[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 163 (2017), Part 9]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 12287-12288]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


             MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLE

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN

                              of virginia

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, July 27, 2017

  Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the following 
statement on behalf of my constituent, Mr. Steve Chill, on the Marine 
Corps Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle.

      Blowing the Whistle on a Whistleblower: The Real MRAP Story

                            (By Steve Chill)

       There is a perception that the Marine Corps was negligent 
     in providing armored vehicle support for the warfighters in 
     Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This purported negligence was 
     centered on the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) 
     vehicle effort, but negligence accusations extended to other 
     equipment. These perceptions about Marine Corps negligence 
     surrounding the MRAP efforts reflect ignorance of the facts. 
     The negligence story was largely fabricated by a 
     whistleblower and drew the interest of the press. The 
     perceptions were also drawn from a DODIG report, the 
     conclusions of which are based on incomplete information, and 
     a Marine Corps that failed to adequately explain the truth 
     with supporting evidence.
       The study ``Blowing the Whistle on a Whistleblower: The 
     Real MRAP Story'' is a refutation of previous works dealing 
     with the aforementioned MRAP accusations. This study explains 
     what occurred and provides the evidence necessary (including 
     hundreds of emails) to disprove the allegations of 
     negligence. The author was in a unique position to observe 
     the events incorrectly described. This study corrects the 
     record about the Marine Corps' fabricated negligence. It also 
     provides a means to understand the real lessons on support to 
     operations in Iraq.
       There are two series of events associated with MRAP: the 
     Marine Corps effort providing armored vehicles and the 
     portrayal of this effort.
       Providing armored vehicles: The term ``Hejlik UUNS'' will 
     be used for the Feb 2005 I MEF MRAP Urgent Universal Needs 
     Statement (UUNS). ``An UUNS is an immediate request from 
     units that are deployed to or are awaiting imminent 
     deployment to a combat theater. The UUNS is a request for a 
     capability that, if not filled, places the accomplishment of 
     the unit's mission in jeopardy or unduly increases the risk 
     of casualties'' (MARADMIN 045/06). The Commandant of the 
     Marine Corps (CMC) decided to provide m1114 (armored HMMWVs 
     or Humvees) as the material solution covering the Hejlik 
     UUNS. The Executives of the Marine Corps were involved in 
     this decision. The Hejlik UUNS was reduced to an UNS 
     (Universal Needs Statement-not Urgent), removing it from 
     further executive consideration and from the itinerary of the 
     dozens of flag officer commands that were responsible for it. 
     No Marine Corps command continued pursuing the UUNS. There 
     was an absence of action (due to an absence of demand) 
     between the removal of MRAP from consideration in August of 
     2005 until May of 2006 when I Marine Expeditionary Force 
     (MEF) (in Iraq) submitted a brand new UUNS for 185 armored 
     vehicles. A subsequent submission for 1000 MRAP brought the 
     total requirement to 1,185 which the Marine Corps pursued in 
     the DOD and in Congress.
       The portrayal: Franz Gayl, a whistleblower, created his 
     first whistleblower brief in March of 2007. It was not MRAP 
     focused and only one slide (of 31 slides) focused on MRAP. 
     Gayl, despite scant firsthand knowledge about MRAP needs, 
     became the ``MRAP whistleblower''. Gayl published his study 
     in Jan 2008 prompting the DOD Inspector General (DODIG) to 
     investigate MRAP. Both the study and the DODIG report were 
     flawed. Senator Biden, in conjunction with Gayl, established 
     the ``Marine Corps negligence'' story in the mainstream 
     press.
       The simple facts concerning the MRAP need are enough to 
     dispel the MRAP negligence falsehoods. A summary of the facts 
     is as follows:
       Marine forces in combat drive the initiation of urgent new 
     capabilities by submitting UUNS. These forces may be regarded 
     as ``the customer'' that drives the rest of the support 
     system. If the customer does not want it, it is not deployed. 
     If deployed Marines do not ask, they do not receive.
       Over the period of decades before the 2005 Hejlik UUNS, 
     several mid-level Marines noted the effectiveness of MRAP-
     type vehicles and wrote several articles/papers about them. 
