[Senate Executive Report 104-28]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
104th Congress Exec. Rept.
SENATE
2d Session 104-28
_______________________________________________________________________
EXTRADITION TREATY WITH BELGIUM AND SUPPLEMENTARY EXTRADITION TREATY
WITH BELGIUM
_______
July 30, 1996.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany Treaty Docs. 104-7 and 104-8]
The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred
the Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Kingdom of Belgium signed at Brussels on April 27, 1987 and
the Supplementary Treaty on Extradition Between the United
States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium to Promote the
Repression of Terrorism, signed at Brussels on April 27, 1987,
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with one
proviso to each treaty and recommends that the Senate give its
advice and consent to the ratification thereof as set forth in
this report and the accompanying resolutions of ratification.
I. Purpose
Modern extradition treaties (1) identify the offenses for
which extradition will be granted, (2) establish procedures to
be followed in presenting extradition requests, (3) enumerate
exceptions to the duty to extradite, (4) specify the evidence
required to support a finding of a duty to extradite, and (5)
set forth administrative provisions for bearing costs and legal
representation.
II. Background
On April 27, 1987, the President signed two extradition
treaties with Belgium. The Treaties were transmitted to the
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on June 12,
1995. In recent years the Departments of State and Justice have
undertaken a modernization effort for U.S. bilateral
extradition treaties to better combat international criminal
activity, such as drug trafficking, terrorism and money
laundering. The United States is a party to approximately 100
bilateral extradition treaties. According to the Justice
Department, during 1995 131 individuals were extradited to the
United States and 79 individuals were extradited from the
United States.
The increase in international crime also has prompted the
U.S. Government to become a party to several multilateral
international conventions which, although not themselves
extradition treaties, deal with international law enforcement
and provide that the offenses which they cover shall be
extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty between the
parties. These include: The Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague), art. 8; the Convention to
Discourage Acts of Violence Against Civil Aviation (Montreal),
art. 8; the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs of 1961, art. 14 amending art. 36(2)(b)(I) of the Single
Convention; the Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of
Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related
Extortion that are of International Significance (Organization
of American States), art. 3; the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, art. 8; the International
Convention against the Taking of Hostages, art. 10; the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials,
art. 11; and the United Nations Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna).
These multilateral international agreements are incorporated by
reference in the United States' bilateral extradition treaties.
III. Summary
A. General
An extradition treaty is an international agreement in
which the Requested State agrees, at the request of the
Requesting State and under specified conditions, to turn over
persons who are within its jurisdiction and who are charged
with crimes against, or are fugitives from, the Requesting
State. Extradition treaties can be bilateral or multilateral,
though until recently the United States showed little interest
in negotiating multilateral agreements dealing with
extradition.
The contents of recent treaties follow a standard format.
Article 1 sets forth the obligation of contracting states to
extradite to each other persons charged by the authorities of
the Requesting State with, or convicted of, an extraditable
offense. Article 2, sometimes referred to as a dual criminality
clause, defines extraditable offenses as offenses punishable in
both contracting states by prison terms of more than one year.
Attempts or conspiracies to commit an extraditable offense are
themselves extraditable. Several of the treaties provide that
neither party shall be required to extradite its own nationals.
The treaties carve out an exception to extraditable crimes for
political offenses. The trend in modern extradition treaties is
to narrow the political offense exceptions.
The treaties include a clause allowing the Requested State
to refuse extradition in cases where the offense is punishable
by death in the Requesting State, unless the Requesting State
provides assurances satisfactory to the Requested State that
the individual sought will not be executed.
In addition to these substantive provisions, the treaties
also contain standard procedural provisions. These specify the
kinds of information that must be submitted with an extradition
request, the language in which documents are to be submitted,
the procedures under which documents submitted are to be
received and admitted into evidence in the Requested State, the
procedures under which individuals shall be surrendered and
returned to the Requesting State, and other related matters.
B. Summary of Primary Provisions
1. Extraditable offenses: The dual criminality clause
Article 2 contains a standard definition of what
constitutes an extraditable offense: an offense is extraditable
if it is punishable under the laws of both parties by a prison
term of at least one year. Attempts and conspiracies to commit
such offenses, and participation in the commission of such
offenses, are also extraditable. If the extradition request
involves a fugitive, it shall be granted only if the remaining
sentence to be served is more than six months.
The dual criminality clause means, for example, that an
offense is not extraditable if in the United States it
constitutes a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than one
year, but it is not a crime in the treaty partner or is a crime
punishable by a prison term of less than one year. In earlier
extradition treaties the definition of extraditable offenses
consisted of a list of specific categories of crimes. This
categorizing of crimes has resulted in problems when a specific
crime, for example drug dealing, is not on the list, and is
therefore not extraditable. The result has been that as
additional offenses become punishable under the laws of both
treaty partners the extradition treaties between them need to
be renegotiated or supplemented. A dual criminality clause
obviates the need to renegotiate or supplement a treaty when it
becomes necessary to broaden the definition of extraditable
offenses.
2. Extraterritorial offenses
In order to extradite individuals charged with
extraterritorial crimes (offenses committed outside the
territory of the Requesting State) such as international drug
traffickers and terrorists, provision must be made in
extradition treaties. The Belgium treaty and the Supplementary
Belgium treaty are silent on the extraditionality of
extraterritorial offenses. The Belgium treaty applies only to
extraditable offenses within ``the jurisdiction'' of one of the
contracting states (art. 1). Although the term ``jurisdiction''
could be interpreted as referring to the power of the courts of
the Requesting State to try the alleged offender, historically
the United States has interpreted it as referring only to the
territorial jurisdiction of the Requesting State.\1\ Thus, it
would appear that the Belgium treaty applies only to offenses
committed on the territory of one of the parties.
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\1\ Michael Abbell and Bruno Ristau, 4 International Judicial
Assistance 64 (International Law Institute, 1990).
