[Senate Executive Report 104-10]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



104th Congress                                             Exec. Report
                                 SENATE

 1st Session                                                     104-10
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                            START II TREATY

                                _______


               December 15, 1995.--Ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


   Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                    [To accompany Treaty Doc. 103-1]

    The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred 
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation of Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty) signed at Moscow on 
January 3, 1993, including the following documents, which are 
integral parts thereof: the Elimination and Conversion 
Protocol; the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol; and the 
Memorandum of Attribution having considered the same, reports 
favorably thereon and recommends that the Senate give its 
advice and consent to ratification thereof subject to 6 
conditions and 7 declarations as set forth in this report and 
the accompanying resolution of ratification.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                  Pages
  I.  Purpose.........................................................2
 II. Treaty Terms.....................................................3
III. Bilateral Military Implications..................................6
 IV. Multilateral Implications.......................................21
  V. Verification and Compliance.....................................29
 VI. START II Implementation.........................................38
VII. Committee Action................................................40
VIII.Resolution of Ratification......................................46

 IX. Article-by-Article Analysis.....................................49
  X. Additional Views................................................60

                               I. Purpose

    The Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms (The START II Treaty) will commit the 
United States and Russia to deeper reductions in strategic 
offensive nuclear weapons, building upon the Treaty between the 
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms (The START Treaty). Whereas START theoretically 
limits each States Party to 6,000 total warheads deployed on 
1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (a 30 to 40 percent 
reduction in existing arsenals), the START II Treaty 
contemplates a substantially lower limit of 3,500 deployed 
warheads, a ban on all land-based, multiple warhead ballistic 
missiles, and limitations on the number of warheads deployed on 
submarine launched ballistic missiles. Furthermore, unlike 
START, all warheads deployed on heavy bombers will be 
attributable under START II counting rules. Taken together, 
START and START II will reduce the deployed strategic offensive 
arms of the United States and Russia by roughly two-thirds.

                       CENTRAL LIMITS IN START II                       
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Phase II   
              Weapon System                   Phase I      (complete by 
                                                               2003)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total warheads..........................     3,800-4,250     3,000-3,500
    MIRVed ICBM warheads................           1,200               0
    Heavy ICBM warheads.................             650               0
    SLBM warheads.......................           2,160           1,750
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    START II is a bilateral treaty between the United States 
and the Russian Federation, in contrast with START, which also 
includes Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine as Parties. In 
accordance with Lisbon Protocol, the other three Parties to the 
START Treaty have joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty and have 
pledged and are proceeding to eliminate strategic offensive 
arms located on their territories. No nuclear warheads or 
deployed strategic offensive arms should be located on their 
territories by the completion of the first phase of the 
reductions under START II.
    START II is to be implemented simultaneously with START. 
Seven years after START's entry into force neither Party may 
deploy in excess of 4,250 strategic warheads. By January 1, 
2003, the total number of warheads deployed by each Party will 
not exceed 3,500. Furthermore, beyond that date no warheads are 
to be deployed on land-based, intercontinental ballistic 
missiles with multiple independently targetable nuclear 
warheads (MIRVed ICBMs) or on heavy ICBMs.
    In addition to central limits, the Treaty contains a number 
of other prohibitions and exemptions, such as provisions 
allowing for the downloading of all SLBMs and some multiple 
warhead ICBMs, the elimination or conversion of launchers 
(including the conversion of 90 SS-18 launchers to accommodate 
the single-warhead SS-25), the elimination of the SS-18 class 
of heavy ICBMs and conversion of SS-18 silos, and procedures 
for inspecting and counting warheads deployed on heavy bombers.
    The inspection regime established under START will be used 
to verify START II provisions, except as otherwise provided. In 
addition to the use of national technical means, on-site 
inspection, and technical exhibitions, the START II Treaty 
provides for additional inspections to confirm the elimination 
of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters and to confirm ICBM 
silo conversions. The Treaty also provides for exhibitions and 
inspections to observe the variety of nuclear weapons with 
which heavy bombers are actually equipped in order to ascertain 
their relevant observable differences. For the U.S. this means 
Russian inspection of the weapons carriage areas of a B-2 
bomber--something not allowed under START inspection 
provisions. Portions of the B-2 can be ``shrouded,'' however, 
to safeguard the bomber's sensitive technical characteristics 
during inspections.
    Negotiations on START II, conducted throughout 1992, were 
premised on U.S. interest in eliminating MIRVed ICBMs and 
Russian interest in reducing nuclear arsenals to a sustainable 
level given political and economic realities following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a result, Presidents Bush 
and Yeltsin agreed at a June 1992 summit to a complete ban on 
MIRVed ICBMs, warhead limitations on SLBMs, and a central limit 
of 3,500 accountable warheads. They also issued the Joint 
Statement on a Global Protection System, endorsing the concept 
of U.S.-Russian cooperation on ballistic missile defense as a 
stabilizing complement to well-structured reductions in 
strategic offensive forces.
    However, a number of developments in the fall of 1992 
complicated negotiations, including a number of new Russian 
proposals that differed from the agreed framework and which 
raised concerns regarding new break-out opportunities for 
Russia. During the final weeks of December 1992, the United 
States made two significant concessions. Specifically, the 
downloading rule established in START was relaxed to permit 
Russia to maintain 105 of its 170 SS-19 ICBMs as single-warhead 
missiles, and it was further agreed that Russia would be 
allowed to deploy single-warhead missiles in 90 of its 154 SS-
18 silos. In return, Russia agreed to destroy all of its SS-18 
missiles. Russia also agreed that the 90 SS-18 launchers it 
retained would be converted using procedures designed to make 
reconversion difficult.
    Notwithstanding these modifications, the critical 
components of the START II Treaty remained intact. Presidents 
Bush and Yeltsin signed the Treaty on January 3, 1993 and it 
was submitted to the Senate for advice and consent and referred 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations on January 20, 1993. 
Discussions on ballistic missile defense cooperation continued 
throughout the Bush Administration but were discontinued by the 
Clinton Administration.

                            II. Treaty Terms

    The Treaty between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms (The START II Treaty) consists of the 
main Treaty text and three documents formally transmitted to 
the Senate by the President on January 20, 1993, for the 
Senate's advice and consent to ratification. START II is a 
treaty with a preamble and 8 articles of an initial duration 
the same as that of the START Treaty, two protocols, and a 
memorandum of understanding as follows:
          --The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of 
        Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of 
        Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty 
        Between the United States of America and the Russian 
        Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of 
        Strategic Offensive Arms (the Elimination and 
        Conversion Protocol);
          --The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of 
        Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United 
        States of America and the Russian Federation on Further 
        Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 
        (the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol); and
          --The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead 
        Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the 
        Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
        Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation 
        of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Memorandum on 
        Attribution).
    The President also transmitted documents associated with, 
but not integral parts of, the Protocols or the START II 
Treaty. These documents are three exchanges of letters 
embodying legally binding commitments from the Russian 
Federation and the United States concerning the removal of SS-
18 missiles from Kazakstan, the deployment of nuclear weapons 
on heavy bombers, and Russian conversion of SS-18 missile 
silos. These documents are relevant to the consideration of the 
START II Treaty by the Senate. No new U.S. security assurances 
or guarantees are associated with any of these letters.

                           a. the treaty text

    Article I obligates the Parties to meet START reductions 
and to reduce their ICBMs, SLBMs, respective launchers, and 
heavy bombers so that by January 1, 2003, the aggregate number 
for deployed warheads does not exceed 3,500. The following 
sublimits are also applied: 1,750 for deployed SLBMs, no ICBMs 
to which more than one warhead is attributed, no deployed heavy 
ICBMs, no deployed launchers of an ICBM to which more than one 
warhead is attributed, no deployed launchers of heavy ICBMs, 
and no heavy ICBMs. Launchers may either be destroyed or 
converted (the procedures for which are specified elsewhere) 
and, in most cases, the missiles need not be destroyed. To 
reach the above levels there is not a specific legal obligation 
to reduce at a given rate.]
    Article II states an exception to the requirement for 
launchers. Ninety heavy ICBM silo launchers may be converted to 
accommodate SS-25 type ICBMs. Russia further pledges its best 
efforts to reach an agreement with Kazakstan on the return of 
heavy SS-18 ICBMs for destruction. Each party has the right to 
inspect the destruction of heavy ICBMs and their launch 
canisters, as well as the conversion of silo launchers for 
heavy ICBMs. Both Parties agree not to transfer heavy ICBMs to 
any recipient whatsoever; nor will they produce, acquire, 
flight-test, or deploy ICBMs to which more than one warhead is 
attributed.
    Article III sets forth the rules for reducing the warhead 
attribution (i.e. ``downloading'') of existing types of ICBMs 
and SLBMs other than heavy ICBMs. START II bans downloading of 
heavy ICBMs as well as new types of ICBMs and SLBMs but it 
allows the Parties to exceed the START limit of 1,250 on total 
warhead downloading and the 500 warhead limit on downloading 
ICBMs and SLBMs other than the U.S. Minuteman III and the 
Russian SS-N-18. The Parties also are allowed to download by up 
to five warheads up to 105 of one of the two types of ICBMs or 
SLBMs permitted to be downloaded by subparagraph 5(c)(ii) of 
Article III of the START Treaty. As a practical matter, this 
means Russia will retain 105 SS-19 missiles whose elimination 
otherwise would be required. Reentry vehicle platform 
destruction is not required. The uploading of ICBMs or SLBMs 
which have been downloaded is banned.
    Article IV establishes constraints on heavy bombers, 
specifying that the number of nuclear warheads attributed to a 
deployed heavy bomber shall be equal to the number of nuclear 
weapons with which any bomber of that type or variant is 
actually equipped. The number of warheads attributed to a heavy 
bomber of a given type or variant of a type is listed in the 
Memorandum on Attribution. The Memorandum requires a one-time 
exhibition, no later than 180 days after entry into force, of 
one heavy bomber of each type and variant to demonstrate the 
number of nuclear weapons for which such bombers are actually 
equipped. Each Party can increase or decrease the number of 
warheads for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped, but 
this requires a repeated exhibition. Each party may reorient to 
a conventional role heavy bombers not accountable under START 
as being equipped with air launched cruise missiles. This is in 
addition to the right under START to convert up to 76 heavy 
bombers, using specified procedures, to a non-nuclear role. 
Reoriented heavy bombers must have segregated basing and may 
not be used in nuclear missions, nuclear exercises, nor can 
their crews train or exercise for nuclear missions. Each party 
has the one-time right, with a 90-day notice, to return heavy 
bombers to a nuclear role. Reoriented bombers must be based at 
least 100 kilometers away from storage areas for heavy bomber 
nuclear armaments, and are subject to inspection. If only some 
bombers of a given type are reoriented, then those bombers must 
be distinguished from the nuclear types in a manner observable 
by National Technical Means.
    Article V establishes that the provisions of the START 
Treaty, including its verification provisions, shall be used 
for implementing START II. The Bilateral Implementation 
Commission (BIC) shall be established to serve as the framework 
within which the Parties will seek to resolve any questions 
related to compliance with the START II Treaty, and the forum 
by which Parties might agree on any additional measures 
necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of START 
II.
    Article VI specifies that the Treaty is subject to 
ratification prior to entering into force, and will not enter 
into force prior to the START Treaty. The ban on the transfer 
of heavy ICBMs to a third state or states shall be 
provisionally applied as of the date of signature of START II. 
The START II Treaty will remain in force for the duration of 
the START Treaty. Both Parties have the right to withdraw from 
the Treaty with six months notice if extraordinary events 
related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized a 
Party's supreme interests.
    Article VII is identical in content to Article XVIII of the 
START Treaty, providing for amendments to the START II Treaty. 
Such amendments would be subject to ratification as specified 
in Article VI of the Treaty.
    Article VIII provides for the registration of the Treaty 
with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations.
    Final Provision of the START II Treaty records that the 
Treaty was done at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, 
each in the English and Russian languages, and each being 
equally authentic.

                    b. integral additional documents

    The Treaty includes other documents which the President and 
the Secretary indicated are ``integral'' parts of the Treaty, 
and are submitted for consideration as legally binding parts of 
the Treaty:
          --an Elimination and Conversion Protocol setting 
        forth elimination and conversion procedures for heavy 
        ICBMs and heavy ICBM launchers;
          --an Exhibition and Inspections Protocol setting 
        forth requirements on exhibitions and inspections of 
        heavy bombers; and
          --a Memorandum of Understanding that includes the 
        required data on the treaty-limited items possessed by 
        the Parties.

                          c. separate letters

    Associated with the START II Treaty are three separate, 
legally binding exchanges of letters, two of which were signed 
by Andrey Kozyrev, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and 
Lawrence Eagleburger, U.S. Secretary of State, and one exchange 
of letters signed by Pavel Grachev, Russian Minister of 
Defense, and Richard Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense. No new 
U.S. obligations are entailed in these letters.

                  III. Bilateral Military Implications

    The committee considered the START II Treaty during a 
period of fundamental transformation in the international 
security environment. START II is a bilateral arms control 
agreement committing the United States and Russia to even 
deeper reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals than 
contemplated under the START Treaty. The Treaty provides that 
by the year 2003 the United States and Russia must reduce their 
deployed strategic warheads to a level at or below 3,500--a 
more than two-thirds reduction over current levels. When fully 
implemented, it will eliminate completely all land-based 
multiple warhead (MIRVed) ICBMs, including all of the Russian 
``heavy'' SS-18 ICBMs, thereby accomplishing two longstanding 
U.S. negotiating goals. However, both U.S. nuclear doctrine and 
U.S. strategic forces must evolve to meet the challenges of the 
post-Cold War era. Consequently, as shall be discussed later in 
this report, any assessment of the military implications of the 
START II Treaty must consider the changing nature of a complex 
and multipolar world. More directly, START II's bipolar 
military significance and verifiability both are linked 
integrally to the full implementation of START and the 
anticipated composition of the post-START II Russian strategic 
forces. It should also be recalled that START II was negotiated 
in the context of a robust national missile defense program 
intended to enhance strategic stability and possible 
cooperation with Russia on the same. A national missile defense 
system remains imperative to enhance stability under START II; 
safeguard against potential changes in Russia; and defend 
against other emerging ballistic missile threats to the United 
States.

Linkages with the START Treaty

    The START Treaty provides for the following principal, 
maximum numerical limitations on the strategic arsenals of the 
United States and Russia:
          1,600 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 
        (ICBMs, SLBMs, and Heavy Bombers);
           6,000 accountable warheads (ICBMs, SLBMs, and Heavy 
        Bombers);
           4,900 ballistic missile warheads (ICBMs and SLBMs);
           1,100 warheads on land-mobile ICBMs;
           1,540 warheads deployed on no more than 154 Soviet 
        SS-18s;
           1,250 total warhead limit on downloading;
           500 total warhead sublimit on downloading for ICBMs 
        and SLBMs other than the U.S. Minuteman III and the 
        Russian SS-N-18 SLBM; and
           3,600 metric tons throw-weight ceiling.
    Further, a set of politically binding side agreements under 
START limits each side to 880 deployed sea-launched cruise 
missiles (SLCMs) in any one year, and limits Russia to 500 
Backfire bombers, which are understood not to possess 
intercontinental range nor in-flight refueling capability.
    In addition to these limits, START requires the destruction 
of strategic launchers (bombers, silos, and submarine 
launchers), but does not require destruction of nuclear 
warheads or missiles (other than mobile missiles beyond the 
non-deployed limit of 250). Instead, START allows the use of 
retired missiles as space-launch vehicles and for missile 
defense programs, with corresponding verification provisions 
designed to constrain illicit activities.
    Taken altogether, the START Treaty will produce the 
following reductions:

                                              TOTAL ACTUAL WARHEADS                                             
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          As of EIF         START limits      Net reduction    Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU).................             13,000              8,500              4,500                 35
Soviet (MOU)........................             11,000              6,500              4,500                 41
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                           ACCOUNTABLE START WARHEADS                                           
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        As of EIF \1\       START limits      Net reduction    Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU).................             10,563              6,000              4,563                 43
Soviet (MOU)........................             10,271              6,000              4,271                 42
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Entry into Force                                                                                            


                                           BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS                                           
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          As of EIF         START limits      Net reduction    Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU).................              8,210              4,900              3,310                 40
Soviet (MOU)........................              9,416              4,900              4,516                 48
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                       STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES                                      
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          As of EIF         START limits      Net reduction    Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU).................              2,246              1,245               1,00                145
Soviet (MOU)........................              2,500              1,424              1,076                 43
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note.--Estimates depend upon particular force structure assumptions.                                            


                                                  HEAVY ICBM's                                                  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          As of EIF         START limits      Net reduction    Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU).................                  0                  0                  0                  0
Soviet (MOU)........................                308                154                154                 50
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The START Treaty was signed as a bilateral agreement 
between the United States and the Soviet Union on July 31, 
1991, after nine years of negotiation. Although the Treaty was 
transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to 
ratification on November 25, 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved 
formally on December 25, 1991. The dissolution of the Soviet 
Union introduced a number of complex state succession issues 
into the Senate's consideration of the START Treaty. Most 
importantly, strategic offensive nuclear weapons were left 
deployed in four former Soviet republics: Russia, Belarus, 
Ukraine and Kazakstan:

                 1992 DISPOSITION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (FSU)                 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Kazakstan           Ukraine              Belarus         Russia     Total 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBM's...........................  104 SS-18s       46 SS-24s (silo),    54 SS-25s (mobile)      1,067     1,401
                                                     130 SS-19s (silo)                                          
ICBM warheads....................  1,040            1,240                54                      4,278     6,612
SLBM's...........................  0                0                    0                         940       940
SLBM warheads....................  0                0                    0                       2,804     2,804
SSBN's...........................  0                0                    0                           0        62
Bombers..........................  40 Bear Hs       14 Bear Hs, 16       0                          88       162
                                                     Blackjacks, 4                                              
                                                     Heavy Bombers                                              
Bomber warheads..................  370              416                  0                         800     1,600
IC/HB bases......................  3                4                    2                           2        31
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note.--Estimates of the total number of warheads on Ukrainian territory are open to question. In testimony      
  before the committee on October 4, 1994, Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter indicated that Ukraine  
  had 1,734 warheads prior to START's EIF, as opposed to the 1,564 cited in the START MOU.                      

    In order to resolve this key succession problem, the START 
Treaty was converted into a multilateral treaty among the 
United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine by means 
of the May 23, 1992, Lisbon Protocol (Treaty Doc. 102-32). 
Constituting an amendment to, and an integral part of, the 
START Treaty, the Protocol provided that the four former Soviet 
republics would together assume the legal obligations of the 
USSR for the START Treaty. It further obligated the four states 
to make arrangements among themselves as necessary to implement 
the Treaty's limitations, to permit verification of the 
Treaty's provisions on their territory, and to allocate costs. 
It also obligated Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakstan to accede to 
the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the status 
of non-nuclear-weapons states as soon as possible.
    In letters submitted with the Protocol, Belarus, Ukraine 
and Kazakstan pledged to eliminate all nuclear weapons and 
strategic offensive arms on their respective territories within 
seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty. All 
tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from the three 
states and transferred to Russia. However, the committee notes 
that Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakstan are under no legal 
obligation to transfer any nuclear weapons to Russia. They 
could--in theory--elect to eliminate such weapons on their own 
territories. Yet, because these countries lack the necessary 
facilities for local elimination, the Bush Administration's 
Article-by-Article Analysis of the Lisbon Protocol concluded: 
``As a practical matter, we expect that nuclear weapons will be 
transferred to and eliminated in Russia.''
    In addition to obligations undertaken with respect to the 
Lisbon Protocol, Belarus and Kazakstan have also concluded 
bilateral agreements with Russia to deactivate and transfer 
their strategic arsenals to Russia. Prior to START's entry into 
force, all Parties began deactivating and eliminating strategic 
systems to meet Treaty obligations. In this regard, as of 
September the Parties have achieved the following levels for 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) and warheads (WH).

