[Senate Executive Report 104-2]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



104th Congress                                              Exec. Rept.
                                 SENATE

 1st Session                                                      104-2
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                     EXTRADITION TREATY WITH JORDAN

                                _______


      May 2 (legislative day, May 1), 1995.--Ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


   Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                    [To accompany Treaty Doc. 104-3]

    The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred 
the Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan, signed at Washington on March 28, 1995, having 
considered the same, reports favorably thereon without 
amendment and recommends that the Senate give its advice and 
consent to ratification thereof.

                                Purpose

    The Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan, hereinafter ``The Treaty,'' identifies the offenses 
for which extradition will be granted, establishes procedures 
to be followed in presenting extradition requests, enumerates 
exceptions to the duty to extradite, specifies the evidence 
required to support a finding of a duty to extradite, and sets 
forth administrative provisions for bearing costs and legal 
representation.

                               Background

    On March 28, 1995, the United States signed a treaty on 
extradition with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It was 
transmitted by the President to the Senate for advice and 
consent to ratification on April 24, 1995, and will become the 
first to enter into force with Jordan if ratified. Ratification 
of this Treaty is seen as a step forward in the efforts of the 
United States to win the cooperation of countries in the Middle 
East in combatting crimes such as transnational terrorism and 
international drug trafficking.
    The United States currently has extradition treaties in 
force with nearly one hundred countries which enable the United 
States to extradite fugitives to other countries and to request 
that other countries extradite fugitives to the United States. 
These treaties play an increasingly important role in law 
enforcement as modern transportation has enabled criminals to 
operate on an international scale and to flee more easily from 
country to country. In March 1995, for example, the United 
States received 51 requests from treaty partners for surrender 
of fugitives found in this country, and the United States 
requested the extradition of 45 fugitives from other countries.
    It is anticipated that the Treaty, if ratified, will be 
implemented in the United States pursuant to the procedural 
framework provided by Title 18, United States Code, Section 
3184 et seq. No new implementing legislation will be needed. 
Jordan has its own internal legislation on extradition that 
will apply to U.S. requests under the Treaty.

                            Major Provisions

    In general, many of the provisions contained in the 
Extradition Treaty with Jordan find precedent in other U.S. 
extradition treaties. There are some variations, however, and 
some of the key provisions are outlined below.
    Article 2 defines extraditable offenses solely in terms of 
dual criminality. Defining extraditable offenses generically, 
rather than through an exclusive listing of crimes, broadens 
the scope of cooperation and obviates the need to renegotiate 
treaties to add new offenses to a list of extraditable crimes. 
A drawback of the exclusive dual criminality approach is that 
there may not be a complete congruence of elements of similar 
criminal offenses in different legal systems. Paragraph 3 of 
article 2 contains common provisions designed to focus on the 
criminality of the underlying acts instead of on the 
terminology used in describing various offenses.
    Article 2 also provides for the inclusion of (1) ancillary 
misdemeanors and (2) attempts and conspiracies. This in effect 
creates an exception to the dual criminality rule. Further, the 
inclusion of all extraterritorial crimes, once an extraditable 
offense is proved, is viewed as a useful tool in obtaining 
perpetrators of such transnational crimes as drug dealing and 
terrorism.
    Article 4 sets out the political offense exception to 
extraditable crimes. The provision is in keeping with the trend 
toward narrowing the scope of the political offense exception 
to exclude certain universally condemned crimes that are the 
subject of multilateral agreements. Under these agreements, 
covering such crimes as hostage taking, air hijacking, aircraft 
sabotage, and attacks on internationally protected persons, a 
party State must either prosecute a person accused of a covered 
crime or extradite the person for trial elsewhere. Attacks on a 
head of State or his or her family also are generally excluded 
from political offenses. The Jordan Treaty is consistent with 
this approach and Jordan is party to the major international 
agreements on sabotage, terrorism, narco-trafficking and 
similar universally condemned crimes.
    Though the Jordan Treaty narrows the political offense 
exception somewhat, it does not do so to the same extent as 
certain recently concluded treaties with democratic allies, 
such as in the 1986 treaty with the United Kingdom.
    Article 5 addresses prior prosecution and bars extradition 
for an offense for which the person sought has been convicted 
or acquitted in the Requested State. Because the restriction is 
limited to offenses and not acts, it appears that extradition 
may be permissible where extradition is sought for a different 
offense arising from the same pattern of conduct that was the 
basis of the Requested State prosecution.
    Like many recent treaties, the Jordan Treaty states that 
extradition is not precluded for offenses which the Requested 
State has investigated or begun and then dropped prosecution. 
Unlike some recent treaties, the Jordan Treaty does not permit 
discretionary denials of extradition in such cases.
    Article 6 permits extradition regardless of the applicable 
statutes of limitation. Although there is precedent for this 
provision, it is uncommon as most treaties bar extradition if 
the statute of limitation in the Requesting State has lapsed. 
Under this Treaty, objections would be raised at trial after 
extradition has been completed.
    Article 15 authorizes both the seizure and surrender of 
tangible evidence of the offense for which extradition is 
granted. The Treaty does not, however, constitute an 
independent legal basis for seizing and surrendering evidence.
    Article 21 states that the Treaty will apply to offenses 
committed prior to the date it enters into force. This 
provision does not violate ex post facto protection under the 
Constitution as that provision applies only to punishing acts 
that were not criminal when committed, not to transferring a 
defendant for acts that were criminal when committed but for 
which no transfer agreement then existed. This retroactivity 
provision is of the broadest type but is common in many 
treaties concluded during the past 15 years.

                           Committee Comments

    The Committee on Foreign Relations recommends Senate advice 
and consent to ratification of the Extradition Treaty between 
the Government of the United States and the Government of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. If ratified, the Treaty will be 
the first extradition treaty ever concluded between the United 
States and Jordan. The Treaty will enhance the U.S.-Jordan law 
enforcement relationship by enabling greater cooperation 
between the two Governments in the combat of crime.
    The form and content of the Treaty is fairly typical of 
other extradition treaties recently concluded by the United 
States. Subject to the terms of the Treaty, the Parties agree 
to extradite to one another fugitives who have been accused or 
convicted of committing an offense punishable by both Parties 
by deprivation of liberty or other form of detention for more 
than 1 year, or by a more severe penalty. The Committee 
endorses this type of ``dual criminality'' clause, rather than 
a list of specific offenses, as it obviates the need for the 
Parties to agree on particular offenses that will be 
extraditable or to amend the treaty as new criminal offenses 
are developed by the Parties.
    The Treaty provides that extradition shall not be refused 
based on the nationality of the person sought, and that a 
decision whether to grant a request for extradition shall be 
made without regard to provisions of the law of either 
Contracting State concerning statutes of limitation on the 
extraditable offense. The Treaty also provides for the 
provisional arrest and detention of fugitives pending receipt 
by the competent authority of the Requested State of a fully 
documented extradition request. It specifies the procedures to 
govern the surrender and return of fugitives, and also provides 
for the temporary surrender of fugitives incarcerated in one 
State to stand trial on other charges in the courts of the 
other State. The Committee notes that the Treaty is 
retroactive, and, if ratified, will permit the extradition of 
persons charged with offenses committed before as well as after 
the Treaty enters into force.
    The Committee supports ratification of the Treaty as it is 
a positive step in bilateral relations between the United 
States and Jordan, and most importantly, in the efforts of both 
Governments to combat serious crime, such as terrorism and 
sabotage. The Committee therefore recommends that the Senate 
grant early advice and consent to ratification.

