[Senate Executive Report 104-27]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



104th Congress                                              Exec. Rept.
                                 SENATE

 2d Session                                                      104-27
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                    EXTRADITION TREATY WITH HUNGARY

                                _______
                                

                 July 30, 1996.--Ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


   Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                    [To accompany Treaty Doc. 104-5]

    The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred 
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Hungary on Extradition, signed at 
Budapest on December 1, 1994, having considered the same, 
reports favorably thereon with one proviso, and recommends that 
the Senate give its advice and consent to the ratification 
thereof as set forth in this report and the accompanying 
resolution of ratification.

                               I. Purpose

    Modern extradition treaties (1) identify the offenses for 
which extradition will be granted, (2) establish procedures to 
be followed in presenting extradition requests, (3) enumerate 
exceptions to the duty to extradite, (4) specify the evidence 
required to support a finding of a duty to extradite, and (5) 
set forth administrative provisions for bearing costs and legal 
representation.

                             II. Background

    On December 1, 1994, the President signed an extradition 
treaty with Hungary. The Treaty was transmitted to the Senate 
for its advice and consent to ratification on May 8, 1995. In 
recent years the Departments of State and Justice have led an 
effort to modernize U.S. bilateral extradition treaties to 
better combat international criminal activity, such as drug 
trafficking, terrorism and money laundering. The United States 
is a party to approximately 100 bilateral extradition treaties. 
According to the Justice Department, during 1995 131 
individuals were extradited to the United States and 79 
individuals were extradited from the United States.
    The increase in international crime also has prompted the 
U.S. government to become a party to several multilateral 
international conventions which, although not themselves 
extradition treaties, deal with international law enforcement 
and provide that the offenses which they cover shall be 
extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty between the 
parties. These include: the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague), art. 8: the Convention to 
Discourage Acts of Violence Against Civil Aviation (Montreal), 
art. 8; the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs of 1961, art. 14 amending art. 36(2)(b)(I) of the Single 
Convention; the Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of 
Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related 
Extortion that are of International Significance (Organization 
of American States), art. 3; the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, art. 8; the International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages, art. 10; the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, 
art. 11; and the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna). 
These multilateral international agreements are incorporated by 
reference in the United States' bilateral extradition treaties.

                              III. Summary

                               a. general

    An extradition treaty is an international agreement in 
which the Requested State agrees, at the request of the 
Requesting State and under specified conditions, to turn over 
persons who are within its jurisdiction and who are charged 
with crimes against, or are fugitives from, the Requesting 
State. Extradition treaties can be bilateral or multilateral, 
though until recently the United States showed little interest 
in negotiating multilateral agreements dealing with 
extradition.
    The contents of recent treaties follow a standard format. 
Article I sets forth the obligation of contracting states to 
extradite to each other persons charged by the authorities of 
the Requesting State with, or convicted of, an extraditable 
offense. Article 2, sometimes referred to as a dual criminality 
clause, defines extraditable offenses as offenses punishable in 
both contracting states by prison terms of more than one year. 
Attempts or conspiracies to commit an extraditable offense are 
themselves extraditable. Several of the treaties provide that 
neither party shall be required to extradite its own nationals. 
The treaties carve out an exception to extraditable crimes for 
political offenses. The trend in modern extradition treaties is 
to narrow the political offense exceptions.
    The treaties include a clause allowing the Requested State 
to refuse extradition in cases where the offense is punishable 
by death in the Requesting State, unless the Requesting State 
provides assurances satisfactory to the Requested State that 
the individual sought will not be executed.
    In addition to these substantive provisions, the treaties 
also contain standard procedural provisions. These specify the 
kinds of information that must be submitted with an extradition 
request, the language in which documents are to be submitted, 
the procedures under which documents submitted are to be 
received and admitted into evidence in the Requested State, the 
procedures under which individuals shall be surrendered and 
returned to the Requesting State, and other related matters.

                          b. major provisions

1. Extraditable offenses: The dual criminality clause

    Article 2 contains a standard definition of what 
constitutes an extraditable offense: an offense is extraditable 
if it is punishable under the laws of both parties by a prison 
term of at least one year. Attempts and conspiracies to commit 
such offenses, and participation in the commission of such 
offenses, are also extraditable. If the extradition request 
involves a fugitive, it shall be granted only if the remaining 
sentence to be served is more than six months.
    The dual criminality clause means, for example, that an 
offense is not extraditable if in the United States it 
constitutes a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than one 
year, but it is not a crime in the treaty partner or is a crime 
punishable by a prison term of less than one year. In earlier 
extradition treaties the definition of extraditable offenses 
consisted of a list of specific categories of crimes. This 
categorizing of crimes has resulted in problems when a specific 
crime, for example drug dealing, is not on the list, and is 
therefore not extraditable. The result has been that as 
additional offenses become punishable under the laws of both 
treaty partners the extradition treaties between them need to 
be renegotiated or supplemented. A dual criminality clause 
obviates the need to renegotiate or supplement a treaty when it 
becomes necessary to broaden the definition of extraditable 
offenses.

2. Extraterritorial offenses

    In order to extradite individuals charged with 
extraterritorial crimes (offenses committed outside the 
territory of the Requesting State) such as international drug 
traffickers and terrorists, provision must be made in 
extradition treaties. The Hungary Treaty states that the 
Requested State shall grant extradition for an offense 
committed outside the Requesting State's territory if the 
Requested State's laws provide that an offense committed 
outside its territory is punishable in similar circumstances 
(art. 2(4)). If the Requested State's laws do not provide that 
an offense committed outside its territory is punishable in 
similar circumstances, under the Hungary Treaty the Requested 
State nevertheless has discretionary authority to grant 
extradition (art. 2(4)).
    In the proposed treaty an obligation to extradite depends 
mostly on whether the Requested State also punishes offenses 
outside its territory ``in similar circumstances.'' This, in 
effect, appears to be a dual criminality clause applied to 
extraterritorial offenses. The phrase ``in similar 
circumstances'' is undefined in each of the treaties that have 
such a requirement and in the Letters of Submittal from the 
Department of State to the President. The phrase appears to be 
sufficiently vague to give a reluctant Requested State ``wiggle 
room'' to avoid its possible obligation to extradite 
individuals for crimes committed outside its territory.

