[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 163 (2017), Part 9]
[House]
[Pages 12323-12334]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018

  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 481, I call up 
the bill (H.R. 3180) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2018 
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 481, the 
amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, shall be 
considered as adopted, and the bill, as amended, shall be considered 
read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 3180

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

[[Page 12324]]



     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central 
              Intelligence Agency.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 303. Congressional oversight of intelligence community 
              contractors.
Sec. 304. Enhanced personnel security programs.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of 
              the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing 
              environment.
Sec. 403. Technical correction to the executive schedule.

                       Subtitle B--Other Elements

Sec. 411. Requirements relating to appointment of General Counsel of 
              National Security Agency.
Sec. 412. Transfer or elimination of certain components and functions 
              of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 413. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.

             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Sec. 501. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns 
              directed at foreign elections and referenda.
Sec. 502. Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to 
              Federal election campaigns.
Sec. 503. Assessment of threat finance relating to the Russian 
              Federation.

                  TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 601. Period of overseas assignments for certain foreign service 
              officers.
Sec. 602. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized public 
              disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 603. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
Sec. 604. Report on expansion of Security Protective Services 
              jurisdiction.
Sec. 605. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with 
              respect to certain foreign investments.
Sec. 606. Report on Cyber Exchange Program.
Sec. 607. Review of intelligence community participation in 
              vulnerabilities equities process.
Sec. 608. Review of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 609. Sense of Congress on notifications of certain disclosures of 
              classified information.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2018 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to 
     be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 
     103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 
     2018, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the 
     elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 
     101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--
       (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made 
     available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, and to the President.
       (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, 
     within the executive branch.
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
     disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
     portion of such Schedule except--
       (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
     Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
     3306(a));
       (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
       (C) as otherwise required by law.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel 
     in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2018 by 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines that such action is necessary to the performance 
     of important intelligence functions, except that the number 
     of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized 
     under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such 
     element.
       (b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, 
     for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment 
     under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), 
     including any exemption from such personnel levels, of 
     employment or assignment in--
       (1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
       (2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
       (3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.
       (c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The 
     Director of National Intelligence shall notify the 
     congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 
     days prior to each exercise of an authority described in 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2018 the sum of $526,900,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2019.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 804 positions as of 
     September 30, 2018. Personnel serving in such elements may be 
     permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the 
     United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account for fiscal year 2018 such additional 
     amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional 
     amounts made available for advanced research and development 
     shall remain available until September 30, 2019.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2018, there are authorized such additional personnel for the 
     Community Management Account as of that date as are specified 
     in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2018 the sum of $514,000,000.

     SEC. 202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Computation of Annuities.--

[[Page 12325]]

       (1) In general.--Section 221 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period at the 
     end and inserting ``, as determined by using the annual rate 
     of basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in 
     that position.'';
       (B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking ``12-month'' 
     and inserting ``2-year'';
       (C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ``one year'' and 
     inserting ``two years'';
       (D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking ``one year'' each 
     place such term appears and inserting ``two years'';
       (E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), and 
     (l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), respectively; 
     and
       (F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
       ``(h) Conditional Election of Insurable Interest Survivor 
     Annuity by Participants Married at the Time of Retirement.--
       ``(1)  Authority to make designation.--Subject to the 
     rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and section 
     222, at the time of retirement a married participant found by 
     the Director to be in good health may elect to receive an 
     annuity reduced in accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and 
     designate in writing an individual having an insurable 
     interest in the participant to receive an annuity under the 
     system after the participant's death, except that any such 
     election to provide an insurable interest survivor annuity to 
     the participant's spouse shall only be effective if the 
     participant's spouse waives the spousal right to a survivor 
     annuity under this Act. The amount of the annuity shall be 
     equal to 55 percent of the participant's reduced annuity.
       ``(2) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The annuity 
     payable to the participant making such election shall be 
     reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection 
     (a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the 
     designated individual is younger than the participant. The 
     total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40 
     percent.
       ``(3) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The annuity 
     payable to the designated individual shall begin on the day 
     after the retired participant dies and terminate on the last 
     day of the month before the designated individual dies.
       ``(4) Recomputation of participant's annuity on death of 
     designated individual.--An annuity which is reduced under 
     this subsection shall, effective the first day of the month 
     following the death of the designated individual, be 
     recomputed and paid as if the annuity had not been so 
     reduced.''.
       (2) Conforming amendments.--
       (A) Central intelligence agency retirement act.--The 
     Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 et 
     seq.) is amended--
       (i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(1)), by 
     striking ``221(h),'' and inserting ``221(i),''; and
       (ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2082(h)(4)), by 
     striking ``221(k)'' and inserting ``221(l)''.
       (B) Central intelligence agency act of 1949.--Subsection 
     (a) of section 14 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is amended by striking ``221(h)(2), 
     221(i), 221(l),'' and inserting ``221(i)(2), 221(j), 
     221(m),''.
       (b) Annuities for Former Spouses.--Subparagraph (B) of 
     section 222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by 
     striking ``one year'' and inserting ``two years''.
       (c) Prior Service Credit.--Subparagraph (A) of section 
     252(b)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking ``October 1, 
     1990'' both places that term appears and inserting ``March 
     31, 1991''.
       (d) Reemployment Compensation.--Section 273 of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is 
     amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections 
     (c) and (d), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
       ``(b) Part-time Reemployed Annuitants.--The Director shall 
     have the authority to reemploy an annuitant in a part-time 
     basis in accordance with section 8344(l) of title 5, United 
     States Code.''.
       (e) Effective Date and Application.--The amendments made by 
     subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as 
     if enacted on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to 
     computations or participants, respectively, as of such date.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

     SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 303. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   CONTRACTORS.

       (a) Oversight by Congress.--
       (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 506J the following new section:

     ``SEC. 506K. OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.

       ``Notwithstanding the terms of any contract awarded by the 
     head of an element of the intelligence community, the head 
     may not--
       ``(1) prohibit a contractor of such element from contacting 
     or meeting with either of the congressional intelligence 
     committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to 
     discuss matters relating to a contract;
       ``(2) take any adverse action against a contractor of such 
     element, including by suspending or debarring the contractor 
     or terminating a contract, based on the contractor contacting 
     or meeting with either of the congressional intelligence 
     committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to 
     discuss matters relating to a contract; or
       ``(3) require the approval of the head before a contractor 
     of such element contacts or meets with either of the 
     congressional intelligence committees (including a member or 
     an employee thereof) to discuss matters relating to a 
     contract.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 506J the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 506K. Oversight of intelligence community contractors.''.
       (b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a)(1) 
     shall apply with respect to a contract awarded by the head of 
     an element of the intelligence community on or after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 304. ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS.

       Section 11001(d) of title 5, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Audit'' and 
     inserting ``Review'';
       (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``audit'' and inserting 
     ``review''; and
       (3) in paragraph (2), by striking ``audit'' and inserting 
     ``review''.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     SEC. 401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER 
                   EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking ``such 
     personnel of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may 
     designate;'' and inserting ``current and former personnel of 
     the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their 
     immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence 
     may designate;''.

     SEC. 402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER-INFORMATION 
                   SHARING ENVIRONMENT.

