[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 163 (2017), Part 8]
[House]
[Pages 11516-11545]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




         COUNTERING AMERICA'S ADVERSARIES THROUGH SANCTIONS ACT

  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and 
pass the bill (H.R. 3364) to provide congressional review and to 
counter aggression by the Governments of Iran, the Russian Federation, 
and North Korea, and for other purposes.

[[Page 11517]]

  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 3364

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Countering 
     America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                TITLE I--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN

Sec. 101. Short title.
Sec. 102. Definitions.
Sec. 103. Regional strategy for countering conventional and asymmetric 
              Iranian threats in the Middle East and North Africa.
Sec. 104. Imposition of additional sanctions in response to Iran's 
              ballistic missile program.
Sec. 105. Imposition of terrorism-related sanctions with respect to the 
              IRGC.
Sec. 106. Imposition of additional sanctions with respect to persons 
              responsible for human rights abuses.
Sec. 107. Enforcement of arms embargos.
Sec. 108. Review of applicability of sanctions relating to Iran's 
              support for terrorism and its ballistic missile program.
Sec. 109. Report on coordination of sanctions between the United States 
              and the European Union.
Sec. 110. Report on United States citizens detained by Iran.
Sec. 111. Exceptions for national security and humanitarian assistance; 
              rule of construction.
Sec. 112. Presidential waiver authority.

    TITLE II--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND 
               COMBATING TERRORISM AND ILLICIT FINANCING

Sec. 201. Short title.

 Subtitle A--Sanctions and Other Measures With Respect to the Russian 
                               Federation

Sec. 211. Findings.
Sec. 212. Sense of Congress.

 Part 1--Congressional Review of Sanctions Imposed With Respect to the 
                           Russian Federation

Sec. 215. Short title.
Sec. 216. Congressional review of certain actions relating to sanctions 
              imposed with respect to the Russian Federation.

        Part 2--Sanctions With Respect to the Russian Federation

Sec. 221. Definitions.
Sec. 222. Codification of sanctions relating to the Russian Federation.
Sec. 223. Modification of implementation of Executive Order 13662.
Sec. 224. Imposition of sanctions with respect to activities of the 
              Russian Federation undermining cybersecurity.
Sec. 225. Imposition of sanctions relating to special Russian crude oil 
              projects.
Sec. 226. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Russian and other 
              foreign financial institutions.
Sec. 227. Mandatory imposition of sanctions with respect to significant 
              corruption in the Russian Federation.
Sec. 228. Mandatory imposition of sanctions with respect to certain 
              transactions with foreign sanctions evaders and serious 
              human rights abusers in the Russian Federation.
Sec. 229. Notifications to Congress under Ukraine Freedom Support Act 
              of 2014.
Sec. 230. Standards for termination of certain sanctions with respect 
              to the Russian Federation.
Sec. 231. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons engaging in 
              transactions with the intelligence or defense sectors of 
              the Government of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 232. Sanctions with respect to the development of pipelines in the 
              Russian Federation.
Sec. 233. Sanctions with respect to investment in or facilitation of 
              privatization of state-owned assets by the Russian 
              Federation.
Sec. 234. Sanctions with respect to the transfer of arms and related 
              materiel to Syria.
Sec. 235. Sanctions described.
Sec. 236. Exceptions, waiver, and termination.
Sec. 237. Exception relating to activities of the National Aeronautics 
              and Space Administration.
Sec. 238. Rule of construction.

                            Part 3--Reports

Sec. 241. Report on oligarchs and parastatal entities of the Russian 
              Federation.
Sec. 242. Report on effects of expanding sanctions to include sovereign 
              debt and derivative products.
Sec. 243. Report on illicit finance relating to the Russian Federation.

     Subtitle B--Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia

Sec. 251. Findings.
Sec. 252. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 253. Statement of policy.
Sec. 254. Coordinating aid and assistance across Europe and Eurasia.
Sec. 255. Report on media organizations controlled and funded by the 
              Government of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 256. Report on Russian Federation influence on elections in Europe 
              and Eurasia.
Sec. 257. Ukranian energy security.
Sec. 258. Termination.
Sec. 259. Appropriate congressional committees defined.

         Subtitle C--Combating Terrorism and Illicit Financing

  Part 1--National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit 
                               Financing

Sec. 261. Development of national strategy.
Sec. 262. Contents of national strategy.

Part 2--Enhancing Antiterrorism Tools of the Department of the Treasury

Sec. 271. Improving antiterror finance monitoring of funds transfers.
Sec. 272. Sense of Congress on international cooperation regarding 
              terrorist financing intelligence.
Sec. 273. Examining the counter-terror financing role of the Department 
              of the Treasury in embassies.
Sec. 274. Inclusion of Secretary of the Treasury on the National 
              Security Council.
Sec. 275. Inclusion of all funds.

                          Part 3--Definitions

Sec. 281. Definitions.

                    Subtitle D--Rule of Construction

Sec. 291. Rule of construction.
Sec. 292. Sense of Congress on the strategic importance of Article 5 of 
              the North Atlantic Treaty.

            TITLE III--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA

Sec. 301. Short title.
Sec. 302. Definitions.

Subtitle A--Sanctions to Enforce and Implement United Nations Security 
                 Council Sanctions Against North Korea

Sec. 311. Modification and expansion of requirements for the 
              designation of persons.
Sec. 312. Prohibition on indirect correspondent accounts.
Sec. 313. Limitations on foreign assistance to noncompliant 
              governments.
Sec. 314. Amendments to enhance inspection authorities.
Sec. 315. Enforcing compliance with United Nations shipping sanctions 
              against North Korea.
Sec. 316. Report on cooperation between North Korea and Iran.
Sec. 317. Report on implementation of United Nations Security Council 
              resolutions by other governments.
Sec. 318. Briefing on measures to deny specialized financial messaging 
              services to designated North Korean financial 
              institutions.

   Subtitle B--Sanctions With Respect to Human Rights Abuses by the 
                       Government of North Korea

Sec. 321. Sanctions for forced labor and slavery overseas of North 
              Koreans.
Sec. 322. Modifications to sanctions suspension and waiver authorities.
Sec. 323. Reward for informants.
Sec. 324. Determination on designation of North Korea as a state 
              sponsor of terrorism.

                    Subtitle C--General Authorities

Sec. 331. Authority to consolidate reports.
Sec. 332. Rule of construction.
Sec. 333. Regulatory authority.
Sec. 334. Limitation on funds.

                TITLE I--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN

     SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Countering Iran's 
     Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017''.

     SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Act of international terrorism.--The term ``act of 
     international terrorism'' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-
     172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a 
     person that is not a United States person.
       (4) Iranian person.--The term ``Iranian person'' means--
       (A) an individual who is a citizen or national of Iran; or
       (B) an entity organized under the laws of Iran or otherwise 
     subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran.
       (5) IRGC.--The term ``IRGC'' means Iran's Islamic 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps.

[[Page 11518]]

       (6) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (7) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence to the United States; or
       (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States 
     or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a 
     foreign branch of such an entity.

     SEC. 103. REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING CONVENTIONAL AND 
                   ASYMMETRIC IRANIAN THREATS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
                   AND NORTH AFRICA.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter, the 
     Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
     of the Treasury, and the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees and leadership a strategy for 
     deterring conventional and asymmetric Iranian activities and 
     threats that directly threaten the United States and key 
     allies in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond.
       (b) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a) 
     shall include at a minimum the following:
       (1) A summary of the near- and long-term United States 
     objectives, plans, and means for countering Iran's 
     destabilizing activities, including identification of 
     countries that share the objective of countering Iran's 
     destabilizing activities.
       (2) A summary of the capabilities and contributions of 
     individual countries to shared efforts to counter Iran's 
     destabilizing activities, and a summary of additional actions 
     or contributions that each country could take to further 
     contribute.
       (3) An assessment of Iran's conventional force capabilities 
     and an assessment of Iran's plans to upgrade its conventional 
     force capabilities, including its acquisition, development, 
     and deployment of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, 
     unmanned aerial vehicles, and maritime offensive and anti-
     access or area denial capabilities.
       (4) An assessment of Iran's chemical and biological weapons 
     capabilities and an assessment of Iranian plans to upgrade 
     its chemical or biological weapons capabilities.
       (5) An assessment of Iran's asymmetric activities in the 
     region, including--
       (A) the size, capabilities, and activities of the IRGC, 
     including the Quds Force;
       (B) the size, capabilities, and activities of Iran's cyber 
     operations;
       (C) the types and amount of support, including funding, 
     lethal and nonlethal contributions, and training, provided to 
     Hezbollah, Hamas, special groups in Iraq, the regime of 
     Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Houthi fighters in Yemen, and other 
     violent groups across the Middle East; and
       (D) the scope and objectives of Iran's information 
     operations and use of propaganda.
       (6) A summary of United States actions, unilaterally and in 
     cooperation with foreign governments, to counter 
     destabilizing Iranian activities, including--
       (A) interdiction of Iranian lethal arms bound for groups 
     designated as foreign terrorist organizations under section 
     219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189);
       (B) Iran's interference in international commercial 
     shipping lanes;
       (C) attempts by Iran to undermine or subvert 
     internationally recognized governments in the Middle East 
     region; and
       (D) Iran's support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad in 
     Syria, including--
       (i) financial assistance, military equipment and personnel, 
     and other support provided to that regime; and
       (ii) support and direction to other armed actors that are 
     not Syrian or Iranian and are acting on behalf of that 
     regime.
       (c) Form of Strategy.--The strategy required by subsection 
     (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
     a classified annex.
       (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees and Leadership 
     Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees and leadership'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Banking, 
     Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations, and the majority and minority leaders of the 
     Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the 
     Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the 
     House of Representatives.

     SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS IN RESPONSE TO 
                   IRAN'S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State 
     should continue to implement Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note; relating to blocking property of weapons of mass 
     destruction delivery system proliferators and their 
     supporters).
       (b) Imposition of Sanctions.--The President shall impose 
     the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any 
     person that the President determines, on or after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act--
       (1) knowingly engages in any activity that materially 
     contributes to the activities of the Government of Iran with 
     respect to its ballistic missile program, or any other 
     program in Iran for developing, deploying, or maintaining 
     systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, 
     including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, 
     develop, transport, transfer, or use such capabilities;
       (2) is a successor entity to a person referred to in 
     paragraph (1);
       (3) owns or controls or is owned or controlled by a person 
     referred to in paragraph (1);
       (4) forms an entity with the purpose of evading sanctions 
     that would otherwise be imposed pursuant to paragraph (3);
       (5) is acting for or on behalf of a person referred to in 
     paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4); or
       (6) knowingly provides or attempts to provide financial, 
     material, technological, or other support for, or goods or 
     services in support of, a person referred to in paragraph 
     (1), (2), (3), (4) or (5).
       (c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subsection are the following:
       (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall block, in 
     accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), all transactions in all 
     property and interests in property of any person subject to 
     subsection (b) if such property and interests in property are 
     in the United States, come within the United States, or are 
     or come within the possession or control of a United States 
     person.
       (2) Exclusion from united states.--The Secretary of State 
     shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall exclude from the United States, any person subject to 
     subsection (b) that is an alien.
       (d) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
     violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of 
     subsection (c)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued 
     to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the 
     penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 
     of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful 
     act described in subsection (a) of that section.
       (e) Report on Contributions to Iran's Ballistic Missile 
     Program.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report describing each person that--
       (A) has, during the period specified in paragraph (2), 
     conducted any activity that has materially contributed to the 
     activities of the Government of Iran with respect to its 
     ballistic missile program, or any other program in Iran for 
     developing, deploying, or maintaining systems capable of 
     delivering weapons of mass destruction, including any efforts 
     to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, 
     transfer, or use such capabilities;
       (B) is a successor entity to a person referred to in 
     subparagraph (A);
       (C) owns or controls or is owned or controlled by a person 
     referred to in subparagraph (A);
       (D) forms an entity with the purpose of evading sanctions 
     that could be imposed as a result of a relationship described 
     in subparagraph (C);
       (E) is acting for or on behalf of a person referred to in 
     subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D); or
       (F) is known or believed to have provided, or attempted to 
     provide, during the period specified in paragraph (2), 
     financial, material, technological, or other support for, or 
     goods or services in support of, any material contribution to 
     a program described in subparagraph (A) carried out by a 
     person described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E).
       (2) Period specified.--The period specified in this 
     paragraph is--
       (A) in the case of the first report submitted under 
     paragraph (1), the period beginning January 1, 2016, and 
     ending on the date the report is submitted; and
       (B) in the case of a subsequent such report, the 180-day 
     period preceding the submission of the report.
       (3) Form of report.--Each report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 105. IMPOSITION OF TERRORISM-RELATED SANCTIONS WITH 
                   RESPECT TO THE IRGC.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The IRGC is subject to sanctions pursuant to Executive 
     Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking 
     property of weapons of mass destruction delivery system 
     proliferators and their supporters), the Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 
     U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), Executive Order 13553 (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     note; relating to blocking property of certain persons with 
     respect to serious human rights abuses by the Government of 
     Iran), and Executive Order 13606 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; 
     relating to blocking the property and suspending entry into 
     the United States of certain persons with respect to grave 
     human rights

[[Page 11519]]

     abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via information 
     technology).
       (2) The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (in 
     this section referred to as the ``IRGC-QF'') is the primary 
     arm of the Government of Iran for executing its policy of 
     supporting terrorist and insurgent groups. The IRGC-QF 
     provides material, logistical assistance, training, and 
     financial support to militants and terrorist operatives 
     throughout the Middle East and South Asia and was designated 
     for the imposition of sanctions by the Secretary of the 
     Treasury pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     note; relating to blocking property and prohibiting 
     transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or 
     support terrorism) in October 2007 for its support of 
     terrorism.
       (3) The IRGC, not just the IRGC-QF, is responsible for 
     implementing Iran's international program of destabilizing 
     activities, support for acts of international terrorism, and 
     ballistic missile program.
       (b) In General.--Beginning on the date that is 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
     shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with 
     respect to the IRGC and foreign persons that are officials, 
     agents, or affiliates of the IRGC.
       (c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subsection are sanctions applicable with respect to a foreign 
     person pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     note; relating to blocking property and prohibiting 
     transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or 
     support terrorism).

     SEC. 106. IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a list of each person the Secretary 
     determines, based on credible evidence, on or after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act--
       (1) is responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or 
     other gross violations of internationally recognized human 
     rights committed against individuals in Iran who seek--
       (A) to expose illegal activity carried out by officials of 
     the Government of Iran; or
       (B) to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote internationally 
     recognized human rights and freedoms, such as the freedoms of 
     religion, expression, association, and assembly, and the 
     rights to a fair trial and democratic elections; or
       (2) acts as an agent of or on behalf of a foreign person in 
     a matter relating to an activity described in paragraph (1).
       (b) Sanctions Described.--
       (1) In general.--The President may, in accordance with the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.), block all transactions in all property and 
     interests in property of a person on the list required by 
     subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are 
     in the United States, come within the United States, or are 
     or come within the possession or control of a United States 
     person.
       (2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
     violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of 
     paragraph (1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to 
     carry out paragraph (1) shall be subject to the penalties set 
     forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) 
     to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act 
     described in subsection (a) of that section.

     SEC. 107. ENFORCEMENT OF ARMS EMBARGOS.

       (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (d), the 
     President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection 
     (b) with respect to any person that the President 
     determines--
       (1) knowingly engages in any activity that materially 
     contributes to the supply, sale, or transfer directly or 
     indirectly to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of 
     Iran, of any battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large 
     caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack 
     helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as 
     defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of 
     Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare 
     parts; or
       (2) knowingly provides to Iran any technical training, 
     financial resources or services, advice, other services or 
     assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, 
     manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel 
     described in paragraph (1).
       (b) Sanctions Described.--
       (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall block, in 
     accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), all transactions in all 
     property and interests in property of any person subject to 
     subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are 
     in the United States, come within the United States, or are 
     or come within the possession or control of a United States 
     person.
       (2) Exclusion from united states.--The Secretary of State 
     shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall exclude from the United States, any person subject to 
     subsection (a) that is an alien.
       (c) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
     violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of 
     subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued 
     to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the 
     penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 
     of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful 
     act described in subsection (a) of that section.
       (d) Exception.--The President is not required to impose 
     sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person for 
     engaging in an activity described in that subsection if the 
     President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
     committees that--
       (1) permitting the activity is in the national security 
     interest of the United States;
       (2) Iran no longer presents a significant threat to the 
     national security of the United States and to the allies of 
     the United States; and
       (3) the Government of Iran has ceased providing operational 
     or financial support for acts of international terrorism and 
     no longer satisfies the requirements for designation as a 
     state sponsor of terrorism.
       (e) State Sponsor of Terrorism Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``state sponsor of terrorism'' means a country the 
     government of which the Secretary of State has determined to 
     be a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts 
     of international terrorism for purposes of--
       (1) section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 
     1979 (50 U.S.C. 4605(j)(1)(A)) (as continued in effect 
     pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.));
       (2) section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2371(a));
       (3) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2780(d)); or
       (4) any other provision of law.

     SEC. 108. REVIEW OF APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO 
                   IRAN'S SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND ITS BALLISTIC 
                   MISSILE PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 5 years after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall conduct a 
     review of all persons on the list of specially designated 
     nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of 
     Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury for 
     activities relating to Iran--
       (1) to assess the conduct of such persons as that conduct 
     relates to--
       (A) any activity that materially contributes to the 
     activities of the Government of Iran with respect to its 
     ballistic missile program; or
       (B) support by the Government of Iran for acts of 
     international terrorism; and
       (2) to determine the applicability of sanctions with 
     respect to such persons under--
       (A) Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 
     blocking property of weapons of mass destruction delivery 
     system proliferators and their supporters); or
       (B) Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 
     blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons 
     who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism).
       (b) Implementation of Sanctions.--If the President 
     determines under subsection (a) that sanctions under an 
     Executive order specified in paragraph (2) of that subsection 
     are applicable with respect to a person, the President 
     shall--
       (1) impose sanctions with respect to that person pursuant 
     to that Executive order; or
       (2) exercise the waiver authority provided under section 
     112.

