[Senate Executive Report 104-2]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
104th Congress Exec. Rept.
SENATE
1st Session 104-2
_______________________________________________________________________
EXTRADITION TREATY WITH JORDAN
_______
May 2 (legislative day, May 1), 1995.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany Treaty Doc. 104-3]
The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred
the Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan, signed at Washington on March 28, 1995, having
considered the same, reports favorably thereon without
amendment and recommends that the Senate give its advice and
consent to ratification thereof.
Purpose
The Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan, hereinafter ``The Treaty,'' identifies the offenses
for which extradition will be granted, establishes procedures
to be followed in presenting extradition requests, enumerates
exceptions to the duty to extradite, specifies the evidence
required to support a finding of a duty to extradite, and sets
forth administrative provisions for bearing costs and legal
representation.
Background
On March 28, 1995, the United States signed a treaty on
extradition with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It was
transmitted by the President to the Senate for advice and
consent to ratification on April 24, 1995, and will become the
first to enter into force with Jordan if ratified. Ratification
of this Treaty is seen as a step forward in the efforts of the
United States to win the cooperation of countries in the Middle
East in combatting crimes such as transnational terrorism and
international drug trafficking.
The United States currently has extradition treaties in
force with nearly one hundred countries which enable the United
States to extradite fugitives to other countries and to request
that other countries extradite fugitives to the United States.
These treaties play an increasingly important role in law
enforcement as modern transportation has enabled criminals to
operate on an international scale and to flee more easily from
country to country. In March 1995, for example, the United
States received 51 requests from treaty partners for surrender
of fugitives found in this country, and the United States
requested the extradition of 45 fugitives from other countries.
It is anticipated that the Treaty, if ratified, will be
implemented in the United States pursuant to the procedural
framework provided by Title 18, United States Code, Section
3184 et seq. No new implementing legislation will be needed.
Jordan has its own internal legislation on extradition that
will apply to U.S. requests under the Treaty.
Major Provisions
In general, many of the provisions contained in the
Extradition Treaty with Jordan find precedent in other U.S.
extradition treaties. There are some variations, however, and
some of the key provisions are outlined below.
Article 2 defines extraditable offenses solely in terms of
dual criminality. Defining extraditable offenses generically,
rather than through an exclusive listing of crimes, broadens
the scope of cooperation and obviates the need to renegotiate
treaties to add new offenses to a list of extraditable crimes.
A drawback of the exclusive dual criminality approach is that
there may not be a complete congruence of elements of similar
criminal offenses in different legal systems. Paragraph 3 of
article 2 contains common provisions designed to focus on the
criminality of the underlying acts instead of on the
terminology used in describing various offenses.
Article 2 also provides for the inclusion of (1) ancillary
misdemeanors and (2) attempts and conspiracies. This in effect
creates an exception to the dual criminality rule. Further, the
inclusion of all extraterritorial crimes, once an extraditable
offense is proved, is viewed as a useful tool in obtaining
perpetrators of such transnational crimes as drug dealing and
terrorism.
Article 4 sets out the political offense exception to
extraditable crimes. The provision is in keeping with the trend
toward narrowing the scope of the political offense exception
to exclude certain universally condemned crimes that are the
subject of multilateral agreements. Under these agreements,
covering such crimes as hostage taking, air hijacking, aircraft
sabotage, and attacks on internationally protected persons, a
party State must either prosecute a person accused of a covered
crime or extradite the person for trial elsewhere. Attacks on a
head of State or his or her family also are generally excluded
from political offenses. The Jordan Treaty is consistent with
this approach and Jordan is party to the major international
agreements on sabotage, terrorism, narco-trafficking and
similar universally condemned crimes.
Though the Jordan Treaty narrows the political offense
exception somewhat, it does not do so to the same extent as
certain recently concluded treaties with democratic allies,
such as in the 1986 treaty with the United Kingdom.
Article 5 addresses prior prosecution and bars extradition
for an offense for which the person sought has been convicted
or acquitted in the Requested State. Because the restriction is
limited to offenses and not acts, it appears that extradition
may be permissible where extradition is sought for a different
offense arising from the same pattern of conduct that was the
basis of the Requested State prosecution.
Like many recent treaties, the Jordan Treaty states that
extradition is not precluded for offenses which the Requested
State has investigated or begun and then dropped prosecution.
Unlike some recent treaties, the Jordan Treaty does not permit
discretionary denials of extradition in such cases.
Article 6 permits extradition regardless of the applicable
statutes of limitation. Although there is precedent for this
provision, it is uncommon as most treaties bar extradition if
the statute of limitation in the Requesting State has lapsed.
Under this Treaty, objections would be raised at trial after
extradition has been completed.
Article 15 authorizes both the seizure and surrender of
tangible evidence of the offense for which extradition is
granted. The Treaty does not, however, constitute an
independent legal basis for seizing and surrendering evidence.
Article 21 states that the Treaty will apply to offenses
committed prior to the date it enters into force. This
provision does not violate ex post facto protection under the
Constitution as that provision applies only to punishing acts
that were not criminal when committed, not to transferring a
defendant for acts that were criminal when committed but for
which no transfer agreement then existed. This retroactivity
provision is of the broadest type but is common in many
treaties concluded during the past 15 years.
Committee Comments
The Committee on Foreign Relations recommends Senate advice
and consent to ratification of the Extradition Treaty between
the Government of the United States and the Government of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. If ratified, the Treaty will be
the first extradition treaty ever concluded between the United
States and Jordan. The Treaty will enhance the U.S.-Jordan law
enforcement relationship by enabling greater cooperation
between the two Governments in the combat of crime.
The form and content of the Treaty is fairly typical of
other extradition treaties recently concluded by the United
States. Subject to the terms of the Treaty, the Parties agree
to extradite to one another fugitives who have been accused or
convicted of committing an offense punishable by both Parties
by deprivation of liberty or other form of detention for more
than 1 year, or by a more severe penalty. The Committee
endorses this type of ``dual criminality'' clause, rather than
a list of specific offenses, as it obviates the need for the
Parties to agree on particular offenses that will be
extraditable or to amend the treaty as new criminal offenses
are developed by the Parties.
