[Senate Executive Report 104-31]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



104th Congress                                              Exec. Rept.
                                 SENATE

 2d Session                                                      104-31
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                    EXTRADITION TREATY WITH BOLIVIA

                                _______
                                

                 July 30, 1996.--Ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


   Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                   [To accompany Treaty Doc. 104-22]

    The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred 
the Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Republic of 
Bolivia, signed at La Paz on June 27, 1995, having considered 
the same, reports favorably thereon with one proviso, and 
recommends that the Senate give its advice and consent to the 
ratification thereof as set forth in this report and the 
accompanying resolution of ratification.

                               I. Purpose

    Modern extradition treaties (1) identify the offenses for 
which extradition will be granted, (2) establish procedures to 
be followed in presenting extradition requests, (3) enumerate 
exceptions to the duty to extradite, (4) specify the evidence 
required to support a finding of a duty to extradite, and (5) 
set forth administrative provisions for bearing costs and legal 
representation.

                             II. Background

    On June 27, 1995, the President signed an extradition 
treaty with Bolivia. The Treaty was transmitted to the Senate 
for its advice and consent to ratification on October 10, 1995. 
In recent years the Departments of State and Justice have led 
an effort to modernize U.S. bilateral extradition treaties to 
better combat international criminal activity, such as drug 
trafficking, terrorism and money laundering. The United States 
is a party to approximately 100 bilateral extradition treaties. 
According to the Justice Department, during 1995 131 
individuals were extradited to the United States and 79 
individuals were extradited from the United States.
    The increase in international crime also has prompted the 
U.S. government to become a party to several multilateral 
international conventions which, although not themselves 
extradition treaties, deal with international law enforcement 
and provide that the offenses which they cover shall be 
extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty between the 
parties. These include: the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague), art. 8; the Convention to 
Discourage Acts of Violence Against Civil Aviation (Montreal), 
art. 8; the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs of 1961, art. 14 amending art. 36(2)(b)(I) of the Single 
Convention; the Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of 
Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related 
Extortion that are of International Significance (Organization 
of American States), art. 3; the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, art. 8; the International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages, art. 10; the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, 
art. 11; and the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna). 
These multilateral international agreements are incorporated by 
reference in the United States' bilateral extradition treaties.

                              III. Summary

                               a. general

    An extradition treaty is an international agreement in 
which the Requested State agrees, at the request of the 
Requesting State and under specified conditions, to turn over 
persons who are within its jurisdiction and who are charged 
with crimes against, or are fugitives from, the Requesting 
State. Extradition treaties can be bilateral or multilateral, 
though until recently the United States showed little interest 
in negotiating multilateral agreements dealing with 
extradition.
    The contents of recent treaties follow a standard format. 
Article 1 sets forth the obligation of contracting states to 
extradite to each other persons charged by the authorities of 
the Requesting State with, or convicted of, an extraditable 
offense. Article 2, sometimes referred to as a dual criminality 
clause, defines extraditable offenses as offenses punishable in 
both contracting states by prison terms of more than one year. 
Attempts or conspiracies to commit an extraditable offense are 
themselves extraditable. Several of the treaties provide that 
neither party shall be required to extradite its own nationals. 
The treaties carve out an exception to extraditable crimes for 
political offenses. The trend in modern extradition treaties is 
to narrow the political offense exceptions.
    The treaties include a clause allowing the Requested State 
to refuse extradition in cases where the offense is punishable 
by death in the Requesting State, unless the Requesting State 
provides assurances satisfactory to the Requested State that 
the individual sought will not be executed.
    In addition to these substantive provisions, the treaties 
also contain standard procedural provisions. These specify the 
kinds of information that must be submitted with an extradition 
request, the language in which documents are to be submitted, 
the procedures under which documents submitted are to be 
received and admitted into evidence in the Requested State, the 
procedures under which individuals shall be surrendered and 
returned to the Requesting State, and other related matters.

                          B. major provisions

1. Extraditable offenses: The dual criminality clause

    Article 2 contains a standard definition of what 
constitutes an extraditable offense: an offense is extraditable 
if it is punishable under the laws of both parties by a prison 
term of at least one year. Attempts and conspiracies to commit 
such offenses, and participation in the commission of such 
offenses, are also extraditable. If the extradition request 
involves a fugitive, it shall be granted only if the remaining 
sentence to be served is more than six months.
    The dual criminality clause means, for example, that an 
offense is not extraditable if in the United States it 
constitutes a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than one 
year, but it is not a crime in the treaty partner or is a crime 
punishable by a prison term of less than one year. In earlier 
extradition treaties the definition of extraditable offenses 
consisted of a list of specific categories of crimes. This 
categorizing of crimes has resulted in problems when a specific 
crime, for example drug dealing, is not on the list, and is 
therefore not extraditable. The result has been that as 
additional offenses become punishable under the laws of both 
treaty partners the extradition treaties between them need to 
be renegotiated or supplemented. A dual criminality clause 
obviates the need to renegotiate or supplement a treaty when it 
becomes necessary to broaden the definition of extraditable 
offenses.

2. Extraterritorial offenses

    In order to extradite individuals charged with extra 
territorial crimes (offenses committed outside the territory of 
the Requesting State) such as international drug traffickers 
and terrorists, provision must be made in extradition treaties. 
The Bolivia Treaty states that so long as the underlying 
conduct is criminal in both contracting states, it is 
irrelevant where the criminal acts were committed (art. 2 
3(b)). While the meaning of this provision is not entirely 
clear, it seems to be saying that for an extra territorial 
crime to be extraditable it is only necessary that the laws of 
the Requested State punish such a crime on its own territory, 
but that it is not necessary that its laws punish such a crime 
when committed outside its territory.