     SEC. 109. REPORT ON COORDINATION OF SANCTIONS BETWEEN THE 
                   UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report that includes the following:
       (1) A description of each instance, during the period 
     specified in subsection (b)--
       (A) in which the United States has imposed sanctions with 
     respect to a person for activity related to the proliferation 
     of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for such 
     weapons to or by Iran, support for acts of international 
     terrorism by Iran, or human rights abuses in Iran, but in 
     which the European Union has not imposed corresponding 
     sanctions; and
       (B) in which the European Union has imposed sanctions with 
     respect to a person for activity related to the proliferation 
     of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for such 
     weapons to or by Iran, support for acts of international 
     terrorism by Iran, or human rights abuses in Iran, but in 
     which the United States has not imposed corresponding 
     sanctions.
       (2) An explanation for the reason for each discrepancy 
     between sanctions imposed by the European Union and sanctions 
     imposed by the United States described in subparagraphs (A) 
     and (B) of paragraph (1).
       (b) Period Specified.--The period specified in this 
     subsection is--
       (1) in the case of the first report submitted under 
     subsection (a), the period beginning on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act and ending on the date the report is 
     submitted; and

[[Page 11520]]

       (2) in the case of a subsequent such report, the 180-day 
     period preceding the submission of the report.
       (c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 110. REPORT ON UNITED STATES CITIZENS DETAINED BY IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees and leadership a report on United States citizens, 
     including United States citizens who are also citizens of 
     other countries, detained by Iran or groups supported by Iran 
     that includes--
       (1) information regarding any officials of the Government 
     of Iran involved in any way in the detentions; and
       (2) a summary of efforts the United States Government has 
     taken to secure the swift release of those United States 
     citizens.
       (b) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees and Leadership 
     Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees and leadership'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Banking, 
     Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations, and the majority and minority leaders of the 
     Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the 
     Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the 
     House of Representatives.

     SEC. 111. EXCEPTIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN 
                   ASSISTANCE; RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       (a) In General.--The following activities shall be exempt 
     from sanctions under sections 104, 105, 106, and 107:
       (1) Any activity subject to the reporting requirements 
     under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3091 et seq.), or to any authorized intelligence activities 
     of the United States.
       (2) The admission of an alien to the United States if such 
     admission is necessary to comply with United States 
     obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations 
     and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters 
     of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, 
     and entered into force November 21, 1947, or under the 
     Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 
     1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or other 
     applicable international obligations of the United States.
       (3) The conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the 
     sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical 
     devices to Iran or for the provision of humanitarian 
     assistance to the people of Iran, including engaging in a 
     financial transaction relating to humanitarian assistance or 
     for humanitarian purposes or transporting goods or services 
     that are necessary to carry out operations relating to 
     humanitarian assistance or humanitarian purposes.
       (b) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
     authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 
     and 1704) to carry out this Act.
       (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be 
     construed to limit the authority of the President under the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.).
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Agricultural commodity.--The term ``agricultural 
     commodity'' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of 
     the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
       (2) Good.--The term ``good'' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 
     (50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.)).
       (3) Medical device.--The term ``medical device'' has the 
     meaning given the term ``device'' in section 201 of the 
     Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
       (4) Medicine.--The term ``medicine'' has the meaning given 
     the term ``drug'' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, 
     and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

     SEC. 112. PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER AUTHORITY.

       (a) Case-by-Case Waiver Authority.--
       (1) In general.--The President may waive, on a case-by-case 
     basis and for a period of not more than 180 days, a 
     requirement under section 104, 105, 106, 107, or 108 to 
     impose or maintain sanctions with respect to a person, and 
     may waive the continued imposition of such sanctions, not 
     less than 30 days after the President determines and reports 
     to the appropriate congressional committees that it is vital 
     to the national security interests of the United States to 
     waive such sanctions.
       (2) Renewal of waivers.--The President may, on a case-by-
     case basis, renew a waiver under paragraph (1) for an 
     additional period of not more than 180 days if, not later 
     than 15 days before that waiver expires, the President makes 
     the determination and submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report described in paragraph (1).
       (3) Successive renewal.--The renewal authority provided 
     under paragraph (2) may be exercised for additional 
     successive periods of not more than 180 days if the President 
     follows the procedures set forth in paragraph (2), and 
     submits the report described in paragraph (1), for each such 
     renewal.
       (b) Contents of Waiver Reports.--Each report submitted 
     under subsection (a) in connection with a waiver of sanctions 
     under section 104, 105, 106, 107, or 108 with respect to a 
     person, or the renewal of such a waiver, shall include--
       (1) a specific and detailed rationale for the determination 
     that the waiver is vital to the national security interests 
     of the United States;
       (2) a description of the activity that resulted in the 
     person being subject to sanctions;
       (3) an explanation of any efforts made by the United 
     States, as applicable, to secure the cooperation of the 
     government with primary jurisdiction over the person or the 
     location where the activity described in paragraph (2) 
     occurred in terminating or, as appropriate, penalizing the 
     activity; and
       (4) an assessment of the significance of the activity 
     described in paragraph (2) in contributing to the ability of 
     Iran to threaten the interests of the United States or allies 
     of the United States, develop systems capable of delivering 
     weapons of mass destruction, support acts of international 
     terrorism, or violate the human rights of any person in Iran.
       (c) Effect of Report on Waiver.--If the President submits a 
     report under subsection (a) in connection with a waiver of 
     sanctions under section 104, 105, 106, 107, or 108 with 
     respect to a person, or the renewal of such a waiver, the 
     President shall not be required to impose or maintain 
     sanctions under section 104, 105, 106, 107, or 108, as 
     applicable, with respect to the person described in the 
     report during the 30-day period referred to in subsection 
     (a).

    TITLE II--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND 
               COMBATING TERRORISM AND ILLICIT FINANCING

     SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Countering Russian 
     Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017''.

 Subtitle A--Sanctions and Other Measures With Respect to the Russian 
                               Federation

     SEC. 211. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) On March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama issued 
     Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to 
     blocking property of certain persons contributing to the 
     situation in Ukraine), which authorizes the Secretary of the 
     Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to 
     impose sanctions on those determined to be undermining 
     democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine or 
     threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and 
     territorial integrity of Ukraine. President Obama 
     subsequently issued Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 
     15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons 
     contributing to the situation in Ukraine) and Executive Order 
     13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of 
     additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) 
     to expand sanctions on certain persons contributing to the 
     situation in Ukraine.
       (2) On December 18, 2014, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act 
     of 2014 was enacted (Public Law 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et 
     seq.), which includes provisions directing the President to 
     impose sanctions on foreign persons that the President 
     determines to be entities owned or controlled by the 
     Government of the Russian Federation or nationals of the 
     Russian Federation that manufacture, sell, transfer, or 
     otherwise provide certain defense articles into Syria.
       (3) On April 1, 2015, President Obama issued Executive 
     Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to blocking the 
     property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious 
     cyber-enabled activities), which authorizes the Secretary of 
     the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and 
     the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on persons 
     determined to be engaged in malicious cyber-hacking.
       (4) On July 26, 2016, President Obama approved a 
     Presidential Policy Directive on United States Cyber Incident 
     Coordination, which states, ``certain cyber incidents that 
     have significant impacts on an entity, our national security, 
     or the broader economy require a unique approach to response 
     efforts''.
       (5) On December 29, 2016, President Obama issued an annex 
     to Executive Order 13694, which authorized sanctions on the 
     following entities and individuals:
       (A) The Main Intelligence Directorate (also known as 
     Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie or the GRU) in Moscow, 
     Russian Federation.
       (B) The Federal Security Service (also known as Federalnaya 
     Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or the FSB) in Moscow, Russian 
     Federation.
       (C) The Special Technology Center (also known as STLC, Ltd. 
     Special Technology Center St. Petersburg) in St. Petersburg, 
     Russian Federation.
       (D) Zorsecurity (also known as Esage Lab) in Moscow, 
     Russian Federation.

[[Page 11521]]

       (E) The autonomous noncommercial organization known as the 
     Professional Association of Designers of Data Processing 
     Systems (also known as ANO PO KSI) in Moscow, Russian 
     Federation.
       (F) Igor Valentinovich Korobov.
       (G) Sergey Aleksandrovich Gizunov.
       (H) Igor Olegovich Kostyukov.
       (I) Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev.
       (6) On January 6, 2017, an assessment of the United States 
     intelligence community entitled, ``Assessing Russian 
     Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections'' stated, 
     ``Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence 
     campaign in 2016 aimed at the United States presidential 
     election.'' The assessment warns that ``Moscow will apply 
     lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the 
     U.S. Presidential election to future influence efforts 
     worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election 
     processes''.

     SEC. 212. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that the President--
       (1) should continue to uphold and seek unity with European 
     and other key partners on sanctions implemented against the 
     Russian Federation, which have been effective and 
     instrumental in countering Russian aggression in Ukraine;
       (2) should engage to the fullest extent possible with 
     partner governments with regard to closing loopholes, 
     including the allowance of extended prepayment for the 
     delivery of goods and commodities and other loopholes, in 
     multilateral and unilateral restrictive measures against the 
     Russian Federation, with the aim of maximizing alignment of 
     those measures; and
       (3) should increase efforts to vigorously enforce 
     compliance with sanctions in place as of the date of the 
     enactment of this Act with respect to the Russian Federation 
     in response to the crisis in eastern Ukraine, cyber 
     intrusions and attacks, and human rights violators in the 
     Russian Federation.

 PART 1--CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE 
                           RUSSIAN FEDERATION

     SEC. 215. SHORT TITLE.

       This part may be cited as the ``Russia Sanctions Review Act 
     of 2017''.

     SEC. 216. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATING TO 
                   SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       (a) Submission to Congress of Proposed Action.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees and leadership a report that describes the 
     proposed action and the reasons for that action.
       (2) Actions described.--
       (A) In general.--An action described in this paragraph is--
       (i) an action to terminate the application of any sanctions 
     described in subparagraph (B);
       (ii) with respect to sanctions described in subparagraph 
     (B) imposed by the President with respect to a person, an 
     action to waive the application of those sanctions with 
     respect to that person; or
       (iii) a licensing action that significantly alters United 
     States' foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.
       (B) Sanctions described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subparagraph are--
       (i) sanctions provided for under--

       (I) this title or any provision of law amended by this 
     title, including the Executive orders codified under section 
     222;
       (II) the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, 
     and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901 
     et seq.); or
       (III) the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 
     8921 et seq.); and

       (ii) the prohibition on access to the properties of the 
     Government of the Russian Federation located in Maryland and 
     New York that the President ordered vacated on December 29, 
     2016.
       (3) Description of type of action.--Each report submitted 
     under paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in 
     paragraph (2) shall include a description of whether the 
     action--
       (A) is not intended to significantly alter United States 
     foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation; or
       (B) is intended to significantly alter United States 
     foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.
       (4) Inclusion of additional matter.--
       (A) In general.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     that relates to an action that is intended to significantly 
     alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian 
     Federation shall include a description of--
       (i) the significant alteration to United States foreign 
     policy with regard to the Russian Federation;
       (ii) the anticipated effect of the action on the national 
     security interests of the United States; and
       (iii) the policy objectives for which the sanctions 
     affected by the action were initially imposed.
       (B) Requests from banking and financial services 
     committees.--The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
     Affairs of the Senate or the Committee on Financial Services 
     of the House of Representatives may request the submission to 
     the Committee of the matter described in clauses (ii) and 
     (iii) of subparagraph (A) with respect to a report submitted 
     under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is not 
     intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy 
     with regard to the Russian Federation.
       (5) Confidentiality of proprietary information.--
     Proprietary information that can be associated with a 
     particular person with respect to an action described in 
     paragraph (2) may be included in a report submitted under 
     paragraph (1) only if the appropriate congressional 
     committees and leadership provide assurances of 
     confidentiality, unless such person otherwise consents in 
     writing to such disclosure.
       (6) Rule of construction.--Paragraph (2)(A)(iii) shall not 
     be construed to require the submission of a report under 
     paragraph (1) with respect to the routine issuance of a 
     license that does not significantly alter United States 
     foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.
       (b) Period for Review by Congress.--
       (1) In general.--During the period of 30 calendar days 
     beginning on the date on which the President submits a report 
     under subsection (a)(1)--
       (A) in the case of a report that relates to an action that 
     is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign 
     policy with regard to the Russian Federation, the Committee 
     on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
     Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and 
     briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully 
     review the report; and
       (B) in the case of a report that relates to an action that 
     is intended to significantly alter United States foreign 
     policy with regard to the Russian Federation, the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives should, as 
     appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain 
     information in order to fully review the report.
       (2) Exception.--The period for congressional review under 
     paragraph (1) of a report required to be submitted under 
     subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 calendar days if the report is 
     submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 in 
     any calendar year.
       (3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional 
     review period.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     during the period for congressional review provided for under 
     paragraph (1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) 
     proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2), including 
     any additional period for such review as applicable under the 
     exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not 
     take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with 
     respect to that action is enacted in accordance with 
     subsection (c).
       (4) Limitation on actions during presidential consideration 
     of a joint resolution of disapproval.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval 
     relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) 
     proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes 
     both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), 
     the President may not take that action for a period of 12 
     calendar days after the date of passage of the joint 
     resolution of disapproval.
       (5) Limitation on actions during congressional 
     reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint 
     resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted 
     under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in 
     subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in 
     accordance with subsection (c), and the President vetoes the 
     joint resolution, the President may not take that action for 
     a period of 10 calendar days after the date of the 
     President's veto.
       (6) Effect of enactment of a joint resolution of 
     disapproval.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if 
     a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report 
     submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action 
     described in subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with 
     subsection (c), the President may not take that action.
       (c) Joint Resolutions of Disapproval or Approval Defined.--
     In this subsection:
       (1) Joint resolution of approval.--The term ``joint 
     resolution of approval'' means only a joint resolution of 
     either House of Congress--
       (A) the title of which is as follows: ``A joint resolution 
     approving the President's proposal to take an action relating 
     to the application of certain sanctions with respect to the 
     Russian Federation.''; and
       (B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is 
     the following: ``Congress approves of the action relating to 
     the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the 
     Russian Federation proposed by the President in the report 
     submitted to Congress under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia 
     Sanctions Review Act of 2017 on _______ relating to 
     ________.'', with the first blank space being filled with the 
     appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with 
     a short description of the proposed action.

[[Page 11522]]

       (2) Joint resolution of disapproval.--The term ``joint 
     resolution of disapproval'' means only a joint resolution of 
     either House of Congress--
       (A) the title of which is as follows: ``A joint resolution 
     disapproving the President's proposal to take an action 
     relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect 
     to the Russian Federation.''; and
       (B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is 
     the following: ``Congress disapproves of the action relating 
     to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the 
     Russian Federation proposed by the President in the report 
     submitted to Congress under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia 
     Sanctions Review Act of 2017 on _______ relating to 
     ________.'', with the first blank space being filled with the 
     appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with 
     a short description of the proposed action.
       (3) Introduction.--During the period of 30 calendar days 
     provided for under subsection (b)(1), including any 
     additional period as applicable under the exception provided 
     in subsection (b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint 
     resolution of disapproval may be introduced--
       (A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader 
     or the minority leader; and
       (B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority 
     leader's designee) or the minority leader (or the minority 
     leader's designee).
       (4) Floor consideration in house of representatives.--If a 
     committee of the House of Representatives to which a joint 
     resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has 
     been referred has not reported the joint resolution within 10 
     calendar days after the date of referral, that committee 
     shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint 
     resolution.
       (5) Consideration in the senate.--
       (A) Committee referral.--A joint resolution of approval or 
     joint resolution of disapproval introduced in the Senate 
     shall be--
       (i) referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
     Urban Affairs if the joint resolution relates to a report 
     under subsection (a)(3)(A) that relates to an action that is 
     not intended to significantly alter United States foreign 
     policy with regard to the Russian Federation; and
       (ii) referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations if the 
     joint resolution relates to a report under subsection 
     (a)(3)(B) that relates to an action that is intended to 
     significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect 
     to the Russian Federation.
       (B) Reporting and discharge.--If the committee to which a 
     joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of 
     disapproval was referred has not reported the joint 
     resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral 
     of the joint resolution, that committee shall be discharged 
     from further consideration of the joint resolution and the 
     joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
       (C) Proceeding to consideration.--Notwithstanding Rule XXII 
     of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any 
     time after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
     Affairs or the Committee on Foreign Relations, as the case 
     may be, reports a joint resolution of approval or joint 
     resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has been 
     discharged from consideration of such a joint resolution 
     (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been 
     disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the 
     joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint 
     resolution (and against consideration of the joint 
     resolution) are waived. The motion to proceed is not 
     debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. 
     A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed 
     to or disagreed to shall not be in order.
       (D) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals from the 
     decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the 
     rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure 
     relating to a joint resolution of approval or joint 
     resolution of disapproval shall be decided without debate.
       (E) Consideration of veto messages.--Debate in the Senate 
     of any veto message with respect to a joint resolution of 
     approval or joint resolution of disapproval, including all 
     debatable motions and appeals in connection with the joint 
     resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally 
     divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and 
     the minority leader or their designees.
       (6) Rules relating to senate and house of 
     representatives.--
       (A) Treatment of senate joint resolution in house.--In the 
     House of Representatives, the following procedures shall 
     apply to a joint resolution of approval or a joint resolution 
     of disapproval received from the Senate (unless the House has 
     already passed a joint resolution relating to the same 
     proposed action):
       (i) The joint resolution shall be referred to the 
     appropriate committees.
       (ii) If a committee to which a joint resolution has been 
     referred has not reported the joint resolution within two 
     calendar days after the date of referral, that committee 
     shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint 
     resolution.
       (iii) Beginning on the third legislative day after each 
     committee to which a joint resolution has been referred 
     reports the joint resolution to the House or has been 
     discharged from further consideration thereof, it shall be in 
     order to move to proceed to consider the joint resolution in 
     the House. All points of order against the motion are waived. 
     Such a motion shall not be in order after the House has 
     disposed of a motion to proceed on the joint resolution. The 
     previous question shall be considered as ordered on the 
     motion to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion 
     shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by 
     which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.
       (iv) The joint resolution shall be considered as read. All 
     points of order against the joint resolution and against its 
     consideration are waived. The previous question shall be 
     considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final 
     passage without intervening motion except two hours of debate 
     equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the joint 
     resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to 
     reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall 
     not be in order.
       (B) Treatment of house joint resolution in senate.--
       (i) If, before the passage by the Senate of a joint 
     resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, 
     the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the 
     House of Representatives, the following procedures shall 
     apply:

       (I) That joint resolution shall not be referred to a 
     committee.
       (II) With respect to that joint resolution--

       (aa) the procedure in the Senate shall be the same as if no 
     joint resolution had been received from the House of 
     Representatives; but
       (bb) the vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution 
     from the House of Representatives.
       (ii) If, following passage of a joint resolution of 
     approval or joint resolution of disapproval in the Senate, 
     the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the 
     House of Representatives, that joint resolution shall be 
     placed on the appropriate Senate calendar.
       (iii) If a joint resolution of approval or a joint 
     resolution of disapproval is received from the House, and no 
     companion joint resolution has been introduced in the Senate, 
     the Senate procedures under this subsection shall apply to 
     the House joint resolution.
       (C) Application to revenue measures.--The provisions of 
     this paragraph shall not apply in the House of 
     Representatives to a joint resolution of approval or joint 
     resolution of disapproval that is a revenue measure.
       (7) Rules of house of representatives and senate.--This 
     subsection is enacted by Congress--
       (A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate 
     and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such 
     is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, 
     and supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is 
     inconsistent with such rules; and
       (B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
     either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the 
     procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and 
     to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that 
     House.
       (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees and Leadership 
     Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees and leadership'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the majority and 
     minority leaders of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and 
     the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

        PART 2--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

     SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.