  NUMBER OF WEAPONS ATTRIBUTED TO THE FOUR PARTIES TO THE UNITED STATES 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  SNDV/WH               
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                    As of Sept. 1,                      
                                         1990            Sept. 1, 1995  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Belarus.........................         54/54               18/18      
Kazakstan.......................        144/1,360            48/480     
Russia..........................      2,092/7,345         1,513/6,769   
Ukraine.........................        210/1,512           220/1,592   
                                 ---------------------------------------
      Total for the former                                              
       Soviet Union.............      2,500/10,271        1,799/8,859   
United States...................      2,246/10,563        1,727/8,345   
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As of September 1995, the United States has:
          Removed all nuclear warheads--approximately 3,900--
        from 450 Minuteman II ICBMs and from 384 Poseidon C-3 
        and C-4 SLBMs;
          Destroyed 120 Minuteman II ICBM silo launchers and 
        removed ICBMs from the remaining Minuteman II silo 
        launchers;
          Destroyed 320 Poseidon C-3 and C-4 SLBM launchers, 
        which represents 20 ballistic missile submarines 
        destroyed, and removed SLBMs from the remaining 64 
        launchers;
          Eliminated 251 heavy bombers from Treaty 
        accountability; roughly 135 heavy bombers remaining to 
        be eliminated under START have been retired from 
        operation and moved to an elimination facility.
    The United States has thus completed 56 percent of its 
overall missile launcher and heavy bomber eliminations to be 
accomplished under START. As a result, the United States is 
already below START's first phase limits on delivery vehicles 
and accountable warheads, which do not take effect until 
December 1997.
    Also as of December 1995, over 3,000 strategic warheads 
have been removed from deployment in Belarus, Kazakstan, and 
Ukraine, and over 2,500 of these have been transferred to 
Russia, including all warheads formerly located Kazakstan. The 
remaining warheads in Belarus and Ukraine are scheduled to be 
transferred to Russia in 1996. Furthermore, over 700 missile 
launchers and heavy bombers have been eliminated throughout the 
former Soviet Union. As a result of these eliminations, the 
combined total number of delivery vehicles and accountable 
warheads in the new independent states is also below START's 
first phase limits on these items.

From START to START II

    In January 1992, President Bush proposed to ban MIRVed 
ICBMs and to limit actual warheads to 4,700. He further offered 
to reduce the number of U.S. Trident warheads by one-third. 
Although President Yeltsin agreed with the ban in principle, he 
considered the Bush proposal inequitable since it would affect 
primarily the land-based leg of Russia's strategic triad--
traditionally Russia's forte--while allowing U.S. retention of 
a nuclear advantage in both heavy bombers and submarine-
launched ballistic missile warheads. The impasse was resolved 
by U.S. agreement to deeper cuts in SLBMs. On June 17, 1992, 
Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed a Joint Understanding in 
Washington that paved the way for the formal negotiation of the 
START II Treaty. On that same day they issued the Joint 
Statement on a Global Protection System providing for 
discussion of U.S.-Russian cooperation on ballistic missile 
defense. This followed-up on President Yeltsin's speech at the 
United Nations on January 31, 1992.
    The START II Treaty, in contrast with START, is relatively 
brief and straightforward, calling for two phases of reductions 
in ICBMs, ICBM launchers, ICBM warheads, SLBMs, SLBM launchers, 
SLBM warheads, heavy bombers, and the nuclear payloads loaded 
onto heavy bombers. START II contains limits in some categories 
of weapons not addressed in the START Treaty, and in turn does 
not alter all START limits. In those cases where no limit is 
expressed in the latter treaty, START limits remain applicable.

           COMPARISON OF CENTRAL LIMITS IN START AND START II           
------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Weapon system                START              START II       
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total delivery vehicles.......  1,600...........  No limit specified.   
Warheads attributed to all      6,000...........  3,000-3,500.          
 delivery vehicles.                                                     
Warheads attributable to all    4,900...........  No limit specified.   
 ballistic missiles.                                                    
Warheads attributed to MIRVed   No limit          0.                    
 ICBMs.                          specified.                             
Warheads attributed to heavy    1,540...........  0.                    
 ICBMs.                                                                 
Warheads attributed to mobile   1,100...........  No limit specified.   
 ICBMs.                                                                 
Warheads attributed to SLBMs..  No limit          1,750.                
                                 specified.                             
Warheads attributed to heavy    Discounted by     As actually deployed. 
 bombers.                        50%, or counted                        
                                 as a single                            
                                 warhead.                               
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Besides the deeper cuts, the practical effect of the START 
II Treaty is the elimination of the U.S. MX missile, 
significant reductions in U.S. heavy bombers, and a sublimit on 
the number of warheads to be deployed on SLBMs--all areas of 
comparative advantage for the United States--in exchange for 
elimination of the Russian SS-18 heavy ICBM and a ban on MIRVed 
ICBMs.

Maintenance of the U.S. strategic deterrent

    The committee has concluded that the START II Treaty will 
enhance U.S. security through reducing the overall levels of 
strategic nuclear arms possessed by both Russia and the United 
States, eliminating the Russian SS-18 heavy ICBM, and banning 
the deployment of ICBMs with more than one warhead. At the same 
time, START II does not fundamentally alter the deterrence 
value of the U.S. nuclear force posture, maintaining instead 
the two fundamental concerns of strategic parity and strategic 
stability. Parity undergirds U.S. deterrence strategy by 
ensuring a retaliatory capability threatening unacceptable 
costs that would outweigh benefits. Strategic stability--at 
least in the Cold War, bipolar vein--derives from the types of 
strategic offensive arms deployed by both Parties. In 
particular, stability depends upon an environment in which 
neither side has the incentive to engage in a pre-emptive 
strike. As such, these two concepts are intertwined. In 
testimony before the committee, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvilli, offered his 
judgment that the START II Treaty not only maintains the 
deterrent value of U.S. nuclear forces, but goes further than 
the START Treaty to ensure stability by emphasizing a 
survivable mix of forces. On the subject of parity, General 
Shalikashvilli noted:

          It was our view that with the 3,500 warheads allowed 
        under this treaty we would remain capable of holding at 
        risk a broad enough range of high value political and 
        military targets to deter any rational adversary from 
        launching a nuclear attack against our nation or our 
        allies.
          Last September, we completed the Nuclear Posture 
        Review (NPR)--an effort chartered to determine what 
        roles our nuclear forces must meet to protect against 
        future challenges to U.S. National Security interests. 
        The NPR assumed the post-START II nuclear force levels 
        and its analysis reconfirmed the calculations that were 
        done before and during the negotiations for START II. 
        The review reaffirmed both that we must maintain a 
        viable nuclear deterrent in the post-Cold War world and 
        that 3,500 warheads will be sufficient to hold at risk 
        those assets which any foreseeable enemy would most 
        value--the core determinant of effective deterrence.

On the question of strategic stability, General Shalikashvilli 
further concluded:

          In the past, with MIRVed ICBMs a significant part of 
        the forces of both sides, there was much greater 
        incentive to shoot first during a crisis. The inherent 
        vulnerability of land-based missiles to a first strike, 
        compounded by the consideration of losing the multiple 
        warheads on MIRVed missiles, argued for launching these 
        weapons before they could be disabled by an enemy 
        strike. Thus, eliminating this entire category of 
        nuclear weapons relieves the incentive to launch first, 
        adding greatly to crisis stability. START II also 
        eliminates the last of the heavy ICBMs--the remaining 
        Russian SS-18s--which are hostage to the same logic and 
        are therefore equally destabilizing in a crisis.
          In addition to eliminating these two kinds of 
        systems, the restructuring of our triad made under the 
        terms of this Treaty will improve stability in its own 
        right. Our START II ICBM leg will be a less attractive 
        target than has been the case in the past. That all of 
        our remaining ICBMs will have single warheads will make 
        them less valuable targets than MIRVed missiles. But, 
        in addition, the combined calculus of rough equivalency 
        in overall warheads between us and the Russians, and 
        the fact that all remaining ICBMs will be equipped with 
        single warheads, will make it highly unlikely that 
        Russia will consider launching an effective first 
        strike to disarm our ICBMs. Under the warhead calculus 
        of this Treaty, to achieve the levels of confidence 
        needed to disarm this one leg of our triad would 
        require such a high proportion of Russia's overall 
        warheads that this course would leave the attacker at a 
        significant disadvantage. By any rational calculation, 
        the costs would greatly outweigh any potential gains.

    The committee finds the logic and objectives underpinning 
the U.S. negotiating position on START II to be based on sound 
reasoning concerning the size and composition of nuclear forces 
necessary to retain a credible deterrent force beyond the year 
2003. Notwithstanding significant reductions under START and 
START II, U.S. nuclear forces will continue to be robust enough 
to sustain an appropriate targeting strategy and a suitable 
range of response options, even in the unlikely event of a 
massive first strike. The START II force levels provide enough 
survivable forces which, when coupled with survivable, 
sustained command and control systems, maintain U.S. national 
security. Stability would be further enhanced by a national 
missile defense against limited strikes whether by accidental 
launch or from third countries.

U.S. force survivability

    The START Treaty limits each side to 6,000 accountable 
warheads (of which no more than 4,900 may be deployed on ICBMs 
and SLBMs). START II will limit the two Parties to roughly half 
of that ceiling--to between 3,500 and 3,000 warheads, of which 
no more than 1,750 may be deployed on SLBMs and of which none 
may be deployed on MIRVed or ``heavy'' ICBMs. As can be seen in 
the table below, the Treaty will accomplish deep reductions in 
both U.S. and Russian strategic forces. This table reflects the 
judgment of Secretary of Defense Perry, who stated in testimony 
before the committee that the U.S. allocation of 3,500 
warheads:

          * * * will be divided among ICBM, SLBMs and the bombs 
        and warheads on our bombers. An approximate disposition 
        of this force would be 500 ICBM warheads, fewer than 
        1700 SLBM warheads, and approximately 1300 warheads on 
        bombers. * * * Based on present planning, that is the 
        way we would distribute our forces under START II. I 
        believe this would be, of course, entirely capable of 
        carrying out our mission of strategic deterrence.

                   ILLUSTRATIVE COMPARISON OF U.S. AND RUSSIAN FORCES UNDER START AND START II                  
                              [As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]                              
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         December 1994           START             START II     
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
                                                        U.S.     Russia     U.S.     Russia     U.S.     Russia 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBM warheads.......................................     2,499     6,078     1,444     2,800       500       805
SLBM warheads.......................................     3,648     2,560     3,456     2,096     1,680     1,712
Bomber weapons......................................     4,884     1,784     4,504     1,888     1,260       744
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
      Totals........................................    11,031    10,422     9,404     6,784     3,440     3,261
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Because weapons that are deactivated but not eliminated continue to count under the force limits          
  established in both START and START II, some of the warheads included on this table may be attributable to non-
  operational systems.                                                                                          

    In general, the survivability of U.S. forces depends upon 
the nature of the attack, the mix of strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles employed, and force preparedness. It is commonly 
accepted that the following percentages of warheads would 
survive a first-strike attack:
          --ICBMs in silos (roughly 10 percent survivable)
          --ICBMs on mobile trucks/trains in garrisons (roughly 
        10 percent)
          --ICBMs on mobile platforms scattered to deployment 
        areas (roughly 80-100 percent)
          --SLBMs under normal U.S. operational practices 
        (roughly 65 percent for Tridents)
          --Heavy bomber weapons under day-to-day alert 
        (roughly 30 percent).
    Given these ratios, the committee finds that reductions 
under both START and START II have resulted in a more 
survivable U.S. force structure. Whereas these calculations 
yielded a survivable force estimate of just over 37 percent for 
the pre-START U.S. force posture, that estimate increases to 40 
percent with START fully implemented, and to 44 percent, or 
1,520 warheads, for a post-START II force structure. (500 
ICBMs10%=50 warheads; 1,680 SLBMs65%=1,092 
warheads; 1,260 Bomber Weapons30%=378 warheads; 
total=1,520 warheads.)

Post-START II structure of U.S. forces

    United States maintains a triad of strategic offensive 
forces. In this combination, ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers 
provide a redundant mix of mutually supporting capabilities. 
This is designed, in part, to complicate an aggressors attack 
by requiring the targeting of each independent leg in an effort 
to reduce the effectiveness of a retaliatory second strike. 
Further, the triad serves as a hedge against both a system-wide 
flaw in one or another leg and the possibility of technological 
breakthrough, which might render a component of the triad 
obsolete or vulnerable. Finally, the triad offers flexibility 
in striking military targets. While the bomber leg of the triad 
will undergo deep reductions under START II--28 B-52H bombers 
will be eliminated and all B-1B bombers will be reoriented to 
conventional bombing roles--the composition of the ICBM and 
SLBM legs of the U.S. triad will remain fairly constant. The 
U.S. will operate four fewer Trident submarines and fifty fewer 
ICBMs (all MX missiles having been slated for elimination) than 
it would have under START. General Shalikashvilli contended in 
his testimony before the committee on March 1, 1995, that START 
and START II will improve the viability of the triad by 
eliminating those elements of the Russian force posture which 
most directly threatened its integrity.
    Yet despite the effective retention of the nuclear triad 
posture in the post-START II force structure, the committee is 
concerned that no U.S. bombers are on day-to-day alert at 
present, having been removed from nuclear alert in September 
1991. A short or no-notice attack therefore holds the prospect 
of destroying nearly all of the air-breathing leg of the triad 
as well as the vast majority of U.S. ICBMs, leaving the United 
States dependent upon those Trident submarines patrolling at 
sea. During the Cold War, the U.S. fielded 40 SSBNs. The post-
START II force recommended in the Nuclear Posture Review will 
consist of just 14 Trident submarines (of which only 8 to 10 
would be at sea at any given time). Thus the number of 
submarines that an adversary would need to locate at sea is 
markedly less.
    Second, the committee is concerned that, with no new 
strategic systems under development, the United States will 
possess for the next several decades an aging fleet of 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The last B-52 was produced 
in 1964, and the last Minuteman III ICBM was deployed in 1975. 
Yet these two systems comprise 61 percent of all U.S. nuclear 
delivery vehicles, and will carry 42 percent of the warheads 
allowed the United States. In contrast, it is likely that fully 
three quarters of all of Russia's post-START II strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicles will have been produced after 1985. 
The committee concurs with Admiral Chiles, Commander in Chief, 
U.S. Strategic Command, when he noted in a letter to Secretary 
Perry prior to the public release of the Nuclear Posture Review 
findings:

          With no new strategic systems anticipated for the 
        foreseeable future, the challenge is to maintain 
        existing systems in the absence of a supporting 
        production base. Preservation of key strategic 
        industrial-base capabilities is required to attract and 
        retain the experienced personnel that will be needed to 
        resolve inevitable problems with aging systems.

If the United States is to maintain a credible nuclear 
deterrent, it must accord a high priority to Minuteman life-
extension programs and retention of both the bomber and 
submarine industrial bases.

Implications for the U.S. defense industrial base

    Nowhere are qualitative and quantitative issues so 
intertwined as in the case of the B-2 bomber. The fact that the 
platform is so well positioned to capitalize upon technological 
innovations such as stealth capability, new precision-guided 
munitions, and information warfare, has much to do with its 
cost. Nor is it is surprising to find that the defense 
industrial base responsible for B-2 production has proven very 
sensitive to decreases in procurement. Reduction in the number 
of B-2s to be purchased to a total of 20 aircraft from the 
original plan for 132 has caused dramatic attrition in the 
ranks of subcontractors involved in B-2 production. Nearly half 
of the industry has '``haken out'' between 1989 and 1995. Most 
importantly, key components of the bomber will no longer be 
produced after the construction of the twentieth aircraft. For 
example, the sole producer of the radar-absorbent body core of 
the B-2, the Hexcel Corporation, declared bankruptcy in late 
1993.
    There has been much discussion of late regarding the merits 
of commercial and military integration. Certainly it has often 
been the case that the technologies which have spurred 
technological revolutions originated outside the defense sector 
and were subsequently imported. Both the railroad and 
telegraph, and the rise of commercial automotive and aircraft 
production are excellent examples. Indeed, even the casting 
methods employed to fashion church bells proved applicable to 
creation of artillery tubes, leading the military historian 
Bernard Brodie to comment that ``the early founders, whose task 
had been to fashion bells which tolled the eternal message of 
peace * * * contributed unintentionally to the discovery of one 
of man's most terrible weapons.''
    However, the committee does not agree with Secretary of 
Defense Perry's testimony on March 1, 1994, before a Senate 
Armed Services subcommittee that:

          The rationale for not maintaining the bomber 
        industrial base is that we have a robust commercial 
        base in building large transport planes * * * and 
        [that] we could, in time, pivot from the commercial 
        base to the building of bombers again as we have done 
        in earlier eras in our history.

    This policy ignores the fact that some elements of the 
defense industrial base are so uniquely military in their 
orientation that they are without parallel in the commercial 
sector. Such would be the case for the B-2, whose large 
composite structures depend upon facilities and know-how the 
reconstitution of which would prove an expensive proposition. 
The original development of the B-2, for example, involved $24 
billion in sunk costs. Once dissipated, the loss of 
institutional memory and personnel would prove costly.
    Debate on the preservation of the B-2 industrial base is in 
many respects similar to the discussion over the submarine 
industrial base. While the committee believes uniqueness, in 
and of itself, is not a convincing argument for retention of 
either capability, it does find central to both the B-2 and the 
submarine debates the question of whether or not these 
platforms fulfill important roles, and the extent to which 
their respective industrial capabilities are critical to future 
security requirements. The criticality of these systems to the 
post-START II deterrent posture of the United States is beyond 
question. Together, these two platforms will bear the onus of 
carrying 61 percent of the U.S. nuclear arsenal--just 20 B-2 
bombers will carry over 12 percent of the total, and an even 
fewer number of Trident submarines will carry 49 percent. In 
particular, the stealth capabilities and flexibility of the B-2 
will become increasingly important in a world littered with 
sophisticated technologies such as radar systems, surface-to-
air missiles, and nuclear, chemical, and biological threats.

The ongoing technological revolution

    A number of defense planners have suggested that the United 
States finds itself in the midst of an ongoing ``military-
technical revolution.'' Developments associated with this 
revolution are particularly relevant to the question of how 
U.S. strategic forces will be structured, as well as to efforts 
at anticipating future threats. The Senate is challenged, in 
its consideration of the START II Treaty, to conceptualize 
future conflict in an environment already undergoing dramatic 
transformations. While the United States may seek to use 
emerging technologies in the future to compensate for force 
structure reductions and to maximize platform capabilities, it 
must be well positioned to capitalize upon such a development. 
Naturally the identification of such technologies becomes 
critical. Failure in this respect threatens the U.S. military 
with obsolescence. Just as importantly, such a failure would 
afford other countries the opportunity to offset current 
numerical or qualitative inferiorities vis-vis the U.S. 
deterrent with innovation, or to possibly to realize a sudden 
jump to parity.
    Military-technical revolutions depend not only on the 
emergence of new technologies, but upon the adaptation of 
operations and organizations to maximize the employment of 
cutting-edge capabilities. German integration of aircraft 
operations and radios following the First World War enabled 
them to defeat the French and British in a six-week-long 
combined arms offensive. Today's global positioning receiver 
holds for the future battlefield what the radio posed for the 
Western Front in 1940.
    However, the comparative advantage conferred by a given 
technology tends to be short-lived. The initial advantage by no 
means suggests continued dominance, or even competitiveness. 
This is a lesson of particular relevance to the submarine leg 
of the U.S. triad. It was, after all, the French who made 
substantial advances in sub-surface warfare during the 
nineteenth century, but the Germans who ultimately employed the 
submarine to devastating effect in both World Wars. Forty years 
later, it would seem that current U.S. superiority in this 
dimension of warfare make the Trident SSBN leg of the triad the 
most invulnerable of the three. Yet financial pressures may 
cause this advantage to evaporate, along with the submarine 
industrial base. This is a particularly troubling prospect 
given that Russian work on a fifth generation SSN continues 
apace and that a new Russian SSBN is scheduled to enter 
production shortly after the turn of the century. According to 
a public report issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence: 
``For the first time, Russia's front-line submarines are as 
quiet or quieter in some respects than America's best.'' The 
committee is concerned that, in light of continued Russian 
technological advances and the global spread of sophisticated 
technologies, the loss of the United States' industrial 
capability in either the subsurface or aerospace dimension of 
the battlefield would prove a serious error.