3. Political offense exception

    In recent years the United States has been promoting a 
restrictive view of the political offense exception in 
furtherance of its campaign against terrorism, drug 
trafficking, and money laundering. The political offense 
exception in the Hungary Treaty is narrower than other U.S. 
extradition treaties.
    The Hungary treaty starts out with standard language that 
extradition shall not be granted for political offenses (art. 4 
(1)). It then goes on to list several categories of offenses 
that are not considered political: a murder or other willful 
crime against a head of state or a member of his or her family; 
certain specified crimes, including murder, kidnapping, and 
placing explosive devices; an offense for which both parties 
have the obligation pursuant to a multilateral international 
agreement to extradite the person sought or submit the case to 
their authorities for prosecution; and an attempt or conspiracy 
to commit any of the foregoing acts, or participation in the 
commission of those acts. The first category of offenses not 
considered political--a criminal attack on a head of state or 
members of his family--is a carryover from older extradition 
treaties.
    The exclusion of certain violent crimes, (i.e. murder, 
kidnapping, and others) from the political offense exception 
has become standard in many U.S. extradition treaties, 
reflecting the concern of the United States government and 
certain other governments with international terrorism. The 
Hungary Treaty does not contain such an exclusion in their 
political offense exception.
    The exclusion from the political offense exception for 
crimes covered by multilateral international agreements, and 
the obligation to extradite for such crimes or submit the case 
to prosecution by the Requested State, is now a standard 
exclusion and is contained in the proposed treaty. The 
incorporation by reference of these multilateral agreements is 
intended to assure that the offenses with which they deal shall 
be extraditable under an extradition treaty. But, extradition 
for such offenses is not guaranteed. A Requested State has the 
option either to extradite or to submit the case to its 
competent authorities for prosecution. For example, a Requested 
State could refuse to extradite and instead declare that it 
will itself prosecute the offender.

4. The death penalty exception

    The United States and other countries appear to have 
different views on capital punishment. Under the proposed 
treaty a party may refuse extradition for an offense punishable 
by the death penalty in the Requesting State if the same 
offense is not punishable by the death penalty in the Requested 
State, unless the Requesting State gives assurances 
satisfactory to the Requested State that the death penalty will 
not be imposed or carried out.

5. The extradition of nationals

    The U.S. does not object to extraditing its own nationals 
and has sought to negotiate treaties without nationality 
restrictions. Many countries, however, refuse to extradite 
their own nationals. U.S. extradition treaties take varying 
positions on the nationality issue.
    The Hungary Treaty contains the traditional nationality 
clause providing that neither party is obligated to extradite 
its own nationals, but that they may do so at their discretion 
(art. 3). Upon a refusal to extradite, the Requested State may 
be required by the Requesting State to submit the case to its 
authorities for prosecution.\1\
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    \1\ An article in the Washington Post, A25, of June 28, 1996, 
reported that the Constitutional Court in Italy refused to allow the 
extradition to the United States of an Italian-born U.S. citizen or 
resident under the U.S.-Italy extradition treaty for a murder he 
committed in the United States despite U.S. assurances he would not be 
subject to the death penalty.
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6. Retroactivity

    The proposed treaty states that it shall apply to offenses 
committed before as well as after it enters into force (art. 
22). These retroactivity provisions do not violate the 
Constitution's prohibition against the enactment of ex post 
facto laws which applies only to enactments making criminal 
acts that were innocent when committed, not to the extradition 
of a defendant for acts that were criminal when committed but 
for which no extradition agreement existed at the time.

7. The rule of speciality

    The rule of speciality (or specialty), which prohibits a 
Requesting State from trying an extradited individual for an 
offense other than the one for which he was extradited, is a 
standard provision included in U.S. bilateral extradition 
treaties, including the six under consideration. The Hungary 
Treaty (art. 17) contains exceptions to the rule of specialty 
that are designed to allow a Requesting State some latitude in 
prosecuting offenders for crimes other than those for which 
they had been specifically extradited.

8. Lapse of time

    The Hungary Treaty contains rules that preclude extradition 
of offenses barred by an applicable statute of limitations. 
Extradition is barred if the statute of limitations has run 
under the laws of the Requesting State, not the Requested State 
(art. 6).

                  IV. Entry Into Force and Termination

                          a. entry into force

    This Treaty shall enter into force upon the exchange of 
instruments of ratification.

                             b. termination

    This Treaty may be terminated by either Party, effective 
six months after receipt of notice by a Party of the intention 
of the other Party to terminate the Treaty.

                          V. Committee Action

    The Committee on Foreign Relations held a public hearing on 
the proposed treaty on Wednesday, July 17, 1996. The hearing 
was chaired by Senator Helms. The Committee considered the 
proposed treaty on Wednesday, July 24, 1996, and ordered the 
proposed treaty favorably reported with one proviso by voice 
vote, with the recommendation that the Senate give its advice 
and consent to the ratification of the proposed treaty.