The Treaty provides that extradition shall not be refused
based on the nationality of the person sought, and that a
decision whether to grant a request for extradition shall be
made without regard to provisions of the law of either
Contracting State concerning statutes of limitation on the
extraditable offense. The Treaty also provides for the
provisional arrest and detention of fugitives pending receipt
by the competent authority of the Requested State of a fully
documented extradition request. It specifies the procedures to
govern the surrender and return of fugitives, and also provides
for the temporary surrender of fugitives incarcerated in one
State to stand trial on other charges in the courts of the
other State. The Committee notes that the Treaty is
retroactive, and, if ratified, will permit the extradition of
persons charged with offenses committed before as well as after
the Treaty enters into force.
The Committee supports ratification of the Treaty as it is
a positive step in bilateral relations between the United
States and Jordan, and most importantly, in the efforts of both
Governments to combat serious crime, such as terrorism and
sabotage. The Committee therefore recommends that the Senate
grant early advice and consent to ratification.
Committee Action
The Committee considered the Treaty at its business meeting
on May 2, 1995, and voted by voice vote with a quorum present
to report it favorably to the Senate for its advice and
consent.
Article-by-Article Analysis of Provisions
article 1--obligation to extradite
The first article of the Treaty, like the first article in
every recent United States extradition treaty, formally
obligates each Party to extradite to the other persons charged
with or convicted of an extraditable offense, subject to the
provisions of the remainder of the Treaty. The article refers
to charges brought by the authorities ``in'' the Requesting
State rather than ``of'' the Requesting State, since the
obligation to extradite, in cases arising from the United
States, would include state and local prosecutions as well as
federal cases. It was agreed that the term ``found guilty''
includes instances in which the person has been convicted but a
sentence has not yet been imposed.\1\ The negotiators intended
to make it clear that the Treaty applies to persons who have
been adjudged guilty but fled prior to sentencing.
\1\ See, Stanbrook and Stanbrook, ``Extradition: The Law and
Practice,'' 25-26 (1979).
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article 2--extraditable offenses
This article contains the basic guidelines for determining
what are extraditable offenses. This treaty, like the recent
United States extradition treaties with Jamaica, Italy,
Ireland, Thailand, Sweden (Supplementary Convention), and Costa
Rica, does not list the offenses for which extradition may be
granted. Instead, paragraph 1 of the article permits
extradition for any offense punishable under the laws of both
countries by deprivation of liberty (i.e., imprisonment, or
other form of detention), for more than 1 year, or by a more
severe penalty such as capital punishment. Defining
extraditable offenses in terms of ``dual criminality'' rather
than attempting to list each extraditable crime obviates the
need to renegotiate the treaty or supplement it if both
countries pass laws dealing with a new type of criminal
activity or if the list inadvertently fails to cover an
important type of criminal activity punishable in both
countries.
During the negotiations, the United States delegation
received assurances from the Jordanian delegation that key
offenses such as operating a continuing criminal enterprise
(Title 21, United States Code, Section 848) would be
extraditable, and that offenses under the RICO statutes (Title
18, United States Code, Sections 1961-1968) would be
extraditable if the predicate offense is an extraditable
offense. The Jordanian delegation also stated that extradition
would be possible for such high priority offenses as drug
trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, certain forms of tax
fraud or tax evasion, certain environmental protection
offenses, and antitrust offenses that would be punishable in
both states by at least one year of imprisonment.\2\ The
delegations also agreed that the international abduction of a
child by one of its own parents is a crime in both states for
which extradition would be possible in appropriate
circumstances.\3\
\2\ In response to a question from the Jordanian delegation, the
U.S. delegation noted that in general incest is punishable by more than
one year of imprisonment in the U.S., but that blasphemy, adultery, and
criminal defamation are not punishable by more than 1 year of
imprisonment.
\3\ See Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1204. Jordan's delegation told
the U.S. delegation that if one of the parents obtains a court order
for custody of a minor child, and the other parent abducts the child,
the abducting parent would be punishable under Article 291 of Jordan's
Penal Code 1960, which states: ``Anyone who abducts or takes away a
minor under the age of 15 years, even with his/her consent, with the
aim of removing him/her from those who have custody or guardianship
over him/her, shall be punished by a prison sentence ranging from 1
month to 3 years, and a fine ranging from 5 to 25 dinars. * * * ''
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Paragraph 2 follows the practice of recent extradtion
treaties in providing that extradition should also be granted
for attempting or conspiring to commit, or participating in the
commission of an extraditable offense. Conspiracy charges are
frequently used in United States criminal cases, particularly
those involving complex transnational criminal activity, so it
was especially important that the Treaty be clear on this
point. According to the Jordanian delegation, Jordan has no
general conspiracy statute like Title 18, United States Code,
Section 371.\4\ Therefore, paragraph 2 creates an exception to
the ``dual criminality'' rule of paragraph 1 by expressly
making conspiracy an extraditable crime if the offense which
was the object of the conspiracy is an extraditable offense.
The paragraph creates a similar exception for the Jordanian
offense of participation in an offense.
\4\ The closest analogue seems to be the offense of ``ishtorok,''
proscribed in Section 75 of Jordan's Penal Code, which makes it an
offense to participate in or plan a criminal offense.
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Paragraph 3 reflects the intention of both countries to
interpret the principles of this article broadly. Judges in
foreign countries are often confused by the fact that many
United States federal statutes require proof of certain
elements (such as use of the mails or interstate
transportation) solely to establish jurisdiction in the United
States federal courts. Because these foreign judges know of no
similar requirement in their own criminal law, they
occasionally have denied the extradition of fugitives sought by
the United States on federal charges on this basis. This
paragraph requires that such elements be disregarded in
applying the dual criminality principle. For example, Jordanian
authorities must treat United States mail fraud charges (Title
18, United States Code, Section 1341) in the same manner as
fraud charges under state laws, and view the federal crime of
interstate transportation of stolen property (Title 18, United
States Code, Section 2314) in the same manner as unlawful
possession of stolen property. This paragraph also requires a
Requested State to disregard differences in the categorization
of the offense in determining whether double criminality
exists, and to overlook mere differences in the terminology
used to define the offense under the laws of each country. A
similar provision is contained in all recent United States
extradition treaties.
Paragraph 4 deals with the fact that many federal crimes
involve acts committed wholly outside United States territory.