3. Political offense exception

    In recent years the United States has been promoting a 
restrictive view of the political offense exception in 
furtherance of its campaign against terrorism, drug 
trafficking, and money laundering. Though some of the treaties 
considered by the Committee have taken a narrower view then 
others of the political offense exception, all of them give it 
a more limited scope than earlier U.S. extradition treaties. In 
general, the political offense exception is a broad one in the 
Bolivia Treaty.
    The exclusion from the political offense exception for 
crimes covered by multilateral international agreements, and 
the obligation to extradite for such crimes or submit the case 
to prosecution by the Requested State, is now a standard 
exclusion and is contained in the proposed treaty. The 
incorporation by reference of these multilateral agreements is 
intended to assure that the offenses with which they deal shall 
be extraditable under an extradition treaty. But, extradition 
for such offenses is not guaranteed. A Requested State has the 
option either to extradite or to submit the case to its 
competent authorities for prosecution. For example, a Requested 
state could refuse to extradite and instead declare that it 
will itself prosecute the offender.

4. The death penalty exception

    The United States and other countries appear to have 
different views on capital punishment. Under the proposed 
treaties, Bolivia may refuse extradition for an offense 
punishable by the death penalty in the Requesting state if the 
same offense is not punishable by the death penalty in the 
Requested State, unless the Requesting State gives assurances 
satisfactory to the Requested State that the death penalty will 
not be imposed or carried out.

5. The extradition of nationals

    The U.S. does not object to extraditing its own nationals 
and has sought to negotiate treaties without nationality 
restrictions. Many countries, however, refuse to extradite 
their own nationals. U.S. extradition treaties take varying 
positions on the nationality issue.
    The Bolivia treaty moves substantially in the direction of 
the U.S. position on the extradition of nationals (art. 3). It 
provides that each party shall have discretion to deny 
extradition of its own nationals except as to certain offenses 
with respect to which extradition on the basis of nationality 
cannot be refused. Such offenses include those as to which 
there is an obligation to establish criminal jurisdiction under 
multilateral international agreements in force between the 
parties. In addition, extradition cannot be refused on the 
basis of the criminal's nationality for offenses that include 
murder, kidnapping, rape, drug-and terrorism-related offenses, 
organized criminal activity, counterfeiting, and certain 
others. Attempts or conspiracies to commit any of these 
offenses by a national of the Requested State are also 
extraditable.

6. Retroactivity

    The proposed treaty states that it shall apply to offenses 
committed before as well as after it enters into force (art. 
17). These retroactivity provisions do not violate the 
Constitution's prohibition against the enactment of ex post 
facto laws which applies only to enactments making criminal 
acts that were innocent when committed, not to the extradition 
of a defendant for acts that were criminal when committed but 
for which no extradition agreement existed at the time.

7. The rule of speciality

    The rule of speciality (or specialty), which prohibits a 
Requesting State from trying an extradited individual for an 
offense other than the one for which he was extradited, is a 
standard provision included in U.S. bilateral extradition 
treaties, including the six under consideration. The Bolivia 
Treaty (art. 12) contains exceptions to the rule of specialty 
that are designed to allow a Requesting State some latitude in 
prosecuting offenders for crimes other than those which they 
had been specifically extradited.

8. Lapse of time

    The Bolivia Treaty has no provision denying extradition if 
barred by the statute of limitations of either the Requesting 
or Requested State.

                  IV. Entry Into Force and Termination

                          A. ENTRY INTO FORCE

    This Treaty shall enter into force upon the exchange of 
instruments of ratification.

                             b. termination

    This Treaty shall terminate six months after notice by a 
Party of an intent to terminate the Treaty.

                          V. Committee Action

    The Committee on Foreign Relations held a public hearing on 
the proposed treaty on Wednesday, July 17, 1996. The hearing 
was chaired by Senator Helms. The Committee considered the 
proposed treaty on July 24, 1996, and ordered the proposed 
treaty favorably reported with one proviso by voice vote, with 
the recommendation that the Senate give its advice and consent 
to the ratification of the proposed treaty.

                         VI. Committee Comments

    The Committee on Foreign Relations recommended favorably 
the proposed treaty. The Committee believes that the proposed 
treaty is in the interest of the United States and urges the 
Senate to act promptly to give its advice and consent to 
ratification. In 1996 and the years ahead, U.S. law enforcement 
officers increasingly will be engaged in criminal 
investigations that traverse international borders. Certainly, 
sovereign relationships have always been important to 
prosecution of suspected criminals. The first recorded 
extradition treaty dates as far back as 1280 B.C. under Ramses 
II, Pharaoh of Egypt. The United States entered into its first 
extradition treaty in 1794 with Great Britain. Like these early 
treaties, the basic premise of the treaties is to facilitate, 
under specified conditions, the transfer of persons who are 
within the jurisdiction of one nation, and who are charged with 
crimes against, or are fugitives from, the nation requesting 
extradition. Despite the long history of such bilateral 
treaties, the Committee believes that these treaties are more 
essential than ever to U.S. efforts to bring suspected 
criminals to justice.
    In 1995, 131 persons were extradited to the U.S. for 
prosecution for crimes committed in the U.S., and the U.S. 
extradited 79 individuals to other countries for prosecution. 
After the Senate ratified an extradition treaty with Jordan in 
1995, the U.S. Attorney General was able to take into custody 
an alleged participant in the bombing of the World Trade 
Center. His prosecution would not be possible without an 
extradition treaty. Crimes such as terrorism, transshipment of 
drugs by international cartels, and international banking fraud 
are but some of the international crimes that pose serious 
problems to U.S. law enforcement efforts. The Committee 
believes that modern extradition treaties provide an important 
law enforcement tool for combatting such crimes and will 
advance the interests of the United States.
    The proposed resolution of ratification includes a proviso 
that reaffirms that ratification of this treaty does not 
require or authorize legislation that is prohibited by the 
Constitution of the United States. Bilateral extradition 
treaties rely on relationships between sovereign countries with 
unique legal systems. In as much as U.S. law is based on the 
Constitution, this treaty may not require legislation 
prohibited by the Constitution.