       In this part:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on 
     Finance of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of 
     the House of Representatives.
       (2) Good.--The term ``good'' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 
     (50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.)).
       (3) International financial institution.--The term 
     ``international financial institution'' has the meaning given 
     that term in section 1701(c) of the International Financial 
     Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)).
       (4) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'', with respect to 
     conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has 
     actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the 
     circumstance, or the result.
       (5) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or 
     entity.
       (6) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--

[[Page 11523]]

       (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence to the United States; or
       (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States 
     or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a 
     foreign branch of such an entity.

     SEC. 222. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       (a) Codification.--United States sanctions provided for in 
     Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to 
     blocking property of certain persons contributing to the 
     situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 
     15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons 
     contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 
     13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of 
     additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), 
     Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to 
     blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting certain 
     transactions with respect to the Crimea region of Ukraine), 
     Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to 
     blocking the property of certain persons engaging in 
     significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), and 
     Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to taking 
     additional steps to address the national emergency with 
     respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), 
     as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, including with respect to all persons sanctioned 
     under such Executive orders, shall remain in effect except as 
     provided in subsection (b).
       (b) Termination of Certain Sanctions.--Subject to section 
     216, the President may terminate the application of sanctions 
     described in subsection (a) that are imposed on a person in 
     connection with activity conducted by the person if the 
     President submits to the appropriate congressional committees 
     a notice that--
       (1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the 
     basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable 
     steps toward stopping the activity; and
       (2) the President has received reliable assurances that the 
     person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to 
     sanctions described in subsection (a) in the future.
       (c) Application of New Cyber Sanctions.--The President may 
     waive the initial application under subsection (a) of 
     sanctions with respect to a person under Executive Order 
     13694 or 13757 only if the President submits to the 
     appropriate congressional committees--
       (1) a written determination that the waiver--
       (A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       (B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
       (2) a certification that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number 
     and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that 
     Government.
       (d) Application of New Ukraine-Related Sanctions.--The 
     President may waive the initial application under subsection 
     (a) of sanctions with respect to a person under Executive 
     Order 13660, 13661, 13662, or 13685 only if the President 
     submits to the appropriate congressional committees--
       (1) a written determination that the waiver--
       (A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       (B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
       (2) a certification that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement 
     to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in 
     Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of 
     Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, 
     which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor 
     agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.

     SEC. 223. MODIFICATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 
                   13662.

       (a) Determination That Certain Entities Are Subject to 
     Sanctions.--The Secretary of the Treasury may determine that 
     a person meets one or more of the criteria in section 1(a) of 
     Executive Order 13662 if that person is a state-owned entity 
     operating in the railway or metals and mining sector of the 
     economy of the Russian Federation.
       (b) Modification of Directive 1 With Respect to the 
     Financial Services Sector of the Russian Federation 
     Economy.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall 
     modify Directive 1 (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, 
     issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under 
     Executive Order 13662, or any successor directive (which 
     shall be effective beginning on the date that is 60 days 
     after the date of such modification), to ensure that the 
     directive prohibits the conduct by United States persons or 
     persons within the United States of all transactions in, 
     provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of 
     longer than 14 days maturity or new equity of persons 
     determined to be subject to the directive, their property, or 
     their interests in property.
       (c) Modification of Directive 2 With Respect to the Energy 
     Sector of the Russian Federation Economy.--Not later than 60 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary of the Treasury shall modify Directive 2 (as 
     amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of 
     Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any 
     successor directive (which shall be effective beginning on 
     the date that is 60 days after the date of such 
     modification), to ensure that the directive prohibits the 
     conduct by United States persons or persons within the United 
     States of all transactions in, provision of financing for, 
     and other dealings in new debt of longer than 60 days 
     maturity of persons determined to be subject to the 
     directive, their property, or their interests in property.
       (d) Modification of Directive 4.--Not later than 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     the Treasury shall modify Directive 4, dated September 12, 
     2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under 
     Executive Order 13662, or any successor directive (which 
     shall be effective beginning on the date that is 90 days 
     after the date of such modification), to ensure that the 
     directive prohibits the provision, exportation, or 
     reexportation, directly or indirectly, by United States 
     persons or persons within the United States, of goods, 
     services (except for financial services), or technology in 
     support of exploration or production for new deepwater, 
     Arctic offshore, or shale projects--
       (1) that have the potential to produce oil; and
       (2) that involve any person determined to be subject to the 
     directive or the property or interests in property of such a 
     person who has a controlling interest or a substantial non-
     controlling ownership interest in such a project defined as 
     not less than a 33 percent interest.

     SEC. 224. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ACTIVITIES 
                   OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION UNDERMINING 
                   CYBERSECURITY.

       (a) In General.--On and after the date that is 60 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
     shall--
       (1) impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with 
     respect to any person that the President determines--
       (A) knowingly engages in significant activities undermining 
     cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic 
     institution, or government on behalf of the Government of the 
     Russian Federation; or
       (B) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act 
     for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person 
     described in subparagraph (A);
       (2) impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 
     235 with respect to any person that the President determines 
     knowingly materially assists, sponsors, or provides 
     financial, material, or technological support for, or goods 
     or services (except financial services) in support of, an 
     activity described in paragraph (1)(A); and
       (3) impose 3 or more of the sanctions described in section 
     4(c) of the of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 
     U.S.C. 8923(c)) with respect to any person that the President 
     determines knowingly provides financial services in support 
     of an activity described in paragraph (1)(A).
       (b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subsection are the following:
       (1) Asset blocking.--The exercise of all powers granted to 
     the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block 
     and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests 
     in property of a person determined by the President to be 
     subject to subsection (a)(1) if such property and interests 
     in property are in the United States, come within the United 
     States, or are or come within the possession or control of a 
     United States person.
       (2) Exclusion from the united states and revocation of visa 
     or other documentation.--In the case of an alien determined 
     by the President to be subject to subsection (a)(1), denial 
     of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, the 
     alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i) of 
     the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of 
     any visa or other documentation of the alien.
       (c) Application of New Cyber Sanctions.--The President may 
     waive the initial application under subsection (a) of 
     sanctions with respect to a person only if the President 
     submits to the appropriate congressional committees--
       (1) a written determination that the waiver--
       (A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       (B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
       (2) a certification that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number 
     and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that 
     Government.
       (d) Significant Activities Undermining Cybersecurity 
     Defined.--In this section, the term ``significant activities 
     undermining cybersecurity'' includes--
       (1) significant efforts--
       (A) to deny access to or degrade, disrupt, or destroy an 
     information and communications technology system or network; 
     or

[[Page 11524]]

       (B) to exfiltrate, degrade, corrupt, destroy, or release 
     information from such a system or network without 
     authorization for purposes of--
       (i) conducting influence operations; or
       (ii) causing a significant misappropriation of funds, 
     economic resources, trade secrets, personal identifications, 
     or financial information for commercial or competitive 
     advantage or private financial gain;
       (2) significant destructive malware attacks; and
       (3) significant denial of service activities.

     SEC. 225. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO SPECIAL RUSSIAN 
                   CRUDE OIL PROJECTS.

       Section 4(b)(1) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 
     (22 U.S.C. 8923(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``on and after 
     the date that is 45 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the President may impose'' and inserting ``on and 
     after the date that is 30 days after the date of the 
     enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and 
     Eurasia Act of 2017, the President shall impose, unless the 
     President determines that it is not in the national interest 
     of the United States to do so,''.

     SEC. 226. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN AND 
                   OTHER FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

       Section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 
     U.S.C. 8924) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking ``may impose'' and inserting ``shall 
     impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the 
     national interest of the United States to do so,''; and
       (B) by striking ``on or after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act'' and inserting ``on or after the date of the 
     enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and 
     Eurasia Act of 2017''; and
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) by striking ``may impose'' and inserting ``shall 
     impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the 
     national interest of the United States to do so,''; and
       (B) by striking ``on or after the date that is 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act'' and inserting 
     ``on or after the date that is 30 days after the date of the 
     enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and 
     Eurasia Act of 2017''.

     SEC. 227. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   SIGNIFICANT CORRUPTION IN THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       Section 9 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and 
     Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908(a)) 
     is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``is 
     authorized and encouraged to'' and inserting ``shall''; and
       (B) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) by striking ``President determines is'' and inserting 
     ``President determines is, on or after the date of the 
     enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and 
     Eurasia Act of 2017,''; and
       (ii) by inserting ``or elsewhere'' after ``in the Russian 
     Federation'';
       (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e);
       (3) in subsection (c), by striking ``The President'' and 
     inserting ``except as provided in subsection (d), the 
     President''; and
       (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
       ``(d) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may 
     waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection 
     (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to 
     the appropriate congressional committees--
       ``(1) a written determination that the waiver--
       ``(A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       ``(B) will further the enforcement of this Act; and
       ``(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement 
     to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in 
     Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of 
     Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, 
     which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor 
     agreements that are agreed to by the Government of 
     Ukraine.''.

     SEC. 228. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGN SANCTIONS 
                   EVADERS AND SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS IN THE 
                   RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--The Support for the Sovereignty, 
     Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act 
     of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following:

     ``SEC. 10. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS THAT EVADE 
                   SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       ``(a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions 
     described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person 
     if the President determines that the foreign person 
     knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of the 
     Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 
     2017--
       ``(1) materially violates, attempts to violate, conspires 
     to violate, or causes a violation of any license, order, 
     regulation, or prohibition contained in or issued pursuant to 
     any covered Executive order, this Act, or the Ukraine Freedom 
     Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.); or
       ``(2) facilitates a significant transaction or 
     transactions, including deceptive or structured transactions, 
     for or on behalf of--
       ``(A) any person subject to sanctions imposed by the United 
     States with respect to the Russian Federation; or
       ``(B) any child, spouse, parent, or sibling of an 
     individual described in subparagraph (A).
       ``(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subsection are the exercise of all powers granted to the 
     President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and 
     prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in 
     property of a person determined by the President to be 
     subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in 
     property are in the United States, come within the United 
     States, or are or come within the possession or control of a 
     United States person.
       ``(c) Implementation; Penalties.--
       ``(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
     authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 
     205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
     U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b).
       ``(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
     violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of 
     subsection (b) or any regulation, license, or order issued to 
     carry out subsection (b) shall be subject to the penalties 
     set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) 
     to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act 
     described in subsection (a) of that section.
       ``(d) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may 
     waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection 
     (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to 
     the appropriate congressional committees--
       ``(1) a written determination that the waiver--
       ``(A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       ``(B) will further the enforcement of this Act;
       ``(2) in the case of sanctions imposed under this section 
     in connection with a covered Executive order described in 
     subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of subsection (f)(1), a 
     certification that the Government of the Russian Federation 
     is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address 
     the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, 
     Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, 
     Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was 
     agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor agreements 
     that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine; and
       ``(3) in the case of sanctions imposed under this section 
     in connection with a covered Executive order described in 
     subparagraphs (E) or (F) of subsection (f)(1), a 
     certification that the Government of the Russian Federation 
     has made significant efforts to reduce the number and 
     intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.
       ``(e) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of the Russia 
     Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the 
     application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to 
     a person if the President submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees--
       ``(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; 
     and
       ``(2) a notice that--
       ``(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was 
     the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant 
     verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
       ``(B) the President has received reliable assurances that 
     the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to 
     sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.
       ``(f) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Covered executive order.--The term `covered Executive 
     order' means any of the following:
       ``(A) Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating 
     to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the 
     situation in Ukraine).
       ``(B) Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating 
     to blocking property of additional persons contributing to 
     the situation in Ukraine).
       ``(C) Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating 
     to blocking property of additional persons contributing to 
     the situation in Ukraine).
       ``(D) Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating 
     to blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting 
     certain transactions with respect to the Crimea region of 
     Ukraine).
       ``(E) Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating 
     to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in 
     significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), relating to 
     the Russian Federation.
       ``(F) Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to 
     taking additional steps to address the national emergency 
     with respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled 
     activities), relating to the Russian Federation.
       ``(2) Foreign person.--The term `foreign person' has the 
     meaning given such term in

[[Page 11525]]

     section 595.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as 
     in effect on the date of the enactment of this section).
       ``(3) Structured.--The term `structured', with respect to a 
     transaction, has the meaning given the term `structure' in 
     paragraph (xx) of section 1010.100 of title 31, Code of 
     Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation 
     or ruling).

     ``SEC. 11. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN 
                   RIGHTS ABUSES.

       ``(a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions 
     described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person 
     if the President determines that the foreign person, based on 
     credible information, on or after the date of the enactment 
     of this section--
       ``(1) is responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for 
     ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission 
     of serious human rights abuses in any territory forcibly 
     occupied or otherwise controlled by the Government of the 
     Russian Federation;
       ``(2) materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial, 
     material, or technological support for, or goods or services 
     to, a foreign person described in paragraph (1); or
       ``(3) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act 
     for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a foreign person 
     described in paragraph (1).
       ``(b) Sanctions Described.--
       ``(1) Asset blocking.--The exercise of all powers granted 
     to the President by the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary 
     to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and 
     interests in property of a person determined by the President 
     to be subject to subsection (a) if such property and 
     interests in property are in the United States, come within 
     the United States, or are or come within the possession or 
     control of a United States person.
       ``(2) Exclusion from the united states and revocation of 
     visa or other documentation.--In the case of an alien 
     determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a), 
     denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, 
     the alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i) 
     of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of 
     any visa or other documentation of the alien.
       ``(c) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may 
     waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection 
     (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to 
     the appropriate congressional committees--
       ``(1) a written determination that the waiver--
       ``(A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       ``(B) will further the enforcement of this Act; and
       ``(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation has made efforts to reduce serious human rights 
     abuses in territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled 
     by that Government.
       ``(d) Implementation; Penalties.--
       ``(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
     authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 
     205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
     U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b)(1).
       ``(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
     violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of 
     subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued 
     to carry out subsection (b)(1) shall be subject to the 
     penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 
     of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful 
     act described in subsection (a) of that section.
       ``(e) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of Russia 
     Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the 
     application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to 
     a person if the President submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees--
       ``(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; 
     and
       ``(2) a notice--
       ``(A) that--
       ``(i) the person is not engaging in the activity that was 
     the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant 
     verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
       ``(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that 
     the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to 
     sanctions under subsection (a) in the future; or
       ``(B) that the President determines that insufficient basis 
     exists for the determination by the President under 
     subsection (a) with respect to the person.''.
       (b) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.--
     Section 2(2) of the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, 
     Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 
     U.S.C. 8901(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,'' before ``the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``the Committee on 
     Financial Services'' before ``the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs''.

     SEC. 229. NOTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS UNDER UKRAINE FREEDOM 
                   SUPPORT ACT OF 2014.

       (a) Sanctions Relating to Defense and Energy Sectors of the 
     Russian Federation.--Section 4 of the Ukraine Freedom Support 
     Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections 
     (h) and (i), respectively;
       (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:
       ``(g) Notifications and Certifications to Congress.--
       ``(1) Imposition of sanctions.--The President shall notify 
     the appropriate congressional committees in writing not later 
     than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a 
     foreign person under subsection (a) or (b).
       ``(2) Termination of sanctions with respect to russian 
     producers, transferors, or brokers of defense articles.--
     Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 
     2017, the President may terminate the imposition of sanctions 
     under subsection (a)(2) with respect to a foreign person if 
     the President submits to the appropriate congressional 
     committees--
       ``(A) a notice of and justification for the termination; 
     and
       ``(B) a notice that--
       ``(i) the foreign person is not engaging in the activity 
     that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant 
     verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
       ``(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that 
     the foreign person will not knowingly engage in activity 
     subject to sanctions under subsection (a)(2) in the 
     future.''; and
       (3) in subparagraph (B)(ii) of subsection (a)(3), by 
     striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.
       (b) Sanctions on Russian and Other Foreign Financial 
     Institutions.--Section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act 
     of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections 
     (f) and (g), respectively;
       (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
       ``(e) Notification to Congress on Imposition of 
     Sanctions.--The President shall notify the appropriate 
     congressional committees in writing not later than 15 days 
     after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign financial 
     institution under subsection (a) or (b).''; and
       (3) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (1), by 
     striking ``section 4(h)'' and inserting ``section 4(i)''.

     SEC. 230. STANDARDS FOR TERMINATION OF CERTAIN SANCTIONS WITH 
                   RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) Sanctions Relating to Undermining the Peace, Security, 
     Stability, Sovereignty, or Territorial Integrity of 
     Ukraine.--Section 8 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, 
     and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 
     8907) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
       ``(d) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of the Russia 
     Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the 
     application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to 
     a person if the President submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a notice that--
       ``(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was 
     the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant 
     verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
       ``(2) the President has received reliable assurances that 
     the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to 
     sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.''.
       (b) Sanctions Relating to Corruption.--Section 9 of the 
     Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of 
     Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
       ``(d) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of the Russia 
     Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the 
     application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to 
     a person if the President submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a notice that--
       ``(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was 
     the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant 
     verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
       ``(2) the President has received reliable assurances that 
     the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to 
     sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.''.

     SEC. 231. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS 
                   ENGAGING IN TRANSACTIONS WITH THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   OR DEFENSE SECTORS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
                   RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--On and after the date that is 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
     shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 
     235 with respect to a person the President determines 
     knowingly, on or after such date of enactment, engages in a 
     significant transaction with a person that is part of, or 
     operates for or on behalf of, the defense or

[[Page 11526]]

     intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian 
     Federation, including the Main Intelligence Agency of the 
     General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 
     or the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.
       (b) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may waive 
     the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a) 
     with respect to a person only if the President submits to the 
     appropriate congressional committees--
       (1) a written determination that the waiver--
       (A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       (B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
       (2) a certification that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number 
     and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that 
     Government.
       (c) Delay of Imposition of Sanctions.--The President may 
     delay the imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) with 
     respect to a person if the President certifies to the 
     appropriate congressional committees, not less frequently 
     than every 180 days while the delay is in effect, that the 
     person is substantially reducing the number of significant 
     transactions described in subsection (a) in which that person 
     engages.
       (d) Requirement To Issue Guidance.--Not later than 60 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
     shall issue regulations or other guidance to specify the 
     persons that are part of, or operate for or on behalf of, the 
     defense and intelligence sectors of the Government of the 
     Russian Federation.
       (e) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
     violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of 
     subsection (a) or any regulation, license, or order issued to 
     carry out subsection (a) shall be subject to the penalties 
     set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) 
     to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act 
     described in subsection (a) of that section.

     SEC. 232. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
                   PIPELINES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--The President, in coordination with allies 
     of the United States, may impose 5 or more of the sanctions 
     described in section 235 with respect to a person if the 
     President determines that the person knowingly, on or after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment 
     described in subsection (b) or sells, leases, or provides to 
     the Russian Federation, for the construction of Russian 
     energy export pipelines, goods, services, technology, 
     information, or support described in subsection (c)--
       (1) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or 
     more; or
       (2) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair 
     market value of $5,000,000 or more.
       (b) Investment Described.--An investment described in this 
     subsection is an investment that directly and significantly 
     contributes to the enhancement of the ability of the Russian 
     Federation to construct energy export pipelines.
       (c) Goods, Services, Technology, Information, or Support 
     Described.--Goods, services, technology, information, or 
     support described in this subsection are goods, services, 
     technology, information, or support that could directly and 
     significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the 
     construction, modernization, or repair of energy export 
     pipelines by the Russian Federation.

