
examination of the data supplied and routine inspections of the 
companies facilities.
            Schedule 1 requirements
    The Schedule 1 regime is the most rigorous of the CWC's 
sets of verification provisions. If the United States ratifies 
the treaty, it will forgo the ability to produce or otherwise 
acquire in one year--or possess at any given time--more than 1 
ton of all Schedule 1 chemicals combined, notwithstanding the 
fact that Schedule 1 contains chemicals essential to research, 
medical, pharmaceutical, and chemical defense programs. 
Moreover, Schedule 1 also includes biological toxins, such as 
ricin. Not only does the inclusion of toxins under the Schedule 
1 regime directly affect pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries, but we are concerned that this impact will become 
more pronounced if the CWC is expanded to cover various 
biological pathogens failing efforts to create a verification 
regime for the BWC.
    Production of Schedule 1 chemicals is limited to minute 
quantities. Each country may possess 1 small-scale facility (no 
more than an aggregate 500-liter capacity) which may not be 
configured for continuous operation, and which may not have any 
reaction vessels with a volume greater than 100 liters. All 
other production of Schedule 1 chemicals is limited to no more 
than 10 kg per year, and is still subject to the 1 ton limit on 
production, as well as to the rigorous declaration and 
inspection provisions of the CWC.
    For each and every Schedule 1 chemical ``produced, 
acquired, consumed, or stored'' a company must provide a 
detailed annual data declaration identifying the chemical name, 
structural formula, Chemical Abstracts Service registry number 
(if assigned), the methods employed, quantity produced, the 
name and quantity of precursors listed in Schedules 1, 2, and 3 
used for production of the chemical, the quantity consumed and 
purposes of consumption, shipping data, storage data, and 
technical description of the facility, including detailed 
inventories of equipment and diagrams.
            Schedule 2 requirements
    The list of Schedule 2 chemicals appears in the CWC in the 
Annex on Chemicals. The required declarations are described in 
Part VII of the Verification Annex. Schedule 2 requirements 
include aggregate national data on quantities produced, 
processed, consumed, imported, and exported of each Schedule 2 
chemical including full specification of imports and exports 
for each chemical involved. Declarations are required for all 
plant sites involved in production, processing or consumption 
above the following thresholds:
          1 kg of a ``*'' chemical in 2A;
          100 kg of other chemicals in 2A; and
          1 ton of a chemical in 2B.
    A considerable amount of detailed information is also 
required on the actual plant site where a Schedule 2 chemical 
is produced above the threshold. The initial declaration for 
each plant site has to cover the three previous calendar years.
    In sum, the following declarations are required for 
Schedule 2:
          (1) initial Declarations on aggregate National Data 
        and plant sites 30 days after entry into force;
          (2) annual Declarations on past or completed 
        activities 90 days after year end for aggregate 
        national data and plant sites;
          (3) annual Declarations for anticipated activities 60 
        days before the annual production cycle begins at plant 
        sites; and
          (4) additional production over that declared under 
        (3) above must be declared 5 days before the production 
        cycle begins.
    All declarations for Schedule 2 chemicals must include: (1) 
a primary declaration identification, (2) one declaration per 
chemical, and (3) specifications on the import and export of 
the Schedule 2 chemical by country. The OPCW in turn has 
interpreted this to mean that national authorities will need to 
require from producers, consumers, and processors of Schedule 2 
chemicals data that will contain significant confidential 
business information. We therefore expect the basic set of data 
will include the item number on Schedule 2, chemical name, CAS 
registry number, common/trade name and structural formula, 
quantity produced (including information on percentage 
concentration regarding raw material and product), quantity 
processed (including information on percentage concentration 
regarding raw material and product) and quantity consumed, 
imported, exported, retained stored, sold or transferred, 
information on import/export (supplier and recipient 
countries), information on quantities sold or transferred 
(including information on destination and final product for 
which the chemical has been used), and information on instances 
where the chemical produced is used for other purposes than 
processing, consumption and shipment to another destination.
    Declarations on Schedule 2 plant sites must include a 
primary declaration identification, Schedule 2 plant site 
information, the number of Schedule 2 plants at the plant site, 
the production capacity per chemical, information on all 
Schedule 2 chemicals at each plant site, information on 
Schedule 2 chemicals sold or transferred off the plant site, 
anticipated time periods for the production, processing or 
consumption of Schedule 2 chemicals, a one-time declaration of 
Schedule 2 chemicals produced at the plant sites since January 
1, 1946 for chemical weapons purposes, production periods for 
Schedule 2 chemicals produced for chemical weapons purposes 
since January 1, 1946, and locations to which each Schedule 2 
chemical produced for chemical weapons purposes was delivered.
    It is thus expected that the basic set of data Schedule 2 
plant sites will include: (1) logistics information such as the 
name and address of the facility (including building number or 
address, structure and postal code) and name of both the owner 
and operator of the facility; and (2) activity information such 
as the main activities of the facility, which scheduled 
chemicals are produced, production capacity, and information on 
the type of plant (dedicated or multipurpose).
    There are two major unresolved issues with respect to 
Schedule 2. The term aggregate national data and the reporting 
requirements for mixtures containing a ``low concentration'' of 
a Schedule 2 chemical are not defined. In the former instance, 
some countries assumed that the aggregate would cover all 
production, including that from sites below the declaration 
threshold. Others insist on the aggregation of data from 
declared sites only, adding all declared data on production, 
processing and consumption above the threshold together with 
the actual import and export quantities. The matter has been 
further complicated by the Technical Secretariat's proposed 
``Rounding rules'' whereby, for example, quantities less than 
500 kg would be rounded down to 0 tons (e.g., production, 
processing or consumption of 1.5 tons would be declared as 1.0 
ton, while 1.6 tons would be rounded up to 2 tons).
    Secondly, the CWC states that declarations ``are not 
generally required for mixtures containing a low concentration 
of a Schedule 2 chemical'' and goes on to state that 
declarations are only required in accordance with 
``guidelines'' that relate to the ease of recovery of the 
Schedule 2 chemical and its total weight. The guidelines have 
not yet been developed by the Preparatory Commission or 
approved by the conference of States Parties, pursuant to 
Article VIII. Nor has the Expert Group come to agreement on 
total weight and a percentage below which a declaration would 
not be required (provided that the Schedule 2 chemical was not 
isolated), or on an elaboration of criteria related to ease of 
recovery together with quantitative thresholds.
    As it stands, the CWC requires declarations on any chemical 
produced as a byproduct of an industrial process whether it has 
some commercial value or not. In the case of Schedule 2 
chemicals, such byproducts will be produced by processing and 
consumption as well. Furthermore, finished products, either 
imported or exported, containing even a small amount of a 
scheduled chemical formed part of a formulated material may 
need to be declared.
            Schedule 3 requirements
    The list of Schedule 3 chemicals also appears in the CWC in 
the Annex on Chemicals (as described in Article VI). Schedule 3 
requirements include aggregate national data and plant sites, 
but only specifies production, imports and exports, with no 
requirements related to processing or consumption. Declarations 
are needed for plant sites producing more than 30 tons of a 
Schedule 3 chemical. The production is to be expressed in 
ranges:
          30 to 200 tons;
          200 to 1,000 tons;
          1,000 to 10,000 tons;
          10,000 to 100,000 tons; and
          above 100,000 tons.
    The following declarations are required for Schedule 3 
chemicals:
          (1) initial declarations on aggregate national data 
        and on plant sites 30 days after entry into force;
          (2) annual declarations on past or completed 
        activities 90 days after year end both for aggregate 
        national data and plant sites;
          (3) annual declarations for anticipated activities at 
        plant sites 60 days before the year begins; and
          (4) any proposed change after the anticipatory 
        declarations to be made 5 days before additional 
        production begins.
    All Schedule 3 chemical data declarations must include a 
primary declaration identification, one declaration per 
chemical, and specifications on the import and export of the 
Schedule 3 chemical by country. For these declarations the 
following data will be essential: item number on Schedule 3, 
chemical name, CAS registry number, common/trade name and 
structural formula, quantity produced (including information on 
percentage concentration regarding raw material and product), 
information on import/export, information on purpose of 
production, and information on the production range for the 
given chemical (i.e., less than 30 tons, 30-200 tons, 200-1,000 
tons, 1,000-10,000 tons, 10,000-100,000 tons and above 100,000 
tons).
    Information on declared Schedule 3 plant sites must include 
the primary declaration identification, Schedule 3 plant site 
information, information on all Schedule 3 plants at the plant 
site, data on all Schedule 3 chemicals at the plant site, a 
one-time declaration of any Schedule 3 chemicals produced at 
the plant sites since January 1, 1946 for chemical weapons 
purposes, production periods for Schedule 3 chemicals produced 
for chemical weapons purposes since January 1, 1946, and a list 
of locations to which each Schedule 3 chemical produced for 
chemical weapons purposes was delivered. The basic set of data 
would thus consist of the name and address of the facility 
(including building number or address, structure and postal 
code) and name of both the owner and operator of the facility, 
main activities of the facility, which scheduled chemicals are 
produced there and their production capacity, and information 
on the type of plant (dedicated or multipurpose).
    The same two problems exist for Schedule 3 chemicals as for 
Schedule 2 chemicals: questions over ``aggregate national 
data'' and ``low concentrations'' as terms. Again 
``guidelines'' have yet to be developed as to when declarations 
are required for Schedule 3 chemicals which are part of 
mixtures and an understanding of what aggregate national data 
means in the CWC.
            Other chemical production facilities
    Since there are many chemicals that are not on the 
schedules but which could play a role in CW development, the 
CWC casts an even broader net to capture facilities capable of 
being used or converted into facilities that could be used for 
the production of scheduled chemicals or other chemicals that 
could be used as chemical weapons or precursors. The CWC 
requires declarations on ``other'' chemical production 
facilities engaged in the production of ``unscheduled discrete 
organic chemicals'' (DOC's), a subclass of which is 
``unscheduled discrete organic chemicals containing the 
elements Phosphorus, Sulfur or Fluorine'' (PSF). Declarations 
are required for plants that synthesize: 200 tons or more of 
DOC's; and 30 tons or more of PSF chemicals.
    Declarations of plant sites are to occur 30 days after 
entry into force, with an annual update of this list 90 days 
after the calendar year end. The list of plant sites must also 
include an aggregate amount of the production of each DOC given 
in the ranges: under 1,000 tons; 1,000 to 10,000 tons; and 
above 10,000 tons.
    The production of PSF chemicals in PSF plants is to be 
expressed in the aggregate ranges: under 200 tons; 200 to 1,000 
tons; 1,000 to 10,000 tons; and above 10,000 tons.
    For DOC's, including PSF chemicals, the following 
information would likely be needed in an industrial 
declaration: data on chemical group, chemical name, CAS 
registry number and common/trade name, and information on the 
production range for the plant site. For a facility producing 
DOC's, including PSF's, logistics information such as the name 
and address of the facility where the chemical is handled or 
stored (including building and structure specification) and 
name of both the owner and operator of the facility and 
activity information (e.g., main activities of the facility and 
identification of each unit or plant at each plant site that 
has produced a DOC, including PSF plants) would be necessary.
    We find inconsistency in the CWC's treatment of DOC's and 
PSF chemicals in comparison with Scheduled chemicals. Elsewhere 
the CWC defines production as ``its formation through chemical 
reaction.'' Why is the production of DOC's ``by synthesis'' 
also covered?
    Second, the DOC category is far too expansive. It should be 
limited, and synthesis as a method of production should be 
excluded. As it stands, this provision of the CWC increases 
significantly declaration and inspections costs, and will 
require a far broader number of U.S. companies to assume new 
regulatory burdens under the CWC than otherwise would be the 
case.

CWC inspection requirements

    Any company that provides declarations to the federal 
government should prepare for inspections. Once a State Party 
provides its declarations to the OPCW, these will be verified 
by on-site inspections (routine and challenge inspections) by 
the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW. Both declarations and 
inspections are ``triggered'' by activity beyond certain 
thresholds:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Declaration           Inspection  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Schedule 2A *................  1 kilogram...............  10 kilograms. 
Schedule 2A..................  100 kilograms............  1 ton.        
Schedule 2B..................  1 ton....................  10 tons.      
Schedule 3...................  30 tons..................  200 tons.     
Unscheduled DOC's............  200 tons.................  200 tons.     
PSF's........................  30 tons..................  200 tons.     
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Facilities that produce Schedule 1 chemicals can be 
inspected at anytime, and there is no limit on the actual 
number of inspections per annum. Individual Schedule 2 or 3 
plants can receive a maximum of two inspections per year. 
Plants that produce ``other discrete organic chemicals'' will 
not be inspected during the first three years, but will be 
liable for inspection thereafter. The total annual number of 
inspections for all Schedule 3 plants and these other 
facilities will be either 20, or 3 + 5 percent of the total 
number of the plant sites declared, whichever figure is 
smaller.
    The CWC limits the time that inspectors from the OPCW may 
spend at an individual site unless the National Authority 
agrees to an extension. The time limit is 96 hours for Schedule 
2 sites, and 24 hours for Schedule 3 facilities and other 
chemical production facilities. Due notice must be given for a 
routine inspection.
            Schedule 2 facilities
    During the first three years after entry into force, all 
commercial facilities that produce, process or consume Schedule 
2 chemicals above the thresholds will undergo an initial 
inspection, during which negotiations will commence work on a 
Facility Agreement (FA). This will be negotiated between 
representatives of the OPCW and the federal government, with 
``assistance'' from the plant management. If the FA is not 
agreed upon within 90 days, inspections will involve the 
``managed access'' approach. The agreement must specify those 
parts of the site apart from the plant which are of concern to 
the Inspectorate and thus, may form part of the routine 
inspection pathway.
    In general, access by the OPCW inspection team to other 
parts of the plant site will be granted in accordance with the 
negotiated Facility Agreement. The National Authority will have 
a minimum of 48-hours notice of any given inspections and the 
inspection cannot last more than 96 hours.
            Schedule 3 facilities
    Schedule 3 facilities are also subject to routine 
inspections after entry into force. There is no requirement for 
a formal initial inspection nor for a Facility Agreement, 
although one can be requested by a given firm. Inspections will 
focus on the declared Schedule 3 plant(s) but may request 
access to other parts of the plant site on the basis of 
negotiation. Access to records, sampling and on-site analysis 
will also be the subject of negotiation. The State Party will 
receive a minimum notice of five days before the inspection 
takes place and the inspection cannot last more than 24 hours 
without further agreement of the national authority.
            Other chemical production facilities
    The inspection regime for ``other chemical production 
facilities'' will not begin until four years after entry into 
force. Facility agreements are optional. The State Party will 
receive a minimum of 120 hours advance notice of an inspection, 
and the duration of the inspection will not exceed 24 hours 
unless the federal government agrees to extend it.
            Challenge inspections
    Article IX of the CWC provides for short notice inspections 
at any site, declared or undeclared, and at government or 
privately owned facilities. We are concerned with the 
possibility that the on-site inspection provisions of the CWC 
will compromise the trade secrets of U.S. businesses. 
Businesses are concerned, too.
    The U.S. chemical pharmaceutical, and biotechnology 
industries have long been heavily targeted for industrial 
espionage. Since the end of the cold war, the number of 
reported incidents has continued to increase annually, along 
with increases in the number of incidents involving foreign 
firms or governments. A nationwide survey regarding industrial 
espionage conducted in 1992 by the American Society for 
Industrial Security documents a 280 percent increase (over a 
1985 survey) in the number of incidents involving the 
compromise of confidential business information, and a 360 
percent increase in foreign involvement in these incidents. 
Eleven chemical companies responded anonymously to the survey, 
eight of whom reported a total of 21 known attempts to steal 
proprietary information--the most frequent targets being 
customer lists, pricing data, and manufacturing process 
information. Six of those incidents cost the companies a total 
of $86.25 million.
    Dr. Will Carpenter, a former-Vice President for Technology 
at the Monsanto Agriculture Company and a Chemical 
Manufacturers Association representative, supplied the 
Committee with a copy of his remarks before the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science on January 16, 1989. 
In that statement, he noted:

          Those of use who manufacture chemicals that are only 
        a step or two away from chemical weapons--and that 
        means a large number of us in the CMA--have already 
        accepted the reality that a good treaty means 
        significant losses of information that we consider 
        confidential.

    Proprietary information is often the basis for a chemical 
company's competitive edge. As a practical matter, a wide 
variety of things may be considered proprietary or sensitive by 
a given company. Some examples of common types of confidential 
business information were compiled by the Office of Technology 
Assessment in 1993:
          The formula of a new drug or specialty chemical
          A synthetic route that requires the fewest steps or 
        the cheapest raw materials
          The form, source, composition, and purity of raw 
        materials or solvents
          A new catalyst that improves the selectivity, 
        efficiency, or yield of a reaction
          The precise order and timing with which chemicals are 
        fed into a reactor
          Subtle changes in pressure or temperature at key 
        steps in a process
          Isolation methods that give the highest yields 
        consistent with good recycling of solvents and reagents
          Expansion and marketing plans
          Raw materials and suppliers
          Manufacturing costs
          Prices and sales figures
          Names of technical personnel working on a particular 
        project
          Customer lists
    The theft of any one of these items could result in a loss 
of revenue and investment that could damage a large company, 
and drive a small one out of business. Underscoring the 
importance attached to proprietary information is the fact that 
companies seldom patent their unique ``tricks of the trade'' in 
order to prevent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests (to 
which patents are subject) from compromising business secrets. 
Because some trade secrets are not all that complex, the OTA 
found that ``even visual inspection alone might reveal a unique 
process configuration that could be of great value to a 
competitor.'' Yet the CWC allows for far more than mere visual 
inspection during a challenge inspection.
    CWC inspections will be conducted by international teams of 
inspectors including nationals from U.S. political and/or 
economic adversaries. During even a routine inspection a 
skilled chemical engineer equipped with knowledge of the target 
facility and list of specific questions to be answered could 
learn a great deal about the activities of a given business. 
According to the OTA, potential sources of proprietary 
information that might be compromised during an on-site 
inspection include:
          manifests and container labels that disclose the 
        nature/purity of the feedstock and the identity of the 
        supplier
          instrument panels revealing precise temperature and 
        pressure settings for a production process
          chemical analysis of residues taken from a valve or 
        seal on the production line
          visual inspection of piping configurations and 
        instrumentation diagrams could allow an inspector to 
        deduce flow and process parameters
          audits of plant records
    Lieutenant General (Ret.) James A. Williams, former 
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, wrote Senator Lott 
on September 9, 1996, urging that ratification of the CWC be 
delayed until the Senate had engaged in informed debate on the 
dangers of economic espionage. According to General Williams, 
who is currently a consultant to several large firms on 
competitive and counter-economic intelligence issues:

          * * * the opportunity for unfettered access to 
        virtually every industrial facility in this country, 
        not merely the pharmaceutical and chemical plants, 
        would make most foreign intelligence organizations very 
        happy, even gleeful. It is likely to cause the 
        counterintelligence sections of the FBI and the Defense 
        Investigative Service major problems for the 
        foreseeable future. The inspection procedures which 
        apply to ALL industries constitute unprecedented access 
        to our manufacturing base, not just to those thought 
        likely to be engaged in proscribed activities! My 
        experience in protecting patents and intellectual 
        property over the past ten years leads me to conclude 
        that there is the potential for the loss of untold 
        billions of dollars in trade secrets which can be used 
        to gain competitive advantage, to shorten R&D cycles, 
        and to steal U.S. market share. To allow invasion of 
        private property without probable cause or a search 
        warrant could undermine every industrial security 
        standard established under government regulations or by 
        private firms seeking to protect industrial processes 
        or other proprietary information.

    Many U.S. companies are extremely concerned with the CWC's 
inspection regime. The Detrex Corporation, for example, wrote 
to Senator Abraham on August 30, 1996, stating that:

          Although reverse engineering of a product (the 
        process of determining the products' composition or 
        molecular structure) may be possible, many companies 
        enjoy a competitive advantage in a market due to the 
        manufacturing process used. Process ``trade secrets'' 
        may include items as simple as: the type of equipment 
        used, manufacturing parameters, or even who supplies a 
        particular raw material. Allowing inspectors full 
        access to a company's manufacturing site and records 
        could have a large impact on a company's ability to 
        compete in domestic and international trade.

    We are concerned, along with U.S. businesses, that even 
routine inspections under the CWC could erode a businesses 
competitive advantage. What is worse, the CWC's challenge 
inspection provisions allow inspectors wide latitude in 
interviewing employees and access to company documents, not to 
mention the right to take samples and ship them off-site to 
international laboratories for analysis. It is expected that 
laboratories conducting analysis of samples will be 
geographically dispersed among the ratifiers of the CWC. A 
number of countries with questionable chemical weapons 
nonproliferation credentials, such as China and Iran, have 
already indicated an interest in fielding laboratories.
    In preparation for the CWC, the U.S. conducted seven 
National Trial Inspections at government and industrial 
facilities. Those trial inspections support concerns that even 
routine access by the OPCW to chemical facilities could result 
in the loss of trade and/or national security secrets--to say 
nothing of the access allowed under more intrusive challenge 
inspection provisions. During one National Trial Inspection, 
soil and water samples taken from the exterior of buildings at 
a chemical plant three weeks after a production run revealed 
the product of the operation and process details. Moreover, the 
CWC explicitly affords an inspection team the right to take 
samples on-site and, pursuant to Part II paragraph (E)(55) of 
the Verification Annex, the right to transfer, ``if it deems 
necessary,'' samples for analysis off-site at international 
laboratories designated by the OPCW.
    The CWC's sampling provisions pose a danger not only to 
trade secrets, but to government secrets as well. Dr. Kathleen 
Bailey, Senior Fellow at Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, testified before the Committee on March 21, 1996, 
that:

          Experts in my laboratory recently conducted 
        experiments to determine whether or not there would be 
        a remainder inside of the equipment that is used for 
        sample analysis on-site.
          They found out that, indeed, there is residue 
        remaining. And if the equipment were taken off-site, 
        off of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory site, or off 
        of the site of a biotechnology firm, for example, and 
        further analysis were done on those residues, you would 
        be able to get classified and/or proprietary 
        information.