                  VII. Explanation of Proposed Treaty

    The following is the Technical Analysis of the Extradition 
Treaty submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations by the 
Departments of State and Justice prior to the Committee hearing 
to consider pending extradition treaties.

technical analysis of the extradition treaty between the united states 
                   of america and republic of bolivia

    On June 27, 1995, at La Paz, Bolivia, the United States 
signed a treaty on extradition with the Republic of Bolivia 
(``the Treaty''). In recent years, the United States has signed 
similar treaties with many other countries as part of ongoing 
and highly successful efforts to modernize out international 
law enforcement relations. The Treaty is intended to replace 
the outdated treaty currently in force between the United 
States and Bolivia, the Treaty of Extradition (``the 1900 
Treaty''),\1\ with a modern agreement to facilitate the 
extradition of serious offenders, including narcotics 
traffickers, regardless of their nationality.
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    \1\ Apr. 21, 1900, 32 Stat. 1857, T.S. 399, 5 Bevans 735.
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    It is anticipated that the Treaty will be implemented in 
the United States pursuant to the procedural framework provided 
by Title 18, United States Code, Section 3184 et seq. No new 
implementing legislation will be needed.
    The following technical analysis of the Treaty was prepared 
by the United States delegation that conducted the 
negotiations.

Article I--Agreement to extradite

    This article, like the first article in every recent United 
States extradition treaty, formally obligates each Party to 
extradite to the other, pursuant to the provisions and 
conditions of the Treaty, persons charged with or convicted of 
extraditable offenses.
    The phrase ``found guilty of, or sentenced for'' was used 
instead of ``convicted'' because of peculiarities in United 
States and Bolivian criminal procedure and in order to avoid 
potential interpretation problems due to semantic differences. 
In Bolivia, the terms ``convicted'' and ``sentenced'' are used 
interchangeability, in part because a defendant cannot be found 
guilty without being sentenced at the same time. On the other 
hand, in the United States, a defendant who has been found 
guilty ordinarily will not be sentenced until after a 
presentence report has been prepared and considered by the 
court.
    The negotiators agreed that the term ``found guilty'' 
includes instances in which a defendant has been convicted but 
a sentence has not yet been imposed. By including all three 
terms (i.e., ``charged,'' ``found guilty,'' and ``sentenced''), 
the negotiators intended to make it clear that the Treaty 
applies not only to charged and sentenced persons, but also to 
persons who are adjudged guilty and flee prior to 
sentencing.\2\
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    \2\ See Stanbrook and Stanbrook, Extradition: The Law and Practice 
25-26 (1979).
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    The article also refers to offenses ``in'' the Requesting 
State rather than ``of'' the Requesting State, thereby 
obligating Bolivia to extradite fugitives to the United States 
for state and local prosecutions as well as federal cases.

Article II--Extraditable offenses

    This article contains the basic guidelines for determining 
what constitutes an extraditable offense. The Treaty, like 
other recent United States extradition treaties, does not list 
the offenses for which extradition may be granted.
    Paragraph 1 permits extradition for any offense punishable 
under the laws of both Parties by deprivation of liberty (i.e., 
imprisonment or other form of detention) for a maximum period 
of more than one year, or by a more severe penalty such as 
capital punishment. The term ``maximum'' was included to ensure 
that with respect to offenses punishable by a range of years, 
the Requested State will look only to the maximum potential 
penalty in determining whether the offense meets the 
requirement of being punishable by ``more than one year'' of 
imprisonment.
    During the negotiations, the Bolivian delegation stated 
that key offenses such as drug trafficking and organized 
criminal activity (RICO) are extraditable provided the 
predicate offense is extraditable.
    Defining extraditable offenses in terms of dual criminality 
rather than attempting to list each extraditable crime obviates 
the need to renegotiate the Treaty or supplement it if both 
countries pass laws dealing with a new type of criminal 
activity or if the list inadvertently fails to cover an 
important type of criminal activity punishable in both 
countries. For example, although money laundering is not a 
crime in Bolivia at this time, according to the Bolivian 
delegation, the Bolivian government currently is drafting 
legislation to criminalize money laundering. Once this 
legislation is passed by the Bolivian Congress, money 
laundering will automatically be included as an extraditable 
offense under the dual criminality provision without having to 
amend the Treaty.
    In order to ensure that extradition is not requested for 
minor offenses, paragraph 2 requires that if the person whose 
extradition is sought has already been sentenced in the 
Requesting State, more than six months of that sentence must 
remain to be served. Provisions of this kind are not 
preferred,\3\ but they do appear in some United States 
extradition treaties.\4\
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    \3\ For example, recent United States extradition treaties with 
Australia, Canada, Jamaica, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom contain 
no such requirement.
    \4\ See, e.g., U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, art. 
II(1), T.I.A.S. No. 10837.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 3 reflects the intention of both Parties to 
interpret the principles of this article broadly. Paragraph 
3(a) requires the Requested State to disregard differences in 
the categorization of an offense in determining whether dual 
criminality exists and to overlook mere differences in 
terminology used to define the offense under the laws of each 
Party. Paragraph 3(a) also states it shall be irrelevant 
whether the laws of both Parties contain identical elements as 
long as the underlying conduct is criminal in both 
countries.\5\ Provisions similar to paragraph 3(a) are present 
in most recent United States extradition treaties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ See In re Extradition of Russell, 789 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 766 (1st Cir. 1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 3(b) states that extradition shall be granted for 
an extraditable offense regardless of where the act or acts 
constituting the offense were committed. Because United States 
jurisprudence recognizes jurisdiction in our courts to 
prosecute offenses committed outside the United States if the 
crime was intended to, or did, have effects in this country, or 
if the legislative history of the statute shows clear 
Congressional intent to assert such jurisdiction,\6\ many 
federal statutes criminalize acts committed wholly outside 
United States territory. On the other hand, in Bolivia, the 
government's ability to prosecute extraterritorial offenses is 
much more limited, except when the offense was committed by a 
Bolivian citizen.\7\ Therefore, paragraph 3(b) reflects 
Bolivia's agreement to recognize United States jurisdiction to 
prosecute offenses committed outside the United States. This 
provision will greatly improve the ability of the United States 
to obtain extradition for a number of offenses that frequently 
are orchestrated from abroad, such as narcotics trafficking and 
acts of terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States Sec. 402 (1987); Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction Over 
Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 1109 (1982).
    \7\ Bolivia, like many countries whose jurisprudence is rooted in 
the civil law tradition, recognizes broad jurisdiction based on the 
nationality of the offender. In effect, Bolivian courts have 
jurisdiction over virtually any offense committed by a Bolivian citizen 
anywhere in the world. In this respect, this provision also is 
beneficial to Bolivia in that it allows Bolivia to extradite from the 
United States one of its citizens accused of committing a crime in a 
third country, even though United States courts normally would not have 
jurisdiction over a United States citizen who committed a crime under 
similar circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, judges in foreign countries are often confused 
by the fact that many United States federal statutes require 
proof of certain elements (such as use of the mails or 
interstate transportation) solely to establish jurisdiction in 
United States federal courts. Because these judges know of no 
similar requirement in their own criminal law, they 
occasionally have denied on this basis the extradition of 
fugitives sought by the United States on federal charges. 
Therefore, paragraph 3(c) requires that such elements be 
disregarded in applying the dual criminality principle. For 
example, Bolivian authorities must treat United States mail 
fraud charges \8\ in the same manner as fraud charges under 
state laws, and must view the federal crime of interstate 
transportation of stolen property \9\ in the same manner as 
unlawful possession of stolen property.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341.
    \9\ See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 4 follows the pattern of recent extradition 
treaties in requiring that extradition be granted for 
attempting or conspiring to commit, participating in the 
commission of, or associating to commit an extraditable 
offense. As conspiracy charges frequently are used in United 
States criminal cases, particularly those involving complex 
transnational criminal activity, it is especially important 
that the Treaty be clear on this point. According to the 
Bolivian delegation, Bolivia has no general conspiracy statute 
similar to Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.\10\ 
Therefore, paragraph 2 creates an exception to the dual 
criminality rule of paragraph 1 by expressly making conspiracy 
an extraditable crime if the offense that was the object of the 
conspiracy constitutes an extraditable offense. Paragraph 2 
creates a similar exception for the Bolivian offense of illicit 
association in the commission of an offense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ The closest analogue seems to be the offense of ``illicit 
association'' proscribed in article 132 of the Bolivian Penal Code, 
which makes it an offense for at least four individuals to form an 
association to participate in or plan a criminal offense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 5 provides that when extradition has been granted 
for an extraditable offense, it shall also be granted for any 
other offense for which all of the requirements for extradition 
are met except for the requirement that the offense be 
punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. For example, 
if Bolivia agrees to extradite to the United States a fugitive 
wanted for prosecution on a felony charge, the United States is 
also permitted to obtain extradition for any misdemeanor 
offenses charged, as long as those misdemeanors also are 
recognized as criminal offenses in Bolivia. Thus, the Treaty 
incorporates the recent United States extradition practice of 
permitting extradition for misdemeanors when the fugitive's 
extradition is granted for a more serious extraditable offense. 
This practice is generally desirable from the standpoint of 
both the fugitive and the Requesting State in that: (1) it 
permits all charges against the fugitive to be disposed of more 
quickly, either by facilitating plea agreements or trials while 
evidence is available; and (2) it permits the possibility of 
concurrent sentences. Similar provisions are found in many 
recent United States extradition treaties.