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3. Political offense exception
In recent years the United State has been promoting a
restrictive view of the political offense exception in
furtherance of its campaign against terrorism, drug
trafficking, and money laundering. Though some of the treaties
considered by the Committee have taken a narrower view than
others of the political offense exception, all of them give it
a more limited scope than earlier U.S. extradition treaties. In
general, the political offense exception is narrower in the
Supplementary Belgium treaty, which excludes certain violent
crimes, (i.e. murder, kidnapping, and others) from the
political offense exception.
The exclusion from the political offense exception for
crimes covered by multilateral international agreements, and
the obligation to extradite for such crimes or submit the case
to prosecution by the Requested State, is now a standard
exclusion and is contained in the proposed treaty. The
incorporation by reference of these multilateral agreements is
intended to assure that the offenses with which they deal shall
be extraditable under an extradition treaty. But, extradition
for such offenses is not guaranteed. A Requested State has the
option either to extradite or to submit the case to its
competent authorities for prosecution. For example, a Requested
State could refuse to extradite and instead declare that it
will itself prosecute the offender.
The Belgium treaty and Supplementary Belgium treaty list
for the most part the same exclusions to the political offense
exception as are in other treaties, but take a somewhat
different approach in dealing with these exclusions. First, it
should be noted that the Belgium treaty itself contains a broad
political offense exception with an exclusion only for attacks
on a head of state or member of his family. It is the
Supplementary Belgium treaty, which was negotiated for the
specific purpose of limiting the political offense exception in
order to facilitate the extradition of terrorists, that
contains substantially the larger list of exclusions. However,
the Supplementary Belgium treaty provides that the categories
of offenses excluded from the political exception shall be
extraditable, but only at the discretion of the Requested
State, unless they create a collective danger to the life or
liberty of any persons, affect an innocent bystander, involve
the use of cruel or vicious means, or involve the taking of a
hostage. In any of these latter situations, extradition, when
requested, shall be mandatory rather than discretionary (arts.
2 and 3). In effect, the Supplementary Belgium treaty reserves
for the Requested State discretion whether or not to grant
extradition for certain types of offenses, except when they are
considered to be part of a terrorist plot or attack, in which
case it is under an obligation to extradite.
4. The death penalty exception
The United States and other countries appear to have
different views on capital punishment. Under the proposed
treaties, Belgium may refuse extradition for an offense
punishable by the death penalty in the Requesting State if the
same offense is not punishable by the death penalty in the
Requested State, unless the Requesting State gives assurances
satisfactory to the Requested State that the death penalty will
not be imposed or carried out.
5. The extradition of nationals
The U.S. does not object to extraditing its own nationals
and has sought to negotiate treaties without nationality
restrictions. Many countries, however, refuse to extradite
their own nationals. U.S. extradition treaties take varying
positions on the nationality issue.
The Belgium treaty contains the traditional nationality
clause providing that neither party is obligated to extradite
its own nationals, but that they may do so at their discretion
(Belgium, art. 3). Upon a refusal to extradite, the Requested
State may be required by the Requesting State to submit the
case to its authorities for prosecution.\2\
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\2\ An article in the Washington Post, A25, of June 28, 1996,
reported that the Constitutional Court in Italy refused to allow the
extradition to the United States of an Italian-born U.S. citizen or
resident under the U.S.-Italy extradition treaty for a murder he
committed in the United States despite U.S. assurances he would not be
subject to the death penalty.
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6. Retroactivity
The proposed treaty states that it shall apply to offenses
committed before as well as after it enters into force (art.
20). These retroactivity provisions do not violate the
Constitution's prohibition against the enactment of ex post
facto laws which applies only to enactments making criminal
acts that were innocent when committed, not to the extradition
of a defendant for acts that were criminal when committed but
for which no extradition agreement existed at the time.
7. The rule of speciality
The rule of speciality (or specialty), which prohibits a
Requesting State from trying an extradited individual for an
offense other than the one for which he was extradited, is a
standard provision included in U.S. bilateral extradition
treaties, including the six under consideration. The Belgium
treaty expresses the basic prohibition and also includes the
following exceptions: an extradited individual may be tried by
the Requesting State for an offense other than the one for
which he was extradited if the Requested State (which may
request the submission of additional supporting documents)
waives the prohibition; the extradited individual leaves the
territory of the Requesting State and voluntarily returns to
it; the extradited individual does not leave the territory of
the Requesting State within 15 days of the day on which he or
she is free to leave; or, the extradited individual voluntarily
consents to being tried for an offense other than the one for
which he was extradited (art. 15). These exceptions to the
speciality rule are designed to allow a Requesting State some
latitude in prosecuting offenders for crimes other than those
for which they had been specifically extradited.
8. Lapse of time
The Belgium treaty states that extradition shall be denied
if prosecution of an offense or execution of a penalty is
barred by the statute of limitations of the Requested State
(art. 2(6)).
IV. Entry Into Force and Termination
a. entry into force
Both Treaties will enter into force on the first day of the
second month after the exchange of instruments of ratification.
b. termination
Both Treaties shall terminate six months after notice by a
Party of an intent to terminate the Treaty.
V. Committee Action
The Committee on Foreign Relations held a public hearing on
the proposed treaties on Wednesday, July 17, 1996. The hearing
was chaired by Senator Helms. The Committee considered the
proposed treaties on July 24, 1996, and ordered the proposed
treaties favorably reported with one proviso to each treaty by
voice vote, with the recommendation that the Senate give its
advice and consent to the ratification of the proposed
treaties.
VI. Committee Comments
The Committee on Foreign Relations recommended favorably
the proposed treaty. The Committee believes that the proposed
treaty is in the interest of the United States and urges the
Senate to act promptly to give its advice and consent to
ratification. In 1996 and the years ahead, U.S. law enforcement
officers increasingly will be engaged in criminal
investigations that traverse international borders. Certainly,
sovereign relationships have always been important to
prosecution of suspected criminals. The first recorded
extradition treaty dates as far back as 1280 B.C. under Ramses
II, Pharaoh of Egypt. The United States entered into its first
extradition treaty in 1794 with Great Britain. Like these early
treaties, the basic premise of the treaties is to facilitate,
under specified conditions, the transfer of persons who are
within the jurisdiction of one nation, and who are charged with
crimes against, or are fugitives from, the nation requesting
extradition. Despite the long history of such bilateral
treaties, the Committee believes that these treaties are more
essential than ever to U.S. efforts to bring suspected
criminals to justice.