                            Committee Action

    The Committee considered the Treaty at its business meeting 
on May 2, 1995, and voted by voice vote with a quorum present 
to report it favorably to the Senate for its advice and 
consent.

               Article-by-Article Analysis of Provisions

                   article 1--obligation to extradite

    The first article of the Treaty, like the first article in 
every recent United States extradition treaty, formally 
obligates each Party to extradite to the other persons charged 
with or convicted of an extraditable offense, subject to the 
provisions of the remainder of the Treaty. The article refers 
to charges brought by the authorities ``in'' the Requesting 
State rather than ``of'' the Requesting State, since the 
obligation to extradite, in cases arising from the United 
States, would include state and local prosecutions as well as 
federal cases. It was agreed that the term ``found guilty'' 
includes instances in which the person has been convicted but a 
sentence has not yet been imposed.\1\ The negotiators intended 
to make it clear that the Treaty applies to persons who have 
been adjudged guilty but fled prior to sentencing.
    \1\ See, Stanbrook and Stanbrook, ``Extradition: The Law and 
Practice,'' 25-26 (1979).
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                    article 2--extraditable offenses

    This article contains the basic guidelines for determining 
what are extraditable offenses. This treaty, like the recent 
United States extradition treaties with Jamaica, Italy, 
Ireland, Thailand, Sweden (Supplementary Convention), and Costa 
Rica, does not list the offenses for which extradition may be 
granted. Instead, paragraph 1 of the article permits 
extradition for any offense punishable under the laws of both 
countries by deprivation of liberty (i.e., imprisonment, or 
other form of detention), for more than 1 year, or by a more 
severe penalty such as capital punishment. Defining 
extraditable offenses in terms of ``dual criminality'' rather 
than attempting to list each extraditable crime obviates the 
need to renegotiate the treaty or supplement it if both 
countries pass laws dealing with a new type of criminal 
activity or if the list inadvertently fails to cover an 
important type of criminal activity punishable in both 
countries.
    During the negotiations, the United States delegation 
received assurances from the Jordanian delegation that key 
offenses such as operating a continuing criminal enterprise 
(Title 21, United States Code, Section 848) would be 
extraditable, and that offenses under the RICO statutes (Title 
18, United States Code, Sections 1961-1968) would be 
extraditable if the predicate offense is an extraditable 
offense. The Jordanian delegation also stated that extradition 
would be possible for such high priority offenses as drug 
trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, certain forms of tax 
fraud or tax evasion, certain environmental protection 
offenses, and antitrust offenses that would be punishable in 
both states by at least one year of imprisonment.\2\ The 
delegations also agreed that the international abduction of a 
child by one of its own parents is a crime in both states for 
which extradition would be possible in appropriate 
circumstances.\3\
    \2\ In response to a question from the Jordanian delegation, the 
U.S. delegation noted that in general incest is punishable by more than 
one year of imprisonment in the U.S., but that blasphemy, adultery, and 
criminal defamation are not punishable by more than 1 year of 
imprisonment.
    \3\ See Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1204. Jordan's delegation told 
the U.S. delegation that if one of the parents obtains a court order 
for custody of a minor child, and the other parent abducts the child, 
the abducting parent would be punishable under Article 291 of Jordan's 
Penal Code 1960, which states: ``Anyone who abducts or takes away a 
minor under the age of 15 years, even with his/her consent, with the 
aim of removing him/her from those who have custody or guardianship 
over him/her, shall be punished by a prison sentence ranging from 1 
month to 3 years, and a fine ranging from 5 to 25 dinars. * * * ''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 2 follows the practice of recent extradtion 
treaties in providing that extradition should also be granted 
for attempting or conspiring to commit, or participating in the 
commission of an extraditable offense. Conspiracy charges are 
frequently used in United States criminal cases, particularly 
those involving complex transnational criminal activity, so it 
was especially important that the Treaty be clear on this 
point. According to the Jordanian delegation, Jordan has no 
general conspiracy statute like Title 18, United States Code, 
Section 371.\4\ Therefore, paragraph 2 creates an exception to 
the ``dual criminality'' rule of paragraph 1 by expressly 
making conspiracy an extraditable crime if the offense which 
was the object of the conspiracy is an extraditable offense. 
The paragraph creates a similar exception for the Jordanian 
offense of participation in an offense.
    \4\ The closest analogue seems to be the offense of ``ishtorok,'' 
proscribed in Section 75 of Jordan's Penal Code, which makes it an 
offense to participate in or plan a criminal offense.
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    Paragraph 3 reflects the intention of both countries to 
interpret the principles of this article broadly. Judges in 
foreign countries are often confused by the fact that many 
United States federal statutes require proof of certain 
elements (such as use of the mails or interstate 
transportation) solely to establish jurisdiction in the United 
States federal courts. Because these foreign judges know of no 
similar requirement in their own criminal law, they 
occasionally have denied the extradition of fugitives sought by 
the United States on federal charges on this basis. This 
paragraph requires that such elements be disregarded in 
applying the dual criminality principle. For example, Jordanian 
authorities must treat United States mail fraud charges (Title 
18, United States Code, Section 1341) in the same manner as 
fraud charges under state laws, and view the federal crime of 
interstate transportation of stolen property (Title 18, United 
States Code, Section 2314) in the same manner as unlawful 
possession of stolen property. This paragraph also requires a 
Requested State to disregard differences in the categorization 
of the offense in determining whether double criminality 
exists, and to overlook mere differences in the terminology 
used to define the offense under the laws of each country. A 
similar provision is contained in all recent United States 
extradition treaties.
    Paragraph 4 deals with the fact that many federal crimes 
involve acts committed wholly outside United States territory. 
Our jurisprudence recognizes jurisdiction in our courts to 
prosecute offenses committed outside of the United States if 
the crime was intended to, or did, have effects in this 
country, or if the legislative history of the statute shows 
clear Congressional intent to assert such jurisdiction.\5\ In 
Jordan, however, the Government's ability to prosecute 
extraterritorial offenses is much more limited. Therefore, 
Article 2(4) reflects Jordan's agreement to recognize United 
States jurisdiction to prosecute offenses committed outside of 
the United States regardless of where the offense was 
committed.
    \5\ Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States Sec. 402 (1987); Blakesley, ``United States Jurisdiction over 
Extraterritorial Crime,'' 73 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
1109 (1982).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 5 states that when extradition has been granted 
for an extraditable offense it shall also be granted for any 
other offense for which all of the requirements for extradition 
have been met except for the requirement that the offense be 
punishable by more than 1 year of imprisonment. For example, if 
Jordan agrees to extradite to the United States a fugitive 
wanted for prosecution on a felony charge, the United States 
will also be permitted to obtain extradition for any 
misdemeanor offenses that have been charged, as long as those 
misdemeanors would also be recognized as criminal offenses in 
Jordan. Thus, the Treaty incorporates recent United States 
extradition practice by permitting extradition for misdemeanors 
committed by a fugitive when the fugitive's extradition is 
granted for a more serious extraditable offense. This practice 
is generally desirable from the standpoint of both the fugitive 
and the prosecuting country in that it permits all charges 
against the fugitive to be disposed of more quickly, thereby 
facilitating trails while evidence is still fresh and 
permitting the possibility of concurrent sentences. Similar 
provisions are found in recent extradition treaties with 
countries such as Australia, Ireland, Italy, and Costa Rica.
    Some recent United States extradition treaties provide that 
persons who have convicted of an extraditable offense and 
sentenced to imprisonment may be extradited only if at least a 
certain specified portion of the sentence (often 6 months) 
remains to be served on the outstanding sentence. The treaty 
with Jordan contains no such requirement. Provisions of this 
kind are an attempt to limit extradition to serious cases 
because of the significant costs associated with the process. 
However, the negotiators of this treaty felt that the 
particular sentence imposed or outstanding is not necessarily a 
measure of the seriousness of the crime, \6\ and concluded that 
the Treaty's goals could be served by the exercise of 
discretion and good judgment in the administration of the 
Treaty without arbitrary limits imposed in the terms of the 
agreement itself. This is the approach taken in our extradition 
treaties with other countries including Australia, Canada, 
Jamaica, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
    \6\ Cf. United States v. Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Vt. 1979) 
(``Leniency in sentencing does not give rise to a bar to 
extradition.'') Reliance on the amount of the sentence remaining to be 
served can produce anomalous results. For instance, a murderer who 
escapes from custody with less than 6 months of his sentence remaining 
can hardly resist extradition on the ground that murder is not a 
serious offense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         article 3--nationality