    The U.S. Government published in the Conference on 
Disarmament an unclassified report of the third National Trial 
Inspection of the Monsanto Agricultural Company's Luling, 
Louisiana plant in August, 1991 by a mock inspection team 
comprised of U.S. experts. One of the most troubling findings 
of the inspection report was in the area of the protection of 
confidential business information (CBI). The report determined:

          The Monsanto representative who was on the inspection 
        team to determine the extent of CBI he could obtain, 
        determined there would be a loss of such information. 
        He stated he was able to obtain enough information 
        about the glyphosate intermediate process merely by 
        equipment inspection to save a potential competitor 
        considerable process development, time and dollars. He 
        said a knowledgeable inspector could compromise 
        Monsanto's proprietary business interests with no 
        access to their records beyond the quantity of 
        phosphorous trichloride consumed.

    The conclusions of this report would seem to be 
particularly troubling for many chemical, pharmaceutical, and 
biotechnology companies. The Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA) estimated in August, 1993, that the U.S. chemical 
industry loses approximately $3-$6 billion per year in 
counterfeited chemicals and chemical products. The development 
of a new pesticide takes an average of 10 years and costs $25 
million. U.S. pharmaceutical firms take an average of 12 years 
and spend roughly $350 million in research and development of 
each new drug.
    Information gleaned from inspections and data declarations 
literally could be worth millions of dollars to foreign 
competitors. However, the greatest threat is not to large, 
diversified chemical manufacturers, but to small companies 
concentrating on a single market or technological niche. A 
small company whose profitability (and economic survival) 
derives from a cost or quality advantage in one area will be 
particularly vulnerable to industrial espionage. Theft of that 
one trade secret, which may not be all that complex, could 
drive the company out of business.
    As a consequence, the CWC's threat to trade secrets 
concerns far more than the chemical, biotech, and 
pharmaceutical industries. In an August 7, 1996 letter to 
Senator Jon Kyl, a manufacturer of animal health-care products, 
Farnam Industries, stated:

          First, the short-notice challenge inspections that 
        can be initiated by foreign states would be a burden 
        physically and financially. We have confidential 
        information concerning formulations and manufacturing 
        procedures that we need to protect.

    Similarly, Crafco, Inc., wrote to Senator Kyl on September 
6, 1996:

          Our company does not maintain, use or propose to use 
        any Schedule 1, 2, or 3 chemicals. However, we would 
        like to express our reservations concerning unannounced 
        inspections. The potential for abuse, specifically the 
        theft of trade secrets both formulations and process 
        oriented is significant. Unannounced inspections are 
        also costly in terms of production disruption. A second 
        concern would be that the apparent goals of this treaty 
        are enforceable in the United States under already 
        existing statutes. Industry sponsored terrorism in the 
        form of chemical weapons manufacture is controllable 
        without external intervention. Finally, without the 
        assent of the states sponsoring terrorism this treaty 
        really amounts to the good guys policing the good guys 
        and picking up whatever they can in the process.

    CITGO Petroleum wrote on August 29, 1996 that ``CITGO 
believes that the requisite inspections associated with the 
Treaty will, no doubt, jeopardize confidential business 
information as well as disrupt normal business operations.''
    Another small laboratory in Minnesota commented that ``We 
are also concerned about protecting trade secrets from 
international inspection teams. * * * We have seen information 
leaked through the FOI [Freedom of Information] process and do 
not believe that information obtained by international 
inspection teams would be as secure.''
    On August 15, 1996, the Gemini Company stated that it would 
not be prepared to receive a foreign inspection team:

          * * * hosting such an inspetion would be a serious 
        hindrance to our business. It would be very difficult 
        to safeguard confidential business information during 
        such an inspection.
          We have serious reservations about the ability of 
        more legislation and further regulation of U.S. 
        industry to solve the chemical weapons problem. 
        Further, since the countries of Libya, Iraq, Syria and 
        North Korea refuse to sign this treaty, how will 
        further reporting requirements, and inspection of 
        businesses such as ours prohibit the development of 
        chemical weapons?

    On July 19, 1996, The Sundt Corporation noted that:

          Based upon the depth of inspection, e.g., interviews 
        with corporate personnel, employees, vendors, 
        subcontractors; review of drawings, purchase orders, 
        subcontracts; inspection and review of internal and 
        external correspondence; we feel that it could be 
        difficult to safeguard confidential business 
        information during this inspection. This has to do not 
        only with our internal corporate information but we 
        would be concerned about information that we have 
        signed a confidentiality agreement with our partners 
        and/or customers.

    The Dial Corporation wrote to Senator Kyl on July 23, 1996 
to inform him that: ``We are not prepared to receive a foreign 
inspection team to our facilities, and we would be greatly 
concerned that such a visit might compromise our confidential 
business information.''
    Prepared or not, if the United States Senate ratifies the 
CWC, the burden of safeguarding proprietary information will 
fall squarely upon the shoulders of U.S. businesses. This, too, 
will entail significant cost to industry. Following the first 
U.S. National Trial Inspection at the Akzo Chemicals Plant in 
Gallipolis Ferry, West Virginia, Akzo reported a cost of 
$10,000 for its time spent in preparing for the trial 
inspection.
    In practice, inspections will depend upon the size of the 
facility, the portion of the commercial site relevant to 
activities that might be of concern, and the extent to which 
the facility is engaged in highly proprietary or classified 
defense activities, such as the manufacture of materials for 
stealth aircraft. According to the Department of Defense, the 
cost to commercial and government facilities which meet these 
criteria for preparing for a challenge inspection is expected 
to range from $200,000 to $500,000. According to the OTA, 
inspection costs will be higher if a company must shut down 
production for safety reasons or to protect trade secrets, or 
if the company must reconfigure or relocate production or 
consumption of chemicals to protect trade secrets.
    The disruption of production runs poses a serious, 
unestimable opportunity cost. Many businesses have expressed 
concern about their loss of revenue if they must suspend 
operations during an inspection. As McWhorter Technologies put 
it on September 5, 1996:

          * * * many of our operations run on a seven day, 
        twenty-four hour schedule. A foreign inspection team 
        could be quite disruptive particularly on the short 
        notice indicated in this proposed treaty. In addition 
        to the negative impact on operation such a visit could 
        incur, reimbursement of costs for the inspection could 
        be quite significant.

    The total cost to U.S. economy from ratification of the 
CWC, as a consequence of indirect inspection costs, production 
interruptions, accounting costs, and the potential theft of 
trade secrets, could be enormous.

Impact upon advanced biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms

    The CWC may seriously affect some ``cutting-edge'' 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies by denying access to 
chemicals needed to produce their medical treatments. A small 
but significant cross-section of the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industries may find their ability to obtain to 
basic raw ingredients used to manufacture their products 
constrained. For example, one biotechnology firm in 
Massachusetts uses ricin--a Schedule 1 chemical--in its anti-
cancer compounds. While the CWC permits the use of Schedule 1 
chemicals under Part VI, paragraph (A)(2) of the Verification 
Annex, that use is subject to two subsequent provisions in 
paragraph (A) which: (1) limit the aggregate quantity of all 
Schedule 1 chemicals at any one time in the United States to 1 
metric ton; and (2) limit production or other acquisition of 
Schedule 1 chemicals to one metric ton annually. Furthermore, 
the CWC limits manufacture of Schedule 1 chemicals in excess of 
10 kg to one single, small scale facility in the United States. 
Each other facility is limited to production of no more than 10 
kg per year of Schedule 1 chemicals.
    Given the fact that this biotechnology firm alone expects 
to need between 50 and 80 kg per year, the possibility exists 
that the firm's medicinal needs will be placed in direct 
competition with the other demands placed upon the annual 
aggregate ton of Schedule 1 chemicals. Indeed, the very 
existence of the one-ton exception came at the insistence of 
the United States, which desired to retain some Schedule 1 
chemicals for use in law enforcement activities. Moreover, the 
excepted ton likely also will be called upon to satisfy 
chemical defensive research and testing. Clearly the CWC 
establishes a trade-off between the ability of biotechnology 
and pharmaceutical industries to manufacture anti-cancer agents 
and other life-saving drugs and the ability of the U.S. to 
develop life-saving chemical warfare defenses. Even under the 
best circumstances, biotechnology firms using Schedule 1 
chemicals will be forced to pursue multiple sources and to 
conduct duplicative testing and auditing of their multiple 
chemical supplies. This will entail costs that are significant 
for small firms whose competitive edge derives from a single 
product.

Significance of the CWC for trade in chemicals

    In addition to concerns over the impact upon industry of 
CWC ratification, during hearings from private sector witnesses 
in March 1996, the committee also considered the significance 
of nonratification of the CWC. In testimony before the 
committee on March 21, 1996, the President and Chief Executive 
Officer of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Frederick 
Webber stated that:

          We are a fast, reliable, high-quality supplier to 
        customers in every corner of the globe. But we could 
        lose that distinction; we could lose it if the U.S. 
        does not ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
          The Convention sharply restricts trade in chemicals 
        with countries who are not parties to the treaty. If 
        the Senate does not ratify, our customers will cut us 
        off. They will drop us, and find other suppliers.
          * * * Our largest trading partners, who will be party 
        to the Convention, what they are going to do is, they 
        are going to apply trade restrictions to chemicals that 
        originate here, or that are being shipped there.

In direct contrast, Dr. Kathleen Bailey stated:

        I would like to correct what I think are two mistakes 
        in things that have been said before.
          The first one has to do with the idea that the United 
        States, if it does not ratify the treaty, will create a 
        situation which sharply restricts trade in chemicals. 
        There are three schedules of chemicals listed in the 
        Convention. Schedule one chemicals are essentially 
        chemical weapons. They are very nasty chemicals; they 
        are not traded by the United States anyway.
          Schedule two chemicals are terrible, but they were 
        less terrible than schedule one, in terms of chemical 
        weapons. But these chemicals are not traded very 
        widely. This is the category of chemicals of which 
        there is a trade restriction.
          Now, schedule three chemicals, the ones in which we 
        have a lot of trade, is not restricted by the treaty. 
        So statements made today that not ratifying the treaty 
        would result in a restriction on trade is simply not 
        true, because the trade we do in chemical trade is 
        schedule three chemicals, and the treaty does not 
        restrict that.

The assumption that the CWC will enter-into-force without the 
participation of the United States, which is expected by most 
countries to pay one-quarter of the OPCW's total costs, is 
highly questionable. More significantly, the export of Schedule 
2 chemicals to non-parties of the CWC may occur for three years 
after entry into force of the CWC, if end-use certificates are 
presented. The certificate must include a statement by the 
recipient state that the chemical will only be used for 
permitted purposes, assurance that the chemical will not be re-
transferred, the types and quantities of the chemical, its end-
use, and the name and address of the end-user. There is no 
limitation on quantities transferred. After three years, 
transfer will be permitted only to States Parties.
    For trade in Schedule 3 chemicals above 30 tons, 
information must be submitted in the annual declarations for 
the previous calendar year on aggregate national data for 
export of each chemical and specification of export for each 
country. There are no quantity limitations on the transfer of 
Schedule 3 chemicals. Moreover, there is no point at which a 
cut-off in trade in Schedule 3 chemicals will occur. This is 
significant since most Schedule 2 chemicals are covered by 
Australia Group controls and U.S. domestic law. That is to say, 
nearly all of the U.S. chemical trade overseas derives from the 
export of chemicals that are either listed on Schedule 3 or are 
not controlled by the CWC at all.

                     C. MONITORING AND VERIFICATION

Introduction

    Then-Vice President George Bush told CWC negotiators in 
Geneva on April 18, 1984:

          For a chemical weapons ban to work, each party must 
        have confidence that the other parties are abiding by 
        it * * * No sensible government enters into those 
        international contracts known as treaties unless it can 
        ascertain--or verify--that it is getting what it 
        contracted for.

    In ascertaining the ``verifiability'' of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, however, the Executive Branch and the 
Senate must do more than simply determine that the United 
States is ``getting what it is contracted for.'' The U.S. 
Government must also assess both the ``military significance'' 
of possible violations and the probability of timely detection 
of these violations. In turn, this entails determining the 
degree of risk to U.S. national security that would be posed by 
possible violations and the timeliness of the warning that the 
United States would require in order to respond effectively.
    It is the responsibility of the intelligence community to 
assess U.S. capability to monitor the compliance of other 
parties to the Convention. In the past, such assessments have 
been derived taking into account various cheating scenarios and 
the implications of non-compliance. Other Executive branch 
agencies share the responsibility for considering the military 
significance of non-compliance in determining whether or not a 
treaty is ``effectively verifiable.''
    On the basis of administration testimony, our review of 
classified information, and our understanding of the 
widespread, dual-use nature of chemicals with weapons 
applications, we must conclude that not only is the Chemical 
Weapons Convention not effectively verifiable--it is not even 
minimally verifiable.

Standards of effective verification

    A cogent definition of ``effective verification'' was 
offered the Committee during its consideration of the 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1988 by Ambassador 
Paul Nitze:

          What do we mean by effective verification? We mean 
        that we want to be sure that, if the other side moves 
        beyond the limits of the Treaty in any militarily 
        significant way, we would be able to detect such 
        violation in time to respond effectively and thereby 
        deny the other side the benefit of the violation.

The standard for effective verification was reaffirmed and 
clarified by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, Major General William Burns, in testimony before the 
Committee on January 24, 1989 on ongoing negotiations for a 
multilateral chemical weapons ban:

          What is effective verification? It is a system by 
        which we can have a high level of assurance that we 
        will be able to detect a violation of the terms of the 
        treaty early enough so we can do something about it. 
        That is sort of a simple layman's definition, I think, 
        of effective verification.

Secretary of State James Baker further elaborated upon the 
nature of an effective verification regime when responding to a 
question from Senator Pell on the START Treaty in January, 
1992:

          A key criterion in evaluating whether the START 
        agreement is effectively verifiable is whether, if the 
        other side attempts to move beyond the limits of the 
        Treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be 
        able to detect such a violation well before it became a 
        threat to national security so that we are able to 
        respond. Additionally, the verification regime should 
        enable us to detect patterns of marginal violations 
        that do not present immediate risk to U.S. security. 
        However, no verification regime can be expected to 
        provide firm guarantees that all violations will be 
        detected immediately.

Administration views on effective verification of the CWC

    Certainly previous administrations have developed a 
yardstick of effective verification during Senate deliberations 
over other arms control treaties. The committee noted as much 
in Executive Report 102-53 in evaluating the verifiability of 
the START Treaty. However, with the CWC the Clinton 
administration has deviated from its predecessor's definition 
of effective verification. As can be seen in the aforementioned 
quotes, ``effective verification'' consisted of: (1) a ``high 
level of assurance'' in the intelligence community's ability to 
detect (2) a ``militarily significant'' violation in (3) a 
``timely fashion.'' Moreover, an effective verification regime 
should, according to Secretary of State Baker's testimony, 
provide detection of patterns of marginal violation. These, 
then, are the elements of the standard of effective 
verification put forward in the 1980s during Senate 
consideration of previous arms control treaties. The term 
``effective verification'' itself arose from Senate insistence 
upon more stringent conditions than the standard at the time--
``adequate verification.''
    The committee received testimony in open sessions on the 
verifiability of the CWC from a number of administration 
witnesses. In nearly every appearance by Clinton administration 
witnesses, the committee was told that the CWC is ``effectively 
verifiable.'' The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, John Holum, stated on March 22, 1994, that ``We are 
quite confident that the treaty is effectively verifiable.'' 
Walter Slocombe, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
echoed this judgment on May 13, 1994, when he stated: ``No 
treaty is 100 percent verifiable. But the Chemical Weapons 
Convention is effectively verifiable.''
    Yet simply saying that the CWC is effectively verifiable 
does not necessarily make it so. We believe, in light of other 
testimony, that the Clinton administration is using a far 
different yardstick when it assesses the effectiveness of the 
CWC's verification regime. In particular, the administration 
has repeatedly noted that it does not have a high degree of 
assurance/confidence in its ability to detect noncompliance. 
Nor, for that matter, has the administration indicated 
confidence in the ability of the intelligence community to 
detect small-scale production or patterns of ``marginal 
violation.'' In short, the new definition of ``effective 
verifiability'' seems less akin to the high standard set in the 
late 1980's, and more similar to the less stringent standard of 
``adequate verifiability'' adopted during the Carter 
administration.
    In this vein, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense, John 
Deutch, testified before the Armed Services Committee on August 
11, 1994, that:

          Over time, through its declaration, routine 
        inspection, fact finding, consultation, and challenge 
        inspection mechanisms, the CWC's verification regime 
        should prove reasonably effective [emphasis added].

Degrees of confidence

    In 1989, the United States made a major diplomatic ``push'' 
to move forward multilateral negotiations on a global chemical 
weapons treaty. At that time, administration witnesses raised 
concerns before the committee suggesting that a multilateral 
treaty banning chemical weapons would be extremely difficult to 
verify. On March 1, 1989, in response to a question by Senator 
Pell asking if a chemical weapons ban could be monitored 
sufficiently so as to ensure detection of a violation, the 
then-Director of Central Intelligence, William Webster, stated:

          As I said earlier, it is the most difficult challenge 
        that we have in the intelligence community. These 
        plants all can be converted. You can make a plant that 
        will look like a fertilizer plant or a pharmaceutical 
        plant.
          In all the negotiations, we have been talking 
        verification as a very important part of any kind of 
        multilateral treaty. But this, in itself, is going to 
        be costly and difficult, and, presently, the level of 
        confidence is quite low [emphasis added], because, 
        unless you can go anywhere, any time, these plants can 
        be cleaned out and made to look like a legitimate 
        enterprise on very short notice.
          There are some clear intelligence indicators, but 
        they can be removed.

Major General William Burns, Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, testified on January 24, 1989, that:

          The crucial issue, then, is verification. I believe 
        that verification of any chemical ban is going to be 
        extremely difficult. Probably more difficult than 
        verification of a strategic nuclear arms treaty.

General Burns further noted, in response to a question by 
Senator Lugar, that:

          Senator, I would not go so far as to say that a 
        treaty, because of its ultimate intention or overall 
        worth, should be accepted with a marginal capability to 
        verify it. I think, if we are going to sign a treaty in 
        arms control, it cannot be based on trust; it must be 
        based on verification.
          So, I would not advocate the signing of a chemical 
        convention banning chemical weapons, unless we are sure 
        that we had an effective means to ensure that the 
        signatories would abide by the treaty.

Five years later, the intelligence community was unable to 
provide the committee with assurances that the CWC could be 
monitored with a sufficient degree of confidence to detect 
noncompliance. The then-Director of Central Intelligence, James 
Woolsey, declared in testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on June 23, 1994:

          The chemical weapons problem is so difficult from an 
        intelligence perspective, that I cannot state that we 
        have high confidence in our ability to detect 
        noncompliance, especially on a small scale [emphasis 
        added].

Walter Slocombe, Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, Department 
of Defense, testified before the Committee on May 13, 1994 
that:

          Detecting illicit production of small quantities of 
        chemical weapons will admittedly be extremely 
        difficult, not least because of substantial overlap in 
        the technology for producing chemical weapons and the 
        technology for producing many industrial chemicals.
          However, we are confident that we would be able to 
        detect large-scale production, filling, and stockpiling 
        of chemical weapons.

On August 9, 1994, in testimony before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Major General John Landry, National 
Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces, stated:

          As I have indicated in the briefing on monitoring, we 
        are concerned about our ability to monitor prohibited 
        activities. * * * in fact, to the extent that they 
        maintain smaller, covert programs, it's very difficult 
        to detect, indeed.

General Landry further added:

          * * * if we have never detected before a state as 
        having a program, and so it has remained undetected, a 
        covert program, and you are asking me can we detect it, 
        I am telling you that it is very difficult.

Similarly, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch, 
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on August 
11, 1994, that:

          * * * I think both General Shalikashvilli and I have 
        been clear that this treaty is not perfectly 
        verifiable.
          There are certain kinds of surreptitious production 
        of chemical agents that would be possible in this 
        regime, and the verification schemes which were set up 
        in the treaty, in our judgment, would not capture with 
        100 percent certainty, even taking into account the 
        very intrusive challenge inspection provisions allowed.

Finally, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in accordance 
with Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 
submitted an interagency report on March 18, 1994, entitled 
``Chemical Weapons Convention Verification.'' That assessment 
made the following determination:

          The verification provisions of the CWC, in 
        combination with national intelligence means * * * are 
        insufficient to detect, with a high degree of 
        confidence, all activities prohibited under the 
        Convention [emphasis added]. The larger and more 
        systematic the violations, the higher the probability 
        that, over time, evidence of these would surface. The * 
        * * existence of a program with the scope and size of 
        the former Soviet Union's would be difficult to 
        completely conceal under the Convention.

While it may be true, as the administration has repeatedly 
asserted, that it would be difficult to conceal the existence 
of a program the scope and size of the former Soviet Union's, 
most countries that envision a need for chemical weapons hardly 
intend to wage World War III and conquer Western Europe. A 
country desirous of developing a militarily significant 
stockpile of chemical agent need not engage in a program 
anything like that undertaken by the former Soviet Union.

Military significance and timely detection

    The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John 
Shalikashvilli, testified before both the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Senate Committee on Armed Services 
that the determination of military significance with respect to 
chemical weapons does not readily translate to a single, 
quantifiable answer. In testimony before the Foreign Relations 
Committee on June 23, 1994, General Shalikashvilli noted:

          A militarily significant quantity of chemical weapons 
        is very situationally dependent. Variables involved in 
        determining this quantity are the military objective, 
        weather, terrain, number of troops, type of chemical 
        agent used, the chemical agent weapons system, and 
        method of employment. And in the chemical weapons 
        defensive capability of the targeted force.