In 1995, 131 persons were extradited to the U.S. for
prosecution for crimes committed in the U.S., and the U.S.
extradited 79 individuals to other countries for prosecution.
After the Senate ratified an extradition treaty with Jordan in
1995, the U.S. Attorney General was able to take into custody
an alleged participant in the bombing of the World Trade
Center. His prosecution would not be possible without an
extradition treaty. Crimes such as terrorism, transshipment of
drugs by international cartels, and international banking fraud
are but some of the international crimes that pose serious
problems to U.S. law enforcement efforts. The Committee
believes that modern extradition treaties provide an important
law enforcement tool for combating such crimes and will advance
the interests of the United States.
The proposed resolution of ratification includes a proviso
that reaffirms that ratification of this treaty does not
require or authorize legislation that is prohibited by the
Constitution of the United States. Bilateral extradition
treaties rely on relationships between sovereign countries with
unique legal systems. In as much as U.S. law is based on the
Constitution, this treaty may not require legislation
prohibited by the Constitution.
VII. Explanation of Proposed Treaties
The following is the Technical Analysis of the Extradition
Treaty submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations by the
Departments of State and Justice prior to the Committee hearing
to consider pending extradition treaties.
A. Technical Analysis of the Extradition Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium
On April 27, 1987, in Brussels, the United States signed a
treaty on extradition with the Kingdom of Belgium (``the
Treaty''). The Treaty is intended to replace the outdated
treaties currently in force between the United States and
Belgium \3\ with a modern agreement for facilitating the
extradition of serious offenders. No new legislation is needed
in Belgium or in the United States in order to implement the
provisions of the Treaty.
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\3\ Extradition between the United States and Belgium is currently
governed by the following: (1) the Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of
Fugitives from Justice Between the United States and the Kingdom of
Belgium (``the 1901 Treaty''), Oct. 26, 1901, 32 Stat. 1894, T.S. 409,
5 Bevans 508; (2) the Supplementary Convention to the Extradition
Convention of October 26, 1901, June 20, 1935, 49 Stat. 3276, T.S. 900,
5 Bevans 566; and (3) the Supplementary Extradition Convention, Nov.
14, 1963, 15 U.S.T. 2252, T.I.A.S. No. 5715, 522 U.N.T.S. 237 (``the
Supplementary Conventions'').
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The following technical analysis of the Treaty was prepared
by the United States delegation that conducted the
negotiations.
Article 1--Obligation to extradite
This article formally obligates each Contracting State to
extradite to the other Contracting State persons charged with
or convicted of an extraditable offense, subject to the other
provisions of the Treaty.
Article 2--Extraditable offenses
This article contains the basic guidelines for determining
what constitutes an extraditable offense. The Treaty is similar
to recent United States extradition treaties with Canada
(Protocol), Jamaica, Italy, Ireland, Thailand, Sweden
(Supplementary Convention), Costa Rica, Switzerland and the
Bahamas in that it does not list the offenses for which
extradition may be granted.
Paragraph 1 permits extradition for any offense punishable
under the laws of both Contracting States by deprivation of
liberty (i.e., imprisonment or other form of detention) for
more than one year. By defining extraditable offenses in terms
of ``dual criminality'' rather than attempting to list each
extraditable crime, the Treaty obviates the need to renegotiate
or supplement it should the Contracting States pass criminal
laws dealing with a new type of criminal activity, or should
the list inadvertently fail to cover an important type of
criminal activity punishable in both countries.
If extradition is sought for the execution of a sentence,
paragraph 2 requires that the original sentence imposed be for
imprisonment for a period of at least one year.\4\
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\4\ Some recent United States extradition treaties state that
persons who have been convicted of an extraditable offense and
sentenced to imprisonment may be extradited only if at least a certain
portion of the sentence (often six months) remains to be served on the
outstanding sentence. The Treaty contains no such requirement. The
negotiators concluded that while there is merit in attempting to limit
extradition to serious cases because of the significant costs
associated with the process, the sentence imposed is a better measure
of the seriousness of the offense than the portion of the sentence
remaining to be served.
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Paragraph 3, which is similar to provisions in many other
recent United States extradition treaties, expressly provides
that extradition be granted for attempting to commit an
extraditable offense, being an accessory to an extraditable
offense, and conspiring to commit an extraditable offense (in
violation of United States law) or being a member of an
``association of wrongdoers'' (the Belgian legal equivalent of
a conspiracy).
Paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) state that in determining whether
an offense is extraditable, the Contracting States ``shall
consider only the essential elements of the offense punishable
under the laws of both states,'' and shall not consider as an
essential element of an offense any element included in the
offense (such as use of the mails or interstate transportation
of stolen goods) for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction
in a United States federal court. Foreign judges are often
confused by the fact that many United States federal statutes
require proof of certain elements solely to establish
jurisdiction in United States federal courts. These judges know
of no similar requirement in their own criminal law and on
occasion have denied the extradition of fugitives sought by the
United States on federal charges on this basis. Paragraph 4
requires that such elements be disregarded in applying the dual
criminality principle. Thus, this clause will ensure that
Belgian authorities treat United States requests for
extradition for charges such as mail fraud \5\ in the same
manner as fraud charges under state laws, and view the federal
crime of interstate transportation of stolen property \6\ in
the same manner as unlawful possession of stolen property. A
similar provision is contained in all recent United States
extradition treaties.
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\5\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341.
\6\ See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314.
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Paragraph 4(c) states that the Contracting States ``shall
disregard that the respective laws do not place the offense
within the same category of offenses or describe the offense by
the same terminology'' in determining whether the offense is
extraditable. This clause requires each Contracting State to
disregard differences in the categorization of the offense in
determining whether dual criminality exists and to overlook
mere differences in the terminology used to define the offense
under the laws of each Contracting State. This reflects the
intention of both countries to interpret the principles of
paragraph 1 broadly. Similar clauses are found in most recent
United States extradition treaties.