Article III--Extradition of nationals

    Some countries, including most countries in Latin America, 
refuse to extradite their own nationals for trial or 
punishment. Although Bolivia has no law that expressly 
prohibits the extradition of Bolivian nationals, securing the 
extradition of Bolivian citizens from Bolivia has been an 
extremely difficult process for the United States. There is 
strong public opposition in Bolivia to the extradition of 
nationals, and the Bolivian government has had difficulty 
finding the political will to extradite its citizens to the 
United States. Despite numerous United States requests for the 
extradition of Bolivians charged with crimes in the United 
States, in recent times, the Bolivian government has approved 
the extradition to the United States of only two Bolivian 
citizens (in July, 1992, and in March, 1995).
    The 1900 Treaty provides that neither Party shall be bound 
to deliver up its own citizens. According to the Bolivian 
delegation, Bolivian legislators, jurists and legal scholars 
are divided in their interpretation of this provision. Some 
argue that, while creating no obligation to extradite 
nationals, the 1900 Treaty nevertheless allows extradition at 
the discretion of the Requested State. Others maintain that the 
provision precludes the extradition of nationals altogether.
    Because the majority of United States fugitives in Bolivia 
traditionally have been Bolivian citizens, the United States 
delegation made clear at the outset of the negotiations that we 
would not accept a treaty that does not guarantee the 
extradition of serious offenders regardless of their 
nationality. In response, the Bolivian delegation maintained 
that a treaty that calls for the mandatory extradition of 
Bolivian citizens in all cases would be politically impossible 
for the Bolivian government to accept and would face certain 
defeat in the Bolivian Congress's ratification process. 
Ultimately, an agreement was reached on language satisfying the 
objectives of both delegations.
    This article obligates the Parties to extradite their own 
nationals for numerous serious crimes, but permits the 
Executive Authority of the Requested State to exercise 
discretion concerning extradition of its citizens in some 
cases.
    Paragraph 1 sets forth the general rule that neither Party 
shall be obligated to extradite its own nationals and 
enumerates in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) offenses excepted 
from the general rule for which extradition of nationals is 
mandatory.
    Paragraph 1(a) includes offenses for which both Parties 
have an obligation to establish criminal jurisdiction pursuant 
to a multilateral treaty. The conventions to which this clause 
applies at present include the Convention on Offenses and 
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft; \11\ the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizures of Aircraft 
(Hijacking); \12\ the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage); 
\13\ the United Nations Convention Against the Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances; \14\ and the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs \15\ and the Amending 
Protocol to the Single Convention.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 
U.N.T.S. 219.
    \12\ Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192.
    \13\ Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
    \14\ Dec. 20, 1988, T.I.A.S. No. --.
    \15\ Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 
204.
    \16\ Mar. 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1439, T.I.A.S. No. 8118, 976 U.N.T.S. 
3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 1(b) lists a number of serious offenses for which 
there is an obligation to extradite nationals, including 
murder, kidnaping, aggravated assault, rape, sexual offenses 
involving children, drug trafficking, terrorism, organized 
crime offenses, major frauds and counterfeiting. Paragraph 1(b) 
also includes any offenses not listed that are punishable by 
both Parties by a maximum penalty of at least ten years of 
imprisonment.\17\
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    \17\ According to the Bolivian delegation, offenses punishable 
under Bolivian law by a maximum penalty of at least ten years of 
imprisonment include the following: perpetrating a disaster on a means 
of transportation; rape; cattle stealing; treason; espionage; sabotage; 
armed uprising against the security and sovereignty of the State; 
attempts on the life of the President and other dignitaries of the 
State; terrorism; genocide; murder; kidnaping; the manufacture, 
trafficking, transportation, importation, distribution, or aggravated 
use of controlled substances; bribery; and extortion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 1(c) includes attempts and conspiracies to 
commit, participation in, and illicit association in, the 
commission of any of the offenses described in subparagraphs 
(a) and (b).
    Paragraph 2 provides that with respect to offenses not 
covered in paragraph 1 (a), (b) or (c), the Executive Authority 
of the Requested State shall have the power to extradite its 
nationals, although it may refuse their extradition at its 
discretion.
    Paragraph 3 requires that if the Requested State refuses 
extradition solely on the basis of nationality, that State must 
submit the case to its authorities for prosecution if asked to 
do so by the Requesting State.
    Overall, the large class of offenses enumerated under 
article III for which the extradition of nationals is mandatory 
creates exceptions greater than the general rule of non-
obligatory extradition of nationals. This article establishes a 
clear framework that enables the United States to obtain the 
extradition of Bolivian citizens from Bolivia for numerous 
serious offenses, including narcotics trafficking.
    Under this article, the United States will continue to 
extradite its nationals to Bolivia in accordance with 
established United States policy favoring such 
extraditions.\18\
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    \18\ See generally Shearer, Extradition in International Law 110-14 
(1970); 6 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 871-76 (1968). Our 
policy of drawing no distinction between nationals of the United States 
and nationals of other countries in extradition matters has been 
underscored by Congress in legislation. Title 18, United States Code, 
Section 3196 authorizes the Secretary of State to extradite United 
States citizens pursuant to a treaty that permits but does not 
expressly require surrender of citizens as long as the other 
requirements of the treaty are met. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3196.
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Article IV--Bases for discretionary denial of extradition

