[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 163 (2017), Part 9]
[Senate]
[Pages 12582-12584]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              NORTH KOREA

  Mrs. FISCHER. Mr. President, I come to the floor today to discuss the 
growing threat from North Korea. Last month, the North Koreans 
conducted two intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, tests. The 
first came as our Nation celebrated its Independence Day. The second 
test was conducted last week.
  According to a number of reports, the second test demonstrated 
sufficient range to reach much of the United States. This increasing 
threat is a concern that I often hear about from Nebraskans.
  For years, the United States has assessed North Korea to have an ICBM 
capability, but it was largely unproven. In his 5\1/2\ years in power, 
Kim Jong Un has conducted more missile tests than his father did during 
his 17-year reign. Under an aggressive testing program, North Korea has 
turned a theoretical ICBM capability into an undeniable reality.
  Adding to the threat, they have made progress beyond ICBM technology. 
Over the past year, North Korea has conducted several tests of a 
submarine-launched ballistic missile. In February,

[[Page 12583]]

the regime demonstrated a new solid-fueled, road-mobile ballistic 
missile.
  Altogether, these developments reveal a dedicated, sophisticated 
development program that is relentlessly pursuing weapons designed for 
no other purpose than to threaten the United States and our allies. The 
rapid pace of development also indicates an increasingly capable 
scientific industrial base within North Korea.
  Questions still remain about the regime's ability to miniaturize a 
nuclear warhead, deliver it accurately, and shield it from the stress 
associated with launch and then reentry. We should expect Kim Jong Un 
to overcome these obstacles if the status quo remains unchanged.
  Admiral Harris, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, said in 
his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this 
year: ``It is clearly a matter of when.''
  This sense confirms that a drastic change in our approach is 
required. Our current multilateral efforts have not yielded the results 
needed to keep the world safe.
  The failure of the United Nations Security Council to issue a 
statement condemning North Korea's July 3 ICBM test was a step backward 
in the international effort to isolate and to punish the regime for its 
illegal behavior. With Russia and China preventing any substantive 
action at the United Nations, I believe we must aggressively implement 
unilateral sanctions to punish the companies and the countries 
underwriting Pyongyang's belligerence.
  One thing is certain. The principal economic enablers of the Kim 
regime are China and Russia.
  Beijing provides direct food and energy assistance to North Korea and 
is by far the largest market for North Korean exports, such as 
minerals. North Korean hackers reportedly conduct cyber crime 
operations from northern China, and almost all of North Korea's 
internet access is provided via a fiber-optic cable running between 
those two nations. North Korea has also used Chinese banks to conduct 
transactions associated with its illicit proliferation activities and 
its criminal operations.
  Russia's economic ties are more limited, but the Russians have been 
known to import North Korean labor and provide energy supplies, 
including jet fuel, to Pyongyang.
  These ties provide China and Russia with influence over North Korea. 
How have they used that influence? Instead of helping to restrain the 
regime, they appear to be rewarding its bad behavior. Reports indicate 
both nations are increasing their bilateral trade, with several 
claiming trade between Russia and North Korea increased by 85 percent 
in comparison to last year.
  Some argue China is unwilling to impose harsh restrictions on trade 
with Pyongyang because it would risk the regime's collapse and send a 
wave of North Korean refugees across their border. This argument might 
explain providing minimal assistance, but it does not justify billions 
of dollars in cross-border trade, nor does it explain why North Korean 
ballistic missiles are photographed being hauled by Chinese-made 
trucks.
  China and Russia must believe the Kim regime serves their strategic 
interests.
  For our purposes, these economic relationships are avenues through 
which we can impose costs on facilitating North Korea's belligerent 
behavior. Congress gave President Trump broad authority to take action 
against the nations supporting the North Korean regime's illegal 
activities, particularly those fostering the regime's hostile cyber 
activities, weapons programs, abuse of human rights, and their criminal 
networks. It is time for the President to use his authority to show 
China and Russia that continued support of the North Koreans will harm 
their own interests.
  The administration has already begun to implement such measures. In 
June, the United States announced sanctions against a Chinese bank, two 
Chinese individuals, and a Chinese entity for supporting the North 
Korean regime. It appears, though, that this warning shot has fallen on 
deaf ears, because there has been no change in their behavior.
  Chinese officials are sticking to their talking points, and they are 
objecting to any measures so they don't have to bear the costs of their 
own behavior. Take China's reaction to South Korea's decision to deploy 
the THAAD system. South Korea deployed a THAAD battery to improve the 
defenses against North Korean missiles. This is a defensive system that 
poses no threat to China.
  Yet how did China respond? They shut down South Korean-owned 
department stores. The South Korean conglomerate who owns the stores 
also owns the property where the THAAD system was deployed. Moreover, 
the conglomerate's websites were hit by cyber attacks, and unofficial 
restrictions appear to have been imposed on imports of South Korean 
cosmetics and South Korean tourism.
  It is clear that the Chinese view North Korea through a narrow lens 
of immediate strategic interest. That is how we must target our 
actions. By rigorously applying sanctions, we can make clear to China 
and any other nation doing business with the North Korean regime that 
continued support for the DPRK will harm their interests.
  Of course, sanctions are not a panacea, and aggressively applying 
them does carry risk. Indeed, if we could be totally confident that the 
secondary sanctions would solve this problem, I suspect that they would 
have been implemented long ago. Time is not on our side and 8 years of 
strategic patience has narrowed our options. If we want different 
results, we must change our strategy, and we must make these changes 
now.
  While firmly applying additional sanctions, the United States must 
also increase its defenses. Of course, our nuclear deterrent remains 
our country's ultimate protection against nuclear attack. Wednesday's 
successful test of a Minuteman III ICBM by our military provides 
continued assurance that our deterrent remains reliable and ready. We 
cannot rely on deterrence alone, and we must ensure that our missile 
defense efforts stay ahead of North Korea's accelerating developments.
  I am a longtime member, and now the chairman, of the Senate Armed 
Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, which oversees our missile 
defense programs. Through this role, I have had the benefit of working 
closely with the Directors of the Missile Defense Agency and the 
commanders of STRATCOM to improve our missile defenses.
  Over the years, the Senate Armed Services Committee has authorized 
additional funding for the construction of a new missile defense radar, 
known as the Long Range Discrimination Radar, or the LRDR, to track 
potential threats from North Korea. The committee is also focused on 
improving the robustness of our homeland missile defense system, known 
as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, or GMD, system as well.
  This year in the fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, 
our committee authorized over $200 million to meet unfunded 
requirements for that system.
  The GMD System is our only defense against North Korea's ICBMs. It 
consists of silo-based interceptors, which are located in Alaska and 
California, supported by space-based and terrestrial-based sensors and 
a vast command and control network.
  It provides an effective capability against North Korea's ICBMs, as 
was demonstrated in a successful intercept test on May 30 of this year. 
During that test, a single interceptor successfully destroyed an ICBM 
class target. It was the longest range test, and it was conducted at a 
greater altitude and closing speed than the system had ever faced 
before.
  This successful test was an important milestone that visibly 
demonstrated the impressive capabilities of our GMD System. However, 
shortly after, then-Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Admiral Jim 
Syring, testified before the House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 
that our defenses were not ``comfortably ahead of the threat.''