    Some countries refuse to extradite their own nationals to 
other countries for trial or punishment, or are prohibited from 
doing so by their statutes or constitution. The United States 
does not deny extradition on the basis of the offender's 
citizenship,\7\ and the Extradition Law 1927 contains no 
exception for Jordanian nationals. Therefore, in Article 3 of 
the Treaty, each State promises not to refuse extradition on 
the ground that the person sought is a national of the 
Requested State.
    \7\ See generally Shearer, ``Extradition in International Law'' 
110-114 (1970); 6 Whiteman, ``Digest of International Law'' 871-876 
(1968). Our policy of drawing no distinction between nationals of the 
United States and those of other countries in extradition matters is 
underscored by Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3196, which authorizes the 
Secretary of State to extradite U.S. citizens pursuant to treaties that 
permit (but do not expressly require) surrender of citizens, if other 
requirements of the Treaty have been met.
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               article 4--political and military offenses

    Paragraph 1 of this article prohibits extradition for a 
political offense. This is a common provision in United States 
extradition treaties. The United States and Jordanian 
delegations discussed the jurisprudence of each country 
regarding the ``political offense'' doctrine. For the United 
States, political offense has generally been construed narrowly 
by our courts to exclude common crimes. The Jordanian 
delegation indicated that in addition to ``political'' crimes 
such as treason and sedition, in some circumstances Jordan may 
consider some common crimes such as robbery to fund a political 
movement as a political offense.
    Paragraph 2 describes three categories of offenses that 
shall not be considered to be political offenses.
    First, the political offense exception does not apply where 
there is a murder or other violent crime \8\ against the person 
of a Head of State of the Contracting States or a member of the 
Head of State's family.
    \8\ The phrase ``violent crime'' was used to make it clear that 
offenses such as defamation would not fall within this provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, the political offense exception does not apply to 
offenses that are included in a multilateral treaty, 
convention, or international agreement that requires the 
parties to either extradite the person sought or submit the 
matter for prosecution. The treaties to which this clause 
applies include the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other 
Acts Committed On Board Aircraft; \9\ the Convention on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizures of Aircraft (Hijacking); \10\ 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage); \11\ the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents; \12\ the 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages; \13\ 
and the United Nations Convention Against the Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.\14\
    \9\ Done at Tokyo September 14, 1963, and entered into force 
December 4, 1969 (20 UST 2941; TIAS 6768; 704 UNTS 219).
    \10\ Done at the Hague December 16, 1970, and entered into force 
October 14, 1971 (22 UST 1641; TIAS 7192).
    \11\ Done at Montreal September 23, 1971, and entered into force 
January 26, 1973 (24 UST 564; TIAS 7570).
    \12\ Done at New York December 14, 1973, and entered into force 
February 20, 1977 (28 UST 1975; TIAS 8532).
    \13\ Done at New York December 17, 1979, and entered into force 
June 3, 1983 and for the United States Jan. 6, 1985 (TIAS 11081).
    \14\ Done at Vienna December 20, 1988, and entered into force 
November 11, 1990. Both the United States and Jordan also are parties 
to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, done at New York March 30, 
1961, entered into force December 13, 1964, and the Amending Protocol 
to the Single Convention, done at Geneva March 25, 1972, and entered 
into force August 8, 1975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, the political offense exception does not apply to 
conspiracy or attempt to commit, or participation in, any of 
the foregoing offenses.
    Article 4(3) provides that extradition shall be denied if 
the competent authority of the Requested State finds that the 
request was politically motivated.\15\ The term ``competent 
authority'' is defined in Article 22 of the Treaty, and means, 
for the United States, the appropriate authorities of the 
executive branch. This is consistent with the longstanding law 
and practice of the United States, under which the Secretary of 
State alone has the discretion to determine whether an 
extradition request is based on improper political 
motivation.\16\
    \15\ There are similar provisions in many recent treaties. See 
Article III(3), US-Jamaica Extradition Treaty, signed at Kingston June 
14, 1983, entered into force July 7, 1991 (  UST  ); Article 5(4), US-
Spain Extradition Treaty, signed at Madrid May 29, 1970, and entered 
into force June 16, 1971 (22 UST 737, TIAS 7136, 796 UNTS 245); Article 
4, US-Netherlands Extradition Treaty, signed at The Hague June 24, 
1980, and entered into force September 15, 1983 (TIAS 10733); and 
Article IV(c), US-Ireland Extradition Treaty, signed at Washington July 
13, 1983, and entered into force December 15, 1984 (TIAS 10813).
    \16\ See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513-518 (7th Cir.) cert. 
denied 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. Supp. 904 (D. 
Mass. 1990), aff'd 931 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The final paragraph of the article states that the 
competent authority of the Requested State may deny extradition 
if the request relates to an offense under military law which 
would not be an offense under ordinary criminal law.\17\
    \17\ An example of such an offense is desertion. Matter of Suarez-
Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676, 703 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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                      article 5--prior prosecution