General Shalikashvilli clarified this view, however, in 
response to a question later during his testimony, when he 
noted that ``clearly, one SCUD missile containing roughly half 
a ton of chemical is militarily significant to those on whom 
that missile lands.''
    In earlier testimony before the Armed Services Committee, 
on August 11, 1994, General Shalikashvilli stated that:

          In certain limited circumstances even one ton of 
        chemical agent may have a military impact * * * With 
        such variables in scale of target and impact of 
        chemical weapons, the United States should be resolute 
        that the 1 ton limit set by the Convention will be our 
        guide.

    The bottomline is that a stockpile less than 100 tons of 
chemical agent can prove of military significance. Unclassified 
portions of the National Intelligence Estimate on U.S. 
Monitoring Capabilities indicate that it is unlikely that the 
U.S. will be able to detect or address violations in a timely 
fashion, if at all, when they occur on a small scale. And yet, 
even small-scale diversions of chemicals to chemical weapons 
production are capable, over time, of yielding a stockpile far 
in excess of a single ton.
    In other words, the intelligence community has low 
confidence in its ability to detect in a timely fashion the 
covert production of chemical weapons which could produce 
militarily significant quantities. This is not ``effective 
verification.''

The CWC verification regime

    According to a 1989 RAND study, ``Domestic Implementation 
of a Chemical Weapons Treaty,'' the CWC verification regime is 
intended to serve five primary functions:
          1. assure the destruction of existing chemical-
        weapons stocks and production facilities;
          2. detect violation through rigorous accounting and 
        monitoring;
          3. deter noncompliance by increasing the economic and 
        political costs of cheating;
          4. build confidence in the regime by demonstrating 
        that States Parties are abiding by their treaty 
        obligations; and
          5. provide strategic warning of a country's intent to 
        violate the treaty so that the other Parties can take 
        defensive measures.
The conclusions of the RAND study were more or less echoed in 
the statements of Administration witnesses. Most significantly, 
the Administration argued that some of the verification 
problems associated with the CWC were more than offset by the 
value of the verification regime as a deterrent and confidence-
building measure. In testimony before the Committee on June 23, 
1994, then-Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey 
noted:

          One question you might wish to consider is whether 
        the CWC will act as a deterrent for some states party 
        who might otherwise have initiated or retained chemical 
        weapons programs. In our judgment, the answer is yes.

Similarly, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, John Holum, stated that on June 23, 1994 that ``rigor 
of verification was an important value but was not the sole 
value.''
    Incorporating all of these objectives, the intelligence 
community has categorized its responsibilities under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention according to three specific tasks:
          Detecting activities prohibited under the Convention, 
        such as the development, testing, production, storage, 
        transfer, or use of chemical weapons;
          Assessing data declarations to the OPCW made by 
        States Parties; and
          Monitoring eliminations and conversions.
            Detecting prohibited activities
    The first of these tasks, detection of chemical weapons-
related activities, is a function already performed by the 
intelligence community. It also is a task about which the 
intelligence community has very low confidences in its ability 
to detect the production of chemical weapons. In discussing the 
United States' ability to track the proliferation of chemical 
weapons that General Landry noted, in testimony before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee on August 9, 1994, that:

          * * * we will talk specifically about our ability to 
        detect prohibited activities. This is at once our most 
        critical challenge and our most difficult task. The 
        community has taken the position that we have [deleted] 
        in our ability to detect prohibited activities.
          * * * Now, when you ask why it is that this is such a 
        difficult task, it is because the national technical 
        means at our disposal [deleted]. I am talking now about 
        overhead reconnaissance means, both imagery and SIGINT 
        * * *
          When you look at the other means available to the 
        intelligence community, for example, HUMINT, it is 
        potentially the most important of the means available 
        to us * * *. Unfortunately, HUMINT is very difficult to 
        rely upon * * *. In addition to that, you cannot 
        program HUMINT the way you can national technical 
        means, and frankly, the reporting lags the event fairly 
        significantly.
          * * * There are other means that we have that today 
        give us some results, not as much as we would like. But 
        in the future they will give us a much better 
        capability, and we are staking much of our hopes on 
        those.

In general, the intelligence community has poor confidence in 
its ability to detect prohibited activities, stemming from 
three aspects of the chemical weapons problem: (1) the large 
number of sites involved in chemical activities worldwide; (2) 
the dual-use nature of chemical manufacturing and production; 
and (3) the fact that most prohibited activity can be easily 
concealed or disguised. The most significant cheating 
activities for which no adequate technical means of detection 
exist are:
          development of clandestine production facilities 
        (which may have no observable features and which can be 
        quite small if devoted solely to agent production);
          diversion of common chemicals with chemical weapons 
        applications;
          production of non-classical agents which are not on 
        the CWC's Schedules and therefore are beyond the 
        capability of inspectors to detect;
          stockpiling of chemical munitions which are, 
        according to the OTA, ``small, impossible to 
        distinguish visually from high-explosive shells, and 
        easy to conceal;'' and
          development of binary agents which can be stored 
        separately and readily explained as stored commercial 
        chemicals.
    According to a study prepared under contract from the 
Defense Nuclear Agency by former ACDA Assistant Director 
Kathleen Bailey and six others, entitled ``Noncompliance 
Scenarios: Means By Which Parties to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention Might Cheat,'' ``cheating on the Chemical Weapons 
Convention can be technically easy and relatively 
inexpensive.'' Using an area 40' x 40', a small portion of 
which must be 40' high, a group of skilled chemists and 
chemical engineers could produce 100 tons/year of an agent 
utilizing chemical processes described extensively in open 
literature and using equipment commonly found in university 
laboratories. It would cost less than $2 million to build such 
a plant to produce mustard phosgene, for instance. Indeed, as 
the Aum Shinrikyo experience demonstrated, an even smaller area 
with far more crude equipment may yield significant quantities 
of agent.
            Assessing data declarations
    The CWC requires initial and annual data declarations on 
all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production/storage 
facilities and on all facilities that produce quantities of 
certain types of chemicals beyond various thresholds. It falls 
to the intelligence community to assess the veracity of data 
supplied to the OPCW by various member states. The intelligence 
community's monitoring confidences regarding this aspect of the 
CWC are dependent upon: (1) access to the declarations made by 
other states parties; and (2) the adequacy of baseline 
information against which data declarations may be compared. In 
the words of General Landry, the National Intelligence Officer 
for General Purpose Forces, assessment will be hampered by 
``many shortfalls in baseline knowledge * * * ''
    ACDA's report on CWC verification notes that:

          The U.S. will be able to verify the veracity of 
        declarations with a degree of confidence which will 
        vary with the State Party, the specific type of 
        declaration, the effectiveness of the inspection 
        regime, and the availability of parallel intelligence.

    A January 18, 1994 ``Red Team'' assessment, ``Chemical 
Weapons Convention Verifiability Assessment,'' prepared by 
former ACDA assistant director Manfred Eimer and five others 
under contract to ACDA, concluded that the CWC would be forced 
to cover far too many chemical plants to prove highly 
verifiable, and that therefore:

          * * * the minimum reporting and production limits 
        have been set well above what constitutes a militarily 
        significant amount of agent, removing potentially 
        dangerous sites from the possibility of routine 
        surveillance and its deterrent effect.

In other words, because verification of the CWC is bedeviled by 
the dual-use nature of chemicals in general, and by the 
relative ease with which chemical weapons precursors may be 
acquired, a truly verifiable regime would have required data 
declarations from a far greater number of businesses. 
Accordingly, we assess the contribution of the data declaration 
regime of the CWC to U.S. monitoring of the chemical weapons 
problem to be minimal. However, it is conceivable that the data 
declaration requirements of the CWC may encourage ``whistle 
blowers'' to reveal questionable or undeclared activities.
            Monitoring eliminations and conversion
    The intelligence community has a greater degree of 
confidence in its ability to verify the destruction of chemical 
weapons and agent stocks than it does in the other monitoring 
requirements associated with the CWC. Given adequate access, 
routine monitoring to check data declarations, systematic 
inspections of chemical weapons storage, production and 
destruction facilities, the intelligence community should be 
able to determine, with a fair degree of assurance, that 
declared stocks and facilities have been destroyed.
    Ensuring continuing compliance at converted facilities, 
however, faces similar problems as those associated with the 
detection of prohibited activities. As General Landry noted to 
the Armed Services Committee, ``It is when you get into the 
issue of conversion of facilities and your ability to assure 
yourself that those facilities will remain unrelated to 
chemical warfare programs that we have some concern.''
    We are concerned with the intelligence community's low 
confidences regarding compliance at converted facilities in 
light of the fact that the Defense Intelligence Agency stated 
on May 6, 1996, that Russia will seek to retain a ``core 
capability'' in the form of a ``production mobilization'' 
capability.
    Andrei Zheleznyakov, a Russian scientist involved in 
Russia's binary weapons program, commented to The Wall Street 
Journal that ``the generals cannot be trusted with the 
destruction of chemical weapons. The money received from the 
Americans will definitely be channeled into the development of 
new and more powerful toxic substances.'' Even more disturbing, 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) drafted a report in May, 
1995, documenting its finding that U.S. defense conversion 
assistance was being channeled by Russia into chemical weapons 
research. According to the GAO:

          Recipients of two Center grants at three different 
        institutes told us they had been involved in nuclear 
        weapons testing and nerve agent research. They noted 
        that the grants were important in redirecting their 
        research and helping them survive the current economic 
        conditions.
          * * * We found that Center-supported scientists are 
        not necessarily employed full-time on Center projects 
        and that they may spend part of their time working on 
        Russian weapons of mass destruction. They may remain 
        employed by FSU laboratories and most work less than 
        100 percent of their time on Center projects. Some work 
        as little as ten percent--raising the prospect that 
        they could spend the remainder of their time on their 
        institutes'' work on weapons of mass destruction.

    The GAO assessment is particularly troubling given the 
Defense Intelligence Agency's May 6, 1996, acknowledgment to 
the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
that Russia intends to produce chemical weapons, regardless of 
whether or not it ratifies the CWC:

          While some parts of the infrastructure of the Soviet/
        Russian CW program have been downsized and 
        restructured, a core capability may be retained. The 
        future Russian CW program will rely more on the 
        technology to rapidly mobilize production and less on 
        the manufacture and retention of large quantities of 
        war material.

Furthermore, both the GAO and DIA studies would seem to lend 
credence to allegations made by several Russian dissidents in a 
letter to Senator Helms on August 25, 1994. At that time, the 
President of Resistance International, Mikhail Makarenko, 
wrote:

          General Kuntsevich announced at a press conference at 
        the beginning of 1992: ``In Russia all problems of 
        bacteriological warfare have come to an end. We have no 
        stockpiles of biological weapons, consequently there is 
        no problem with their destruction.'' Nevertheless, 
        Russia's capability of waging biological warfare has 
        been preserved. It has not decreased by one millimeter.
          For that reason, there exists a mobility branch in 
        the State Concern ``Biopreparat'' and a mobility plan 
        which covers what quantities and what formulae are 
        necessary to immediately start up again production of 
        the biological weapon ``S.Pl.2,'' upon receipt of 
        orders from the military. To begin this production 
        requires only a few weeks.
          All equipment is now in a preserved state, in special 
        workshops at biochemical production centers functioning 
        today.
          These workshops are standing ready at chemical 
        factories--in the Berdsk and Omutninsk chemical 
        factories and the ``Progress'' chemical factory and at 
        others.

We should not allow Russia to convert to commercial uses any 
facility if we cannot be completely confident that a 
mobilization capability will not be maintained and that 
clandestine production will not occur at that plant.

Challenge inspections

    The CWC provides for challenge inspections at any location 
for the purpose of resolving questions of noncompliance. A 
request for a challenge inspection must be submitted to the 
Executive Council and to the Director-General of the Technical 
Secretariat, along with evidence supporting the request. The 
CWC requires that the Executive Council may either approve the 
request or, within 12 hours after receipt of the request, 
decide (by a three-quarter majority vote of all its members) 
against carrying out the challenge inspection. Given the 
impossible odds of mobilizing 31 of 41 members of the Council 
to vote against a request 12 hours after it is issued, it is 
expected that most challenge inspections will proceed.
    Following the conduct of a challenge inspection, the 
Executive Council will review the final report and, in addition 
to making compliance determinations, will address concerns as 
to whether the request was within the scope of the Convention 
and whether the right to request a challenge inspection was 
abused. If the Executive Council concludes that there was 
abuse, it may recommend to the conference measures to be taken 
against the requesting party, to include the assessment to the 
requesting party all or a portion of the costs of the 
inspection.
    The CWC seeks to balance the need for intrusiveness to 
verify compliance with the need for protection of sensitive 
information of national security or commercial, proprietary 
concern. Accordingly, the party to be inspected is obligated to 
accept a challenge inspection. At the same time, the Convention 
provides for managed--rather than unrestricted--access to a 
challenged site. The CWC specifies time-frames of access, 
limitations on observers, and a process of negotiated access 
on-site.
    The problem with this is that CWC challenge inspections, 
while perfectly suitable for stealing trade secrets, possess 
timeframes and loopholes that render extremely unlikely the 
detection of a ``smoking gun.'' The CWC requires the OPCW to 
provide an inspected State Party a minimum of 12 hours notice 
prior to the arrival of an inspection team at the point of 
entry. For declared facilities, the inspected party must 
provide the inspection team access to the site within 27 hours 
after the team's arrival at the point of entry. Thus a 
inspected State Party will have a minimum of 39 hours warning 
of an inspection at a declared facility, assuming that the 
Director General dispatches an inspection team immediately (the 
requirement for him to do so is not specified in the treaty).
    For inspections of an undeclared facility, the inspected 
country will again be given at least twelve hours advance 
notice, and may take up to 108 hours to allow access of the 
inspection team within the perimeter of the site. In other 
words, a country may delay access to the interior of an 
undeclared site for 4.5 days, and will have at least 5 days 
advance warning.
    On March 1, 1989, then-Director of Central Intelligence, 
Judge William Webster, drew the Committee's attention to how 
little time is required to successfully conceal evidence of 
chemical weapons production:

          Because much of the equipment needed to produce 
        chemical warfare agents can also be used to produce 
        legitimate industrial chemicals, any pharmaceutical or 
        pesticide plant can be converted to produce these 
        agents. A nation with even a modest chemical industry 
        could use its facilities for part-time production of 
        chemical warfare agents.
          Libyan leader Qadhafi, in a speech delivered in 
        October, claimed that the facility at Rabta is intended 
        to produce pharmaceuticals, not chemical warfare 
        agents. He proposed opening the complex for 
        international inspection. But within fewer than 24 
        hours, some say 8\1/2\ hours, it would be relatively 
        easy for the Libyans to make the site appear to be a 
        pharmaceutical facility. All traces of chemical weapons 
        production could be removed in that amount of time.

Furthermore, delays ranging between two to sixteen hours have 
proven problematic for U.N. inspectors in Iraq in their efforts 
to detect Iraqi chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic 
missile activities. A 5-day delay would allow ample time to 
pursue concealment activities, such as producing pesticides on 
a line used to manufacture nerve agent (e.g., production of the 
pesticide methyl-parathion instead of the nerve agent sarin).
    General John Landry, National Intelligence Officer for 
General Purpose Forces, highlighted the problem posed by delays 
for the Armed Services Committee on August 9, 1994:

          Data declarations and the routine inspections will 
        give us some degree of assurance. The most important of 
        those, however, are the challenge inspections at 
        undeclared sites, at which we would have the 
        opportunity to tag munitions, to sample at the 
        perimeters that have been identified, and to inspect 
        commercial production facilities. Our concern here are 
        delays.
          For example, under the current provisions that are 
        being worked out, those delays could take up to five 
        days, and there is a provision called ``managed 
        access,'' in which the perimeter of a challenge state's 
        area which we could sample would be chosen by the state 
        itself * * * These, in fact, limit the selection 
        against these targets that we are concerned with.
In addition to these concerns, once at the site, the challenge 
inspection period is limited to 84 hours, and can be extended 
only by agreement with the inspected party. Further, while the 
requesting party can also request to have an observer accompany 
the inspection team, the inspected party may disapprove the 
observer's participation, or limit the access and activities of 
the observer to the site perimeter.
    In sum, the inspected party has the final say in 
determining: (1) the extent of access to any particular place 
or places within the final or requested perimeters; (2) the 
particular inspection activities (including sampling); (3) the 
performance of particular activities by the inspected party; 
and (4) the provision of particular information. Nonetheless, 
the inspected party is under the obligation to make every 
reasonable effort to respond to the concerns underlying the 
request, including offering alternate means to resolve 
concerns.

Universality

    In testimony before the Governmental Affairs Committee on 
February 24, 1993, the then-Director of Central Intelligence, 
James Woolsey, stated:

          More than two dozen countries have programs to 
        research or develop chemical weapons, and a number have 
        stockpiled such weapons, including Libya, Iran, and 
        Iraq. The military competition in the always volatile 
        Middle East has spurred others in the region to develop 
        chemical weapons. We have also noted a disturbing 
        pattern of biological weapons development following 
        closely on the heels of the development of chemical 
        weapons.

    Further details were provided in testimony before the Armed 
Services Committee on August 9, 1994, by General John Landry 
and members of the intelligence community. They identified 15 
countries as having active programs. Six additional states were 
classified as having either inactive programs, or as being 
cases where insufficient information existed to make a 
determination on the existence of a program. In March, 1995, 
the Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency 
released an unclassified estimate that gave a troubling 
assessment of the likely impact the CWC would have upon the 
proliferation of chemical weapons:

          A number of states continue to pursue the development 
        or enhancement of a chemical weapons (CW) capability. 
        Some states have chosen to pursue a CW capability 
        because of the relatively low cost of--and low 
        technology required for--CW production. Moreover, they 
        believe that a CW capability can serve as both a 
        deterrent to enemy attack and as an enhancement of 
        their offensive military capabilities. Currently, at 
        least fifteen countries have an offensive CW program at 
        some level of development. The most aggressive chemical 
        weapons programs are in Iran, Libya, and Syria.
          CW proliferation will continue to be a serious threat 
        for at least the remainder of the decade, despite a 
        number of arms control efforts, such as the Chemical 
        Weapons Convention (CWC). Several countries of 
        proliferation concern--including Libya, Syria, and 
        Iraq--have so far refused to sign the CWC, and some CW-
        capable countries that have signed the CWC show no 
        signs of ending their programs.

    While the intent of the CWC is to create a global chemical 
weapons ban, some believe accomplishing that goal unlikely. Six 
countries with chemical weapons programs--including all of 
those with ``aggressive programs''--have not yet signed the 
CWC, let alone ratified it. In this medium we are able to 
discuss eleven countries believed to possess ongoing, offensive 
chemical weapons capabilities have not ratified the Convention.

    Countries believed to possess chemical weapons capability 
that have not ratified the CWC: China \1\, Iraq, Pakistan \1\, 
Egypt, Israel \1\, Russia \1\, Taiwan, Libya, Syria, Iran \1\, 
and North Korea.

    \1\ Indicates the country is a signatory to the CWC.

The following information is drawn from Administration 
testimony, reports to the Congress, and a report by the Russian 
Foreign Intelligence Service. We have included this section to 
demonstrate: (1) that the countries possessing chemical weapons 
will not be bound by the CWC; (2) that they will continue to 
pursue chemical weapons regardless of whether or not the treaty 
is ratified by the United States; and (3) these countries will 
be only marginally hampered by outside efforts to constrain 
their access to chemical weapons precursors. Some of them, such 
as Libya, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, are already subject to 
the most stringent sanctions regimes imaginable--and still 
their production of chemical weapons continues apace.
            China
    According to an April, 1996, report issued by the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response:
          China has a mature chemical warfare capability and 
        may well have maintained the biological warfare program 
        it had prior to acceding to the Biological Weapons 
        Convention in 1984. It has funded a chemical warfare 
        program since the 1950s and has produced and weaponized 
        a wide variety of agents. Its biological warfare 
        program included manufacturing infectious micro-
        organisms and toxins. China has a wide variety of 
        delivery means available, including ballistic and 
        cruise missiles and aircraft, and is continuing to 
        develop systems with upgraded capabilities.
        * * * In the past, China has exported chemical warfare-
        related material and missile technology and components 
        to Iran.
China has signed, but has not ratified the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
            Egypt
      The Russian Federation's Foreign Intelligence Service 
released a report in March, 1993, entitled A New Challenge 
After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. The report concluded that Egypt:

        * * * has the scientific and industrial base that is 
        sufficient for the production of certain types of 
        chemical weapons involving the use of local and 
        imported raw materials. Specifically, techniques for 
        the production of nerve and blister agents have been 
        assimilated. There is information to the effect that 
        Egypt is displaying interest in overseas purchases of 
        warheads for liquid chemical agents. The stockpiles of 
        chemical agents available at this time are insufficient 
        for broad-based operations, but the industrial 
        potential would make it possible to produce additional 
        quantities in a relatively short period of time. The 
        substantial industrial capacity for the manufacture of 
        pesticides using techniques similar to chemical agent 
        production processes are a significant reserve for 
        chemical weapons production.

Egypt has neither signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
            Iran
    On March 1, 1989, the then-Director of Central 
Intelligence, Judge William Webster, testified that:

          Iran's chemical weapons production facility is 
        located in the vicinity of Teheran.
          Iran produces the blister agent mustard, blood 
        agents, and nerve agents, and, like Iraq, has filled 
        some bombs and artillery with these agents.