     SEC. 233. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO INVESTMENT IN OR 
                   FACILITATION OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED 
                   ASSETS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--The President shall impose 5 or more of 
     the sanctions described in section 235 if the President 
     determines that a person, with actual knowledge, on or after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment of 
     $10,000,000 or more (or any combination of investments of not 
     less than $1,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals or 
     exceeds $10,000,000 in any 12-month period), or facilitates 
     such an investment, if the investment directly and 
     significantly contributes to the ability of the Russian 
     Federation to privatize state-owned assets in a manner that 
     unjustly benefits--
       (1) officials of the Government of the Russian Federation; 
     or
       (2) close associates or family members of those officials.
       (b) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may waive 
     the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a) 
     with respect to a person only if the President submits to the 
     appropriate congressional committees--
       (1) a written determination that the waiver--
       (A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       (B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
       (2) a certification that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement 
     to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in 
     Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of 
     Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, 
     which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor 
     agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.

     SEC. 234. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSFER OF ARMS AND 
                   RELATED MATERIEL TO SYRIA.

       (a) Imposition of Sanctions.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall impose on a foreign 
     person the sanctions described in subsection (b) if the 
     President determines that such foreign person has, on or 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly 
     exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Syria 
     significant financial, material, or technological support 
     that contributes materially to the ability of the Government 
     of Syria to--
       (A) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear 
     weapons or related technologies;
       (B) acquire or develop ballistic or cruise missile 
     capabilities;
       (C) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of 
     advanced conventional weapons;
       (D) acquire significant defense articles, defense services, 
     or defense information (as such terms are defined under the 
     Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)); or
       (E) acquire items designated by the President for purposes 
     of the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of 
     the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
       (2) Applicability to other foreign persons.--The sanctions 
     described in subsection (b) shall also be imposed on any 
     foreign person that--
       (A) is a successor entity to a foreign person described in 
     paragraph (1); or
       (B) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on 
     behalf of, a foreign person described in paragraph (1).
       (b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions to be imposed on a 
     foreign person described in subsection (a) are the following:
       (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all 
     powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of 
     section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to 
     the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions 
     in all property and interests in property of the foreign 
     person if such property and interests in property are in the 
     United States, come within the United States, or are or come 
     within the possession or control of a United States person.
       (2) Aliens ineligible for visas, admission, or parole.--
       (A) Exclusion from the united states.--If the foreign 
     person is an individual, the Secretary of State shall deny a 
     visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude 
     from the United States, the foreign person.
       (B) Current visas revoked.--
       (i) In general.--The issuing consular officer, the 
     Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or 
     a designee of one of such Secretaries) shall revoke any visa 
     or other entry documentation issued to the foreign person 
     regardless of when issued.
       (ii) Effect of revocation.--A revocation under clause (i) 
     shall take effect immediately and shall automatically cancel 
     any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the 
     possession of the foreign person.
       (c) Waiver.--Subject to section 216, the President may 
     waive the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with 
     respect to a person if the President determines that such a 
     waiver is in the national security interest of the United 
     States.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Financial, material, or technological support.--The 
     term ``financial, material, or technological support'' has 
     the meaning given such term in section 542.304 of title 31, 
     Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar 
     regulation or ruling).
       (2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' has the 
     meaning given such term in section 594.304 of title 31, Code 
     of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar 
     regulation or ruling).
       (3) Syria.--The term ``Syria'' has the meaning given such 
     term in section 542.316 of title 31, Code of Federal 
     Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or 
     ruling).

     SEC. 235. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.

       (a) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions to be imposed with 
     respect to a person under section 224(a)(2), 231(b), 232(a), 
     or 233(a) are the following:
       (1) Export-import bank assistance for exports to sanctioned 
     persons.--The President may direct the Export-Import Bank of 
     the United States not to give approval to the issuance of any 
     guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation 
     in the extension of credit in connection with the export of 
     any goods or services to the sanctioned person.
       (2) Export sanction.--The President may order the United 
     States Government not to issue any specific license and not 
     to grant any other specific permission or authority to export 
     any goods or technology to the sanctioned person under--
       (A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4601 
     et seq.) (as continued in effect pursuant to the 
     International Emergency

[[Page 11527]]

     Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.));
       (B) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);
       (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.); 
     or
       (D) any other statute that requires the prior review and 
     approval of the United States Government as a condition for 
     the export or reexport of goods or services.
       (3) Loans from united states financial institutions.--The 
     President may prohibit any United States financial 
     institution from making loans or providing credits to the 
     sanctioned person totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-
     month period unless the person is engaged in activities to 
     relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided 
     for such activities.
       (4) Loans from international financial institutions.--The 
     President may direct the United States executive director to 
     each international financial institution to use the voice and 
     vote of the United States to oppose any loan from the 
     international financial institution that would benefit the 
     sanctioned person.
       (5) Prohibitions on financial institutions.--The following 
     prohibitions may be imposed against the sanctioned person if 
     that person is a financial institution:
       (A) Prohibition on designation as primary dealer.--Neither 
     the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the 
     Federal Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit the 
     continuation of any prior designation of, the financial 
     institution as a primary dealer in United States Government 
     debt instruments.
       (B) Prohibition on service as a repository of government 
     funds.--The financial institution may not serve as agent of 
     the United States Government or serve as repository for 
     United States Government funds.
     The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph (A) or 
     (B) shall be treated as 1 sanction for purposes of subsection 
     (b), and the imposition of both such sanctions shall be 
     treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of subsection (b).
       (6) Procurement sanction.--The United States Government may 
     not procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement 
     of, any goods or services from the sanctioned person.
       (7) Foreign exchange.--The President may, pursuant to such 
     regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any 
     transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the 
     jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned 
     person has any interest.
       (8) Banking transactions.--The President may, pursuant to 
     such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any 
     transfers of credit or payments between financial 
     institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, 
     to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to 
     the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any 
     interest of the sanctioned person.
       (9) Property transactions.--The President may, pursuant to 
     such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any 
     person from--
       (A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring, 
     withdrawing, transporting, importing, or exporting any 
     property that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
     States and with respect to which the sanctioned person has 
     any interest;
       (B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege 
     with respect to such property; or
       (C) conducting any transaction involving such property.
       (10) Ban on investment in equity or debt of sanctioned 
     person.--The President may, pursuant to such regulations or 
     guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any 
     United States person from investing in or purchasing 
     significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of the 
     sanctioned person.
       (11) Exclusion of corporate officers.--The President may 
     direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United 
     States, any alien that the President determines is a 
     corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a 
     controlling interest in, the sanctioned person.
       (12) Sanctions on principal executive officers.--The 
     President may impose on the principal executive officer or 
     officers of the sanctioned person, or on persons performing 
     similar functions and with similar authorities as such 
     officer or officers, any of the sanctions under this 
     subsection.
       (b) Sanctioned Person Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``sanctioned person'' means a person subject to sanctions 
     under section 224(a)(2), 231(b), 232(a), or 233(a).

     SEC. 236. EXCEPTIONS, WAIVER, AND TERMINATION.

       (a) Exceptions.--The provisions of this part and amendments 
     made by this part shall not apply with respect to the 
     following:
       (1) Activities subject to the reporting requirements under 
     title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 
     et seq.), or any authorized intelligence activities of the 
     United States.
       (2) The admission of an alien to the United States if such 
     admission is necessary to comply with United States 
     obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations 
     and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters 
     of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, 
     and entered into force November 21, 1947, under the 
     Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 
     1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or under other 
     international agreements.
       (b) Waiver of Sanctions That Are Imposed.--Subject to 
     section 216, if the President imposes sanctions with respect 
     to a person under this part or the amendments made by this 
     part, the President may waive the application of those 
     sanctions if the President determines that such a waiver is 
     in the national security interest of the United States.
       (c) Termination.--Subject to section 216, the President may 
     terminate the application of sanctions under section 224, 
     231, 232, 233, or 234 with respect to a person if the 
     President submits to the appropriate congressional 
     committees--
       (1) a notice of and justification for the termination; and
       (2) a notice that--
       (A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the 
     basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable 
     steps toward stopping the activity; and
       (B) the President has received reliable assurances that the 
     person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to 
     sanctions under this part in the future.

     SEC. 237. EXCEPTION RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL 
                   AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION.

       (a) In General.--This Act and the amendments made by this 
     Act shall not apply with respect to activities of the 
     National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
       (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act or the 
     amendments made by this Act shall be construed to authorize 
     the imposition of any sanction or other condition, 
     limitation, restriction, or prohibition, that directly or 
     indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Russian 
     Federation of any product or service, or the procurement of 
     such product or service by any contractor or subcontractor of 
     the United States or any other entity, relating to or in 
     connection with any space launch conducted for--
       (1) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; or
       (2) any other non-Department of Defense customer.

     SEC. 238. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this part or the amendments made by this part 
     shall be construed--
       (1) to supersede the limitations or exceptions on the use 
     of rocket engines for national security purposes under 
     section 1608 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 
     (Public Law 113-291; 128 Stat. 3626; 10 U.S.C. 2271 note), as 
     amended by section 1607 of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1100) 
     and section 1602 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 Stat. 2582); or
       (2) to prohibit a contractor or subcontractor of the 
     Department of Defense from acquiring components referred to 
     in such section 1608.

                            PART 3--REPORTS

     SEC. 241. REPORT ON OLIGARCHS AND PARASTATAL ENTITIES OF THE 
                   RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and 
     the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a detailed report on the following:
       (1) Senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the 
     Russian Federation, including the following:
       (A) An identification of the most significant senior 
     foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian 
     Federation, as determined by their closeness to the Russian 
     regime and their net worth.
       (B) An assessment of the relationship between individuals 
     identified under subparagraph (A) and President Vladimir 
     Putin or other members of the Russian ruling elite.
       (C) An identification of any indices of corruption with 
     respect to those individuals.
       (D) The estimated net worth and known sources of income of 
     those individuals and their family members (including 
     spouses, children, parents, and siblings), including assets, 
     investments, other business interests, and relevant 
     beneficial ownership information.
       (E) An identification of the non-Russian business 
     affiliations of those individuals.
       (2) Russian parastatal entities, including an assessment of 
     the following:
       (A) The emergence of Russian parastatal entities and their 
     role in the economy of the Russian Federation.
       (B) The leadership structures and beneficial ownership of 
     those entities.
       (C) The scope of the non-Russian business affiliations of 
     those entities.
       (3) The exposure of key economic sectors of the United 
     States to Russian politically exposed persons and parastatal 
     entities, including, at a minimum, the banking, securities, 
     insurance, and real estate sectors.
       (4) The likely effects of imposing debt and equity 
     restrictions on Russian parastatal entities, as well as the 
     anticipated effects of

[[Page 11528]]

     adding Russian parastatal entities to the list of specially 
     designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the 
     Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the 
     Treasury.
       (5) The potential impacts of imposing secondary sanctions 
     with respect to Russian oligarchs, Russian state-owned 
     enterprises, and Russian parastatal entities, including 
     impacts on the entities themselves and on the economy of the 
     Russian Federation, as well as on the economies of the United 
     States and allies of the United States.
       (b) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection 
     (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may 
     contain a classified annex.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on 
     Finance of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of 
     the House of Representatives.
       (2) Senior foreign political figure.--The term ``senior 
     foreign political figure'' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or 
     any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

     SEC. 242. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF EXPANDING SANCTIONS TO INCLUDE 
                   SOVEREIGN DEBT AND DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and 
     the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report describing in detail the 
     potential effects of expanding sanctions under Directive 1 
     (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office 
     of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662 (79 
     Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional 
     persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), or any 
     successor directive, to include sovereign debt and the full 
     range of derivative products.
       (b) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection 
     (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may 
     contain a classified annex.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on 
     Finance of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of 
     the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 243. REPORT ON ILLICIT FINANCE RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and not later than the end of each 
     one-year period thereafter until 2021, the Secretary of the 
     Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report describing interagency efforts in the 
     United States to combat illicit finance relating to the 
     Russian Federation.
       (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     contain a summary of efforts by the United States to do the 
     following:
       (1) Identify, investigate, map, and disrupt illicit 
     financial flows linked to the Russian Federation if such 
     flows affect the United States financial system or those of 
     major allies of the United States.
       (2) Conduct outreach to the private sector, including 
     information sharing efforts to strengthen compliance efforts 
     by entities, including financial institutions, to prevent 
     illicit financial flows described in paragraph (1).
       (3) Engage and coordinate with allied international 
     partners on illicit finance, especially in Europe, to 
     coordinate efforts to uncover and prosecute the networks 
     responsible for illicit financial flows described in 
     paragraph (1), including examples of that engagement and 
     coordination.
       (4) Identify foreign sanctions evaders and loopholes within 
     the sanctions regimes of foreign partners of the United 
     States.
       (5) Expand the number of real estate geographic targeting 
     orders or other regulatory actions, as appropriate, to 
     degrade illicit financial activity relating to the Russian 
     Federation in relation to the financial system of the United 
     States.
       (6) Provide support to counter those involved in illicit 
     finance relating to the Russian Federation across all 
     appropriate law enforcement, intelligence, regulatory, and 
     financial authorities of the Federal Government, including by 
     imposing sanctions with respect to or prosecuting those 
     involved.
       (7) In the case of the Department of the Treasury and the 
     Department of Justice, investigate or otherwise develop major 
     cases, including a description of those cases.
       (c) Briefing.--After submitting a report under this 
     section, the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide 
     briefings to the appropriate congressional committees with 
     respect to that report.
       (d) Coordination.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
     coordinate with the Attorney General, the Director of 
     National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
     and the Secretary of State in preparing each report under 
     this section.
       (e) Form.--Each report submitted under this section shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex.
       (f) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on 
     Finance of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of 
     the House of Representatives.
       (2) Illicit finance.--The term ``illicit finance'' means 
     the financing of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or 
     proliferation, money laundering, or other forms of illicit 
     financing domestically or internationally, as defined by the 
     President.

     Subtitle B--Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia

     SEC. 251. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Government of the Russian Federation has sought to 
     exert influence throughout Europe and Eurasia, including in 
     the former states of the Soviet Union, by providing resources 
     to political parties, think tanks, and civil society groups 
     that sow distrust in democratic institutions and actors, 
     promote xenophobic and illiberal views, and otherwise 
     undermine European unity. The Government of the Russian 
     Federation has also engaged in well-documented corruption 
     practices as a means toward undermining and buying influence 
     in European and Eurasian countries.
       (2) The Government of the Russian Federation has largely 
     eliminated a once-vibrant Russian-language independent media 
     sector and severely curtails free and independent media 
     within the borders of the Russian Federation. Russian-
     language media organizations that are funded and controlled 
     by the Government of the Russian Federation and disseminate 
     information within and outside of the Russian Federation 
     routinely traffic in anti-Western disinformation, while few 
     independent, fact-based media sources provide objective 
     reporting for Russian-speaking audiences inside or outside of 
     the Russian Federation.
       (3) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to 
     violate its commitments under the Memorandum on Security 
     Assurances in connection with Ukraine's Accession to the 
     Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at 
     Budapest December 5, 1994, and the Conference on Security and 
     Co-operation in Europe Final Act, concluded at Helsinki 
     August 1, 1975 (commonly referred to as the ``Helsinki Final 
     Act''), which laid the ground-work for the establishment of 
     the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, of 
     which the Russian Federation is a member, by its illegal 
     annexation of Crimea in 2014, its illegal occupation of South 
     Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in 2008, and its ongoing 
     destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine.
       (4) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to 
     ignore the terms of the August 2008 ceasefire agreement 
     relating to Georgia, which requires the withdrawal of Russian 
     Federation troops, free access by humanitarian groups to the 
     regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and monitoring of the 
     conflict areas by the European Union Monitoring Mission.
       (5) The Government of the Russian Federation is failing to 
     comply with the terms of the Minsk Agreement to address the 
     ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, 
     Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, 
     Russia, France, and Germany, as well as the Minsk Protocol, 
     which was agreed to on September 5, 2014.
       (6) The Government of the Russian Federation is--
       (A) in violation of the Treaty between the United States of 
     America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
     Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range 
     Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered 
     into force June 1, 1988 (commonly known as the ``INF 
     Treaty''); and
       (B) failing to meet its obligations under the Treaty on 
     Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered into 
     force January 1, 2002 (commonly known as the ``Open Skies 
     Treaty'').

     SEC. 252. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Government of the Russian Federation bears 
     responsibility for the continuing violence in Eastern 
     Ukraine, including the death on April 24, 2017, of Joseph 
     Stone, a citizen of the United States working as a monitor 
     for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe;
       (2) the President should call on the Government of the 
     Russian Federation--
       (A) to withdraw all of its forces from the territories of 
     Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova;

[[Page 11529]]

       (B) to return control of the borders of those territories 
     to their respective governments; and
       (C) to cease all efforts to undermine the popularly elected 
     governments of those countries;
       (3) the Government of the Russian Federation has applied, 
     and continues to apply, to the countries and peoples of 
     Georgia and Ukraine, traditional uses of force, intelligence 
     operations, and influence campaigns, which represent clear 
     and present threats to the countries of Europe and Eurasia;
       (4) in response, the countries of Europe and Eurasia should 
     redouble efforts to build resilience within their 
     institutions, political systems, and civil societies;
       (5) the United States supports the institutions that the 
     Government of the Russian Federation seeks to undermine, 
     including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the 
     European Union;
       (6) a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization is critical 
     to maintaining peace and security in Europe and Eurasia;
       (7) the United States should continue to work with the 
     European Union as a partner against aggression by the 
     Government of the Russian Federation, coordinating aid 
     programs, development assistance, and other counter-Russian 
     efforts;
       (8) the United States should encourage the establishment of 
     a commission for media freedom within the Council of Europe, 
     modeled on the Venice Commission regarding rule of law 
     issues, that would be chartered to provide governments with 
     expert recommendations on maintaining legal and regulatory 
     regimes supportive of free and independent media and an 
     informed citizenry able to distinguish between fact-based 
     reporting, opinion, and disinformation;
       (9) in addition to working to strengthen the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization and the European Union, the United States 
     should work with the individual countries of Europe and 
     Eurasia--
       (A) to identify vulnerabilities to aggression, 
     disinformation, corruption, and so-called hybrid warfare by 
     the Government of the Russian Federation;
       (B) to establish strategic and technical plans for 
     addressing those vulnerabilities;
       (C) to ensure that the financial systems of those countries 
     are not being used to shield illicit financial activity by 
     officials of the Government of the Russian Federation or 
     individuals in President Vladimir Putin's inner circle who 
     have been enriched through corruption;
       (D) to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption by 
     Russian actors; and
       (E) to work toward full compliance with the Convention on 
     Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
     International Business Transactions (commonly referred to as 
     the ``Anti-Bribery Convention'') of the Organization for 
     Economic Co-operation and Development; and
       (10) the President of the United States should use the 
     authority of the President to impose sanctions under--
       (A) the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 
     2012 (title IV of Public Law 112-208; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note); 
     and
       (B) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 
     (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 
     2656 note).