SLBMs

    Under START II the United States will deploy 14 Trident 
submarines, each equipped with 24 D-5 SLBMs. As was to be the 
case under START, roughly half of all U.S. warheads will be 
deployed on submarines. SLBMs will comprise 77 percent of all 
ballistic missiles in the post-START II arsenal (versus 71 
percent under START).

                           ILLUSTRATIVE U.S. SUBMARINE FORCES UNDER START AND START II                          
                              [As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]                              
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          December 1994            Expected, START         Expected, START II   
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       SLBMs       Warheads      SLBMs       Warheads      SLBMs       Warheads 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Poseidon C-3......................           48          480            0            0            0            0
Poseidon C-4......................           96          768            0            0            0            0
Trident C-4.......................          192        1,536          192        1,536            0            0
Trident D-5.......................          168        1,344          240        1,920          336        1,680
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Totals......................          456        3,648          432        3,456          336        1,680
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Heavy bombers

    START II's attribution rules for heavy bombers differ 
significantly from those in START. Under the START Treaty, each 
of the first 150 U.S. bombers equipped to carry air-launched 
cruise missiles (ALCMs) was counted as having 10 warheads, 
though these bombers in fact are capable of carrying as many as 
20 ALCMs. Similarly, each of the first 210 Russian bombers 
equipped with cruise missiles was counted as 8 warheads though 
in reality each could carry up to 16. Every additional ALCM-
equipped bomber would be attributed with the full number of 
warheads that they were equipped to carry. All other bombers 
carrying nuclear gravity bombs or short-range nuclear missiles 
were attributed one warhead (despite the fact that U.S. 
bombers, for example, can carry up to 24 of these weapons). 
These counting rules would have allowed both sides to deploy 
nuclear weapons in excess of the 6,000 warhead limit imposed on 
delivery vehicles by START.
    Under the START II Treaty, bombers are attributed with the 
actual number of warheads with which they can be equipped. As a 
practical matter, this will produce major changes in the heavy 
bomber leg of the U.S. strategic triad. In order to meet the 
3,500 warhead central limit of START II, all B-1B bombers are 
likely to be reoriented to conventional missions. Further, the 
U.S. will retain fewer B-52s in inventory, and may equip many 
of those with 12 ALCMs rather than the 20 allowed under START. 
The committee anticipates that the net effect of changes in 
attribution rules, coupled with lower warhead limits, will be a 
much reduced heavy bomber force of less than 90 bombers 
carrying roughly 1,260 warheads. The committee notes that, all 
other considerations aside, the incorporation of an additional 
20 B-2 bombers into the U.S. force structure would only require 
the retirement of 16 B-52H bombers, thereby increasing the 
number of U.S. strategic nuclear delivery platforms without 
altering the basic warhead allocations of the triad.
    As it now stands, the heavy bomber component will likely 
constitute less than 40 percent of the total number of deployed 
warheads in the total strategic force--a decrease of roughly 10 
percent from the expected START nuclear force posture.

                                             ILLUSTRATIVE U.S. HEAVY BOMBER FORCES UNDER START AND START II                                             
                                                  [As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]                                                  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     December 1994            Expected, START                Expected, START II         
                                                              ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Aircraft     Warheads     Aircraft     Warheads       MOU        Aircraft     Warheads 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B-52G........................................................           53          636            0            0           12            0            0
B-52H........................................................           94        1,880           94        1,880           20       \1\ 66          940
B-1B.........................................................           96        2,304           96        2,304           16            0            0
B-2..........................................................            4           64           20          320           16           20          320
                                                              ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Totals.................................................          247        4,884          210        4,504  ...........           86        1,260
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ B-52G and B-52H.                                                                                                                                    

ICBM's

    The land-based component of the U.S. triad will also be 
significantly reduced under the START II Treaty. Whereas the 
United States planned to field 550 ICBMs under the START force 
posture, under START II it will field 500 missiles, eliminating 
its arsenal of 50 MX Peacekeeper ICBMs with 10 warheads each. 
The Minuteman III, which is to be deployed with one warhead 
under force planning for both Treaties, will become the sole 
ICBM in the U.S. inventory. The land-based share of the total 
U.S. warhead allotment remains unchanged from START to START II 
(at 15 percent). However, the number of ballistic missiles that 
will be deployed on land versus the number deployed at sea will 
decrease to less than one quarter of the total.

                             ILLUSTRATIVE U.S. ICBM FORCES UNDER START AND START II                             
                              [As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]                              
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          December 1994            Expected, START         Expected, START II   
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       ICBMs       Warheads      ICBMs       Warheads      ICBMs       Warheads 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minuteman II......................          409          409            0            0            0            0
Minuteman III.....................          530        1,590          500          944          500          500
MX................................           50          500           50          500            0            0
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Totals......................          989        2,499          550        1,444          500          500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post-START II structure of Russian forces

    Like the United States, Russia maintains a strategic triad 
of land-based, submarine, and bomber forces. Unlike the United 
States, however, Russia's strategic forces are dominated by the 
land-based component. Even more so than in the case of START, 
ICBMs will bear the brunt of Russia's reductions under START 
II. Under START, Russia could be expected to deploy roughly 60 
percent of its ballistic missile warheads on ICBMs. The 
committee anticipates that START II will produce a significant 
shift in the composition of Russian strategic forces, leading 
Russia to deploy approximately 30 percent of its ballistic 
missile warheads on land-based systems. The other 70 percent 
likely will be deployed on SLBMs. Even with this shift in 
priorities, START II will have very little effect on either the 
submarine or bomber-based legs of the Russian strategic triad 
since--in any event--Russia would have eliminated the bulk of 
these systems to comply with START and to reduce maintenance 
and operations costs.

SLBM's

    In the case of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as 
noted previously, START II contains a sublimit of 1,750 SLBMs. 
Projections of Russia's future SLBM force structure are 
contingent upon a number of variables. Given Russian Defense 
Minister Grachev's high prioritization of a new generation of 
ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), the committee believes it 
reasonable to assume that Russia will deploy roughly the 
treaty-maximum number of warheads. One difference, however, may 
be that the SS-N-18 missiles, which would have been downloaded 
under START from seven to three warheads, will instead be 
eliminated.

                         ILLUSTRATIVE RUSSIAN SUBMARINE FORCES UNDER START AND START II                         
                              [As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]                              
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         December, 1994            Expected, START         Expected, START II   
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       SLBM's      Warheads      SLBM's      Warheads      SLBM's      Warheads 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SS-N-6............................           32           32            0            0            0            0
SS-N-8............................          256          256            0            0            0            0
SS-N-17...........................            0            0            0            0            0            0
SS-N-18...........................          208          624          128          384            0            0
SS-N-20...........................          120        1,200          120        1,200          120        1,200
SS-N-23...........................          112          448          128          512          128          512
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Totals......................          728        2,560          376        2,096          248        1,712
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bombers

    According to President Yeltsin, Russia has ceased 
production of heavy bombers. Soviet declarations on bombers in 
the START MOU were already within START limits, and thus no 
reduction in the size of the Russian heavy bomber force was 
anticipated. However, the counting rules for START II differ 
from those of START, attributing the actual number of warheads 
deployed on every heavy bomber. Whereas under START, 150 U.S. 
and 180 Soviet bombers equipped with long-range air-launched 
cruise missiles (ALCMs) were discounted by up to 50 percent, 
and all other bombers equipped with nuclear weapons other than 
ALCMs were counted as having only one warhead, under START II 
these platforms are attributed with their actual nuclear 
payloads. Thus, in a departure from a Russian force structure 
designed to meet START limits, the committee expects that 
Russia may choose to retire or reorient the Bear B/G heavy 
bomber.

                                            ILLUSTRATIVE RUSSIAN HEAVY BOMBER FORCES UNDER START AND START II                                           
                                                  [As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]                                                  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    December, 1994            Expected, START                Expected, START II         
                                                              ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Aircraft     Warheads     Aircraft     Warheads       MOU        Aircraft     Warheads 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bear B/G.....................................................          .35          140           60          240       1 or 2            0            0
Bear H.......................................................           84        1,344           85        1,360      6 or 16           57          912
Blackjack....................................................           25          300           24          288           12            5           60
                                                              ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Totals.................................................          144        1,784          169        1,888  ...........           62          972
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ICBM's

    In order to reach a mix of forces permitted under START II, 
Russia will be required to remove from service roughly 2,500 
warheads deployed on 250 missiles. However, most of this 
reduction will be achieved by the total elimination of the SS-
18 MIRVed heavy ICBM force. Furthermore, because of the MIRV 
ban and the limitations on down-loading, Russia will also be 
forced to eliminate its mobile SS-24 ICBM force (the Russian 
equivalent of the MX).
    While the central numerical limits of START II are 
important, START II requirements for the downloading or 
elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs and the elimination of all of 
Russia's SS-18 missiles--believed to be the only Russian 
missile capable of destroying hardened targets such as ICBM 
silos--are even more important. MIRVed ICBMs deployed in fixed 
silos have long been considered destabilizing by the U.S. since 
they make inviting targets--one attacking warhead delivered 
onto a silo holds the prospect for pre-emptively destroying up 
to ten warheads per missile. This vulnerability in turn is 
thought to contribute, at a minimum, to a ``launch-on-warning'' 
posture, and--in a worst-case scenario--to a first-strike 
nuclear strategy. The committee notes that in 1983, the 
Scowcroft Commission found that ``the Soviets now probably 
possess the necessary combination of ICBM numbers, reliability, 
accuracy, and warhead yield to destroy almost all of the 1,047 
U.S. ICBM silos, using only a portion of their own ICBM 
force.''
    The START Treaty did little to alleviate this concern. 
Although it reduced the number of deployed SS-18s from 308 to 
154, it also reduced the number of U.S. silo-based ICBMs from 
1,000 to 550. Thus the ratio of SS-18 warheads to U.S. silos 
decreased only marginally, from 3.08:1 to 2.80:1. Under START 
II, the elimination of all SS-18 missiles assuages this 
longstanding concern. By altering fundamentally the 
capabilities of the Russian strategic rocket forces, shifting 
Russian emphasis to more survivable platforms such as 
submarines and mobile ICBMs, it is possible that the Treaty 
will also prompt revision of Russia's nuclear posture and 
doctrine.
    START II creates a managed process of nuclear arms 
reductions. While much of Russia's motivation to engage in 
deeper cuts may stem from economic imperatives, reliance upon 
these incentives alone can provide no assurance that reductions 
would be undertaken in a sustained or stabilizing fashion. In 
his testimony before the committee, Ambassador Linton Brooks 
noted that:

          * * * I do not believe that economics and goodwill 
        exchange of information is a substitute for these 
        treaties, because economics will in fact not drive you 
        to a stabilizing force structure. The cheapest way for 
        the Russian Federation to reduce is to keep the new SS-
        24s and the new SS-18s and throw away all that 
        expensive single warhead mobile stuff and all those 
        submarines. That is not in our interest, because it 
        would then lead to a very destabilizing force 
        structure.

    Retention of the SS-18 is not an option under START II. 
Furthermore, by allowing Russia to convert 90 SS-18 silos and 
by relaxing START downloading rules--which will have the 
cumulative effect of allowing Russia to deploy 90 additional 
SS-25 type missiles and to maintain 105 SS-19 missiles--the 
START II Treaty makes more palatable the elimination of the 
newer, ten-warhead SS-24, which probably would have been 
retained by Russia in a START force structure. In addition, 
Russia may deploy several hundred new, single-warhead missiles 
to build-up to the central limits of the START II Treaty. The 
post-START II Russian ICBM force will be significantly smaller 
and different in composition than it is currently.

                            ILLUSTRATIVE RUSSIAN ICBM FORCES UNDER START AND START II                           
                              [As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]                              
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          December 1994            Expected, START         Expected, START II   
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       ICBMs       Warheads      ICBMs       Warheads      ICBMs       Warheads 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SS-11.............................           20           20            0            0            0            0
SS-13.............................           20           20            0            0            0            0
SS-17.............................           11           44            0            0            0            0
SS-18.............................          292        2,920          154        1,540            0            0
SS-19.............................          300        1,800            0            0          105          105
SS-24 silo-based..................           56          560            0            0            0            0
SS-24 rail-based..................           36          360           96          960            0            0
SS-2520...........................          354          354          300          300          700          700
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Totals......................        1,089        6,078          550        2,800          805          805
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     IV. Multilateral Implications

    The committee recognizes that familiar Cold War assumptions 
about Soviet military power as the key threat to U.S. survival, 
the predictability of the rigid, bipolar arena and attendant 
East-West alliances, the rationality of actors and the primacy 
of mutual-assured destruction in deterrence strategy, the 
political, military, and economic role of the United States 
within NATO, the strategic value of nuclear weapons, and the 
global nature of U.S. security concerns can be called into 
question as bases for strategic thought, planning, and action. 
At the same time, the committee believes that we have only a 
rudimentary understanding of the emerging environment with 
which the United States will be forced to contend. The end of 
the Cold War ushered in unprecedented change in several key 
respects, each with significant strategic military 
implications. Already the world has witnessed an increased 
assertiveness by states with regional ambitions; the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and 
the proliferation of conventional armaments, sensitive, dual-
use technologies, and ballistic missile capability.
    The juxtaposition of these trends in countless combinations 
at the regional, state, and sub-state level offer the potential 
for a wide range of conflicts, some of which may impinge upon 
U.S. national security interests. Consequently, this new 
security environment will demand greater recourse to a broad 
range of political, economic, and military responses than did 
the relatively predictable Cold War era. Recent commitments to 
reductions in the U.S. strategic arsenal notwithstanding, the 
committee finds that nuclear deterrence will remain the 
fundamental guarantor of U.S. security. Nuclear weapons will 
serve an indispensable role in U.S. national security policy 
for the foreseeable future. The objective of nuclear arms 
control must therefore be the maintenance of nuclear forces at 
a level commensurate with the nation's national security needs, 
and specifically its targeting requirements. The task of 
understanding the military implications of the START II Treaty 
is rendered challenging since a variety of new threats such as 
regional assertiveness by various states increasingly is likely 
to be coupled with the spread of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and sophisticated conventional weapons systems such as 
ballistic missiles. This creates the potential for an expansion 
in the number of strategic targeting requirements at precisely 
the same time that the U.S. arsenal is being dramatically 
reduced. The committee therefore believes that the United 
States should only proceed with strategic nuclear arms control 
to the extent that an equilibrium is maintained between targets 
and strategic capability.

Further reductions

    The committee finds that nuclear targeting policy and arms 
control can prove mutually reinforcing. Both START and START II 
reduce moderately the U.S. target list, thereby decreasing the 
need for strategic weapons. It has been estimated in open 
source literature that START will eliminate roughly 20 percent 
of the U.S. targeting requirement. Implementation of START II 
will further reduce the number of targets in the single 
integrated operational plan (SIOP), as long as other countries 
do not deploy additional strategic offensive arms. However, the 
committee notes other countries are seeking nuclear capability. 
For example, China not only fields two dozen SLBMs, several 
hundred heavy bomber warheads, and roughly 24 medium and long-
range ballistic missiles, but has several modernization 
initiatives ongoing. The following table uses estimates of 
China's nuclear arsenal drawn from the Carnegie Endowment's 
``Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1995'':

                  ESTIMATES OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL                  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Type                     Operating parameters       Number
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dong Feng-3(3A)/CSS-2 (IRBM)....  DF-3: 2,650 km range/2,150 kg       50
                                   payload/1-3 Mt Warhead DF-           
                                   3A: 2,800 km/2,159 kg/2 Mt           
                                   Warhead.                             
Dong Feng-4/CSS-3 (IRBM)........  4,750 km/2,200 kg/3.3 Mt            20
                                   Warhead/1-3 Mt Warhead.              
Dong Feng-5(5A)/CSS-4 (ICBM)....  DF-5: 12,000 km/3,200 kg/3.3         4
                                   Mt Warhead DF-5A: 13,000 km/         
                                   3,200 kg/4-5 Mt Warhead.             
Dong Feng-21(21A)/CSS-6 (Road-    DF-21: 1,700 km/600 kg DF-          36
 Mobile IRBM).                     21A: 1,800 km/600 kg.                
Julang-1/CSS-N-3 (SLBM).........  1,700 km/600 kg/200-300 Kt          24
                                   Warhead.                             
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to these forces, the Chinese military operates 
several tactical, solid-fuel, road-mobile missiles such as the 
M-9. Further, China is also developing for deployment by the 
end of the 1990s four intermediate and long-range ballistic 
missile systems: the land-mobile Dong Feng-25 (1,700 km/2,000 
kg); the land-mobile Dong-Feng-31 (8,000 km/700 kg/200-300 Kt 
Warhead); the silo-based Dong Feng-41 (12,000 km/800 kg/200-300 
Kt Warhead; and the Julang-2 second-generation SLBM (8,000 km/
700kg/200-300 Kt Warhead).
    Based upon a U.S. Army memorandum provided to the 
Congressional Budget Office detailing the 1991/1992 SIOP for a 
large military-industrial economy, the committee believes the 
counter-force target reductions afforded by START II, largely 
in the areas of silos and launch centers, will allow the United 
States to meet narrowly its targeting requirements. However, 
this depends upon U.S. deployment of the full START II Treaty--
allowable number of warheads, the down-sizing of a sizeable 
percentage of the infrastructure supporting Russia's nuclear 
arsenal, the absence of significant, new nuclear deployments 
elsewhere in the world, and the replacement--rather than 
augmentation--of aging Chinese delivery vehicles with second or 
third generation systems.
    General Colin Powell's stated before the Senate Committee 
on Armed Services on July 28, 1992, that the viability of the 
U.S. strategic triad depends upon the avoidance of ``pressure 
to go lower than START II, precipitously lower than START II, 
so it makes it hard for all three legs to remain coherent legs, 
to make the land-based size too small or the number of bombers 
too low or the number of submarines and warheads and missiles 
aboard too small.'' This statement highlights the importance of 
evaluating carefully further reductions beyond START II. The 
committee will review any such a possibility in light of its 
broad effect upon U.S. national security, targeting 
requirements, and the effect upon the U.S. triad and strategic 
stability.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

    R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence, 
testified in February, 1993, before a Senate Governmental 
Affairs subcommittee that more than twenty-five countries 
either possess or are in the process of acquiring WMD 
capabilities, as well as the means for delivering these 
weapons. The committee is concerned that this trend may be 
exacerbated by the fact that more than thirty thousand warheads 
are scattered throughout Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan, and 
Russia. Adding to this problem--as a consequence of the START 
II Treaty--is the fact that thousands of additional warheads 
will be removed from Russian delivery vehicles and stored in 
facilities where security is suspect. On this matter, the 
committee notes that neither START nor START II require the 
dismantlement of the warheads downloaded to meet treaty limits. 
Thus the size of Russia's fissile material stocks likely will 
increase as warheads are withdrawn to Russia from Belarus, 
Ukraine, and Kazakstan.
    Weakened centralized control in Russia over nuclear 
materials stocks has created a serious proliferation problem. 
Former Director Woolsey also stated in testimony before 
Congress that Russian criminal organizations, in particular, 
have established elaborate infrastructures that ultimately may 
be used to facilitate the transfer of this material to rogue 
states. In the last ten years, the number, size, and range of 
activities of non-state ``criminal'' organizations has 
burgeoned in most regions of the world. President Boris 
Yeltsin, for example, stated in 1993 that organized crime 
constituted a major threat to Russia's strategic interests. The 
committee believes these organizations also threaten the 
security of the United States by potentially accelerating the 
spread of nuclear weapons.
    Regardless of the means by which states seek to acquire 
weapons-grade material, their motivations invariably are 
similar, and may be categorized as either fundamentally 
military, political, or economic in nature. The following list 
of rationales also apply to chemical and biological weapons 
proliferation. In that respect, five Middle Eastern countries 
reportedly possess undeclared offensive biological weapons 
programs--Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and Syria. These five, 
plus Egypt, also possess chemical arsenals. Thus just as it is 
conceivable that a growing number of states will possess 
nuclear devices, is it also likely that the ``poor man's 
bomb''--either biological or chemical weapons--will spread to 
new countries for the following reasons:

      RATIONALES FOR THE ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION     
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Military                  Political             Economic     
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) To deter or coerce a        (1) To obtain        (1) To obtain      
 regional adversary.             international        ``more bang for   
                                 prestige and         the buck.''       
                                 political leverage.                    
(2) To deter a larger power,    (2) To garner        (2) For the        
 such as the United States.      domestic support     benefits and      
                                 and pride.           backward-linkages 
                                                      of a national     
                                                      technical         
                                                      infrastructure.   
(3) To possess a weapon of      (3) To offset a      (3) For their ease 
 last resort.                    lack of extended     of acquisition as 
                                 security             bi-products of    
                                 guarantees, real     civilian          
                                 or perceived.        biological and    
                                                      chemical          
                                                      industrial        
                                                      development.      
(4) To equalize a military                                              
 imbalance, real or perceived.                                          
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The importance accorded to WMD by states is not limited 
solely to the deterrence value these types of weapons afford. 
In fact, the cost-benefit calculus for the acquisition and use 
of these weapons likely will not conform to U.S. conceptions of 
``rationality.'' The committee views this as important since 
General Shalikashvili unequivocally linked the value of U.S. 
strategic offensive weapons to their deterrent effect upon 
``rational'' actors.