Subsequently, then-Director Woolsey added additional 
information on February 24, 1993, in testimony before the 
Governmental Affairs Committee:

          Iran has an active chemical warfare program. It used 
        chemical weapons in response to Iraqi use during the 
        Iran/Iraq war, and it can still manufacture hundreds of 
        tons of chemical agent every year. Although it produces 
        primarily choking and blister agents, Iran may have a 
        stockpile of nerve agents. Biological weapons, if not 
        already in production, are probably not very far behind 
        there.

Director Woolsey additionally stated in a response to Senator 
McCain:

          Iran has produced at least several hundred tons of 
        blister, choking, and blood agents, and may have 
        produced as much as 2,000 tons of agent.

The Russian Federation's Foreign Intelligence Service reported 
in March, 1993, that:

          Iran possesses at least two types of chemical 
        weapons.
          During the Geneva conference to formulate a global 
        convention to ban chemical weapons, in 1992 Iran's 
        representatives confirmed the presence of chemical 
        weapons in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
          At present the industrial production of mustard gas 
        and sarin has been established in Iran. A plant for the 
        production of pesticides, which could be used as 
        precursors in the manufacture of nerve and blister 
        agents, operates not far from the capital.
          In terms of the assortment of starting chemicals, 
        Iran is partially dependent upon imports.
          The main chemical munition with which the Iranian 
        Army is equipped are 155 mm artillery shells for 
        American-made howitzers, 120 mm mines, and chemical 
        aerial bombs.
          Research is being conducted in the area of 
        synthesizing chemical agents and the search for new 
        physiologically active substances.

    Three years later, an April, 1996, report issued by the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and 
Response made available yet more unclassified information.

          Iran has been producing chemical agents at a steadily 
        increasing rate since 1984, and has cumulatively 
        produced at a minimum several hundred tons of blister, 
        blood, and choking agents. Tehran has weaponized some 
        of these chemical agents--a weapons stockpile to 
        support ground combat operations. In addition, Iran 
        could attempt to deliver chemical bombs against targets 
        such as airfields, ports, or oil installations across 
        the Persian Gulf.
          Iran has increased defensive and offensive chemical 
        warfare training for its ground forces in the last two 
        years. Furthermore, it is making efforts to buy 
        defensive chemical equipment from foreign sources, 
        perhaps as a prelude to acquiring indigenous production 
        capability.
          Although Iran has signed the CWC, its efforts to 
        establish an independent chemical production capability 
        and a wider program to put chemicals into battlefield 
        weapons cast doubt on its adherence to the agreement.

On May 10, 1996 the Central Intelligence Agency reported to the 
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that:

          Iran's CW program is already among the largest in the 
        Third World, yet it has continued to expand and become 
        more diversified, even since Tehran's signing of the 
        CWC in January 1993. Iran's stockpile is comprised of 
        several thousand tons of CW agents, including sulfur 
        mustard, phosgene, and cyanide agents, and Tehran is 
        capable of producing an additional 1,000 tons of these 
        agents each year. In addition, Iran is developing a 
        production capability for the more toxic nerve agents 
        and is pushing to reduce its dependence on imported raw 
        materials. Iran has various dissemination means for 
        these agents, including artillery, mortars, rockets, 
        aerial bombs, and, possibly, even Scud warheads.

We are particularly troubled with this last assessment. Iran is 
the only state with an ``aggressive'' chemical weapons program 
that has signed the CWC. It has not ratified, and it clearly 
has no intention of abiding by the treaty. The Defense 
Intelligence Agency noted on May 6, 1996, that ``As part of 
this expansion [of its CW program], Iran is making long-term 
capital improvements to its CW program, suggesting that it 
intents to maintain a CW- capability well into the future.''
    This latest DIA assessment reinforces comments made on 
November 1, 1995, by the Director of the Nonproliferation 
Center of the Central Intelligence Agency, Gordon Oehler, who 
testified before the Committee on Government Affairs that Iran 
``also is developing a production capability for precursor 
chemicals it needs to support chemical agent production, and 
within several years may become virtually independent of 
imported raw materials.''
            Iraq
    Judge Webster stated in 1989:

          At Samarra, Baghdad produces the blister agent 
        mustard and the nerve agents tabun and sarin. Several 
        types of weapons, including bombs and artillery shells 
        and rockets, have been filled with these agents.

In his written statement for the record before the Committee on 
Government Affairs on November 1, 1995, Gordon Oehler, Director 
of the Nonproliferation Center, stated:

          Iraq admitted producing 65 tons of chlorine, intended 
        for the production of VX, and had more than 200 tons 
        each of the precursor chemicals phosphorous 
        pentasulfide and diisopropylamine. Together, these 
        three precursors would have been sufficient to produce 
        almost 500 tons of VX.
          Iraq developed a true binary sarin-filled artillery 
        shell, 122-mm rockets, and aerial bombs in quantities 
        beyond the prototype level.
          An Al Husayn missile with a chemical warhead was 
        flight-tested in April 1990.

    Lieutenant General Hughes, Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, testified before the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence on February 22, 1996, that:

          We now know that Baghdad had a more extensive 
        chemical warfare effort than originally believed, 
        including the production of VX and binary sarin for 
        delivery by artillery, rockets, and aerial bombs.

    The April, 1996, Department of Defense report, 
Proliferation: Threat and Response, found:

          In the absence of UN monitoring or import controls, 
        Iraq could revive a viable chemical weapon capability 
        in a matter of months, despite war damage to its 
        production and storage facilities. The Iraqis still 
        have a domestic chemical industry, and converting some 
        of these plants from producing chemicals to producing 
        chemical warfare precursors and even agents would be 
        relatively straightforward. Iraq retains the capability 
        to deliver chemical agents using a variety of 
        munitions, including artillery shells and rockets, 
        aerial bombs, spray tanks, mortar rounds, and SCUD-type 
        missile warheads.
          Iraq's past use of chemical weapons demonstrates its 
        willingness to ignore international norms of conduct.

Iraq has neither signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
            Libya
    Then-Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, 
testified before the Governmental Affairs Committee on February 
24, 1993:

          Even as it publicly proclaims its good intentions, 
        Libya is constructing a second chemical weapons 
        production facility. The new facility recently 
        described in the media is yet another indicator of the 
        extent to which Libya--apparently unchastened--will go 
        to evade international attempts to prevent its 
        development of chemical weapons.

In a response to a question asked by Senator Levin, Director 
Woolsey added:

          Libya also is building a second CW agent plant near 
        Tarhunah and is attempting to establish an indigenous 
        precursor chemical production complex near Benghazi.
          We estimate that Libya has produced at least 100 tons 
        of CW agents, mostly the blister agent mustard and 
        smaller amounts of the nerve agent sarin. The Libyans 
        also could produce the more toxic nerve agent soman in 
        the future. In our judgement, Libya would use chemical 
        bombs to deliver its agents. It may intend to develop a 
        chemical warhead for missiles.

The Russian Federation's Foreign Intelligence Service reported 
in March, 1993, that:

          Libya has certain stocks of chemical weapons--70-80 
        tons. Until recently, certain types of chemical agents 
        (sarin, mustard gas, phosgene) were produced in Libya, 
        but in limited quantities. The stock of chemical agents 
        that has been produced is considered inadequate for 
        conducting large-scale combat operations. * * *
          Some experts are concerned about the construction of 
        a chemical plant in the Ubari area that is currently 
        under way. Nor can the possibility that research work 
        is continuing in the area of chemical weapons at the 
        facilities of the military research center in the 
        Gharyan region, where laboratory equipment and the 
        necessary chemical components purchased overseas are 
        concentrated, be ruled out.

    Most recently, the April, 1996 report issued by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense found:

          Although the Rabta facility appears inactive, Libya's 
        chemical weapons program continues to flourish. To 
        replace the Rabta facility, Libya has begun 
        constructing a large underground chemical warfare plant 
        near Tarhunah, a mountainous region about 60 kilometers 
        southeast of Tripoli. Putting the facility underground 
        masks its activities and increases its survivability in 
        case of attack. In the meantime, Libya will rely on 
        foreign sources for its precursor needs.
          Libya claims it will not sign the CWC as long as 
        other countries in the region possess NBC weapons. 
        Libya almost certainly will keep its chemical warfare 
        program as long as Qadhafi remains in power.

Libya has neither signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
            North Korea
    On February 23, 1993, then-Director of Central 
Intelligence, James Woolsey, provided a written response to a 
question by Senator McCain which stated:

        North Korea is capable of indigenously producing nerve 
        gas, blood agents, and mustard-gas that could be 
        delivered by mortars, artillery pieces, multiple rocket 
        launchers, and Scud missiles. In addition, the North 
        Korean Air Force probably has bombs capable of 
        delivering chemical agents. Several of North Korea's 
        large chemical complexes could be capable of producing 
        chemical agents, but we have little information on 
        possible production rates and types of munitions.

    Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service reported in March, 
1993, that:

          The information available to international experts 
        indicates that the DPRK has a program of military-
        applied work in the chemical area and an adequate 
        industrial base.

    The Department of Defense was more specific in its April, 
1996 report, Proliferation: Threat and Response:

          Since the late 1980's, North Korea has intensified 
        and expanded its chemical warfare program as part of 
        its military preparedness plan. Today, it can produce 
        large quantities of nerve, blister, and blood chemical 
        warfare agents, and it maintains a number of facilities 
        involved in producing or storing chemical precursors, 
        agents, and weapons.

North Korea has neither signed nor ratified the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.
            Pakistan
    The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation 
reported in March, 1993, that:

          There is no reliable information to indicate the 
        existence of chemical weapons in Pakistan. But research 
        of an applied military nature is being conducted in 
        this area.
          * * * Available information on Pakistani chemical and 
        biological enterprises shows that they--mainly in 
        pesticide production--are employing technologies that 
        can be used for producing precursors of chemical agents 
        for military purposes.
          * * * One of the new signs that prompt us to pay more 
        attention to the possible creation of several kinds of 
        chemical weapons is the purchase of large batches of 
        dual-use chemical raw materials. Thus there are reports 
        that phosphorous compounds used for creating chemical 
        weapons have been shipped into the country.
          * * * From assessments by Pakistani environmental 
        protection specialists, we have learned about 
        significant supplies of pesticides (tens of thousands 
        of tons in the provinces of Sindh and Punjab) which are 
        in long-term storage. Considering the constant shortage 
        of pesticides in the country's agriculture, there is no 
        explanation for the accumulation of these chemicals.

Pakistan has signed, but has not ratified, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
            Syria
    According to Judge Webster:

          Syria began producing chemical warfare agents and 
        munitions in the mid-1980's, and currently has a 
        chemical warfare production facility.
          Syria has nerve agents in some weapons systems. 
        Damascus conceals its program--it is quite closely 
        held--and, much like its Middle East neighbors, it is 
        quite likely to continue to expand its chemical warfare 
        capability.

The Russian Federation's Foreign Intelligence Service reported 
in March, 1993, that:

          Syria has a chemical weapons potential. The program 
        to organize the production of chemical weapons began 
        during the seventies. At that time the country created 
        a system for purchasing the appropriate equipment and 
        technologies from developed countries. Its main efforts 
        were concentrated on the creation of an industrial base 
        for the production of semifinished products necessary 
        for chemical agents for military purposes.
          At the present time, Syria has developed production 
        capacity for mustard gas and organophosphorous nerve 
        agents based on indigenous raw material and basic 
        semifinished products.
          It is typical that Syria does not regard the military 
        chemical agents available to the Syrian army as WMD. 
        According to Syrian military doctrine, military 
        chemical agents are components of military parity only 
        with Israel and will be used only in the event of 
        large-scale aggression by Israel against Syria.

Syria has neither signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
            Russia
    According to a May 6, 1996, letter from the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) to the Chairman of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence:

          Russia has the world's largest CW program. The 
        Russian stockpile includes over 40,000 tons of chemical 
        agent, most of which is in weapons including artillery, 
        rockets, bombs, and missiles. Russia may also have CW 
        stocks in excess of those declared.

    While Russia has signed the CWC, it has not ratified the 
treaty. Nor has Russia agreed to implement a six-year old U.S.-
Russian bilateral Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production 
of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the 
Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons (BDA). 
Indeed evidence has come to light recently suggesting that 
Russia never intends to implement the BDA, will not pursue 
ratification of the CWC in the near term, and does not intend 
to abide by the CWC if it ratifies.
    According to DIA:

          There are several factors affecting Russia's actions 
        regarding its CW programs and arms control commitments. 
        Russian officials probably believe they need a CW 
        capability to deter other nations from chemical 
        warfare. They cite a potential threat from purported CW 
        programs in the United States, other Western nations, 
        and several countries on or near Russia's borders.
          In addition, Russian officials believe that 
        dismantling the CW program would waste resources and 
        rob them of valuable production assets. They maintain 
        that the CW production facilities should not be 
        destroyed but be used to produce commercial products.
          Moreover, these officials do not want to see their 
        life's work destroyed, their jobs eliminated, and their 
        influence diminished.

    We are particularly concerned about the views of Russia's 
senior military leadership on the CWC, and on the elimination 
of Russia's chemical warfare capability in general. On numerous 
instances, the United States has received indications that key 
elements within the Russian government staunchly oppose the 
CWC. On October 25, 1994, for example, Dr. Lev Fyodorov, head 
of the Union for Chemical Security, told the Interfax news 
service that key officers from the Russian Ministry of Defense 
had spoken against the treaty during the Russian Duma Defense 
Committee's closed hearings on October 11, 1994.

Russian implementation of the BDA and intent to comply with the CWC

    The U.S.-Russian bilateral destruction agreement (BDA) was 
signed in June 1990 by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. It banned 
the production of chemical weapons agents; called for a 
reduction in U.S. and Russian stocks to 5,000 tons by 2002, 
requiring cuts of 80 percent in U.S. stocks and 90 percent in 
Russian stocks; and, significantly, provided for on-site 
inspections of storage, destruction and production facilities, 
combined with data declarations.
    We are concerned that the administration has refused to 
provide the Senate, despite two consecutive letters from the 
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, with an updated 
assessment of the Russian position regarding the BDA and the 
CWC. We understand that Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin 
wrote to Vice President Gore on July 8, 1996, stating that both 
the BDA and the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
have outlived their usefulness to Russia. Moreover, the Prime 
Minister (1) tied Russian ratification of the CWC to U.S. 
agreement to a Joint Statement linking ratification by the 
United States to Russian ratification, (2) stated that the 
American taxpayers must pay the cost of the Russian destruction 
program, and (3) linked ratification to U.S. acquiescence to 
Russia's position on conversion of its chemical weapons 
facilities. This shift in Russian arms control policy will have 
several important ramifications.
            Questions regarding the size of Russia's chemical weapons 
                    stockpile
    In October, 1994, President Clinton submitted a report to 
the Congress on Russia's commitment to comply with the 
Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. He noted that `` * 
* * Russia will have some difficulty fulfilling in a timely 
fashion its obligations under the CWC * * * Progress [in 
developing a comprehensive chemical weapons destruction 
program] has been disappointing.'' Further, the President 
observed that ``Russian implementation of the Wyoming MOU has 
been problematic,'' and that ``the United States continues to 
have concerns * * * '' The Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency's 1995 Pell Report amplified these concerns, noting that 
Russia has refused to accept the BDA's key provisions and has 
``taken a minimalist approach to declaration requirements and 
verification costs of CWC production facilities that is 
inconsistent with the CWC.''
    Of the minimalist approaches taken by Russia, one of 
serious concern is Russia's declaration on the Wyoming 
Memorandum of Understanding that the total size of its 
stockpiled chemical weapons was equivalent to 40,000 tons of 
agent. This declaration has prompted challenges of the veracity 
of Russian reporting. The Director of Central Intelligence, 
James Woolsey, testified before the Foreign Relations Committee 
on June 23, 1994, that the United States had ``serious concerns 
over apparent incompleteness, inconsistency and contradictory 
aspects of the data'' submitted by Russia under the Wyoming 
MOU. On August 27, 1993, Admiral William Studeman, acting 
Director of Central Intelligence, wrote to Senator Glenn 
stating:

          We cannot confirm that the Russian declaration of 
        40,000 mt is accurate. In addition, we cannot confirm 
        that the total stockpile is stored only at the seven 
        sites declared by the Soviets * * *

Articles in both The Washington Post and The Washington Times 
alleged that the Defense Intelligence Agency has estimated the 
Soviet stockpile could be as large as 75,000 metric tons.
    Omissions in Russia's MOU data declarations have clear 
implications for how Russia will interpret the various 
provisions of the CWC. Because the BDA mandates annual updates 
to the Wyoming MOU, Russian withdrawal from the BDA may also 
signal that Russia will henceforth refuse to entertain any 
additional U.S. questions about the size of its chemical 
weapons stockpile or its binary weapons program. We are 
concerned that Russia may intend to provide to the OPCW data 
which mirrors that provided under the Wyoming MOU. This would, 
in our view, serve as a clear indicator that Russia intends to 
violate the CWC.
            The Russian binary weapons program
    Russia has consistently refused to provide information on 
the status of its binary chemical weapons program. On June 23, 
1994, then-Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey 
declared that ``the data we have received from Russia makes no 
reference to binary chemical weapons or agents. That is 
contrary to our understanding of the program that was initiated 
by the former Soviet Union.''
    Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, former chief of counterintelligence at 
the State Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic 
Chemistry and Technology, has stated that the Russian 
Federation may continue work on novel nerve agents far more 
lethal than any other known chemical agents--``Substance A-
230,'' ``Substance 33,'' and ``Substance A-232.'' In an article 
in The Wall Street Journal on May 25, 1994, Dr. Mirzayanov 
wrote:

          It is very easy to produce binary weapons without 
        detection under the guise of agricultural 
        petrochemicals. The products easily pass all safety 
        tests and become registered with the government as 
        legitimate commercial products. The plant receives a 
        license for production and goes into operation. Neither 
        the firm's leaders, its staff, nor international 
        inspectors know that the chemicals are a component of a 
        new binary weapon.
          As the public talks toward banning chemical weapons 
        progressed, the more intense became Russia's secret 
        development and testing of binary weapons * * * our 
        laboratories created Substance A-230, a weapon about 
        which I can only say that its killing efficiency 
        surpassed any known military toxin by a factor of five 
        to eight.
          * * * Two more major achievements took place in 1990 
        and 1991. First, a binary weapon based on a compound 
        code-named Substance 33 passed site tests and was put 
        into production for the Soviet army.
          * * * The second development was the synthesis of a 
        binary weapon based on Substance A-232, a toxin similar 
        to A-230. This new weapon, part of the ultra-lethal 
        ``Novichok'' class, provides an opportunity for the 
        military establishment to disguise production of 
        components of binary weapons as common agricultural 
        chemicals; because the West does not know the formula, 
        and its inspectors cannot identify the compounds.
           * * * Fifteen thousand tons of Substance 33 have 
        been produced int he city of Novocheborksarsk * * * But 
        our generals have told the U.S. that Novocheborksarsk 
        is turning out another substance known as VX.

Dr. Mirzayanov and other dissident Russian scientists have 
claimed that Russia's binary weapons program has been 
specifically crafted to evade detection under the verification 
regime of the CWC. They allege that components for the binary 
agents have been given legitimate commercial applications, that 
they are not covered under the CWC's schedules, and that OPCW 
inspectors will not know what they are examining when they come 
across such chemicals.
            Confidence in monitoring Russian conversion of production 
                    facilities
    The BDA provides for U.S. on-site inspections of Russian 
storage, destruction and production facilities, combined with 
data declarations. We agree with the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence September 30, 1994, assessment that:

          The United States would gain real monitoring benefits 
        (and both sides could expect financial benefits) from 
        implementing the BDA, rather than relying upon the OPCW 
        alone to inspect declared Russian and U.S. facilities. 
        Finally, any resolution of Russia's desire to convert, 
        rather than destroy, its CW facilities could set a 
        precedent for conversion under the CWC that would be 
        used by other states.

In a written response on June 23, 1994, to questions for the 
record, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar stated that:

          As a means of assisting the development of the 
        multilateral CWC, and later as a complement to it, the 
        United States and the Former Soviet Union, and later 
        the Russian Federation, negotiated a separate bilateral 
        agreement providing for destruction and mutual 
        verification of their chemical weapons stockpiles.
          * * * In March, 1993, U.S. and Russian delegations 
        agreed ad referendum on detailed implementing 
        procedures and updated provisions for the BDA, 
        including allowing conversion of CW production 
        facilities (CWPF) consistent with CWC provisions. Since 
        that time, the Russian Federation has indicated that 
        they cannot accept some of these provisions and has 
        proposed significant changes, primarily to the portions 
        of the documents concerning conversion of former CWPF.

We assess Russian insistence on excluding several of its 
chemical weapons-related facilities from the BDA's definition 
of ``chemical weapons production facility,'' and hence from the 
CWC's definition, to relate directly to its aforementioned 
desire to maintain a clandestine chemical weapons production 
capability. We believe that the U.S. refusal to accede to the 
Russian position, which would have--in turn--strengthened the 
Russian case for CWPF conversions under the CWC, may be a 
primary reason that Russia has refused to implement the BDA.
    If the BDA is not implemented, the United States will be 
forced to verify Russian compliance with the CWC based upon a 
smaller number of inspections than anticipated under the 
bilateral arrangement, with inspections of Russian sites by the 
OPCW rather than by U.S. personnel, and with no guaranteed U.S. 
access to detailed inspection data. Without the bilateral 
inspection regime, the intelligence community's already poor 
confidence level in its ability to monitor Russian treaty 
compliance will fall even lower.
            The financial burden
    Lack of agreement on the BDA will create additional 
financial burdens for the member states of the Organization for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the United States in 
particular since the U.S. is slated to be assessed 25 percent 
of the OPCW's costs. The OPCW currently is planning under the 
assumption that the BDA will be in effect. On March 31, 1994, 
John Gee, Director of the Provisional Technical Secretariat 
(PTS) for the OPCW, stated that a key planning assumption of 
the PTS was that:

          the bilateral agreement of June 1990 between the 
        Russian Federation and the United States on destruction 
        and nonproduction of chemical weapons will be in force 
        and in the process of implementation. The commission 
        will recommend that the OPCW decide, pursuant to 
        articles IV and V of the convention, to limit 
        verification by the OPCW to measures complementary to 
        those to be undertaken under this agreement.