       (a) Information Sharing Environment.--Section 1016(b) of 
     the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
     (6 U.S.C. 485(b)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``President'' and 
     inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``President'' both places 
     that term appears and inserting ``Director of National 
     Intelligence''.
       (b) Program Manager.--Section 1016(f) of the Intelligence 
     Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(f)) 
     is amended by striking ``The individual designated as the 
     program manager shall serve as program manager until removed 
     from service or replaced by the President (at the President's 
     sole discretion).'' and inserting ``Beginning on the date of 
     the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2018, each individual designated as the program 
     manager shall be appointed by the Director of National 
     Intelligence.''.

     SEC. 403. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

       Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``Director of the National Counterintelligence and 
     Security.''.

                       Subtitle B--Other Elements

     SEC. 411. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL 
                   COUNSEL OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

       (a) In General.--Section 2 of the National Security Agency 
     Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50 U.S.C. 3602) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(c)(1) There is a General Counsel of the National 
     Security Agency.
       ``(2) The General Counsel of the National Security Agency 
     shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
     and consent of the Senate.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--Subsection (c) of section 2 of the 
     National Security Agency Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50 
     U.S.C. 3602) shall apply with respect to any person who is 
     appointed to serve as General Counsel of the National 
     Security Agency on or after January 21, 2021.

     SEC. 412. TRANSFER OR ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN COMPONENTS AND 
                   FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Information Review Task Force.--

[[Page 12326]]

       (1) Transfer required.--Effective on the date that is 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is 
     transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all 
     functions performed by the Information Review Task Force and 
     all assigned responsibilities performed by the Information 
     Review Task Force. Upon such transfer, such Task Force shall 
     be designated as a chairman's controlled activity.
       (2) Transition plan.--
       (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff shall jointly brief the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required 
     under paragraph (1).
       (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees a formal plan for the transfer required under 
     paragraph (1).
       (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any 
     funds authorized to be appropriated for the Information 
     Review Task Force for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 
     180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any 
     such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date 
     shall be transferred to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff.
       (b) Identity Intelligence Project Office.--
       (1) Elimination.--Effective on the date that is 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     the Defense Intelligence Agency shall eliminate the Identity 
     Intelligence Project Office, including all functions and 
     assigned responsibilities performed by the Identity 
     Intelligence Project Office. All personnel and assets 
     pertaining to such Office shall be transferred to other 
     elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by 
     the Director.
       (2) Transition plan.--
       (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees on the plan to carry out the elimination required 
     under paragraph (1).
       (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees a formal plan for the elimination required under 
     paragraph (1).
       (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any 
     funds authorized to be appropriated for the Identity 
     Intelligence Project Office for fiscal year 2018 after the 
     date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of 
     such date shall be transferred to other elements of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.
       (c) Watchlisting Branch.--
       (1) Transfer required.--Effective on the date that is 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is 
     transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency to the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff 
     all functions and all assigned responsibilities performed by 
     the Watchlisting Branch.
       (2) Transition plan.--
       (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director for Intelligence 
     of the Joint Staff shall jointly brief the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required 
     under paragraph (1).
       (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director for Intelligence 
     of the Joint Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees a formal plan for the transfer required under 
     paragraph (1).
       (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any 
     funds authorized to be appropriated for the Watchlisting 
     Branch for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds 
     that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be 
     transferred to the Director for Intelligence of the Joint 
     Staff.
       (d) Counter-Threat Finance.--
       (1) Elimination.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency shall eliminate the Counter-Threat 
     Finance analysis function of the Defense Intelligence Agency. 
     All personnel and assets pertaining to such function shall be 
     transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency, as determined by the Director.
       (2) Transition plan.--
       (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees on the plan to eliminate the Counter-Threat 
     Finance analysis function under paragraph (1).
       (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees a formal plan to eliminate such function under 
     paragraph (1).
       (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any 
     funds authorized to be appropriated for the Counter-Threat 
     Finance analysis function for fiscal year 2018 after the date 
     that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
     Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such 
     date shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.
       (e) National Intelligence University.--
       (1) Transfer required.--Effective on October 1, 2020, there 
     is transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency to the Director of National Intelligence all functions 
     and all assigned responsibilities performed by the National 
     Intelligence University.
       (2) Transition plan.--
       (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than October 1, 
     2018, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall jointly brief the 
     congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 
     defense committees on the plan to carry out the transfer 
     required under paragraph (1).
       (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than April 1, 
     2019, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall jointly submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 
     defense committees a formal plan for the transfer required 
     under paragraph (1).
       (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any 
     funds authorized to be appropriated for the National 
     Intelligence University after October 1, 2020. Any such funds 
     that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be 
     transferred to the Director of National Intelligence.
       (f) Congressional Notice for Reprogramming.--Not later than 
     30 days before transferring any funds relating to 
     transferring or eliminating any function under this section, 
     the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
     congressional defense committees notice in writing of such 
     transfer.
       (g) Treatment of Certain Functions and Responsibilities.--
       (1) In general.--In the case of any function or executive 
     agent responsibility that is transferred to the Director of 
     National Intelligence pursuant to this section, the Director 
     of National Intelligence may not delegate such function or 
     responsibility to another element of the intelligence 
     community.
       (2) Executive agent responsibility.--In this subsection, 
     the term ``executive agent responsibility'' means the 
     specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities 
     assigned by the Director of National Intelligence to the head 
     of an intelligence community element to provide defined 
     levels of support for intelligence operations, or 
     administrative or other designated activities.
       (h) Deadline for Policy Updates.--Not later than October 1, 
     2020, the Director of National Intelligence, the Under 
     Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Chairman of 
     the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall ensure that all relevant 
     policies of the intelligence community and Department of 
     Defense are updated to reflect the transfers required to be 
     made pursuant to this section.
       (i) Treatment of Transferred Functions.--No transferred 
     functions or assigned responsibility referred to in 
     subsection (a), (c), or (e) shall be considered a new start 
     by the receiving element, including in the case of any lapse 
     of appropriation for such transferred function or assigned 
     responsibility.
       (j) Reports on Other Elements of Defense Intelligence 
     Agency.--
       (1) National center for credibility assessment.--
       (A) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (i) the assignment of executive agency for the National 
     Center for Credibility Assessment to the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency may be limiting the ability of 
     the Center to effectively serve the Federal customer base of 
     the Center;
       (ii) the failure of the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in the role of the Director as security executive for the 
     Federal Government, to define in policy the term ``Executive 
     Agent'' may be further limiting the ability of the Center to 
     receive sufficient resources to carry out the critical 
     Federal mission of the Center; and
       (iii) the evolution of the Center from an organization of 
     the Army to an organization serving 27 departments and 
     agencies and responsible for all Federal credibility 
     assessment training, oversight, and research and development, 
     has resulted in a convoluted oversight structure based on 
     legacy reporting requirements.
       (B) Report.--Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director 
     of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
     congressional defense committees a report on--
       (i) the current and projected missions and functions of the 
     National Center for Credibility Assessment;
       (ii) the effectiveness of the current organizational 
     assignment of the Center to the Director of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency;

[[Page 12327]]