                         VI. Committee Comments

    The Committee on Foreign Relations recommended favorably 
the proposed treaty. The Committee believes that the proposed 
treaty is in the interest of the United States and urges the 
Senate to act promptly to give its advice and consent to 
ratification. In 1996 and the years ahead, U.S. law enforcement 
officers increasingly will be engaged in criminal 
investigations that traverse international borders. Certainly, 
sovereign relationships have always been important to 
prosecution of suspected criminals. The first recorded 
extradition treaty dates as far back as 1280 B.C. under Ramses 
II, Pharoah of Egypt. The United States entered into its first 
extradition treaty in 1794 with Great Britain. Like these early 
treaties, the basic premise of the treaties is to facilitate, 
under specified conditions, the transfer of persons who are 
within the jurisdiction of one nation, and who are charged with 
crimes against, or are fugitives from, the nation requesting 
extradition. Despite the long history of such bilateral 
treaties, the Committee believes that these treaties are more 
essential than ever to U.S. efforts to bring suspected 
criminals to justice.
    In 1995, 131 persons were extradited to the U.S. for 
prosecution for crimes committed in the U.S., and the U.S. 
extradited 79 individuals to other countries for prosecution. 
After the Senate ratified an extradition treaty with Jordan in 
1995, the U.S. Attorney General was able to take into custody 
an alleged participant in the bombing of the World Trade 
Center. His prosecution would not be possible without an 
extradition treaty. Crimes such as terrorism, transshipment of 
drugs by international cartels, and international banking fraud 
are but some of the international crimes that pose serious 
problems to U.S. law enforcement efforts. The Committee 
believes that modern extradition treaties provide an important 
law enforcement tool for combating such crimes and will advance 
the interests of the United States.
    The proposed resolution of ratification includes a proviso 
that reaffirms that ratification of this treaty does not 
require or authorize legislation that is prohibited by the 
Constitution of the United States. Bilateral extradition 
treaties rely on relationships between sovereign countries with 
unique legal systems. In as much as U.S. law is based on the 
Constitution, this treaty may not require legislation 
prohibited by the Constitution.

                  VII. Explanation of Proposed Treaty

    The following is the Technical Analysis of the Extradition 
Treaty submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations by the 
Departments of State and Justice prior to the Committee hearing 
to consider pending extradition treaties.

technical analysis of the extradition treaty between the united states 
                         of america and hungary

    On December 1, 1994, the United States signed a treaty on 
extradition with the Republic of Hungary (``the Treaty''). In 
recent years, the United States has signed similar treaties 
with many other countries as part of an ongoing effort to 
modernize our law enforcement relations. The Treaty is intended 
to replace the current treaty in force between the two 
countries, the Convention for the Mutual Delivery of Criminals, 
Fugitives from Justice, in Certain Cases \2\ (``the 1856 
Treaty''), which is the oldest United States extradition treaty 
still in force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ July 3, 1856, 11 Stat. 691, T.S. 9, 5 Bevans 211.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is anticipated that the Treaty will be implemented in 
the United States pursuant to the procedural framework provided 
by Title 18, United States Code, Section 3184 et seq. No new 
implementing legislation will be needed. Hungary has internal 
extradition legislation \3\ that will apply to United States 
requests under the Treaty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ See Act I of 1973, Criminal Procedure Code of the Hungarian 
People's Republic, Sec. Sec. .389-393. The key sections of Hungarian 
law that are germane to the interpretation and implementation of the 
Treaty are discussed in more detail in this technical analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The following technical analysis of the Treaty was prepared 
by the United States delegation that conducted the 
negotiations.

Article 1--Obligation to extradite

    This article, like the first article in every recent United 
States extradition treaty, formally obligates each Contracting 
Party to extradite to the other persons charged with or 
convicted of extraditable offenses, subject to the provisions 
of the Treaty.
    Article 1 refers to charges brought by authorities ``in'' 
the Requesting State rather than ``of'' the Requesting State, 
thereby obligating Hungary to extradite fugitives to the United 
States for state and local prosecutions as well as federal 
cases. The term ``found guilty'' is used instead of 
``convicted'' because in Hungary, a person is not considered 
convicted until a sentence is imposed, whereas in the United 
States, a sentence ordinarily is not imposed until after a 
presentence report is prepared and reviewed. The negotiators 
intended to make it clear that the Treaty applies to persons 
adjudged guilty who flee the jurisdiction prior to 
sentencing.\4\
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    \4\ See Stanbrook and Stanbrook, ``Extradition: The Law and 
Practice'' 25-26 (1979).
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Article 2--Extraditable offenses