As Director Gee indicates, the CWC contains three specific 
provisions designed to allow bilateral, reciprocal inspections 
under the BDA to supplant international inspections of U.S. and 
Russian chemical weapons facilities.
    Without the BDA, which allows the U.S. and Russia to 
conduct verification of one another's destruction programs, the 
OPCW will need to increase the size of its international 
inspectorate by at least 92 personnel. The purchase of 
additional equipment and pay for additional inspectors will in 
turn drive up the expected costs of the regime (of which 70 
percent are associated with verification activities to begin 
with) by between $30-60 million per year. Moreover, the CWC 
requires States Parties to pay for monitoring of their chemical 
weapons production, storage, and disposal facilities. We can 
only predict that inspection by multinational, United Nations-
type organization will prove much more expensive than 
inspections by the professional inspectorate of the Russian 
Federation.

                            d. other issues

The Australia Group

    Many chemical weapon agents are easily produced. In the 
case of first-generation agents, the technology associated with 
production is over 80 years old, and readily available to most 
Third World countries. While later generations of chemical 
weapons--nerve agents in particular--are more difficult to 
produce (G-Series agents were first developed in the 1930's and 
V-Series in the 1950's), the technology necessary for research, 
development, and production of these chemical weapons is 
becoming increasingly available.
    One of the troubling aspects of chemical weapons production 
is its virtual indistinguishability from production for 
legitimate commercial purposes or for defensive chemical 
weapons research. The dual-use nature of chemical weapons 
derives both from the productive process, which involves the 
use of standard chemical equipment, and the inherent toxicity 
of many chemicals. Commercial and military programs both 
utilize reactor vessels, distillation columns and filters, heat 
exchangers, and a plethora of other pumps, pipes, and valves. 
Nowhere are the similarities greater than between pesticide and 
nerve agent production, stemming largely from the fact that 
nerve agents were initially developed during research on 
pesticides. As a consequence, many precursor chemicals for 
chemical weapons agents have important civil uses.
    The following chart illustrates two points: (1) the dual-
use nature of chemical weapons production, highlighting 20 of 
the 54 chemical precursors controlled by the Australia Group--
an informal organization comprised of 29 countries that are 
committed to ensuring that their exports do not contribute to 
the spread of chemical or biological weapons; and (2) that the 
CWC does not, and cannot, hope to control every chemical with 
potential chemical weapons applications.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Chemical               Commercial uses \1\     Military uses 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3-Hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine..  Reagent in manufacture  Not identified  
                                 of pharmaceuticals                     
                                 and bleach precursors.                 
Potassium fluoride............  Catalyst; Glass         GB, GD, GF      
                                 frosting and etching;                  
                                 Reagent for various                    
                                 chemical processes.                    
2-Chloroethanol...............  Agent used to sprout    HD, Q, Nitrogen 
                                 potatoes; Catalyst      mustard (HN-1) 
                                 for olefin                             
                                 polymerization;                        
                                 Reagent for various                    
                                 chemical processes.                    
Dimethylamine (DMA)...........  Acid gas absorbent;     GA              
                                 Additive in                            
                                 electroplating and                     
                                 antioxidants; Reagent                  
                                 for various chemical                   
                                 processes.                             
Dimethylamine hydrochloride...  Ingredient in ink-jet   GA              
                                 printing solutions;                    
                                 Reagent for various                    
                                 chemical processes.                    
Hydrogen fluoride.............  Solvent extraction;     GB, GD, GE, GF  
                                 Catalyst in petroleum                  
                                 alkylation process;                    
                                 Reagent for various                    
                                 chemical processes.                    
Methyl benzilate..............  Additive to             BZ              
                                 polyurethane; Reagent                  
                                 for various chemical                   
                                 processes.                             
3-Quinuclidone................  Coating stainless       BZ              
                                 stell with silicone;                   
                                 Reagent for various                    
                                 chemical processes.                    
Pinacolone....................  Separation of           GD              
                                 impurities from                        
                                 acrylic acid; Reagent                  
                                 for various chemical                   
                                 processes.                             
Potassium cyanide.............  Catalyst for benzoin    GA, Hydrogen    
                                 condensation;           cyanide        
                                 Fumigating agent;                      
                                 Reagent for various                    
                                 chemical processes.                    
Potassium bifluoride..........  Agent for etching,      GB, GD, GF      
                                 frosting and                           
                                 polishing glass.                       
Ammonium bifluoride...........  Agent to frost or       GB, GD, GF      
                                 polish glass; Reagent                  
                                 for various chemical                   
                                 processes.                             
Sodium fluoride...............  Agent used in           GB, GD, GF      
                                 fluoridation;                          
                                 Component of laundry                   
                                 sours; Reagent for                     
                                 various chemical                       
                                 processes.                             
Sodium bifluoride.............  Agent used in           GB, GD, GF      
                                 biological specimen                    
                                 preservation;                          
                                 Component of laundry                   
                                 sours; Reagent for                     
                                 various chemical                       
                                 processes.                             
Sodium cyanide................  Agent used for mineral  GA, Hydrogen    
                                 flotation; Fumigation   cyanide,       
                                 agent; Reagent for      Cyanogen       
                                 various chemical        chloride       
                                 processes.                             
Phosphorus pentasulfide.......  Ingredient in           VG, VX          
                                 pyrotechnic                            
                                 compositions; Reagent                  
                                 for various chemical                   
                                 processes.                             
Diisopropylamine (DIPA).......  Agent to remove acidic  VX              
                                 compounds from gases;                  
                                 Reagent for various                    
                                 chemical processes;                    
                                 Stabilizer.                            
Diethylaminoethanol (DEAE)....  Corrosion and rust      VG, VM          
                                 inhibitor; Curing                      
                                 agent for resins;                      
                                 Reagent for various                    
                                 chemical processes.                    
Sodium sulfide................  Flotation agent in ore  HD              
                                 processing; Reagent                    
                                 for various chemical                   
                                 processes; Reducing                    
                                 agent.                                 
Triethanolamine hydrochloride.  Catalyst for synthesis  Nitrogen        
                                 of imidized acrylic     mustard. (HN-3)
                                 polymers; Reagent for                  
                                 various chemical                       
                                 processes.                             
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Illustrative in some cases.                                         

    These chemicals, and others, are regulated by the Group 
because of their direct applicability to the formulation of 
chemical weapons. To date Australia Group members have 
instituted controls not only on 54 chemical precursors, but on 
related technical data, dual-use equipment, and other items 
that could be used for chemical weapons or biological weapons 
production.
    Because the CWC does not control all chemicals which may be 
used to formulate chemical weapons, and because most chemical 
weapons can be developed using a multiplicity of approaches 
(many chemicals involved in gold and silver extraction, for 
example, can be utilized to produce the nerve agent Tabun, but 
so too can Tabun be produced from pesticides), comprehensive 
controls would be difficult to institute. Accordingly, we 
believe that the Australia Group should remain a critical 
element of U.S. nonproliferation strategy regardless of whether 
the Senate consents to ratification of the CWC or not.
    We would note that the CWC's implementation of partial 
controls over a select group of chemicals for purposes of 
minimizing the effect upon commercial industry will not 
foreclose all avenues to the acquisition of a given chemical 
weapon. Complete controls over these chemicals, however, would 
have far reaching implications for a vast number of industries 
and productive processes. Thus regardless of the CWC, control 
over exports of dual-use chemicals to countries of chemical 
weapons proliferation concern--many of whom have neither signed 
nor ratified the CWC--will remain of paramount importance.
    The danger here is that the CWC actually holds the 
potential for accelerating the proliferation of chemical 
weapons by entitling parties to Western assistance in 
developing indigenous commercial chemical industries. Article 
XI, paragraph 2(c) of the CWC creates grounds for such concerns 
by stating that parties ``shall not maintain among themselves 
any restrictions, including those in any international 
agreements, incompatible with the obligations undertaken under 
this Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the 
development and promotion of scientific and technological 
knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial, 
agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other 
peaceful purposes.'' Paragraph 2(d) of Article XI also enjoins 
countries ``to not use this Convention to apply measures other 
than those provided for, or permitted, under this Convention * 
* *'' and Paragraph 2(e) requires each State Party to 
``undertake to review their existing national regulations in 
the field of trade in chemicals in order to render them 
consistent with the object and purpose of the [CWC].''
    Article XI further specifies that States Parties shall 
``undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate 
in, the fullest exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific 
and technical information relating to the development and 
application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention.'' This creates a controversy over the future of 
export control regulations as to whether: (a) to keep 
indefinitely existing export control measures at various levels 
(national, regional, and international, such as the Australia 
Group); (b) to maintain controls until the States Parties have 
evidence that an export control system functions under the CWC; 
or (c) upon entry into force to review all existing measures 
and abandon organizations such as the Australia Group. At the 
heart of this debate are different views on the purpose of the 
CWC. While the Administration has promoted the CWC as a non-
proliferation/arms control treaty, some clearly view the CWC as 
a treaty designed to facilitate trade in chemicals and 
technology.
    The debate continues in the PrepCom over the extent to 
which Article XI's injunction to ensure the ``free and 
unhampered transfer of chemicals'' for peaceful purposes should 
supersede the obligation of CWC members under Article I not to 
``assist * * * anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a 
State Party'' and the right of states to determine their own 
national export policies. We are troubled by the recent move to 
use Article XI even to facilitate the exchange of information 
related to economic and technological development in the field 
of chemistry, as put forward by the Executive Secretary in PC-
IX/B/1, (13 Oct. 1994). Even this could accelerate the spread 
of chemical weapons capability to countries within the CWC who 
are judged by the intelligence community as having no intent to 
abandon their chemical weapons programs.
    The dual-use nature of chemicals poses the troubling 
prospect that foreign assistance could contribute to a program 
that in turn could be diverted to weapons uses. Moreover, such 
a diversion might well go undetected. This may explain why some 
countries with poor arms control compliance records advocate 
approval of the CWC.
    Several countries opine that the CWC should be interpreted 
to mean that no restrictions be placed on the chemical trade. 
The governments of Iran, Cuba, India, and Pakistan--all 
signatories of the CWC--are currently challenging the 
legitimacy of Australia Group controls which prohibit them from 
acquiring dual-use chemicals and chemical weapons-capable 
production equipment. According to ACDA's 1994 Report to 
Congress, ``this provision has some support within the Non-
Aligned Movement and will continue to be the subject of 
contention * * * '' Similarly, one of the reasons for the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association support of the CWC is the 
anticipation, stated in testimony before the Committee on June 
9, 1994, that ``an effective CWC could have the positive effect 
of liberalizing the existing system of export controls 
applicable to our industry's products, technologies and 
processes.''
    When questioned on this by the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, the Executive Branch stated:

          Australia Group members * * * in August 1992 * * * 
        committed to review their export control measures with 
        a view of removing them for CWC States Parties in full 
        compliance with their obligations under the Convention.

    The response added, however:

          The United States and other Australia Group members, 
        while remaining committed to the August 1992 statement 
        and full implementation of Article XI of the CWC, have 
        also made clear their view that the export control and 
        nonproliferation measures they have undertaken as AG 
        members are fully consistent with all of the 
        requirements of the CWC and, indeed, help AG members to 
        fulfill their obligations under Article I of the CWC to 
        ``never under any circumstances * * * assist, encourage 
        or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity 
        prohibited to a State Party * * * ''

    The Director of ACDA made a similar reassurance to the 
Foreign Relations Committee, stating that the Australia Group 
and domestic export controls are compatible with the objectives 
of the treaty, and that they will be maintained.
    We are unsure, however, how the administration can 
unilaterally ensure that entry-into-force of the CWC will not 
erode the consensus now existing among the 29 supplier states 
of the Australia Group.

The constitutionality of the CWC

    The right of the OPCW to inspect private, civilian 
facilities must be reconciled with Constitutional protection 
against unreasonable search and seizure. Given the large number 
of inspectable facilities in the United States, it seems 
inevitable that eventually a property owner will refuse to 
consent to an international inspection. The fourth amendment to 
the Constitution provides that:

          The right of the people to be secure in their 
        persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
        unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
        violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
        probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
        particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
        the persons or things to be seized.

    The Supreme Court upheld the notion that the chemical 
industry retains fourth amendment rights in Dow Chemical Co. v. 
United States. The issue in Dow was whether overflight of the 
plant by an Environmental Protection Agency aircraft 
constituted a search. While the Supreme Court found that it did 
not, it also noted that:

          Plainly a business establishment or an industrial or 
        commercial facility enjoys certain protections under 
        the fourth amendment.
          * * * Dow plainly has a reasonable, legitimate, and 
        objective expectation of privacy within the interior of 
        its covered buildings, and it is equally clear that 
        expectation is one society is prepared to observe.

    The difficulty in reconciling the CWC inspection regime 
with the fourth amendment stems from a combination of CWC 
obligations. While constitutional law has treated warrantless 
administrative search schemes void of penal consequences with 
some leniency (Donovan v. Dewey and New York v. Burger), 
Article II of the CWC requires State Parties to enact penal 
legislation. As Barry Kellman, Professor of Law at DePaul 
University, succinctly notes, because this creates the 
possibility that ``inspections might lead to the discovery of 
evidence of CWC violations that the treaty itself requires to 
be punished under domestic law, an accused may invoke rights of 
due process.''
    Additional, other legal questions not discussed in this 
report pertain to takings under the fifth amendment and 
disclosure of confidential business information by agencies of 
the United States pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act 
request.
    Finally, the CWC contains two provisions which infringe 
upon the Senate's Constitutional responsibilities to consider 
treaties. First, paragraph 3 of Article XV provides that:

    3. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 
30 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification or 
acceptance by all the States Parties referred to under 
subparagraph (b) below:
          (a) When adopted by the Amendment Conference by a 
        positive vote of all States Parties with no State Party 
        casting a negative vote; and
          (b) Ratified or accepted by all those States Parties 
        casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.

    We concur with the concerns of the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence on this issue. It would be possible, according 
to Article XV, for an amendment to the CWC to be adopted 
without that amendment being submitted to the Senate for advice 
and consent. Moreover, this provision could allow for the 
adoption of an amendment over the objections of the Senate if 
the U.S. were to abstain or not vote when the matter was 
decided in the Amendment Conference.
    Second, Article XXII states:

          The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject 
        to reservations. The Annexes of this Convention shall 
        not be subject to reservations incompatible with its 
        object and purpose.

This provision is directly at odds with the right of the Senate 
to ratify treaties subject to understandings and reservations 
regarding specific treaty provisions.

Enforceability

    Article XII sets forth general measures that may be taken 
to address noncompliance, including the possibility of 
restricting or suspending a State Party's rights and 
privileges, recommending sanctions, or bringing the issue 
before the United Nations. The question of penalties for 
misbehavior was addressed late in the negotiations over the 
CWC. The CWC's lack of specificity regarding both what 
sanctions would be appropriate and how sanctions would be 
applied is indicative of the lack of consensus that existed in 
Conference on Disarmament. The Convention is not specific about 
sanctions that could be imposed against violators. While minor 
violations would be handled within the Executive Committee of 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, in 
the instance of more serious violations, the Conference of 
States Parties ``may recommend'' unspecified collective 
measures. The U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council 
would consider violations of ``particular gravity.''
    Supporters of the Convention argue that this lack of 
specificity gives a degree of flexibility and raises a 
potential violator's uncertainty about penalties. We cannot see 
the logic in this. The CWC's enforcement sanctions are too 
vague to serve as a deterrent. Moreover, the lack of 
specificity undermine the value of the CWC in creating an 
international norm. If the experience with Iraq--a clear 
instance of the use of poison gas in war--suggests anything, it 
is that international opprobrium will be impossible to obtain 
under most circumstances. In this instance, five days of debate 
in an international conference convened at the initiative of 
the U.S. in January 1989 to condemn Iraq's use of chemical 
weapons during its war with Iran yielded a final document that 
did not even mention Iraq by name. Unlike the unambiguous 
evidence of Iraqi use of chemical agents against Iran, many 
cases of noncompliance with the CWC should be expected to yield 
no ``smoking gun.''

                          E. BUDGETARY IMPACT

U.S. Government Costs

    The total cost of the CWC to the United States has yet to 
be fully evaluated, but consists of direct and indirect costs. 
According to a June 1992 study concluded by the Institute for 
Defense Analyses, CWC implementation costs to the U.S. 
Government will exceed $200 million annually over a 15-year 
period.
    A sizeable percentage of this projection derives from the 
obligation of each member state, pursuant to Article VIII of 
the Convention, to pay for the OPCW's activities ``in 
accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment.'' As a 
practical matter, this means the U.S. will shoulder one quarter 
of the costs of implementation and verification of the CWC 
should it elect to ratify the Convention. On April 19, 1996, 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher responded to a question 
by the Chairman stating that ``the Administration anticipates 
that the U.S. assessment for the OPCW for FY97 will be $24.935 
million.''
    The current budgetary assumptions of the OPCW indicate a 
total operating cost of between $100 and $200 million, though 
this figure is subject to cost growth in such events as non-
implementation of the BDA, ratification of the CWC by states 
possessing both chemical weapons and large inspectable 
territories, absence of the availability of ``dedicated 
airlift,'' and continued rent increases on the OPCW 
headquarters at The Hague. In sum, the assessed cost to the 
U.S. are substantial, open-ended, and may ultimately exceed $50 
million per year.
    Beyond the U.S. assessment for the OPCW, a cost estimate 
prepared by David Evans of Analytic Services, Inc., determines 
that ``the Department of Defense has planned approximately $50 
million annually for the [Armed] services to comply with the 
CWC. In addition, the U.S. spends approximately $10 million 
annually on research, development, test, and evaluation of 
equipment and procedures to support the implementation of the 
CWC.''
    To this must be added the salaries and expenses associated 
with personnel in the Department of State, ACDA, the Department 
of Commerce, Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, 
and various law enforcement agencies with CWC responsibilities. 
Clearly this figure will be difficult to track.
    The following table identifies those costs that are 
estimable:

FINANCIAL COSTS OF CWC IMPLEMENTATION TO THE UNITED STATES--ANNUAL COSTS
              TO U.S. GOVERNMENT: $185,700,000-$210,700,000             
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                        
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Assessment to the Organization    $25,000,000-50,000,000.          
 for the Prohibition of Chemical                                        
 Weapons \1\.                                                           
U.S. Mandatory Contributions Under     Undetermined.                    
 Article X of the CWC.                                                  
U.S. National Authority Costs........  $9,500,000 \2\.                  
Treaty Implementation Costs \3\:                                        
    Army                               $33,500,000.                     
    Navy                               $4,700,000.                      
    Air Force                          $100,000.                        
    On-Site Inspection Agency          $45,900,000.                     
    Defense Nuclear Agency (R&D)       $12,000,000.                     
Assistance to Russia For Chemical      $55,000,000 \4\.                 
 Demilitarization.                                                      
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The U.S. will pay 24.96% of the OPCW's Total Operating Expenses.    
  Total expenses are estimated to range between $100-$200 million per   
  year.                                                                 
\2\ Based on ACDA's FY96-97 Authorization Request, adjusted to account  
  for funds contributed as assessment to the Preparatory Commission of  
  the OPCW.                                                             
\3\ Based on March 1994 GAO Study Projections for Fiscal Years 1994-99. 
\4\ Based on March 1994 GAO Study and March 1994 DoD testimony          
  indicating that the U.S. is prepared to provide $300 million or more  
  over 8 years to help build a pilot destruction plant.                 

Cost to Industry

            The cost of filling out forms
    It is difficult--if not impossible--to predict the costs 
posed by the CWC to industry. However, based upon industry 
responses, it is possible to establish a range of costs 
associated with filling out the additional government forms 
that will be required if the Senate ratifies the CWC. Some 
companies conducted comprehensive internal reviews of their own 
based upon the instruction manual and draft regulations 
compiled by the Department of Commerce. For the sake of 
confidentiality, we will not identify specific companies here, 
but will simply report their findings. Cost estimates 
associated with the reporting burden ranged from $1,500/$2,000 
for two small companies producing DOC's, to $250,000 estimated 
by a large, diversified company. Responses falling within that 
range included: $8,000; $10,000--$20,000; $20,000; $70,000; and 
$50,000--$100,000. If the average cost to a company for filling 
out CWC forms were but $20,000, and only 3,000 companies were 
so affected, the total cost to the economy would still 
approximate $60 million per year. If 8,000 companies are 
affected, the cost would equal $160 million per year.
    Clearly, the cost to some businesses will be less than 
$20,000 annually, but for many others it will be far greater. 
Moreover, we expect more than 3,000, but fewer than 8,000, 
companies to be affected by this treaty. Without precise 
figures, it is impossible to estimate.
            The cost of hosting routine inspections
    ACDA informed the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
in September, 1994, that routine inspection costs for 100 
Schedule 1 and 2 facilities would approximate $10,000 per 
inspection, $5,000 per inspection of 200 Schedule 3 facilities, 
and $2,000 per inspection of 6,000 DOC plants. Routine 
inspections of Schedule 3 and DOC plants are limited, however, 
to no more than 20 combined. ACDA further estimated:

    ACDA's rough estimate is that initially U.S. industry will 
receive 53 inspections per year (40 at Schedule 1 and 2 sites, 
13 at Schedule 3 sites) * * * There will be no inspections of 
``other chemical production facilities'' [DOCs] until the 
fourth year after entry into force, when there could be up to 
20 inspections per year of these facilities and Schedule 3 
facilities combined.