The spread of ballistic and cruise missile technology

    The proliferation of WMD is rendered all the more troubling 
by the increasing availability of sophisticated weapons systems 
and sensitive technologies. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
led to a reduction in barriers traditionally blocking arms 
collaboration between many states. Moreover, the increasingly 
competitive nature of the global arms market and reductions in 
military budgets have led many governments and defense 
industries to conclude that collaborative arms development and 
production offer the best prospects for maintaining research, 
development, and production capabilities. As a consequence, the 
transnational design, development, and production of weapons 
systems is becoming increasingly common. Economic trends have 
changed the structure of defense industries worldwide, made 
many sorts of critical and dual-use technology affordable and 
available, and altered states' perspectives on the enforcement, 
efficacy, and economic wisdom of various export controls. 
Although these controls can serve as important retardants on 
the development of ballistic missiles, they have been weakened 
in the United States, Europe, Russia, and elsewhere by the 
quest for access to export markets and an ``export or die'' 
mentality on the part of many firms and governments. This trend 
has increased the diffusion of sensitive technologies and know 
how around the globe.
    Roughly thirty countries already possess ballistic missile 
systems. Nine developing countries also produce ballistic 
missiles--Argentina, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North 
Korea, South Korea, and South Africa. Four others--Brazil, 
Libya, Pakistan, and Syria--are pursuing the means for 
production. The committee is concerned that the number of 
states with ballistic missile arsenals continues to grow, and 
that several states are in the process of acquiring large 
inventories.
    Several industrialized countries also possess cruise 
missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. At least thirty 
other countries are currently seeking to develop cruise missile 
systems. While few cruise missiles can carry a 500 kg nuclear 
warhead, at this point, and while most have a range of less 
than 200 km, most are capable of delivering chemical or 
biological warheads and some missiles exceed 300 km in range. 
The spread of dual-use technologies will enable more effective 
integration of global positioning systems, larger turbojet, 
turbofan, and ramjet engines, larger fuel tanks, and larger 
wings. This will extend range and payload capabilities for 
cruise missiles and reduce their circular error probable (CEP). 
The committee notes that China, for example, has tested a 
supersonic unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and Israel is building 
an air-launched cruise missile with a range of over 400 km.
    Many countries engaged in the development of ballistic and 
cruise missile capabilities have proven alarmingly willing to 
collaborate, both covertly and in some cases quite openly. At 
least ten countries in the Third World and four republics of 
the former Soviet Union field either Soviet-made missiles or 
some variant. The most prevalent evidence of cooperation in 
ballistic missile development is the prominence of the single-
stage, liquid-fueled SCUD-B, which has a range of 300 km and is 
capable of carrying a 1,000 kilogram payload. Libya, North 
Korea, and Egypt have all transferred missiles to other 
countries, and the committee believes China may have sold 
intermediate range missiles to Saudi Arabia, M-11s to Pakistan, 
and missiles or technology to Iran, Syria, and North Korea. The 
latter of these states is now the predominant source of both 
missiles and missile production facilities.
    Ballistic missiles provide an extremely efficient means for 
delivering weapons of mass destruction. When coupled with a 
nuclear, chemical, or biological program, missiles enable 
states to hold at risk neighboring populations, and potentially 
the United States as well. Indeed, the primary motivation for 
acquiring such systems may not be military in nature, but 
political. First and foremost, ballistic missiles armed with 
WMD are instruments of intimidation.
    However, as suggested in the preceding table, they also may 
be used to achieve military objectives. Drawing a number of 
lessons from the Gulf War, Iranian defense planners with recent 
acquisitions have oriented their country's military towards a 
posture presumably designed to deter the United States from 
engaging in military activities in the Gulf. Iranian analysts 
have openly claimed that missile systems represent a critical 
deterrent to outside attack, arguing in the Iranian press that 
Iran should ``build up its own short, medium and long-range 
surface-to-surface as well as surface-to-air missiles.'' 
Another country of concern is North Korea, which is developing 
a series of missiles--the Taepo Dong-1 and -2--with ranges in 
excess of 3,000 kilometers. In sum, the committee believes that 
countries with interests antithetical to those of the United 
States view nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as 
affording the opportunity to offset numerical and qualitative 
conventional inferiorities with the U.S. military.

The problem of post-cold-war deterrence: Who-whom?

    Deterrence during the Cold War was based upon assumptions 
of rationality which allowed states to predict reactions with a 
fair degree of success. Communication and the centralization of 
command and control allowed for mutual familiarity between the 
United States and the Soviet Union over one another's plans for 
reaction in crisis situations. In other words, the potential 
for an action-reaction spiral was controlled by strategic 
parity at the top of the escalatory ladder. The committee 
believes that the Nuclear Posture Review puts forward a START 
II Treaty-compliant force based on Cold War deterrence 
assumptions despite the fact that the post-Cold-War era has 
none of the predictability or parity of its balanced, bipolar 
predecessor.
    The conventional/nuclear balance seems to have reversed 
completely in this new era. Whereas strategic forces were 
previously essential to the U.S. as a means of countering the 
conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, now the commitment 
of conventional forces may prove critical to countering or 
reversing the proliferation of WMD in the Third World. In 
parallel, the acquisition of WMD may be accelerated by desires 
to counter conventional imbalances. This shift was aptly 
enunciated by Chairman Aspin in 1992, when he declared that 
while nuclear weapons may still serve as ``great equalizers,'' 
it is now the United States that is the potential 
``equalizee.''
    In short, the psychological assumptions underpinning the 
doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) may no longer 
prove applicable. The security environment is no longer such 
that deterrence can be postulated in a consistent, reliable 
framework. Instead, the U.S. is posed with the problem of 
determining who is to be deterred and how.
    National objectives and strategic cultures will prove 
critical variables affecting the utility of deterrence. Perhaps 
the greatest challenge for the United States in the next 
century will be to deter regional aggressors that may use 
tactics common to low-intensity conflicts in order to secure 
their objectives. Military power may prove markedly 
asymmetrical in favor of the U.S., thus if conventional 
military action alone does not offer future aggressors 
prospects for success, it will be relegated to a secondary 
role. Operations might be characterized by terrorism, 
subversion, and efforts at blackmail using WMD capabilities. In 
other words, future aggressors may increasingly employ 
strategies that tend towards the indirect and unconventional, 
emphasizing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to deter 
the U.S. and/or allies.
    Accordingly the most important aspects of the country's 
order of battle will not be the number of main battle tanks, 
armored fighting vehicles, and artillery that it fields, but 
the number of nuclear, chemical, and biological munitions, 
types of delivery systems, and access to commercial satellite 
communications networks it possesses, and the way it seeks to 
shield these capabilities--presumably among civilians or 
hostages--from the deep-strike capabilities of the United 
States. The committee therefore concludes that nuclear 
deterrence will require additional flexibility, require a case 
by case approach, and may prove to have reduced efficacy in 
some instances.

Theater missile defense

    The threat to the United States is changing. In responding 
to the challenge of proliferation, the United States has four 
options at its disposal: (1) deterrence against the use of the 
system in question; (2) unilateral counter-proliferation 
initiatives; (3) the use of arms control and nonproliferation 
endeavors to restrict the spread of WMD systems and dual-use 
technologies; and (4) passive and active defenses against the 
use of WMD and ballistic/cruise missiles.
    At the theater level, WMD proliferation and the spread of 
missile delivery vehicles will likely circumscribe U.S. crisis 
response capability. The use of forward-based tactical 
platforms such as aircraft carriers will become more difficult 
with the increased likelihood that U.S. forces will be detected 
and engaged at their points of entry into theater. Indeed, the 
fact that a number of regional powers are actively seeking 
missile capability and nuclear weapons may ultimately preclude 
the U.S. military from forward deployments unprotected by 
ballistic missile defenses. It is with this logic that the 
Director of the Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment, 
Andrew Marshall, has warned against the creation of ``large, 
juicy targets.'' Moreover, the spread of these technologies 
raises the possibility that states may seek to deter the U.S. 
from intervening at all in a region in defense of its security 
interests. Some on the committee therefore view as critical the 
development of effective theater missile defenses (TMD) to 
protect U.S. troops, and is concerned that the effectiveness 
and capability of programs such as the Theater High Altitude 
Area Defense, Navy Upper Tier, and Brilliant Eyes systems not 
be constrained. Other members would oppose any program or 
development that jeopardizes the continued viability of the ABM 
Treaty. In response, some feel that any deliberate degradation 
of a TMD system's capability holds the prospect of rendering 
U.S. troops more vulnerable than need be the case, or than is 
acceptable, in the turbulent post-Cold War environment.
    The committee is concerned that the Administration is 
considering an expansion of the ABM Treaty's limitations to 
include TMD systems through a joint declaration, and intends to 
exercise its constitutional responsibilities to review 
carefully for advice and consent any proposed modification or 
multilateralization of the Treaty, or agreement to limit the 
location or deployment of theater missile defenses.

National missile defense

    The committee notes that the United States remains a party 
to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limits the 
development and deployment of national missile defenses. The 
intent of that treaty, formulated in the midst of the Cold War, 
was to circumvent the possibility of an expensive and 
potentially dangerous action-reaction spiral whereby the United 
States and the Soviet Union sought to overcompensate for one 
another's ballistic missile defenses by increasing their 
offensive arsenals.
    Some on the committee feel that robust missile defense 
programs have proven conducive to promoting arms control 
initiatives. In the 1980s, the Strategic Defense Initiative 
helped break the ``log-jam'' on offensive reductions, directly 
contributing to conclusion of the Intermediate-range Nuclear 
Force Treaty, and indirectly to START and the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The committee notes that 
the Joint Understanding of June 17, 1992--which created the 
framework for the START II Treaty--was concluded in conjunction 
with a Joint Statement on a Global Protection System signed on 
the same day. This fact is explicitly referenced in the 
Preamble to the START II. However, the committee is concerned 
that U.S.-Russian discussions on cooperation on defenses 
against ballistic missiles have fallen by the wayside.
    The Chairman believes a number of factors combine to bring 
into question the value of the ABM Treaty in the post-Cold War 
world. Major technological advances have been made by Russia 
and the U.S. in the last quarter of a century. Also, there has 
been a considerable improvement in relations between the two 
countries following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. At its 
most basic level, the logic of the ABM Treaty assumes hostility 
between Russia and the United States. Clearly, while a certain 
degree of wariness still permeates U.S.-Russian relations, the 
world has moved beyond the Cold War. Further, the mounting 
problem of WMD and ballistic missile proliferation, the 
uncertainties of the new security environment which complicate 
the role of deterrence, and continuing concerns over the 
potential for turbulence in the former Soviet Union all suggest 
that--in a world of multiple potential nuclear threats--the 
most likely nuclear danger to the U.S. is not a massive, pre-
emptive Russian strike, but the deliberate or accidental launch 
of a few warheads. Such a danger is unpredictable, 
undeterrable, and something to which the United States--
currently without any national missile defense whatsoever--is 
completely vulnerable.
    Some on the committee believe that this argument can easily 
be carried too far. They believe it ignores the fact that the 
United States has no effective defense against bomber attack or 
transport of a nuclear device by terrorists. More importantly, 
it completely discounts U.S. intelligence capabilities and our 
considerable economic, diplomatic, and military strengths to 
deal with such a threat. Consistent with this view, the least 
desirable solution would be to spend tens of billions of 
dollars developing and deploying a terminal defense, anti-
ballistic missile system.
    In this later respect, the committee notes that though the 
possibility of an outright nuclear exchange between Russia and 
the United States is at an all-time low, the risk of mishap has 
not decreased proportionately to reductions in the Russian 
nuclear arsenal. In fact, the post-START II Russian force will 
be far more mobile than its predominantly silo-based 
predecessor. This poses a potential problem for command and 
control of the arsenal in the event of internal turmoil in 
Russia
    While some on the committee disagree with this assessment, 
others conclude that the reduction of the U.S. strategic 
offensive arsenal under START and START II must be conducted in 
connection with a review of U.S. deterrence doctrine and the 
value of strategic missile defenses in ensuring U.S. national 
security. In conclusion, the Chairman notes that a clearly 
articulated defense strategy and credible national missile 
defense system can possess a deterrent value of their own, and 
need not threaten the viability of the Russian nuclear triad.

                     V. Verification and Compliance

    START II builds upon the verification provisions 
established in the START Treaty. Unless otherwise specified, 
the counting rules, notifications, verification, conversion, 
and elimination procedures from START are used in START II. 
Having already concluded that the START Treaty is essentially 
verifiable (see Exec. Rept. 102-53, pp. 27-64 for the 
committee's analysis of START's verifiability), the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff analyzed START II to determine whether its 
additional verification procedures, in conjunction with those 
of START, offer the United States an acceptable level of 
confidence in verifying compliance and in detecting significant 
violations, and whether the verification procedures provide 
essential safeguards for protecting U.S. national security 
assets against unnecessary or unwarranted intrusion. The 
committee concurs, in general, with the Joint Chiefs' 
assessment that START II's verification procedures are adequate 
for monitoring Russian compliance while remaining sufficiently 
restrictive to safeguard U.S. interests.

Militarily significant violations

    The committee notes that a lack of consensus exists over 
the definition of ``military significance.'' All violations, 
intentional or otherwise, are significant. With dramatically 
lower levels of strategic offensive arms, the degree of risk to 
national security posed by possible violations is 
proportionately greater for even minor cases of noncompliance. 
The danger is that the resulting inequalities may undermine 
strategic parity. Thus a military significant violation would 
be one upsetting the strategic equilibrium maintained between 
the United States and Russia, and between U.S. targeting 
requirements and strategic nuclear assets. Such a violation 
inevitably would necessitate an adjustment in the U.S. force 
structure. Therefore, as then-Secretary of State James Baker 
put it in testimony before the committee in January, 1992, a 
key criterion in evaluating whether a treaty is verifiable ``is 
whether, if the other side attempts to move beyond the limits 
of the Treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be 
able to detect such a violation before it became a threat to 
national security.''
    That said, the quantifiability of ``significance'' is less 
than clear. Secretary of Defense Perry set a fairly high 
benchmark when he argued before the committee on March 1, 1995, 
that:

          It is clear that * * * the violation would have to 
        result in an increase of a substantial number of 
        warheads, certainly measured in the many hundreds to 
        have a chance of meeting this definition of military 
        significance.

For its part, the committee assesses a lower threshold to the 
question of military significance, and is more concerned about 
noncompliance in terms of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 
than warheads. The committee expects the projected U.S. warhead 
stockpile after implementation of START II to total roughly 
8,500 (including spares), and to be adequate to ensure U.S. 
national security in the near term.


                          THE PROJECTED U.S. STOCKPILE AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF START II                         
                                 [Prepared for Tri-Valley CARE's by Greg Mello]                                 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Weapon             Use             Yield (Kt)       No.               Produced              IHE \1\  FRP \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B61-7........  Strategic bomb.....  c. 10-350.......     450  1985-(pits 1966-1971)...........     yes       no 
B61-mods 3/4/  Tactical bomb......  1-150...........     100  1979-1990.......................     yes       no 
 10.                                                                                                            
W76..........  SLBM C-4/D-5.......  100.............   1,280  1978-1987.......................      no       no 
W80-0........  SLCM...............  5 & 150.........     350  1984-1990.......................     yes       no 
W80-1........  ALCM...............  5 & 150.........     400  1982-1990.......................     yes       no 
B-83.........  Strategic bomb.....  low to 1,200....     500  1983-1990.......................     yes      yes 
W87-0........  ICBM...............  300.............     500  1986-1989.......................     yes      yes 
W88..........  SLBM D-5...........  475.............     400  1989-1990.......................      no       no 
                                                                                                                
            Reserve stockpile after START II (``Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,'' Jan./Feb. 1995)            
                                                                                                                
W76..........  SLBM C-4/D-5.......  100.............   1,000  1978-1987.......................      no       no 
W78..........  ICBM...............  335.............   1,000  1979-...........................      no       no 
B53-1(?), B61  Gravity bombs and    5 to 1,200;        1,500  B-53: 1962-1965.................                  
 & B83, W80-1.  ALCM's.              9,000 for B53-1.                                                           
(1)B53 lacks                                                                                                    
 IHP, FRP, or                                                                                                   
 full                                                                                                           
 electrical                                                                                                     
 safety                                                                                                         
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total weapons after START II: Roughly 8,500 (including spares).                                                 
                                                                                                                
\1\ IHE: Internal High Explosive; FRP: Fire Resistant Pit.                                                      


    In order to retain a sufficiently-sized stockpile, the 
committee expects the Department of Energy to regulate its 
warhead disassembly process. According to a Clinton 
Administration response to questions asked by Senator Lugar 
during the course of committee consideration of START II, DOE 
has dismantled nearly 8,200 warheads in the last six fiscal 
years as follows:

                           Weapons dismantled

Year:                                                                No.
    1989.......................................................... 1,208
    1990.......................................................... 1,151
    1991.......................................................... 1,595
    1992.......................................................... 1,303
    1993.......................................................... 1,556
    1994.......................................................... 1,371

    The committee notes that the assembly of a nuclear weapon 
is an exacting procedure requiring approximately 2,000 steps to 
combine hundreds of subassemblies and parts (depending upon the 
type of weapon or warhead). Because reconstitution of the U.S. 
stockpile would prove a time-consuming enterprise, a balance 
must be struck between warhead dismantlement and the 
maintenance of a hedge against Russian noncompliance. The same 
can be said for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. However, 
the committee finds that the potential uploading of all 
multiple warhead Trident II D-5 buses and reorientation of the 
B-1B heavy bomber provide acceptable interim assurances against 
even a dramatic breakout in SNDVs deploying as many as 2,500 
additional warheads. It is in this context that the committee 
believes the aforementioned U.S. stockpile will prove adequate, 
and expects all C-4 SLBMs to be back-fitted for the D-5. The 
committee further urges the Administration, as an additional 
assurance, to retain in storage all multiple warhead Minuteman 
III buses if they are replaced with single-warhead buses.
    These measures will prove sufficient to meet the national 
security needs of the United States in the near term. However, 
some on the committee are concerned that through neglect and 
the application of some types of environmental restrictions the 
infrastructure supporting the U.S. nuclear deterrent has 
entered a precipitous decline. With the last U.S. warhead 
having been manufactured five years ago, and a cut-off on 
tritium production (which has a half-life of 12.3 years), U.S. 
warheads will eventually lose their effectiveness. Purified 
tritium gas from retired warheads will only meet U.S. stockpile 
requirements for perhaps another fifteen years--yet the restart 
of tritium production likely will take that long. Russia, on 
the other hand, continues the manufacture of highly-enriched 
uranium, plutonium, and tritium, and will not encounter such a 
dilemma. The committee believes this issue to be of looming 
importance to the maintenance of a viable nuclear deterrent 
under the START II Treaty.