    Paragraph 1 permits the Executive Authority of the 
Requested State to refuse extradition when the offense for 
which extradition is sought is punishable by death in the 
Requesting State, unless the Requesting State provides 
assurances that the person sought will not be executed. This 
paragraph further provides that if the Requesting State gives 
such assurances, the death penalty, if imposed, shall not be 
carried out. The Bolivian delegation insisted on this provision 
because Bolivia has abolished the death penalty. Similar 
provisions are found in many recent United States extradition 
treaties.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Similar provisions are present in recent United States 
extradition treaties with the Bahamas, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Jamaica, Jordan and Thailand.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 2 provides that the Requested State may refuse 
extradition if the request relates to an offense under military 
law that is not an offense under ordinary criminal law.\20\ 
This also is a common provision in United States extradition 
treaties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ An example of such an offense is desertion. Matter of the 
Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676, 703 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Article V--Bases for non-discretionary denial of extradition

    Paragraph 1 prohibits extradition for political offenses 
and describes several categories of offenses that shall not be 
considered political offenses. This is a common provision in 
United States extradition treaties.
    Paragraph 1(a) provides that the political offense 
exception does not apply in cases involving a murder or other 
willful crime against the ``person'' of a Head of State or a 
member of the Head of State's family.
    Paragraph 1(b) establishes that the political offense 
exception does not apply to offenses for which both Parties 
have the obligation to establish criminal jurisdiction pursuant 
to a multilateral treaty. The conventions to which this clause 
applies at present include: the Convention on Offenses and 
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft; the Convention 
on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizures of Aircraft 
(Hijacking); the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage); the 
United Nations Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances; and the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the Amending Protocol to the 
Single Convention.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Supra n. 11-16.
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    Paragraph 1(c) provides that the political offense 
exception does not apply to conspiracy or attempt to commit, or 
aiding and abetting in the commission or attempted commission 
of, offenses in subparagraphs (a) and (b).
    Paragraph 2 prohibits extradition if the person sought was 
convicted or acquitted in the Requested State for the offense 
for which extradition is requested; its language is similar to 
provisions in many United States extradition treaties. This 
paragraph permits extradition in situations in which the person 
sought is charged with different offenses by each Party arising 
out of the same basic transaction.
    Paragraph 2 further makes clear that extradition shall not 
be precluded by the fact that the Requested State's authorities 
declined to prosecute the person sought, or instituted and 
subsequently dismissed criminal proceedings against the person. 
This provision was included because the decision of the 
Requested State to forego prosecution, or to dismiss criminal 
charges already filed, might be the result of a failure to 
obtain sufficient evidence or to locate available witnesses for 
trail, while the prosecution in the Requesting State might not 
suffer from the same impediments. This provision should enhance 
the ability of the Parties to extradite to the jurisdiction 
that has the better chance of a successful prosecution.