     They did not convince their leadership to take action, nor 
     did they aggressively pursue MRAP-type vehicle purchases. The 
     rest of the combat development community did not develop a 
     need for MRAPs. Other Services, the Joint community, the DOD, 
     and other civilian organizations that are not Marine Combat 
     Developers could have developed MRAP-type vehicle needs and 
     did not.
       In February 2005, BGen Hejlik (I MEF) submitted an UUNS for 
     1,169 MRAPs. That UUNS was received by most major support 
     commands. The need was immediate and there were significant 
     concerns about material availability and manufacturing 
     ability.
       The UUNS was briefed at the Marine Corps Executive Safety 
     Board (ESB-March 05) and the Marine Corps Executive Off-Site 
     (EOS-May 05). Between the two briefs, the entirety of the 
     Marine Corps Executive body was briefed and considered MRAP-
     type vehicles. This included the Commandant of the Marine 
     Corps (CMC). CMC selected the m1114 (armored HMMWVs) with 
     advice from his Executives and with the full knowledge of the 
     Hejlik UUNS. The CMC decision to answer the 2005 Hejlik UUNS 
     with m1114s effectively ended the urgent status of the 2005 
     Hejlik UUNS.
       A key point is that I MEF (Fwd) in Iraq was asking for 
     m1114s as a solution for the Hejlik UUNS. M1114 procurement 
     was a decision supported by the MEFs in (or going to) Iraq.
       Marine Executives continued to be briefed on the Hejlik 
     UUNS through August 2005. In August of 2005 Marine Executives 
     ended consideration of the Hejlik UUNS as the m1114 decision 
     by CMC was implemented. Over ten other senior Marine Corps 
     Commands with MRAP decision responsibilities also ended their 
     considerations. These commands did not simultaneously 
     ``lose'' or ``bury'' the request as has been falsely 
     insinuated by Gayl and the press.
       The 2005 Hejlik UUNS was downgraded to an UNS which changed 
     the status of MRAPs away from a critical need by a Commander 
     involved in operations to save lives. The reduction to an UNS 
     placed MRAP in the regular combat development process with 
     other trucks where it continued to be considered by Systems 
     Command as a potential vehicle solution for future needs. 
     Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) reflected this reduction in 
     its UUNS tracker and reflected the 2005 Hejlik UUNS as 
     complete. The reduction to a regular UNS shows that the need 
     was no longer required by the forces in Iraq to prevent undue 
     increases in casualties.
       II MEF (2005-2006 deployment), in Iraq, did not pursue the 
     2005 Hejlik UUNS or any different request for MRAPs. I MEF 
     (2006-2007 deployment), in its prioritized listings before 
     deployment neither listed MRAP as a priority nor as a need at 
     all. The forces in combat or going to combat simply were not 
     requesting MRAPs during this timeframe. The entire combat 
     development community to include the MEFs, MARFORs, Advocates 
     and Executives regarded the Hejlik UUNS as resolved and 
     reduced to an UNS. The DODIG would later incorrectly 
     summarize BGen Hejlik's assertion that the UUNS was reduced 
     as a fabrication.
       A separate Marine Corps I.G. of I MEF (Fwd) that concluded 
     in May of 2006 found no documented need for MRAP. I MEF (Fwd) 
     did nothing to indicate any existing MRAP UUNS during this 
     I.G. once again indicating an absence of demand. I MEF had 
     the opportunity to identify a MRAP need (new or old) to the 
     Marine Corps I.G. and did not do so. The I.G. process allowed 
     for review by CG I MEF (Fwd) and yet there was still no MRAP 
     demand. This is evidence that I MEF was not pursuing MRAPs at 
     this time.
       Approximately nine months after Hejlik UUNS removal from 
     MROC consideration, I MEF (back in Iraq) submitted a new UUNS 
     for 185 vehicles (May 2006). The name requested was not MRAP. 
     The number requested was not 1,169 (the number requested in 
     the Hejlik UUNS). Combat developers pressured I MEF to ask 
     for more vehicles and to submit for joint funding. I MEF 
     initially refused to ask for more than 185. There is no logic 
     in Gayl's or the DODIG's contention that I MEF simultaneously 
     wanted 1,169 MRAPs, but also did not want more than 185 
     MRAPs. The fact is that the Hejlik UUNS was satisfied by the 
     provision of m1114 and was no longer an active urgent 
     request.
       Eventually I MEF submitted a second request for 1000 more 
     vehicles (July 2006), this time calling them MRAP.
       Starting in May 2006 the Marine Corps supporting 
     establishment, to include MCCDC, diligently processed and 
     worked the new request even before it was officially 
     submitted. Congress was briefed. Marine Corps leadership, up 
     to and including the CMC, advocated