U.S. verification issues under START II

    Verification of START II will be based largely upon 
capabilities and provisions designed to verify START, and 
generally reflect the same assumptions and considerations. The 
two central elements of START II are the elimination of MIRVed 
ICBMs (including all heavy ICBMs) by the year 2003, and deeper 
reductions in the same basic categories of strategic offensive 
arms as START. Accordingly, the conceptual basis for 
verification of START II verification is the same as that for 
START. The same capabilities and measures that provide for 
verification of START limits on launchers, missiles, and 
attributable warheads will be relied upon to verify the lower 
aggregate limits of START II. The combination of START and 
START II-mandated on-site inspections, U.S. National Technical 
Means, and the increasing transparency of Russian society will 
afford the United States opportunity to detect in a timely 
fashion a violation of the magnitude contemplated by Secretary 
Perry in his aforementioned testimony. The committee notes, 
though, that there are some types of violations which the U.S. 
will find difficult to detect. The Deputy Director of 
Intelligence for the Central Intelligence Agency, Douglas 
MacEachin, stated in testimony before the committee on February 
28, 1995:

          As with monitoring START I, the Intelligence 
        Community will be able to monitor many--and the most 
        significant--provisions of START II with high 
        confidence. In some areas, though, we will have 
        uncertainty.

    START II will necessitate--in addition to the monitoring of 
locational prohibitions and qualitative restrictions on 
technical characteristics and capabilities (such as re-entry 
vehicle telemetry data and throw-weight) as provided for by 
START--the following new tasks:
          Monitoring deployed warhead reduction to 3,500;
          Monitoring the sublimit of 1,750 for SLBMs;
          Monitoring the ban on the flight-testing, 
        acquisition, and deployment of MIRVed ICBMs after 
        January 1, 2003;
          Verifying the conversion of up to 90 SS-18 silos to 
        accommodate the smaller, SS-25 type missile, and 
        continued compliance with START II's conversion 
        provisions;
          Monitoring Russian compliance with START II 
        downloading rules for 105 SS-19 ICBMs;
          Monitoring the payloads of Russian heavy bombers; and
          Monitoring the activities of Russian heavy bombers 
        reoriented to conventional roles.
    To augment the intelligence community's capabilities in 
fulfilling these responsibilities, the START II Treaty provides 
for four new types of on-site inspections in addition to the 
thirteen types allowed under START. These inspections consist 
of observations of all the eliminations of SS-18s that are not 
launched to destruction, inspection of converted SS-18 silos, 
four additional re-entry vehicle inspections per year at 
converted SS-18 silo sites, and weapons bay inspections of 
heavy bombers during all short-notice and special heavy bomber 
exhibitions. Furthermore, START II provides for a detailed 
exchange of data beyond that required under START on heavy 
bombers, the downloading of missiles, heavy ICBM elimination, 
and SS-18 silo conversion. For a full discussion of the 
intelligence community's monitoring responsibilities for the 
START Treaty, the committee refers to its report for that 
treaty (Exec. Rept. 102-53, pp. 27-64 for the committee's 
analysis of START's verifiability).
    All of these measures depend in some fashion upon Russian 
cooperation. Even with new inspections and data exchanges, the 
committee underscores the necessity for the intelligence 
community to continue to rely upon U.S. NTM to verify the 
Treaty. Given uncertainties about Russia's political future, 
the committee believes the maintenance of an independent 
collection means to be critical and is concerned about Deputy 
Director Douglas MacEachin's statement from the aforementioned 
testimony that:

          The Intelligence Community has reduced its resources 
        devoted to Russian military developments across the 
        board and since 1993, when the Senate first considered 
        the START II Treaty we have witnessed a steady erosion 
        of trained analysts on Russian strategic forces issues.

Furthermore, there are differences in the two treaties that add 
to, modify, or in a few cases reduce, U.S. verification 
challenges. For example, while the ability of the United States 
to verify aggregate numbers of deployed ICBM silo-based 
missiles and their associated launchers and deployed SLBM 
launchers and their associated missiles is generally the same 
and subject to the same concerns and considerations, START II 
requires the elimination or conversion of all deployed and non-
deployed mobile launchers of MIRVed ICBMs, with the exception 
of launchers for ICBMs (other than heavy ICBMs) permitted at 
space launch facilities. The Treaty also requires that the 
number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to 
which more than one warhead is attributed be reduced to zero. 
It further allows downloading by more than four warheads of the 
SS-19 missile. Since the SS-24 ICBM is attributed with ten 
reentry vehicles, all SS-24 launchers (except those permitted 
for space launch purposes) must be eliminated or converted to 
launchers of single-warhead ICBMs. Consequently, after the end 
of the elimination period, the problems associated with 
verifying numbers of deployed rail-mobile ICBMs and launchers 
(generally the most difficult deployed systems to verify) will 
be reduced since any single detection of such a launcher 
(except at a space launch facility), or of an SS-24 missile 
loaded in any launcher, would be a clear Treaty violation.
    Heavy ICBMs must be eliminated under START II, and their 
launchers must be eliminated or converted. Currently, the 
United States can confidently verify the number of deployed 
heavy ICBMs and their silo launchers. This should remain true 
even after the conversion of up to 90 heavy ICBM silos. For a 
cheating scenario involving the covert deployment of illegal 
heavy ICBMs in converted heavy ICBM silos to be successful, 
several things would have to be achieved. First, the silo would 
have to be reconverted without detection (or the conversion 
would have to be successfully ``faked''). Second, a clandestine 
supply of heavy ICBMs would have to be available. Third, the 
illegal missiles would have to be transported to the silos, 
installed, and fueled without detection. Each of these steps 
likely would prove complicated enough that, taken together, 
such an effort would be very difficult for the Russians to 
accomplish without detection.
    Under current Russian practices, the United States has high 
confidence in its ability to identify the type of ICBM deployed 
in a given launcher. Since the U.S. also has similarly high 
confidence in which types of ICBMs have been tested with more 
than one warhead, the U.S. expects to remain capable of 
verifying the ban on fixed launchers for MIRVed ICBMs once it 
goes into effect. Further, the ban on flight testing or 
launching (other than space launches) of MIRVed ICBMs should 
reinforce these confidences over time.
    However, there are scenarios for which U.S. confidences 
could be significantly lower. These involve covert deployment 
of previously developed MIRVed ICBMs, the deployment of MIRVed 
missiles such as SLBMs in heavy ICBM silos instead of the 
single-warhead missile allowed, the uploading of warheads on 
existing buses such as on the SS-19, the deployment of heavy 
bombers with more warheads than currently attributed, and 
Russian break-out of the SS-25 mobile missile.

Warheads on deployed ballistic missiles

    Cheating scenarios involving the testing of ICBMs in ways 
designed to conceal the maximum numbers of warheads with which 
they have been tested, with which they are capable of 
releasing, or involving deception with respect to the weight of 
the lightest re-entry vehicle released, will be countered 
significantly by U.S. interpretation of telemetry data. 
Furthermore, after January 1, 2003 launches of MIRVed ICBMs 
with re-entry vehicles will be prohibited. The committee notes 
that Russia will be allowed to launch non-heavy, MIRVed ICBM 
airframes without reentry vehicles from space launch facilities 
after 2003, though these activities too will be monitored by 
U.S. NTM. On the other hand, since MIRVed SLBMs will still be 
permitted, no similar restriction will be applied. The 
committee is concerned with the possible development of a 
common missile (one developed for use as both an ICBM and an 
SLBM) that would complicate verification questions.
    Further, because for the purposes of economy the U.S. 
agreed to relax the START requirement that multiple reentry 
vehicle buses be removed, Russia will be allowed to retain its 
six-warhead bus on the SS-19. The START II Treaty contains 
provisions tailored to allow Russian retention of 105 SS-19s. 
The committee notes that this provides one of the most obvious 
break-out potentials in the START II Treaty, since over a short 
period of time Russia could upload these ICBMs and restore 525 
warheads to its arsenal. The United States, on the other, 
likely will remove its three-warhead buses for the Minuteman 
III arsenal and will be unable to respond without a massive 
retrofit operation. This possible liability can be offset only 
by the uploading potential of the Trident II D-5 which, though 
having a smaller ``footprint'' than the Minuteman III, is also 
widely believed to have hard-target kill-capability, and by 
continued viability of the U.S. strategic triad.

The conversion of SS-18 silos

    START II presents a different problem with regard to 
converted heavy ICBM silos. START II provides for on-site 
inspection to confirm the required conversion procedures for 
heavy ICBM silos. After the completion of these specified 
procedures, the Treaty also allows Russia to carry out further 
conversion measures, presumably to complete conversion for a 
single-warhead missile. However, the Treaty does not provide 
for any on-site inspection or other specified access to observe 
or fully identify the nature of these later conversion 
procedures. Although the Treaty prohibits emplacement in such 
converted silos of a missile with a launch canister greater 
than 2.5 meters in diameter, and the Russians have undertaken a 
political commitment to deploy in these converted launchers 
only a single-warhead ICBMs of the SS-25 type, the possibility 
exists that Russia could further modify the converted SS-18 
silos to enable them to launch a different missile than the one 
declared.

Heavy bombers and attributable warheads

    The START II Treaty requires that, unless all of a given 
type or variant of heavy bomber are reoriented to a 
conventional role, there must be differences observable to NTM 
and visible during inspections, between heavy bombers. However, 
these required differences are left to the choice of the 
reorienting Party, and there is no requirement that they be 
functionally related. Moreover, inspections of heavy bombers 
reoriented to a conventional role are limited to inspecting 
only the observable differences in the bombers, and not the 
internal portions of weapons bays. Under these circumstances, 
it would not be difficult for the Russians to actually load 
reoriented bombers with nuclear weapons if they so chose. The 
committee recognizes that Russia might plan to use them in that 
fashion in either a breakout scenario, or in contingency 
planning surrounding Russian verification of U.S. compliance 
with START II. Though START II provides additional restrictions 
on reoriented bombers, these only modestly increase the risk of 
detection in this scenario. Separate basing makes easier the 
counting of declared bombers, but due to the inherent mobility 
of aircraft, this will not prove meaningful in terms of 
preventing the pickup (or delivery) of nuclear weapons.
    Warhead attribution for bombers is meant to capture the 
number of nuclear weapons for which the type bomber is actually 
equipped. In other words, bombers will be attributed with a 
number of warheads supposedly equal to the number with which 
that type of bomber is operationally deployed. Inspecting 
Parties will only be able to confirm at an exhibition the 
number of nuclear weapons that the exhibiting Party loads on 
the bomber at that time. This number may not necessarily prove 
the maximum number for which the bomber is designed to carry or 
is capable of carrying. The committee believes it is possible 
for both the United States and Russia to equip a bomber with 
more weapons than specified. However, while the detection of 
such activities designed to equip a bomber with more weapons 
than specified might be difficult, the testing and regular 
training required to maintain this sort of capability on a day-
to-day operational basis would likely be detected over time. As 
a consequence, such scenarios would appear to be more suited to 
breakout than cheating.

Monitoring mobile missiles

    Perhaps the most significant verification concern for the 
United States is a potential mismatch between Russia's 
anticipated modernization programs and U.S. capabilities to 
monitor mobile missile deployments and missile inventories. 
According to testimony before the committee on several 
occasions, the Intelligence Community's confidence will be 
highest when monitoring mandated restrictions such as the 
elimination of SS-18 ICBMs and when accounting for the number 
of deployed silo-based single-warhead ICBMs, submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers remaining in the Russian 
arsenal. In addition, the ban on MIRVed ICBMs will be managed 
through tracking the elimination of MIRVed ICBM launchers and 
by analyzing the flight test data of new missiles.
    With the signing of the START Treaty, Russia and the United 
States have demonstrated telemetry tapes and installed 
telemetry playback equipment on one another's territory. Thus 
the Intelligence Community is now receiving telemetry tapes and 
associated interpretive data which will provide the United 
States a measure of confidence that many START and START II 
provisions, such as the ban on flight-testing more than one re-
entry vehicle, are being observed.
    However, as MIRVed ICBM systems are eliminated, the 
committee expects the single-warhead SS-25 road-mobile force to 
expand. The monitoring of missile production activity and 
mobile missile deployments has proven more difficult than the 
monitoring of reductions in other systems. During its 
consideration of the START Treaty, then-Director of Central 
Intelligence, Robert Gates, testified in open session that:

          Not surprisingly, the same areas where we have the 
        most concern with regard to monitoring the [START] 
        treaty provisions are the areas where we would be most 
        concerned about cheating. Because of the inherent 
        covert nature of mobile missiles, the cheating 
        scenarios that would be particularly troublesome are 
        those that would involve the covert production and 
        deployment of such missiles and their launchers.

    An outgrowth of the historical difficulty in monitoring 
missile production is that estimates of Russia's nondeployed 
missile inventory are less than certain. While Russia is not 
believed to have maintained a large-scale program to store 
several hundred or more undeclared, nondeployed strategic 
ballistic missiles, it is possible that some undeclared 
missiles have been stored at unidentified facilities. Since the 
mobile SS-25 likely will become the mainstay of the land-based 
leg of the Russian strategic triad the committee is concerned 
about possible imbalances in deployed SNDVs.
    Counterbalancing this concern somewhat, are a number of 
interlocking provisions in the START Treaty regarding mobile 
missiles. These provisions render more easily detectable any 
militarily significant, covert deployment of Russian mobile 
missiles. Though the effectiveness of a combination of 
provisions, ranging from continuous portal monitoring of the 
Votkinsk facility (where the SS-25 currently is produced) to 
suspect site inspections and locational restrictions on mobile 
ICBMs, stages, and solid rocket motors, can only be gauged over 
time, the committee believes these provisions to be adequate, 
provided Russia continues along the path to greater openness. 
Failing that, new concerns over Russian motivations to engage 
in clandestine activity may emerge, calling into question the 
verifiability of both START and START II.
    Secretary Perry underscored the importance of Russian 
openness when he stated that:

          There are three factors which make cheating, I think, 
        improbable in START II. The first is just the general 
        openness of communications and exchange of personnel 
        which now exists between our two countries. For 
        example, I have, myself, been to the Russian test range 
        at Baikinur. I have been to the operational test side 
        at Pervomaysk. I have examined the missiles and their 
        control centers in great detail. I have discussed 
        detailed issues about these programs with the 
        scientists in the program and with the operational 
        officers in the Strategic Rocket Forces. That kind of 
        communication makes it very difficult to execute 
        successfully a cheating program.

    For his part, General Shalikashvili noted:

          * * * we think it is very difficult to picture a 
        scenario that would give an advantage to the Russians 
        to cheat. They have already, under the treaty, the 
        ability to successfully accomplish deterrence and 
        accomplish the military task of covering necessary 
        targets. So any cheating would at best give them some 
        ability to increase their reserve. And the cost of 
        being caught at cheating would far outweigh any of that 
        advantage.
          Therefore, I see very little incentive for them to 
        cheat, but I am also very confident that should they, 
        we would be in a very good position through the 
        inspections and verification procedures, to detect 
        that.

Motivations to cheat and the Russian record of compliance

    These assurances, in and of themselves, cannot constitute 
an acceptable level of comfort with the verification provisions 
of START II. Senate consideration of the START II Treaty will 
take place in the context of growing concern about the economic 
and political stability of the Russian Federation as well as 
growing tensions with its newly-independent neighbors. Even as 
START has been ratified by all Parties and each signatory has 
undertaken steps to accelerate its implementation, tensions 
have increased between Russia and neighboring states as a 
result of Russian military action in Chechnya. Moscow has 
simultaneously begun to reorder Russia's ``legitimate'' 
security requirements in both the conventional and nuclear 
areas. The military implications of rising tensions within 
Russia and on its peripheries are not clear but portend 
difficulties for any arms control accord. The committee is 
concerned that the poor showing of the Russian army in Chechnya 
and the dismal outlook for Russian conventional forces in the 
near- and mid-term have revived interest in certain circles in 
a ``cheap nuclear fix.'' Certainly suspicions about Russian 
nuclear intentions could create delays on the part of Ukraine 
and Kazakstan in meeting their de-nuclearization commitments, 
and may prompt the U.S. to reconsider its posture.
    Despite all of this, the committee believes the Senate 
should ratify the START II Treaty, demanding that the Russian 
Federation break with its own lackluster treaty compliance 
track-record and that inherited from its predecessor. It is 
critical that Russia alter its behavior, for example with its 
ongoing biological weapons program, its failure to begin 
implementing the Bilateral Destruction Agreement for its 
chemical weapons program, its failure to meet the time-line for 
destruction under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe, and persistent evidence of Russian noncompliance with 
the ABM Treaty. The committee believes some of these 
difficulties may be attributable to a Cold War overhang in 
strategic culture and weapons programs, and that START II 
affords a useful means of dialogue and engagement. In the 
balance, the committee has determined that, with the triad of 
3,500 warheads remaining once START II is implemented, the size 
and mix of U.S. nuclear forces will be sufficient to deter 
Russia even in the event of a break-out.

                      VI. START II Implementation

    The Department of Defense and the Congressional Budget 
Office have both provided preliminary cost estimates of START 
II implementation using the following assumptions: (1) the 
United States will draw down to the aggregate limit of no more 
than 3,500 warheads by January 1, 2003; (2) this reduction will 
include the elimination of all Peacekeeper launchers; (3) the 
United States will retain 14 Trident submarines, with each 
Trident II D-5 downloaded to 5 warheads. These assumptions are 
based on the results of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), but 
do not reflect NPR programmatic costs.
    These estimates also assume that the United States will 
exercise all START II on-site inspection rights, including 
those for the elimination of all SS-18 missiles and their 
launch canisters, the conversion of 90 SS-18 silos and the four 
additional reentry vehicle on-site inspections (RVSOI) allowed 
annually at converted SS-18 silos. Likewise, heavy bomber 
inspection and protection are included in these figures.
    A preliminary estimate suggests that the total costs might 
amount to approximately $201.9 million between 1995 and the end 
of the second Treaty reduction phase in 2003. These costs break 
are as follows:

                                                                 Million
Elimination of MIRVed ICBMs....................................... $42.5
Reduction of deployed SLBM warheads............................... 110.0
ICBM launcher elimination.........................................  14.5
Bomber exhibitions................................................   1.3
Data reporting....................................................   2.0
Bomber conversion.................................................  10.5
Verification of SS-18 silo conversion.............................  12.6
Verification of missile and launch canister elimination...........   2.8
Verification of rail-mobile ICBM launcher elimination.............   2.9
Additional reentry vehicle inspectors.............................   2.8
                        -----------------------------------------------------------------
                        ________________________________________________
      Total....................................................... 201.9

    The figures show the total estimated cost of U.S. 
compliance to be approximately $180.8 million with the majority 
of that (about 61 percent) to be dedicated to deployed SLBM 
warhead reductions. Total START II costs for verification of 
Russian compliance are approximately at $21.1 million, with the 
verification of silo conversions representing about 60 percent 
of that total.
    It is important to contrast these relatively small, eight 
year costs for START II with the START implementation costs for 
just FY1994 and FY1995. For this period, the Department of 
Defense budgeted approximately $180 million for START 
implementation. This investment forms the basis for meeting 
START II requirements and will allow these reductions to be 
undertaken at moderate cost.
    Two additional inspection and security issues are worthy of 
mention. First, START II does not add any new inspectable 
facilities in the U.S. (although the portion of Whiteman A.F.B. 
where the B-2 bomber is deployed will be subject to inspection 
under START II only). This will help minimize costs as well as 
security concerns. Second, U.S. heavy bombers, particularly the 
B-2, will be subject to more intrusive exhibitions and 
inspections than under the START Treaty. The START II Treaty 
requires inspections to verify that heavy bombers are not 
actually equipped for more nuclear weapons than declared, but 
also allows portions of the heavy bomber not related to this 
determination to be shrouded. The U.S. Air Force is developing 
an inspection implementation plan that will ensure protection 
of sensitive/classified information during the inspection/
exhibition.