Our jurisprudence recognizes jurisdiction in our courts to
prosecute offenses committed outside of the United States if
the crime was intended to, or did, have effects in this
country, or if the legislative history of the statute shows
clear Congressional intent to assert such jurisdiction.\5\ In
Jordan, however, the Government's ability to prosecute
extraterritorial offenses is much more limited. Therefore,
Article 2(4) reflects Jordan's agreement to recognize United
States jurisdiction to prosecute offenses committed outside of
the United States regardless of where the offense was
committed.
\5\ Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States Sec. 402 (1987); Blakesley, ``United States Jurisdiction over
Extraterritorial Crime,'' 73 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
1109 (1982).
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Paragraph 5 states that when extradition has been granted
for an extraditable offense it shall also be granted for any
other offense for which all of the requirements for extradition
have been met except for the requirement that the offense be
punishable by more than 1 year of imprisonment. For example, if
Jordan agrees to extradite to the United States a fugitive
wanted for prosecution on a felony charge, the United States
will also be permitted to obtain extradition for any
misdemeanor offenses that have been charged, as long as those
misdemeanors would also be recognized as criminal offenses in
Jordan. Thus, the Treaty incorporates recent United States
extradition practice by permitting extradition for misdemeanors
committed by a fugitive when the fugitive's extradition is
granted for a more serious extraditable offense. This practice
is generally desirable from the standpoint of both the fugitive
and the prosecuting country in that it permits all charges
against the fugitive to be disposed of more quickly, thereby
facilitating trails while evidence is still fresh and
permitting the possibility of concurrent sentences. Similar
provisions are found in recent extradition treaties with
countries such as Australia, Ireland, Italy, and Costa Rica.
Some recent United States extradition treaties provide that
persons who have convicted of an extraditable offense and
sentenced to imprisonment may be extradited only if at least a
certain specified portion of the sentence (often 6 months)
remains to be served on the outstanding sentence. The treaty
with Jordan contains no such requirement. Provisions of this
kind are an attempt to limit extradition to serious cases
because of the significant costs associated with the process.
However, the negotiators of this treaty felt that the
particular sentence imposed or outstanding is not necessarily a
measure of the seriousness of the crime, \6\ and concluded that
the Treaty's goals could be served by the exercise of
discretion and good judgment in the administration of the
Treaty without arbitrary limits imposed in the terms of the
agreement itself. This is the approach taken in our extradition
treaties with other countries including Australia, Canada,
Jamaica, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
\6\ Cf. United States v. Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Vt. 1979)
(``Leniency in sentencing does not give rise to a bar to
extradition.'') Reliance on the amount of the sentence remaining to be
served can produce anomalous results. For instance, a murderer who
escapes from custody with less than 6 months of his sentence remaining
can hardly resist extradition on the ground that murder is not a
serious offense.
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article 3--nationality
Some countries refuse to extradite their own nationals to
other countries for trial or punishment, or are prohibited from
doing so by their statutes or constitution. The United States
does not deny extradition on the basis of the offender's
citizenship,\7\ and the Extradition Law 1927 contains no
exception for Jordanian nationals. Therefore, in Article 3 of
the Treaty, each State promises not to refuse extradition on
the ground that the person sought is a national of the
Requested State.
\7\ See generally Shearer, ``Extradition in International Law''
110-114 (1970); 6 Whiteman, ``Digest of International Law'' 871-876
(1968). Our policy of drawing no distinction between nationals of the
United States and those of other countries in extradition matters is
underscored by Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3196, which authorizes the
Secretary of State to extradite U.S. citizens pursuant to treaties that
permit (but do not expressly require) surrender of citizens, if other
requirements of the Treaty have been met.
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article 4--political and military offenses
Paragraph 1 of this article prohibits extradition for a
political offense. This is a common provision in United States
extradition treaties. The United States and Jordanian
delegations discussed the jurisprudence of each country
regarding the ``political offense'' doctrine. For the United
States, political offense has generally been construed narrowly
by our courts to exclude common crimes. The Jordanian
delegation indicated that in addition to ``political'' crimes
such as treason and sedition, in some circumstances Jordan may
consider some common crimes such as robbery to fund a political
movement as a political offense.
Paragraph 2 describes three categories of offenses that
shall not be considered to be political offenses.
First, the political offense exception does not apply where
there is a murder or other violent crime \8\ against the person
of a Head of State of the Contracting States or a member of the
Head of State's family.
\8\ The phrase ``violent crime'' was used to make it clear that
offenses such as defamation would not fall within this provision.
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Second, the political offense exception does not apply to
offenses that are included in a multilateral treaty,
convention, or international agreement that requires the
parties to either extradite the person sought or submit the
matter for prosecution. The treaties to which this clause
applies include the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other
Acts Committed On Board Aircraft; \9\ the Convention on the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizures of Aircraft (Hijacking); \10\
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage); \11\ the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents; \12\ the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages; \13\
and the United Nations Convention Against the Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.\14\
\9\ Done at Tokyo September 14, 1963, and entered into force
December 4, 1969 (20 UST 2941; TIAS 6768; 704 UNTS 219).
\10\ Done at the Hague December 16, 1970, and entered into force
October 14, 1971 (22 UST 1641; TIAS 7192).
\11\ Done at Montreal September 23, 1971, and entered into force
January 26, 1973 (24 UST 564; TIAS 7570).
\12\ Done at New York December 14, 1973, and entered into force
February 20, 1977 (28 UST 1975; TIAS 8532).
\13\ Done at New York December 17, 1979, and entered into force
June 3, 1983 and for the United States Jan. 6, 1985 (TIAS 11081).
\14\ Done at Vienna December 20, 1988, and entered into force
November 11, 1990. Both the United States and Jordan also are parties
to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, done at New York March 30,
1961, entered into force December 13, 1964, and the Amending Protocol
to the Single Convention, done at Geneva March 25, 1972, and entered
into force August 8, 1975.
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Third, the political offense exception does not apply to
conspiracy or attempt to commit, or participation in, any of
the foregoing offenses.
Article 4(3) provides that extradition shall be denied if
the competent authority of the Requested State finds that the
request was politically motivated.\15\ The term ``competent
authority'' is defined in Article 22 of the Treaty, and means,
for the United States, the appropriate authorities of the
executive branch. This is consistent with the longstanding law
and practice of the United States, under which the Secretary of
State alone has the discretion to determine whether an
extradition request is based on improper political
motivation.\16\
\15\ There are similar provisions in many recent treaties. See
Article III(3), US-Jamaica Extradition Treaty, signed at Kingston June
14, 1983, entered into force July 7, 1991 ( UST ); Article 5(4), US-
Spain Extradition Treaty, signed at Madrid May 29, 1970, and entered
into force June 16, 1971 (22 UST 737, TIAS 7136, 796 UNTS 245); Article
4, US-Netherlands Extradition Treaty, signed at The Hague June 24,
1980, and entered into force September 15, 1983 (TIAS 10733); and
Article IV(c), US-Ireland Extradition Treaty, signed at Washington July
13, 1983, and entered into force December 15, 1984 (TIAS 10813).