       (iii) the effectiveness of the current oversight structure 
     between the Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
     Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director 
     of National Intelligence; and
       (iv) the resources and authorities necessary to most 
     effectively execute the missions and functions of the Center.
       (2) Underground facilities analysis center.--
       (A) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (i) the assignment of executive agency for the Underground 
     Facilities Analysis Center to the Director of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency may be limiting the ability of the Center 
     to effectively serve the broader intelligence community 
     customer base of the Center;
       (ii) the failure of the Director of National Intelligence 
     to define in policy the term ``Executive Agent'' may be 
     further limiting the ability of the Center to receive 
     sufficient resources to carry out the critical mission of the 
     Center; and
       (iii) the requirements of the intelligence community and 
     Department of Defense with respect to underground facilities 
     are not adequately being met given the scale and complexity 
     of the problem set and the relatively small amount of funding 
     currently received by the Center.
       (B) Report.--Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director 
     of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
     shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees and the congressional defense committees a report 
     on--
       (i) the missions and functions of the Underground 
     Facilities Analysis Center;
       (ii) the state of the requirements of the intelligence 
     community and Department of Defense with respect to 
     underground facilities and the ability of the Center to meet 
     such requirements;
       (iii) the effectiveness of the current organizational 
     assignment of the Center to the Director of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency;
       (iv) the effectiveness of the current oversight structure 
     between the Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
     Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National 
     Intelligence; and
       (v) the resources and authorities necessary to most 
     effectively execute the missions and functions of the Center.
       (k) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``congressional defense committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and 
     House of Representatives; and
       (2) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and 
     House of Representatives.

     SEC. 413. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                   ENERGY.

       (a) Atomic Energy Defense Act.--Section 4524(b)(2) of the 
     Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended 
     by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``The Director of''.
       (b) National Security Act of 1947.--Paragraph (2) of 
     section 106(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ``and 
     Counterintelligence'' after ``Office of Intelligence'';
       (2) by striking subparagraph (F);
       (3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as 
     subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively; and
       (4) in subparagraph (H), as redesignated by paragraph (3), 
     by realigning the margin of such subparagraph two ems to the 
     left.

             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

     SEC. 501. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE 
                   CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND 
                   REFERENDA.

       (a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report containing an analytical assessment of 
     the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any, 
     conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant 
     current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any. 
     Such assessment shall include--
       (1) a summary of such significant Russian influence 
     campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by 
     which such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or 
     likely will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific 
     goal of each such campaign;
       (2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such 
     Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the 
     elections or referenda;
       (3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the 
     intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of 
     assisting the government of such foreign state in defending 
     against or responding to such Russian influence campaigns; 
     and
       (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and 
     responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).
       (b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) may be 
     submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall 
     contain an unclassified summary.
       (c) Russian Influence Campaign Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``Russian influence campaign'' means any effort, 
     covert or overt, and by any means, attributable to the 
     Russian Federation directed at an election, referendum, or 
     similar process in a country other than the Russian 
     Federation or the United States.

     SEC. 502. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND CYBERSECURITY 
                   THREATS TO FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.

       (a) Reports Required.--
       (1) In general.--As provided in paragraph (2), for each 
     Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
     for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an 
     internet website an advisory report on foreign 
     counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election 
     campaigns for Federal offices. Each such report shall 
     include, consistent with the protection of sources and 
     methods, each of the following:
       (A) A description of foreign counterintelligence and 
     cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal 
     offices.
       (B) A summary of best practices that election campaigns for 
     Federal offices can employ in seeking to counter such 
     threats.
       (C) An identification of any publicly available resources, 
     including United States Government resources, for countering 
     such threats.
       (2) Schedule for submittal.--A report under this subsection 
     shall be made available as follows:
       (A) In the case of a report regarding an election held for 
     the office of Senator or Member of the House of 
     Representatives during 2018, not later than the date that is 
     60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (B) In the case of a report regarding an election for a 
     Federal office during any subsequent year, not later than the 
     date that is one year before the date of the election.
       (3) Information to be included.--A report under this 
     subsection shall reflect the most current information 
     available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding 
     foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.
       (b) Treatment of Campaigns Subject to Heightened Threats.--
     If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
     the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and 
     Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for 
     Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign 
     counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and 
     the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of 
     sources and methods, may make available additional 
     information to the appropriate representatives of such 
     campaign.

     SEC. 503. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO THE 
                   RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
     acting through the National Intelligence Manager for Threat 
     Finance, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report containing an assessment of the financing 
     of threat activity by the Russian Federation.
       (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) 
     shall include, at a minimum, the following:
       (1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period 
     prior to the date of the report of any threat finance 
     activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at the behest 
     of officials of the Government of Russia, persons subject to 
     sanctions under any provision of law imposing sanctions with 
     respect to Russia, or Russian nationals subject to sanctions 
     under any other provision of law.
       (2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in 
     threat finance activities relating to Russia, including 
     common methods of conducting such activities.
       (3) A summary of engagement and coordination with 
     international partners on threat finance relating to Russia, 
     especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement 
     and coordination.
       (4) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.
       (c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) may be 
     submitted in classified form.
       (d) Threat Finance Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``threat finance'' means--
       (1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence 
     campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation, 
     terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;
       (2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move, 
     raise, or conceal money or value on behalf of threat actors;
       (3) sanctions evasion; or
       (4) other forms of threat financing domestically or 
     internationally, as defined by the President.

                  TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 601. PERIOD OF OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS FOR CERTAIN FOREIGN 
                   SERVICE OFFICERS.

       (a) Length of Period of Assignment.--Subsection (a) of 
     section 502 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 
     3982) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(3) In making assignments under paragraph (1), and in 
     accordance with section 903, and, if applicable, section 503, 
     the Secretary shall assure that a member of the Service may 
     serve at a post for a period of not more than six consecutive 
     years.''.
       (b) Foreign Language Deployment Requirements.--Section 702 
     of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4022) is 
     amended by--
       (1) redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and

[[Page 12328]]

       (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(c) Foreign Language Deployment Requirements.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, with the 
     assistance of other relevant officials, shall require all 
     members of the Service who receive foreign language training 
     in Arabic, Farsi, Chinese (Mandarin or Cantonese), Turkish, 
     Korean, and Japanese by the institution or otherwise in 
     accordance with subsection (b) to serve three successive 
     tours in positions in which the acquired language is both 
     relevant and determined to be a benefit to the Department.
       ``(2) Overseas deployments.--In carrying out paragraph (1), 
     at least one of the three successive tours referred to in 
     such paragraph shall be an overseas deployment.
       ``(3) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the 
     application of paragraph (1) for medical or family hardship 
     or in the interest of national security.
       ``(4) Congressional notification.--The Secretary of State 
     shall notify the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives and Committees on 
     Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate at the end 
     of each fiscal year of any instances during the prior twelve 
     months in which the waiver authority described in paragraph 
     (3) was invoked.''.

     SEC. 602. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF 
                   UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:

     ``SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF 
                   UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED 
                   INFORMATION.