The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)

    The Committee has confidence in the proven competency of 
the On-Site Inspection Agency. OSIA has assured the committee 
that it will be ready to implement START II as soon as it is 
ratified and enters into force; its personnel have conducted 
468 INF inspections, 278 escort missions, 22 START exhibitions, 
218 START mock inspections and have almost 7 full years of day-
to-day experience in portal monitoring. On March 1, 1995, OSIA 
began START baseline operations. This 120-day intensive period 
will position that agency to execute START II effectively.
    OSIA has submitted a detailed assessment of operational 
differences confronting U.S. inspectors under START II versus 
those under the START Treaty. Those additional verification 
provisions involving OSIA include:
          Extensive U.S. inspection permitted of the detailed 
        procedures for converting SS-18 silos to launch single-
        warhead ICBMs of the type SS-25;
          An additional four inspections per year to confirm 
        that only single-warhead ICBMs are installed in the 90 
        converted SS-18 silos;
          Detailed procedures for destroying SS-18 missiles and 
        launch canisters in the presence of U.S. inspectors;
          One-time exhibitions to demonstrate the number of 
        nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers are actually 
        equipped; and
          Exhibition of observable differences between nuclear 
        heavy bombers and heavy bombers of the same type and 
        variant reoriented to a conventional role.
    Though some of these inspections, such as data updates, 
reentry vehicle (RV), conversion or elimination, and heavy 
bomber distinguishability exhibitions, are to be accomplished 
within the context of START, there are several unique START II 
inspections and exhibitions which place greater demands on OSIA 
personnel and resources. These range from heavy ICBM missile 
and associated launch canister eliminations to conversion of 
heavy ICBM silos, additional reentry vehicle on-site 
inspections related to the converted heavy ICBM silos, 
inspections of eliminations of mobile ICBMs and their 
launchers, additional heavy bomber actual equipage exhibitions, 
inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, 
and inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional 
role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role.
    From an operational standpoint--the planning and arranging 
for the logistical infrastructure needed to conduct an 
inspection or escort mission--START II inspections and 
eliminations would closely resemble those conducted under INF 
and those set to occur under START. Team composition will be, 
as in INF and START, a mixture of weapons specialists and 
linguists. Weapons accountability, however, poses of distinct 
challenge. Because the Treaties use different counting rules, 
specific weapons systems may be attributed with different 
numbers of warheads under each Treaty. Since a single 
inspection will do ``double-duty'' for both treaties, a 
thorough knowledge of both treaties by inspection team members 
(especially team chiefs) is essential. The terms of both 
Treaties would be in force simultaneously. Both sets of 
inspection records must reflect the weapons accountability of 
the particular agreement to which they apply. The key here is 
that the counting process and record keeping for both treaties 
would occur during the same inspection. These accounting 
differences apply to both sides, and a U.S. inspector or 
escort's job would require these different rules to be applied 
properly in every inspection.

                         VII. Committee Action

    On behalf of the United States, President Bush signed the 
START II Treaty on January 3, 1993 in Moscow in the Russian 
Federation. The Treaty, along with two Protocols, a Memorandum 
of Understanding, and Letters Signed by U.S. and Russian 
Representatives was transmitted to the Senate on January 20, 
1993 and referred on the same day to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations.
    The committee held public hearings on the Treaty and 
related strategic nuclear matters in May and June 1992 with 
Administration witnesses, and again in January, February, and 
March 1995 with Administration and private-sector witnesses.

January 31, 1995 (open session)

    The Honorable Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, with:
    The Honorable Linton Brooks, Chief U.S. Negotiator to the 
START II Negotiations;
    The Honorable John Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency.

February 28, 1995 (open and closed sessions)

    Mr. Douglas MacEachin, Deputy Director for Intelligence, 
Central Intelligence Agency.

March 1, 1995 (open session)

    The Honorable William Perry, Secretary of Defense;
    General John Shalikashvili, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

March 29, 1995 (open session)

    Mr. Stephen Hadley, Esquire, Attorney, Shea and Gardner;
    Mr. Sven Kraemer, President, Global 2000;
    Mr. Michael Krepon, President, Henry L. Stimson Center;
    Mr. Jack Mendelsohn, Deputy Director, The Arms Control 
Association.

May 11, 1993 (open session)

    The Honorable Warren Christopher, Secretary of State.

May 18, 1993 (open session)

    The Honorable Linton Brooks, Chief U.S. Negotiator to the 
START II Negotiations;
    Mr. Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director, U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency;
    Mr. Douglas MacEachin, Deputy Director for Intelligence, 
Central Intelligence Agency.

June 17, 1993 (open session)

    The Honorable Lawrence Eagleburger, Former Secretary of 
State.

June 24, 1993 (open and closed sessions)

    The Honorable R. James Woolsey, Director of Central 
Intelligence.
    At a markup on December 12, 1995, the committee considered 
a draft resolution of ratification including six conditions and 
seven declarations. All were agreed to by the committee by a 
roll call vote of 18-0.
    The conditions and declarations and the rationale for 
approving them are as follows:
            Condition 1: Noncompliance
    Since reductions under START II build upon those mandated 
by START, the provisions of the two treaties are interrelated. 
However, START II is a bilateral treaty and does not include 
all Parties to START (Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine). 
Implementation of the START II Treaty must take into account 
the possibility and effect of noncompliance by START Parties 
that are not Parties to the START II Treaty. Under such 
circumstances, the U.S. would be forced to question its 
continued adherence to START II since, as a practical matter, 
noncompliance by one of these states would likely consist of 
their retaining some form of a nuclear capability. Condition 
(1) establishes the framework by which the President may seek 
to bring a noncompliant Party into compliance, or by which the 
President may accommodate the changed circumstances. Any 
modification or change in obligations shall be submitted for 
the advice and consent of the Senate, and in the event that 
noncompliance persists, the President shall seek a Senate 
resolution of support for continued U.S. adherence to one or 
both START treaties.
            Condition 2: Treaty obligations
    It has been implied by senior government officials in the 
Russian Federation that Russian ratification of the START II 
Treaty is contingent upon continued adherence by the United 
States to Russian interpretations of U.S. obligations under the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The U.S. government does not 
accept such a linkage. This provision states the view of the 
Senate that in ratifying this treaty, no such linkage may be 
implied.
            Condition 3: Financing implementation
    Article I, paragraph 6, provides for an accelerated 
schedule of reductions in the event that both Parties agree on 
a program of financial assistance to fulfill the Treaty. The 
second phase of reductions would be completed two years 
earlier, by December 31, 2000 (as opposed to January 1, 2003), 
if agreement on assistance can be reached. However, 
ratification and implementation of START II is in no way 
contingent upon such an agreement. As a means of ensuring 
Russian commitment to the Treaty, Russia must share a 
substantial portion--if not all--of the burden of Russian 
implementation of START II.
            Condition 4: Exchange of letters
    The President also transmitted to the Senate documents 
associated with the START II Treaty. These documents are three 
exchanges of letters embodying agreements on various aspects of 
the Treaty.
    (4a) The first exchange of letters pertains to the 
negotiation of an agreement between Russia and Kazakstan 
regarding SS-18 missiles and launchers on the territory of 
Kazakstan. In his response to Russian Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev's commitment to spare no effort to conclude such an 
agreement (both made on December 29, 1992), Secretary of State 
Eagleburger made it clear that the START II Treaty would be 
submitted to the United States Senate for its advice and 
consent based on the understanding that the agreement referred 
to by Minister Kozyrev (providing for the movement to Russia 
and elimination of heavy ICBMs from Kazakstan) would be signed 
and implemented, and that all deployed and non-deployed heavy 
ICBMs and associated launch canisters now located on the 
territory of Kazakstan will have been removed to Russia and 
destroyed no later than seven years after entry into force of 
the START Treaty. The Senate will ratify the START II Treaty 
based upon the understanding that the SS-18 heavy ICBM will be 
eliminated as an entire class of missile.
    (4b) The second exchange of letters between Secretary of 
State Eagleburger and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, dated 
December 29, 1992, and December 31, 1992, relates to heavy 
bombers and constitutes the assurance of the United States of 
America, during the duration of the START II Treaty, never to 
have more nuclear weapons deployed on any heavy bomber than the 
number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution for that type 
or variant. This letter creates no new legal obligation for the 
United States. It simply reiterates U.S. Treaty obligations per 
paragraph 3 of Article IV of the START II Treaty.
    (4c) The third exchange of letters between Russian Minister 
of Defense Grachev and Secretary of Defense Cheney, dated 
December 29, 1992, and January 3, 1993, sets forth a number of 
assurances on Russian intent regarding the conversion and 
retention of silo launchers originally designed for the RS-20/
SS-18 heavy ICBM. Minister Grachev reaffirms the steps that 
Russia will take to convert these silos and assures the 
Secretary of Defense that only SS-25 type missiles will be 
deployed in these converted silos.
    Specifically, Russia provides commitments to install a 
restrictive ring 2.9 meters in diameter in the top of the SS-18 
silo launcher, to fill the base of the launcher with five 
meters of concrete, to refrain from installing in the silo any 
missile launch canister with a diameter in excess of 2.5 
meters, to install only RS 12M/SS-25 missiles in the converted 
silos, and to allow for verification of the silo conversion. 
All but one of these assurances are contained in either the 
main text of the START II Treaty, or in its Elimination and 
Conversion Protocol. The commitment to only install SS-25 type 
missiles in the converted silos represents a new obligation 
undertaken by the Russian Federation.
    These documents are relevant to the consideration of the 
Treaty by the Senate, and are of the same force and effect as 
the provisions of the START II Treaty. These letters are 
understood to be legally binding, carrying with them the 
obligation of both Parties to comply with the commitment 
associated with the letters and the right of each Party to 
enforce the obligation under international law.
            Condition 5: Space-launch vehicles
    The Elimination and Conversion Protocol of the START II 
Treaty provides two alternatives for eliminating heavy ICBMs: 
either through physical destruction or by use as a space-launch 
vehicle (SLV). Under the START Treaty, Russia is similarly 
allowed to use ballistic missiles to deliver objects into the 
upper atmosphere or outer space. These provisions highlight the 
fact that SLVs are virtually indistinguishable from nuclear-
capable ballistic missiles. The Administration has indicated 
that agreement has been reached with the Russian Federation 
under which there will be strict accountability for all 
ballistic missiles associated with the START Treaty. The Senate 
reaffirms its position that SLVs comprised of any item limited 
by START or START II are subject to the obligations of the 
relevant treaty.
            Condition 6: National technical means and Cuba
    This condition reiterates the Clinton Administration's 
position--expressed in a letter to the Committee dated April 6, 
1995--that the obligation of Parties to both START and START II 
not to interfere with one another's national technical means of 
verification does not preclude the United States from pursuing 
options to urge the Russian Federation to dismantle its 
electronic eavesdropping facility at Lourdes, Cuba. Removal of 
that facility in no way constitutes interference with Russian 
Treaty verification capability, but rather the removal of an 
asset devoted to signals intelligence collection against the 
United States.
            Declaration 1: Cooperative threat reductions
    Neither START nor START II require the dismantlement of the 
warheads downloaded to meet treaty limits. The Russian 
Federation will possess exactly as much fissionable, weapons-
grade material (possibly as much as 900 tons) as it had before 
START II was negotiated. Indeed, the size of Russia's fissile 
material stocks will increase since warheads are being 
withdrawn to Russia from Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakstan. For 
example, approximately 632 of Kazakstan's 810 warheads had been 
returned to Russia by March 1995.
    The ultimate disposition of these stocks is of concern to 
the United States. Given that political and economic 
uncertainty have weakened centralized control over nuclear 
weapons materials, Russia has emerged as a serious 
proliferation concern. Several incidents involving the 
smuggling of weapons-usable materials in Russia and Europe 
underscore this concern. Former Director of Central 
Intelligence R. James Woolsey stated in testimony before 
Congress that Russian criminal organizations, in particular, 
have established elaborate infrastructures that may ultimately 
be used to facilitate the transfer of fissile material to 
states seeking to accelerate their own weapons development 
programs, such as Iran, Libya, or North Korea.
    Accordingly, the committee encourages the Administration to 
continue vigorously with current Safe and Secure Dismantlement 
Talks. Every avenue should be pursued to improve confidence in 
the integrity of Russia's nuclear material stockpiles and the 
irreversibility of the process of nuclear weapons reduction.
            Declaration 2: Asymmetry in reductions
    Unlike START, which mandates a minimum rate of reductions 
in items such as heavy ICBM launchers, START II contains no 
specific legal obligations by either Party to reduce at a given 
rate. Rather, START II requires only that reductions be of a 
``sustained'' nature. Thus Russia is not obligated to eliminate 
or convert a specified number of missiles or launchers per 
year. Russian failure to engage in a significant, sustained 
effort would prompt, at a minimum, concerns over Russian intent 
to comply with START II commitments. In addition, given the 
current pace of U.S. reductions, the cost and long lead-time 
associated with reconstitution of nuclear forces, and the 
increased significance of each warhead in a reduced arsenal, 
asymmetry in the implementation of START II could create a 
strategic imbalance whereby the United States would be 
incapable of meeting its targeting requirements. The Chairman 
is concerned that the initial process of U.S. dismantlement 
under START ran far in advance of Russia's. At the time of the 
release of the Administration's Nuclear Posture Review, the 
U.S. had decreased its arsenal to 6,000 deliverable warheads, 
whereas Russia retained roughly 9,000.
    The resolution of ratification indicates that the committee 
believes that the United States needs to articulate a clear 
policy regarding the pace of disarmament to be conducted under 
the START II Treaty in order to avoid any strategic imbalance 
endangering the national security of the United States. The 
Senate therefore urges the President to regulate reductions 
under both START and START II to avoid such a possibility.
            Declaration 3: Expanding strategic arsenals in countries 
                    other than Russia
    Both the START Treaty and the START II Treaty deal solely 
with the strategic arsenals of the former Soviet Union and the 
United States. However, the resolution recognizes that the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile 
technology could lead to a new and significant threat to the 
United States. The United States should not ignore these 
trends. Given that nuclear weapons will remain the cornerstone 
of U.S. deterrent strategy notwithstanding reductions under 
START or START II, in the event of such a development--or the 
possibility of such a development--the President should consult 
with the Senate on an urgent basis to determine whether 
continued adherence to START II Treaty levels remains in the 
national security interests of the United States.
            Declaration 4: Substantial further reductions
    Consistent with its pledge under the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to pursue in good faith 
negotiations on the issue of nuclear disarmament, the Senate 
calls upon the parties to this treaty to seek further strategic 
offensive arms reductions as consistent with their national 
security interests and calls upon the nuclear-weapon states to 
give careful and early consideration to corresponding 
reductions.
            Declaration 5: Missile technology control regime
    The United States has urged a number of nations to become 
members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)--or to 
adhere to its ``guidelines''--in order to reduce the risks 
associated with the proliferation of ballistic missiles and 
other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons. 
Established in 1987, the purpose of the regime is to limit 
transfers of equipment and technology that would contribute to 
unmanned nuclear weapons delivery systems capable of delivering 
a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a range of at least 300 
kilometers. This Committee declaration urges the President to 
insist on the adherence of Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine to 
the guidelines of the MTCR.
            Declaration 6: Further arms reduction obligations
    This declaration affirms the Committee's intention to 
consider agreements between the United States and other 
countries involving militarily significant obligations on U.S. 
forces only as treaties. Some in the Executive branch persist 
in the mistaken belief that it is constitutionally acceptable 
to undertake militarily significant accords by Executive 
agreements supported by a simple majority vote in both Houses 
of Congress.
            Declaration 7: Treaty interpretation
    The Committee declaration on Treaty Interpretation affirms 
that the principles of treaty interpretation, derived as a 
necessary implication from the Constitution, set forth in 
Condition (1) of the Senate's resolution of ratification of the 
INF Treaty (May 27, 1988) apply to all treaties. These 
principles apply regardless of whether the Senate chooses to 
say so in its consideration of any particular treaty.
    Following this discussion, the committee voted 18-0 to 
recommend to the Senate that it advise and consent to the 
ratification of the START II Treaty, together with its 
Protocols and Memorandum of Understanding, all transmitted to 
the Senate in Treaty Doc. 103-1, subject to the Conditions and 
Declarations set forth in the Resolution of Ratification. 
Voting in the affirmative were Senators Helms, Pell, Lugar, 
Biden, Kassebaum, Sarbanes, Brown, Dodd, Coverdell, Kerry, 
Snowe, Robb, Thompson, Feingold, Thomas, Feinstein, Grams, and 
Ashcroft.