Article VI--Transmission of extradition request and required documents

    This article sets forth the appropriate means of 
transmitting an extradition request and the required 
documentation and evidence to be submitted in support thereof; 
it contains language similar to provisions in recent United 
States extradition treaties.
    Paragarph 1 requires that all requests for extradition be 
submitted through the diplomatic channel. Paragraph 2 outlines 
the information that must accompany every request for 
extradition under the Treaty. Paragraph 3 details the 
additional information needed when the person is sought for 
trail in the Requesting State. Depending upon whether the 
United States or Bolivia is the Requesting State, paragraph 4 
or 5 describes the information needed, in addition to the 
requirements of paragraph 2, when the person sought has already 
been convicted in the Requesting State.
    Most of the items listed in paragraph 2 enable the 
Requested State to determine quickly whether extradition is 
permitted under the Treaty. For example, the ``description of 
the facts of the offense'' and ``the text of the laws 
describing the essential elements of, and punishment for, the 
offense for which extradition is requested'' called for in 
paragraphs 2 (b) and (c) enable the Requested State to 
determine whether a lack of dual criminality exists to deny 
extradition under article II. Other information, such as the 
physical description and probable location of the person sought 
as required under paragraph 2(a), assist the Requested State in 
locating and apprehending the person sought.
    Paragraph 3 requires that if the person sought is charged 
with but not yet convicted of a crime, the Requesting State 
must provide certified copies of the charging document and 
warrant of arrest, along with ``such evidence as, in accordance 
with the laws of the Requesting State, would be necessary to 
justify the apprehension and commitment for trial of the person 
sought.'' This is consistent with United States extradition 
jurisprudence, which interprets this language to require 
probable cause.\22\ The Bolivian delegation assured the United 
States that under Bolivian law, the standard applied in 
determining whether sufficient evidence exists to justify 
extradition is quite similar to our probable cause 
requirement.\23\
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    \22\ Courts applying Title 18, United States Code, Section 3184 
have long required probable cause for international extraditions. 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
Sec. 476 comment b (1987).
    \23\ Article 194 of the Bolivian Criminal Procedure Code requires a 
showing of obvious and serious indications of guilt (``indicios 
manifiestos y graves'') to permit extradition. According to the 
Bolivian delegation, this standard is interpreted in light of 
``reasonableness'' or ``common sense.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraphs 4 and 5 describe the information needed in 
addition to the requirements of paragraph 2 when the person 
sought has already been convicted in the Requesting State. 
Paragraph 4 applies when Bolivia is the Requesting State, and 
paragraph 5 applies when the United States is the Requesting 
State. The two paragraphs contain essentially the same 
requirements, but were separated at the request of the Bolivian 
delegation to avoid any confusion due to differences in 
Bolivian and United States criminal procedure. For example, 
paragraph 4 recognizes that when Bolivia is the Requesting 
State and the person sought has been convicted, a copy of the 
sentence always will be provided because a person cannot be 
found guilty in Bolivia without being sentenced at the same 
time. On the other hand, recognizing that a person in the 
United States is first convicted and usually sentenced at a 
subsequent date, paragraph 5 requires that the United States 
provide a copy of the sentence only if the person sought has in 
fact been sentenced. Both paragraphs make clear that once a 
conviction has been obtained, no showing of probable cause is 
required. In essence, the fact of conviction speaks for itself, 
a position taken in recent United States court decisions even 
without a specific treaty provision.\24\ The Requesting State 
must provide only such evidence that establishes that the 
person sought is the person to whom the conviction refers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ See, e.g., Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362, 374 
(E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 925 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976 (D. Vt. 1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 6 states that if the person sought has been found 
guilty in absentia, the documentation required for extradition 
includes both proof of conviction and the same documentation 
required under paragraph 3. Paragraph 6 is consistent with the 
longstanding United States policy of requiring such 
documentation before extraditing persons convicted in absentia.
    Paragraph 7 provides for the submission of additional 
information if the original request and supporting 
documentation are viewed as insufficient by the Requested 
State. This paragraph is intended to allow the Requesting State 
the opportunity to cure in the request and supporting materials 
any deficiencies found by the Requested State, which may set a 
time limit for receipt of the additional information. This 
paragraph is similar to provisions in other recent United 
States extradition treaties.

Article VII--Certification, authentication, and translation

    Paragraph 1 governs the authentication procedures for the 
documentation accompanying an extradition request. It provides 
that the documents shall be accepted as evidence if certified 
and authenticated by the principal diplomatic or consular 
officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting 
State.\25\ In addition, in the case of a request from the 
United States, the documents must be certified by the 
Department of State; in the case of a request from Bolivia, the 
documents must be authenticated by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Worship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ This provision is consistent with requirements imposed by 
United States law. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3190.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragrpah 2 is a standard treaty provision that requires 
that all documents submitted in the support of an extradition 
request be translated into the language of the Requested State. 
Thus, requests from Bolivia to the United States must be 
translated into English, and United States requests to Bolivia 
must be translated into Spanish. Paragraph 2 also makes clear 
that such translation is at the expense of the Requesting 
State.

Article VIII--Provisional arrest

    This article describes the process by which a person in the 
Requested State may be arrested and detained while the formal 
extradition papers are being prepared in the Requesting State.
    Paragraph 1 provides that provisional arrest is reserved 
for cases of urgency and such requests shall be transmitted 
through the diplomatic channel.
    Paragrpah 2 sets forth the information that the Requesting 
State must provide in support of a provisional arrest request.
    Paragraph 3 requires the Requested State promptly to notify 
the Requesting State of the disposition of the request and any 
reasons for its denial.
    Paragraph 4 provides that an individual who has been 
provisionally arrested may be released from custody if the 
documents are not received by the Requested State within 60 
days from the date of provisional arrest. In such cases, the 
individual may be taken into custody again and the extradition 
proceedings may be recommenced if the formal request is 
received at a later date.

Article IX--Decision regarding the request

    This article requires that the Requested State promptly 
notify the Requesting State of its decision on the extradition 
request.
    If extradition is denied, in whole or in part, the 
Requested State must provide a reasoned explanation for the 
denial and a copy of the pertinent decision by its authorities. 
If extradition is granted, the Parties shall agree on the date 
and place of the surrender of the person sought. However, if 
the Requesting State does not remove the person sought within 
the time period set by the law of the Requested State, the 
Requested State may release the person from custody and may 
subsequently deny an extradition request for the same offense. 
United States law requires that such surrender occur within two 
calendar months of a finding that the person is 
extraditable,\26\ or of the conclusion of any litigation 
challenging that finding,\27\ whichever is later. According to 
the Bolivian delegation, Bolivian law does not specify the time 
in which a surrender must take place.\28\
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    \26\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3188.
    \27\ See Jimenez v. U.S. District Court, 84 S. Ct. 14, 11 L.Ed.2d 
30 (1963) (decided by Golberg, J., in chambers), Liberto v. Emery, 724 
F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1983); In re United States, 713 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 
1983); see also Barrett v. United States, 590 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1978).
    \28\ Therefore, the parenthetical ``if any'' was added to the text 
of this article in reference to the laws of the Requested State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Article X--Competing requests