    This article contains the basic guidelines for determining 
what are extraditable offenses. The Treaty, like the recent 
United States extradition treaties with Jamaica, Italy, 
Ireland, Thailand, Sweden (Supplementary Convention), and Costa 
Rica, does not list the offenses for which extradition may be 
granted.
    Paragraph 1 permits extradition for any offense punishable 
under the laws of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of 
liberty (i.e., imprisonment or other form of detention) for 
more than one year or by a more severe penalty such as capital 
punishment. Defining extraditable offenses in this manner 
obviates the need to renegotiate the Treaty or supplement it if 
both Contracting Parties pass laws dealing with a new type of 
criminal activity or if the list inadvertently fails to cover 
an important type of criminal activity punishable in both 
Contracting Parties.
    During the negotiations, the Hungarian delegation stated 
that key offenses such as drug trafficking, including operating 
a continuing criminal enterprise,\5\ money laundering, and 
offenses under the RICO statutes \6\ are considered 
extraditable under the Treaty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848.
    \6\ See 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1961-68.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 2 follows the practice of recent extradition 
treaties in providing that extradition should also be granted 
for attempting to commit, or otherwise participating in, an 
extraditable offense. Conspiracy charges are frequently used in 
United States criminal cases, particularly those involving 
complex transnational criminal activity, so it is especially 
important that the Treaty be clear on this point. Hungary has 
no general conspiracy statute like Title 18, United States 
Code, Section 371. Therefore, paragraph 2 creates an exception 
to the ``dual criminality'' rule of paragraph 1 by expressly 
making conspiracy an extraditable crime. Similarly, this 
paragraph makes the Hungarian offense of association to commit 
an offense an extraditable offense.
    Paragraph 3 reflects the intention of both Contracting 
Parties to interpret the principles of this article broadly. 
Judges in foreign countries often are confused by the fact that 
many United States federal statutes require proof of certain 
elements (such as use of the mails or interstate 
transportation) solely to establish jurisdiction in United 
States federal courts. Because these foreign judges know of no 
similar requirement in their own criminal law, they 
occasionally have denied the extradition of fugitives sought by 
the United States on this basis. This paragraph requires that 
such elements be disregarded in applying the dual criminality 
principle. For example, it will ensure that Hungarian 
authorities treat United States mail fraud charges \7\ in the 
same manner as fraud charges under state laws, and view the 
federal crime of interstate transportation of stolen property 
\8\ in the same manner as unlawful possession of stolen 
property. Paragraph 3 further requires a Requested State to 
disregard differences in the categorization of the offense in 
determining whether dual criminality exists, and to overlook 
mere differences in the terminology used to define the offense 
under the laws of each Contracting Party. A similar provision 
is contained in all recent United States extradition treaties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ See U.S.C. Sec. 1341.
    \8\ See U.S.C. Sec. 2314.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 4 deals with the fact that many federal crimes 
involve acts committed wholly outside United States territory. 
Our jurisprudence recognizes jurisdiction in our courts to hear 
cases involving offenses committed outside the United States if 
the crime was intended to, or did, have effects in this 
country, or if the legislative history of the statute shows 
clear Congressional intent to assert such jurisdiction.\9\ In 
Hungary, however, the government's ability to prosecute 
extraterritorial offenses is very different.\10\ Paragraph 4 
therefore reflects Hungary's agreement to recognize United 
States jurisdiction to prosecute offenses committed outside the 
United States if Hungarian law permits it to prosecute similar 
offenses committed outside Hungary in corresponding 
circumstances. If the law of the Requested State does not 
provide for such prosecution, paragraph 4 nevertheless permits 
the executive authority of the Requested State to decide, at 
its discretion, to grant the extradition. For the United 
States, this decision is made by the Secretary of State, and 
for Hungary, by the Minister of Justice. A similar provision 
appears in several recent United States treaties.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States Sec. 402 (1987); Blakesley, ``United States Jurisdiction over 
Extraterritorial Crime,'' 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1109 (1982).
    \10\ For example, Hungary can prosecute its citizens for offenses 
committed outside Hungary.
    \11\ See Protocol Amending U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty, Jan. 11, 
1988, art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. --; Protocol Amending U.S.-Australia 
Extradition Treaty, Sept. 4, 1990, art. III, T.I.A.S. No. --.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 5 states that when extradition is granted for an 
extraditable offense, it shall also be granted for any other 
offense for which all of the requirements for extradition are 
met except for the requirement that the offense be punishable 
by more than one year of imprisonment. For example, if Hungary 
agrees to extradite to the United States a fugitive wanted for 
prosecution on a felony charge, the United States will also be 
permitted to obtain extradition for any misdemeanor offenses 
charged, as long as those misdemeanors are also recognized as 
criminal offenses in Hungary. Thus, the Treaty incorporates 
recent United States extradition practice by permitting 
extradition for misdemeanors committed by a fugitive when the 
fugitive's extradition is granted for a more serious 
extraditable offense. This practice is generally desirable from 
the perspective of both the fugitive and the prosecuting 
country in that it permits all charges against the fugitive to 
be disposed of more quickly, thereby facilitating trials while 
evidence is still fresh and permitting the possibility of 
concurrent sentences. Similar provisions are found in recent 
extradition treaties with Australia, Ireland, Italy, and Costa 
Rica.
    Some recent United States extradition treaties provide that 
persons who have been convicted of an extraditable offense and 
sentenced to imprisonment may be extradited only if at least a 
certain specified portion of the sentence (often six months) 
remains to be served on the outstanding sentence. The Treaty 
contains no such requirement. Provisions of this kind are an 
attempt to limit extradition to serious cases because of the 
significant costs associated with the process. However, the 
negotiators felt that the particular sentence imposed or 
outstanding is not necessarily an adequate measure of the 
seriousness of the crime.\12\ They preferred the exercise of 
discretion and good judgment in considering the remainder of a 
sentence to be served, not arbitrary limits imposed in the 
terms of the Treaty, as the better approach to promote the 
Treaty's goals. A similar provision is found in our extradition 
treaties with other countries, including Australia, Canada, 
Jamaica, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Cf. United States v. Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Vt. 
1979) (``Leniency in sentencing does not give rise to a bar to 
extradition''). Reliance on the amount of the sentence remaining to be 
served can also produce anomalous results. For instance, a murderer who 
escapes from custody with less than six months to serve on a sentence 
can hardly resist extradition on the basis that murder is not a serious 
offense.
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Article 3--Nationality

    Paragraph 1 specifically states that each Contracting Party 
has the discretionary power to extradite its own nationals 
unless prohibited from doing so by internal legislation. This 
paragraph, like the clause in article IV of the 1901 Treaty 
that it replaces, is intended to permit the United States to 
extradite its nationals to Hungary, in accordance with 
established United States policy favoring such 
extraditions.\13\ However, since Hungary is barred by its law 
from extraditing Hungarian nationals,\14\ it is unlikely that 
Hungary will actually surrender its nationals to the United 
States under the Treaty unless Hungarian law is amended in the 
future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ See generally Shearer, ``Extradition in International Law'' 
110-14 (1970); 6 Whiteman, ``Digest of International Law'' 871-76 
(1968). Our policy of drawing no distinction between nationals of the 
United States and those of other countries in extradition matters has 
been underscored by Congress in legislation. Title 18, United States 
Code, Section 3196 authorizes the Secretary of State to extradite 
United States citizens pursuant to treaties that permit but do not 
expressly require surrender of citizens, as long as the other 
requirements of the treaty are met. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3196.
    \14\ See Act IV of 1978, Criminal Code of the Hungarian People's 
Republic, Sec. 9(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 2 requires that if the Requested State refuses 
extradition solely on the basis of nationality, that State must 
submit the case to its authorities for prosecution if asked to 
do so by the Requesting State.
    Similar provisions are found in many recent United States 
extradition treaties.\15\
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    \15\ See e.g., U.S.-Costa Rica Extradition Treaty, Dec. 4, 1982, 
art. 8, T.I.A.S. No.--; U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, 
art. 9, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Article 4--Political and military offenses