    While we have questions about these figures, ACDA did state 
that this is ``a very rough estimate.'' Accordingly, one might 
derive the following formula for inspections. [(40 x $10,000) + 
(13 x $5,000) + (7 x $2,000)] = $479,000 per year.
    If, however, the OPCW inspects every Schedule 1 and 2 
facility every year, and the costs are closer to $20,000, with 
costs for Schedule 3 and DOC plants closer to $10,000, with a 
reduced number of inspectable sites (40 Schedule 1 and 2 plants 
and 100 Schedule 3 plants), the following would be the case: 
[(40 x $20,000) + (20 x $10,000)] = $1 million.
    In general, we believe that ACDA: (1) underestimates the 
number of U.S. businesses that will be affected; and (2) 
underestimates the cost to a company posed by a routine 
inspection. Only time will tell just how expensive this 
provision of the CWC will be.
            The cost of challenge inspections
    During administration briefings held for Senate staff in 
August, 1996, the administration stated that it expected no 
more than 2 challenge inspections per year to be mounted 
against the United States. If this is the case, then based upon 
an April 1993 letter to the Congressional Office of Technology 
Assessment from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (which 
put challenge inspections costs at between $200,000 and 
$500,000), we estimate that no more than $1 million would be 
expended per year by industry to comply with this provision of 
the CWC. In cases where a challenge inspection were directed 
against a government facility, clearly there would be no cost 
to industry at all. However, the OPCW is planning for both 
Russia and one other chemical weapons possessor state to ratify 
the treaty. If this does not occur, significant resources will 
be available for the conduct of additional challenge and 
routine inspections.

                 ANNUAL COSTS TO INDUSTRY: UNDETERMINED                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                        
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs Associated With Data Reporting  Unestimated 1.                    
 Requirements.                                                          
Costs Associated With Challenge       $200,000--$500,000 per inspection 
 Inspections.                          2 (c. $1 million).               
Costs Associated With Annual Routine  $10,000--$20,000 per inspection 3 
 Inspections.                          (c. $1 million).                 
Costs Associated With Plant Closure/  Unestimated                       
 Shutdown During Inspections.                                           
Costs Associated With Disclosure of   Unestimated (Congressional Office 
 Confidential Business Information.    of Technology Assessment         
                                       determined that the U.S. chemical
                                       industry loses between $3-6      
                                       billion per year in counterfeited
                                       chemicals).                      
U.S. Fines for Noncompliance........  $50,000 per violation for actions 
                                       involving Schedule 1 or 2        
                                       chemicals; $5,000 per failure to 
                                       submit documents and records;    
                                       $25,000 per violation in doing on-
                                       site inspection.                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ February 26, 1993 CMA Response to Congressional Office of Technology
  Assessment Questionnaire indicated that the cost to U.S. industry in  
  complying with U.S. environmental regulations exceeded $4,900,000,000 
  annually. The CWC will require more information from more companies   
  than current regulations.                                             
\2\ Office of the Secretary of Defense, letter to the Congressional     
  Office of Technology Assessment, April 1993. Estimates of the upcoming
  Russian Mutual Reciprocal Inspection at the Y12 plant at Savannah     
  River are estimated to reach $500,000. Costs for hosting CWC          
  inspections at the high explosives applications facility located at   
  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory have been estimated at $350,000
  to $400,000 (with $150,000 in non-recurring costs).                   
\3\ Conference on Disarmament, ``Report on a United States National     
  Trial Inspection Exercise,'' document No. CD/922, June 22, 1989, p.   
  13. According to a March 1994 GAO Study, the CMA estimates that costs 
  associated with inspections will total roughly $20 million per annum. 

                   F. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

    On April 25, 1996, the Chairman offered a Resolution of 
Ratification for the Chemical Weapons Convention that addressed 
many of the concerns raised in this report. The following is 
the speech he gave in introducing the Chairman's Mark:

    Mr. Helms. This afternoon the Committee fulfills its 
obligation as required by the unanimous consent agreement 
entered into on Pearl Harbor Day, December 7, 1995, to consider 
the resolution of ratification for the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC).
    In recent months I have presided over three hearings of 
this Committee dedicated to examining the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. We heard testimony from the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary or Defense, and a number of experts on arms control. 
While I intend no disrespect to the distinguished 
Administration witnesses, none of the testimony convinced me 
that the Convention--as submitted to the Senate--serves the 
national security interests of the United States. In fact, many 
of the experts who appeared before this Committee questioned 
the Convention's verifiability and its impact upon industry and 
business in the United States. I have circulated for every 
Senator's consideration brief excerpts from some of the 
testimony critical of this Convention.
    I have stated before that we all agree that a verifiable 
treaty, accomplishing real reductions in these abhorrent 
weapons, will clearly be in the national security interests of 
the United States. However, I do not believe that the treaty 
submitted to the Senate is verifiable. Nor will it reduce the 
arsenals of terrorist countries and other nations hostile to 
the United States. Several countries identified by our 
government as possessing chemical weapons have not even signed 
the Convention, let alone ratified it. Yet those countries--
Libya, Syria, Iraq, North Korea--are the countries most likely 
to use chemical weapons against America or our allies.
    Moreover, not one country outside of Europe that has ever 
had an offensive chemical weapons program has ratified this 
Convention, with the exception of Japan. Not one. Neither 
Communist China nor Iran, for example, have ratified.
    Furthermore, Russia--the country that possesses the largest 
and most sophisticated chemical weapons arsenal in the world--
has signaled that it has no intention of abiding by its 
commitments to eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile, 
despite our bilateral agreement to get rid of these terrible 
weapons that we entered into 6 years ago. There has not been 
one iota of progress over the last 6 years in persuading the 
Russians to implement their agreement. To the contrary, Russia 
consistently has refused to come clean about the true size of 
its chemical weapons stockpile, and about the status of its 
binary chemical weapons program. This, it seems to me, is an 
ominous sign of things to come in terms of even the slightest 
show of good faith regarding Russia's willingness to eliminate 
its chemical weapons capabilities.
    With respect to verifiability, even the senior most 
administration officials have conceded that the Convention 
submitted to the Senate is not verifiable. The then-Director of 
Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, declared in testimony 
before this committee on June 23, 1994, that ``the chemical 
weapons problem is so difficult from an intelligence 
perspective, that I cannot state that we have high confidence 
in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a small 
scale.'' Based on what I have learned in recent months, this 
judgement is every bit as accurate today as it was in 1994, and 
every bit as troubling.
    I was equally concerned to learn recently that the 
Intelligence Community has determined that not one country that 
is pursuing chemical weapons--with the exception of the United 
States and its allies--can be expected to abide by the treaty.
    In view of these serious concerns with the Convention, I 
believe that the Senate should consent to ratification only 
with the strictest possible conditions, ensuring that we are 
party to a verifiable treaty that is binding on those nations 
most likely to threaten our national security. This resolution 
of ratification addresses a number of key concerns:
    Now, as I have already said, the CWC must be verifiable. I, 
for one, believe it to be a misleading and dangerous precedent 
for the United States to become party to an unverifiable 
national security treaty. Verifiability should be upheld as a 
cornerstone of U.S. national security, and we should not--if I 
may be allowed to recall a quote from the testimony of Douglas 
Feith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations 
Policy during the Reagan administration--act like the Groucho 
Marx character in the movie who said, ``Those, sir, are my 
principles, and if you do not like those, I have others.''
    Accordingly, this resolution contains conditions on 
monitoring, verification, and noncompliance which will require 
the President to certify to the Congress that the Convention is 
verifiable before moving ahead with its implementation.
    Second, the CWC must accomplish real reductions in the 
chemical weapons arsenals of those countries of greatest 
concern to the United States. This resolution contains key 
provisions which will require the President to secure agreement 
from Russia, Communist China, Iraq, Iran, Syria, North Korea, 
and other states with chemical arsenals, that they, too, will 
observe and be bound by this global ban on chemical weapons, 
prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of 
ratification.
    Third, this resolution will ensure that we learn from our 
experience with the United Nations, and that, in creating a new 
international bureaucracy to verify the Convention, we do not 
agree to disproportionate cost assessments, burgeoning 
administrative overhead, waste, corruption, nepotism, and the 
compromise of U.S.-provided intelligence. There are specific 
conditions in the resolution to establish an office of an 
independent inspector general, create intelligence- and cost-
sharing arrangements, and ensure that the United States does 
not pay disproportionately for this treaty.
    Without a provision to limit U.S. assessments to the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 
the United States will end up paying 25 percent of the annual 
costs of the Organization. That should be compared to Russia's 
5.7 percent. This provision will ensure that our contributions 
to the OPCW take into account the fact that the U.S. has 
already agreed to foot the bill for verifying and helping 
destroy Russia's chemical weapons arsenal.
    Finally, this resolution will ensure that we do not fall 
into the idealistic American response of complacency, as seems 
so often to be the case when the Senate concludes a treaty 
banning a whole class of weapons. If we conveniently assume 
that this treaty will solve all of our chemical weapons 
problems, we may fall victim to the inevitable effect of 
reducing support for the entire range of programs necessary to 
deter attack by chemical weapons, and to maintain our troops 
capability to defend against chemical weapons and other 
threats. This resolution requires the United States to maintain 
robust chemical warfare defenses, to re-evaluate our national 
deterrence doctrine, and to permit commanders in the field to 
use riot control agents to protect the lives of U.S. servicemen 
and innocents.
    Each and every provision of this resolution of ratification 
is essential to ensuring that the Chemical Weapons Convention 
enhances, rather than reduces, our national security. I urge my 
colleagues to consent to ratification only if all of the 
aforementioned concerns have been adequately addressed.