       ``(a) In General.--On a semiannual basis, each covered 
     official shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report that includes, with respect to the 
     preceding 6-month period--
       ``(1) the number of investigations opened by the covered 
     official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of 
     classified information;
       ``(2) the number of investigations completed by the covered 
     official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of 
     classified information; and
       ``(3) of the number of such completed investigations 
     identified under paragraph (2), the number referred to the 
     Attorney General for criminal investigation.
       ``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The term `covered official' means--
       ``(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence 
     community; and
       ``(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility 
     for an element of the intelligence community.
       ``(2) The term `investigation' means any inquiry, whether 
     formal or informal, into the existence of an unauthorized 
     public disclosure of classified information.
       ``(3) The term `unauthorized public disclosure of 
     classified information' means the unauthorized disclosure of 
     classified information to a journalist or media 
     organization.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 1104 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized 
              public disclosures of classified information.''.

     SEC. 603. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY 
                   CLEARANCES.

       Section 506H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting ``and'' after the 
     semicolon;
       (B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a period; and
       (C) by striking subparagraph (C);
       (2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
       (3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
     subsection (b):
       ``(b) Intelligence Community Reports.--(1) Not later than 
     March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on the security clearances processed by each element 
     of the intelligence community during the preceding calendar 
     year. Each such report shall separately identify security 
     clearances processed by each such element and shall cover 
     Federal employees and contractor employees.
       ``(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
     include each of the following for each element of the 
     intelligence community for the year covered by the report:
       ``(A) The total number of initial security clearance 
     background investigations opened for new applicants.
       ``(B) The total number of security clearance periodic re-
     investigations opened for existing employees.
       ``(C) The total number of initial security clearance 
     background investigations for new applicants that were 
     finalized and adjudicated with notice of a determination 
     provided to the prospective applicant, including--
       ``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably and 
     granted access to classified information; and
       ``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably 
     and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security 
     clearance.
       ``(D) The total number of security clearance periodic 
     background investigations that were finalized and adjudicated 
     with notice of a determination provided to the existing 
     employee, including--
       ``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably; and
       ``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably 
     and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security 
     clearance.
       ``(E) The total number of pending security clearance 
     background investigations, including initial applicant 
     investigations and periodic re-investigations, that were not 
     finalized and adjudicated as of the last day of such year and 
     that remained pending as follows:
       ``(i) For 180 days or less.
       ``(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 months.
       ``(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 months.
       ``(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 months.
       ``(v) For 24 months or longer.
       ``(F) In the case of security clearance determinations 
     completed or pending during the year preceding the year for 
     which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12 
     months to complete--
       ``(i) the cause of the delay for such determinations; and
       ``(ii) the number of such determinations for which 
     polygraph examinations were required.
       ``(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations, 
     including initial and periodic re-investigations, that 
     resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
       ``(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations 
     that resulted in incomplete information.
       ``(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations 
     that did not result in enough information to make a decision 
     on potentially adverse information.
       ``(3) The report required under this subsection shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.''; and
       (4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
     inserting ``and (b)'' after ``subsection (a)(1)''.

     SEC. 604. REPORT ON EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICES 
                   JURISDICTION.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report on the feasibility, 
     justification, costs, and benefits of expanding the 
     jurisdiction of the protective services of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency under section 15(a)(1) of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)). The 
     report shall include--
       (1) an explanation of the need for expanding such 
     jurisdiction beyond the 500-feet limit specified in such 
     section 15(a)(1); and
       (2) an identification of any comparable departments or 
     agencies of the Federal Government in the Washington 
     metropolitan region (as defined in section 8301 of title 40, 
     United States Code) whose protective services jurisdictions 
     exceed 500 feet.
       (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted 
     in classified form.

     SEC. 605. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the heads of the elements of the 
     intelligence community determined appropriate by the 
     Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on the role of the Director in preparing 
     analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the 
     Federal Government of national security risks associated with 
     potential foreign investments into the United States.
       (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) 
     shall--
       (1) describe the current process for the provision of the 
     analytic materials described in subsection (a);
       (2) identify the most significant benefits and drawbacks of 
     such process with respect to the role of the Director, 
     including any benefits or drawbacks relating to the time 
     allotted to the Director to prepare such materials; and
       (3) include recommendations to improve such process.

     SEC. 606. REPORT ON CYBER EXCHANGE PROGRAM.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on the potential establishment of a fully voluntary 
     exchange program between elements of the intelligence 
     community and private technology companies under which--
       (1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community 
     with demonstrated expertise and work experience in 
     cybersecurity or related disciplines may elect to be 
     temporarily detailed to a private technology company that has 
     elected to receive the detailee; and
       (2) an employee of a private technology company with 
     demonstrated expertise and work experience in cybersecurity 
     or related disciplines may elect to be temporarily detailed 
     to an element of the intelligence community that has elected 
     to receive the detailee.
       (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) 
     shall include the following:
       (1) The feasibility of establishing the exchange program 
     described in such subsection.

[[Page 12329]]

       (2) Identification of any challenges in establishing the 
     exchange program.
       (3) An evaluation of the benefits to the intelligence 
     community that would result from the exchange program.

     SEC. 607. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN 
                   VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS.

       (a) Review.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall review, with respect to the 3-
     year period preceding the date of the review, the roles and 
     responsibilities of the elements of the intelligence 
     community in the process of the Federal Government for 
     determining whether, when, how, and to whom information about 
     a vulnerability that is not publicly known will be shared 
     with or released to a non-Federal entity or the public.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) Submission.--Not later than 240 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
     results of the review under subsection (a).
       (2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include 
     the following:
       (A) A description of the roles and responsibilities of the 
     elements of the intelligence community in the process of 
     determining whether, when, how, and to whom information about 
     a vulnerability that is not publicly known will be shared or 
     released to a non-Federal entity or the public.
       (B) The criteria used by the Federal Government, including 
     elements of the intelligence community, in making such 
     determination.
       (C) With respect to the period covered by the review--
       (i) a summary of vulnerabilities known to elements of the 
     intelligence community that were reviewed by the Federal 
     Government pursuant to such process, including--

       (I) the number of vulnerabilities known to the intelligence 
     community that were reviewed; and
       (II) of such number of reviewed vulnerabilities, the number 
     for which information was shared with or released to a non-
     Federal entity or the public;

       (ii) an assessment of whether there were any 
     vulnerabilities known to elements of the intelligence 
     community that were not reviewed pursuant to such process, 
     and if so, the basis and rationale for not conducting such a 
     review; and
       (iii) a summary of the most significant incidents in which 
     a vulnerability known to the intelligence community, but not 
     shared with or released to a non-Federal entity or the 
     public, was exploited by an individual, an entity, or a 
     foreign country in the course of carrying out a cyber 
     intrusion.
       (D) A description of any current mechanisms for overseeing 
     such process.
       (E) Recommendations to improve the efficiency, 
     effectiveness, accountability, and, consistent with national 
     security, transparency of such process.
       (F) Any other matters the Inspector General determines 
     appropriate.
       (3) Form.--The report may be submitted in classified form.
       (c) Vulnerability Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``vulnerability'' means, with respect to information 
     technology, a design, configuration, or implementation 
     weakness in a technology, product, system, service, or 
     application that can be exploited or triggered to cause 
     unexpected or unintended behavior.

     SEC. 608. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER 
                   MATTERS.