    Paragraph 1 prohibits extradition for political offenses. 
This is a common provision in United States extradition 
treaties.
    Paragraph 2 describes several categories of offenses that 
shall not be considered political offenses.
    Paragraph 2(a) provides that the political offense 
exception to extradition does not apply when there is a murder 
or other willful crime against the life of a Head of State of a 
Contracting Party, or a member of the head of State's family.
    Paragraph 2(b) states that the political offense exception 
does not apply to offenses for which both Contracting Parties 
have the obligation, pursuant to a multilateral treaty, 
convention or international agreement, either to extradite the 
person sought or to submit the matter for prosecution. The 
conventions to which this clause applies at present include the 
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on 
Board Aircraft; \16\ the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizures of Aircraft (Hijacking); \17\ the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation (Sabotage); \18\ the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents; \19\ and the 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.\20\ In 
addition, Hungary is expected to ratify the United Nations 
Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances \21\ in the near future. In the 
meantime, both the United States and Hungary are parties to the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs \22\ and the Amending 
Protocol to the Single Convention; \23\ this provision of the 
Treaty applies to both conventions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; 704 
U.N.T.S. 219.
    \17\ Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192.
    \18\ Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
    \19\ Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532.
    \20\ Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11081.
    \21\ Dec. 20, 1988, T.I.A.S. No.--.
    \22\ Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 
204.
    \23\ Mar. 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1439, T.I.A.S. No. 8118, 976 U.N.T.S. 
3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Subparagraphs 2(c), (d) and (e) specify that the Requested 
State shall not consider any of the following crimes to be 
political offenses: murder, manslaughter or any other offense 
involving substantial bodily harm; offenses involving 
kidnapping or any form of unlawful detention, including 
hostage-taking; and placement or use of a device, incendiary, 
or destructive device capable of endangering life, of causing 
substantial bodily harm, or of causing substantial property 
damage. Thus, the Treaty is similar to recent United States 
extradition treaties with the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, 
and Spain, in each of which the scope of the political offense 
exception is substantially narrowed to eliminate its 
application to certain crimes typically committed by 
terrorists.
    Paragraph 2(f) states that the political offense exception 
does not apply to conspiracy or any type of association to 
commit, attempt to commit, or participation in, the commission 
or attempted commission of the foregoing offenses.
    Paragraph 3 provides that extradition shall not be granted 
if the executive authority of the Requested State finds that 
the request is politically motivated. This is consistent with 
longstanding United States law and practice, under which the 
Secretary of State alone has the discretion to determine 
whether an extradition request is based on improper political 
motivation.\24\ Similar provisions appear in many United States 
extradition teeaties.\25\
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    \24\ See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F. 2d 504, 513-18 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. Supp. 904 (D. 
Mass. 1990), aff'd, 931 F. 2d 169 (1st Cir. 1991).
    \25\ See U.S.-Jamaica Extradition Treaty, June 14, 1983, art. 
III(3), T.I.A.S. No. --; U.S.-Spain Extradition Treaty, May 29, 1970, 
art. 5(4), 22 U.S.T. 737, T.I.A.S. No. 7136, 796 U.N.T.S. 245; U.S.-
Netherlands Extradition Treaty, June 24, 1980, art. 4, T.I.A.S. No. 
10733; and U.S.-Ireland Extradition Treaty, July 13, 1983, art. IV(c), 
T.I.A.S. No. 10813.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 4 provides that extradition may be denied by the 
executive authority of the Requested State if the request 
relates to an offense under military law that is not an offense 
under ordinary criminal law.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ An example of such a crime is desertion. See, e.g., In re 
Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676, 703 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Article 5--Prior prosecution

    This article will permit extradition in situations in which 
the fugitive is charged with different offenses in each 
Contracting Party arising out of the same basic transaction.
    Paragraph 1 prohibits extradition if the fugitive has been 
convicted or acquitted in the Requested State for the offense 
for which extradition is requested. This is similar to language 
found in many United States extradition treaties. The paragraph 
also permits extradition to be denied if the charges in the 
Requesting State have been ``dismissed by a court order with 
binding effect. * * *'' This refers to the dismissal of charges 
by the court ``with prejudice,'' a situation which raises 
double jeopardy concerns. This paragraph will, however, permit 
extradition in situations in which the activities of the 
fugitive result in his being charged with different offenses in 
both Contracting Parties arising out of the same basic 
transaction.
    Paragraph 2 makes it clear that neither Contracting Party 
can refuse to extradite an offender to the other on the ground 
that the Requested State's authorities declined to prosecute 
the offender, or instituted criminal proceedings against the 
offender and thereafter elected to discontinue the proceedings. 
This provision was included because a decision by the Requested 
State to forego prosecution, or to drop charges already filed, 
may be the result of a failure to obtain sufficient evidence or 
witnesses for trial, whereas the prosecution in the Requesting 
State may not suffer from the same impediments. This provision 
should enhance the ability to extradite to the jurisdiction 
with the better chance of a successful prosecution.

Article 6--Lapse of time

    This article states that extradition must be denied if at 
the time the extradition request is received, the prosecution 
of the offense or the enforcement of the penalty or detention 
order is barred by lapse of time under the law of the 
Requesting State. Similar provisions appear in several United 
States extradition treaties. The reference to ``enforcement of 
the penalty or of the detention order'' reflects the fact that 
Hungary, like many civil law countries, has a statute of 
limitations relating to such matters in addition to a statute 
of limitation on prosecutions. The article indicates that the 
Requested State should not deny the request if the statute of 
limitations expires after the requested State receives the 
request.

Article 7--Capital punishment

    Paragraph 1 permits the requested State to refuse 
extradition in cases in which the offense for which extradition 
is sought is punishable by death in the Requesting State, but 
is not punishable by death in the Requested State, unless the 
Requesting State provides assurances that the death penalty 
will not be imposed, or, if imposed, will not be carried out. 
Similar provisions are found in many recent United States 
extradition treaties.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ See e.g., U.S.-Netherlands Extradition Treaty, June 24, 1980, 
art. 7, T.I.A.S. No. 10733; U.S.-Ireland Extradition Treaty, July 13, 
1983, art. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 10813.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Hungarian delegation insisted on this provision because 
Hungary has abolished the death penalty and usually denies 
extradition in cases in which the person sought might be 
executed. However, the Hungarian delegation assured the United 
States delegation that in an extraordinarily egregious case. 
Hungary might be persuaded to grant extradition without 
assurances pursuant to this paragraph.
    Paragraph 2 provides that when the Requesting State gives 
assurances in accordance with paragraph 1, the assurances shall 
be respected, and the death penalty, if imposed, shall not be 
carried out.