    This article sets forth the factors the Requested State 
shall consider in determining to which country to surrender a 
person whose extradition was requested by the other Party and 
one or more other countries. For the United States, the 
Executive Authority make this decision by taking into account 
all relevant factors.\29\ For Bolivia, the decision is made by 
the competent judicial authority.\30\
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    \29\ Under United States law, the appropriate authority within the 
executive branch is the Secretary of State. Cheng Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 
734 F. Supp. 988 (S.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 932 F.2d 977 (11th Cir. 
1991).
    \30\ The Bolivian delegation maintained that under Bolivian law, 
the judicial branch, not the executive, is the competent authority to 
make this decision. The Bolivian delegation also requested that in 
cases in which Bolivia is the Requested State, this article set forth a 
detailed framework of factors to be considered.
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Article XI--Conditional and deferred surrender

    A person sought for extradition could be facing prosecution 
or serving a sentence in the Requested State for offenses other 
that those for which extradition is requested. This article 
provides a means for the Requested State to temporarily 
surrender the person sought to the Requesting State or, in the 
alternative, to defer extradition until the conclusion of local 
proceedings against the person and the service of any 
punishment imposed. Similar provisions are present in recent 
United States extradition treaties.
    Paragraph 1 provides for temporary surrender of a person 
sought for prosecution in the Requesting State who is being 
prosecuted or is serving a sentence in the Requested State. A 
person temporarily transferred pursuant to this article is kept 
in custody while in the Requesting State, and is returned to 
the Requested State at the conclusion of the proceedings in the 
Requesting State. Such temporary surrender furthers the 
interests of justice in that it permits trial of the person 
sought while evidence and witnesses are more likely to be 
available, thereby increasing the likelihood of conviction. 
Such transfer might also be advantageous to the person sought 
in that: (1) it permits resolution of the charges sooner; (2) 
it makes it possible for any sentence to be served in the 
Requesting State concurrently with the sentence in the 
Requested State; and (3) it permits defense against the charges 
while favorable evidence is fresh and more likely to be 
available.
    Paragraph 2 provides that the Requested State may postpone 
the surrender of a person who is being prosecuted or serving a 
sentence in the Requested State until the conclusion of the 
prosecution or the full execution of any punishment 
imposed.\31\
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    \31\ Under United States law and practice, the Secretary of State 
makes this decision. Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. Supp. 904, 920 (D. Mass. 
1990), aff'd, 931 F. 2d 169 (1st Cir. 1991).
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Article XII--Rule of specialty

    This article covers the rule of specialty, a standard 
principle of United States extradition law and practice. 
Designed to ensure that a fugitive surrendered for one offense 
is not tried for other crimes, the rule of specialty prevents a 
request for extradition from being used as a subterfuge to 
obtain custody of a person for trial or service of a sentence 
on different charges that are not extraditable under the Treaty 
or not properly documented in the request.
    Exceptions to the rule have developed over the years. This 
article codifies the current formulation of the rule by 
providing that a person extradited under the Treaty may not be 
detained, tried, convicted or punished in the Requesting State 
for an offense committed prior to surrender except with respect 
to: (1) an offense for which extradition was granted; (2) a 
differently denominated offense that nonetheless is based on 
the same facts as the offense for which extradition was 
granted; and (3) any other offense for which the Requested 
State gives consent.\32\ Paragraph 1(c)(2) provides that in 
cases in which such consent is sought, the Requested State may: 
(1) require the submission of supporting documentation as set 
forth in article VI; and (2) detain the person for 90 days, or 
such longer period of time as the Requested State may 
authorize, while the request for consent is being processed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ In the United States, the Secretary of State has the authority 
to consent to a waiver of the rule of specialty. See Berenguer v. 
Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (D.D.C. 1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 2 prohibits the Requesting State from 
surrendering an extraditee to a third state for a crime 
committed prior to extradition under the Treaty without the 
consent of the Requested State.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ A similar provision is contained in all recent United States 
extradition treaties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 3 permits the detention, trial or punishment of 
an extraditee for additional offenses, or the extradition of 
that person to a third state, if the extraditee (1) leaves the 
Requesting State and voluntarily returns to it; or (2) does not 
leave the Requesting State within 30 days of being free to do 
so.\34\
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    \34\ The policy behind paragraph 3 is that an extraditee should not 
be allowed to benefit from the rule of specialty indefinitely by 
remaining in or returning to the Requesting State with impunity. Under 
this paragraph, if the extraditee chooses to return to or remain in the 
Requesting State, the extraditee effectively ``waives'' the benefits of 
the rule. Generally, we prefer that the time period afforded the person 
to leave the Requesting State be as short as practicable, e.g., 10 or 
15 days, to avoid frustration by law enforcement and the public from 
having such a person at large in the community. The Bolivian 
delegation, however, requested a period of at least 30 days in order to 
allow an extraditee the opportunity to obtain necessary travel 
documents and to get personal and/or business affairs in order. 
Although 30 days is longer than we generally prefer, equivalent and 
longer time limits are not uncommon in recent United States extradition 
treaties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Article XIII--Waiver of extradition

    Persons sought for extradition frequently elect to waive 
their right to extradition proceedings in order to expedite 
their return to a Requesting State. This article provides that 
when a person sought consents to surrender to the Requesting 
State, the person may be returned to the Requesting State as 
expeditiously as possible without further proceedings. Such 
consent must be given before a judicial authority of the 
Requested State.
    The delegations agreed that in such cases there is no need 
for the formal documents described in article VI or any further 
judicial or administrative proceedings.
    When a person sought elects to return voluntarily to the 
Requesting State under this article, the process is not deemed 
an ``extradition''; therefore, the rule of specialty does not 
apply.

Article XIV--Seizure and surrender of property

    This article provides that to the extent permitted by the 
law of the Requested State, any assets, objects of value, or 
documents relating to the offense (whether proceeds, 
instrumentalities, or other relevant evidence) shall be 
surrendered to the Requesting State upon the granting of the 
extradition. Article XIV further provides that surrender of 
these items shall occur even if extradition cannot be effected 
due to the death or disappearance of the person sought.
    The obligation to surrender property under this provision 
is subject to due respect for the rights of third parties in 
the property.