     SEC. 253. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       The United States, consistent with the principle of ex 
     injuria jus non oritur, supports the policy known as the 
     ``Stimson Doctrine'' and thus does not recognize territorial 
     changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions 
     and occupations of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Eastern 
     Ukraine, and Transnistria.

     SEC. 254. COORDINATING AID AND ASSISTANCE ACROSS EUROPE AND 
                   EURASIA.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Countering Russian Influence Fund 
     $250,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019.
       (b) Use of Funds.--Amounts in the Countering Russian 
     Influence Fund shall be used to effectively implement, 
     prioritized in the following order and subject to the 
     availability of funds, the following goals:
       (1) To assist in protecting critical infrastructure and 
     electoral mechanisms from cyberattacks in the following 
     countries:
       (A) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization or the European Union that the Secretary of 
     State determines--
       (i) are vulnerable to influence by the Russian Federation; 
     and
       (ii) lack the economic capability to effectively respond to 
     aggression by the Russian Federation without the support of 
     the United States.
       (B) Countries that are participating in the enlargement 
     process of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the 
     European Union, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
     Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Kosovo, Serbia, and Ukraine.
       (2) To combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and 
     otherwise strengthen independent judiciaries and prosecutors 
     general offices in the countries described in paragraph (1).
       (3) To respond to the humanitarian crises and instability 
     caused or aggravated by the invasions and occupations of 
     Georgia and Ukraine by the Russian Federation.
       (4) To improve participatory legislative processes and 
     legal education, political transparency and competition, and 
     compliance with international obligations in the countries 
     described in paragraph (1).
       (5) To build the capacity of civil society, media, and 
     other nongovernmental organizations countering the influence 
     and propaganda of the Russian Federation to combat 
     corruption, prioritize access to truthful information, and 
     operate freely in all regions in the countries described in 
     paragraph (1).
       (6) To assist the Secretary of State in executing the 
     functions specified in section 1287(b) of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 
     114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) for the purposes of 
     recognizing, understanding, exposing, and countering 
     propaganda and disinformation efforts by foreign governments, 
     in coordination with the relevant regional Assistant 
     Secretary or Assistant Secretaries of the Department of 
     State.
       (c) Revision of Activities for Which Amounts May Be Used.--
     The Secretary of State may modify the goals described in 
     subsection (b) if, not later than 15 days before revising 
     such a goal, the Secretary notifies the appropriate 
     congressional committees of the revision.
       (d) Implementation.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall, acting 
     through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe 
     and Eurasia (authorized pursuant to section 601 of the 
     Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 
     U.S.C. 5461) and section 102 of the Freedom for Russia and 
     Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 
     1992 (22 U.S.C. 5812)), and in consultation with the 
     Administrator for the United States Agency for International 
     Development, the Director of the Global Engagement Center of 
     the Department of State, the Secretary of Defense, the 
     Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the 
     heads of other relevant Federal agencies, coordinate and 
     carry out activities to achieve the goals described in 
     subsection (b).
       (2) Method.--Activities to achieve the goals described in 
     subsection (b) shall be carried out through--
       (A) initiatives of the United States Government;
       (B) Federal grant programs such as the Information Access 
     Fund; or
       (C) nongovernmental or international organizations, such as 
     the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 
     National Endowment for Democracy, the Black Sea Trust, the 
     Balkan Trust for Democracy, the Prague Civil Society Centre, 
     the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Strategic 
     Communications Centre of Excellence, the European Endowment 
     for Democracy, and related organizations.
       (3) Report on implementation.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than April 1 of each year, the 
     Secretary of State, acting through the Coordinator of United 
     States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report on the programs 
     and activities carried out to achieve the goals described in 
     subsection (b) during the preceding fiscal year.
       (B) Elements.--Each report required by subparagraph (A) 
     shall include, with respect to each program or activity 
     described in that subparagraph--
       (i) the amount of funding for the program or activity;
       (ii) the goal described in subsection (b) to which the 
     program or activity relates; and
       (iii) an assessment of whether or not the goal was met.
       (e) Coordination With Global Partners.--
       (1) In general.--In order to maximize cost efficiency, 
     eliminate duplication, and speed the achievement of the goals 
     described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall 
     ensure coordination with--
       (A) the European Union and its institutions;
       (B) the governments of countries that are members of the 
     North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union; and
       (C) international organizations and quasi-governmental 
     funding entities that carry out programs and activities that 
     seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b).
       (2) Report by secretary of state.--Not later than April 1 
     of each year, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that includes--
       (A) the amount of funding provided to each country referred 
     to in subsection (b) by--
       (i) the European Union or its institutions;
       (ii) the government of each country that is a member of the 
     European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and
       (iii) international organizations and quasi-governmental 
     funding entities that carry out programs and activities that 
     seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b); and
       (B) an assessment of whether the funding described in 
     subparagraph (A) is commensurate with funding provided by the 
     United States for those goals.
       (f) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to apply to or limit United States foreign 
     assistance not

[[Page 11530]]

     provided using amounts available in the Countering Russian 
     Influence Fund.
       (g) Ensuring Adequate Staffing for Governance Activities.--
     In order to ensure that the United States Government is 
     properly focused on combating corruption, improving rule of 
     law, and building the capacity of civil society, media, and 
     other nongovernmental organizations in countries described in 
     subsection (b)(1), the Secretary of State shall establish a 
     pilot program for Foreign Service officer positions focused 
     on governance and anticorruption activities in such 
     countries.

     SEC. 255. REPORT ON MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS CONTROLLED AND FUNDED 
                   BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report that includes a description of media 
     organizations that are controlled and funded by the 
     Government of the Russian Federation, and any affiliated 
     entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian 
     Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based 
     television, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.
       (b) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 256. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION INFLUENCE ON ELECTIONS 
                   IN EUROPE AND EURASIA.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees and leadership a report on funds provided by, or 
     funds the use of which was directed by, the Government of the 
     Russian Federation or any Russian person with the intention 
     of influencing the outcome of any election or campaign in any 
     country in Europe or Eurasia during the preceding year, 
     including through direct support to any political party, 
     candidate, lobbying campaign, nongovernmental organization, 
     or civic organization.
       (b) Form of Report.--Each report required by subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees and leadership.--
     The term ``appropriate congressional committees and 
     leadership'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed 
     Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence, and the majority and minority 
     leaders of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
     Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and the 
     minority leader of the House of Representatives.
       (2) Russian person.--The term ``Russian person'' means--
       (A) an individual who is a citizen or national of the 
     Russian Federation; or
       (B) an entity organized under the laws of the Russian 
     Federation or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the 
     Government of the Russian Federation.

     SEC. 257. UKRANIAN ENERGY SECURITY.

       (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
     States--
       (1) to support the Government of Ukraine in restoring its 
     sovereign and territorial integrity;
       (2) to condemn and oppose all of the destabilizing efforts 
     by the Government of the Russian Federation in Ukraine in 
     violation of its obligations and international commitments;
       (3) to never recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by 
     the Government of the Russian Federation or the separation of 
     any portion of Ukrainian territory through the use of 
     military force;
       (4) to deter the Government of the Russian Federation from 
     further destabilizing and invading Ukraine and other 
     independent countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
     Caucuses;
       (5) to assist in promoting reform in regulatory oversight 
     and operations in Ukraine's energy sector, including the 
     establishment and empowerment of an independent regulatory 
     organization;
       (6) to encourage and support fair competition, market 
     liberalization, and reliability in Ukraine's energy sector;
       (7) to help Ukraine and United States allies and partners 
     in Europe reduce their dependence on Russian energy 
     resources, especially natural gas, which the Government of 
     the Russian Federation uses as a weapon to coerce, 
     intimidate, and influence other countries;
       (8) to work with European Union member states and European 
     Union institutions to promote energy security through 
     developing diversified and liberalized energy markets that 
     provide diversified sources, suppliers, and routes;
       (9) to continue to oppose the NordStream 2 pipeline given 
     its detrimental impacts on the European Union's energy 
     security, gas market development in Central and Eastern 
     Europe, and energy reforms in Ukraine; and
       (10) that the United States Government should prioritize 
     the export of United States energy resources in order to 
     create American jobs, help United States allies and partners, 
     and strengthen United States foreign policy.
       (b) Plan To Promote Energy Security in Ukraine.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in coordination 
     with the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
     International Development and the Secretary of Energy, shall 
     work with the Government of Ukraine to develop a plan to 
     increase energy security in Ukraine, increase the amount of 
     energy produced in Ukraine, and reduce Ukraine's reliance on 
     energy imports from the Russian Federation.
       (2) Elements.--The plan developed under paragraph (1) shall 
     include strategies for market liberalization, effective 
     regulation and oversight, supply diversification, energy 
     reliability, and energy efficiency, such as through 
     supporting--
       (A) the promotion of advanced technology and modern 
     operating practices in Ukraine's oil and gas sector;
       (B) modern geophysical and meteorological survey work as 
     needed followed by international tenders to help attract 
     qualified investment into exploration and development of 
     areas with untapped resources in Ukraine;
       (C) a broadening of Ukraine's electric power transmission 
     interconnection with Europe;
       (D) the strengthening of Ukraine's capability to maintain 
     electric power grid stability and reliability;
       (E) independent regulatory oversight and operations of 
     Ukraine's gas market and electricity sector;
       (F) the implementation of primary gas law including 
     pricing, tariff structure, and legal regulatory 
     implementation;
       (G) privatization of government owned energy companies 
     through credible legal frameworks and a transparent process 
     compliant with international best practices;
       (H) procurement and transport of emergency fuel supplies, 
     including reverse pipeline flows from Europe;
       (I) provision of technical assistance for crisis planning, 
     crisis response, and public outreach;
       (J) repair of infrastructure to enable the transport of 
     fuel supplies;
       (K) repair of power generating or power transmission 
     equipment or facilities; and
       (L) improved building energy efficiency and other measures 
     designed to reduce energy demand in Ukraine.
       (3) Reports.--
       (A) Implementation of ukraine freedom support act of 2014 
     provisions.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to 
     the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing 
     the status of implementing the provisions required under 
     section 7(c) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 
     U.S.C. 8926(c)), including detailing the plans required under 
     that section, the level of funding that has been allocated to 
     and expended for the strategies set forth under that section, 
     and progress that has been made in implementing the 
     strategies developed pursuant to that section.
       (B) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report detailing the plan 
     developed under paragraph (1), the level of funding that has 
     been allocated to and expended for the strategies set forth 
     in paragraph (2), and progress that has been made in 
     implementing the strategies.
       (C) Briefings.--The Secretary of State, or a designee of 
     the Secretary, shall brief the appropriate congressional 
     committees not later than 30 days after the submission of 
     each report under subparagraph (B). In addition, the 
     Department of State shall make relevant officials available 
     upon request to brief the appropriate congressional 
     committees on all available information that relates directly 
     or indirectly to Ukraine or energy security in Eastern 
     Europe.
       (D) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
     paragraph, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (i) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
       (c) Supporting Efforts of Countries in Europe and Eurasia 
     To Decrease Their Dependence on Russian Sources of Energy.--
       (1) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (A) The Government of the Russian Federation uses its 
     strong position in the energy sector as leverage to 
     manipulate the internal politics and foreign relations of the 
     countries of Europe and Eurasia.
       (B) This influence is based not only on the Russian 
     Federation's oil and natural gas resources, but also on its 
     state-owned nuclear power and electricity companies.

[[Page 11531]]

       (2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (A) the United States should assist the efforts of the 
     countries of Europe and Eurasia to enhance their energy 
     security through diversification of energy supplies in order 
     to lessen dependencies on Russian Federation energy resources 
     and state-owned entities; and
       (B) the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the 
     Overseas Private Investment Corporation should play key roles 
     in supporting critical energy projects that contribute to 
     that goal.
       (3) Use of countering russian influence fund to provide 
     technical assistance.--Amounts in the Countering Russian 
     Influence Fund pursuant to section 254 shall be used to 
     provide technical advice to countries described in subsection 
     (b)(1) of such section designed to enhance energy security 
     and lessen dependence on energy from Russian Federation 
     sources.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Department of State a total of 
     $30,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 to carry out the 
     strategies set forth in subsection (b)(2) and other 
     activities under this section related to the promotion of 
     energy security in Ukraine.
       (e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed as affecting the responsibilities required and 
     authorities provided under section 7 of the Ukraine Freedom 
     Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8926).

     SEC. 258. TERMINATION.

       The provisions of this subtitle shall terminate on the date 
     that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 259. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

       Except as otherwise provided, in this subtitle, the term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed 
     Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
     Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

         Subtitle C--Combating Terrorism and Illicit Financing

  PART 1--NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORIST AND OTHER ILLICIT 
                               FINANCING

     SEC. 261. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

       (a) In General.--The President, acting through the 
     Secretary, shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, 
     the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
     the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the 
     Office of Management and Budget, and the appropriate Federal 
     banking agencies and Federal functional regulators, develop a 
     national strategy for combating the financing of terrorism 
     and related forms of illicit finance.
       (b) Transmittal to Congress.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive national 
     strategy developed in accordance with subsection (a).
       (2) Updates.--Not later than January 31, 2020, and January 
     31, 2022, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees updated versions of the national 
     strategy submitted under paragraph (1).
       (c) Separate Presentation of Classified Material.--Any part 
     of the national strategy that involves information that is 
     properly classified under criteria established by the 
     President shall be submitted to Congress separately in a 
     classified annex and, if requested by the chairman or ranking 
     member of one of the appropriate congressional committees, as 
     a briefing at an appropriate level of security.

     SEC. 262. CONTENTS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

       The strategy described in section 261 shall contain the 
     following:
       (1) Evaluation of existing efforts.--An assessment of the 
     effectiveness of and ways in which the United States is 
     currently addressing the highest levels of risk of various 
     forms of illicit finance, including those identified in the 
     documents entitled ``2015 National Money Laundering Risk 
     Assessment'' and ``2015 National Terrorist Financing Risk 
     Assessment'', published by the Department of the Treasury and 
     a description of how the strategy is integrated into, and 
     supports, the broader counter terrorism strategy of the 
     United States.
       (2) Goals, objectives, and priorities.--A comprehensive, 
     research-based, long-range, quantifiable discussion of goals, 
     objectives, and priorities for disrupting and preventing 
     illicit finance activities within and transiting the 
     financial system of the United States that outlines 
     priorities to reduce the incidence, dollar value, and effects 
     of illicit finance.
       (3) Threats.--An identification of the most significant 
     illicit finance threats to the financial system of the United 
     States.
       (4) Reviews and proposed changes.--Reviews of enforcement 
     efforts, relevant regulations and relevant provisions of law 
     and, if appropriate, discussions of proposed changes 
     determined to be appropriate to ensure that the United States 
     pursues coordinated and effective efforts at all levels of 
     government, and with international partners of the United 
     States, in the fight against illicit finance.
       (5) Detection and prosecution initiatives.--A description 
     of efforts to improve, as necessary, detection and 
     prosecution of illicit finance, including efforts to ensure 
     that--
       (A) subject to legal restrictions, all appropriate data 
     collected by the Federal Government that is relevant to the 
     efforts described in this section be available in a timely 
     fashion to--
       (i) all appropriate Federal departments and agencies; and
       (ii) as appropriate and consistent with section 314 of the 
     International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
     Terrorism Act of 2001 (31 U.S.C. 5311 note), to financial 
     institutions to assist the financial institutions in efforts 
     to comply with laws aimed at curbing illicit finance; and
       (B) appropriate efforts are undertaken to ensure that 
     Federal departments and agencies charged with reducing and 
     preventing illicit finance make thorough use of publicly 
     available data in furtherance of this effort.
       (6) The role of the private financial sector in prevention 
     of illicit finance.--A discussion of ways to enhance 
     partnerships between the private financial sector and Federal 
     departments and agencies with regard to the prevention and 
     detection of illicit finance, including--
       (A) efforts to facilitate compliance with laws aimed at 
     stopping such illicit finance while maintaining the 
     effectiveness of such efforts; and
       (B) providing guidance to strengthen internal controls and 
     to adopt on an industry-wide basis more effective policies.
       (7) Enhancement of intergovernmental cooperation.--A 
     discussion of ways to combat illicit finance by enhancing--
       (A) cooperative efforts between and among Federal, State, 
     and local officials, including State regulators, State and 
     local prosecutors, and other law enforcement officials; and
       (B) cooperative efforts with and between governments of 
     countries and with and between multinational institutions 
     with expertise in fighting illicit finance, including the 
     Financial Action Task Force and the Egmont Group of Financial 
     Intelligence Units.
       (8) Trend analysis of emerging illicit finance threats.--A 
     discussion of and data regarding trends in illicit finance, 
     including evolving forms of value transfer such as so-called 
     cryptocurrencies, other methods that are computer, 
     telecommunications, or Internet-based, cyber crime, or any 
     other threats that the Secretary may choose to identify.
       (9) Budget priorities.--A multiyear budget plan that 
     identifies sufficient resources needed to successfully 
     execute the full range of missions called for in this 
     section.
       (10) Technology enhancements.--An analysis of current and 
     developing ways to leverage technology to improve the 
     effectiveness of efforts to stop the financing of terrorism 
     and other forms of illicit finance, including better 
     integration of open-source data.

PART 2--ENHANCING ANTITERRORISM TOOLS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

     SEC. 271. IMPROVING ANTITERROR FINANCE MONITORING OF FUNDS 
                   TRANSFERS.

       (a) Study.--
       (1) In general.--To improve the ability of the Department 
     of the Treasury to better track cross-border fund transfers 
     and identify potential financing of terrorist or other forms 
     of illicit finance, the Secretary shall carry out a study to 
     assess--
       (A) the potential efficacy of requiring banking regulators 
     to establish a pilot program to provide technical assistance 
     to depository institutions and credit unions that wish to 
     provide account services to money services businesses serving 
     individuals in Somalia;
       (B) whether such a pilot program could be a model for 
     improving the ability of United States persons to make 
     legitimate funds transfers through transparent and easily 
     monitored channels while preserving strict compliance with 
     the Bank Secrecy Act (Public Law 91-508; 84 Stat. 1114) and 
     related controls aimed at stopping money laundering and the 
     financing of terrorism; and
       (C) consistent with current legal requirements regarding 
     confidential supervisory information, the potential impact of 
     allowing money services businesses to share certain State 
     examination information with depository institutions and 
     credit unions, or whether another appropriate mechanism could 
     be identified to allow a similar exchange of information to 
     give the depository institutions and credit unions a better 
     understanding of whether an individual money services 
     business is adequately meeting its

[[Page 11532]]

     anti-money laundering and counter-terror financing 
     obligations to combat money laundering, the financing of 
     terror, or related illicit finance.
       (2) Public input.--The Secretary should solicit and 
     consider public input as appropriate in developing the study 
     required under subsection (a).
       (b) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the 
     Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that 
     contains all findings and determinations made in carrying out 
     the study required under subsection (a).