Paragraph 5, which is similar to provisions in most recent
United States extradition treaties, permits extradition for
crimes that otherwise are not extraditable under the Treaty
solely because they are misdemeanors, when extradition is
granted with respect to another more serious offense. This
provision permits the early resolution of all pending charges
in the Requesting State.\7\
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\7\ See, e.g., U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, art.
II(3) T.I.A.S. No. 10837.
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Paragraph 6 requires the Requested State to deny
extradition if prosecution of the offense for which extradition
is sought would be barred by the Requested State's statute of
limitations. The practical effect of this provision is to
permit the Requested State to require the Requesting State to
comply with the requirements of the Requested State's statute
of limitations.
The requirements of the Requesting State's prosecution may
not easily conform to the Requested State's statute of
limitations; the burden imposed by paragraph 6 on the
Requesting State, however, is lessened by the fact that this
paragraph requires the Requested State to consider insofar as
possible the effect of acts that in the Requesting State
interrupt the running of the Requesting State's statute of
limitations. For example, under United States law, a
defendant's flight from the jurisdiction to avoid prosecution
tolls the running of the statute of limitations. The
negotiators intended that Belgian authorities keep this fact in
mind when considering any United States extradition request in
which the comparable Belgian statute of limitations arguably
has expired.
Article 3--Nationality
This article states that each Contracting State has the
discretionary power to extradite its own nationals unless
prohibited from doing so by internal legislation. This clause,
like the clause in article IV of the 1901 Treaty which it
replaces, permits the United States to extradite its nationals
to Belgium in accordance with established United States policy
favoring such extraditions.\8\ However, as Belgium is barred by
its internal law from extraditing Belgian nationals,\9\ it is
unlikely that Belgium will actually surrender its nationals to
the United States under the Treaty. The Treaty therefore
includes a requirement that if the Requested States refuses
extradition solely on the basis of nationality, the Requested
State must submit the case to its authorities for prosecution
if asked to do so by the Requesting State.
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\8\ See generally Shearer, ``Extradition in International Law,''
110-14 (1970); Whiteman, ``Digest of International Law,'' 871-76
(1968). Our policy of drawing no distinction between United States
nationals and others in extradition matters has been underscored by
Congress in legislation. Title 18, United States Code, Section 3196
authorizes the Secretary of State to extradite United States citizens
pursuant to treaties that permit but do not expressly require surrender
of citizens as long as the other requirements of the treaty have been
met. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3196.
\9\ See Loi du 15 Mars 1874 Sur Les Extraditions, Matieres Penales,
Codes Belge, art. 1.
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Similar provisions are found in many recent United States
extradition treaties.\10\
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\10\ See, e.g., U.S.-Costa Rica Extradition Treaty, Nov. 10, 1922,
art. 8, 43 Stat. 1621, T.S. 668, 6 Bevans 1033; U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty, May 4, 1978, art. 9, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656.
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Article 4--Political and military offenses
Paragraph 1 prohibits extradition for political offenses.
Paragraph 2 states that a murder or other criminal act
directed against Heads of State of the Contracting States, or a
member of their families, or an attempt to commit, conspiracy
to commit, or being an accessory to such a crime, shall not be
considered political offenses within the meaning of paragraph
1.
Paragraph 3 bars extradition when the executive authority
of the Requested State determines that the request, although
appearing to be for an extraditable offense, is in fact
politically motivated. This paragraph is similar to provisions
in other recent United States extradition treaties that permit
denial of extradition if the Requested State determines that
the request was made for political purposes or with political
motivation.\11\
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\11\ CF. U.S.-Jamaica Extradition Treaty, June 14, 1983, art.
III(3), T.I.A.S. No. --; U.S.-Spain Extradition Treaty, May 29, 1970,
art. 5(5), 22 U.S.T. 737, T.I.A.S. No. 7136, 796 U.N.T.S. 245; U.S.-
Netherlands Extradition Treaty, June 24, 1980, art. 4(1), T.I.A.S. No.
10733; U.S.-Ireland Extradition Treaty, July 13, 1983, art. IV(c),
T.I.A.S. No. 10813.
In the United States, longstanding law and practice have been that
the Secretary of State alone has the discretion to determine whether or
not a foreign country's request is based on improper political
motivation. See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513-18 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). Paragraph 3 follows this jurisprudence in
specifying that the ``executive authority'' of the Requested State
makes this determination.
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Paragraph 4 provides that extradition may be denied if the
offense is an offense under military law that is not an offense
under ordinary criminal law. An example of such a crime is
desertion.\12\
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\12\ See, e.g., Matter of Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp.
676, 703 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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The Treaty contains only a portion of the agreement between
the two Contracting States concerning application of the
political offense exception. Because of the seriousness with
which both countries view acts of terrorism, the Contracting
States signed the Supplementary Treaty on Extradition to
Promote the Repression of Terrorism (``the Supplementary
Treaty'') on March 17, 1987. The Supplementary Treaty further
restricts the application of the political offense exception,
making it unavailable for the offenses of murder, hostage-
taking, and other crimes typically committed by terrorists.
Paragraph 5 establishes that when the provisions of
paragraphs 1 through 4 conflict with provisions of the
Supplementary Treaty, the terms of the Supplementary Treaty
control.
Article 5--Prior jeopardy for the same offense
Paragraph 1, which prohibits extradition if the person
sought has been found guilty, convicted, or acquitted in the
Requested State for the offense for which extradition is
requested, is similar to provisions in many United States
extradition treaties. This paragraph permits extradition,
however, if the person sought is charged in each Contracting
State with different offenses arising out of the same basic
transaction.
Paragraph 1 prohibits extradition when the person sought
has been ``found guilty'' or ``convicted'' of the same offense
in the Requested State. While these terms are synonymous under
United States law, they are distinct concepts in civil law
systems. Both terms are used in this paragraph to ensure that
extradition is barred after either a finding of guilt or a
conviction for the same offense under Belgian law.
Paragraph 2 prohibits the Requested State from refusing to
extradite a person sought on the basis that the Requested
State's authorities declined to prosecute or instituted and
later discontinued criminal proceedings against the person.