    This article will permit extradition in situations in which 
the fugitive is charged with different offenses in each of the 
two countries arising out of the same basic transaction.
    The first paragraph prohibits extradition if the offender 
has been convicted or acquitted in the Requested State for the 
offense for which extradition is requested, and is similar to 
language present in many United States extradition treaties. 
The parties agreed that this provision applies only when the 
offender is convicted or acquitted in the Requested State of 
exactly the same crime with which he is charged in the 
Requesting State. It would not be enough that the same facts 
were involved. Thus, if an offender is accused in one State of 
illegally smuggling narcotics into the country, and is charged 
in the other State of unlawfully exporting the same shipment of 
drugs, an acquittal or conviction in one State would not 
insulate him from extradition, for different crimes are 
involved.
    Paragraph 2 makes it clear that neither State can refuse to 
extradite an offender on the ground that the Requested State's 
authorities declined to prosecute the offender, or instituted 
proceedings against the offender and thereafter elected to 
discontinue the proceedings. This provision was included 
because a decision of the Requested State to forego 
prosecution, or to drop charges already filed, may result from 
failure to obtain sufficient evidence or witnesses for trial, 
whereas the Requesting State may not suffer from the same 
impediments. This provision should enhance the ability to 
extradite if the Requesting State has the better chance of a 
successful prosecution.

                        article 6--lapse of time

    Article 6 states that the decision to grant an extradition 
request must be granted or denied without regard to provisions 
of the law regarding lapse of time in either contracting state. 
The U.S. and Jordanian delegations agreed that a claim that the 
statute of limitations has expired is best resolved by the 
courts of the Requesting State after the fugitive has been 
extradited.\18\
    \18\ This is consistent with settled law in the United States, 
which holds that lapse of time is not a defense to extradition unless 
the treaty specifically provides to the contrary. Freedman v. United 
States, 437 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Ga. 1977); United States v. Galanis, 429 
F. Supp. 1215 (D. Conn. 1977).
     Some United States extradition treaties do permit extradition to 
be denied if the statute of limitations has run in the Requesting 
State. See, e.g., Article 4(1)(ii), U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty, 
signed December 3, 1971, and entered into force March 22, 1976 (3 UST 
2826, TIAS 8237). Others require denial of the request if the statute 
of limitations would have run in the Requested State had the offense 
been committed in that state. See, e.g., Article 6, U.S.-Netherlands 
Extradition Treaty, supra note 14; Article 4, U.S.-Japan Extradition 
Treaty, signed March 3, 1978, and entered into force March 26, 1980 (31 
UST 892, TIAS 9625). A few treaties require denial if the statute of 
limitations has run or would have run in either State. See, e.g., 
Article V(1)(b), U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, signed June 8, 1972, and 
entered into force January 21, 1977 (28 UST 227, TIAS 8468); U.S.-
Mexico Extradition Treaty signed May 4, 1978, and entered into force 
January 25, 1980 (TIAS 9656, 31 UST 5059).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     article 7--capital punishment

    The first paragraph of Article 7 permits the Requested 
State to refuse extradition in cases where the offense for 
which extradition is sought would be punishable by death in the 
Requesting State, but not in the Requested State, unless the 
Requesting State, provides assurances the Requested State 
considers sufficient that the death penalty will not be carried 
out. Similar provisions are found in many recent United States 
extradition treaties.\19\ The United States delegation sought 
this provision because Jordan imposes the death penalty for 
some crimes that are not punishable by death in the United 
States.\20\
    \19\ E.g., Article 7, U.S.-Netherlands Extradition Treaty, supra 
note 17; Article 6, US-Ireland Extradition Treaty, supra note 17.
    \20\ The Jordanian delegation informed the U.S. delegation that in 
Jordan, the death penalty is prescribed in the 1960 Penal Code, the 
1952 Military Penal Code, and several individual laws for murder, for 
crimes against the security of the state, for illegal possession of 
weapons, for the rape of a girl less than fifteen years of age, and for 
a number of offenses related to drug trafficking. The death penalty is 
also permitted for killing, torture, or ``barbaric treatment'' by an 
armed gang (defined as three or more persons roaming public roads or 
countryside together).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The second paragraph of this article provides that when the 
Requesting State gives assurances in accordance with paragraph 
1, the assurances shall be respected, and the death penalty, if 
imposed, shall not be carried out.