\16\ See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513-518 (7th Cir.) cert.
denied 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. Supp. 904 (D.
Mass. 1990), aff'd 931 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1991).
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The final paragraph of the article states that the
competent authority of the Requested State may deny extradition
if the request relates to an offense under military law which
would not be an offense under ordinary criminal law.\17\
\17\ An example of such an offense is desertion. Matter of Suarez-
Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676, 703 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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article 5--prior prosecution
This article will permit extradition in situations in which
the fugitive is charged with different offenses in each of the
two countries arising out of the same basic transaction.
The first paragraph prohibits extradition if the offender
has been convicted or acquitted in the Requested State for the
offense for which extradition is requested, and is similar to
language present in many United States extradition treaties.
The parties agreed that this provision applies only when the
offender is convicted or acquitted in the Requested State of
exactly the same crime with which he is charged in the
Requesting State. It would not be enough that the same facts
were involved. Thus, if an offender is accused in one State of
illegally smuggling narcotics into the country, and is charged
in the other State of unlawfully exporting the same shipment of
drugs, an acquittal or conviction in one State would not
insulate him from extradition, for different crimes are
involved.
Paragraph 2 makes it clear that neither State can refuse to
extradite an offender on the ground that the Requested State's
authorities declined to prosecute the offender, or instituted
proceedings against the offender and thereafter elected to
discontinue the proceedings. This provision was included
because a decision of the Requested State to forego
prosecution, or to drop charges already filed, may result from
failure to obtain sufficient evidence or witnesses for trial,
whereas the Requesting State may not suffer from the same
impediments. This provision should enhance the ability to
extradite if the Requesting State has the better chance of a
successful prosecution.
article 6--lapse of time
Article 6 states that the decision to grant an extradition
request must be granted or denied without regard to provisions
of the law regarding lapse of time in either contracting state.
The U.S. and Jordanian delegations agreed that a claim that the
statute of limitations has expired is best resolved by the
courts of the Requesting State after the fugitive has been
extradited.\18\
\18\ This is consistent with settled law in the United States,
which holds that lapse of time is not a defense to extradition unless
the treaty specifically provides to the contrary. Freedman v. United
States, 437 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Ga. 1977); United States v. Galanis, 429
F. Supp. 1215 (D. Conn. 1977).
Some United States extradition treaties do permit extradition to
be denied if the statute of limitations has run in the Requesting
State. See, e.g., Article 4(1)(ii), U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty,
signed December 3, 1971, and entered into force March 22, 1976 (3 UST
2826, TIAS 8237). Others require denial of the request if the statute
of limitations would have run in the Requested State had the offense
been committed in that state. See, e.g., Article 6, U.S.-Netherlands
Extradition Treaty, supra note 14; Article 4, U.S.-Japan Extradition
Treaty, signed March 3, 1978, and entered into force March 26, 1980 (31
UST 892, TIAS 9625). A few treaties require denial if the statute of
limitations has run or would have run in either State. See, e.g.,
Article V(1)(b), U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, signed June 8, 1972, and
entered into force January 21, 1977 (28 UST 227, TIAS 8468); U.S.-
Mexico Extradition Treaty signed May 4, 1978, and entered into force
January 25, 1980 (TIAS 9656, 31 UST 5059).
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article 7--capital punishment
The first paragraph of Article 7 permits the Requested
State to refuse extradition in cases where the offense for
which extradition is sought would be punishable by death in the
Requesting State, but not in the Requested State, unless the
Requesting State, provides assurances the Requested State
considers sufficient that the death penalty will not be carried
out. Similar provisions are found in many recent United States
extradition treaties.\19\ The United States delegation sought
this provision because Jordan imposes the death penalty for
some crimes that are not punishable by death in the United
States.\20\
\19\ E.g., Article 7, U.S.-Netherlands Extradition Treaty, supra
note 17; Article 6, US-Ireland Extradition Treaty, supra note 17.
\20\ The Jordanian delegation informed the U.S. delegation that in
Jordan, the death penalty is prescribed in the 1960 Penal Code, the
1952 Military Penal Code, and several individual laws for murder, for
crimes against the security of the state, for illegal possession of
weapons, for the rape of a girl less than fifteen years of age, and for
a number of offenses related to drug trafficking. The death penalty is
also permitted for killing, torture, or ``barbaric treatment'' by an
armed gang (defined as three or more persons roaming public roads or
countryside together).
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The second paragraph of this article provides that when the
Requesting State gives assurances in accordance with paragraph
1, the assurances shall be respected, and the death penalty, if
imposed, shall not be carried out.
article 8--extradition procedures and required documents
This article sets out the documentary and evidentiary
requirements for an extradition request, and is generally
similar to articles in the United States' most recent
extradition treaties.
The first paragraph requires that each formal request for
extradition be submitted through the diplomatic channel.\21\ A
formal extradition request may be preceded by a request for the
provisional arrest of the fugitive under Article 11, and
provisional arrest requests need not be initiated through
diplomatic channels if the requirements of Article 11 are met.
\21\ This is consistent with Section 8, Extradition Law 1927.
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Article 8(2) outlines the information that must accompany
every request for extradition under the Treaty. Article 8(3)
describes the additional information needed when the person is
sought for trial in the Requesting State; Article 8(4)
describes the information needed, in addition to the
requirements of Article 8(2), when the person sought has
already been tried and convicted in the Requesting State.
Most of the items listed in Article 8(2) enable the
Requested State to determine quickly whether extradition is
appropriate under the Treaty. For example, Article 8(2)(c)
calls for ``the texts of the laws describing the essential
elements of the offense for which extradition is requested,''
enabling the Requested State to determine easily whether any
claimed lack of dual criminality would be a basis for denying
extradition under Article 2. Some of the items listed in
Article 8(2), however, are required strictly for information
purposes. Thus, Article 8(2)(a) calls for information on the
nationality of the person sought even though this Treaty does
not permit denial of extradition based on nationality. The
United States and Jordanian delegations agreed that Article
8(2)(a) should require this information so that the Requested
State would be fully informed about the offender's background.