This provision was included in the Treaty because a decision by
the Requested State to forego prosecution or to drop charges
previously filed may be the result of a failure to obtain
sufficient evidence or witnesses for trial, while the
prosecution in the Requesting State may not suffer from the
same impediments. This provision should enhance the Contracting
Parties' ability to extradite to the jurisdiction that has the
better chance of a successful prosecution.
Article 6--Humanitarian considerations
Paragraph 1 permits the Requested State to refuse
extradition when the offense for which extradition is sought is
punishable by death in the Requesting State, but not in the
Requested State, unless the Requesting State provides
assurances the Requested State considers sufficient that if the
death penalty is imposed, it will not be carried out. Similar
provisions are found in many recent United States extradition
treaties.\13\
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\13\ See, e.g., U.S.-Netherlands Extradition Treaty, June 24, 1980,
art. 7, T.I.A.S. No. 10733; US-Ireland Extradition Treaty, July 13,
1983, art. VI T.I.A.S. No. 10813; U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, May
4, 1978, art. 8, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656.
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Paragraph 2 permits the executive authority of the
Requested State broad discretion to deny extradition on
humanitarian grounds in accordance with its internal law.
Similar provisions are found in United States extradition
treaties with the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Finland. The
United States does not favor including such broad discretion to
deny extradition in our treaties; the Belgian delegation,
however, insisted on this provision to satisfy requirements of
Belgian law.\14\
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\14\ See Loi du 15 Mars 1874 Sur Les Extraditions, Matieres
Penales, Codes Belge, art 2.
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Article 7--Extradition procedures and required documents
This article, which is similar to provisions in most recent
United States extradition treaties, sets out the documentary
and evidentiary requirements for an extradition request.
Paragraph 1 requires that each formal request for
extradition be submitted through the diplomatic channel. A
formal extradition request may be preceded by a request for the
provisional arrest of the person sought pursuant to article 8.
Provisional arrest requests need not be initiated through the
diplomatic channel provided the requirements of article 8 are
met.
Paragraph 2 outlines the information that must accompany
every request for extradition under the Treaty.
Paragraph 3 lists the additional information needed when
the person is sought for trial in the Requesting State.
Paragraph 3(c) requires that if the person sought has not yet
been convicted of the crime for which extradition is requested,
the Requesting State must provide ``such evidence as would
justify the committal for trial of the person if the offense
had been committed in the Requested State.''
Paragraph 4 sets forth the information needed, in addition
to the requirements of paragraph 2, when the person sought has
already been tried and convicted in the Requesting State.
Under United States law, persons are committed for trial
upon a showing of probable cause; therefore, when Belgium is
the Requesting State, this paragraph requires that it submit
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the crime
for which extradition is requested was committed and the person
sought committed it. As in the case of a probable cause finding
at a preliminary hearing in the United States, the extradition
magistrate's finding of probable cause may be based on hearsay
evidence in whole or in part.
Under Belgian law, the quantum of evidence needed to
``justify the committal to trial'' of a person charged with an
offense is essentially the equivalent of probable cause,\15\
although the term ``probable cause'' is not present in Belgian
law. Thus, paragraph 3(c) has the practical effect of requiring
the United States to provide a showing of probable cause in
order to obtain the extradition of a fugitive from Belgium.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See Chapitre I, Titre II, Matieres Penales, Codes Belge, art.
221.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph 4 makes it clear that once a conviction has been
obtained, no showing of probable cause is required. In essence,
the fact of conviction speaks for itself, a position taken in
recent United States court decisions, even absent a specific
treaty provision.\16\ Paragraph 4(d) states that when a person
has been convicted but not yet sentenced, the Requesting State
must provide a copy of the arrest warrant and must affirm that
a sentence will be imposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362, 374 (E.D.N.Y.
1990), aff'd, 925 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Clark, 470
F. Supp. 976 (D. Vt. 1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph 4(e) states that if a person sought was found
guilty in absentia, the documentation required for extradition
includes both proof of conviction and the same documentation
required in cases in which no conviction has been obtained.
This is consistent with the longstanding United States policy
of requiring such documentation in extraditions of persons
convicted in absentia.
Article 8--Admissibility of documents
This article establishes that evidence submitted in support
of an extradition request shall be admissible at an extradition
proceeding if authenticated by one of three methods.
Subparagraph (a) states that United States extradition
requests to Belgium shall be authenticated by the Department of
State, thus codifying existing practice in this matter.
Subparagraph (b) describes the procedure for authenticating
Belgian requests to the United States. It follows the
authentication requirements set forth in Title 18, United
States Code, Section 3190.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3190.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subparagraph (c) provides a third method for authenticating
evidence for an extradition proceeding: such evidence is
admissible if it is authenticated in any manner accepted by the
laws of the Requested State. This provision was inserted in
order to prevent a situation in which relevant evidence that
normally satisfies the evidentiary rules of the Requested State
would be inadmissable at an extradition hearing due to an
inadvertent error or omission in the authentication process.
Article 9--Translation
This article follows the standard practice of requiring
that extradition documents be written in or translated into the
language of the Requested State. Because Belgium has two
official languages, French and Flemish (Dutch), the United
States has the option of translating its requests into either
language.
Article 10--Provisional arrest
This article describes the process by which a person sought
in one Contracting State may be arrested and detained in the
other while the formal extradition documentation is prepared.
Paragraph 1 provides that a request for provisional arrest
may be made directly between the United States Department of
Justice and the Belgian Ministry of Justice; Interpol also may
be used as a channel to transmit messages in this regard.
Experience has shown that the ability to call upon Interpol
channels in emergency situations can be crucial when a fugitive
is poised to flee.
Paragraph 2 sets forth the information needed from the
Requesting State in support of its provisional arrest request.
Paragraph 3 requires that the Requested State notify the
Requesting State of the disposition of the provisional arrest
request and advise it of any reasons for denial.