        article 8--extradition procedures and required documents

    This article sets out the documentary and evidentiary 
requirements for an extradition request, and is generally 
similar to articles in the United States' most recent 
extradition treaties.
    The first paragraph requires that each formal request for 
extradition be submitted through the diplomatic channel.\21\ A 
formal extradition request may be preceded by a request for the 
provisional arrest of the fugitive under Article 11, and 
provisional arrest requests need not be initiated through 
diplomatic channels if the requirements of Article 11 are met.
    \21\ This is consistent with Section 8, Extradition Law 1927.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Article 8(2) outlines the information that must accompany 
every request for extradition under the Treaty. Article 8(3) 
describes the additional information needed when the person is 
sought for trial in the Requesting State; Article 8(4) 
describes the information needed, in addition to the 
requirements of Article 8(2), when the person sought has 
already been tried and convicted in the Requesting State.
    Most of the items listed in Article 8(2) enable the 
Requested State to determine quickly whether extradition is 
appropriate under the Treaty. For example, Article 8(2)(c) 
calls for ``the texts of the laws describing the essential 
elements of the offense for which extradition is requested,'' 
enabling the Requested State to determine easily whether any 
claimed lack of dual criminality would be a basis for denying 
extradition under Article 2. Some of the items listed in 
Article 8(2), however, are required strictly for information 
purposes. Thus, Article 8(2)(a) calls for information on the 
nationality of the person sought even though this Treaty does 
not permit denial of extradition based on nationality. The 
United States and Jordanian delegations agreed that Article 
8(2)(a) should require this information so that the Requested 
State would be fully informed about the offender's background.
    Article 8(3)(c) requires that if the fugitive is a person 
who has not yet been convicted of the crime for which 
extradition is requested, the Requesting State must provide 
``such evidence as would provide a reasonable basis to believe 
that the person sought committed the offense for which 
extradition is requested.'' U.S. law permits extradition only 
when there is probable cause to believe that an extraditable 
offense was committed and the offender committed it,\22\ and 
this clause effectively includes that requirement in the 
Treaty. During the negotiations, the Jordanian delegation 
assured the United States that under Jordanian law, the 
outstanding U.S. arrest warrant and the ``recovery file,'' or 
formal papers supporting the request, should constitute 
sufficient evidence for extradition.
    \22\ Courts applying Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3184, have long 
required probable cause for international extradition. Restatement 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Sec. 476, 
comment b (1987).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Article 8(4) describes the information needed in addition 
to the requirements of Article 8(2) when the person sought has 
already been tried and convicted in the Requesting State. 
Article 8(4) makes it clear that once a conviction has been 
obtained, no showing of probable cause is required. In essence, 
the fact of conviction speaks for itself, a position taken in 
recent United States court decisions, even without a specific 
treaty provision.\23\ However, Article 8(4)(d) states that if 
the person sought was found guilty in absentia, the 
documentation required for extradition must include both proof 
of conviction and the documentation required under paragraph 3 
of this article. This is consistent with the longstanding 
United States policy of requiring such documentation in 
extradition proceedings of persons convicted in absentia.
    \23\ See, e.g., Spatola v. United States, 741 F.Supp. 362, 374 
(E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd 925 F.2d 615 (2nd Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Clark, 470 F.Supp. 976 (D. Vt. 1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 article 9--admissibility of documents

    Article 9 governs the authentication procedures for 
documents prepared for use in extradition cases.
    The article requires that the documents be certified by the 
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State 
resident in the Requesting State.\24\
    \24\ This provision is consistent with requirements imposed by 
United States law. See Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3190.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The article also permits documents to be admitted into 
evidence if they are authenticated in such other manner as may 
be permitted under the law of the Requested State. For example, 
there may be information in the Requested State itself which is 
relevant and probative to extradition, and the Requested State 
is free under this subsection to utilize that information if 
the information satisfies the ordinary rules of evidence in 
that State. This ensures that evidence that is acceptable under 
the evidentiary rules of the Requested State may be used in 
extradition proceedings even if it is not otherwise 
authenticated pursuant to the Treaty. This paragraph also 
should ensure that relevant evidence that would normally 
satisfy the evidentiary rules of the requested country is not 
excluded at the extradition hearing simply because of an 
inadvertent error or omission in the authentication process.

                        article 10--translation

    Article 10 of the Treaty requires that all extradition 
documents be translated into the language of the Requested 
State. The Parties could consult pursuant to Article 20 
regarding this requirement and consider waiving it in 
particular cases.

                     article 11--provisional arrest

    This article describes the process by which a person in one 
country may be arrested and detained while the formal 
extradition papers are being prepared in the Requesting State.
    Paragraph 1 expressly provides that a request for 
provisional arrest may be made directly between the United 
States Department of Justice and the Ministry of Justice in the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The provision also indicates that 
Interpol may be used to transmit such a request.\25\ Experience 
has shown that the ability to use such direct channels in 
emergency situations can be crucial when a fugitive is poised 
to flee.
    \25\ Similar provisions appear in many recent U.S. extradition 
treaties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 2 states the information that the Requesting 
State must provide in support of such a request.
    Paragraph 3 states that the Requesting State must be 
notified without delay of the outcome of the request and the 
reasons for any denial.
    Paragraph 4 provides that the fugitive may be released from 
detention if the Requesting State does not file a fully 
documented request for extradition with the competent authority 
of the Requested State within sixty days of the date on which 
the person was arrested pursuant to this treaty.\26\ Article 22 
states that the term ``competent authority'' means the 
``appropriate authorities of the executive branch'' for the 
United States. Thus, when the United States is the Requested 
State, the ``competent authority'' for purposes of Article 
11(4) would include the Secretary of State or the United States 
Embassy in Amman.\27\ The Requested State has the discretion, 
upon application of the Requesting State, to extend the sixty 
day period by an additional thirty days.
    \26\ Section 9(3) of the Extradition Law 1927 requires the 
Magistrate handling a provisional arrest to release the person arrested 
``unless he receives an order from [the King] (within a period of time 
whose duration shall be determined by the magistrate depending upon the 
circumstances of that case) informing him that [the King] had received 
an extradition request for that criminal.''
    \27\ United States v. Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976, 979 (D. Vt. 1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the person sought may be released from custody if 
the documents are not received within the sixty day period or 
any extension thereof, the extradition proceedings against the 
fugitive need not be dismissed. Article 11(5) makes it clear 
that in such cases the person may be taken into custody again 
and the extradition proceedings may commence when the formal 
request is presented.

                   article 12--decision and surrender

    This article requires that the Requested State promptly 
notify the Requesting State of its decision on the extradition 
request. If extradition is denied, the Requested State must 
provide the reasons for the denial. If extradition is granted, 
the article requires that the two States agree on a time and 
place for surrender of the person. The Requesting State must 
remove the fugitive within the time prescribed by the law of 
the Requested State, or the person may be discharged from 
custody, and the Requested State may subsequently refuse to 
extradite for the same offense. United States law requires that 
such surrender occur within two calendar months of the finding 
that the offender is extraditable,\28\ or of the conclusion of 
any litigation challenging that finding,\29\ whichever is 
later. The law in Jordan specifies that the surrender must take 
place within two months.\30\
    \28\ Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3188.
    \29\ Jimenez v. United States District Court, 84 S.Ct. 14, 11 L. Ed 
2d 30 (1963) (decided by Goldberg, J., in chambers). See also Liberto 
v. Emery, 724 F. 2d 23 (2d Cir. 1983); In Re United States, 713 F. 2d 
105 (5th Cir. 1983); Barrett v. United States, 590 F. 2d 624 (6th Cir. 
1978).
    \30\ Section 13, Extradition Law 1927.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              article 13--deferred and temporary surrender