                    VIII. Resolution of Ratification

    Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
therein), That (a) the Senate advise and consent to the 
ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on January 3, 
1993, including the following protocols and memorandum of 
understanding, all such documents being integral parts of and 
collectively referred to as the ``START II Treaty'' (contained 
in Treaty Document 103-1), subject to the conditions of 
subsection (b) and the declarations of subsection (c):
          (1) The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination 
        of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion 
        of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty 
        Between the United States of America and the Russian 
        Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of 
        Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the 
        ``Elimination and Conversion Protocol'').
          (2) The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of 
        Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United 
        States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction 
        and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known 
        as the ``Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol'').
          (3) The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead 
        Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the 
        Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
        Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation 
        of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the 
        ``Memorandum on Attribution'').
    (b) Conditions.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
the ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the 
following conditions, which shall be binding upon the 
President:
          (1) Noncompliance.--If the President determines that 
        a party to the Treaty Between the United States of 
        America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
        the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
        Arms, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1991 (in this 
        resolution referred to as the ``START Treaty'') or to 
        the START II Treaty is acting in a manner that is 
        inconsistent with the object and purpose of the 
        respective Treaty or is in violation of either the 
        START or START II Treaty so as to threaten the national 
        security interests of the United States, then the 
        President shall
                  (A) consult with and promptly submit a report 
                to the Senate detailing the effect of such 
                actions on the START Treaties;
                  (B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the 
                highest diplomatic level with the noncompliant 
                party with the objective of bringing the 
                noncompliant party into compliance;
                  (C) in the event that a party other than the 
                Russian Federation is determined not to be in 
                compliance--
                          (i) request consultations with the 
                        Russian Federation to assess the 
                        viability of both START Treaties and to 
                        determine if a change in obligations is 
                        required in either treaty to 
                        accommodate the changed circumstances, 
                        and
                          (ii) submit for the Senate's advice 
                        and consent to ratification any 
                        agreement changing the obligations of 
                        the United States; and
                  (D) in the event that noncompliance persists, 
                seek a Senate resolution of support of 
                continued adherence to one or both of the START 
                Treaties, notwithstanding the changed 
                circumstances affecting the object and purpose 
                of one or both of the START Treaties.
          (2) Treaty obligations.--Ratification by the United 
        States of the START II Treaty obligates the United 
        States to meet the conditions contained in this 
        resolution of ratification and shall not be interpreted 
        as an obligation by the United States to accept any 
        modification, change in scope, or extension of the 
        Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
        Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation 
        of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on 
        May 26, 1972 (commonly referred to as the ``ABM 
        Treaty'').
          (3) Financing implementation.--The United States 
        understands that in order to be assured of the Russian 
        commitment to a reduction in arms levels, Russia must 
        maintain a substantial stake in financing the 
        implementation of the START II Treaty. The costs of 
        implementing the START II Treaty should be borne by 
        both parties to the Treaty. The exchange of instruments 
        of ratification of the START II Treaty shall not be 
        contingent upon the United States providing financial 
        guarantees to pay for implementation of commitments by 
        Russia under the START II Treaty.
          (4) Exchange of letters.--The exchange of letters--
                  (A) between Secretary of State Lawrence 
                Eagleburger and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
                Andrey Kozyrev, dated December 29, 1992, 
                regarding SS-18 missiles and launchers now on 
                the territory of Kazakstan,
                  (B) between Secretary of State Eagleburger 
                and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev, dated 
                December 29, 1992, and December 31, 1992, 
                regarding heavy bombers, and
                  (C) between Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev 
                and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, dated 
                December 29, 1992, and January 3, 1993, making 
                assurances on Russian intent regarding the 
                conversion and retention of 90 silo launchers 
                of RS-20 heavy intercontinental ballistic 
                missiles (ICBMs) (all having been submitted to 
                the Senate as associated with the START II 
                Treaty),
        are of the same force and effect as the provisions of 
        the START II Treaty. The United States shall regard 
        actions inconsistent with obligations under those 
        exchanges of letters as equivalent under international 
        law to actions inconsistent with the START II Treaty.
          (5) Space-launch vehicles.--Space-launch vehicles 
        composed of items that are limited by the START Treaty 
        or the START II Treaty shall be subject to the 
        obligations undertaken in the respective treaty.
          (6) NTM and cuba.--The obligation of the United 
        States under the START Treaty not to interfere with the 
        national technical means (NTM) of verification of the 
        other party to the Treaty does not preclude the United 
        States from pursuing the question of the removal of the 
        electronic intercept facility operated by the 
        Government of the Russian Federation at Lourdes, Cuba.
    (c) Declarations.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the following 
declarations, which express the intent of the Senate:
          (1) Cooperative threat reductions.--Pursuant to the 
        Joint Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility 
        of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons, agreed to 
        in Moscow, May 10, 1995, between the President of the 
        United States and the President of the Russian 
        Federation, it is the sense of the Senate that both 
        parties to the START II Treaty should attach high 
        priority to--
                  (A) the exchange of detailed information on 
                aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on 
                stocks of fissile materials, and on their 
                safety and security;
                  (B) the maintenance at distinct and secure 
                storage facilities, on a reciprocal basis, of 
                fissile materials removed from nuclear warheads 
                and declared to be excess to national security 
                requirements for the purpose of confirming the 
                irreversibility of the process of nuclear 
                weapons reduction; and
                  (C) the adoption of other cooperative 
                measures to enhance confidence in the 
                reciprocal declarations on fissile material 
                stockpiles.
          (2) Asymmetry in reductions.--It is the sense of the 
        Senate that, in conducting the reductions mandated by 
        the START or START II Treaty, the President should, 
        within the parameters of the elimination schedules 
        provided for in the START Treaties, regulate reductions 
        in the United States strategic nuclear forces so that 
        the number of accountable warheads under the START and 
        START II Treaties possessed by the Russian Federation 
        in no case exceeds the comparable number of accountable 
        warheads possessed by the United States to an extent 
        that a strategic imbalance endangering the national 
        security interests of the United States results.
          (3) Expanding strategic arsenals in countries other 
        than russia.--It is the sense of the Senate that, if 
        during the time the START II Treaty remains in force or 
        in advance of any further strategic offensive arms 
        reductions the President determines there has been an 
        expansion of the strategic arsenal of any country not 
        party to the START II Treaty so as to jeopardize the 
        supreme interests of the United States, then the 
        President should consult on an urgent basis with the 
        Senate to determine whether adherence to the START II 
        Treaty remains in the national interest of the United 
        States.
          (4) Substantial further reductions.--Cognizant of the 
        obligation of the United States under Article VI of the 
        Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons of 
        July 1, 1968 ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
        effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
        arms race at any early date and to nuclear disarmament 
        and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament 
        under strict and effective international control'', it 
        is the sense of the Senate that in anticipation of the 
        ratification and entry into force of the START II 
        Treaty, the Senate calls upon the parties to the START 
        II Treaty to seek further strategic offensive arms 
        reductions consistent with their national security 
        interests and calls upon the other nuclear weapon 
        states to give careful and early consideration to 
        corresponding reductions of their own nuclear arsenals.
          (5) Missile technology control regime.--The Senate 
        urges the President to insist that the Republic of 
        Belarus, the Republic of Kazakstan, Ukraine, and the 
        Russian Federation abide by the guidelines of the 
        Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). For purposes 
        of this paragraph, the term ``Missile Technology 
        Control Regime'' means the policy statement between the 
        United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic 
        of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, announced 
        April 16, 1987, to restrict sensitive missile-relevant 
        transfers based on the MTCR Annex, and any amendments 
        thereto.
          (6) Further arms reduction obligations.--The Senate 
        declares its intention to consider for approval 
        international agreements that would obligate the United 
        States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments 
        of the United States in a militarily significant manner 
        only pursuant to the treaty power as set forth in 
        Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.
          (7) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
        applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally 
        based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in 
        Condition (1) of the resolution of ratification with 
        respect to the INF Treaty. For purposes of this 
        declaration, the term ``INF Treaty'' refers to the 
        Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
        Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination 
        of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, 
        together with the related memorandum of understanding 
        and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.

                    IX. Article-by-Article Analysis

    President Bush submitted to the Senate a 75 page Article by 
Article Analysis of the START II Treaty text, Protocols, 
Memorandum of Attribution, and associated documents which is 
set forth in Treaty Doc. 103-1, pp. 1-75. The Treaty text, 
Protocols, Memorandum of Attribution, and associated documents, 
including the Article by Article Analysis, together with the 
testimony and other authoritative representations directed to 
the meaning and legal effect of the Treaty which were provided 
by officials from the Administration to various inquiries from 
the Senate during its consideration of the START II Treaty are 
all part of the ``shared understanding'' between the Executive 
Branch and the Senate as to both the meaning of the Treaty and 
the way the United States will interpret it--all in accordance 
with the constitutionally based Treaty interpretation 
principles clarified in Condition (1) of the INF Treaty and 
reaffirmed in the recent CFE Treaty.
    The following summary is based upon the administration's 
summaries, analysis, testimony, and other submissions to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations. Due to the brevity of the 
Treaty, specific references are provided to the appropriate 
material only as necessary to assist the Senate's review.

                         I. The START II Treaty

    The Treaty between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms (The START II Treaty) consists of the 
main Treaty text and three documents formally transmitted to 
the Senate by President George Bush on January 20, 1993 (Treaty 
Doc. 103-1) for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification 
pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the 
Constitution.
    Transmitted with the START II Treaty and its associated 
documents within Treaty Doc. 103-1 for the information of the 
Senate as associated with but not integral parts of the START 
II Treaty were three exchanges of letters embodying legally 
binding commitments from the Russian Federation and the United 
States concerning the removal of SS-18 missiles from Kazakstan, 
the deployment of nuclear weapons on heavy bombers, and Russian 
conversion of SS-18 missile silos. These documents are relevant 
to the consideration of the START II Treaty by the Senate.

A. The treaty text (Treaty Doc. 103-1, pp. 32-41; see pp. 1-18 for 
        analysis)

    Article I, paragraph 1, obligates the Parties to meet START 
reductions and then to continue to reduce so that by seven 
years after the START Treaty's entry into force (December 5, 
2001), the aggregate number of warheads deployed by each Party 
on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers does not exceed 4,250, as 
counted pursuant to Articles III and IV of the START II Treaty 
(Treaty Doc. 102-20, pp. 3-21; see pp. 743-771 for analysis). 
This is the first phase of START II reductions.
    Paragraph 2 establishes the following warhead sublimits for 
the first phase of reductions:
          2,160 for deployed SLBMs;
          1,200 for ICBMs with more than one attributable 
        warhead;
          650 for deployed heavy ICBMs.
    Paragraph 3 obligates the Parties to undertake a second 
phase of reductions so that by no later than January 1, 2003, 
the aggregate number of warheads deployed by each Party on 
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers does not exceed 3,500.
    Paragraph 4 establishes the following warhead sublimits for 
the second and final phase of reductions:
          1,750 for deployed SLBMs;
          0 for ICBMs with more than one attributable warhead;
          0 for deployed heavy ICBMs.
    Paragraph 5 commits both Parties to the two phase time-
line. Upon completion of the first phase, the second phase of 
reductions will commence. However, neither this paragraph nor 
the Treaty contain specific legal obligations by either Party 
to reduce at a given rate. Unlike START, which mandates a 
minimum rate of reductions of heavy ICBM launchers, for 
example, START II requires only that reductions be of a 
``sustained'' nature. Thus Russia is not obligated to eliminate 
or convert a specified number of missiles or launchers per 
year, though failure to engage in a significant, sustained 
effort would prompt concerns over Russian intent to comply with 
START II commitments.
    Paragraph 6 allows the possibility of accelerated 
reductions should both Parties agree on a program of 
assistance. Ratification and implementation of the START II 
Treaty is in no way contingent upon U.S. provision of any 
financial guarantees or a program of assistance.
    Article II, paragraph 1, requires the elimination by 
January 1, 2003, of all MIRVed ICBM launchers (including 
nondeployed, test, and training launchers) or their conversion 
to accommodate only single-warhead ICBMs. Exempted from this 
provision are those launchers of non-``heavy'' ICBMs permitted 
under the START Treaty to be located at space launch 
facilities.
    Paragraph 2 exempts silo launchers of downloaded ICBMs from 
the requirement in paragraph 1, thus enabling the U.S. to 
retain all Minuteman III ICBMs and Russia to retain 105 SS-19 
ICBMs. Russia gains the right to retain 105 SS-19s in Article 
III of the START II Treaty.
    Paragraph 3 requires the elimination of silo launchers to 
be undertaken in accordance with Section II of the Conversion 
or Elimination Protocol to the START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-
20, pp. 84-101; see pp. 873-895 for analysis). In addition, 
while most SS-18 launchers must be physically destroyed, 
including all those at space launch facilities, 90 launchers 
may be converted to accommodate single-warhead ICBMs. While the 
START Treaty requires destruction of 154 of the former Soviet 
Union's 308 heavy ICBM launchers by the conclusion of the first 
seven-year reduction phase (Treaty Doc. 102-20, p. 2; see pp. 
741-743 for analysis and thirty third agreed statement at pp. 
61-63 and 834-846), START II further requires elimination or 
conversion of all heavy ICBM launchers, although--as mentioned 
previously--90 of these may be converted. That leaves, as a 
practical matter, 64 heavy ICBM launchers that must be 
destroyed by the end of the second phase of reductions.
    Paragraph 4 prohibits the emplacement of any ICBM launch 
canister with a diameter greater than 2.5 meters in any of the 
90 converted heavy ICBM launchers. This prohibition reinforces 
the commitment made by Defense Minister Grachev to Secretary of 
Defense Cheney in a letter dated December 29, 1992 (Treaty Doc. 
103-1, pp. 72-73; see p. 7 for analysis).
    Paragraph 5 requires the elimination of heavy ICBM 
launchers at space launch facilities.
    Paragraph 6 obligates both Parties to completely eliminate 
through destruction or by space-launch all deployed and non-
deployed heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters by January 1, 
2003.
    Paragraph 7 specifies that each Party maintains the right 
to inspect the destruction of heavy ICBMs and heavy ICBM launch 
canisters, as well as the conversion of silo launchers for 
heavy ICBMs.
    Paragraph 8 sets forth the commitment by both parties to 
not transfer heavy ICBMs to any state.
    Paragraph 9 prohibits both Parties, beginning on January 1, 
2003, from producing, acquiring from any other state, flight-
testing, or deploying MIRVed ICBMs.
    Article III, paragraph 1, specifies that START II will use 
the ``counting'' rules for attributing warheads established in 
Section I of the START Memorandum of Understanding for deployed 
ICBMs and SLBMs (Treaty Doc. 102-20, pp. 324-693; see pp. 1055 
to 1066 for analysis), and by paragraph 4 of Article III of the 
START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-20, pp. 3-13; see pp. 743-762 for 
analysis) in the case of new intercontinental and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles.
    Paragraph 2 allows for the use of downloading to reduce the 
number of warheads attributed to a missile, following the same 
rules as established under START (Treaty Doc. 102-20, pp. 3-13; 
see pp. 743-762 for analysis). Like the START Treaty, START II 
bans downloading of heavy ICBMs and of new types of ICBMs and 
SLBMs.
    Subparagraph 2(a) allows the Parties to exceed the START 
limit of 1,250 for the total allowable number of downloaded 
warheads.
    Subparagraph 2(b) further relaxes START's sublimit on 
downloading of no more than 500 warheads to be removed from 
ICBMs and SLBMs other than the U.S. Minuteman III ICBM and the 
Russian SS-N-18 SLBM.
    Subparagraph 2(c) relaxes the START prohibition, imposed 
under subparagraph 5(c)(iii) of Article III of that treaty 
(Treaty Doc. 102-20, pp. 3-13; see pp. 743-762 for analysis), 
on downloading more than four warheads per missile. Instead, 
each Party is allowed to remove up to five warheads from no 
more than 105 ICBMs of one type. Russia therefore will be 
enabled to download 105 SS-19s from six to one warhead, and 
will retain these missiles beyond the deadline banning all 
MIRVed ICBMs. These missiles will only be deployable in silos 
which possessed a missile of that type at the time of START's 
signing.
    Subparagraph 2(d) permits both Parties to retain--rather 
than replace--reentry vehicle platforms downloaded by more than 
two warheads, in contrast to subparagraphs 5(b)(iii) and 
5(b)(iv) of Article III of START (Treaty Doc. 102-20, pp. 3-13; 
see pp. 743-762 for analysis) which requires both Parties to 
remove and destroy reentry vehicle platforms in order to take 
advantage of downloading provisions.
    Paragraph 3 prohibits the production, flight-testing, or 
deployment of ICBMs or SLBMs with more than the number of 
warheads attributed to it, and precludes the uploading of 
missiles that have been downloaded.
    Article IV, paragraph 1, establishes constraints on heavy 
bombers. Whereas under START counting rules, 150 U.S. and 180 
Soviet heavy bombers equipped with air-launch cruise missiles 
(ALCMs) are discounted by up to fifty percent in terms of the 
number of attributable warheads, and non-ALCM equipped heavy 
bombers are considered to have only one warhead, paragraph 1 
specifies that all heavy bombers shall be attributed with the 
largest number of warheads with which any type or variant was 
actually equipped. Thus START II departs significantly from 
START in attributing warheads to heavy bombers.
    Paragraph 2 sets forth the agreement that the number of 
warheads attributed to a heavy bomber of a given type or 
variant would be that number listed in the Memorandum on 
Attribution (MOA).
    Paragraph 3 prohibits either side from equipping heavy 
bombers with more warheads than attributed in the MOA.
    Paragraph 4 requires a one-time exhibition of each type and 
variant of heavy bomber in order to demonstrate, for the 
purposes of the Memorandum on Attribution, the number of 
nuclear weapons with which each type or variant of bomber will 
be equipped. These exhibitions are to be conducted no later 
than 180 days after START II's entry into force and, in another 
departure from START, will allow inspection of the B-2 Spirit 
heavy bomber.
    Paragraph 5 allows the Parties to alter the number of 
warheads attributed to their heavy bombers, requiring 90-day 
advance notification and exhibition of either the last or the 
first heavy bomber so modified, depending on whether the Party 
wishes to increase or decrease the number of attributable 
warheads, or to introduce a new variant of heavy bomber.
    Paragraph 6 requires that all inspections and exhibitions 
relating to the preceding two paragraphs be conducted according 
to the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol, and as provided 
for in paragraph 1 of Article V of the START II Treaty.
    Paragraph 7 allows Parties to reorient to a conventional 
role those heavy bombers not accountable under START as being 
equipped with ALCMs. Reorientation may be done without any 
conversion procedures, but the reoriented bombers must have 
observable differences from similar bombers with nuclear roles. 
This is in addition to the right under START to convert up to 
76 heavy bombers to non-nuclear missions.
    Paragraph 8, subparagraph 8(a), restricts the number of 
reoriented heavy bombers to 100 at any one time, subparagraph 
8(b) requires segregated basing for the bombers, and 8(c) bans 
their participation in nuclear missions or exercises and 
prohibits their crews from training or exercising for nuclear 
missions. Finally, subparagraph 8(d) requires that if fewer 
than all of the bombers of a type or variant are to be 
reoriented, then those bombers must have differences observable 
by National Technical Means and by on-site inspections. These 
differences need not be functional, in contrast with the 
requirement under START that converted bombers be 
``distinguishable.''
    Paragraph 9 affords each Party the right, after a 90-day 
advance notification, to return reoriented heavy bombers to a 
nuclear role. However, these bombers may not again be 
reoriented. In order to aid in the enforcement of the 
prohibition on subsequent reorientation, if only a portion of 
the total of a given type or variant of heavy bomber are so 
reoriented, those bombers must have observable differences.
    Paragraph 10 requires a minimum 100 kilometer separation 
between bases for conventionally-oriented heavy bombers and 
storage facilities for heavy bomber nuclear armaments.
    Paragraph 11 requires that reoriented bombers remain 
subject to START Treaty provisions, including inspections. 
These bombers will continue to be attributed one warhead each 
under START Treaty counting rules.
    Paragraphs 12 and 13 provide for exhibitions of heavy 
bombers to demonstrate observable differences between types and 
variants oriented towards different missions (e.g. nuclear 
versus conventional).
    Paragraph 14 requires that all inspections conducted 
pursuant to Article IV be done in accordance with the 
Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol.
    Article V, paragraph 1 specifies that, except as provided 
for elsewhere in the START II Treaty, START provisions shall be 
used to verify and implement START II.
    Paragraph 2 establishes the Bilateral Implementation 
Commission (BIC) to resolve compliance issues or to agree upon 
additional measures necessary to improve the viability and 
effectiveness of START II.
    Article VI specifies that the Treaty is subject to 
ratification prior to entering into force, and will not enter 
into force prior to the START Treaty. Second, the START II ban 
on the transfer of heavy ICBMs to a third state or states shall 
be provisionally applied as of the date of signature of START 
II. It also stipulates that the START II Treaty will remain in 
force for the duration of the START Treaty. Both Parties have 
the right to withdraw from the Treaty with six months notice if 
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty have jeopardized a Party's supreme interests.
    Article VII is identical in content to Article XVIII of the 
START Treaty, providing for amendments to the START II Treaty. 
Such amendments would be subject to ratification as specified 
in Article VI of the Treaty.
    Article VIII provides for the registration of the Treaty 
with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations.
    Final Provision of the START II Treaty records that the 
Treaty was done at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, 
each in the English and Russian languages, and each being 
equally authentic.