       (a) Review of Whistleblower Matters.--The Inspector General 
     of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the 
     inspectors general for the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
     National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
     Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the 
     National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review of the 
     authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other 
     practices and procedures relating to intelligence community 
     whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors 
     general.
       (b) Objective of Review.--The objective of the review 
     required under subsection (a) is to identify any 
     discrepancies, inconsistencies, or other issues, which 
     frustrate the timely and effective reporting of intelligence 
     community whistleblower matters to appropriate inspectors 
     general and to the congressional intelligence committees, and 
     the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such 
     matters.
       (c) Conduct of Review.--The Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall take such measures as the 
     Inspector General determines necessary in order to ensure 
     that the review required by subsection (a) is conducted in an 
     independent and objective fashion.
       (d) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a written report containing the 
     results of the review required under subsection (a), along 
     with recommendations to improve the timely and effective 
     reporting of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters to 
     inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence 
     committees and the fair and expeditious investigation and 
     resolution of such matters.

     SEC. 609. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF CERTAIN 
                   DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that section 502 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires 
     elements of the intelligence community to keep the 
     congressional intelligence committees ``fully and currently 
     informed'' about all ``intelligence activities'' of the 
     United States, and to ``furnish to the congressional 
     intelligence committees any information or material 
     concerning intelligence activities . . . which is requested 
     by either of the congressional intelligence committees in 
     order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.''.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the authorities described in subsection (a), together 
     with other intelligence community authorities, obligate an 
     element of the intelligence community to submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees written notification, 
     by not later than 7 days after becoming aware, that an 
     individual in the executive branch has disclosed covered 
     classified information to an official of an adversary foreign 
     government using methods other than established intelligence 
     channels; and
       (2) each such notification should include--
       (A) the date and place of the disclosure of classified 
     information covered by the notification;
       (B) a description of such classified information;
       (C) identification of the individual who made such 
     disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure was 
     made; and
       (D) a summary of the circumstances of such disclosure.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``adversary foreign government'' means the 
     government of any of the following foreign countries:
       (A) North Korea.
       (B) Iran.
       (C) China.
       (D) Russia.
       (E) Cuba.
       (2) The term ``covered classified information'' means 
     classified information that was--
       (A) collected by an element of the intelligence community; 
     or
       (B) provided by the intelligence service or military of a 
     foreign country to an element of the intelligence community.
       (3) The term ``established intelligence channels'' means 
     methods to exchange intelligence to coordinate foreign 
     intelligence relationships, as established pursuant to law by 
     the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National 
     Security Agency, or other head of an element of the 
     intelligence community.
       (4) The term ``individual in the executive branch'' means 
     any officer or employee of the executive branch, including 
     individuals--
       (A) occupying a position specified in article II of the 
     Constitution;
       (B) appointed to a position by an individual described in 
     subparagraph (A); or
       (C) serving in the civil service or the senior executive 
     service (or similar service for senior executives of 
     particular departments or agencies).

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) 
and the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) each will control 30 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes).


                             General Leave

  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and insert 
extraneous material in the Record on the bill, H.R. 3180.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a good, bipartisan bill that we have worked all 
year putting together in a bipartisan manner. I thank all of my 
colleagues not only on the Intelligence Committee, but also those 
colleagues who came down to review the bill. Hopefully they got all the 
information from our staff to provide all the answers that they may 
need so that they understand the classified nature of the bill and the 
importance of this bill to our Nation's intelligence community and our 
warfighters.
  I want to highlight just a few things in the bill, because we did 
debate this bill on Monday, so I will go through this quickly.
  The legislation provides the intelligence community authorization 
needed to protect and defend the United States. It supports critical 
national security programs, such as those protecting Americans against 
terrorism, cyber attacks, and hostile foreign nations.
  The total funding authorized in the bill is slightly below the 
President's budget request, and is consistent with the House Budget 
Committee-passed fiscal year 2018 budget resolution.
  H.R. 3180 enables the intelligence community to carry out its vital 
work

[[Page 12330]]

protecting Americans in the most complex threat environment since 9/11.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 is a solid, 
bipartisan bill, one that garnered unanimous approval in the committee 
by voice vote.
  I thank my committee colleagues and the entire HPSCI staff for their 
collaborative efforts in crafting the measure that we consider here 
today.
  In the 114th Congress, this committee worked in a similar bipartisan 
fashion to pass into law four key pieces of national security 
legislation. I am proud of our past legislative accomplishments, which 
testify to the virtues of substantive deliberation and reasoned 
compromise without needing to compromise the security of the American 
people or of our brave servicemembers.
  Reflecting on the past year, on Russia's assault on Western 
democracies, and on other challenges as well, from everything to 
include North Korea's unrelenting pursuit of a strategic nuclear 
capability, we owe the American people a deliberate process.
  I wish the bill had come to the floor with a rule that allowed 
Members to offer amendments. That opportunity is commensurate with the 
importance of the intelligence bill and the need for vigorous oversight 
of the IC by the whole Congress.
  Nonetheless, the manifest shortcomings in the process cannot take 
precedence over the imperative of discharging our duty and authorizing 
the operations of the intelligence community. On its merits, I urge all 
Members to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 3180 today.
  The Intelligence Committee oversees some of the most sensitive and 
highly classified aspects of U.S. intelligence operations and programs. 
The annual Intelligence Authorization Act is the primary means by which 
we can guarantee an appropriate balance between our Nation's national 
security imperatives and the civil liberties and privacy rights 
enshrined in the Constitution.
  H.R. 3180 does just that by funding, equipping, and giving policy 
direction to the intelligence community and military intelligence 
elements of the Defense Department. It sustains support for key 
national security priorities and programs, and represents a slight 
decrease from the President's budget request from 2018.
  This bill features a number of provisions championed by my Democratic 
colleagues, some of which redouble the IC's focus on the scope and 
nature of the threat, both overt and covert, that Russia poses to our 
interests and American political institutions.
  H.R. 3180 also mandates public reporting about counterintelligence 
and cyber threats against future U.S. elections; bolsters oversight of 
our policy guiding counterterrorism actions outside of declared areas 
of hostilities; and seeks more information about the executive branch's 
process for determining when and to whom to reveal information about 
vulnerabilities in computers and networks.
  At the same time, and unlike IAAs of years past, this bill omits 
problematic language regarding Guantanamo detentions and the role of 
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
  I am less supportive of some elements in this legislation, but the 
bill's merits outweigh any misgivings I may have, and I was proud to 
cosponsor the bill along with the chairman. Through it, our committee 
and the Congress as a whole serves as a guardrail against any excesses, 
transgressions or abuses. That has always been a solemn obligation, but 
at this uncertain and unprecedented moment in our national life, it 
carries even more responsibility for all of us.
  So, again, I urge my colleagues today to vote with me to advance the 
Intelligence Authorization Act and see that it is enacted into law.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers, and I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Himes), one of our subcommittee ranking members.
  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I thank both the chairman and ranking member 
for the strong bill that has been offered up today and for the 
bipartisan manner in which it was developed and enacted and, hopefully, 
will be passed.
  I rise in strong support of this bill, but would note for my 
colleagues that this authorization bill is an odd one. To fully 
understand it, you need to go deep into the basement of this Capitol 
and review it behind heavy metal doors.