                         G: THE CHAIRMAN'S MARK

    Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
therein), That (a) the Senate advise and consent to the 
ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at Paris on January 
13, 1993, including the following annexes, all such documents 
being integral parts of and collectively referred to in this 
resolution as the ``Convention'' (contained in Treaty Document 
10321), subject to the conditions of subsection (b), the 
understandings of subsection (c), and the declarations of 
subsection (d):
          (1) The Annex on Chemicals.
          (2) The Annex on Implementation and Verification 
        (also known as the ``Verification Annex').
          (3) The Annex on the Protection of Confidential 
        Information (also known as the ``Confidentiality 
        Annex'').
    (b) Conditions.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
the ratification of the Convention is subject to the following 
conditions, which shall have binding effect under United States 
law and shall be included in the instrument of ratification of 
the United States to the Convention:
          (1) Effect of article XXII.--Article XXII of the 
        Convention shall not apply to the United States.
          (2) Violation of the prohibition on use of chemical 
        weapons.--The Convention shall cease to be binding on 
        the Government of the United States with respect to the 
        use of chemical weapons in war in the event that 
        another party to the Convention fails to respect the 
        prohibition on use of chemical weapons laid down in the 
        Convention and uses chemical weapons against the United 
        States or its allies.
          (3) Limitation on the scale of assessment.--
        Notwithstanding any provision of the Convention, the 
        United States shall pay as a total annual assessment 
        pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII not more than 
        the percentage of the annual costs of the Organization 
        for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (in this 
        resolution referred to as the ``Organization'') 
        assessed to any other party to the Convention, or 
        $15,000,000, whichever is lesser.
          (4) Financial contributions.--(A) Notwithstanding any 
        provision of the Convention, no funds may be drawn from 
        the Treasury of the United States for payments or 
        assistance (including the transfer of in-kind items) 
        under paragraph 16 of Article IV, paragraph 19 of 
        Article V, paragraph 7 of Article VIII, paragraph 23 of 
        Article IX, Article X, or any other provision of the 
        Convention, without specific statutory authorization 
        and appropriation.
          (B) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made 
        available by law for the purposes of implementing 
        paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Convention may be 
        made available to the United States Arms Control and 
        Disarmament Agency.
          (5) Establishment of an inspector general.--(A) 
        Before the deposit of the instrument of ratification of 
        the United States to the Convention (in this resolution 
        referred to as the ``United States instrument of 
        ratification''), the current internal audit office of 
        the Preparatory Commission has been expanded into an 
        independent Office of Inspector General whose functions 
        will be transferred to the Organization upon its 
        establishment. The Office of the Inspector General 
        shall be obligated to protect confidential information 
        pursuant to the obligations of the Confidentiality 
        Annex. The Office of the Inspector General shall--
                  (i) make investigations and reports relating 
                to all programs of the Organization;
                  (ii) undertake both management and financial 
                audits, including --
                          (I) an annual assessment verifying 
                        that classified and confidential 
                        information is stored and handled 
                        securely pursuant to the general 
                        obligations set forth in Article VIII 
                        and in accordance with all provisions 
                        of the Annex on the Protection of 
                        Confidential Information; and
                          (II) an annual assessment of 
                        laboratories established pursuant to 
                        Paragraph 55 of Part II of the 
                        Verification Annex to ensure the 
                        Director General is carrying out his 
                        functions pursuant to Paragraph 56 of 
                        Part II of the Verification Annex;
                  (iii) undertake performance evaluations 
                annually to ensure the Organization has 
                complied to the extent practicable with the 
                recommendations of the Inspector General;
                  (iv) have access to all records relating to 
                the programs and operations of the 
                Organization;
                  (v) have direct and prompt access to any 
                official of the Organization; and
                  (vi) be required to protect the identity of, 
                and prevent reprisals against, all 
                complainants.
          (B) The Organization shall ensure, to the extent 
        practicable, compliance with recommendations of the 
        independent Inspector General, and shall ensure that 
        annual and other relevant reports by the Inspector 
        General are made available to all member states 
        pursuant to the requirements established in the 
        Confidentiality Annex.
          (6) Cost-Sharing Arrangements.--(A) Prior to the 
        deposit of the United States instrument of 
        ratification, and annually thereafter, the President 
        shall submit a report to Congress identifying all cost-
        sharing arrangements with the Organization.
          (B) The United States shall not undertake any 
        research or development expenditures for the purposes 
        of refining or improving the Organization's regime for 
        verification of compliance under the Convention, 
        including the training of inspectors and the provision 
        of detection equipment and on-site analysis sampling 
        and analysis techniques, without first having concluded 
        and submitted to the Congress a cost-sharing 
        arrangement with the Organization.
          (7) Intelligence sharing and safeguards.--
          (A) Provision of intelligence information to the 
        organization.--(i) No United States intelligence 
        information may be provided to the Organization or to 
        any officials or employees thereof, unless the 
        President certifies to the appropriate committees of 
        Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence (in 
        this paragraph referred to as the ``DCI''), in 
        consultation with the Secretary of State and the 
        Secretary of Defense, has established and implemented 
        requirements which have been formally agreed to and 
        implemented by the Organization for protecting 
        intelligence sources and methods as a condition for the 
        provision of United States intelligence information to 
        the Organization. Those requirements shall include, but 
        not be limited to--
                          (I) the adoption by the Organization 
                        of formal security violation 
                        investigation procedures and security 
                        clearance background investigation 
                        procedures certified by the DCI as 
                        comparable to United States procedures;
                          (II) the agreement by the 
                        Organization to protect United States-
                        provided intelligence information in a 
                        manner certified by the DCI as 
                        comparable to protections maintained by 
                        the United States Government of such 
                        information;
                          (III) the agreement by the 
                        Organization to immediately notify the 
                        United States Government of any 
                        unauthorized disclosure of United 
                        States-provided intelligence, and to 
                        permit the full participation of United 
                        States law enforcement personnel in the 
                        investigation of such disclosure;
                          (IV) prohibitions on access to United 
                        States-provided intelligence 
                        information by nationals of countries 
                        not otherwise eligible for the receipt 
                        of such information;
                          (V) prohibitions on access to United 
                        States-provided intelligence 
                        information by the government of any 
                        country designated by the Secretary of 
                        State as a state supporter of 
                        terrorism;
                          (VI) prohibitions on access to United 
                        States-provided intelligence 
                        information by any government not 
                        eligible for the direct provision of 
                        such information by the United States 
                        through existing bilateral 
                        intelligence-sharing agreements; and
                          (VII) other measures which shall 
                        protect intelligence sources and 
                        methods from unauthorized disclosure in 
                        accordance with section 103(c)(5) of 
                        the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
                        U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)).
                  (ii) Subparagraph (A) may be waived upon 
                written certification by the President to the 
                appropriate committees of Congress that 
                providing such information to the Organization, 
                or to any officials or employees thereof, is in 
                the vital national security interests of the 
                United States and that all possible measures 
                protecting such information have been taken, 
                except that such waiver must be made for each 
                instance such information is provided, or for 
                each such document provided.
                  (B) Periodic and special reports.--(i) The 
                President shall report periodically, but not 
                less frequently than quarterly, to the 
                Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select 
                Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
                Committee on International Relations and the 
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
                the House of Representatives on the types and 
                volume of intelligence provided to the 
                Organization and the purposes for which it was 
                provided during the period covered by the 
                report. The President shall also report to the 
                Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
                and the Permanent Select Committee on 
                Intelligence of the House of Representatives 
                within 15 days after it has become known to the 
                United States Government regarding any 
                unauthorized disclosure of intelligence 
                provided by the United States to the 
                Organization.
                  (ii) The requirement for periodic reports 
                under the first sentence of subparagraph (A) 
                shall not apply to the provision of 
                intelligence that is provided only to, and for 
                the use of, appropriately-cleared United States 
                Government personnel serving with the 
                Organization.
                  (C) Delegation of duties.--The President may 
                not delegate or assign the duties of the 
                President under this paragraph.
                  (D) Relationship to existing law.--Nothing in 
                this paragraph may be construed to--
                          (i) impair or otherwise affect the 
                        authority of the Director of Central 
                        Intelligence to protect intelligence 
                        sources and methods from unauthorized 
                        disclosure pursuant to section 
                        103(c)(5) of the National Security Act 
                        of 1947(50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); or
                          (ii) supersede or otherwise affect 
                        the provisions of title V of the 
                        National Security Act of 1947 (50 
                        U.S.C. 413 et seq.).
          (8) Completion of the work of the preparatory 
        commission.--Prior to the deposit of the United States 
        instrument of ratification, the President shall certify 
        to the Congress that the Preparatory Commission for the 
        Organization has completed, to the satisfaction of the 
        United States, the formulation of detailed guidelines 
        and procedures for all outstanding issues identified as 
        ``necessary preparations for the effective 
        implementation of the Convention * * * and for 
        preparing for the first session of the Conference of 
        States Parties * * *'' by the Executive Secretary of 
        the Preparatory Commission at its Thirteenth Session in 
        document PCXIII/6.
          (9) Amendments to the convention.--(A) A United 
        States representative will be present at all Amendment 
        Conferences and will cast a vote, either affirmative or 
        negative, on all proposed amendments made at such 
        conferences.
          (B) The President shall submit to the Senate for its 
        advice and consent to ratification under Article II, 
        Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United 
        States any amendment to the Convention adopted by an 
        Amendment Conference.
          (10) Plan for destruction of chemical weapons.--(A) 
        In accordance with the rights of the United States to 
        develop a plan of destruction under the Convention and 
        the requirements of Public Law 99145, the Secretary of 
        Defense shall proceed expeditiously with the 
        destruction of the existing stockpile of lethal unitary 
        chemical agents and munitions and shall complete such 
        destruction within the Convention-allowed timeframe and 
        prior to the elimination of the binary chemical agent 
        stockpile and binary munitions. Prior to initiating the 
        destruction of the final remaining 500 tons of binary 
        chemical agents and their associated munitions, and not 
        later than nine years after the date of entry into 
        force of the Convention, the President shall certify to 
        the Congress that all states possessing chemical 
        weapons have signed and ratified the Convention, and 
        that no state, other than a state which has declared 
        chemical weapons under the Convention and is 
        implementing a plan for their destruction pursuant to 
        the Convention, possesses chemical weapons. If the 
        President determines that a state possessing chemical 
        weapons has not signed and ratified the Convention, or 
        that a party to the Convention possesses nondeclared 
        chemical weapons, then the President shall--
                  (i) notify the Congress of his findings 
                within 30 days of having made such a 
                determination;
                  (ii) direct the Secretary of Defense to defer 
                for 5 years the destruction of the remaining 
                500 tons of the stockpile of binary agent and 
                transmit written notice to the Congress of any 
                such deferral within 30 days after the date on 
                which the notification under clause (i) is 
                made;
                  (iii) seek a Senate resolution of support of 
                continued adherence to the Convention, 
                notwithstanding the determination that states 
                possessing chemical weapons remain nonparties 
                to the Convention nine years after the 
                Convention's entry into force, or that a party 
                to the Convention possesses undeclared stocks 
                of chemical weapons; and
                  (iv) secure agreement from the Organization 
                that the destruction timeframe for the 
                remaining 500 tons of binary agent shall be 
                extended by five years, in accordance with the 
                provisions of the Convention.
          (B) For purposes of this resolution, the term 
        ``chemical weapons'' has the meaning given the term in 
        Article I(1) of the Convention.
          (11) Russian elimination of chemical weapons.--Prior 
        to the deposit of the United States instrument of 
        ratification, the President shall certify to the 
        Congress that--
                  (A) Russia is making reasonable progress in 
                the implementation of the Agreement between the 
                United States of America and the Union of 
                Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and 
                Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons and on 
                Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral 
                Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, signed 
                on June 1, 1990 (in this resolution referred to 
                as the ``1990 Bilateral Destruction 
                Agreement');
                  (B) the United States and Russia have 
                resolved, to the satisfaction of the United 
                States, outstanding compliance issues under the 
                Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
                Government of the United States of America and 
                the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
                Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification 
                Experiment and Data Exchange Related to 
                Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, signed at 
                Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989, 
                also known as the ``1989 Wyoming Memorandum of 
                Understanding,'' and the 1990 Bilateral 
                Destruction Agreement;
                  (C) Russia has deposited the Russian 
                instrument of ratification for the Convention 
                and is in compliance with its obligations under 
                the Convention; and
                  (D) Russia is committed to forgoing any 
                chemical weapons capability, chemical weapons 
                modernization program, or any other activity 
                contrary to the object and purpose of the 
                Convention.
          (12) Chemical weapons in countries other than 
        russia.--Prior to the deposit of the United States 
        instrument of ratification, the President, in 
        consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, 
        shall certify to the Congress that countries which have 
        been determined to have offensive chemical weapons 
        programs, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and all other 
        countries determined to be state sponsors of 
        international terrorism, have ratified or otherwise 
        acceded to the Convention.
          (13) Criteria for united states assistance to 
        russia.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
        United States assistance to Russia for the purposes of 
        facilitating the transport, storage, safeguarding, and 
        elimination of chemical weapons and their delivery 
        vehicles, for preventing the proliferation of chemical 
        weapons, chemical weapons components and technology, 
        and chemical weapons-related technology and expertise, 
        or for the planning, design, and construction of a 
        chemical weapons destruction facility, may not be 
        provided unless the President certifies to the 
        Congress, on an annual basis, that--
                  (A) the matters described in paragraph (11) 
                of this resolution are satisfied;
                  (B) Russia has fully and accurately declared, 
                pursuant to Article III of the Convention, all 
                information regarding its unitary and binary 
                chemical weapons, chemical weapons production 
                facilities, other facilities associated with 
                the development of chemical weapons, and riot 
                control agents; and
                  (C) Russia is in compliance with its 
                obligations under the Convention on the 
                Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
                Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
                Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, done at 
                Washington, London, and Moscow on April 10, 
                1972 (commonly referred to as the ``Biological 
                Weapons Convention').
          (14) Other documents.--(A) The documents described in 
        subparagraph (B) have the same force and effect as the 
        provisions of the Convention. The United States shall 
        regard any action inconsistent with an obligation under 
        those documents as equivalent under international law 
        to an action inconsistent with the Convention.
          (B) The documents referred to in subparagraph (A) 
        are--
                  (i) the Resolution Establishing the 
                Preparatory Commission for the Organization for 
                the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
                  (ii) the Text on the Establishment of a 
                Preparatory Commission;
                  (iii) the Annex 1 on Privileges, Immunities 
                and Practical Arrangements in Connection With 
                the Hosting of the Preparatory Commission;
                  (iv) the Annex 2 on Privileges, Immunities 
                and Practical Arrangements to be Laid Down in 
                the Headquarters Agreement; and
                  (v) the Annex 3 on Information Submitted and 
                Commitments Undertaken by the Netherlands and 
                By the City of The Hague.
          (15) The austrialia group.--Prior to the deposit of 
        the United States instrument of ratification, the 
        President shall--
                  (A) certify to the Congress that the 
                international export control measures afforded 
                by the informal forum of States known as the 
                ``Australia Group'' are compatible with the 
                purpose and objectives of the Convention and 
                shall be maintained indefinitely, and
                  (B) certify annually to the Congress that--
                          (i) the Australia Group continues to 
                        maintain an equivalent or more 
                        comprehensive level of control over the 
                        export of toxic chemicals and their 
                        precursors, dual-use processing 
                        equipment, human, animal, and plant 
                        pathogens and toxins with potential 
                        biological weapons application, and 
                        dual-use biological equipment, as that 
                        afforded by the Australia Group as of 
                        the date of ratification of the 
                        Convention by the United States, and
                          (ii) the Australia Group remains a 
                        viable mechanism for curtailing the 
                        spread of chemical and biological 
                        weapons.
          (16) Negative security assurances.--(A) In 
        forswearing the possession of chemical weapons 
        retaliatory capability under the Convention, the United 
        States understands that deterrence of attack by 
        chemical weapons requires a reevaluation of the 
        negative security assurances extended to non-nuclear-
        weapon states.
          (B) Accordingly, prior to the deposit of the United 
        States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
        submit to the Congress a report setting forth the 
        findings of a detailed review of United States policy 
        on negative security assurances as a deterrence 
        strategy, including a determination of the appropriate 
        nuclear and conventional responses to the use of 
        chemical or biological weapons against the United 
        States military, United States citizens, allies, and 
        third parties.
          (C) For purposes of this paragraph--
                  (i) the term ``negative security assurances'' 
                means the assurances provided by the United 
                States to non-nuclear-weapon states to forswear 
                the use of certain weapons unless the United 
                States is attacked by that non-nuclear weapon 
                state in alliance with a nuclear weapon state; 
                and
                  (ii) the term ``non-nuclear-weapon states'' 
                means states that are not nuclear-weapon states 
                (as defined in Article IX(3) of the Treaty on 
                the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 
                UST 492493).
          (17) Protection of advanced biotechnology.--Prior to 
        the deposit of the United States instrument of 
        ratification, and on January 1 of every year 
        thereafter, the President shall certify to the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations and the Speaker of the 
        House of Representatives that chemical, biotechnology, 
        and pharmaceutical firms in the United States are not 
        being adversely affected by the limitations of the 
        Convention on access to, and production of, those 
        chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1 contained in 
        the Annex on Chemicals of the Convention.
          (18) Monitoriing and verification of compliance.--(A) 
        The Senate declares that--
                  (i) the Convention is in the interests of the 
                United States only if all parties to the 
                Convention are in strict compliance with the 
                terms of the Convention as submitted to the 
                Senate for its advice and consent to 
                ratification, such compliance being measured by 
                performance and not by efforts, intentions, or 
                commitments to comply; and
                  (ii) the Senate expects all parties to the 
                Convention to be in strict compliance with 
                their obligations under the terms of the 
                Convention, as submitted to the Senate for its 
                advice and consent to ratification;
          (B) Prior to the deposit of the United States 
        instrument of ratification, and on January 1 of every 
        year thereafter, the President shall certify to the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Speaker of the House that the intelligence community 
        (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security 
        Act of 1947) has the capability to monitor with a high 
        degree of confidence the compliance of all parties to 
        the Convention.
          (C) Given its concern about the low level of 
        confidence of the intelligence community in the 
        verifiability of compliance with the Convention, the 
        President (or his designee) shall offer regular 
        briefings, not less than four times a year, to the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Committee on International Relations of the House of 
        Representatives on compliance issues related to the 
        Convention. Such briefings shall include a description 
        of all United States efforts in bilateral and 
        multilateral diplomatic channels and forums to resolve 
        compliance issues and shall include a complete 
        description of--
                  (i) any compliance issues the United States 
                plans to raise at meetings of the Organization, 
                in advance of such meetings;
                  (ii) any compliance issues raised at meetings 
                of the Organization, within 30 days of each 
                such meeting;
                  (iii) any determination by the President that 
                a party is in noncompliance with or is 
                otherwise acting in a manner inconsistent with 
                the object or purpose of the Convention, within 
                30 days of such a determination.
          (D) The Secretary of State shall submit annually on 
        January 1 to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate and the Committee on International Relations of 
        the House of Representatives a full and complete 
        classified and unclassified report setting forth--
                  (i) a certification of those countries 
                determined to be in compliance with the 
                Convention, on a country-by-country basis;
                  (ii) for those countries not certified 
                pursuant to clause (i), an identification and 
                assessment of all compliance issues arising 
                with regard to the adherence of the country to 
                its obligations under the Convention;
                  (iii) the steps the United States has taken 
                --
                          (I) to initiate challenge inspections 
                        of the noncompliant party with the 
                        objective of demonstrating to the 
                        international community the act of 
                        noncompliance;
                          (II) to call attention publicly to 
                        the activity in question; and
                          (III) to seek on an urgent basis a 
                        meeting at the highest diplomatic level 
                        with the noncompliant party with the 
                        objective of bringing the noncompliant 
                        party into compliance;
                  (iv) a determination of the military 
                significance and broader security risks arising 
                from any compliance issue identified pursuant 
                to clause (ii); and
                  (v) a detailed assessment of the responses of 
                the noncompliant party in question to actions 
                undertaken by the United States pursuant to 
                clause (iii).
          (E) Prior to the deposit of the United States 
        instrument of ratification, and on January 1 of every 
        year thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence 
        shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Relations, 
        Armed Services, and the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the Senate and to the Committees on 
        International Relations, National Security, and 
        Permanent Select Committee of the House of 
        Representatives, a full and complete classified and 
        unclassified report regarding--
                  (i) the status of chemical weapons 
                development, production, stockpiling, and use, 
                within the meanings of the Convention, on a 
                country-by-country basis;
                  (ii) the extent of trade in chemicals capable 
                of serving as a chemical weapon, or as a 
                precursor for the production of chemical 
                weapons, on a country-by-country basis;
                  (iii) the monitoring responsibilities, 
                practices, and strategies of the intelligence 
                community and a determination of the level of 
                confidence of the intelligence community (as 
                defined in section 3(4) of the National 
                Security Act of 1947) with respect to each 
                specific monitoring task undertaken, including 
                an assessment by the intelligence community of 
                the national aggregate data provided by parties 
                to the Organization, on a country-by-country 
                basis;
                  (iv) the identification of chemical weapons 
                development, production, stockpiling, or use, 
                within the meanings of the Convention, by 
                subnational groups, including terrorist and 
                paramilitary organizations;
                  (v) a detailed and specific identification of 
                all United States resources devoted to 
                monitoring the Convention, including 
                information on all expenditures associated with 
                the monitoring of the Convention; and
                  (vi) an identification of the priorities of 
                the executive branch of Government for the 
                development of new resources relating to 
                detection and monitoring capabilities with 
                respect to chemical and biological weapons.
          (19) Preservation of robust chemical defenses.--(A) 
        The Senate declares that--
                  (i) ratification of the Convention of the 
                United States in no way diminishes the 
                necessity for preserving and further developing 
                robust chemical and biological defenses; and
                  (ii) the United States Armed Forces are 
                inadequately trained for chemical and 
                biological defenses, and that this lack of 
                readiness stems from a de-emphasis of chemical 
                and biological defenses within the executive 
                branch of Government and the United States 
                Armed Forces.
          (B) Notwithstanding any provision of law, the 
        Secretary of Defense shall assign responsibility for 
        overall coordination and integration of the chemical 
        and biological warfare defense program and the chemical 
        and biological medical defense program to a single 
        office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
          (C) The Secretary of Defense shall designate the Army 
        as the executive agent for the Department of Defense to 
        coordinate and integrate research, development, test, 
        evaluation, and acquisition, requirements of the 
        military departments for chemical and biological 
        warfare defense programs of the Department of Defense, 
        and shall take those actions necessary to ensure that 
        the United States Army Chemical School remains under 
        the command of a general officer of the United States 
        Army.
          (D) Given its concerns about the present state of 
        chemical and biological defense readiness and training, 
        it is the sense of the Senate that--
                  (i) the transfer, consolidation, and 
                reorganization of the U.S. Army Chemical School 
                from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood, or 
                any other location, should not disrupt or 
                diminish the training and readiness of the 
                United States Armed Forces to fight in a 
                chemical-biological warfare environment;
                  (ii) the Chemical School to be relocated at 
                Fort Leonard Wood, or any other location, 
                should have the same level of smoke training 
                capability as that previously available at Fort 
                McClellan; and
                  (iii) the Chemical School, after being 
                relocated at Fort Leonard Wood, or any other 
                location, should possess a Chemical 
                Decontamination Training Facility, established 
                for live agent training, which is capable of 
                the same level of operations as that permitted 
                at Fort McClellan on the date of the deposit of 
                the United States instrument of ratification.
          (E) Thirty days prior to the deposit of the United 
        States instrument of ratification, and on January 1 
        every year thereafter, the President shall submit a 
        report to the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed 
        Services, and Appropriations of the Senate and the 
        Committees on International Relations, National 
        Security, and Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives on previous, current, and planned 
        chemical and biological weapons defense activities. 
        Each report shall include the following information for 
        each of the previous three fiscal years and for the 
        next three fiscal years:
                  (i) An identification of priorities of the 
                executive branch of Government in the 
                development of both active and passive chemical 
                and biological defenses.
                  (ii) A detailed summary of all budget 
                activities associated with the research, 
                development, testing, and evaluation of 
                chemical and biological defense programs.
                  (iii) A detailed summary of expenditures on 
                research, development, testing, and evaluation, 
                and procurement of chemical and biological 
                defenses by fiscal years defense programs, 
                department, and agency.
                  (iv) A detailed assessment of current and 
                projected vaccine production capabilities and 
                vaccine stocks, including progress in 
                researching and developing a multibiological 
                agent vaccine.
                  (v) A detailed assessment of procedures and 
                capabilities necessary to protect and 
                decontaminate infrastructure to reinforce 
                United States power-projection forces, 
                including progress in developing a nonaqueous 
                chemical decontamination capability.
                  (vi) The progress in developing long-range 
                standoff detection and identification 
                capabilities and other battlefield surveillance 
                capabilities for biological and chemical 
                weapons, including progress on developing a 
                multi-chemical agent detector, unmanned aerial 
                vehicles, and unmanned ground sensors.
                  (vii) An assessment of the training and 
                readiness of the United States Armed Forces to 
                operate in a chemically or biologically 
                contaminated environment and actions taken to 
                sustain training and readiness.
                  (viii) The progress in resolving issues 
                relating to the protection of United States 
                population centers from chemical and biological 
                attack, including plans for inoculation of 
                populations, emergency response, and progress 
                made in developing and deploying effective 
                cruise missile defenses and a national 
                ballistic missile defense.
                  (ix) The progress in incorporating chemical 
                and biological considerations into training and 
                planning simulations, models, and wargames and 
                conclusions drawn from those exercises.
                  (x) The progress in developing and 
                implementing joint operational biological 
                defense and chemical defense doctrines.
          (20) Noncompliance.--If the President determines that 
        a party to the Convention is acting in a manner 
        inconsistent with the object or purpose of the 
        Convention, is maintaining a chemical weapons 
        capability, or is in violation of the Convention in any 
        other manner so as to threaten the national security 
        interests of the United States, then the President 
        shall--
                  (A) consult with, and promptly submit to, the 
                Senate a report detailing the effect of such 
                actions;
                  (B) seek on an urgent basis a challenge 
                inspection of the facilities of the 
                noncompliant party in accordance with the 
                provisions of the Convention with the objective 
                of demonstrating to the international community 
                the act of noncompliance;
                  (C) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the 
                highest diplomatic level with the noncompliant 
                party with the objective of bringing the 
                noncompliant party into compliance;
                  (D) implement prohibitions and sanctions 
                against the noncompliant party as required by 
                law;
                  (E) seek on an urgent basis within the 
                Security Council of the United Nations a 
                multilateral imposition of sanctions against 
                the noncompliant party for the purposes of 
                bringing the noncompliant party into 
                compliance; and
                  (F) in the event that noncompliance persists 
                for a period not longer than one year, promptly 
                seek a Senate resolution of support of 
                continued adherence to the Convention, 
                notwithstanding the changed circumstances 
                affecting the object and purpose of the 
                Convention.
    (c) Understandings.--The advice and consent of the Senate 
to the ratification of the Convention is subject to the 
following understandings, which shall be included in the United 
States instrument of ratification:
          (1) Primacy of the united states constitution.--
        Nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes 
        legislation, or other action, by the United States 
        prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, as 
        interpreted by the United States.
          (2) Financing russian implementation.--The United 
        States understands that in order to be assured of the 
        Russian commitment to a reduction in chemical weapons 
        stockpiles, Russia must maintain a substantial stake in 
        financing the implementation of both the 1990 Bilateral 
        Destruction Agreement, and the Convention. The deposit 
        by Russia of its instrument of ratification for the 
        Convention shall not be contingent upon the United 
        States providing financial guarantees to pay for 
        implementation of commitments by Russia under the 1990 
        Bilateral Destruction Agreement or the Convention.
          (3) Domestic export controls.--Nothing in the 
        Convention obligates the United States to accept any 
        modification, change in scope, or reduction in its 
        national export controls. The United States understands 
        that maintenance of domestic restrictions on trade in 
        chemicals and chemical production technology is 
        compatible with the object and purpose of the 
        Convention and solely within the sovereign jurisdiction 
        of the United States.
          (4) Riot control agents.--(A) Nothing in the 
        Convention diminishes, abridges, or alters the right of 
        the United States to use riot control agents--
                  (i) under all circumstances not involving 
                international armed conflict; and
                  (ii) in defensive military modes to save 
                lives in international armed conflicts, as 
                provided for in Executive Order No. 11850 of 
                April 9, 1975.
          (B) The United States understands that the use of 
        riot control agents under subparagraph (A)(i) includes 
        the use of such agents in--
                  (i) peacekeeping operations;
                  (ii) humanitarian or disaster relief 
                operations;
                  (iii) non-combatant evacuation operations;
                  (iv) counter-terrorist operations and the 
                rescue of hostages; and
                  (v) law enforcement operations and other 
                internal conflicts.
          (C) The United States understands that the use of 
        riot control agents under subparagraph (A)(ii) may 
        include the use of such agents--
                  (i) in areas under direct and distinct United 
                States military control, including the use of 
                such agents for the purposes of controlling 
                rioting or escaping enemy prisoners of war;
                  (ii) to protect personnel or material from 
                civil disturbances, terrorists, and 
                paramilitary organizations;
                  (iii) to minimize casualties during rescue 
                missions of downed air crews and passengers, 
                prisoners of war, or hostages; and
                  (iv) in support of base defense, rear area 
                operations, non-combatant evacuation 
                operations, and operations to protect or 
                recover nuclear weapons.
          (D) The United States further understands that 
        herbicides may be used, under regulations applicable to 
        their domestic use, for control of vegetation within 
        United States bases and installations or around their 
        immediate defensive perimeters.
          (E) The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary 
        measures, and prescribe the rules and regulations he 
        deems necessary, to ensure that the national policy of 
        this paragraph shall be observed by the Armed Forces of 
        the United States.
          (F) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``riot 
        control agent'' has the meaning given the term in 
        Article II(7) of the Convention.
          (5) Protection of confidential information.--The 
        United States understands that the limitation on 
        liability in paragraph (22) of the Confidentiality 
        Annex does not apply to the unauthorized disclosure of 
        national aggregate data and is subject to the enactment 
        of implementing legislation by the United States.
    (d) Declarations.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
ratification of the Convention is subject to the following 
declarations, which express the intent of the Senate:
          (1) Further arms reduction obligations.--The Senate 
        declares its intention to consider for approval 
        international agreements that would obligate the United 
        States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments 
        of the United States in a militarily significant manner 
        only pursuant to the treaty power as set forth in 
        Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution.
          (2) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
        applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally 
        based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in 
        Condition (1) of the resolution of ratification with 
        respect to the INF Treaty. For purposes of this 
        declaration, the term ``INF Treaty'' refers to the 
        Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
        Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination 
        of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, 
        together with the related memorandum of understanding 
        and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
                                ------                                

Hon. Trent Lott, Majority Leader,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Senator Lott: As you know, the Senate is currently 
scheduled to take final action on the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) on or before September 14. This treaty has 
been presented as a global, effective and verifiable ban on 
chemical weapons. As individuals with considerable experience 
in national security matters, we would all support such a ban. 
We have, however, concluded that the present Convention is 
seriously deficient on each of these scores, among others.
    The CWC is not global since many dangerous nations (for 
example, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya), have not agreed 
to join the treaty regime. Russia is among those who have 
signed the Convention, but is unlikely to ratify--especially 
without a commitment of billions in U.S. aid to pay for the 
destruction of Russia's vast arsenal. Even then, given our 
experience with the Kremlin's treaty violations and its 
repeated refusal to implement the 1990 Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement on chemical weapons, future CWC violations must be 
expected.
    The CWC is not effective because it does not ban or control 
possession of all chemicals that could be used for lethal 
weapons purposes. For example, it does not prohibit two 
chemical agents that were employed with deadly effect in World 
War I--phosgene and hydrogen cyanide. The reason speaks volumes 
about this treaty's impractical nature; they are too widely 
used for commercial purposes to be banned.
    The CWC is not verifiable as the U.S. intelligence 
community has repeatedly acknowledged in congressional 
testimony. Authoritarian regimes can be confident that their 
violations will be undetectable. Now, some argue that the 
Treaty's intrusive inspections regime will help us know more 
than we would otherwise. The relevant test, however, is whether 
any additional information thus gleaned will translate into 
convincing evidence of cheating and result in the collective 
imposition of sanctions or other enforcement measures. In 
practice, this test is unlikely to be satisfied since 
governments tend to look the other way at evidence of non-
compliance rather than jeopardize a treaty regime.
    What the CWC will do, however, is quite troubling: It will 
create a massive new, UN-style international inspection 
bureaucracy (which will help the total cost of this treaty to 
U.S. taxpayers amount to as much as $200 million per year). It 
will jeopardize U.S. citizens' constitutional rights by 
requiring the U.S. Government to permit searches without either 
warrants or probable cause. It will impose a costly and complex 
regulatory burden on U.S. industry. As many as 8,000 companies 
across the country may be subjected to new reporting 
requirements entailing uncompensated annual costs of between 
thousands to hundreds-of-thousands of dollars per year to 
comply. Most of these American companies have no idea that they 
will be affected. And perhaps worst of all, the CWC will 
undermine the standard of verifiability that has been a key 
national security principle for the United States.
    Under these circumstances, the national security benefits 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do not outweigh its 
considerable costs. Consequently, we respectfully urge you to 
reject ratification of the CWC unless and until it is made 
genuinely global, effective and verifiable.
                                   William P. Clark.
                                   Cap Weinberger.
                                   Dick Cheney.
                                   Jean Kirkpatrick.
                                   Edwin Meese III.


  signatories on letter to senator trent lott regarding the chemical 
                           weapons convention