     SEC. 272. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
                   REGARDING TERRORIST FINANCING INTELLIGENCE.

       It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary, acting 
     through the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial 
     Crimes, should intensify work with foreign partners to help 
     the foreign partners develop intelligence analytic 
     capacities, in a financial intelligence unit, finance 
     ministry, or other appropriate agency, that are--
       (1) commensurate to the threats faced by the foreign 
     partner; and
       (2) designed to better integrate intelligence efforts with 
     the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing 
     regimes of the foreign partner.

     SEC. 273. EXAMINING THE COUNTER-TERROR FINANCING ROLE OF THE 
                   DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY IN EMBASSIES.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
     the House of Representatives a report that contains--
       (1) a list of the United States embassies in which a full-
     time Department of the Treasury financial attache is 
     stationed and a description of how the interests of the 
     Department of the Treasury relating to terrorist financing 
     and money laundering are addressed (via regional attaches or 
     otherwise) at United States embassies where no such attaches 
     are present;
       (2) a list of the United States embassies at which the 
     Department of the Treasury has assigned a technical 
     assistance advisor from the Office of Technical Assistance of 
     the Department of the Treasury;
       (3) an overview of how Department of the Treasury financial 
     attaches and technical assistance advisors assist in efforts 
     to counter illicit finance, to include money laundering, 
     terrorist financing, and proliferation financing; and
       (4) an overview of patterns, trends, or other issues 
     identified by the Department of the Treasury and whether 
     resources are sufficient to address these issues.

     SEC. 274. INCLUSION OF SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE 
                   NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

       (a) In General.--Section 101(c)(1) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(c)(1)) is amended by inserting 
     ``the Secretary of the Treasury,'' before ``and such other 
     officers''.
       (b) Rule of Construction.--The amendment made by subsection 
     (a) may not be construed to authorize the National Security 
     Council to have a professional staff level that exceeds the 
     limitation set forth under section 101(e)(3) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(e)(3)).

     SEC. 275. INCLUSION OF ALL FUNDS.

       (a) In General.--Section 5326 of title 31, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in the heading of such section, by striking ``coin and 
     currency'';
       (2) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking ``subtitle and'' and inserting ``subtitle 
     or to''; and
       (B) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``United States coins 
     or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the 
     Secretary may describe in such order)'' and inserting ``funds 
     (as the Secretary may describe in such order),''; and
       (3) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``coins or currency 
     (or monetary instruments)'' and inserting ``funds''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``coins or currency (or 
     such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe 
     in the regulation or order)'' and inserting ``funds (as the 
     Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for chapter 
     53 of title 31, United States Code, is amended in the item 
     relating to section 5326 by striking ``coin and currency''.

                          PART 3--DEFINITIONS

     SEC. 281. DEFINITIONS.

       In this subtitle--
       (1) the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Armed 
     Services, Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
     Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland Security, 
     and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives;
       (2) the term ``appropriate Federal banking agencies'' has 
     the meaning given the term in section 3 of the Federal 
     Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813);
       (3) the term ``Bank Secrecy Act'' means--
       (A) section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 
     U.S.C. 1829b);
       (B) chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91-508 (12 U.S.C. 
     1951 et seq.); and
       (C) subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States 
     Code;
       (4) the term ``Federal functional regulator'' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 509 of the Gramm-Leach-
     Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6809);
       (5) the term ``illicit finance'' means the financing of 
     terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or proliferation, money 
     laundering, or other forms of illicit financing domestically 
     or internationally, as defined by the President;
       (6) the term ``money services business'' has the meaning 
     given the term under section 1010.100 of title 31, Code of 
     Federal Regulations;
       (7) the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the 
     Treasury; and
       (8) the term ``State'' means each of the several States, 
     the District of Columbia, and each territory or possession of 
     the United States.

                    Subtitle D--Rule of Construction

     SEC. 291. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this title or the amendments made by this title 
     (other than sections 216 and 236(b)) shall be construed to 
     limit the authority of the President under the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

     SEC. 292. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF 
                   ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The principle of collective defense of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is immortalized in 
     Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in which members 
     pledge that ``an armed attack against one or more of them in 
     Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against 
     them all''.
       (2) For almost 7 decades, the principle of collective 
     defense has effectively served as a strategic deterrent for 
     the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     and provided stability throughout the world, strengthening 
     the security of the United States and all 28 other member 
     nations.
       (3) Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in 
     New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, the Alliance agreed 
     to invoke Article 5 for the first time, affirming its 
     commitment to collective defense.
       (4) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization have made historic contributions and sacrifices 
     while combating terrorism in Afghanistan through the 
     International Security Assistance Force and the Resolute 
     Support Mission.
       (5) The recent attacks in the United Kingdom underscore the 
     importance of an international alliance to combat hostile 
     nation states and terrorist groups.
       (6) At the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, the member countries 
     of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided that all 
     countries that are members of NATO would spend an amount 
     equal to 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense 
     by 2024.
       (7) Collective defense unites the 29 members of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization, each committing to protecting 
     and supporting one another from external adversaries, which 
     bolsters the North Atlantic Alliance.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress--
       (1) to express the vital importance of Article 5 of the 
     North Atlantic Treaty, the charter of the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization, as it continues to serve as a critical 
     deterrent to potential hostile nations and terrorist 
     organizations;
       (2) to remember the first and only invocation of Article 5 
     by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in support of the 
     United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
     2001;
       (3) to affirm that the United States remains fully 
     committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and will 
     honor its obligations enshrined in Article 5; and
       (4) to condemn any threat to the sovereignty, territorial 
     integrity, freedom, or democracy of any country that is a 
     member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

            TITLE III--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA

     SEC. 301. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Korean Interdiction and 
     Modernization of Sanctions Act''.

[[Page 11533]]



     SEC. 302. DEFINITIONS.

       (a) Amendments to Definitions in the North Korea Sanctions 
     and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016.--
       (1) Applicable executive order.--Section 3(1)(A) of the 
     North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 
     U.S.C. 9202(1)(A)) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``or Executive Order 13694'' and inserting 
     ``Executive Order No. 13694''; and
       (B) by inserting ``or Executive Order No. 13722 (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note; relating to blocking the property of the 
     Government of North Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, 
     and Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to North 
     Korea),'' before ``to the extent''.
       (2) Applicable united nations security council 
     resolution.--Section 3(2)(A) of the North Korea Sanctions and 
     Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9202(2)(A)) is 
     amended by striking ``or 2094 (2013)'' and inserting ``2094 
     (2013), 2270 (2016), or 2321 (2016)''.
       (3) Foreign person.--Section 3 of the North Korea Sanctions 
     and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9202) is 
     amended--
       (A) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (14) as 
     paragraphs (6) through (15), respectively; and
       (B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(5) Foreign person.--The term `foreign person' means--
       ``(A) an individual who is not a United States citizen or 
     an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the 
     United States; or
       ``(B) an entity that is not a United States person.''.
       (4) Luxury goods.--Paragraph (9) of section 3 of the North 
     Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 
     9202), as redesignated by paragraph (3) of this subsection, 
     is amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(C) also includes any items so designated under an 
     applicable United Nations Security Council resolution.''.
       (5) North korean person.--Section 3 of the North Korea 
     Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 
     9202), as amended by paragraph (3) of this subsection, is 
     further amended--
       (A) by redesignating paragraphs (13) through (15) as 
     paragraphs (14) through (16), respectively; and
       (B) by inserting after paragraph (12) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(13) North korean person.--The term `North Korean person' 
     means--
       ``(A) a North Korean citizen or national; or
       ``(B) an entity owned or controlled by the Government of 
     North Korea or by a North Korean citizen or national.''.
       (b) Definitions for Purposes of This Act.--In this title:
       (1) Applicable united nations security council resolution; 
     luxury goods.--The terms ``applicable United Nations Security 
     Council resolution'' and ``luxury goods'' have the meanings 
     given those terms, respectively, in section 3 of the North 
     Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 
     9202), as amended by subsection (a).
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees; government of 
     north korea; united states person.--The terms ``appropriate 
     congressional committees'', ``Government of North Korea'', 
     and ``United States person'' have the meanings given those 
     terms, respectively, in section 3 of the North Korea 
     Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 
     9202).
       (3) Foreign person; north korean person.--The terms 
     ``foreign person'' and ``North Korean person'' have the 
     meanings given those terms, respectively, in paragraph (5) 
     and paragraph (13) of section 3 of the North Korea Sanctions 
     and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9202(5) and 
     9202(13)), as added by subsection (a).
       (4) Prohibited weapons program.--The term ``prohibited 
     weapons program'' means--
       (A) any program related to the development of nuclear, 
     chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery, 
     including ballistic missiles; and
       (B) any program to develop related materials with respect 
     to a program described in subparagraph (A).

Subtitle A--Sanctions to Enforce and Implement United Nations Security 
                 Council Sanctions Against North Korea

     SEC. 311. MODIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 
                   DESIGNATION OF PERSONS.

       (a) Expansion of Mandatory Designations.--Section 104(a) of 
     the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 
     (22 U.S.C. 9214(a)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (9), by striking ``; or'' and inserting 
     ``or any defense article or defense service (as such terms 
     are defined in section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
     U.S.C. 2794));'';
       (2) by redesignating paragraph (10) as paragraph (15);
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following new 
     paragraphs:
       ``(10) knowingly, directly or indirectly, purchases or 
     otherwise acquires from North Korea any significant amounts 
     of gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, copper, silver, nickel, 
     zinc, or rare earth minerals;
       ``(11) knowingly, directly or indirectly, sells or 
     transfers to North Korea any significant amounts of rocket, 
     aviation, or jet fuel (except for use by a civilian passenger 
     aircraft outside North Korea, exclusively for consumption 
     during its flight to North Korea or its return flight);
       ``(12) knowingly, directly or indirectly, provides 
     significant amounts of fuel or supplies, provides bunkering 
     services, or facilitates a significant transaction or 
     transactions to operate or maintain, a vessel or aircraft 
     that is designated under an applicable Executive order or an 
     applicable United Nations Security Council resolution, or 
     that is owned or controlled by a person designated under an 
     applicable Executive order or applicable United Nations 
     Security Council resolution;
       ``(13) knowingly, directly or indirectly, insures, 
     registers, facilitates the registration of, or maintains 
     insurance or a registration for, a vessel owned or controlled 
     by the Government of North Korea, except as specifically 
     approved by the United Nations Security Council;
       ``(14) knowingly, directly or indirectly, maintains a 
     correspondent account (as defined in section 201A(d)(1)) with 
     any North Korean financial institution, except as 
     specifically approved by the United Nations Security Council; 
     or''; and
       (4) in paragraph (15), as so redesignated, by striking 
     ``(9)'' and inserting ``(14)''.
       (b) Expansion of Additional Discretionary Designations.--
       (1) In general.--Section 104(b)(1) of the North Korea 
     Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 
     9214(b)(1)) is amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``pursuant to an 
     applicable United Nations Security Council resolution;'' and 
     inserting the following: ``pursuant to--
       ``(i) an applicable United Nations Security Council 
     resolution;
       ``(ii) any regulation promulgated under section 404; or
       ``(iii) any applicable Executive order;'';
       (B) in subparagraph (B)(iii), by striking ``or'' at the 
     end;
       (C) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting a semicolon; and
       (D) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
       ``(D) knowingly, directly or indirectly, purchased or 
     otherwise acquired from the Government of North Korea 
     significant quantities of coal, iron, or iron ore, in excess 
     of the limitations provided in applicable United Nations 
     Security Council resolutions;
       ``(E) knowingly, directly or indirectly, purchased or 
     otherwise acquired significant types or amounts of textiles 
     from the Government of North Korea;
       ``(F) knowingly facilitated a significant transfer of funds 
     or property of the Government of North Korea that materially 
     contributes to any violation of an applicable United National 
     Security Council resolution;
       ``(G) knowingly, directly or indirectly, facilitated a 
     significant transfer to or from the Government of North Korea 
     of bulk cash, precious metals, gemstones, or other stores of 
     value not described under subsection (a)(10);
       ``(H) knowingly, directly or indirectly, sold, transferred, 
     or otherwise provided significant amounts of crude oil, 
     condensates, refined petroleum, other types of petroleum or 
     petroleum byproducts, liquified natural gas, or other natural 
     gas resources to the Government of North Korea (except for 
     heavy fuel oil, gasoline, or diesel fuel for humanitarian use 
     or as excepted under subsection (a)(11));
       ``(I) knowingly, directly or indirectly, engaged in, 
     facilitated, or was responsible for the online commercial 
     activities of the Government of North Korea, including online 
     gambling;
       ``(J) knowingly, directly or indirectly, purchased or 
     otherwise acquired fishing rights from the Government of 
     North Korea;
       ``(K) knowingly, directly or indirectly, purchased or 
     otherwise acquired significant types or amounts of food or 
     agricultural products from the Government of North Korea;
       ``(L) knowingly, directly or indirectly, engaged in, 
     facilitated, or was responsible for the exportation of 
     workers from North Korea in a manner intended to generate 
     significant revenue, directly or indirectly, for use by the 
     Government of North Korea or by the Workers' Party of Korea;
       ``(M) knowingly conducted a significant transaction or 
     transactions in North Korea's transportation, mining, energy, 
     or financial services industries; or
       ``(N) except as specifically approved by the United Nations 
     Security Council, and other than through a correspondent 
     account as described in subsection (a)(14), knowingly 
     facilitated the operation of any branch, subsidiary, or 
     office of a North Korean financial institution.''.
       (2) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraph (1) 
     take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
     apply with respect to conduct described in subparagraphs (D) 
     through (N) of section 104(b)(1) of

[[Page 11534]]

     the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, 
     as added by paragraph (1), engaged in on or after such date 
     of enactment.
       (c) Mandatory and Discretionary Asset Blocking.--Section 
     104(c) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement 
     Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9214(c)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``of a designated person'' and inserting 
     ``of a person designated under subsection (a)'';
       (2) by striking ``The President'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(1) Mandatory asset blocking.--The President''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) Discretionary asset blocking.--The President may also 
     exercise such powers, in the same manner and to the same 
     extent described in paragraph (1), with respect to a person 
     designated under subsection (b).''.
       (d) Designation of Additional Persons.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report including a 
     determination as to whether reasonable grounds exist, and an 
     explanation of the reasons for any determination that such 
     grounds do not exist, to designate, pursuant to section 104 
     of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 
     2016 (22 U.S.C. 9214), as amended by this section, each of 
     the following:
       (A) The Korea Shipowners' Protection and Indemnity 
     Association, a North Korean insurance company, with respect 
     to facilitating imports, exports, and reexports of arms and 
     related materiel to and from North Korea, or for other 
     activities prohibited by such section 104.
       (B) Chinpo Shipping Company (Private) Limited, a Singapore 
     corporation, with respect to facilitating imports, exports, 
     and reexports of arms and related materiel to and from North 
     Korea.
       (C) The Central Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of 
     Korea, with respect to the sale of gold to, the receipt of 
     gold from, or the import or export of gold by the Government 
     of North Korea.
       (D) Kumgang Economic Development Corporation (KKG), with 
     respect to being an entity controlled by Bureau 39 of the 
     Workers' Party of the Government of North Korea.
       (E) Sam Pa, also known as Xu Jinghua, Xu Songhua, Sa Muxu, 
     Samo, Sampa, or Sam King, and any entities owned or 
     controlled by such individual, with respect to transactions 
     with KKG.
       (F) The Chamber of Commerce of the Democratic People's 
     Republic of Korea, with respect to the exportation of workers 
     in violation of section 104(a)(5) or of section 104(b)(1)(M) 
     of such Act, as amended by subsection (b) of this section.
       (2) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) may 
     contain a classified annex.

     SEC. 312. PROHIBITION ON INDIRECT CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNTS.

       (a) In General.--Title II of the North Korea Sanctions and 
     Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9221 et seq.) is 
     amended by inserting after section 201 the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 201A. PROHIBITION ON INDIRECT CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNTS.

       ``(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), if 
     a United States financial institution has or obtains 
     knowledge that a correspondent account established, 
     maintained, administered, or managed by that institution for 
     a foreign financial institution is being used by the foreign 
     financial institution to provide significant financial 
     services indirectly to any person, foreign government, or 
     financial institution designated under section 104, the 
     United States financial institution shall ensure that such 
     correspondent account is no longer used to provide such 
     services.
       ``(b) Exception.--A United States financial institution is 
     authorized to process transfers of funds to or from North 
     Korea, or for the direct or indirect benefit of any person, 
     foreign government, or financial institution that is 
     designated under section 104, only if the transfer--
       ``(1) arises from, and is ordinarily incident and necessary 
     to give effect to, an underlying transaction that has been 
     authorized by a specific or general license issued by the 
     Secretary of the Treasury; and
       ``(2) does not involve debiting or crediting a North Korean 
     account.
       ``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Correspondent account.--The term `correspondent 
     account' has the meaning given that term in section 5318A of 
     title 31, United States Code.
       ``(2) United states financial institution.--The term 
     `United States financial institution' means has the meaning 
     given that term in section 510.310 of title 31, Code of 
     Federal Regulations, as in effect on the date of the 
     enactment of this section.
       ``(3) Foreign financial institution.--The term `foreign 
     financial institution' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, as 
     in effect on the date of the enactment of this section.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act 
     of 2016 is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
     section 201 the following new item:

``Sec. 201A. Prohibition on indirect correspondent accounts.''.

     SEC. 313. LIMITATIONS ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO NONCOMPLIANT 
                   GOVERNMENTS.

       Section 203 of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy 
     Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9223) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in the heading, by striking ``Transactions in Lethal 
     Military Equipment'' and inserting ``Transactions in Defense 
     Articles or Defense Services'';
       (B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``that provides lethal 
     military equipment to the Government of North Korea'' and 
     inserting ``that provides to or receives from the Government 
     of North Korea a defense article or defense service, as such 
     terms are defined in section 47 of the Arms Export Control 
     Act (22 U.S.C. 2794), if the President determines that a 
     significant type or amount of such article or service has 
     been so provided or received''; and
       (C) in paragraph (2), by striking ``1 year'' and inserting 
     ``2 years'';
       (2) in subsection (d), by striking ``or emergency'' and 
     inserting ``maternal and child health, disease prevention and 
     response, or''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Report on Arms Trafficking Involving North Korea.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter 
     for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that 
     specifically describes the compliance of foreign countries 
     and other foreign jurisdictions with the requirement to 
     curtail the trade described in subsection (b)(1).
       ``(2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a 
     classified annex.''.

     SEC. 314. AMENDMENTS TO ENHANCE INSPECTION AUTHORITIES.

       Title II of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy 
     Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9221 et seq.), as amended 
     by section 102 of this Act, is further amended by striking 
     section 205 and inserting the following:

     ``SEC. 205. ENHANCED INSPECTION AUTHORITIES.