[[Page 12584]]

  These comments came before North Korea's July ICBM tests. I strongly 
believe the rate of North Korea's technical progress demands a 
response. There are options before us. For example, additional ground-
based radars and space-based sensors would improve our ability to track 
incoming threats, discriminate warheads from debris and decoys, and 
conduct kill assessments to confirm that the threats have been 
destroyed. The Redesigned Kill Vehicle Program, which will modernize 
the portion of the interceptor that impacts and destroys hostile 
warheads in space, promises to increase the capabilities of our current 
system. Deploying more interceptors, whether at the existing facility 
in Fort Greely, AK, or at a new installation, would add capacity and 
enable our defenses to better handle ICBM threats.
  There are also advanced technology programs, such as the development 
of lasers mounted on unmanned systems, which hold significant promise 
for future missile defense. The Missile Defense Agency is pursuing 
these options, but the question remains: Are our current efforts 
enough? To help answer this question, the administration is conducting 
a review of ballistic missile threats and our missile defense posture--
the first of its kind since 2010. There is no doubt that the threat 
environment of today is far more sophisticated and challenging than it 
was during the last review.
  Our missile defense posture has remained largely unchanged since 
2013. When responding to North Korean missile developments, then-
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced the Obama administration's 
decision to increase the number of deployed interceptors from 30 to 44. 
The final deployment of these interceptors is expected by the end of 
this year, which demonstrates another point that we must bear in mind 
when we consider our missile defenses: Decisions take years to 
implement.
  The fact that we are ahead of the threat today is not good enough. We 
should be asking ourselves whether the steps we are taking today are 
adequate to defeat the threats we know are coming in the future. I 
expect the administration's review to confirm the growing threat and 
articulate a clear response. The review is expected to conclude in the 
fall, and I plan to hold hearings to examine whether it is a proposed 
way forward.
  In closing, I would note that the phrase ``no good options'' is 
frequently repeated when it comes to confronting the threat that is 
posed by North Korea. This may be true, but the gravity of the 
situation demands action. Kim Jong Un has repeatedly threatened to 
attack U.S. cities with nuclear weapons. His capacity to carry this 
threat grows with every passing day. We must change our strategy to 
protect the American people. Strong secondary sanctions and enhanced 
missile defense should form the basis of that new approach.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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