Paragraph 4 provides that the person who is provisionally
arrested shall be detained for no more than 75 days and must be
released from detention if the Requesting State does not file a
fully documented request for extradition with the executive
authority of the Requested State within that time period. When
the United States is the Requested State, the executive
authority is the Department of State.\18\ Although the person
provisionally arrested must be released from custody if the
documents are not received within the 75-day period, the
proceedings against the person need not be dismissed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ See Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976, 979.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph 5 states that if the formal request with
supporting documentation is presented at a later date, the
person may be taken into custody again, and the extradition
proceedings may be commenced anew.
Article 11--Decision and surrender
This article requires that the Requested State promptly
notify the Requesting State through diplomatic channels of its
decision on the extradition request. If extradition is denied,
the Requested State must provide available information as to
the reasons for the denial. If extradition is granted, article
11 requires the Requesting State to remove the person sought
within the time period set by the law of the Requested State,
or else the person may be released from custody and the
Requested State may subsequently refuse extradition for the
same offense.
Article 12--Temporary and deferred surrender
Paragraph 1 provides for the temporary surrender of a
person sought for prosecution in the Requesting State who is
being prosecuted or is serving a sentence in the Requested
State. A person temporarily transferred pursuant to the Treaty
is to be returned to the Requested State at the conclusion of
the proceedings in the Requesting State. Such temporary
surrender furthers the interests of justice in that it permits
trial of the person sought while evidence and witnesses are
more likely to be available, thereby increasing the likelihood
of a successful prosecution. Such transfer may also be
advantageous to the person sought in that: (1) it permits
resolution of the charges sooner; (2) it may make it possible
for any sentence to be served in the Requesting State
concurrently with the sentence in the Requested State; and (3)
it permits defense against the charges while favorable evidence
is fresh and more likely to be available. Similar provisions
are found in many recent United States extradition treaties.
Paragraph 2 provides that the surrender of a person who is
being prosecuted or serving a sentence in the Requested State
may be deferred until the proceedings and execution of any
punishment imposed are completed.
Article 13--Requests for extradition made by several states
This article follows the practice of many recent United
States extradition treaties in listing factors that the
Requested State must consider in determining to which country a
person should be surrendered when reviewing requests from two
or more countries for the extradition of the same person. For
the United States, the Secretary of State makes this decision.
Article 14--Seizure and surrender of property
This article permits the seizure by the Requested State of
all property--articles, documents and other evidence--connected
with the offense to the extent permitted by the Requested
State's internal law.
Paragraph 1 also provides that these items may be
surrendered to the Requesting State upon the granting of the
extradition or even if extradition cannot be affected due to
the death, disappearance or escape of the person sought.
Paragraph 2 states that the Requested State may condition
its surrender of the property upon satisfactory assurances that
the property will be returned to the Requested State as soon as
practicable. Surrender of property under this provision is
expressly made subject to due respect for the rights of third
parties in such property.
Article 15--Rule of specialty
This article covers the principle known as the rule of
specialty, a standard aspect of United States extradition
practice. Designed to ensure that a fugitive surrendered for
one offense is not tried for other crimes, the rule of
specialty prevents a request for extradition from being used as
a subterfuge to obtain custody of a person for trial or service
of a sentence on different charges that might not be
extraditable or properly documented when the request is
granted.
Since a variety of exceptions to the rule have developed
over the years, this article codifies its current formulation
by providing that a person extradited under the Treaty may only
be detained, tried, or punished in the Requesting State for:
(1) the offense for which extradition was granted, or a
differently denominated offense based on the same facts,
provided the offense is extraditable or a lesser included
offense; (2) an offense committed after the extradition; or (3)
an offense for which the executive authority of the Requested
State consents.\19\ Paragraph 1(c)(ii) permits the Contracting
State that is seeking consent to pursue new charges to detain
the person extradited for at least 75 days, or for such longer
period as the Requested State may authorize, while the
Requested State makes its determination on the application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ In the United States, the Secretary of State has the authority
to consent to a waiver of the rule of specialty. See Berenguer v.
Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (D.D.C. 1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph 2 prohibits the Requesting State from
surrendering the person extradited to a third state without the
consent of the state from which extradition was first obtained.
Paragraph 3 permits the detention, trial, or punishment of
an extradited person for additional offenses, or extradition to
a third state, if the extradited person: (1) leaves and returns
to the Requesting State; (2) does not leave the Requesting
State within 15 days \20\ of being free to do so; or (3)
voluntarily consents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Under article III of the 1901 Treaty, the extradited person
has one month to leave the Requesting State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article 16--Waiver of extradition
Persons sought for extradition frequently elect to waive
their right to extradition proceedings in order to expedite
their return to the Requesting State. This article provides
that when a person sought waives extradition in accordance with
the laws of the Requested State, the person may be returned to
the Requesting State as expeditiously as possible and the rule
of specialty does not apply. This amounts to a voluntary return
of the fugitive to the Requesting State.
Longstanding United States practice that the rule of
specialty does not apply when a fugitive waives extradition and
voluntarily returns to the Requesting State is reflected in the
express language of this provision. A similar rule appears in
many recent United States extradition treaties.\21\
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\21\ See, e.g., U.S.-Netherlands Extradition Treaty, June 24, 1980,
art. 16, T.I.A.S. No. 10733; U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, May 4,
1978, art. 18, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article 17--Transit
Paragraph 1 gives each Contracting State the power to
authorize transit through its territory of persons being
surrendered to the other Contracting State by third states. A
person in transit may be detained in custody for up to 24
hours. Requests for transit are to contain a description of the
person being transported and a brief statement of the facts of
the case for which the person is being surrendered. Requests
for transit may be made through diplomatic channels or directly
between the United States Department of Justice and the
Ministry of Justice of Belgium. Requests for transit may be
denied for a national of the Requested State or for a person
sought for prosecution or to serve a sentence in the Requested
State.
Paragraph 2 provides that no advance authorization is
needed if the person in transit to one Contracting State is
travelling by aircraft and no landing is scheduled in the
territory of the other Contracting State. Should an unscheduled
landing occur, a request for transit may be required at that
time. The Treaty ensures that the person will be kept in
custody for up to 24 hours until a request for transit is
received and thereafter until transit is effected.