Article XV--Transit

    Paragraph 1 gives each Party the power to authorize transit 
through its territory of persons being surrendered to the other 
Party by a third state.\35\ Requests for transit under this 
article are to be transmitted through the diplomatic channel 
and must contain a description of the person being transported 
and a brief statement of the facts of the case upon which the 
surrender is based.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ A similar provision is present in all recent United States 
extradition treaties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 2 requires that a Party shall respond promptly to 
transit requests, but allows a Party to refuse permission for 
transit if such transit would compromise its essential 
interests.
    Paragraph 3 states that no authorization is needed when air 
transportation is being used and no landing is scheduled in the 
territory of the other Part. If an unscheduled landing occurs 
in the territory of a Party, that Party may require a request 
as provided for in paragraph 1. In such a case, the person in 
transit shall be kept in custody for up to 96 hours until a 
request for transit and thereafter until transit is effected.

Article XVI--Representation, consultation, and expenses

    Paragraph 1 compels the competent authorities of the 
Requested State, by all legal means within their power, to 
advise, assist and represent the interests of the Requesting 
State in connection with the processing of extradition requests 
in the Requested State.
    Paragraph 2 provides that the Parties shall consult with 
each other with regard to individual extradition cases and 
extradition procedures in general.
    Paragraph 3 requires the Requesting State to bear expenses 
of extradition relating to the translation of documents and the 
transportation of the person sought to the Requesting State.
    Paragraph 4 provides that neither Party shall make a 
pecuniary claim against the other in connection with 
extradition proceedings, including arrest, detention, 
examination or surrender of the person sought. This includes 
any claim by the person for damages or reimbursement of legal 
fees or other expenses occasioned by the execution of the 
extraction request.
    In paragraph 1, the phrase ``by all legal means within 
their power'' was included because the law and practice of the 
United States and Bolivia are quite different on this issue. In 
accordance with established practice, the United States will 
represent Bolivia before the courts of this country in 
connection with Bolivian extradition requests. According to the 
Bolivian delegation, however, Bolivian law and practice 
prohibit the Bolivian executive branch from intervening in an 
extradition proceeding once the case has been submitted to the 
Bolivian judiciary. Under Bolivian law, every foreign 
extradition request is submitted directly to the Bolivian 
Supreme Court, which reviews the request and supporting 
documentation and ultimately issues a decision approving or 
denying the request. Basically, the extradition case is decided 
without oral argument or personal appearances by the parties in 
court. The only Bolivian official who becomes involved in the 
proceedings is the Bolivian Attorney General, who makes a 
written recommendation to the court that the request either be 
approved or denied. In the Bolivian legal system, however, the 
Attorney General is not part of the executive branch of 
government. The Attorney General is an independent authority 
within the judicial branch who represents only the interests of 
the ``Bolivian people.'' The Attorney General does not 
represent the Requesting State and cannot be compelled to argue 
for extradition if the Attorney General believes that the court 
should deny the request. The Bolivian delegation also indicated 
that at this time, there is no possibility Bolivia will modify 
this aspect of its internal procedure.
    The Bolivian delegation did agree, however, that in certain 
ways the Bolivian executive branch can expand its role in the 
extradition process to better represent the interests of the 
United States. The types of assistance that the Bolivian 
delegation agreed to provide are outlined in a pair of 
diplomatic notes exchanged when the Treaty was signed. The 
Bolivian government agreed therein that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs will conduct a substantive review of documents 
submitted with extradition requests for the purpose of 
assessing compliance with Bolivian evidentiary and other legal 
requirements, and will advise the United States on any need for 
revision or supplementation of documents. Therefore, in 
conjunction with the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs will prepare a written opinion or declaration 
regarding whether the offenses named in a request are 
extraditable, whether the request and supporting documentation 
are properly certified or authenticated for admission into 
evidence, and whether extradition is appropriate under the 
Treaty. The Ministry will then submit this opinion or 
declaration to the Bolivian Supreme Court when it files the 
extradition request and supporting documentation with the 
court.
    The Bolivian delegation indicated that in certain cases the 
hiring of private counsel by the United States might be 
necessary to respond to legal briefs and motions filed by 
defense counsel. In this regard, the Bolivian delegation stated 
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will follow up and report 
on the progress of extradition cases, and will advise the 
United States on the need to hire private counsel in those 
cases in which exceptional advocacy is deemed necessary.
    Overall, this article will improve the handling in Bolivia 
of United States extradition requests. By expanding the role of 
the Bolivian executive branch in the extradition process and by 
increasing communication between our two governments, the 
ability of the United States to secure extraditions from 
Bolivia will be enhanced.

Article XVII--Application

    This article, like its counterparts in most other United 
States extradition treaties negotiated in the past two decades, 
expressly makes the Treaty retroactive to cover offenses that 
occurred before the Treaty enters into force, provided they 
were offenses under the laws of both Parties at the time they 
were committed.
    In addition, this article expressly states that the Treaty 
applies to extradition requests pending at the time it enters 
into force for which a final decision has not yet been 
rendered.

Article XVIII--Final provisions (ratification, entry into force, and 
        termination)

    Paragraph 1 contains standard treaty language providing for 
ratification of the Treaty and exchange of the instruments of 
ratification at Washington, D.C. as soon as possible. The 
Treaty will enter into force immediately upon the exchange.
    Paragraph 2 provides that the 1900 Treaty, which is 
currently in force, shall become null and void upon the entry 
into force of this Treaty.
    Paragraph 3 contains standard treaty language for the 
termination of the Treaty by either Party through written 
notice to the other Party. Termination shall become effective 
six months after the date of such notice.

              VIII. Text of the Resolution of Ratification

    Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the 
ratification of The Extradition Treaty Between the Government 
of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Republic of Bolivia, signed at La Paz on June 27, 1995. The 
Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following 
proviso, which shall not be included in the instrument of 
ratification to be signed by the President:

          Nothing in the Treaty requires or authorizes 
        legislation or other action by the United States of 
        America that is prohibited by the Constitution of the 
        United States as interpreted by the United States.