B. The elimination and conversion protocol

    The Elimination and Conversion Protocol consists of three 
sections, the first setting forth procedures for the 
elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, the 
second establishing procedures for the conversion and 
confirmation of conversion of SS-18 silo launchers, silo 
training launchers, and silo test launchers, and the third 
discussing of inspection costs and equipment.
    Section 1, Paragraph 1 provides two alternatives for 
eliminating heavy ICBMs. A Party may either use the procedures 
set forth in Section I, which are to take place at elimination 
facilities for ICBMs specified in the START Treaty, or it may 
eliminate heavy ICBMs by using them for delivering objects into 
the upper atmosphere or outer space. In both cases, advance 
notification must be provided, for the former via the Nuclear 
Risk Reduction Centers (NRCCs) 30 days in advance. The latter 
requires 24 hours of advance notice through the NRRCs.
    Paragraph 2 provides that the inspected Party: shall remove 
the missile's reentry vehicles; may remove the electronic and 
electro-mechanical devices of the missiles's guidance and 
control system, as well as other elements not subject to 
elimination; shall remove the missile from its launch canister 
and disassemble the missile into stages; shall remove liquid 
propellant from the missile; may remove or actuate auxiliary 
pyrotechnic devices; may remove penetration aids, including 
devices for their attachment and release; and may remove 
propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism.
    Paragraph 3 describes the confirmatory inspection to take 
place prior to the destruction. Inspectors may confirm the type 
and number of missiles to be eliminated by visual observation 
and measurement. On-site observation is necessary since 
National-Technical Means cannot confirm that the objects 
presented for destruction are real.
    Paragraph 4 specifies the elimination process to be 
followed for destruction of heavy ICBMs. Missile stages, 
nozzles, and missile interstage skirts are to be cut into two 
pieces of approximately equal size; and the self-contained 
dispensing mechanism (as well as the front section), including 
the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, are 
to be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and 
crushed.
    Paragraph 5 states that launch canisters of heavy ICBMs 
shall be cut into two or three pieces. These procedures apply 
to launch canisters eliminated with their heavy ICBMs, as well 
as to launch canisters for missiles eliminated through flight-
testing, or through launching into the upper atmosphere or 
space. They also apply to empty launch canisters existing at 
the time of the Treaty's entry into force (EIF).
    Paragraph 6 requires a factual written report containing 
the results of the inspection team's observation of the 
elimination process to confirm the conclusion of the 
inspection.
    Paragraph 7 states that heavy ICBMs will no longer be 
subject to the limitations of this Treaty upon completion of 
the procedures set forth in Section I.
    Section 2, paragraph 1 requires that conversion of silo 
launchers of heavy ICBMs (including silo training launchers of 
heavy ICBMs and silo test launchers of heavy ICBMs) be carried 
out in situ and be subject to inspection. Launchers of heavy 
ICBMs at space launch facilities may not be converted, but must 
be destroyed. Silo elimination will be done according to START 
rules.
    Paragraph 2 provides that the missile and launch canister 
must be removed from a silo launcher prior to conversion.
    Paragraph 3 states that Russia will be considered to have 
begun converting heavy ICBM silo launchers (including training 
and test launchers) as soon as the silo door is opened and the 
missile and its canister removed. Notification is to be 
provided according to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section IV of the 
Notification Protocol to the START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-20, 
pp. 283-308; see pp. 1008-1033 for analysis).
    Paragraph 4 sets forth the conversion process for heavy 
ICBM silos. They are: opening the door and removing the missile 
and launch canister; pouring five meters of concrete into the 
base of the silo; and installing a restrictive ring with a 
diameter of no more than 2.9 meters into the upper portion of 
the silo in a way that precludes removal without destruction of 
the ring and its attachment to the silo wall.
    Paragraph 5 provides the U.S. the right to confirm that the 
aforementioned procedures have been carried out. Russia is 
required to notify the U.S. (through the NRRCs) at least 30 
days in advance of pouring the concrete, and upon completion of 
all of the procedures specified.
    Paragraph 6 confers the right of the United States to 
observe the entire process of pouring concrete into each heavy 
ICBM silo that is to be converted, and to measure the diameter 
of the restrictive ring. Inspection teams are limited to ten 
inspectors drawn from the START list of inspectors, as 
specified by Section II of the Inspection Protocol to the START 
Treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-20, pp. 102-282; see pp. 896-1008 for 
analysis). These inspections shall not count against any 
inspection quotas established by the START Treaty. In addition, 
heavy ICBM elimination inspections do not count against START 
Treaty quotas.
    Paragraph 7 provides an alternative method for confirming 
conversion, providing the right to measure the depth of each 
heavy ICBM silo that is to be converted before the concrete has 
been poured, and to return and remeasure the silo depth after 
the concrete has hardened. In addition, paragraph 7 provides 
for the right to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. 
Inspection teams are limited to ten inspectors drawn from the 
START list of inspectors, as specified by Section II of the 
Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-20, 
pp. 102-282; see pp. 896-1008 for analysis), and these 
inspections do not count against any inspection quotas 
established by the START Treaty.
    Paragraph 8 gives Russia the right to carry out further 
conversion measures after the completion of the procedures 
specified in paragraphs 6 or 7 or, if such procedures are not 
conducted, 30 days after notification of completion of the 
procedures specified in paragraph 4.
    Paragraph 9 authorizes, in addition to the reentry vehicle 
inspections provided for in the START Treaty, four additional 
reentry vehicle inspections each year of ICBMs deployed in 
converted silo launchers. Procedures set forth in the 
Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-20, 
pp. 102-282; see pp. 896-1008 for analysis) will be used during 
these inspections. In addition to confirming that the missile 
installed in the converted silo has only one reentry vehicle, 
these inspections permit the U.S. visually to confirm the 
presence of the restrictive ring and of the launch canister and 
missile that Russia has placed in the silo.
    Paragraph 10 states that, upon completion of the procedures 
specified in paragraphs 6 or 7, the silo being converted shall 
be considered to contain a deployed ICBM to which one warhead 
is attributed.
    Section III provides the right to use equipment in these 
inspections agreed-upon in the Bilateral Implementation 
Commission. It also apportions nearly all the costs of these 
inspections to the United States since the U.S. has no heavy 
ICBMs to inspect.

C. The exhibitions and inspections protocol

    The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections consists of a 
Preamble and two sections. It sets forth detailed procedures 
for the conduct of exhibitions of heavy bombers and for 
inspections conducted incident to those exhibitions.
    Section I, paragraph 1 provides for heavy bomber 
exhibitions different from exhibitions required under the START 
Treaty. Paragraph 1 repeats the requirements of Article IV of 
the START II Treaty for three types of exhibitions:
    (1) Exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear 
armaments. The purpose of such an exhibition is to demonstrate 
to the other Party the number of nuclear weapons for which a 
heavy bomber is actually equipped. Similarly, an exhibition is 
required if the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy 
bomber is actually equipped is changed.
    (2) Exhibitions of heavy bombers reoriented to a 
conventional role. Such an exhibition is intended to 
demonstrate to the other Party the specified differences 
between reoriented bombers and other heavy bombers of the same 
type or variant that have a nuclear role. Such differences must 
be both observable by national technical means of verification 
and visible during on-site inspection.
    (3) Exhibitions of heavy bombers reoriented to a 
conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role. 
Such exhibitions serve both to demonstrate the number of 
nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber actually will be 
equipped and to demonstrate the differences between the heavy 
bombers being returned and heavy bombers of the same type or 
variant that are either (a) still in a conventional role or (b) 
never were reoriented.
    Paragraph 2 provides identical basic rules on location, 
date, duration, and inspection team composition for each of the 
three types of exhibitions. The procedures of the START Treaty 
apply to these exhibitions, except as modified by the Protocol. 
Specifically, each heavy bomber shall be subject to inspection 
for no more than two hours. Photographs must be provided to 
show all relevant differences between types and variants of 
reoriented/nonreoriented heavy bombers. Finally, these 
exhibitions do not count against START inspection quotas.
    Section II, paragraph 1 provides rules for the inspections 
of heavy bombers during exhibitions. Section II also provides 
additional procedures for data update inspections and new 
facility inspections conducted pursuant to the START Treaty. 
New facility inspections are included since, under the 
provisions of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol to the 
START Treaty, such inspections include inspection of applicable 
heavy bombers at new airbases. Baseline exhibitions are to be 
conducted to provide an initial demonstration of the number of 
nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of a given type and 
variant are actually equipped. The additional inspection 
procedures for data update and new facility inspections allow 
periodic reconfirmation of this attribution. However, no 
requirement exists to load armaments for inspections. Further, 
there is no requirement to give direct access to the underside 
of the wings of the B-2 in order to prove that no weapons are 
located there. Nor would there be access to the interior of any 
heavy bomber (except for weapons bays).
    Paragraph 2 provides a right to shroud portions of a heavy 
bomber not subject to inspection. This right applies to all 
heavy bombers, but is primarily intended to protect the B-2 and 
future bombers. Two hours are allocated for inspections during 
exhibitions, and 32 hours are provided for the conduct of data 
update or new facility inspections. Given this, there is a 
possible conflict between the two Treaties. In order to provide 
for a situation where more time would be required than 
allocated by the START Treaty, the United States will, if 
necessary, seek, in the Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission established by the START Treaty, the right to extend 
the period of inspection to allow for the completion of START 
II inspection procedures.
    Paragraph 3 requires the in-country escort to provide the 
number of nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber is 
actually equipped and to identify the differences that are 
observable by NTM and visible during inspection. Additional 
measures may be agreed upon by the Parties with respect to the 
Protocol to improve the viability and effectiveness of the 
START II Treaty. Pursuant to Article VI, the Protocol is deemed 
to be an integral part of the START II Treaty.

D. The memorandum on attribution

    The Memorandum on Attribution (MOA) consists of a Preamble 
and five Sections. It establishes the database needed to record 
the following data:
          The number of nuclear weapons for which each heavy 
        bomber of a type and a variant is actually equipped;
          The aggregate number of bomber weapons counted 
        against the limits established in Article I of the 
        Treaty;
          The numbers and locations for heavy bombers 
        reoriented to a conventional role and for heavy bombers 
        subsequently returned to a nuclear role;
          The differences observable to national technical 
        means of verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a 
        conventional role, and for heavy bombers reoriented to 
        a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a 
        nuclear role;
          The number and location of ICBMs and SLBMs downloaded 
        by amounts greater than allowed by the START Treaty, or 
        ICBMs and SLBMs downloaded without destruction of the 
        reentry vehicle platform;
          The number and location of heavy ICBM silos converted 
        to carry single-warhead ICBMs; and
          The number of heavy ICBMs eliminated and remaining to 
        be eliminated.
    Only Treaty-related data that are different from the data 
in the START Memorandum of Understanding are included in this 
MOA.
    Section I sets forth the number of warheads for which 
deployed heavy bombers (other than those reoriented to a 
conventional role) are actually equipped. The accuracy of the 
data provided is the responsibility of the Party owning the 
given heavy bomber. In addition, this Section provides a record 
of the aggregate number of warheads attributed to such heavy 
bombers. Under the START Treaty, older U.S. heavy bombers 
awaiting elimination at the Davis-Monthan conversion or 
elimination facility are included in the Memorandum of 
Understanding, since such bombers count against the START 
Treaty delivery vehicle and warhead totals. Since these older 
bombers will be eliminated before the expiration of the seven 
year reductions period, when the first limits under START II 
must be reached, the number of nuclear weapons for which they 
are actually equipped was not included in the START II MOA.
    Section II records the aggregate number of heavy bombers 
reoriented to a conventional role and the bases at which they 
are located. In addition, this Section allows the recording of 
observable differences. Since no heavy bombers have yet been 
reoriented to a conventional role, this Section is unlikely to 
contain any data when the first data exchange occurs 30 days 
after entry into force of the START II Treaty.
    Section III provides data on the numbers and locations of 
ICBMs and SLBMs downloaded under the provisions of Article III 
of the Treaty. The format is identical to that of Section III 
of the START Treaty Memorandum of Understanding.
    Section IV provides data on the numbers and locations of 
heavy ICBM silos (in practice, silo launchers for Russian SS-18 
ICBMs) which have been converted pursuant to the Elimination 
and Conversion Protocol. Since the START Treaty requires that 
geographic coordinates not be released to the public, the 
locations referred to in this Section will be given by use of 
the silos designators found in the Memorandum of Understanding 
to the START Treaty. Section IV also provides data on the 
number of heavy ICBMs which remain deployed in Russia, remain 
nondeployed in Russia, or have been eliminated in order to 
measure progress toward the elimination of all heavy ICBMs.
    Section V requires each Party to notify the other of 
changes in the attribution and data contained in this 
Memorandum. Unlike the START Treaty, the START II Treaty does 
not prescribe in detail the specific content of notifications.
             X. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL

    It is an illuminating illustration of how far we have come 
in arms control that all 18 Members of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations gave their support to the START II Treaty and 
recommended that it be ratified. I recall that the very first 
of the strategic offensive arms agreements--the 1972 SALT I 
Interim Agreement--brought on extensive expressions of concern. 
In the end it was approved with some Members expressing relief 
that it would be of only limited duration--five years--and thus 
not sufficiently enduring to endanger the national security of 
the United States. The 1979 SALT II Agreement was a highly 
controversial, ambitious undertaking over which the Committee 
was deeply divided. The treaty was finally approved in a 9-6 
vote. SALT I foundered after the brutal Russian invasion of 
Afghanistan. That treaty never came into force, although it set 
the stage for continued efforts. The START I Treaty in 1991 was 
the first offensive arms agreement to dramatically reduce the 
nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union and the United 
States. START I cut the arsenals by one-third, and this treaty 
will reduce by another one-third the nuclear forces possessed 
by the United States and the Russian Federation. It had 
overwhelming--but not unanimous--support in the Committee.
    These major undertakings, together with the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty limiting strategic defensive arms, 
truly represent a continuum of arms control that has already 
had considerable benefits to the nations involved and promise 
still more over the next seven years.
    There is no question that all of this effort, more than two 
decades-long, characterized by new initiatives that build upon 
earlier achievements step-by-step, has been critically 
important in the effort to curb the costly and essentially 
pointless arms competition that characterized much of the 
postwar period prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. While 
I, together with many others, am pleased that we finally have 
reached a point at which we can anticipate the elimination of 
the most destabilizing weapons--land-based missiles with 
multiple warheads, it also is saddening to realize that this 
nation's leaders might have been wiser earlier. The pointless 
and wasteful MIRV competition that has been central to the arms 
race well might have been averted.
    It is useful to recall that the Committee and the Senate 
endeavored in 1970 to forestall the development of MIRVed 
systems.
    Senate Resolution 211 stated in part:

          * * * Whereas development of multiple independently 
        targetable reentry vehicles by both the United States 
        and the Soviet Union represents a fundamental and 
        radical challenge to such stability;
          Whereas the possibility of agreed controls over 
        strategic forces appears likely to diminish greatly if 
        testing and deployment of multiple independently 
        targetable reentry vehicles proceed;
          Resolved further, That the President should propose 
        to the Government of Union of Soviet Socialist 
        Republics an immediate suspension * * * of the further 
        development of all offensive and defensive nuclear 
        strategic weapons systems, subject to national 
        verification or such measures of observation and 
        inspection as may be appropriate.

    Senate Resolution 211 was introduced by Senator Edward 
Brooke and 39 cosponsors (with three later additions) on June 
17, 1969. The Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably S. 
Res. 211 on March 24, 1970, and it passed the Senate on April 
9, 1970, on a vote of 72 to 6.
    I remember well making the case to several senior 
Administration officials that we would do well to do our best 
to avoid a race in multiple-warhead missiles. Nonetheless, the 
Administration did not agree with the Senate on the matter, 
believing instead that the United States enjoyed a 
technological lead over the Soviet Union, and would do better 
if MIRVs were allowed. Accordingly, the United States never 
proposed, in any serious way, that MIRVs be banned in SALT I. 
Two decades later, Soviet MIRVs have become a matter of 
considerable concern, and much effort in START and further 
effort in connection with the de-MIRVing Treaty have been 
required to deal with the problem. Now, 25 years later, it is 
clear how prescient the Senate was. Now that we are coming full 
circle, only five of S. Res. 211's cosponsors--Senators Dole, 
Hatfield, Inouye, Kennedy and I--remain in the Senate.
    I am reminded of the thought of T.S. Eliot in his poem, 
Little Gidding:

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

    The achievements of SALT, START and the ABM Treaty 
demonstrate that the United States and the successors to the 
Soviet Union are fulfilling pledges made repeatedly since the 
1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty to reduce their nuclear arsenals. 
These pledges were seen as justification by other nations for 
decisions to refrain from nuclear weapons testing, join the 
non-proliferation treaty as non-nuclear weapon states and, 
earlier this year, to agree upon the permanent extension of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
    I hope very much that we will have the wisdom to understand 
what has been achieved, the resolve to preserve our 
achievements, and the foresight to build upon them.
    At present, the 1972 ABM Treaty is under serious assault by 
people who believe that the United States should have a nation-
wide defense against ballistic missile attack. This notion runs 
directly counter to the concept underlying the ABM Treaty--that 
ensuring that neither side could have an effective national 
defense against missile attack would reassure each side's 
confidence in the deterrent value of its strategic offensive 
forces, thus enhancing deterrence and opening the way to 
meaningful reductions. That concept has proved correct.
    Those who insist that the United States should build a 
national defense regardless of whether it would destroy the ABM 
Treaty may, in the end, undermine both START I and START II and 
also destroy possibilities for further reduction during this 
era. A Russian decision not to ratify START II because of their 
concern about our commitment to the ABM Treaty could only lead 
to unwanted and unnecessary strategic uncertainty. Should the 
process of reduction be halted, the remaining Russian threat 
could be so great that the limited national defense now being 
advocated by some would be laughable. Should we then raise 
defense spending to cope with the threat, we would create 
further privations for taxpayers as the budget-balancing effort 
was destroyed, and we could find ourselves back in an arms 
race.
    Surely, we need not repeat such past mistakes. We need to 
recognize that there are real new arms control challenges to be 
met and overcome. We should focus on these opportunities and 
bring our best thinking and diplomacy to bear. If we do our 
work well, we will surely avoid much needless and debilitating 
military spending.
    In truth, there is no time to waste as we move to meet arms 
control challenges. Immediate priority should go to two 
activities; one within the province of the Senate, and a second 
within the province of the Executive Branch for the moment.
    First, this Committee should complete at an early date the 
several additional hearings now contemplated on the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and proceed as soon as possible to 
consideration and, I would hope, approval of ratification. I 
chaired seven hearings on the Chemical Weapons Convention in 
1994, and there was overwhelming evidence that the Convention 
merited and had gained wide-spread support in the Executive 
Branch, the Congress, the national security community and the 
chemical weapons industry.
    Delay in further consideration has raised the possibility 
that the Russian Federation may act at an earlier date than the 
United States and that the United States may not be a party 
when the requisite 65 nations have joined and the Convention 
comes into force. It would be very unfortunate for the world to 
start establishing the regime under which the Chemical Weapons 
Convention will operate with the United States on the outside 
looking in. It would be far better for us to lend our 
considerable expertise to the venture and help ensure that this 
ground-breaking agreement prohibiting the manufacturing, 
storage, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons is brought 
into force and enforced with the United States in a central 
role.
    Second, the Administration should do everything it can to 
avoid any deviation from the path toward a comprehensive ban on 
all nuclear testing. The President has made the wise decisions 
that the United States will support a treaty that is 
permanently binding upon the parties and that will press for a 
treaty that completely bans all nuclear explosions.
    Earlier this year the United States led the highly 
successful effort at the United Nations to secure the permanent 
extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We made it clear to 
the non-nuclear weapons states represented that we took our 
obligation seriously to end nuclear testing. We must not falter 
now for our own self-interest and for the interest of those who 
understand the imperative that we continue our best to control 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
    As additional priorities we should undertake very serious 
analysis as to just what further steps to reduce the nuclear 
arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation are in 
our interest and what kinds of reductions we might hope the 
other three nuclear powers--China, Britain, and France--might 
undertake. We will be much more comfortable with further 
reductions if all the nuclear powers are talking and 
cooperating and moving their arsenals to steadily lower levels. 
Each achievement in that regard will help reinforce the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
    In recent years, the United States has led other nations in 
the development of sanctions to be applied to individuals and 
nations taking dangerous actions with regard to chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons proliferation as well as the 
missiles that might be used for their delivery. In most 
instances, we have led the world in our initiative and 
willingness to set higher standards. Fortuitously, we have been 
willing to lead, rather than wait for consensus. As a result, 
it should be clear to all that we and other responsible nations 
will not tolerate proliferation-related activities.
    There should be no doubt that we face new and changing 
proliferation threats. We must be careful, however, neither to 
underrate nor to overrate the threat. If we underrate the 
threat, we and others will become law in meeting it. If we 
overrate, we are likely to waste precious resources over-
responding. For instance, we do not want to spend major sums of 
money to develop a missile defense to counter a threat that 
many experts believe may never pose a serious threat to 
America.
    We are trying through various means to get potential 
proliferant nations, such as China and North Korea, to 
constrain themselves in their activities and exports. We are 
quite properly trying to use diplomatic efforts throughout the 
world to deal with proliferation problems and to set nations 
with worrisome activities on a different course. It will 
enhance this effort considerably if we are willing to respond 
effectively, as required by law, to dangerous proliferation- 
related activities by others. For instance, when sanctions 
should be imposed for various activities, we must not shy away 
from making that decision. The Executive Branch should 
understand that in many cases it has the authority to waive the 
imposition of sanctions, should the President consider that to 
be in order. That is a far more preferable course and one that 
can be discussed freely by the Congress and Executive Branch. 
It is infinitely more honest and understandable than turning a 
blind eye to illicit activity, and it would avoid the danger of 
sending the wrong message to potential proliferators.
    The international barriers to proliferation are being 
steadily broadened and strengthened. As a very important 
example, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the required 
implementing legislation will mean that much activity that was 
previously permitted will now be criminalized. Throughout the 
world, police will be able to investigate and stop chemical 
weapons schemes such as the one that led to the Tokyo subway 
incident and more secure as a result.
    More than ever the benefits of arms control as an 
enhancement of our national security and as a way to spare our 
citizenry needless expenditures and needless risks should be 
imminently clear. I am deeply convinced that the people 
steadily are becoming better informed on the merit of arms 
control and want it fostered and nurtured.
    Many of the activities of arms control are separate, but as 
time has passed they are threads that have come together. A 
true fabric of sensible restraint is indeed being woven.