    Occasionally, a person sought for extradition may be facing 
prosecution or serving a sentence on other charges in the 
Requested State. Article 13 provides a means for the Requested 
State to defer extradition in such circumstances until the 
conclusion of the proceedings against the person sought and the 
service of any punishment that may have been imposed. Similar 
provisions appear in our recent extradition treaties with 
countries such as The Bahamas and Australia.
    Article 13(1) provides for the temporary surrender of a 
person wanted for prosecution in the Requesting State who is 
being prosecuted or is serving a sentence in the Requested 
State. A person temporarily transferred pursuant to this 
provision will be returned to the Requested State at the 
conclusion of the proceedings in the Requesting State. Such 
temporary surrender furthers the interests of justice in that 
it permits trial of the person sought while evidence and 
witnesses are more likely to be available, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of successful prosecution. Such transfer may 
also be advantageous to the person sought in that: (1) it 
allows him to resolve the charges sooner; (2) subject to the 
laws of each State, it may make it possible for him to serve 
any sentence in the Requesting State concurrently with the 
sentence in the Requested State; and (3) it permits him to 
defend the charges while favorable evidence is fresh and more 
likely to be available to him. Similar provisions are found in 
many recent extradition treaties.
    Article 13(2) provides that the executive authority of the 
Requested State may postpone the surrender of a person who is 
serving a sentence in the Requested State until the full 
execution of the punishment which has been imposed.\31\ The 
provision's wording makes it clear that the Requested State may 
postpone the initiation of extradition proceedings as well as 
the surrender of a person facing prosecution or serving a 
sentence.
    \31\ Under United States law and practice, the Secretary of State 
would make this decision. Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. Supp. 904, 920 (D. 
Mass. 1990), aff'd, 931 F. 2d 169 (1st Cir. 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Article 14--Requests for Extradition Made by Several States

    This article reflects the practice of many recent United 
States extradition treaties and lists some of the factors that 
the executive authority of the Requested State must consider in 
determining to which country a person should be surrendered 
when reviewing requests from two or more States for the 
extradition of the same person. For the United States, the 
Secretary of State would make this decision; \32\ for Jordan, 
the decision would be made by the King.\33\
    \32\ Cheng Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 734 F. Supp. 988 (S.D. Fla. 1990), 
Aff'd, 932 F. 2d 977 (11th Cir. 1991).
    \33\ The Extradition Law 1927 appears to be silent on this.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             Article 15--Seizure and Surrender of Property

    This article provides for the seizure by the Requested 
State of all property--articles, instruments, objects of value, 
documents, or other evidence--relating to the offense, to the 
extent permitted by the Requested State's internal law. The 
article also provides that these objects shall be surrendered 
to the Requesting State upon the granting of the extradition or 
even if extradition cannot be effected due to the death, 
disappearance, or escape of the fugitive. The second paragraph 
states that the Requested State may condition its surrender of 
property upon satisfactory assurances that the objects will be 
returned as soon as practicable. The obligation to surrender 
property under this provision is subject to due respect for the 
rights of third parties to such property. The article also 
permits the surrender of property to be deferred if it is 
needed as evidence in the Requested State.

                     article 16--rule of speciality

    This article covers the principle known as the rule of 
speciality, which is a standard aspect of United States 
extradition practice. Designed to ensure that a fugitive 
surrendered for one offense is not tried for other crimes, the 
rule of speciality prevents a request for extradition from 
being used as a subterfuge to obtain custody of a person for 
trial or service of sentence on different charges that may not 
be extraditable under the Treaty or properly documented at the 
time that the request is granted.
    Since a variety of exceptions to the rule have developed 
over the years, this article codifies the current formulation 
of the rule by providing that a person extradited under the 
Treaty may only be detained, tried, or punished in the 
Requesting State for (1) the offense for which extradition was 
granted,\34\ or a differently denominated offense based on the 
same facts, provided the offense is extraditable or is a lesser 
included offense; (2) for offenses committed after the 
extradition; and (3) for other offenses for which the competent 
authority of the Requested State gives consent.\35\ Article 
16(1)(c)(ii) permits the State which is seeking consent to 
pursue new charges to detain the defendant for ninety days 
while the Requested State makes its determination on the 
application.
    \34\ See section 6(B), Extradition Law 1927.
    \35\ In the United States, the Secretary of State has the authority 
to consent. See Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (D.D.C. 
1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paragraph 2 prohibits the Requesting State from 
surrendering the person to a third State for a crime committed 
prior to extradition under this treaty without the consent of 
the State from which extradition was first obtained. \36\
    \36\ A similar provision is contained in all recent U.S. 
extradition treaties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, paragraph 3 permits the detention, trial, or 
punishment of an extraditee for additional offenses, or the 
extradition of that person to a third State, (1) if the 
extraditee leaves and returns to the Requesting State, or (2) 
if the extraditee does not leave the Requesting State within 10 
days of being free to do so.
    The delegations discussed including a provision to the 
Treaty that would have required that the person extradited 
receive credit for the time spent in custody in the Requested 
State prior to extradition. The delegations also considered a 
provision stating that if the person extradited is acquitted, 
the Requesting State must return him to the Requested State at 
its own expense. It was decided to leave both these matters to 
be handled in accordance with the law of the Requesting State.

                   Article 17--Waiver of Extradition

    Persons sought for extradition frequently elect to waive 
their right to extradition proceedings and to expedite their 
return to the Requesting State. This article provides that when 
a fugitive consents to surrender to the Requesting State, the 
person may be returned to the Requesting State as expeditiously 
as possible without further proceedings. The Parties anticipate 
that in such cases there would be no need for the formal 
documents described in Article 8, or further judicial or 
administrative proceedings of any kind.
    If the United States is the Requested State and the person 
sought elects to return voluntarily to Jordan before the United 
States Secretary of State signs a surrender warrant, the 
process would not be deemed an ``extradition,'' and the long-
standing U.S. policy is that the rule of speciality in Article 
16 will not apply to such cases.\37\
    \37\ Cf. Article 16, US-Netherlands Treaty, supra note 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          article 18--transit

    Article 18(1) gives each State the power to authorize 
transit through its territory of persons being surrendered to 
the other country by third countries.\38\ Requests for transit 
are to contain a description of the person whose transit is 
proposed and a brief statement of the facts of the case with 
respect to which he is being surrendered to the Requesting 
State. The request may be transmitted via diplomatic channels 
or through Interpol. The negotiators agreed that the diplomatic 
channels will be employed as much as possible for requests of 
this nature.
    \38\ A similar provision is in all recent U.S. extradition 
treaties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Article 18(2) describes the procedure each State should 
follow when seeking to transport a person in custody through 
the territory of the other. Under this provision, no advance 
authorization is needed if the person in custody is in transit 
to one of the Parties and is travelling by aircraft and no 
landing is scheduled in the territory of the other Party. 
Should an unscheduled landing occur in the other State, that 
State may require a request for transit at that time, and may 
grant the request if, in its discretion, it deems it 
appropriate to do so. The Treaty ensures that the person will 
be kept in custody for up to 96 hours until a request for 
transit is received, and thereafter until the transit executed. 
During the negotiations, the delegations agreed that when 
transit under this article is contemplated, the costs entailed 
by transit would be allocated in accordance with the 
extradition arrangement between the Requesting and Requested 
States with respect to the particular extradition at issue.