[[Page 12288]]

     for MRAP. Testing of different MRAP-type vehicles from 
     different companies occurred in 2006. Budget issues were 
     worked for MRAP. The program office was created and MRAP 
     became the Marine Corps' number 1 priority. Congress and DOD 
     leadership were supportive of Marine efforts.
       A contract was awarded for 200 vehicles in Feb of 2007 with 
     the intent of fielding capability immediately. The Marine 
     Corps MRAP need was considered to be over 800 with 
     expectations of a higher number required. That expectation 
     was realized as the joint requirement in Feb 2007 grew to 
     almost 7,000 vehicles. The MRAP program was recommended for 
     ``high priority'' status. In May 2007 SECDEF Gates finally 
     designated MRAP as the number one DOD priority.
       The Marine Corps was accused of negligence, and did not 
     sufficiently battle these scurrilous accusations. The effort 
     (and success) in smearing the Marine Corps is summarized 
     below.
       In 2007, while the Marine Corps was in combat, Gayl was 
     fabricating a case against the Marine Corps. He stated that 
     it was only a case against Quantico, but those who understand 
     the Marine Corps also understand that combat development is a 
     Corps-wide effort. Gayl's study reflects his inadequately 
     developed or erroneous beliefs. Most of his important points 
     are incorrect. Others are fabricated. Despite the myriad of 
     inaccuracies, Gayl's study was perceived as credible.
       A further repudiation of the Gayl study may be developed in 
     a review of the actions of the Advocates. The Marine Corps 
     developed a system of Advocacy to support the deployed 
     forces. The ``Advocates'' act as a type of lawyer, ensuring 
     the deployed forces' (MARFOR and MEFs) requests (including 
     UUNS) are handled appropriately. The cover page from Gayl's 
     study cites his whistleblower credential as the ``GCE 
     Advocate S&T Advisor''. Advocate responsibilities are 
     delineated in order and directive and are also included on 
     the cover page of every UUNS. The Advocate (including Gayl) 
     has sole responsibility for several UUNS steps and is a 
     contributor for many others. Gayl's critique of the Marine 
     Corps is either a criticism of his own job performance . . . 
     or his critique is fatally flawed (the latter is actually the 
     case).
       The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps asked for a 
     DODIG to look into the accusations in Gayl's study. The MRAP 
     DODIG occurred over two years after the events it was 
     investigating. Marines had rotated out of their billets and 
     emails were deleted. The DODIG failed to uncover key evidence 
     contradicting Gayl's claims. While the DODIG did not validate 
     the great majority of Gayl's claims, it did not fully 
     disprove his study. They were not as thorough as they should 
     have been.
       The ``whistleblowing'' continued and on 14 May 2009 Gayl 
     testified before the House Committee on Oversight and 
     Government Reform on the Whistleblower Protection Act. Gayl's 
     study on MRAP was quoted for the record. Both the testimony 
     and the study were flawed.
       In addition to the outright rejections, there were a series 
     of documents proving that I MEF did not desire or pursue 
     MRAPs beyond the provision of the m1114s. Despite having 
     ample opportunity to manifest any sort of new MRAP 
     requirement (or dissatisfaction with the m1114 solution) in 
     several documents, the deployed forces and their parent 
     commands did not once do so. This absence of requests is 
     reflected in mandated reports. They all show an absence of 
     any unprovided need from the Hejlik UUNS. The numerous 
     official documents that did not identify an MRAP need reflect 
     one thing: the absence of MRAP need. There was never any 
     ``constant demand'' and the portrayal of a ``constant 
     demand'' was a fabrication or outright lie.
       The press remains woefully ignorant of the Marine Corps 
     combat development process yet, even today, feels comfortable 
     criticizing portions of it. Gayl's thousands of errors were 
     not scrutinized by the press. Gayl's accusations were 
     sensational and received widespread coverage but the press 
     did not believe it necessary to check Gayl's ``facts'' before 
     reporting.
       The study ``Blowing the Whistle on a Whistleblower: The 
     Real MRAP Story'' serves to contest the previous versions of 
     events that disparaged the Corps' dealing with MRAP needs 
     from 2005 to late 2006. The reputation of the Corps suffered 
     as a result.

     

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