Article 8(3)(c) requires that if the fugitive is a person
who has not yet been convicted of the crime for which
extradition is requested, the Requesting State must provide
``such evidence as would provide a reasonable basis to believe
that the person sought committed the offense for which
extradition is requested.'' U.S. law permits extradition only
when there is probable cause to believe that an extraditable
offense was committed and the offender committed it,\22\ and
this clause effectively includes that requirement in the
Treaty. During the negotiations, the Jordanian delegation
assured the United States that under Jordanian law, the
outstanding U.S. arrest warrant and the ``recovery file,'' or
formal papers supporting the request, should constitute
sufficient evidence for extradition.
\22\ Courts applying Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3184, have long
required probable cause for international extradition. Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Sec. 476,
comment b (1987).
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Article 8(4) describes the information needed in addition
to the requirements of Article 8(2) when the person sought has
already been tried and convicted in the Requesting State.
Article 8(4) makes it clear that once a conviction has been
obtained, no showing of probable cause is required. In essence,
the fact of conviction speaks for itself, a position taken in
recent United States court decisions, even without a specific
treaty provision.\23\ However, Article 8(4)(d) states that if
the person sought was found guilty in absentia, the
documentation required for extradition must include both proof
of conviction and the documentation required under paragraph 3
of this article. This is consistent with the longstanding
United States policy of requiring such documentation in
extradition proceedings of persons convicted in absentia.
\23\ See, e.g., Spatola v. United States, 741 F.Supp. 362, 374
(E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd 925 F.2d 615 (2nd Cir. 1991); United States v.
Clark, 470 F.Supp. 976 (D. Vt. 1979).
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article 9--admissibility of documents
Article 9 governs the authentication procedures for
documents prepared for use in extradition cases.
The article requires that the documents be certified by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State
resident in the Requesting State.\24\
\24\ This provision is consistent with requirements imposed by
United States law. See Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3190.
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The article also permits documents to be admitted into
evidence if they are authenticated in such other manner as may
be permitted under the law of the Requested State. For example,
there may be information in the Requested State itself which is
relevant and probative to extradition, and the Requested State
is free under this subsection to utilize that information if
the information satisfies the ordinary rules of evidence in
that State. This ensures that evidence that is acceptable under
the evidentiary rules of the Requested State may be used in
extradition proceedings even if it is not otherwise
authenticated pursuant to the Treaty. This paragraph also
should ensure that relevant evidence that would normally
satisfy the evidentiary rules of the requested country is not
excluded at the extradition hearing simply because of an
inadvertent error or omission in the authentication process.
article 10--translation
Article 10 of the Treaty requires that all extradition
documents be translated into the language of the Requested
State. The Parties could consult pursuant to Article 20
regarding this requirement and consider waiving it in
particular cases.
article 11--provisional arrest
This article describes the process by which a person in one
country may be arrested and detained while the formal
extradition papers are being prepared in the Requesting State.
Paragraph 1 expressly provides that a request for
provisional arrest may be made directly between the United
States Department of Justice and the Ministry of Justice in the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The provision also indicates that
Interpol may be used to transmit such a request.\25\ Experience
has shown that the ability to use such direct channels in
emergency situations can be crucial when a fugitive is poised
to flee.
\25\ Similar provisions appear in many recent U.S. extradition
treaties.
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Paragraph 2 states the information that the Requesting
State must provide in support of such a request.
Paragraph 3 states that the Requesting State must be
notified without delay of the outcome of the request and the
reasons for any denial.
Paragraph 4 provides that the fugitive may be released from
detention if the Requesting State does not file a fully
documented request for extradition with the competent authority
of the Requested State within sixty days of the date on which
the person was arrested pursuant to this treaty.\26\ Article 22
states that the term ``competent authority'' means the
``appropriate authorities of the executive branch'' for the
United States. Thus, when the United States is the Requested
State, the ``competent authority'' for purposes of Article
11(4) would include the Secretary of State or the United States
Embassy in Amman.\27\ The Requested State has the discretion,
upon application of the Requesting State, to extend the sixty
day period by an additional thirty days.
\26\ Section 9(3) of the Extradition Law 1927 requires the
Magistrate handling a provisional arrest to release the person arrested
``unless he receives an order from [the King] (within a period of time
whose duration shall be determined by the magistrate depending upon the
circumstances of that case) informing him that [the King] had received
an extradition request for that criminal.''
\27\ United States v. Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976, 979 (D. Vt. 1979).
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Although the person sought may be released from custody if
the documents are not received within the sixty day period or
any extension thereof, the extradition proceedings against the
fugitive need not be dismissed. Article 11(5) makes it clear
that in such cases the person may be taken into custody again
and the extradition proceedings may commence when the formal
request is presented.
article 12--decision and surrender
This article requires that the Requested State promptly
notify the Requesting State of its decision on the extradition
request. If extradition is denied, the Requested State must
provide the reasons for the denial. If extradition is granted,
the article requires that the two States agree on a time and
place for surrender of the person. The Requesting State must
remove the fugitive within the time prescribed by the law of
the Requested State, or the person may be discharged from
custody, and the Requested State may subsequently refuse to
extradite for the same offense. United States law requires that
such surrender occur within two calendar months of the finding
that the offender is extraditable,\28\ or of the conclusion of
any litigation challenging that finding,\29\ whichever is
later. The law in Jordan specifies that the surrender must take
place within two months.\30\
\28\ Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3188.
\29\ Jimenez v. United States District Court, 84 S.Ct. 14, 11 L. Ed
2d 30 (1963) (decided by Goldberg, J., in chambers). See also Liberto
v. Emery, 724 F. 2d 23 (2d Cir. 1983); In Re United States, 713 F. 2d
105 (5th Cir. 1983); Barrett v. United States, 590 F. 2d 624 (6th Cir.
1978).
\30\ Section 13, Extradition Law 1927.
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article 13--deferred and temporary surrender
Occasionally, a person sought for extradition may be facing
prosecution or serving a sentence on other charges in the
Requested State. Article 13 provides a means for the Requested
State to defer extradition in such circumstances until the
conclusion of the proceedings against the person sought and the
service of any punishment that may have been imposed. Similar
provisions appear in our recent extradition treaties with
countries such as The Bahamas and Australia.