Article 8--Extradition procedures and required documents

    This article sets out the documentary and evidentiary 
requirements for an extradition request, and is generally 
similar to articles in the most recent United States 
extradition treaties.
    Paragraph 1 requires that each formal request for 
extradition be submitted through the diplomatic channel. A 
formal extradition request may be preceded by a request for the 
provisional arrest of the fugitive under article 11, and 
provisional arrest request need not be initiated through 
diplomatic channels if the requirements of article 11 are met.
    Paragraph 2 outlines the information that must accompany 
every request for extradition under the Treaty. Paragraph 3 
describes the additional information needed when the person is 
sought for trial in the Requesting State; paragraph 4 describes 
the information needed, in addition to the requirements of 
paragraph 2, when the person sought has already been tried and 
found guilty in the Requesting State.
    Most of the items listed in paragraph 2 enable the 
Requested State to determine quickly whether extradition is 
appropriate under the Treaty. For example, paragraph 2(e) calls 
for ``a statement of the provisions of law describing any time 
limit on the prosecution or enforcement of the penalty or the 
detention order,'' thereby enabling the Requested State to 
determine easily whether lapse of time would be a valid basis 
for denying extradition under article 6.
    Paragraph 3 requires that if the fugitive has not yet been 
convicted of the crime for which extradition is requested, the 
Requesting State must provide a copy of the outstanding arrest 
warrant, the formal charges, and ``such evidence as would 
justify the committal for trial of the person if the offense 
had been committed in the Requested State.'' This is consistent 
with fundamental extradition jurisprudence in the United 
States, under which this language is interpreted to require 
evidence of probable cause.\28\ The Hungarian delegation 
assured the United States delegation that under Hungarian law, 
the outstanding United States arrest warrant would constitute 
sufficient evidence to satisfy this standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Courts applying Title 18, United States Code, Section 3184 
have long required probable cause for international extradition. 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
Sec. 476 comment b (1987).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 4 lists the information needed to extradite a 
person convicted of an offense in the Requesting States. This 
paragraph makes it clear that once a conviction has been 
obtained, no showing of probable cause is required. In essence, 
the fact of conviction speaks for itself, a position taken in 
recent United States court decisions even absent a specific 
treaty provision.\29\ Subsection (d) states that if the person 
sought was found guilty in absentia, the documentation required 
for extradition includes both proof of conviction and the 
documentation required under paragraph 3. This is consistent 
with the longstanding United States policy of requiring such 
documentation in extradition proceedings of persons convicted 
in absentia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ See, e.g., Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362, 374 
(E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 925 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1991); Clark, 470 F. 
Supp. 976.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Article 9--Admissibility of documents

    This article governs the authentication procedures for 
documentation intended for use in extradition proceedings.
    Paragraph (a) states that evidence intended for use in 
extradition proceedings shall be admissible if it is certified 
by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the 
Requested State. This provision primarily accommodates the 
authentication procedures required by United States law.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3190.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph (b) permits such evidence to be admitted if it is 
authenticated in any manner accepted by the laws of the 
Requested State. This provision ensures that relevant evidence 
that would normally satisfy the evidentiary rules of the 
Requested State is not excluded at the extradition hearing 
simply because of an inadvertent error or omission in the 
authentication process. This clause is especially important 
because Hungary has no laws or regulations regarding 
authentication of documents for extradition cases. It was 
agreed that paragraph (b) ensures that documents in support of 
United States extradition requests would not require special 
authentication.

Article 10--Translation

    This standard treaty provision requires that all documents 
submitted in support of an extradition request be translated 
into the language of the Requested State. Thus, requests from 
Hungary to the United States would be translated into English 
and United States requests to Hungary would be translated into 
Hungarian.

Article 11--Provisional arrest

    This article describes the process by which a person in the 
Requested State may be arrested and detained while the formal 
extradition request is being prepared by the Requesting State.
    Paragraph 1 expressly provides that a request for 
provisional arrest may be made directly between the United 
States Department of Justice and the Hungarian Ministry of 
Justice. The request may also be made via the Interpol channel. 
Experience has shown that the ability to use such direct 
channels in emergency situations can be crucial when a fugitive 
is poised to flee a jurisdiction.
    Paragraph 2 sets forth the information that the Requesting 
State must provide in support of such a request.
    Paragraph 3 states that the Requesting State must be 
advised without delay of the outcome of the request and the 
reasons for any denial.
    Paragraph 4 provides that the fugitive may be released from 
detention if the executive authority of the Requested State 
does not receive the fully documented extradition request 
within 60 days of the provisional arrest.\31\ When the United 
States is the Requested State, the ``executive authority'' for 
purposes of paragraph 4 would include the Secretary of State or 
the United States Embassy in Budapest.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Under Section .390(2) of Hungary's extradition law, the 
documents must be received within three months.
    \32\ Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 4 states that the person arrested may be released 
from custody if the documents are not received within the 60-
day period. However, the proceedings against the fugitive need 
not be dismissed, as paragraph 5 makes it clear that the person 
may be taken into custody again and the extradition proceedings 
may be re-commenced when the formal request is presented at a 
later date.

Article 12--Additional information

    This article provides for the submission of additiona 
information if the original request, including supporting 
documentation, is viewed as insufficient by the Requested 
State. It is intended to permit the Requesting State to cure 
any defects in the request and accompanying materials which are 
found by a court in the Requested State or by the attorney 
acting on behalf of the Requesting State, and to permit the 
court, in appropriate cases, to grant a reasonable continuance 
to obtain, translate, and transmit additional materials. This 
provision also states that the person sought may be released 
form custody if the additional information is not received 
within the time specified, but such release shall not preclude 
a subsequent request on the same or different offenses at a 
later time. The Requested State must notify the Requesting 
State of such a release. A similar provision is found in other 
United States extradition treaties. \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ See, e.g., U.S.-Costa Rico Extradiction Treaty, Dec. 4, 1982, 
art. 10, T.I.A.S. No.--; U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, 
art. XI, T.I.A.S. No. 10837.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Article 13--Decision and surrender