       ``(a) Report Required.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for 
     5 years, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report--
       ``(A) identifying the operators of foreign sea ports and 
     airports that knowingly--
       ``(i) significantly fail to implement or enforce 
     regulations to inspect ships, aircraft, cargo, or conveyances 
     in transit to or from North Korea, as required by applicable 
     United Nations Security Council resolutions;
       ``(ii) facilitate the transfer, transshipment, or 
     conveyance of significant types or quantities of cargo, 
     vessels, or aircraft owned or controlled by persons 
     designated under applicable United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions; or
       ``(iii) facilitate any of the activities described in 
     section 104(a);
       ``(B) describing the extent to which the requirements of 
     applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions to de-
     register any vessel owned, controlled, or operated by or on 
     behalf of the Government of North Korea have been implemented 
     by other foreign countries;
       ``(C) describing the compliance of the Islamic Republic of 
     Iran with the sanctions mandated in applicable United Nations 
     Security Council resolutions;
       ``(D) identifying vessels, aircraft, and conveyances owned 
     or controlled by the Reconnaissance General Bureau of the 
     Workers' Party of Korea; and
       ``(E) describing the diplomatic and enforcement efforts by 
     the President to secure the full implementation of the 
     applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions, as 
     described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).
       ``(2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a 
     classified annex.
       ``(b) Specific Findings.--Each report required under 
     subsection (a) shall include specific findings with respect 
     to the following ports and airports:
       ``(1) The ports of Dandong, Dalian, and any other port in 
     the People's Republic of China that the President deems 
     appropriate.
       ``(2) The ports of Abadan, Bandar-e-Abbas, Chabahar, 
     Bandar-e-Khomeini, Bushehr Port, Asaluyeh Port, Kish, Kharg 
     Island, Bandar-e-Lenge, and Khorramshahr, and Tehran Imam 
     Khomeini International Airport, in the Islamic Republic of 
     Iran.
       ``(3) The ports of Nakhodka, Vanino, and Vladivostok, in 
     the Russian Federation.
       ``(4) The ports of Latakia, Banias, and Tartous, and 
     Damascus International Airport, in the Syrian Arab Republic.
       ``(c) Enhanced Security Targeting Requirements.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security may, using a layered approach, 
     require enhanced screening procedures to determine whether 
     physical inspections are

[[Page 11535]]

     warranted of any cargo bound for or landed in the United 
     States that--
       ``(A) has been transported through a sea port or airport 
     the operator of which has been identified by the President in 
     accordance with subsection (a)(1) as having repeatedly failed 
     to comply with applicable United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions;
       ``(B) is aboard a vessel or aircraft, or within a 
     conveyance that has, within the last 365 days, entered the 
     territory or waters of North Korea, or landed in any of the 
     sea ports or airports of North Korea; or
       ``(C) is registered by a country or jurisdiction whose 
     compliance has been identified by the President as deficient 
     pursuant to subsection (a)(2).
       ``(2) Exception for food, medicine, and humanitarian 
     shipments.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any vessel, 
     aircraft, or conveyance that has entered the territory or 
     waters of North Korea, or landed in any of the sea ports or 
     airports of North Korea, exclusively for the purposes 
     described in section 208(b)(3)(B), or to import food, 
     medicine, or supplies into North Korea to meet the 
     humanitarian needs of the North Korean people.
       ``(d) Seizure and Forfeiture.--A vessel, aircraft, or 
     conveyance used to facilitate any of the activities described 
     in section 104(a) under the jurisdiction of the United States 
     may be seized and forfeited, or subject to forfeiture, 
     under--
       ``(1) chapter 46 of title 18, United States Code; or
       ``(2) part V of title IV of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 
     U.S.C. 1581 et seq.).''.

     SEC. 315. ENFORCING COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS SHIPPING 
                   SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA.

       (a) In General.--The Ports and Waterways Safety Act (33 
     U.S.C. 1221 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     ``SEC. 16. PROHIBITION ON ENTRY AND OPERATION.

       ``(a) Prohibition.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this 
     section, no vessel described in subsection (b) may enter or 
     operate in the navigable waters of the United States or 
     transfer cargo in any port or place under the jurisdiction of 
     the United States.
       ``(2) Limitations on application.--
       ``(A) In general.--The prohibition under paragraph (1) 
     shall not apply with respect to--
       ``(i) a vessel described in subsection (b)(1), if the 
     Secretary of State determines that--

       ``(I) the vessel is owned or operated by or on behalf of a 
     country the government of which the Secretary of State 
     determines is closely cooperating with the United States with 
     respect to implementing the applicable United Nations 
     Security Council resolutions (as such term is defined in 
     section 3 of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement 
     Act of 2016); or
       ``(II) it is in the national security interest not to apply 
     the prohibition to such vessel; or

       ``(ii) a vessel described in subsection (b)(2), if the 
     Secretary of State determines that the vessel is no longer 
     registered as described in that subsection.
       ``(B) Notice.--Not later than 15 days after making a 
     determination under subparagraph (A), the Secretary of State 
     shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
     Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House 
     of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
     the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 
     Senate written notice of the determination and the basis upon 
     which the determination was made.
       ``(C) Publication.--The Secretary of State shall publish a 
     notice in the Federal Register of each determination made 
     under subparagraph (A).
       ``(b) Vessels Described.--A vessel referred to in 
     subsection (a) is a foreign vessel for which a notice of 
     arrival is required to be filed under section 4(a)(5), and 
     that--
       ``(1) is on the most recent list of vessels published in 
     Federal Register under subsection (c)(2); or
       ``(2) more than 180 days after the publication of such 
     list, is knowingly registered, pursuant to the 1958 
     Convention on the High Seas entered into force on September 
     30, 1962, by a government the agents or instrumentalities of 
     which are maintaining a registration of a vessel that is 
     included on such list.
       ``(c) Information and Publication.--The Secretary of the 
     department in which the Coast Guard is operating, with the 
     concurrence of the Secretary of State, shall--
       ``(1) maintain timely information on the registrations of 
     all foreign vessels over 300 gross tons that are known to 
     be--
       ``(A) owned or operated by or on behalf of the Government 
     of North Korea or a North Korean person;
       ``(B) owned or operated by or on behalf of any country in 
     which a sea port is located, the operator of which the 
     President has identified in the most recent report submitted 
     under section 205(a)(1)(A) of the North Korea Sanctions and 
     Policy Enhancement Act of 2016; or
       ``(C) owned or operated by or on behalf of any country 
     identified by the President as a country that has not 
     complied with the applicable United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions (as such term is defined in section 3 of such 
     Act); and
       ``(2) not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this section, and periodically thereafter, 
     publish in the Federal Register a list of the vessels 
     described in paragraph (1).
       ``(d) Notification of Governments.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall notify each 
     government, the agents or instrumentalities of which are 
     maintaining a registration of a foreign vessel that is 
     included on a list published under subsection (c)(2), not 
     later than 30 days after such publication, that all vessels 
     registered under such government's authority are subject to 
     subsection (a).
       ``(2) Additional notification.--In the case of a government 
     that continues to maintain a registration for a vessel that 
     is included on such list after receiving an initial 
     notification under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall issue 
     an additional notification to such government not later than 
     120 days after the publication of a list under subsection 
     (c)(2).
       ``(e) Notification of Vessels.--Upon receiving a notice of 
     arrival under section 4(a)(5) from a vessel described in 
     subsection (b), the Secretary of the department in which the 
     Coast Guard is operating shall notify the master of such 
     vessel that the vessel may not enter or operate in the 
     navigable waters of the United States or transfer cargo in 
     any port or place under the jurisdiction of the United 
     States, unless--
       ``(1) the Secretary of State has made a determination under 
     subsection (a)(2); or
       ``(2) the Secretary of the department in which the Coast 
     Guard is operating allows provisional entry of the vessel, or 
     transfer of cargo from the vessel, under subsection (f).
       ``(f) Provisional Entry or Cargo Transfer.--Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of this section, the Secretary of the 
     department in which the Coast Guard is operating may allow 
     provisional entry of, or transfer of cargo from, a vessel, if 
     such entry or transfer is necessary for the safety of the 
     vessel or persons aboard.
       ``(g) Right of Innocent Passage and Right of Transit 
     Passage.--This section shall not be construed as authority to 
     restrict the right of innocent passage or the right of 
     transit passage as recognized under international law.
       ``(h) Foreign Vessel Defined.--In this section, the term 
     `foreign vessel' has the meaning given that term in section 
     110 of title 46, United States Code.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Special powers.--Section 4(b)(2) of the Ports and 
     Waterways Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1223(b)(2)) is amended by 
     inserting ``or 16'' after ``section 9''.
       (2) Denial of entry.--Section 13(e) of the Ports and 
     Waterways Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1232(e)) is amended by 
     striking ``section 9'' and inserting ``section 9 or 16''.

     SEC. 316. REPORT ON COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 
     years, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees and leadership a report that 
     includes--
       (1) an assessment of the extent of cooperation (including 
     through the transfer of goods, services, technology, or 
     intellectual property) between North Korea and Iran relating 
     to their respective nuclear, ballistic missile development, 
     chemical or biological weapons development, or conventional 
     weapons programs;
       (2) the names of any Iranian or North Korean persons that 
     have knowingly engaged in or directed--
       (A) the provision of material support to such programs; or
       (B) the exchange of information between North Korea and 
     Iran with respect to such programs;
       (3) the names of any other foreign persons that have 
     facilitated the activities described in paragraph (1); and
       (4) a determination whether any of the activities described 
     in paragraphs (1) and (2) violate United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution 2231 (2015).
       (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a 
     classified annex.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees and Leadership 
     Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees and leadership'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the majority and 
     minority leaders of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the 
     Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the 
     House of Representatives.

     SEC. 317. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
                   COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 
     years, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees and leadership a report that 
     evaluates the degree to which

[[Page 11536]]

     the governments of other countries have knowingly failed to--
       (1) close the representative offices of persons designated 
     under applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions;
       (2) expel any North Korean nationals, including diplomats, 
     working on behalf of such persons;
       (3) prohibit the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or 
     representative offices of North Korean financial institutions 
     within the jurisdictions of such governments; or
       (4) expel any representatives of North Korean financial 
     institutions.
       (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a 
     classified annex.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees and Leadership 
     Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees and leadership'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the majority and 
     minority leaders of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the 
     Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the 
     House of Representatives.

     SEC. 318. BRIEFING ON MEASURES TO DENY SPECIALIZED FINANCIAL 
                   MESSAGING SERVICES TO DESIGNATED NORTH KOREAN 
                   FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for 
     5 years, the President shall provide to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a briefing that includes the 
     following information:
       (1) A list of each person or foreign government the 
     President has identified that directly provides specialized 
     financial messaging services to, or enables or facilitates 
     direct or indirect access to such messaging services for--
       (A) any North Korean financial institution (as such term is 
     defined in section 3 of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy 
     Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9202)) designated under an 
     applicable United Nations Security Council resolution; or
       (B) any other North Korean person, on behalf of such a 
     North Korean financial institution.
       (2) A detailed assessment of the status of efforts by the 
     Secretary of the Treasury to work with the relevant 
     authorities in the home jurisdictions of such specialized 
     financial messaging providers to end such provision or 
     access.
       (b) Form.--The briefing required under subsection (a) may 
     be classified.

   Subtitle B--Sanctions With Respect to Human Rights Abuses by the 
                       Government of North Korea

     SEC. 321. SANCTIONS FOR FORCED LABOR AND SLAVERY OVERSEAS OF 
                   NORTH KOREANS.

       (a) Sanctions for Trafficking in Persons.--
       (1) In general.--Section 302(b) of the North Korea 
     Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 
     9241(b)) is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) a list of foreign persons that knowingly employ North 
     Korean laborers, as described in section 104(b)(1)(M).''.
       (2) Additional determinations; reports.--With respect to 
     any country identified in section 302(b)(2) of the North 
     Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 
     9241(b)(2)), as amended by paragraph (1), the report required 
     under section 302(a) of such Act shall--
       (A) include a determination whether each person identified 
     in section 302(b)(3) of such Act (as amended by paragraph 
     (1)) who is a national or a citizen of such identified 
     country meets the criteria for sanctions under--
       (i) section 111 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
     of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7108) (relating to the prevention of 
     trafficking in persons); or
       (ii) section 104(a) or 104(b)(1) of the North Korea 
     Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 
     9214(a)), as amended by section 101 of this Act;
       (B) be included in the report required under section 110(b) 
     of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 
     7107(b)) (relating to the annual report on trafficking in 
     persons); and
       (C) be considered in any determination that the government 
     of such country has made serious and sustained efforts to 
     eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons, as such 
     term is defined for purposes of the Trafficking Victims 
     Protection Act of 2000.
       (b) Sanctions on Foreign Persons That Employ North Korean 
     Labor.--
       (1) In general.--Title III of the North Korea Sanctions and 
     Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9241 et seq.) is 
     amended by inserting after section 302 the following new 
     sections:

     ``SEC. 302A. REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION APPLICABLE TO GOODS MADE 
                   WITH NORTH KOREAN LABOR.

       ``(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
     any significant goods, wares, articles, and merchandise 
     mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part by the 
     labor of North Korean nationals or citizens shall be deemed 
     to be prohibited under section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 
     (19 U.S.C. 1307) and shall not be entitled to entry at any of 
     the ports of the United States.
       ``(b) Exception.--The prohibition described in subsection 
     (a) shall not apply if the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and 
     Border Protection finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 
     that the goods, wares, articles, or merchandise described in 
     such paragraph were not produced with convict labor, forced 
     labor, or indentured labor under penal sanctions.

     ``SEC. 302B. SANCTIONS ON FOREIGN PERSONS EMPLOYING NORTH 
                   KOREAN LABOR.

       ``(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (c), 
     the President shall designate any person identified under 
     section 302(b)(3) for the imposition of sanctions under 
     subsection (b).
       ``(b) Imposition of Sanctions.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President shall impose the sanctions 
     described in paragraph (2) with respect to any person 
     designated under subsection (a).
       ``(2) Sanctions described.--The sanctions described in this 
     paragraph are sanctions pursuant to the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to 
     block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests 
     in property of a person designated under subsection (a), if 
     such property and interests in property are in the United 
     States, come within the United States, or are or come within 
     the possession or control of a United States person.
       ``(c) Exception.--
       ``(1) In general.--A person may not be designated under 
     subsection (a) if the President certifies to the appropriate 
     congressional committees that the President has received 
     reliable assurances from such person that--
       ``(A) the employment of North Korean laborers does not 
     result in the direct or indirect transfer of convertible 
     currency, luxury goods, or other stores of value to the 
     Government of North Korea;
       ``(B) all wages and benefits are provided directly to the 
     laborers, and are held, as applicable, in accounts within the 
     jurisdiction in which they reside in locally denominated 
     currency; and
       ``(C) the laborers are subject to working conditions 
     consistent with international standards.
       ``(2) Recertification.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date on which the President transmits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees an initial certification under 
     paragraph (1), and every 180 days thereafter, the President 
     shall--
       ``(A) transmit a recertification stating that the 
     conditions described in such paragraph continue to be met; or
       ``(B) if such recertification cannot be transmitted, impose 
     the sanctions described in subsection (b) beginning on the 
     date on which the President determines that such 
     recertification cannot be transmitted.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act 
     of 2016 is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
     section 302 the following new items:

``Sec. 302A. Rebuttable presumption applicable to goods made with North 
              Korean labor.
``Sec. 302B. Sanctions on foreign persons employing North Korean 
              labor.''.

     SEC. 322. MODIFICATIONS TO SANCTIONS SUSPENSION AND WAIVER 
                   AUTHORITIES.

       (a) Exemptions.--Section 208(a) of the North Korea 
     Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 
     9228(a)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
       (1) by inserting ``201A,'' after ``104,''; and
       (2) by inserting ``302A, 302B,'' after ``209,''.
       (b) Humanitarian Waiver.--Section 208(b) of the North Korea 
     Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 
     9228(b)(1)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``201A,'' after ``104,'' in each place it 
     appears; and
       (2) by inserting ``302A, 302B,'' after ``209(b),'' in each 
     place it appears.
       (c) Waiver.--Section 208(c) of the North Korea Sanctions 
     and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9228(c)) is 
     amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
       (1) by inserting ``201A,'' after ``104,''; and
       (2) by inserting ``302A, 302B,'' after ``209(b),''.

     SEC. 323. REWARD FOR INFORMANTS.

       Section 36(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act 
     of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(b)), is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (9), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (10), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting a semicolon; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(11) the identification or location of any person who, 
     while acting at the direction of or under the control of a 
     foreign government, aids or abets a violation of section 1030 
     of title 18, United States Code; or
       ``(12) the disruption of financial mechanisms of any person 
     who has engaged in the conduct described in sections 104(a) 
     or 104(b)(1) of the North Korea Sanctions and

[[Page 11537]]

     Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 2914(a) or 
     (b)(1)).''.

     SEC. 324. DETERMINATION ON DESIGNATION OF NORTH KOREA AS A 
                   STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM.

       (a) Determination.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     determination whether North Korea meets the criteria for 
     designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.
       (2) Form.--The determination required by paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex, if appropriate.
       (b) State Sponsor of Terrorism Defined.--For purposes of 
     this section, the term ``state sponsor of terrorism'' means a 
     country the government of which the Secretary of State has 
     determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4605(j)) (as in effect 
     pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act), 
     section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
     2371), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2780), or any other provision of law, is a government that 
     has repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
     terrorism.

                    Subtitle C--General Authorities

     SEC. 331. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.

       Any reports required to be submitted to the appropriate 
     congressional committees under this title or any amendment 
     made by this title that are subject to deadlines for 
     submission consisting of similar units of time may be 
     consolidated into a single report that is submitted to 
     appropriate congressional committees pursuant to the earlier 
     of such deadlines. The consolidated reports must contain all 
     information required under this title or any amendment made 
     by this title, in addition to all other elements mandated by 
     previous law.

     SEC. 332. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit--
       (1) the authority or obligation of the President to apply 
     the sanctions described in section 104 of the North Korea 
     Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 
     9214), as amended by section 311 of this Act, with regard to 
     persons who meet the criteria for designation under such 
     section, or in any other provision of law; or
       (2) the authorities of the President pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.).

     SEC. 333. REGULATORY AUTHORITY.

       (a) In General.--The President shall, not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, promulgate 
     regulations as necessary for the implementation of this title 
     and the amendments made by this title.
       (b) Notification to Congress.--Not fewer than 10 days 
     before the promulgation of a regulation under subsection (a), 
     the President shall notify and provide to the appropriate 
     congressional committees the proposed regulation, specifying 
     the provisions of this title or the amendments made by this 
     title that the regulation is implementing.

     SEC. 334. LIMITATION ON FUNDS.

       No additional funds are authorized to carry out the 
     requirements of this title or of the amendments made by this 
     title. Such requirements shall be carried out using amounts 
     otherwise authorized.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Royce) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel) each 
will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.