Article 13(1) provides for the temporary surrender of a
person wanted for prosecution in the Requesting State who is
being prosecuted or is serving a sentence in the Requested
State. A person temporarily transferred pursuant to this
provision will be returned to the Requested State at the
conclusion of the proceedings in the Requesting State. Such
temporary surrender furthers the interests of justice in that
it permits trial of the person sought while evidence and
witnesses are more likely to be available, thereby increasing
the likelihood of successful prosecution. Such transfer may
also be advantageous to the person sought in that: (1) it
allows him to resolve the charges sooner; (2) subject to the
laws of each State, it may make it possible for him to serve
any sentence in the Requesting State concurrently with the
sentence in the Requested State; and (3) it permits him to
defend the charges while favorable evidence is fresh and more
likely to be available to him. Similar provisions are found in
many recent extradition treaties.
Article 13(2) provides that the executive authority of the
Requested State may postpone the surrender of a person who is
serving a sentence in the Requested State until the full
execution of the punishment which has been imposed.\31\ The
provision's wording makes it clear that the Requested State may
postpone the initiation of extradition proceedings as well as
the surrender of a person facing prosecution or serving a
sentence.
\31\ Under United States law and practice, the Secretary of State
would make this decision. Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. Supp. 904, 920 (D.
Mass. 1990), aff'd, 931 F. 2d 169 (1st Cir. 1991).
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Article 14--Requests for Extradition Made by Several States
This article reflects the practice of many recent United
States extradition treaties and lists some of the factors that
the executive authority of the Requested State must consider in
determining to which country a person should be surrendered
when reviewing requests from two or more States for the
extradition of the same person. For the United States, the
Secretary of State would make this decision; \32\ for Jordan,
the decision would be made by the King.\33\
\32\ Cheng Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 734 F. Supp. 988 (S.D. Fla. 1990),
Aff'd, 932 F. 2d 977 (11th Cir. 1991).
\33\ The Extradition Law 1927 appears to be silent on this.
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Article 15--Seizure and Surrender of Property
This article provides for the seizure by the Requested
State of all property--articles, instruments, objects of value,
documents, or other evidence--relating to the offense, to the
extent permitted by the Requested State's internal law. The
article also provides that these objects shall be surrendered
to the Requesting State upon the granting of the extradition or
even if extradition cannot be effected due to the death,
disappearance, or escape of the fugitive. The second paragraph
states that the Requested State may condition its surrender of
property upon satisfactory assurances that the objects will be
returned as soon as practicable. The obligation to surrender
property under this provision is subject to due respect for the
rights of third parties to such property. The article also
permits the surrender of property to be deferred if it is
needed as evidence in the Requested State.
article 16--rule of speciality
This article covers the principle known as the rule of
speciality, which is a standard aspect of United States
extradition practice. Designed to ensure that a fugitive
surrendered for one offense is not tried for other crimes, the
rule of speciality prevents a request for extradition from
being used as a subterfuge to obtain custody of a person for
trial or service of sentence on different charges that may not
be extraditable under the Treaty or properly documented at the
time that the request is granted.
Since a variety of exceptions to the rule have developed
over the years, this article codifies the current formulation
of the rule by providing that a person extradited under the
Treaty may only be detained, tried, or punished in the
Requesting State for (1) the offense for which extradition was
granted,\34\ or a differently denominated offense based on the
same facts, provided the offense is extraditable or is a lesser
included offense; (2) for offenses committed after the
extradition; and (3) for other offenses for which the competent
authority of the Requested State gives consent.\35\ Article
16(1)(c)(ii) permits the State which is seeking consent to
pursue new charges to detain the defendant for ninety days
while the Requested State makes its determination on the
application.
\34\ See section 6(B), Extradition Law 1927.
\35\ In the United States, the Secretary of State has the authority
to consent. See Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (D.D.C.
1979).
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Paragraph 2 prohibits the Requesting State from
surrendering the person to a third State for a crime committed
prior to extradition under this treaty without the consent of
the State from which extradition was first obtained. \36\
\36\ A similar provision is contained in all recent U.S.
extradition treaties.
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Finally, paragraph 3 permits the detention, trial, or
punishment of an extraditee for additional offenses, or the
extradition of that person to a third State, (1) if the
extraditee leaves and returns to the Requesting State, or (2)
if the extraditee does not leave the Requesting State within 10
days of being free to do so.
The delegations discussed including a provision to the
Treaty that would have required that the person extradited
receive credit for the time spent in custody in the Requested
State prior to extradition. The delegations also considered a
provision stating that if the person extradited is acquitted,
the Requesting State must return him to the Requested State at
its own expense. It was decided to leave both these matters to
be handled in accordance with the law of the Requesting State.
Article 17--Waiver of Extradition
Persons sought for extradition frequently elect to waive
their right to extradition proceedings and to expedite their
return to the Requesting State. This article provides that when
a fugitive consents to surrender to the Requesting State, the
person may be returned to the Requesting State as expeditiously
as possible without further proceedings. The Parties anticipate
that in such cases there would be no need for the formal
documents described in Article 8, or further judicial or
administrative proceedings of any kind.
If the United States is the Requested State and the person
sought elects to return voluntarily to Jordan before the United
States Secretary of State signs a surrender warrant, the
process would not be deemed an ``extradition,'' and the long-
standing U.S. policy is that the rule of speciality in Article
16 will not apply to such cases.\37\
\37\ Cf. Article 16, US-Netherlands Treaty, supra note 17.
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article 18--transit
Article 18(1) gives each State the power to authorize
transit through its territory of persons being surrendered to
the other country by third countries.\38\ Requests for transit
are to contain a description of the person whose transit is
proposed and a brief statement of the facts of the case with
respect to which he is being surrendered to the Requesting
State. The request may be transmitted via diplomatic channels
or through Interpol. The negotiators agreed that the diplomatic
channels will be employed as much as possible for requests of
this nature.
\38\ A similar provision is in all recent U.S. extradition
treaties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article 18(2) describes the procedure each State should
follow when seeking to transport a person in custody through
the territory of the other. Under this provision, no advance
authorization is needed if the person in custody is in transit
to one of the Parties and is travelling by aircraft and no
landing is scheduled in the territory of the other Party.