                              {time}  1200

  The bill is full of acronyms and code words and classified 
information. As such, it can be hard to understand, and things that are 
hard to understand sometimes cause anxiety and fear. Let me take a 
moment to describe what this bill does.
  This bill has the strong bipartisan support of my fellow committee 
members, liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans alike, because 
it provides the lifeblood to a truly remarkable group of people who 
work behind the scenes and in the dark to keep us safe and to keep us 
free.
  The unheralded and unacknowledged warriors of the intelligence 
community never stop in the work that they do around the world. As we 
speak, North Korea is feverishly working to develop the ability to 
deliver a nuclear bomb to American shores. Our intelligence community 
is watching, evaluating, and planning against this mortal threat.
  As we speak, for the first time in a generation, Iran is not 
feverishly working to develop the ability to deliver a nuclear bomb to 
our shores. Our intelligence community is making sure that that stays 
true.
  As we speak, Mr. Speaker, for the umpteenth time, terrorists in 
places like Afghanistan and Libya and Syria are spending their time 
desperately trying to stay alive instead of spending their time 
planning to attack our airlines, our cities, and our people.
  As we speak, Mr. Speaker, Russia lurks, seeking advantage, promoting 
instability, and working to erode international norms and instability. 
We should make no mistake about Russia as an adversary, because there 
is a lot of noise about this. Russia is a country that invades 
neighboring sovereign countries, it murders political opponents, it 
bombs Syrian hospitals, and, yes, it conducted an unprecedented attack 
on the very core of our Democratic system: our free and fair elections.
  This bill funds the warriors who are watching that, who are standing 
up against that, in order to keep our system what we all like it to be.
  Mr. Speaker, because these activities are carried out secretly in the 
dark of night and usually unacknowledged, there is always the 
possibility for abuse. These activities, by their nature, run up 
against the lines of those values that make us Americans. This is 
surveillance. It is other things that are worthy of debate. The members 
of this committee spend their days in good argument about what the 
limits of those activities should be, and we will have additional 
arguments around things like the reauthorization of the section 702 
surveillance programs. These are terrific arguments that we have in a 
constructive way. These are not arguments that are present in this 
bill. Just as we did on section 215, we will have a robust discussion 
of the section 702 international authorities. These are authorities 
that raise questions and that should be subject to the debate of this 
Chamber.
  But this bill, this bill today, is about the lifeblood of a 
remarkable group of people who don't always get it right any more than 
we do, but who are patriots, who respect the Constitution, and who need 
our support in the work that they do to keep us safe and keep us free.
  I would like to, again, thank the majority, the chairman, the ranking 
member, and especially the staff who worked diligently to make this a 
bill that we would unanimously support and suggest to my colleagues in 
this Chamber that we don't see a lot of bills like this one, but this 
one is worthy of their support.

[[Page 12331]]


  Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman, Mr. Himes, 
for his kind comments, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to 
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi.)
  Ms. PELOSI. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
time, and I join our colleague in saluting the committee for bringing 
this bipartisan legislation to the floor--so many issues that the 
committee has to deal with. I know that full well as a previous ranking 
member.
  I know that we all agree that every chance we get we want to salute 
the patriotic men and women of the intelligence community for their 
ceaseless heroism and unblinking vigilance to keep the American people 
safe. I thank them for all they do for force protection and conflict 
prevention. The quiet professionals of the U.S. intelligence community 
work every day, again, to keep this country safe and our leaders 
informed. Respect for their work is essential.
  I thank Ranking Member Schiff and members of the committee--Mr. 
Schiff, for his leadership, and commend all the members of the 
committee for their dedication to those same goals.
  I am sorry that this bill is coming up under a closed rule so that 
Members cannot offer amendments. One such amendment might be about an 
independent commission. It is the judgment of the intelligence 
community, as expressed in the January 2017 Intelligence Community 
Assessment, that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a 
multifaceted active-measures campaign to sow discord in our political 
process and help one Presidential candidate and hurt the other.
  For this reason, we continue to ask for an outside, independent 
commission to look forward on how to prevent Russia and others from 
meddling in our election system again. The Swalwell-Cummings 
legislation to establish that commission has 200 bipartisan cosponsors.
  I also want to salute our Homeland Security Committee ranking member, 
Bennie Thompson, for his leadership to strengthen the preparedness of 
the election infrastructure of the United States to identify and 
withstand a foreign attack.
  Our election systems are part of the critical infrastructure of our 
country, some of the most critical infrastructure of our democracy 
itself. We must protect it.
  The United States must reject foreign interference in our elections, 
no matter which party it helps or which party it hurts. Our oath of 
office is to protect and defend the Constitution against all enemies, 
foreign and domestic. Working with the intelligence community to better 
ensure the integrity of our elections is vital to that goal.
  Madam Speaker, I urge a ``yes'' vote on this bipartisan legislation 
and salute the members of the committee. I especially want to 
acknowledge the tremendous leadership of our ranking member, Mr. Schiff 
from California.
  Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I want to express my agreement with Leader 
Pelosi's comments on the continuing need for the appointment of an 
independent commission. An independent commission would have the 
dedicated focus, the distance from any potential political 
interference, and the resources to prepare a report of the caliber that 
we saw of the 9/11 Commission. I think that would be a very sound and 
important complement to what we are doing in Congress and what Special 
Counsel Mueller is doing.
  Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington 
(Mr. Heck), my wonderful colleague on the Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. HECK. Madam Speaker, I rise to support the 2018 Intelligence 
Authorization Act, but first I would like to tender a point of personal 
privilege.
  Happy birthday, Madam Speaker.
  This Intelligence Authorization Act has very strong bipartisan 
language. I just want to highlight two areas where the IAA furthers 
what I believe to be high priorities for our national security.
  First, section 605, which I had the honor to author, sets in motion 
how to change the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 
we also call it CFIUS, to better protect our keystone technologies.
  This IAA provision dovetails with some broader work that we are doing 
in the Financial Services Committee, in fact, across the aisle with 
Congressman Pittenger and myself and others. It would modernize the 
process to better protect and prevent strategic foreign adversaries 
like China or Russia from taking advantage of our open markets in a way 
that undermines our national security.
  America's technological edge is, in fact, a cornerstone of our 
national security, but our strategic adversaries know that, too. They 
are increasingly seeking to obtain these critical technologies and 
resources through commercial transactions, i.e., they are buying them. 
CFIUS is a place to safeguard us against this risk, but it needs 
modernization, more resources, and authority and support from the 
intelligence community.
  Russian meddling in the 2017 election showed us what happens when an 
adversary tries to exploit our political openness. Now they are trying 
to exploit our economic openness. Our intelligence community is vital 
in protecting against both of those threats.
  Let me also underscore this point: The fiscal year 2018 IAA takes 
steps to safeguard our Nation's edge, our advantage in space, which is, 
I am sorry to say, increasingly threatened by adversary nations. To 
mitigate that risk, the bill supports some truly cutting-edge space 
technologies and invests in and oversees programs to ensure the 
resiliency of overhead architecture. At the same time, it keeps up with 
the Intelligence Committee's long-running efforts to stimulate 
innovation.
  In particular, the committee report accompanying today's legislation 
asks the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to examine new 
approaches to public and private sector collaboration, with the goal of 
fostering the faster, smarter development of automation, artificial 
intelligence, and similar technologies.
  Madam Speaker, I am proud to support this legislation. I hope all my 
colleagues will join me in both wishing the Speaker a happy birthday 
and in voting ``yes'' on this bill.
  Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I wasn't aware it is your birthday, but 
happy birthday, and I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, happy birthday.
  Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Castro), who will now sing Happy Birthday for you.
  Mr. CASTRO of Texas. Madam Speaker, I will spare you that.
  Madam Speaker, I voice my support for H.R. 3180, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018.
  The men and women of America's intelligence community, the best in 
the world, protect our country every day. They serve beyond the front 
lines of conflict to collect and analyze intelligence on our 
adversaries.
  In addition to being highly effective, America's intelligence 
community adapts as the threats our country faces shift on a daily 
basis. Their effectiveness is amplified when they are in close 
cooperation and coordination with policymakers.
  I want to thank my fellow members on the committee, especially 
Ranking Member Schiff and Chairman Nunes, for working with me to add 
language into this bill requiring the intelligence community to brief 
Congress on our intelligence capabilities in the South China Sea.
  Over $5 trillion in ship-borne commerce flows through the region each 
year, including the vast majority of sea-borne energy imports by close 
U.S. partners such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
  The security of the United States and those of these partners is 
closely linked to the ability of the United States to guarantee the 
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