                article 19--representation and expenses

    The first paragraph of this article provides that the 
United States will represent Jordan in connection with a 
request from Jordan for extradition before the courts in this 
country, and the Jordanian Government will arrange for the 
representation of the United States in connection with United 
States extradition requests to Jordan.
    Paragraph 2 provides that the Requested State will bear all 
expenses of extradition except those expenses relating to the 
ultimate transportation of a fugitive to the Requesting State 
and the translation of documents, which expenses are to be paid 
by the Requesting State. Cases may arise in which it may be 
necessary for the Requesting State to retain private counsel to 
assist in the presentation of the extradition request, and in 
such cases the fees of private counsel retained by the 
Requesting State must be paid by the Requesting State.
    Paragraph 3 provides that neither State shall make a 
pecuniary claim against the other in connection with 
extradition proceedings, including arrest, detention, 
examination, or surrender of the fugitive. This includes any 
claim by the fugitive for damages, reimbursement, or legal 
fees, or other expenses occasioned by the execution of the 
extradition request.

                        article 20--consultation

    Article 20 of the Treaty provides that the United States 
Department of Justice and the Ministry of Justice in Jordan may 
consult with each other directly or via Interpol with regard to 
an individual extradition case or on extradition procedures in 
general. A similar provision is found in a number of U.S. 
extradition treaties awaiting ratification.\39\
    \39\ See Article 19, U.S.-Belgium Extradition Treaty, signed at 
Brussels April 27, 1987; Article 24, U.S.-Switzerland Extradition 
Treaty, signed at Bern Nov. 11, 1990; Article 18, U.S.-Philippines 
Extradition Treaty, signed at Manila Nov. 13, 1994; Article 21, U.S.-
Hungary Extradition Treaty, signed at Budapest Dec. 1, 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        article 21--application

    This treaty, like most of the other United States 
extradition treaties negotiated in the past two decades, is 
expressly made retroactive, and accordingly covers offenses 
that occurred before the Treaty entered into force.

                         article 22--definition

    Article 22 states that for the United States, the term 
``competent authority'' used in Articles 4(3), 4(4), 11(4), 14, 
and 16(1)(c) in the Treaty means the appropriate authorities of 
its executive branch.

             article 23--ratification and entry into force

    Article 23 contains standard treaty language providing that 
the Treaty shall be subject to ratification after each 
contracting state has completed its internal legal processes 
for approval of the Treaty. The exchange of instruments of 
ratification will take place at Washington, DC, and the Treaty 
will enter into force immediately upon the exchange.

                            Entry Into Force

    The Treaty shall enter into force upon the exchange of 
instruments of ratification by the United States and Jordan.

                   Text of Resolution of Ratification

    Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the 
ratification of the Extradition Treaty between the Government 
of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, signed at Washington on March 28, 
1995.
                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              


  Questions for the Record Submitted to the Departments of State and 
   Justice By the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 1, 1995