Signatures on letter and other former Cabinet Members:
    Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary of Defense.
    William P. Clark, former National Security Advisor to the 
President.
    Alexander M. Haig, Jr., former Secretary of State (signed 
on September 10).
    John S. Herrington, former Secretary of Energy (signed on 
September 9).
    Jean J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations.
    Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General.
    Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense (signed on 
September 10).
    Casper Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense.
Additional Signatories (retired military):
    General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Retired), former 
Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command.
    Vice Admiral William Houser, U.S. Navy (Retired), former 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Aviation.
    General P.X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former 
Commandant of U.S. Marine Corps (signed on September 9).
    Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, U.S. Army (Retired), 
former Director for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff (signed 
on September 9).
    Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired), former 
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.
    Admiral Kinnaird McKee, U.S. Navy (Retired), former 
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion.
    General Merrill A. McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former 
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.
    Lieutenant General T.H. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps 
(Retired), former Fleet Marine Force Commander/Head, Marine 
Aviation.
    General John L. Piotrowski, U.S. Air Force (Retired), 
former Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Vice Chief, U.S. 
Air Force.
    General Bernard Schriever, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former 
Commander, Air Research and Development and Air Force Systems 
Command.
    Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, U.S. Navy (Retired), former 
Commander 3rd Fleet (signed on September 10).
    Lieutenant General James Williams, U.S. Army (Retired), 
former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
Additional Signatories (non-military):
    Elliott Abrams, former Assistant Secretary of State for 
Latin American Affairs (signed on September 9).
    Mark Albrecht, former Executive Secretary, National Space 
Council.
    Kathleen Bailey, former Assistant Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency.
    Robert B. Barker, former Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense for Nuclear and Chemical Weapon Matters.
    Angelo Codevilla, former Senior Fellow, Hoover Institute 
(signed on September 10).
    Henry Cooper, former Director, Strategic Defense Initiative 
Organization.
    J.D. Crouch, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense.
    Midge Decter, former President, Committee for the Free 
World.
    Kenneth deGraffenreid, former Senior Director of 
Intelligence Programs, National Security Council.
    Diane Denman, former Co-Chair, U.S. Peace Corps Advisory 
Council.
    Elaine Donnelly, former Commissioner, Presidential 
Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Services.
    David M. Evans, former Senior Advisor to the Congressional 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
    Charles Fairbanks, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State.
    Douglas J. Feith, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense.
    Rand H. Fishbein, former Professional Staff member, Senate 
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
    Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., former Acting Assistant Secretary of 
Defense.
    William R. Graham, former Science Advisor to the President.
    E.C. Grayson, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy.
    James T. Hackett, former Acting Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency.
    Stefan Halper, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
(signed on September 10).
    Thomas N. Harvey, former National Space Council Staff 
Officer (signed on September 9).
    Charles A. Hamilton, former Deputy Director, Strategic 
Trade Policy, U.S. Department of Defense.
    Amoretta M. Hoeber, former Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. 
Army.
    Charles Horner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for Science and Technology.
    Fred Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
    Sven F. Kraemer, former Director for Arms Control, National 
Security Council.
    Charles M. Kupperman, former Special Assistant to the 
President.
    John Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy.
    John Lenczowski, former Director for Soviet Affairs, 
National Security Council.
    Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant Secretary for Technology 
Policy, Department of Commerce.
    Taffy Gould McCallum, columnist and free-lance writer.
    James C. McCrery, former senior member of the Intelligence 
Community and Arms Control Negotiator (Standing Consultative 
Committee).
    J. William Middendorf II, former Secretary of the Navy 
(signed on September 10).
    Laurie Mylroie, best-selling author and Mideast expert 
specializing in Iraqi affairs.
    Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense.
    Norman Podhoretz, former editor, Commentary Magazine.
    Roger W. Robinson, Jr., former Chief Economist, National 
Security Council.
    Peter W. Rodman, former Deputy Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs and former Director of the Policy 
Planning Staff, Department of State.
    Edward Rowny, former Advisor to the President and Secretary 
of State for Arms Control.
    Carl M. Smith, former Staff Director, Senate Armed Services 
Committee.
    Jacqueline Tillman, former Staff member, National Security 
Council.
    Michelle Van Cleave, former Associate Director, Office of 
Science and Technology.
    William Van Cleave, former Senior Defense Advisor and 
Defense Policy Coordinator to the President.
    Malcolm Wallop, former United States Senator.
    Deborah L. Wince-Smith, former Assistant Secretary for 
Technology Policy, Department of Commerce.
    Curtin Winsor, Jr., former U.S, Ambassador to Costa Rica.
    Dov S. Zakheim, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.
                                ------                                

                                  Annandale, VA, September 9, 1996.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Senator Lott: As you weigh the benefits and costs of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) I would like to offer 
some insight gained during my 28 years at every level of 
Military Intelligence and my subsequent ten years in 
competitive intelligence and counterintelligence for some of 
the premier companies in this country. The need for 
international mechanisms to control or eliminate the potential 
use of chemical weapons cannot be denied but the mechanisms 
must not be adopted in haste or under pressure. I ask only that 
you delay consideration long enough for an informed debate to 
take place, and I stress informed.
    My foremost concern is that the CWC adds little to the 
ability of this country, or any other for that matter, to be 
assured that chemical weapons are not being manufactured by 
specific nations. Experience in Iraq has amply demonstrated the 
ease with which inspections can be thwarted and sanctions can 
be thwarted and sanctions evaded. With all of the effort put 
into the inspection program the United States is still unable 
to say whether Iraq retains a capability to manufacture 
chemical weapons. We are unable to state publicly the chemical 
weapons production capabilities of nations such as Libya, Iran, 
Syria, China or Korea. Many nations posses a production 
capability of are thought to possess such capabilities. Nations 
that are likely to produce chemical weapons for use by 
terrorists or for limited battlefield deployment can produce 
sufficient quantities in laboratories small enough that they 
can temporarily closed or relocated to avoid inspections. The 
existing treaty on chemical weapons is already so weak on this 
point that no effort has been made to enforce it and provisions 
of the CWC are even weaker. Let's discuss objectively what 
information is required to verify such a treaty, the 
capabilities required to collect the information, the cost of 
doing so, and the likelihood of making such collection.
    Furthermore, the opportunity for unfettered access to 
virtually every industrial facility in this country, not merely 
the pharmaceutical and chemical plants, would make some foreign 
intelligence organizations very happy, even gleeful. It is 
likely to cause the counterintelligence sections of the FBI and 
the Defense Investigative Service major problems for the 
foreseeable future. The inspection procedures which apply to 
ALL industries constitute unprecedented access to our 
manufacturing base, not just those though likely to be engaged 
in proscribed activities! My experience in protecting patents 
and intellectual property over the past ten years leads me to 
conclude that there is the potential for the loss of untold 
billions of dollars in trade secrets which can be used to gain 
competitive advantage, to shorten R&D cycles, and to steal U.S. 
market share. To allow the invasion of private property without 
probable cause or a search warrant could undermine every 
industrial security standard established under government 
regulations or by private firms seeking to protect industrial 
processes or other proprietary information. Under the 
inspection and reporting practices specified in the CWC I see 
no prohibition against the exchanging of lucrative information 
among the nations conducting a given inspection. This country, 
for valid reasons, does not permit its intelligence agencies to 
conduct industrial espionage but we may be the only nation in 
the world to hold to such a standard.
    The CWC constitutes a significant departure from the way 
this country conducts business and the way our society has 
elected to protect its very fabric. It seems to me that the CWC 
has been put together as a placebo measure to make people feel 
good but without considering the overall long term impact on 
our industry, our society and our legal system. The Congress 
bears the responsibility of assuring our citizenry that the 
advantages and disadvantages have been carefully considered and 
balanced.
    We look to you to insure that those safeguards are built 
into the process.
            Sincerely,
                                         James A. Williams,
                                              LTG U.S. Army (Ret.).
                                ------                                

                                     Air Force Association,
                                 Arlington, VA, September 10, 1996.
Hon.  James Inhofe,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Senator Inhofe: The Air Force Association is deeply 
concerned that Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), due for 
consideration by the Senate this week, will unreasonably 
restrict military rescue efforts.
    The Administration interprets the CWC to ban the use of 
riot control agents in armed conflict, even in a situation 
where combatants and noncombatants are intermingled. This can 
happen when our forces attempt to rescue downed pilots or 
hostages while engaged in operations during such a conflict.
    Our Association has three concerns. The first is that this 
is an unreasonable interpretation of a treaty intended to 
eliminate truly heinous weapons of war. Banning the use of non-
lethal riot control agents could put the military in the 
unconscionable position of having to abandon the rescue of a 
downed airman, or using lethal means and killing noncombatants 
in the effort. A treaty that does this by design begs for 
appropriate revision. If it results from misinterpretation, the 
convention's restrictions on riot control agents need to be 
revisited and clarified.
    AFA's second concern is that if the Senate provides its 
advice and consent to the CWC with the present interpretation 
of restrictions on riot control agents, there will likely be an 
unacceptable gap between the time that these agents are banned 
and the availability of new non-lethal technologies. To our 
knowledge, no non-lethal technologies that could substitute for 
these agents are mature enough to be fielded in the near term. 
While we understand that the Administration would accelerate 
development efforts if the Senate approves the CWC, no good 
alternatives are apparently available during their development 
and acquisition.
    The Association's final concern relates to the nature of 
the follow-on technologies. Approving the CWC before we can be 
confident that acceptable alternatives can be developed and 
fielded appears to discount the lives of military men and women 
as they put themselves in harm's way for the safety and 
security of others.
    The Air Force Association urges the Senate to assure that 
the U.S. military has access to all the necessary tools, to 
include certainly those that are non-lethal, in its efforts to 
protect innocent lives, American citizens, and our service 
members in very dangerous combat situations.
            Sincerely,
                                             R.E. Smith, President.
                                ------                                

                                                      NFIB,
                                 Washington, DC, September 9, 1996.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Senator Helms: On behalf of the more than 600,000 
members of the National Federation of Independent Business 
(NFIB), I want to express serious concern regarding the 
regulatory requirements and burdens that would be placed on 
small businesses who ``produce, process, consume, export or 
import'' certain regulated chemicals with ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty (CWC) and its implementing 
legislation.
    This Congress has begun to address the serious problems of 
paperwork burdens and red tape which are strangling small 
businesses in this country. The passage of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act and the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act were positive first steps in reducing the 
excessive regulatory burden which consistently ranks in the top 
five problems small businesses face in NFIB surveys.
    The CWC reverses the trend of reducing the growing 
regulatory burden on small business. According to the 
Congressional Office of Technology inspections of businesses 
required under CWC will cost small business $10,000-$20,000. 
The typical small business owner takes home only $40,000 per 
year. The Department of Commerce has estimated that a business 
will spend from 2.5-9 hours on paperwork for each chemical used 
depending on its classification.
    There is a great deal of disagreement on the number of 
businesses which would be affected by the CWC. Numbers have 
ranged from 3,000 to 10,000. The regulatory burden of the CWC 
will hit small business harder than big business. A 1995 Small 
Business Administration study stated that while small business 
employs 53 percent of the workforce, they bear 67 percent of 
business' total regulatory expenses. Even if the number of 
small businesses in the initial list of affected companies is 
limited to a specific list, the fact that additional businesses 
might be regulated by CWC without approval by the U.S. Congress 
will leave small business powerless to have any input as it 
does under the U.S. regulatory system. For the first time, 
small businesses would be subject to a foreign entity 
inspecting their business.
    The CWC will continue to bury small businesses in paperwork 
and regulations. Therefore, NFIB urges your serious 
consideration of the affect of this Treaty on the small 
businesses in this country.
            Sincerely,
                                                Dan Danner,
                    Vice President, Federal Governmental Relations.
                                ------                                

                      U.S. Business and Industrial Council,
                                    Washington, DC, August 8, 1996.
    Dear Senator: On behalf of the 1,000 member companies of 
the United States Business and Industrial Council (USBIC). I 
strongly urge you to oppose ratification of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC). The Senate is expected to vote on 
ratification this September.
    If ratified by the Senate, the CWC will create numerous 
problems for small and medium-sized chemical manufacturers and 
other non-related industries that process chemicals as part of 
their manufacturing operations, included may be autos, auto 
parts, brewers and distillers, electronics, food processing, 
pharmaceuticals, paint and tire producers, and a host of other 
manufacturing industries.
    Abroad, CWC inspections will not substantially reduce the 
proliferation of chemical weapons around the globe. Russia, 
with its huge stockpile of chemical weapons and massive 
production capability, has not ratified the CWC. also the 
world's most notorious terrorist nations, Iran, Syria, North 
Korea, and Libya, refuse to ratify.
    At home, CWC represents a major infringement of U.S. 
sovereignty and the proprietary rights of manufacturers. First, 
the CWC empowers a U.N.-style agency to conduct detailed 
inspections of facilities on both regular and surprise basis. 
They need no justification of suspected illegal activity or 
even a search warrant. These inspections could cost individual 
companies anywhere from $10,000 to $500,000--a substantial 
unfunded mandate. And, CWC inspections could require up to 84 
hours to complete.
    Second, as written, the CWC effectively authorizes 
industrial espionage. The CWC offers no protections for company 
formulas and other trade secrets; they must be handed over if 
inspected. Nothing would prevent other unscrupulous countries 
such as France and China from placing intelligence officers on 
the inspection team.
    Finally, the CWC will cost American business millions. 
Companies and the American taxpayers will pay $50 to $200 
million for the privilege of handing over industrial secrets to 
competitors while not preventing chemical warfare or terrorism.
    Clearly, overwhelming evidence demonstrates that the CWC 
will be disastrous for the United States. Please oppose 
ratification of the CWC this September.
            Sincerely,
                                           Kevin L. Kearns,
                                                         President.

             Chemical Weapons Convention and Small Business

   (By Raymond J. Keating, Chief Economist, Small Business Survival 
                               Committee)

    The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)--a treaty banning the 
production and stockpiling of chemical weapons--will be voted 
on in the U.S. Senate by September 14. The CWC is riddled with 
problems that should concern all Americans.
    Defense and foreign policy experts have raised serious 
questions about the CWC. They see it as non-verifiable and non-
enforceable, and not serving U.S. national interests. Indeed, 
risks may increase as the good guys sign on to the ban and lose 
any deterrence factor, while rogue states continue production 
and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Former Reagan Defense 
Department officials Douglas Feith and Frank Gaffney Jr. wrote 
in the May 5, 1994 New Republic: ``The trouble is the CWC is a 
bad treaty--one that will likely increase the risk of chemical 
warfare around the world.''
    In addition, the CWC would raise regulatory costs on 
already over-regulated U.S. businesses. In particular, the CWC 
would inflict the following on U.S. entrepreneurs and 
businesses:
    For the first time, U.S. private industry would be subject 
to foreign inspection as a result of a treaty. Inspectors would 
come from a new international agency in the Hague, Netherlands.
    Businesses must prove to the U.S. government and 
international inspectors that they are not producing or 
stockpiling chemical weapons, with noncompliance fines reaching 
as high as $50,000 per incident. Forms would have to be filed 
on chemical types each year and changes in a process using 
certain chemicals would have to be reported five days in 
advance. Noncompliance could result in a $5,000 fine. And of 
course, with government bureaucrats issuing fines, the threat 
that fines shift from a means of deterrence or punishment to a 
source of revenues always looms.
    Firms would be open to a real threat of international 
industrial espionage. The loss of proprietary information would 
threaten international competitiveness. The treaties 
protections are frivolous, and any court challenge likely would 
come after the horse left the barn.
    U.S. firms producing, processing, or consuming a scheduled 
chemical will carry a paperwork/declaration burden. The U.S. 
Department of Commerce estimated that it will take companies 9 
hours to fill out paperwork for every Schedule 1 chemical, 7.2 
hours for Schedule 2 chemicals, 2.5 hours for Schedule 3 
chemicals, and 5.3 hours for each Discrete Organic Chemical. 
Estimates range from 2,000 to more than 10,000 U.S. companies 
that will be forced to bear these paperwork burdens.
    Congress's Office of Technology Assessment estimated that 
inspections will cost U.S. firms anywhere from $10,000 to 
$500,000 per visit.
    Smaller businesses will be hit hardest by increased 
regulatory burdens. Interestingly, the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association (CMA) supports ratification of the CWC and told the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the new regulations 
would not be a burden (see Investor's Business Daily, July 16, 
1996). But the CMA is a group of generally large chemical 
manufacturers, and reportedly more than 60 percent of the 
facilities likely affected by the CWC are not CMA members. 
Large companies possess far greater resources and experience in 
dealing with regulators of all kinds. Indeed, new regulatory 
burdens can perversely give large firms a competitive edge over 
small companies due to these resource and experience factors. 
As economist Thomas Hopkins has shown, the per employee cost of 
federal regulation runs almost 50 percent higher for firms with 
fewer than 500 employees vs. companies with more than 500 
employees--$5,400 per employee vs. $3,000 per employee, 
respectively.
    Chemical companies would not be the only types of 
businesses subject to CWC regulations. Firms in the food 
processing, pharmaceutical, paint, petroleum, biotech, 
electronics, textiles, fertilizers, rubber, brewing, and 
distilling industries would be impacted as well.
    U.S. taxpayers--individuals and businesses--ultimately will 
bear the governmental cost of the CWC. Estimates place the 
annual U.S. cost in excess of $200 million over a 15-year 
period, with the U.S. paying 25 percent of the CWC's cost and 
implementation. The total cost to business can only be guessed 
at, possibly running into the billions of dollars.
    Significant legal questions arise for U.S. businesses as 
well. Distinct possibilities exist that rights of due process 
could be violated in relation to warrantless searches and 
personnel being compelled to answer questions, and provide 
information and access; and a ``takings'' could occur when 
government reveals information harming a business.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention is a deeply flawed treaty 
that will do nothing to enhance and may indeed weaken U.S. 
national security, while imposing new regulatory burdens on 
U.S. businesses. The Chemical Weapons Convention should be 
rejected by the U.S. Senate.
                                ------                                

                                       U.S. Senate,
                             Office of the Majority Leader,
                                 Washington, DC, September 6, 1996.
President William Jefferson Clinton,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. President: I am writing to ask your cooperation 
and support for Senate efforts to obtain information and 
documents directly relevant to our consideration of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.
    As you know, the Senate is currently scheduled to consider 
the Convention on or before September 14, 1996 under an 
unanimous consent agreement reached on June 28, 1996. 
Immediately prior to the Senate agreement on the Convention, I 
stated, ``With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 
Majority Leader and the Democratic Leader will make every 
effort to obtain from the administration such facts and 
documents as requested by the Chairman and ranking member of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, in order to pursue its work 
and hearings needed to develop a complete record for the Senate 
* * ''
    I regret to inform you that your administration has not 
been fully cooperative in Senate efforts to obtain critical 
information. Chairman Helms wrote to you on June 21, 1996--
prior to the Senate setting a date for a vote on the 
Convention--and asked eight specific questions. Chairman Helms 
also requested the provision and declassification of documents 
and a cable relating to critical issues of Russian compliance 
with existing chemical weapons arms control agreements and with 
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
    On July 26, 1996, having received no response to his 
earlier letter, Chairman Helms reiterated his earlier request 
and asked additional questions concerning the apparent Russian 
decision to unilaterally end implementation of the 1990 U.S.-
Russian Bilateral Destruction Agreement on chemical weapons. 
Chairman Helms also asked for specific information and 
documents concerning Russian conditions for ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as other information 
important to our consideration of the Convention. While 
Chairman Helms did receive response to his letters on July 31 
and on August 13, his request for declassification of documents 
was refused and the answers to many of his questions were 
incomplete.
    During a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on 
June 17, 1996, Senator Kyl asked for a specific document--a 
cable written in Bonn, Germany by Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA) Director Holum concerning current Russian 
government positions on the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and on U.S. 
assistance for the destruction of Russian chemical weapons. On 
numerous occasions, Senator Kyl was told the document did not 
exist. Finally, on July 26, Senator Kyl was able to see a 
redacted version of the document under tightly controlled 
circumstances but the document has not been made available to 
Chairman Helms or other Senators.
    Mr. President, the unanimous consent agreement of June 28, 
1996, was entered into in good faith, and based on our 
understanding that the administration could and would be fully 
forthcoming in the provision of information and documents to 
enable the Senate to fulfill its constitutional 
responsibilities. Numerous judgments of the United States 
intelligence community deserve as wide a circulation as 
possible--particularly since they are distinctly different than 
some public statements made by officials of your Administration 
concerning the Convention.
    Accordingly, I respectfully request that you reconsider 
your refusal to declassify critical documents and consider the 
declassification of important intelligence community 
judgments--consistent with the need to protect intelligence 
sources and methods. Specifically, I request that you act 
immediately to declassify the May 21, 1996, cable written by 
ACDA Director Holum and the July 8, 1996, letter from Russian 
Prime Minister Chemomyrdin to Vice-President Gore, and consider 
immediate declassification of the paragraphs from which the 
attached statements are excerpted--all drawn from documents 
produced by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense 
Intelligence Agency on the Russian chemical weapons program, 
the verifiability of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 
effect of the Convention on the chemical weapons arsenals of 
rogue states, and the relevance of the Convention to acts of 
terrorism committed with chemical weapons.
    I make these requests to enable the Senate to fully prepare 
for its consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention. I am 
certain you would agree it is necessary for the Senate to have 
complete and usable information in order to fulfill our 
constitutional obligations and to responsibly meet the terms of 
the current unanimous consent agreement. Because the unanimous 
consent agreement calls for the Senate to vote on the Chemical 
Weapons Convention by September 14, 1996, I respectfully 
request that you respond to my declassification request no 
later than the close of business on Tuesday, September 10, 
1996. With best wishes, I am
            Sincerely,
                                                        Trent Lott.