[[Page 12332]]

  Our ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea threaten the 
principles of a rules-based order and the security of the United States 
and our allies.
  The language in the IAA allows Congress to more effectively 
understand the needs of the intelligence community. It allows for a 
two-way conversation so that Congress can act to provide the 
intelligence community the tools and authorities it needs to inform 
policymakers.
  Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Mrs. Murphy).
  Mrs. MURPHY of Florida. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act.
  Good intelligence safeguards our Nation from adversaries. It is used 
to support our Armed Forces, our diplomats, and our homeland security 
professionals.
  The men and women of the U.S. intelligence community make enormous 
sacrifices on behalf of our country. While others seek the limelight, 
they shun publicity and self-promotion. They are silent warriors and 
quiet heroes.
  I want to highlight section 609 of this legislation. It is a version 
of a bill that I authored called the Prevention and Oversight of 
Intelligence Sharing with Enemies Act, or the POISE Act.
  I introduced the POISE Act in May after the President disclosed 
highly sensitive information to senior Russian officials during a White 
House meeting. This information had been entrusted to the U.S. by key 
allies.
  Under Federal law, the executive branch is required to inform the 
congressional intelligence committees of U.S. intelligence activities. 
The POISE Act would specify that the executive branch must notify the 
committees when a member of the executive branch, including the 
President, intentionally or inadvertently discloses top-secret 
information to adversary foreign government.

                              {time}  1215

  It is dangerous for a U.S. official to share classified information 
with an adversary, especially outside of established intelligence 
channels. The adversary could use the information to harm the United 
States or its allies. Moreover, our partners might decide to stop 
sharing critical intelligence with us if they lose confidence in our 
capacity to keep it confidential.
  The congressional notification requirement in the POISE Act would 
help deter inappropriate disclosures of classified information to 
adversaries. Once formally notified of the disclosure, Congress would 
be in a position to take any appropriate oversight action.
  I am so pleased that the core of the POISE Act is contained in 
section 609. I want to thank Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff 
for including the provision in the bill, and I urge the bill's swift 
passage.
  Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Swalwell).
  Mr. SWALWELL of California. Madam Speaker, happy birthday to you.
  Madam Speaker, I would like to thank the ranking member and our 
chair.
  I think this IAA represents the best of what we do together in the 
committee, and I am really just thrilled on behalf of the men and women 
who serve this country in our military and in our intelligence services 
that they have an authorization, act, that respects what they do, that 
enables what they do and understands that we have trying days ahead.
  Press reports right now are showing that North Korea may have just 
launched another ballistic missile, and so people who we represent at 
home are counting on us to do everything we can to protect this great 
country. It has been a privilege to work with Mr. Schiff and the 
chairman on this bill.
  Of particular interest for me is that this bill also has our 
intelligence agencies report back to Congress just what efforts the 
Russians are taking not just in America, but across the globe to 
interfere and meddle in other countries' elections. We have seen an 
escalating pattern of this over the past few decades, certainly 
culminating in our recent 2016 election.
  It is very important that the Congress knows and that the American 
people and our allies know what continued efforts will look like. So I 
appreciate the majority's willingness to work with us.
  We have seen, I think, in just the past few days, a bicameral effort 
to come together and say that we are not going to tolerate Russia's 
aggression in the world. The sanctions that were recently passed in 
this House and across the way in the Senate, I think, showed the world 
that we are serious, that this is our democracy, and it is still a 
democracy that is worth protecting. I think part of the IAA reflects 
that spirit as well.
  So, again, I thank the chairman for his work. I thank the staff on 
the majority side and the Members on the majority side, as well as our 
ranking member and our own staff, for working so hard to put this 
forward to protect and defend this great country.
  Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  This year's Intelligence Authorization Act was a bipartisan effort, 
and I am pleased to vote for it today. With this legislation, we 
reaffirm that all of our government's activities, including ones that 
are, by necessity, classified, must be maximally effective and bound by 
law. I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this year's IAA.
  I do want to take this opportunity, also, to commend our committee's 
outgoing fellow from the Los Alamos National Lab, Phil Tubesing. For 2 
years, Phil has worked alongside the entire HPSCI staff, imparting his 
scientific expertise about nuclear weapons and the other significant 
national security work that our national labs undertake.
  Phil, we thank you for your service to the committee and wish you 
every success in the future.
  Finally, I want to extend a closing word to all of the men and women 
of the intelligence community. The work that you do keeps us safe. Your 
mission is to speak truth to power, to give policymakers objective, 
rigorously vetted and diligently produced intelligence, and you do that 
in magnificent fashion. Thank you for your commitment and resolve in 
the face of a challenging global threat landscape. With this 
legislation, we believe that we provide you with the adequate tools, 
authorities, and funding, while making sure that our congressional 
oversight remains robust.
  Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Speaker, I want to thank both the majority and minority members 
of our committee for working in a bipartisan manner this year to 
complete this bill, which I believe is a really good product and will 
support the men and women doing very difficult work to protect the 
American people.
  I do want to thank the staff not only from the minority side, but 
also from the majority side, specifically: Shannon Stuart, Nick 
Ciarlante, Scott Glabe, Bill Flanigan, Allen Souza, Lisa Major, 
Jacqueline Tame, Mark Stewart, Chelsey Campbell, Andrew House, Marissa 
Skaggs, Angel Smith, Kash Patel, Doug Presley, Steve Keith, George 
Pappas, and Jack Langer for helping craft this bill with the minority; 
as well as the committee-shared staff of Brandon Smith, Kim Kerr, and 
Kristin Jepson.
  I would also like to take another moment, as Mr. Schiff just did, our 
ranking member, and thank our fellow who will be leaving us this year, 
who has been here a couple of years, Mr. Phil Tubesing, who will be 
going back and ending his congressional fellowship. We thank him for 
all of his work.
  Madam Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to pass this bill and send 
an overwhelming message to the men and women who protect this country 
that this Congress stands ready to support them.