                                 Jordan

    Question. With which other countries has the United States 
negotiated an extradition treaty of this type, which does not 
specifically list the offenses for which extradition may be 
granted?
    Answer. United States extradition treaties since the late 
1970's have generally used a ``dual criminality'' formulation, 
which typically provides that an offense will be extraditable 
if it is punishable under the laws in both Contracting States 
by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or 
by a more severe penalty. Older U.S. extradition treaties 
typically included a negotiated list of extraditable offenses. 
Defining extraditable offenses using a dual criminality 
approach obviates the need to renegotiate or supplement the 
treaty if both Parties pass laws dealing with new types of 
criminal behavior or if the list inadvertently fails to cover 
an important type of criminal activity punishable in both 
countries.
    In addition to the treaty with Jordan, dual criminality 
provisions are standard in other extradition treaties recently 
negotiated by the United States. Examples of ``dual 
criminality'' treaties currently in force are Australia, 
Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Jamaica, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Thailand.
    Question. Does the definition of ``extraditable offense'' 
include only federal offenses or also those offenses punishable 
by more than a year of imprisonment under individual state 
laws?
    Answer. The definition of ``extraditable offense'' includes 
offenses under both federal and state laws in the United 
States. This means that both state and federal prosecutors may 
seek the extradition of fugitives from Jordan under the treaty.
    Question. Under what circumstances or for what reasons may 
the United States legally, under the treaty, refuse extradition 
to Jordan of a U.S. citizen?
    Answer. The treaty provides a number of grounds under which 
the United States may deny extradition of U.S. citizens and of 
non-U.S. citizens. For example, the United States can deny 
extradition if the offense for which extradition sought does 
not comply with the treaty's dual criminality provisions 
(Article 2); if the crimes charged are political or military 
offenses, or if the charges are politically motivated (Article 
4); if the fugitive has been convicted or acquitted of the 
charges in the United States (Article 5); if assurances 
regarding the death penalty are requested by the United States 
but not granted by Jordan (Article 7); if Jordan does not 
submit the documentation required to support a request for 
extradition (Article 8); if the fugitive is not removed from 
the Requested State once extradition has been granted (Article 
12); or if the fugitive is extradited to another State (Article 
14). In addition, extradition may be delayed until a United 
States prosecution or punishment of the fugitive sought by 
Jordan is completed.
    Moreover, the treaty does not in any way alter existing 
U.S. law which requires, as a prerequisite for extradition, 
that a U.S. court must find, based on the information submitted 
by the country requesting extradition, that there is probable 
cause to believe that the crime charged was committed and that 
the person whose extradition is sought committed that crime.
    Question. Could the United States refuse extradition in the 
case of a U.S. citizen who is charged with a crime for which 
the penalty in Jordan is significantly more severe than the 
penalty in the United States?
    Answer. The United States could refuse extradition in 
circumstances where a particular crime was punishable by the 
death penalty in Jordan but not in the United States. Article 7 
of the Treaty provides that when the offense for which 
extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws in 
the Requesting State and is not punishable by death under the 
laws in the Requested State, the Requested State may refuse 
extradition unless the Requesting State provides such 
assurances as the Requested State considers sufficient that the 
death penalty, if imposed, shall not be carried out.
    In other cases, in keeping with modern U.S. extradition 
treaty practice, a crime will be extraditable if it is 
punishable under the laws in both Contracting States by 
deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or by 
a more severe penalty, regardless of whether the punishment 
might be more severe in one or the other Contracting State. 
Because the United States frequently imposes more severe 
penalties for crimes than our treaty partners, we do not 
negotiate provisions that would allow one party to refuse 
extradition based on the severity of the penalty, with the 
exception of the special death penalty provision noted above.
    We note that under United States law, the Secretary of 
State has the ultimate discretion to refuse extradition to 
another government under any extradition treaty.
    Question. Could the United States refuse extradition in the 
case of a U.S. citizen accused of a crime if such crime was 
committed in response to an act which is a crime in the U.S. 
but not in Jordan? For example, if a woman fled to the U.S. 
with her child (which is kidnapping) because her husband had 
married another woman, or had committed some other act which is 
illegal in the U.S. but not in Jordan, would she be 
extraditable under the treaty?
    Answer. Crimes are extraditable under the treaty if they 
are punishable under the laws in both Contracting States by 
deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or by 
a more severe penalty. The exceptions to this general 
obligation to extradite are discussed in our answer to Question 
#3. In addition, the Secretary of State has the ultimate 
discretion under United States law to refuse extradition to 
another government under the extradition treaty.
    The Jordan extradition treaty, like other extradition 
treaties negotiated by the United States, does not address the 
motivation of the individuals sought under the treaty, but 
instead focuses on whether the crime at issue is criminal in 
both jurisdictions and whether the treaty's other criteria for 
extradition are met.
    Question. Can residents of either country use the treaty to 
force a government to initiate extradition procedures? For 
instance, could a Palestinian living in Jordan appeal under the 
treaty for extradition from the U.S. of an Israeli citizen 
accused of expropriation of Palestinian land or other offenses?
    Answer. The rights under the treaty are held by the two 
Contracting States, i.e., the United States and Jordan. The 
treaty specifically provides that requests for extradition 
shall be submitted by the Requesting State to the Requested 
State. While private parties can request that their governments 
take certain actions under the treaty, they cannot ``force'' 
their government to initiate extradition procedures.
    Question. How does the treaty define ``political offense''? 
Who, specifically, will make the ultimate determination of 
whether or not an offense is political or whether a request for 
extradition is politically motivated?
    Answer. The phrase ``political offense'' is not defined in 
the treaty, not is it defined any of the extradition treaties 
of the United States, although it appears in virtually all of 
them. Consequently, what constitutes a non-extraditable 
``political offense'' under United States law is a product of 
U.S. jurisprudence, i.e., the body of judicial decisions that 
has addressed the issue. Under U.S. jurisprudence, certain 
offenses such as treason, espionage and conducting peaceful 
political demonstrations would be considered political offenses 
by their very nature. In addition, under U.S. law, even common 
crimes such as assault or kidnapping have sometimes been 
considered political offenses for which extradition has been 
barred based on the particular circumstances of the case.
    As under virtually all of our extradition treaties, it is 
the U.S. extradition court which determines whether an offense 
is a political offense. If the court finds the crime is a 
political offense for which extradition is barred, the person 
may not be surrendered. However, even where a court does not 
find the crime to be a political offense, the Secretary of 
State reserves the right to refuse extradition based on a 
determination that particular conduct is a political offense.
    Under Article 4930 of the treaty, a determination that 
conduct is ``politically motivated'' and therefore non-
extraditable may only be made by the ``competent authority'' of 
the Requested State, which for the United States will be the 
Secretary of State. This is consistent with U.S. caselaw on the 
issue of political motivation in extradition cases.
    Question. In what ways, if any, does Article 4 of this 
treaty differ from political offense articles in other 
extradition treaties that the United States has ratified?
    Answer. Article 4 of the treaty is typical of several of 
the political offense articles negotiated in recent years by 
the United States (e.g., The Bahamas and The Philippines). It 
provides that political offenses are non-extraditable, but 
states that the following are not to be considered political 
offenses: a murder or other violent crime against the person of 
a Head of State of one of the Contracting States, or of a 
member of the Head of State's family; an offense for which both 
Contracting States have the obligation pursuant to a 
multilateral international agreement or treaty to extradite the 
person sought or to submit the case to their competent 
authorities for decision as to prosecution; and a conspiracy or 
attempt to commit, or participate in, any of the foregoing 
offenses. Thus, offenses under terrorism or narcotics 
multilateral conventions to which the United States and Jordan 
are both parties would never be considered political offenses 
under the treaty. Some recent U.S. extradition treaties, 
particularly those negotiated with Canada and several European 
countries, limit even further the possible application of the 
political offense exception to preclude denial of extradition 
for certain enumerated common crime.
    Article 4 also includes other provisions typical of recent 
U.S. extradition treaties, providing that extradition shall not 
be granted if the competent authority of the Requested State 
determines that the request was politically motivated, and that 
the competent authority of the Requested State may refuse 
extradition for offenses under military law which are not 
offenses under ordinary criminal law.
    Question. The Department of State's ``Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 1994'' states that in Jordan, 
``human rights abuses include arbitrary arrest; mistreatment of 
detainees; prolonged detention without charge; lack of due 
process; official discrimination against adherents of the 
Baha'i faith; and restrictions on women's rights. Citizens do 
not have the right to change their form of government * * *''. 
Should the United States conclude extradition treaties with 
governments that do not protect human rights and civil 
liberties we regard as fundamental?
    Answer. The United States and the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan have cooperated on law enforcement issues for many 
years. The negotiation of this treaty is a logical outgrowth of 
our past mutually beneficial cooperation and reflects our joint 
commitment to combat serious crime. Ratification of the U.S.-
Jordan extradition treaty will enhance the scope of this 
cooperation. The two governments initiated treaty negotiations 
in 1994 when the absence of such a treaty precluded the 
extradition from Jordan to the United States of a dual U.S.-
Jordanian national charged in the U.S. with the murder of his 
wife and the kidnapping of his minor children.
    As noted in your question, the State Department expressed 
concern about a number of human rights issues in Jordan in this 
year's human rights report. Jordan's record can, in our view, 
be improved. The Government of Jordan has been responsive to 
U.S. concerns raised in the annual report in the past. We will 
continue to urge further progress in this area. We have had a 
useful dialogue with Jordan on human rights and legal issues, 
including in connection with this treaty.
    We are confident that legal proceedings facing an American 
citizen in Jordan, extradited under the terms of this treaty, 
would be handled fairly and expeditiously under the provisions 
of Jordanian law and practice. In addition, the Committee may 
be assured that the trial and rights of U.S. citizens 
extradited to Jordan would be carefully monitored by our 
Embassy in Amman.
    With respect to Jordan's political system, we continue to 
support strongly progress toward greater political 
participation by Jordanian citizens. Encouragement of this 
process has been a regular feature of our bilateral dialogue.