Article 18--Representation and expenses
Under current extradition practice, the United States
provides for the representation of Belgium in connection with
Belgian requests for extradition before United States courts,
and Belgium provides for the representation of the United
States in connection with United States extradition requests to
Belgium. Paragraph 1 codifies this practice.
Paragraph 2 provides that the Requested State will bear all
expenses of extradition except those expenses relating to the
ultimate transportation of the person surrendered to the
Requesting State and the translation of documents. These
expenses are to be paid by the Requesting State.
Paragraph 3 provides that neither Contracting State shall
make a pecuniary claim against the other in connection with
extradition proceedings, including arrest, detention,
examination and surrender of persons sought. This includes any
claim by fugitives for damages or reimbursement of legal fees
or other expenses occasioned by the execution of the
extradition request.
Article 19--Consultation
This article provides that the United States Department of
Justice and the Belgian Ministry of Justice may consult with
each other, directly or through Interpol, with regard to an
individual extradition case or extradition procedures in
general.
Article 20--Application
This Treaty, like most other United States extradition
treaties negotiated in the past two decades, is expressly made
retroactive to cover offenses committed before the Treaty
enters into force, provided they constituted criminal offenses
under the laws of both Contracting States at the time they were
committed.
Article 21--Ratification and entry into force
This article contains standard treaty language providing
for the exchange of instruments of ratification at Washington,
D.C. and specifies the day on which the Treaty will enter into
force after the exchange.
Paragraph 3 provides that the 1901 Treaty and the
Supplementary Conventions of 1935 and 1963 will cease to have
effect upon the entry into force of the Treaty. Extradition
requests pending when the Treaty enters into force, however,
will nevertheless be processed to conclusion under the 1901
Treaty and the Supplementary Conventions. Paragraph 3 further
provides that articles 2, 12 and 15 of the Treaty will apply to
extradition proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of
instruments. Article 2 defines extraditable offenses, article
12 provides for temporary surrender, and article 15 implements
the rule of specialty.
Article 22--Termination
This article contains the standard treaty language
describing the procedure for termination of the Treaty by
either Contracting State.
b. technical analysis of the supplementary treaty on extradition
between the united states of america and the kingdom of belgium to
promote the repression of terrorism
The Supplementary Treaty on Extradition Between the United
States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium to Promote the
Repression of Terrorism (``the Supplementary Treaty'') was
signed in Washington, D.C. on March 17, 1987. The Supplementary
Treaty is designed to facilitate the extradition of terrorists
and is similar to other protocols to our extradition treaties
with other countries.
The United States and Belgium also negotiated the
Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Kingdom of Belgium, which was signed at Brussels on April 27,
1987 (``the 1987 Treaty''). The 1987 Treaty is intended to
replace the outdated treaty currently in place between the two
countries (``the 1901 Treaty'') \22\ with a modern agreement.
The Supplementary Treaty was negotiated, however, to augment
our extradition relations generally and without regard to
whether negotiations for the new basic extradition treaty, the
1987 Treaty, would be completed, or whether, if signed, the
1987 Treaty would enter into force. In other words, the
Supplementary Treaty was negotiated with a view towards
amending our extradition relations under the 1901 Treaty in
force at the time of negotiations as well as under the 1987
Treaty which was subsequently signed on April 27, 1987.
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\22\ Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice
Between the United States and the Kingdom of Belgium, Oct. 26, 1901, 32
Stat. 1894, T.S. 409, 5 Bevans 508.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following technical analysis of the Supplementary
Treaty was prepared by the United States delegation that
conducted the negotiations.
Article 1
This article provides that the Supplementary Treaty applies
only when a request for extradition of a fugitive would be
denied under the basic extradition treaty currently in force
because the offense is political or is not listed as an
extraditable offense.
As previously explained, the Supplementary Treaty is
intended to amend the 1901 Treaty if that treaty is still in
effect at the time the Supplementary Treaty enters into force.
Thus, subparagraph (b) is necessary, together with article 6,
to amend the 1901 Treaty by permitting extradition for offenses
in addition to those listed in the 1901 Treaty. If and when the
1987 Treaty enters into force, subparagraph (b) will become
unnecessary inasmuch as the 1987 Treaty has no list of offenses
but instead makes offenses extraditable on the basis of dual
criminality.
This article also establishes that the Supplementary Treaty
by itself cannot be used to extradite a fugitive. Instead, in
appropriate cases, the Supplementary Treaty removes particular
obstacles to the surrender of otherwise extraditable fugitives
that exist under the basic treaty.
Articles 2 and 3
Articles 2 and 3 are more easily understood if read
together.
Article 2 specifies that the Requested State may, in its
discretion, consider any of the following crimes not to be
political offenses: murder, voluntary manslaughter and
voluntary assault and battery inflicting serious bodily harm;
kidnapping, abduction, and hostage-taking; placement or use of
a destructive device or automatic weapons that cause or are
capable of causing serious bodily harm or substantial property
damage; and attempts and conspiracies to commit the foregoing
offenses. The provision also applies to any offense for which
both the United States and Belgium have an international
obligation to extradite or to submit the case for prosecution,
including aircraft hijacking,\23\ aircraft sabotage,\24\ and
other crimes on board aircraft.\25\ This exclusion will extend
to crimes similarly defined in future multilateral treaties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192.
\24\ See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S.
No. 7570.
\25\ See Convention on Offenses and Certain Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.t. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704
U.N.T.S. 219.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article 3 specifies that the Requested State shall not
consider any offense described in article 2 to be a political
offense, an offense connected to a political offense, or an
offense inspired by a political offense if the crime involves
any of four aggravating circumstances. The aggravating
circumstances are: (1) the crime created a danger to the life,
liberty, or safety of a group of persons; (2) it affected a
person who is ``foreign to the motives behind the offense''
(i.e., an innocent bystander); (3) if cruel or vicious means
were used to commit it; or (4) if the crime involved the taking
of a hostage.
These two articles read together mandate that offenses that
fall within one of the five categories of crimes in article 2
shall not be considered political offenses if one of the
aggravating circumstances in article 3 is present. If an
aggravating circumstance in article 3 is not present, the
executive authority of the Requested State has discretion to
determine that an offense listed in article 2 is not a
political offense.