Should an unscheduled landing occur in the other State, that
State may require a request for transit at that time, and may
grant the request if, in its discretion, it deems it
appropriate to do so. The Treaty ensures that the person will
be kept in custody for up to 96 hours until a request for
transit is received, and thereafter until the transit executed.
During the negotiations, the delegations agreed that when
transit under this article is contemplated, the costs entailed
by transit would be allocated in accordance with the
extradition arrangement between the Requesting and Requested
States with respect to the particular extradition at issue.
article 19--representation and expenses
The first paragraph of this article provides that the
United States will represent Jordan in connection with a
request from Jordan for extradition before the courts in this
country, and the Jordanian Government will arrange for the
representation of the United States in connection with United
States extradition requests to Jordan.
Paragraph 2 provides that the Requested State will bear all
expenses of extradition except those expenses relating to the
ultimate transportation of a fugitive to the Requesting State
and the translation of documents, which expenses are to be paid
by the Requesting State. Cases may arise in which it may be
necessary for the Requesting State to retain private counsel to
assist in the presentation of the extradition request, and in
such cases the fees of private counsel retained by the
Requesting State must be paid by the Requesting State.
Paragraph 3 provides that neither State shall make a
pecuniary claim against the other in connection with
extradition proceedings, including arrest, detention,
examination, or surrender of the fugitive. This includes any
claim by the fugitive for damages, reimbursement, or legal
fees, or other expenses occasioned by the execution of the
extradition request.
article 20--consultation
Article 20 of the Treaty provides that the United States
Department of Justice and the Ministry of Justice in Jordan may
consult with each other directly or via Interpol with regard to
an individual extradition case or on extradition procedures in
general. A similar provision is found in a number of U.S.
extradition treaties awaiting ratification.\39\
\39\ See Article 19, U.S.-Belgium Extradition Treaty, signed at
Brussels April 27, 1987; Article 24, U.S.-Switzerland Extradition
Treaty, signed at Bern Nov. 11, 1990; Article 18, U.S.-Philippines
Extradition Treaty, signed at Manila Nov. 13, 1994; Article 21, U.S.-
Hungary Extradition Treaty, signed at Budapest Dec. 1, 1994.
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article 21--application
This treaty, like most of the other United States
extradition treaties negotiated in the past two decades, is
expressly made retroactive, and accordingly covers offenses
that occurred before the Treaty entered into force.
article 22--definition
Article 22 states that for the United States, the term
``competent authority'' used in Articles 4(3), 4(4), 11(4), 14,
and 16(1)(c) in the Treaty means the appropriate authorities of
its executive branch.
article 23--ratification and entry into force
Article 23 contains standard treaty language providing that
the Treaty shall be subject to ratification after each
contracting state has completed its internal legal processes
for approval of the Treaty. The exchange of instruments of
ratification will take place at Washington, DC, and the Treaty
will enter into force immediately upon the exchange.
Entry Into Force
The Treaty shall enter into force upon the exchange of
instruments of ratification by the United States and Jordan.
Text of Resolution of Ratification
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the
ratification of the Extradition Treaty between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, signed at Washington on March 28,
1995.
A P P E N D I X
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Questions for the Record Submitted to the Departments of State and
Justice By the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 1, 1995
Jordan
Question. With which other countries has the United States
negotiated an extradition treaty of this type, which does not
specifically list the offenses for which extradition may be
granted?
Answer. United States extradition treaties since the late
1970's have generally used a ``dual criminality'' formulation,
which typically provides that an offense will be extraditable
if it is punishable under the laws in both Contracting States
by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or
by a more severe penalty. Older U.S. extradition treaties
typically included a negotiated list of extraditable offenses.
Defining extraditable offenses using a dual criminality
approach obviates the need to renegotiate or supplement the
treaty if both Parties pass laws dealing with new types of
criminal behavior or if the list inadvertently fails to cover
an important type of criminal activity punishable in both
countries.
In addition to the treaty with Jordan, dual criminality
provisions are standard in other extradition treaties recently
negotiated by the United States. Examples of ``dual
criminality'' treaties currently in force are Australia,
Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Jamaica, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Thailand.
Question. Does the definition of ``extraditable offense''
include only federal offenses or also those offenses punishable
by more than a year of imprisonment under individual state
laws?
Answer. The definition of ``extraditable offense'' includes
offenses under both federal and state laws in the United
States. This means that both state and federal prosecutors may
seek the extradition of fugitives from Jordan under the treaty.
Question. Under what circumstances or for what reasons may
the United States legally, under the treaty, refuse extradition
to Jordan of a U.S. citizen?
Answer. The treaty provides a number of grounds under which
the United States may deny extradition of U.S. citizens and of
non-U.S. citizens. For example, the United States can deny
extradition if the offense for which extradition sought does
not comply with the treaty's dual criminality provisions
(Article 2); if the crimes charged are political or military
offenses, or if the charges are politically motivated (Article
4); if the fugitive has been convicted or acquitted of the
charges in the United States (Article 5); if assurances
regarding the death penalty are requested by the United States
but not granted by Jordan (Article 7); if Jordan does not
submit the documentation required to support a request for
extradition (Article 8); if the fugitive is not removed from
the Requested State once extradition has been granted (Article
12); or if the fugitive is extradited to another State (Article
14). In addition, extradition may be delayed until a United
States prosecution or punishment of the fugitive sought by
Jordan is completed.
Moreover, the treaty does not in any way alter existing
U.S. law which requires, as a prerequisite for extradition,
that a U.S. court must find, based on the information submitted
by the country requesting extradition, that there is probable
cause to believe that the crime charged was committed and that
the person whose extradition is sought committed that crime.
Question. Could the United States refuse extradition in the
case of a U.S. citizen who is charged with a crime for which
the penalty in Jordan is significantly more severe than the
penalty in the United States?
Answer. The United States could refuse extradition in
circumstances where a particular crime was punishable by the
death penalty in Jordan but not in the United States. Article 7
of the Treaty provides that when the offense for which
extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws in
the Requesting State and is not punishable by death under the
laws in the Requested State, the Requested State may refuse
extradition unless the Requesting State provides such
assurances as the Requested State considers sufficient that the
death penalty, if imposed, shall not be carried out.
In other cases, in keeping with modern U.S. extradition
treaty practice, a crime will be extraditable if it is
punishable under the laws in both Contracting States by
deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or by
a more severe penalty, regardless of whether the punishment
might be more severe in one or the other Contracting State.