    This article requires the Requested State promptly to 
notify the Requesting State of its decision on the extradition 
request. If extradition is denied, the Requested State must 
provide the reasons for the denial. If extradiction is granted, 
the articles requires that the two Contracting Parties agree on 
a time and place for surrender of the person. The Requesting 
State must remove the fugitive within the time prescribed by 
the law of the Requested State or the person may be discharged 
from custody, and the Requested State may subsequently refuse 
to extradite for the same offense. United States law requires 
that surrender occur within two calendar months of the finding 
that the offender is extraditable, \34\ or of the conclusion of 
any litigation challenging that finding, \35\ whichever is 
later. According to the Hungarian delegation, the law in 
Hungary does not specify the time in which the surrender must 
take place, as such matters are usually dealt with the 
surrender decree signed by the Minister of Justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3188.
    \35\ Jiminez v. United States District Court, 84 S. Ct. 14, 11 L. 
Ed.2d 30 (1963) (decided by Goldberg, J., in chambers); see Liberto v. 
Emery, 724 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1983); In re United States, 713 F. 2d 105 
(5th Cir. 1983); see also Barrett v. United States, 590 F.2d 624 (6th 
Cir. 1978).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Article 14--Deferred and temporary surrender

    Occasionally, a person sought of extradition may be facing 
prosecution or serving a sentence on other charges in the 
Requested State. This article provides a means for the 
Requested State to defer extradition in such circumstances 
until the conclusion of the proceedings against the person 
sought and the service of any punishment imposed. Similar 
provisions appear in our recent extradition treaties with the 
Bahamas and Australia.
    Paragraph 1 provides that the executive authority to the 
Requested State may postpone the extradition proceedings 
against a person who is being prosecuted or serving a sentence 
in the Requested State until the conclusion of the prosecution 
or the full execution of the punishment which has been imposed. 
\36\ The provision permits the Requested State to postpone the 
surrender of the person as well as the initiation of 
extradiction proceedings against a person facing prosecution 
proceedings against a person facing prosecution or serving a 
sentence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ Under United States law and practice, the Secretary of State 
makes this decision. Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. Supp. 904, 920 (a) (D. 
Mass. 1990), aff'd, 931 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 2 provides for the temporary surrender of a 
person wanted for prosecution in the Requesting State who is 
being proscecuted or is serving a sentence in the Requested 
State. A person temporarily transferred pursuant to the Treaty 
will be returned to the Requested State at the conclusion of 
the proceedings in the Requesting State. Such temporarily 
surrender furthers the interests of justice in that it permits 
trial of the person sought while evidence and witnesses are 
more likely to be available, thereby increasing the likelihood 
of a successful prosecution. Such transfer may also be 
advantageous to the person sought in that: (1) it permits 
resolution of the charges sooner; (2) subject to the laws in 
each Contracting Party, it makes possible serving any sentence 
in the Requested State concurrently with the sentence in the 
Requested State; and (3) it permits defense against the charges 
while favorable evidence is fresh and more likely to be 
available. Similar provisions are found in many recent 
extradiction treaties.

Article 15--Requests for extradition by several states

    This article reflects the practice of many recent United 
States extradition treaties to list some of the factors that 
the executive authority of the Requested State must consider in 
determining to which country a person should be surrendered 
when reviewing requests from two or more countries for 
extradition. For the United States, the Secretary of State 
makes this decision.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Cheng Na-Yuet v. Hueston. 734 F. Supp. 988 (S.D. Fla. 1990), 
aff'd. 932 F.2d 977 (11th Cir. 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Article 16--Seizure and surrender of property

    This article provides for the seizure by the Requested 
State of all property--articles, instruments, objects of value, 
documents, or other evidence--relating to the offense for which 
extradition is requested, to the extent permitted by the 
Requested State's internal law. The article also provides that 
these objects shall be surrendered to the Requesting State upon 
the granting of extradition or even if extradition cannot be 
effected due to the death, disappearance, or escape of the 
fugitive.
    Paragraph 2 states that the Requested State may condition 
its surrender of property in such a way as to ensure its return 
as soon as practicable, and may defer surrender altogether if 
the property is needed as evidence in the Requested State. The 
obligation to surrender property under this article is 
expressly made subject to due respect for the rights of third 
parties in such property.

Article 17--Rule of specialty

    This article covers the principle known as the rule of 
specialty, which is a standard aspect of United States 
extradition practice. Designed to ensure that a fugitive 
surrendered for one offense is not tried for other crimes, the 
rule of specialty prevents a request for extradition from being 
used as a subterfuge to obtain custody of a person for trial or 
service of a sentence on different charges that may not be 
extraditable under the Treaty or properly documented at the 
time that the request is granted.
    Since a variety of exceptions to the rule have developed 
over the years, this article codifies the current formulation 
of the rule by providing that a person extradited under the 
Treaty may only be detained, tried, or punished in the 
Requesting State for (1) the offense for which extradition was 
granted, or a differently denominated offense based on the same 
facts, provided the offense is extraditable or is a lesser-
included offense; (2) offenses committed after the extradition; 
or (3) other offenses for which the executive authority of the 
Requested State consents.\38\ Paragraph 1(c)(ii) permits the 
Contracting Party that is seeking consent to pursue new charges 
to detain the defendant for 90 days while the Requested State 
makes its determination on the application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ In the United States, the Secretary of State has the authority 
to consent to a waiver of the rule of specialty. See Berenguer v. 
Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (D.D.C. 1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 2 prohibits the Requesting State from 
surrendering the person to a third country for an offense 
committed prior to extradition under the Treaty without the 
consent of the Requested State.
    Finally, paragraph 3 permits the detention, trial, or 
punishment of an extraditee for additional offenses, or 
extradition a third country, if the extraditee (1) leaves and 
returns to the Requesting State, or (2) does not leave the 
Requesting State within ten days of being free to do so.