Thus, the Supplementary Treaty is similar to the recent
United States treaties with the United Kingdom, Canada,
Germany, and Spain,\26\ in each of which the scope of the
political offense exception is substantially narrowed. The key
difference between the Supplementary Treaty and the other
supplementary treaties is that this agreement underscores that
while courts of the Requested State must deny extradition if
the offense is one of the terrorist-type offenses listed in
article 2, the executive branch of the Requested State retains
final discretion to grant or deny the request or political
offense grounds. This discretion does not exist if one of the
aggravating factors in article 3 is present.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ See U.S.-Spain Second Supplementary Extradition Treaty, Feb.
9, 1988, T.I.A.S. No. --; U.S.-Canada Protocol Amending Extradition
Treaty, Jan. 11, 1988, T.I.A.S. No. --; U.S.-West Germany Supplementary
Treaty, Oct. 21, 1986, T.I.A.S. No. --; U.S.-United Kingdom
Supplementary Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. --.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The negotiators contemplated that in considering an
extradition request and a fugitive's claim for political
offense protection, a court in the Requested State first will
apply the terms of the basic extradition treaty to determine
whether the fugitive is otherwise extraditable without regard
to the political offense provision. If the fugitive is
otherwise extraditable, the court turns its attention to the
Supplementary Treaty. If the offense is included in article 2
of the Supplementary Treaty, extradition should not be denied
as a matter of law. Instead, when the United States is the
Requested State, the court certifies the person's
extraditability to the Secretary of State under Title 18,
United States Code, Section 3184, noting that the Supplementary
Treaty removes the absolute legal barrier to extradition even
if the fugitive is correct in contending that the offense is
political. If the offense is not listed in article 2, the court
continues with its analysis under the basic treaty to determine
whether extradition should be barred by the political offense
provision.
Under article 2, the Secretary of State upon receipt of the
court's certification of extraditability has discretion
(limited only by article 3) to grant or deny the surrender of
the fugitive as a political offender. If one of the aggravating
factors listed in article 3 is present, the Secretary may not
refuse the fugitive's surrender as a matter of discretion based
upon the political nature of the offense. The Secretary, of
course, continues to maintain any discretionary authority
otherwise possessed to deny the surrender.
Article 4
This article permits the Requested State to refuse
extradition when the offense for which extradition is sought is
punishable by death in the Requesting State, but not in the
Requested State, unless the Requesting State provides
assurances the Requested State considers sufficient that if the
death penalty is imposed, it will not be carried out. A similar
provision is found in many recent United States extradition
treaties.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ See, e.g., U.S.-Ireland Extradition Treaty, July 13, 1983,
art. VI, T.I.A.S. No. 10813; U.S.-Thailand Extradition Treaty, Dec. 14,
1983, art. 6, T.I.A.S. No. --.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 1987 Treaty has a similar provision making this article
redundant if and when both treaties enter into force.
The negotiators agreed that the decision whether to request
assurances and the determination whether any assurances
provided are sufficient will be made by the executive authority
of the Requested State.\28\
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\28\ This is consistent with United States law. See Cheng Na-Yuet
v. Hueston, 734 F. Supp. 988, 994 (S.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 932 F.2d 977
(11th Cir. 1991).
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Article 5
This article permits the executive authority of the
Requested State to deny extradition on humanitarian grounds in
accordance with its domestic law.\29\ This provision is
necessary to satisfy requirements of Belgian law.\30\ A similar
provision is present in the 1987 Treaty as well as in our
recent extradition treaties with the Netherlands, Sweden,
Norway and Finland.\31\
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\29\ United States courts have recognized that the Secretary of
State possesses the authority to determine whether to deny extradition
on humanitarian grounds. See Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir.
1976), 563 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1977).
\30\ See Loi du 15 Mars 1874 Sur Les Extraditions, Matieres
Penales, Codes Belge, art. 2.
\31\ See, e.g., U.S.-Netherlands Extradition Treaty, June 24, 1980,
art. 7(2), T.I.A.S. No. 10833; U.S.-Sweden Extradition Treaty, Oct. 24,
1961, art. V(6), 14 U.S.T. 1845, T.I.A.S. No. 5496, 494 U.N.T.S. 141.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article 6
This article amends the list of extraditable offenses
contained in the 1901 Treaty if the treaty remains in effect if
and when the Supplementary Treaty enters into force. As
discussed in the analysis of article 1, under the 1901 Treaty,
extradition may be granted only for those offenses contained in
the list of extraditable offenses. This list does not include
many offenses committed by terrorists that are viewed by the
Contracting States as so serious as to warrant prosecution
without fail. Article 6 therefore expands the list of
extraditable offenses in the 1901 Treaty to include all
offenses listed in article 2 of the Supplementary Treaty.
The 1987 Treaty will render article 6 unnecessary if and
when the new treaty enters into force because it does not list
specific extraditable offenses. Instead, the 1987 Treaty
permits extradition for any offense punishable under the laws
of both Contracting States by deprivation of liberty (i.e.,
imprisonment or other form of detention) for more than one
year.
Article 7
This article contains standard treaty language providing
for the exchange of instruments of ratification at Brussels and
specifies the day on which the Supplementary Treaty will enter
into force after the exchange.
Article 8
This article provides standard treaty language describing
the procedure for termination of the Supplementary Treaty by
either Contracting State.
VIII. Texts of the Resolutions of Ratification
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the
ratification of the Extradition Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium signed at Brussels
on April 27, 1987. The Senate's advice and consent is subject
to the following proviso, which shall not be included in the
instrument of ratification to be signed by the President:
Nothing in the Treaty requires or authorizes
legislation or other action by the United States of
America that is prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States as interpreted by the United States.
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the
ratification of the Supplementary Treaty on Extradition Between
the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium to
Promote the Repression of Terrorism, signed at Brussels on
April 27, 1987. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to
the following proviso, which shall not be included in the
instrument of ratification to be signed by the President:
Nothing in the Treaty requires or authorizes
legislation or other action by the United States of
America that is prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States as interpreted by the United States.