Because the United States frequently imposes more severe
penalties for crimes than our treaty partners, we do not
negotiate provisions that would allow one party to refuse
extradition based on the severity of the penalty, with the
exception of the special death penalty provision noted above.
We note that under United States law, the Secretary of
State has the ultimate discretion to refuse extradition to
another government under any extradition treaty.
Question. Could the United States refuse extradition in the
case of a U.S. citizen accused of a crime if such crime was
committed in response to an act which is a crime in the U.S.
but not in Jordan? For example, if a woman fled to the U.S.
with her child (which is kidnapping) because her husband had
married another woman, or had committed some other act which is
illegal in the U.S. but not in Jordan, would she be
extraditable under the treaty?
Answer. Crimes are extraditable under the treaty if they
are punishable under the laws in both Contracting States by
deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or by
a more severe penalty. The exceptions to this general
obligation to extradite are discussed in our answer to Question
#3. In addition, the Secretary of State has the ultimate
discretion under United States law to refuse extradition to
another government under the extradition treaty.
The Jordan extradition treaty, like other extradition
treaties negotiated by the United States, does not address the
motivation of the individuals sought under the treaty, but
instead focuses on whether the crime at issue is criminal in
both jurisdictions and whether the treaty's other criteria for
extradition are met.
Question. Can residents of either country use the treaty to
force a government to initiate extradition procedures? For
instance, could a Palestinian living in Jordan appeal under the
treaty for extradition from the U.S. of an Israeli citizen
accused of expropriation of Palestinian land or other offenses?
Answer. The rights under the treaty are held by the two
Contracting States, i.e., the United States and Jordan. The
treaty specifically provides that requests for extradition
shall be submitted by the Requesting State to the Requested
State. While private parties can request that their governments
take certain actions under the treaty, they cannot ``force''
their government to initiate extradition procedures.
Question. How does the treaty define ``political offense''?
Who, specifically, will make the ultimate determination of
whether or not an offense is political or whether a request for
extradition is politically motivated?
Answer. The phrase ``political offense'' is not defined in
the treaty, not is it defined any of the extradition treaties
of the United States, although it appears in virtually all of
them. Consequently, what constitutes a non-extraditable
``political offense'' under United States law is a product of
U.S. jurisprudence, i.e., the body of judicial decisions that
has addressed the issue. Under U.S. jurisprudence, certain
offenses such as treason, espionage and conducting peaceful
political demonstrations would be considered political offenses
by their very nature. In addition, under U.S. law, even common
crimes such as assault or kidnapping have sometimes been
considered political offenses for which extradition has been
barred based on the particular circumstances of the case.
As under virtually all of our extradition treaties, it is
the U.S. extradition court which determines whether an offense
is a political offense. If the court finds the crime is a
political offense for which extradition is barred, the person
may not be surrendered. However, even where a court does not
find the crime to be a political offense, the Secretary of
State reserves the right to refuse extradition based on a
determination that particular conduct is a political offense.
Under Article 4930 of the treaty, a determination that
conduct is ``politically motivated'' and therefore non-
extraditable may only be made by the ``competent authority'' of
the Requested State, which for the United States will be the
Secretary of State. This is consistent with U.S. caselaw on the
issue of political motivation in extradition cases.
Question. In what ways, if any, does Article 4 of this
treaty differ from political offense articles in other
extradition treaties that the United States has ratified?
Answer. Article 4 of the treaty is typical of several of
the political offense articles negotiated in recent years by
the United States (e.g., The Bahamas and The Philippines). It
provides that political offenses are non-extraditable, but
states that the following are not to be considered political
offenses: a murder or other violent crime against the person of
a Head of State of one of the Contracting States, or of a
member of the Head of State's family; an offense for which both
Contracting States have the obligation pursuant to a
multilateral international agreement or treaty to extradite the
person sought or to submit the case to their competent
authorities for decision as to prosecution; and a conspiracy or
attempt to commit, or participate in, any of the foregoing
offenses. Thus, offenses under terrorism or narcotics
multilateral conventions to which the United States and Jordan
are both parties would never be considered political offenses
under the treaty. Some recent U.S. extradition treaties,
particularly those negotiated with Canada and several European
countries, limit even further the possible application of the
political offense exception to preclude denial of extradition
for certain enumerated common crime.
Article 4 also includes other provisions typical of recent
U.S. extradition treaties, providing that extradition shall not
be granted if the competent authority of the Requested State
determines that the request was politically motivated, and that
the competent authority of the Requested State may refuse
extradition for offenses under military law which are not
offenses under ordinary criminal law.
Question. The Department of State's ``Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1994'' states that in Jordan,
``human rights abuses include arbitrary arrest; mistreatment of
detainees; prolonged detention without charge; lack of due
process; official discrimination against adherents of the
Baha'i faith; and restrictions on women's rights. Citizens do
not have the right to change their form of government * * *''.
Should the United States conclude extradition treaties with
governments that do not protect human rights and civil
liberties we regard as fundamental?
Answer. The United States and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan have cooperated on law enforcement issues for many
years. The negotiation of this treaty is a logical outgrowth of
our past mutually beneficial cooperation and reflects our joint
commitment to combat serious crime. Ratification of the U.S.-
Jordan extradition treaty will enhance the scope of this
cooperation. The two governments initiated treaty negotiations
in 1994 when the absence of such a treaty precluded the
extradition from Jordan to the United States of a dual U.S.-
Jordanian national charged in the U.S. with the murder of his
wife and the kidnapping of his minor children.
As noted in your question, the State Department expressed
concern about a number of human rights issues in Jordan in this
year's human rights report. Jordan's record can, in our view,
be improved. The Government of Jordan has been responsive to
U.S. concerns raised in the annual report in the past. We will
continue to urge further progress in this area. We have had a
useful dialogue with Jordan on human rights and legal issues,
including in connection with this treaty.
We are confident that legal proceedings facing an American
citizen in Jordan, extradited under the terms of this treaty,
would be handled fairly and expeditiously under the provisions
of Jordanian law and practice. In addition, the Committee may
be assured that the trial and rights of U.S. citizens
extradited to Jordan would be carefully monitored by our
Embassy in Amman.
With respect to Jordan's political system, we continue to
support strongly progress toward greater political
participation by Jordanian citizens. Encouragement of this
process has been a regular feature of our bilateral dialogue.