[[Page 12333]]

  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Speaker, as a senior member of the Homeland 
Security Committee and vigilant defender of our national security, I 
rise in support of H.R. 3180, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2018,'' which will provide the Intelligence Community (IC) 
with the necessary resources and authorities to ensure they remain 
capable of protecting and defending the United States.
  Our intelligence community is facing unprecedented threats from our 
adversaries around the world as this Administration struggles with the 
basics of leading this great nation.
  The Obama Administration left the nation with a stable and growing 
economy; several important international coalition wins that include 
the Iranian Nuclear Arms Deal; the Russia Sanctions; and the Paris 
Climate Agreement.
  The work of our intelligence community is a key asset in our efforts 
to thwart our adversaries when they seek to do Americans or our 
interests harm.
  Following the Election, President-elect Trump was critical of the 
intelligence community.
  In December 2016, he attacked the CIA over its assessment that 
Russian hacks on Democratic political targets were intended to help him 
win the White House.
  In January of this year just prior to his inauguration, he compared 
our intelligence community to Nazi Germany, while making an unfounded 
accusation that the intelligence community leaked an unconfirmed 
dossier of sensitive information regarding him compiled by a private 
investigator.
  President Trump's disclosure of highly sensitive intelligence to 
Russian officials during a visit they had in the oval office raises 
grave concerns among our allies regarding sharing information with our 
intelligence community and the disclosure threatened to fracture his 
already-delicate relationship with the intelligence community.
  The revelation that President Trump met a second time in secret with 
Russian President Putin was not disclosed to the public, but came to 
light due to investigative journalism.
  The New York Times reported that lawyers and aides to President Trump 
are investigating the investigators hired by special counsel Robert 
Mueller, by scouring their records for potential conflicts of interest 
in an attempt to discredit their work.
  There is a pressing need for not only funding the work of the 
intelligence community, but to also provide additional protections to 
guard this national asset from undue interference from an 
Administration with too many entanglements with the Russian government 
that are under investigation.
  This bill authorizes appropriations for Fiscal Year 2018 for vital 
intelligence activities of the U.S. Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
  H.R. 3180 comes at a critical time in the status of our national 
security and the IC's ability to protect it.
  As we continue to face a diverse and growing array of threats from 
terrorist groups, hostile nation states, and questionable or 
incompetent figures in the Trump administration, it is crucial that the 
IC receive all the resources it needs to do its job while Congress has 
the necessary tools to carry out rigorous oversight of its work.
  This bill seeks to meet these challenges by supporting critical 
national security programs, particularly those focused on countering 
terrorism and cyberattacks.
  Under H.R. 3180, the Director of National Intelligence will be 
required to electronically publish an unclassified advisory report on 
foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to federal 
elections.
  It also bolsters intelligence oversight by ensuring that IC 
contractors can meet freely with Congress.
  Lastly, this bill improves IC accountability to Congress by requiring 
the IC to provide reports on:
  Investigations of leaks of classified information;
  Security clearance processing timelines;
  The process for reviewing information about computer vulnerabilities 
for retention or potential release;
  And Russian influence campaigns directed at foreign elections and 
threat finance activities.
  Madam Speaker, H.R. 3180 is a necessary response to the overwhelming 
evidence pointing to a carefully planned and executed infiltration of 
our 2016 Presidential Election by the Russian government and its 
operatives.
  The issue of cybersecurity, particularly with regards to our federal 
election computer system infrastructure, has been of great concern to 
me and the American public as more and more reports of Russian hacking 
efforts have come to light.
  In addition, the provision requiring reports on security clearance 
processing timelines should shed light on the highly dubious and 
inscrutable security clearances of Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner.
  Donald Trump's blatant and irresponsible nepotism towards his 
daughter and son-in-law have made us all vulnerable to Russian and 
other foreign influence at the highest levels of our federal 
government.
  H.R. 3180 will give the American people what they crave and deserve: 
clarity and transparency to pierce through the haze of cover-ups and 
distractions surrounding the Trump Administration.
  This bill also takes significant, much-needed steps to improve 
benefits for members of the IC, such as increasing employee 
compensation and authorizing $514 million in appropriations for the 
CIA's Retirement and Disability System.
  Congress must do its part to adequately recompense the patriotic 
Americans who serve our nation through their work in the IC, especially 
employees with disabilities, who make up 9 percent of the intelligence 
workforce.
  At the same time, we must continue to ensure that Congress can 
exercise oversight over and maintain transparency for the 17 agencies 
that comprise the IC.
  I am heartened that my Republican colleagues in the Intelligence 
Committee are starting to see the light in recognizing the sinister 
threat of Russian infiltration and White House collusion, both of which 
endanger our nation's ability to practice and protect its core 
democratic values.
  I look forward to working with all Members of Congress to strengthen 
our IC, and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this 
important legislation.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. Cheney). All time for debate has 
expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 481, the previous question is ordered on 
the bill, as amended.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, this 15-
minute vote on passage of H.R. 3180 will be followed by a 5-minute vote 
on passage of S. 114.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 380, 
nays 35, not voting 18, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 437]

                               YEAS--380

     Abraham
     Adams
     Aderholt
     Aguilar
     Allen
     Amodei
     Arrington
     Babin
     Bacon
     Banks (IN)
     Barletta
     Barr
     Barragan
     Barton
     Beatty
     Bera
     Bergman
     Beyer
     Biggs
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (MI)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Blum
     Blunt Rochester
     Bonamici
     Bost
     Boyle, Brendan F.
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brat
     Bridenstine
     Brooks (AL)
     Brooks (IN)
     Brown (MD)
     Brownley (CA)
     Buchanan
     Buck
     Bucshon
     Budd
     Burgess
     Bustos
     Butterfield
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Carbajal
     Cardenas
     Carson (IN)
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (TX)
     Cartwright
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Chabot
     Cheney
     Cicilline
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coffman
     Cohen
     Cole
     Collins (GA)
     Comer
     Comstock
     Conaway
     Connolly
     Cook
     Cooper
     Correa
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crawford
     Crist
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Curbelo (FL)
     Davidson
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Danny
     Davis, Rodney
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delaney
     DeLauro
     Demings
     Denham
     Dent
     DeSantis
     DeSaulnier
     DesJarlais
     Deutch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle, Michael F.
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Dunn
     Emmer
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Espaillat
     Estes (KS)
     Esty (CT)
     Evans
     Farenthold
     Faso
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Flores
     Fortenberry
     Foster
     Foxx
     Frankel (FL)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Fudge
     Gaetz
     Gallagher
     Gallego
     Garamendi
     Garrett
     Gianforte
     Gibbs
     Gohmert
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     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
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     Hanabusa
     Handel
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     Hastings

[[Page 12334]]


     Heck
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                                NAYS--35

     Amash
     Bass
     Blumenauer
     Capuano
     Chu, Judy
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Conyers
     DelBene
     Duncan (TN)
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     O'Rourke
     Pocan
     Polis
     Sanford
     Schakowsky
     Smith (WA)
     Takano
     Velazquez
     Welch

                             NOT VOTING--18

     Clay
     Collins (NY)
     Costa
     Costello (PA)
     Cummings
     Donovan
     Graves (MO)
     Hollingsworth
     King (NY)
     Larson (CT)
     Lujan Grisham, M.
     Napolitano
     Roskam
     Scalise
     Speier
     Waters, Maxine
     Webster (FL)
     Zeldin

                              {time}  1245

  Mmes. SCHAKOWSKY, VELAZQUEZ, and CLARKE of New York changed their 
vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Ms. ADAMS, Messrs. CROWLEY and KIND changed their vote from ``nay'' 
to ``yea.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________