Article 18--Simplified extradition

    Persons sought for extradition frequently elect to waive 
their right to extradition proceedings in order to expedite 
their return to the Requesting State. This article provides 
that when a fugitive consents to return to the Requesting 
State, the person may be returned to the Requesting State as 
expeditiously as possible without further proceedings. The 
negotiators anticipated that in such cases, there would be no 
need for the formal documents described in article 8, or for 
further judicial or administrative proceedings of any kind.
    If the United States is the Requested State and the person 
sought elects to return voluntarily to Hungary before the 
United States Secretary of State signs a surrender warrant, the 
process would not be deemed an ``extradition.'' Longstanding 
United States policy is that the rule of specialty does not 
apply to such cases. Therefore, the second sentence of article 
18 states that the rule of specialty in article 17 will not 
apply to cases in which this article is utilized.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Cf. U.S.-Netherlands Extradition Treaty, June 24, 1980, art. 
16, T.I.A.S. No. 10733.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Article 19--Transit

    Paragraph 1 gives each Contracting Party the power to 
authorize transit through its territory of persons being 
surrendered the other Contracting Party by third countries, and 
to hold such persons in custody during the period of transit. 
Transit requests under this article, like provisional arrest 
requests under article 11, may be transmitted via the Interpol 
channel. Each request for transit must contain a description of 
the person whose transit is proposed and a brief statement of 
the facts of the case with respect to which the person is being 
surrendered to the Requesting State.
    Paragraph 2 describes the procedure each Contracting Party 
should follow when seeking to transport a person in custody 
through the territory of the other Contracting Party. Under 
this provision, no advance authorization is needed if the 
person in custody is in transit to a Contracting Party, is 
travelling by aircraft, and no landing is scheduled in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party. Should an unscheduled 
landing occur, a request for transit may be required at that 
time, and the Requested State may grant the request in its 
discretion. The Treaty ensures that the person will be kept in 
custody for up to 96 hours until a request for transit is 
received and thereafter until its execution.

Article 20--Representation and expenses

    Paragraph 1 provides that in extradition proceedings under 
the Treaty, the Requested State shall advise, assist, and 
appear in court on behalf of the Requesting State, and shall 
represent the interests of the Requesting State by all legal 
means within its power. The phrase ``all legal means within its 
power'' was included because the law and practice of the United 
States and Hungary differ on this issue.
    The United States will represent Hungary in connection with 
requests from Hungary for extradition before courts in the 
United States. However, under Hungarian law, the Requesting 
State is not a party to extradition litigation before Hungarian 
courts and cannot be represented in such proceedings. The 
Hungarian Public Prosecutor appears in court to represent the 
interests of Hungary, but does not represent the interests of 
the Requesting State and cannot be compelled to argue for 
extradition if the Public Prosecutor believes that the court 
should deny the request.\40\ The Hungarian delegation indicated 
that there is no possibility that Hungary would modify this 
aspect of its internal procedure. However, the delegations did 
agree to revisions of article 20 to address this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ The Hungarian delegation assures the United States delegation 
that it is almost inconceivable that the Public Prosecutor would ever 
argue against extradition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 2 provides that the Requested State will bear all 
expenses of extradition except those expenses relating to the 
ultimate transportation of a fugitive to the Requesting State 
and the translation of documents, which are to be paid by the 
Requesting State. Cases may arise in which it may be necessary 
for the Requesting State to retain private counsel to assist in 
the presentation of the extradition request. It is anticipated 
that in such cases, the fees of private counsel retained by the 
Requesting State must be paid by the Requesting State.
    Paragraph 3 provides that neither Contracting Party shall 
make a pecuniary claim against the other in connection with 
extradition proceedings, including the arrest, detention, 
examination, and surrender of the fugitive. This includes any 
claim by the fugitive for damages or reimbursement of legal 
fees or other expenses occasioned by the execution of the 
extradition request.

Article 21--Consultation

    This article provides that the United States Department of 
Justice and the Hungarian Ministry of Justice may consult with 
each other directly or through Interpol channels with regard to 
individual extradition cases and extradition procedures in 
general. A similar provision is found in other United States 
extradition treaties awaiting ratification.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ See, e.g., U.S.-Belgium Extradition Treaty, Apr. 9, 1987, art. 
19, T.I.A.S. No. --; U.S.-Switzerland Extradition Treaty, Nov. 11, 
1990, art. 24, T.I.A.S. No. --; U.S.-Philippines Extradition Treaty, 
Nov. 13, 1994, art. 18, T.I.A.S. No. --.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As discussed in connection with article 20, the Hungarian 
Public Prosecutor appears in court during extradition 
proceedings but does not represent the interests of the 
Requesting State. The delegations agreed that article 21 will 
provide the United States with the opportunity to consult with 
the Public Prosecutor's Office to the extent necessary to make 
certain that the attorney appearing in court understands the 
United States case and intends to argue in favor of 
extradition.

Article 22--Application

    This Treaty, like most other United States extradition 
treaties negotiated in the past two decades, is expressly made 
retroactive and accordingly covers offenses that occurred 
before the Treaty enters into force.

Article 23--Ratification, entry into force, and termination

    This article contains standard treaty language providing 
for the exchange of instruments of ratification at Washington, 
D.C., and states that the Treaty will enter into force 
immediately upon the exchange.
    Paragraph 3 provides that the 1856 Treaty will cease to 
have effect upon the entry into force of the Treaty, but 
extradition requests pending before the courts when the Treaty 
enters into force will nevertheless be processed to conclusion 
under the 1956 Treaty. Article 18 of the Treaty, which deals 
with simplified extradition, will be available in such 
extradition proceedings. The paragraph also states that article 
17 of the Treaty, which concerns the rule of specialty, will 
apply to persons found extraditable under the 1856 Treaty.
    Paragraph 4 contains standard treaty language describing 
the procedure for termination of the Treaty by either 
Contracting Party, and indicates that the termination shall 
become effective six months after notice of termination has 
been received.

              VIII. Text of the Resolution of Ratification

    Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the 
ratification of The Treaty Between The Government of the United 
States of America and The Government of the Republic of Hungary 
on Extradition, signed at Budapest on December 1, 1994. The 
Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following 
proviso, which shall not be included in the instrument of 
ratification to be signed by the President: Nothing in the 
Treaty requires or authorizes legislation or other action by 
the United States of America that is prohibited by the 
Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United 
States.