                             General Leave

  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that 
all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their 
remarks and to include any extraneous material in the Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill represents a very broad, bipartisan House-
Senate agreement that the United States must enforce tougher sanctions 
against North Korea, against Russia, against Iran.
  I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel), the ranking member 
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, for his determined and excellent work 
on this legislation. This is a very important bill.
  These three regimes in different parts of the world are threatening 
vital U.S. interests and they are destabilizing their neighbors. It is 
well past time that we forcefully respond.
  Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has invaded its neighbor, Ukraine, 
seizing its territory and destabilizing its government. It poses a 
threat to our NATO allies in Europe, as Moscow works to undermine 
democratic values with determination and sophistication, as U.S. 
intelligence agencies have made clear. This former KGB colonel 
attempted to interfere with our own election. Left unchecked, Russia is 
sure to continue its aggression.
  Putin's forces continue to prop up the murderous Assad regime in 
Syria, prolonging a deadly conflict that has driven tens of millions of 
people from their homes, while enabling the use of chemical weapons and 
other systematic human rights abuses against the people of Syria.
  The Russia sanctions in this bill are substantially similar to those 
that overwhelmingly passed the other body. They give the administration 
important economic leverage, they give it diplomatic leverage by 
targeting the things that matter to Vladimir Putin and that matter to 
his allies the most, and that is their corrupt efforts to profit from 
the country's oil wealth and their ability to sell weapons overseas.
  To focus their impact, we clarified several provisions that could 
have inadvertently handed Russian companies control of global energy 
projects and impacted pipelines that our European allies rely on in an 
effort to end their dependence on Russian gas. So this strengthens the 
bill.
  To ensure these economic sanctions remain in place as long as Putin's 
aggression continues, this bill empowers Congress to review and to 
disapprove any sanctions relief. This strong oversight is necessary, it 
is appropriate. After all, it is Congress that the Constitution 
empowers to regulate commerce with foreign nations.
  Mr. Speaker, Russia has found a willing partner in Iran. The regime's 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard are fighting alongside Russian forces in 
Syria. At the same time, Tehran continues to threaten Israel by 
providing funding and advanced rockets and missiles to Hezbollah. 
Hezbollah is its leading terrorist proxy. It continues to hold 
Americans hostage, while developing intercontinental ballistic missiles 
capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
  To strengthen the U.S. response to the threat from Iran, this bill 
includes provisions originally introduced by my counterpart, Senator 
Corker, which increase sanctions on those involved in the regime's 
human rights abuses and its support for terrorism, as well as its 
efforts on the ballistic missile program, which the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard forces control.
  Finally, I am proud that this bill includes the text of H.R. 1644, 
the Korean Interdiction and Modernization of Sanctions Act, which we 
passed in May. We passed it here out of the House by a vote of 419-1. 
These provisions, which were strengthened in consultation with the 
other body, expand sanctions targeting North Korea's nuclear weapons 
program, but they also go after those around the world who employ North 
Korean slave labor.
  This is a human rights abuse. It is one that operates by having a 
situation where the indentured workers are fed, but the check, instead 
of going to the workers, goes to the regime, and that money then goes 
into the nuclear weapons program. It is estimated that this earns 
hundreds of millions of dollars for the regime in hard currency.
  So with every test, Kim Jong-un's regime comes closer to being able 
to mount a nuclear warhead on a missile that is capable of reaching the 
U.S. mainland. We simply cannot pass up an opportunity to increase 
pressure in response to this threat.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I might 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation. I want to, first 
of all, thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for all the hard 
work that has gone into this legislation so far. I want to especially 
thank our chairman, Ed Royce, who has been my partner on this committee 
for nearly 5 years. We have passed excellent legislation. The 
legislation today just adds to it, and it shows what you can do when 
you work in a bipartisan way, so I want to thank

[[Page 11538]]

the chairman for all his hard work and all his courtesies.
  Mr. Speaker, I support this bill. I certainly plan to vote for it, 
but it seems we may be on the floor before we have ironed out all the 
differences with the other body. I hope that is not the case.
  In particular, there have been issues with the North Korea sanctions. 
It was another Royce-Engel bill, which already passed in the House and, 
frankly, should have been taken up by the other body on a separate 
track; instead, it is now put into this bill. I hope we don't face 
further delays when this bill gets back to the other House.
  Our job isn't done, obviously, until we get this thing across the 
finish line; and we need to do that because this bill is critical to 
our national security.
  It does far more than just send a message to leaders in Russia, Iran, 
and North Korea. It exacts a heavy price for their aggressive and 
destabilizing behavior.
  Just like the bill we already passed, this legislation would update 
and expand our sanctions on North Korea, closing loopholes that have 
allowed money to flow to the Kim regime, funding its illegal weapons 
program. It would crack down on the trading partners, banks, and 
shipping vessels that enable the regime, and go after the regime's most 
lucrative enterprises, whether exported goods or the pilfered wages of 
North Korean laborers sent abroad to work.
  With respect to Iran, this bill would go after so many of the things 
Iran's leaders do to drive violence and instability, from Tehran's 
ballistic missile program and its support for terrorism to the regime's 
abhorrent human rights record and efforts to build up its military. I 
have said this again and again, that we need to hold the regime's feet 
to the fire on all these issues. This bill does exactly that.
  Finally, on Russia, this bill is a strong, direct response to 
Vladimir Putin's efforts to undermine American democracy. It imposes 
new sanctions on those who want to do business with Putin's cronies or 
with Russia's military or intelligence. It strengthens existing 
sanctions for Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and armed 
intervention in eastern Ukraine. It pushes back against Russia's 
cybercrimes, including the hacking of our election to help Donald 
Trump--a story which Congress and the special counsel are still trying 
to get to the bottom of--as well as Putin's support for the murderous 
Assad regime in Syria. And it gives Congress a strong oversight role in 
making sure that these Russian sanctions are not lifted prematurely.
  This administration has shown over and over that they are willing to 
cozy up to Putin, but here is the truth: Russia is not our ally. Putin 
wants to harm the United States, splinter our alliances, and undermine 
Western democracy. This Congress will not allow him to succeed, so I am 
glad to support this bipartisan bill.
  I thank the chairman once again. We need to keep working to make sure 
this bill gets to the President's desk.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1445

  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCaul), and I just want to thank him for his 
good work to strengthen the bill, as he will discuss, and for his focus 
on pipelines that primarily carry oil and gas through Russia that 
compete with Russian gas and drives down the price of gas.
  Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of increased 
sanctions on Russia, Iran, and North Korea. I thank Chairman Royce and 
Ranking Member Eliot Engel for their leadership on this issue. I cannot 
overstate the importance of sending a strong message to our adversaries 
that there will be consequences for their bad behavior.
  Back in October of last year, at the height of the Presidential 
campaign, I was briefed by our intelligence community. They told me 
that Russia engaged in a blatant effort to meddle in our domestic 
affairs and, specifically, our democratic process. I was an outspoken 
supporter of the need for a strong response then, and I remain so now.
  However, in the process of making Russia pay an economic cost for 
their bad behavior, we must ensure we are not harming U.S. interests at 
home and abroad.
  I want to thank Chairman Royce for clarifying that Section 232 of 
this bill only applies to Russian energy export pipelines. We should 
not be in the business of sanctioning pipelines that help provide 
energy independence from Russia. Putin uses this as a tool to provide 
political leverage over his neighbors.
  So, again, I want to thank Chairman Royce for his leadership in 
working with me on this, I think, clarification to the Senate companion 
and for his leadership in the House on this important issue.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode 
Island (Mr. Cicilline), my colleague on the Foreign Affairs Committee.
  Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3364, the 
Russia, Iran, and North Korea Sanctions Act. I thank my colleagues, 
Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel, for all of their work, 
together with the Senate, to reach this important agreement.
  This legislation will ensure that Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and 
those who seek to help them, will suffer consequences for their bad 
behavior. Passage of this legislation is important to hold Iran 
accountable for its support for terrorism, human rights violations, and 
continued defiance of international treaties, including on ballistic 
missiles.
  Today we are taking an important step toward holding the Iranian 
Government, including the IRGC, and anyone who seeks to support them, 
accountable for their bad actions. Anyone who contributes to Iran's 
ballistic missile program, supplies it with weapons, or assists the 
Iranian Government in their vast human rights abuses will be subject to 
sanction.
  It is important to note that these sanctions do not violate the JCPOA 
and, in my view, strengthen the nuclear deal by showing our allies and 
Iran that the United States is serious about continuing to enforce 
violations of international law.
  I am also pleased to see additional sanctions imposed upon Russia and 
North Korea in this legislation. The human suffering that North Korea 
has brought upon its own people is unimaginable. Such a depraved leader 
as Kim Jong-un getting his hands on nuclear weapons that can be used 
against American allies is an outcome that we simply cannot tolerate.
  Finally, Russia engaged in an unprecedented attack against our 
democracy when it interfered in our 2016 election. This is the 
fundamental foundation of our democracy, our election, and we simply 
cannot allow any foreign power to interfere in our electoral process.
  Given our President's complete unwillingness to hold Russia 
accountable for their attack--and let's not mistake it for anything 
else; it was an attack on America--it has become necessary for Congress 
to assert its role in this area and ensure that Russia will be held 
accountable.
  So, again, I thank Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, Leader 
Pelosi, Whip Hoyer, and members of the Senate who worked together to 
get this bill to the floor. I urge my colleagues to support this 
legislation.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), the chairman of the Foreign 
Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and 
International Organizations.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding. I thank him and Eliot Engel for sponsoring this important 
bill.
  This bill brings together a critical arsenal of stiff and timely 
sanctions against Iran, Russia, and North Korea.
  The administration was absolutely right in early February to put Iran 
on notice regarding its continued testing of ballistic missiles. This 
bill underscores that warning by imposing expanded sanctions against 
Iran's missile program, demonstrating that the United States will not 
sit idly by as Iran augments its ability to militarily blackmail the 
United States, Israel, and our allies.

[[Page 11539]]

  It also, as the world's largest sponsor of terrorism, imposes terror 
sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It very 
importantly, as well, authorizes the imposition of sanctions on 
individuals responsible for Iran's human rights abuses.
  The State Department suggests there are as many as 800 political 
prisoners in Iran alone. It also reminds us and draws attention to 
Iran's despicable practice of arresting American citizens to use them 
as bargaining chips.
  On Russia, Mr. Speaker, the Putin government's invasion of Ukraine 
and annexation of Crimea; indiscriminate bombing in Syria; and 
threatening behavior toward our NATO allies, above all, in the Baltics 
makes it--important in respects--the worst actor in the global stage 
today. Putin's government has passed from threats to aggressive actions 
against our friends, allies, and innocent people abroad.
  Let's not forget that in 2008--and I was there in Tbilisi as it was 
happening--the Russians invaded Georgia and annexed South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.
  As to North Korea, a gulag masquerading as a country, we must cut off 
all economic lifelines to Kim Jong-un, and punish Pyongyang's clients 
and its enablers. A regime that murdered Otto Warmbier and then, of 
course, is working on more missiles and the means to deliver them needs 
to be taken seriously. This legislation does that with very stiff 
sanctions.
  I thank, again, Chairman Royce, Eliot Engel, Majority Leader 
McCarthy, and Steny Hoyer as the principal sponsors of the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support H.R. 3364, the Countering 
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, introduced by my good 
friend, Chairman Ed Royce. I'm proud to be a co-sponsor. This bill 
brings together a critical arsenal of stiff and timely sanctions 
trained at some of the gravest national security threats our country 
faces today.
  The Trump Administration was absolutely right in early February to 
put Iran ``on notice'' regarding its continued testing of ballistic 
missiles. This bill underscores that warning by imposing expanded 
sanctions against Iran's missile program--demonstrating that the United 
States will not sit idly by as Iran augments its ability to blackmail 
Israel and other allies.
  The stakes could hardly be higher. Iran possesses the largest 
ballistic missile program in the region and its medium-range ballistic 
missiles are already able to strike Israel and our allies and 
installations in the Gulf from deep within Iranian territory. Iran's 
growing space launch program--a thinly veiled testing scheme for 
intercontinental ballistic missiles--is cause for greater alarm still.
  Iran is also the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism. By 
requiring the imposition of terror sanctions on the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, H.R. 3364 treats the IRGC as what it truly 
is: Iran's principal means of exporting terrorism around the world, 
particularly to Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain.
  The U.S. cannot tolerate this brinksmanship and blackmail. Iran 
dreams of nothing less than regional hegemony and Israel's 
annihilation. There is no room for compromise with such an adversary. 
Now is the time to act: Iran is entrenching its influence in Syria and 
Iraq and insuring these gains with the credibility of its missile 
threat and militant proxies. We must pass this bill to bring maximum 
pressure to bear against a mounting threat.
  Importantly, this bill also authorizes the imposition of sanctions on 
individuals responsible for Iran's horrifying human rights abuses. In 
May, the State Department reported to Congress that: ``The Iranian 
regime's repression of its own people includes reports of over 800 
political prisoners, composed of peaceful civic activists, journalists, 
women's rights activists, religious and ethnic minorities, and 
opposition political figures.''
  This bill would also draw increased attention to Iran's despicable 
practice of arresting American citizens to use them as bargaining 
chips. On Friday, the Trump Administration rightfully called Iran out 
for using these detentions as ``a tool of state policy'' and threatened 
``new and serious'' consequences if this practice continues. We must 
not forget the lives and families of Robert Levinson, Siamak and Baquer 
Namazi, Xiyue Wang, and others that have been torn apart by Iran's 
cynical schemes.
  Mr. Speaker, regarding Russia, the Putin government's invasion of 
Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, indiscriminate bombing in Syria, and 
threatening behavior toward our NATO allies, above all in the Baltics, 
makes it among the worst actors on the global stage today. Putin's 
government has passed from threats to aggressive action against our 
friends, allies and innocent civilians abroad. And it did so long ago, 
when it invaded Georgia in 2008.
  I was there, in Tbilisi, several weeks after that invasion began, to 
work to secure the exit of two young children, constituents of mine, 
trapped behind Russian lines in South Ossetia. I will never forget the 
quiet courage of the Georgian people in Tbilisi--not entirely surprised 
by Putin's invasion--they were too wise for that--uncertain whether the 
Russian army would proceed to Tbilisi, and determined to soldier on in 
defense of their country.
  And then in 2014 the Russian government annexed Crimea and invaded 
eastern Ukraine--each of these incursions was marked by massive human 
rights violations, violence toward anyone suspected of being 
unsympathetic to the Russian imperialist cause, and created massive 
humanitarian crises of displaced persons, which the Russian government 
did nothing to relieve.
  These acts of aggression underscore the seriousness with which we 
must take the Russian government's testing of our limits and our will, 
by buzzing our ships and planes, harassing our diplomats, and 
intimidating our allies--as it does for example with the Zapad 
exercises set to take place in September near the Polish, Lithuanian, 
Latvian, and Estonian borders.
  We know from experience that the best way to maintain the peace and 
keep our country secure is to respond strongly to Russian expansionism 
and intimidation attempts--this sanctions bill does just that.
  The large number of political assassinations that have scarred 
Russian public life since Putin arrived on the scene--the most 
notorious but not the only attack on the rights of Russian citizens for 
which the Putin government is responsible. These brutal crimes only 
underscore the need to respond strongly to Putin's attempts to 
intimidate us and our allies.
  Congress has responded strongly to Putin's aggressions and crimes 
before, for example with the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law and 
Accountability Act and the Global Magnitsky legislation, of which I was 
the House chief sponsor, taking the lessons of the earlier act and 
applied them globally, while in its name further memorializing the 
heroic sacrifice of Sergei Magnitsky. The Magnitsky legislation was so 
strongly detested by the Putin government that in early 2013, having 
cosponsored the original Magnitsky legislation, the Russian government 
refused to issue me a visa to visit Russia to work on international 
child adoption issues. A State Department official commented to me at 
the time that as far he knew, I was the first Congressman denied a visa 
since the Brezhnev era.
  So, in addition to enacting this new legislation, I want to join 
Vladimir Kara-Murza's call that the Magnitsky legislation continue to 
be implemented energetically and fully. Kara-Murza is a Russian 
democracy activist who twice was nearly killed by sophisticated poisons 
while visiting Russia--he testified for me at the Helsinki Commission 
after the first poisoning attempt, in October 2015. Many of the Putin 
government's murders are motivated by economic crimes and 
implementation of the Magnitsky legislation should also include U.S. 
government advocacy on behalf of U.S. investors defrauded by Russian 
expropriations--the Yukos oil company is the most notorious case of 
this.
  As to North Korea--a gulag masquerading as a country--we must cut off 
all economic lifelines to Kim Jong un and punish Pyongyang's clients 
and its enablers. A regime that murders Otto Warmbier does not deserve 
respect and should be considered an imminent threat to the US and its 
allies because of its nuclear proliferation.
  We cannot negotiate our way out of these strategic problems. Carrots 
have not worked, we need bigger sticks.
  We know sanctions are working. Thae Yong Ho (Thay Young Ho)--North 
Korea's former deputy ambassador to Britain and the highest ranking 
defector in twenty years--said that international sanctions are 
beginning to squeeze the regime. He also said that the spread of 
information from the outside world is having a real impact. So it 
shouldn't be a surprise that South Korea has reported that high-level 
defections are surging.
  This legislation provides crucial tools and I support them 
wholeheartedly--as I supported them in May of this year.
  The Trump Administration will find that it can use the tools we offer 
today to much greater use than did the last White House. With hundreds 
of thousands of North Korean laborers abroad--sending as much as $2 
billion a year back to the regime in hard currency--we should look at 
targeting this expatriate labor and the governments and corporations 
that employ them.

[[Page 11540]]

  Loopholes in our sanctions on North Korea's shipping and financial 
sectors must be closed. And when we discover that foreign banks have 
helped Kim Jong un skirt sanctions--as those in China have repeatedly 
done--we must give those banks and businesses a stark choice: do 
business with Kim Jong un or the U.S.
  Cut off Kim Jong un's economic lifelines, punish those who keep his 
murderous regime afloat, and signal to China and its client state in 
North Korea that the era of ``strategic patience'' is finally over.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to strongly support this critical 
measure at a perilous moment for our country and the rest of the 
planet.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Castro), our colleague on the Foreign Affairs Committee and a 
member of the Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. CASTRO of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank Ranking Member Engel for 
yielding.
  I also thank Chairman Royce for his leadership on the sanctions 
package. The American people have been waiting some time for the 
sanctions package to finally pass.
  This bill dials up our current sanctions on North Korea, Iran, and 
Russia to hold their governments accountable for their destabilizing 
actions.
  The Russia piece in this package is particularly necessary. Russia 
has flagrantly violated international law by invading Ukraine and 
interfering in American and European elections. These sanctions are a 
clear signal that the United States will hold President Putin and his 
close associates accountable for their actions. They are also a 
declaration that Congress can and will act, even when President Trump 
refuses to do so.
  In addition to these sanctions, Congress must continue to investigate 
to determine the scope of Russia's attack on America's democracy and 
establish which Americans, if any, aided in those efforts.
  Again, I thank Ranking Member Engel, Chairman Royce, and everyone in 
this Congress who has supported these sanctions.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hensarling), chairman of the Committee on 
Financial Services.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and 
certainly for his leadership on this very important bill.
  I rise in support of the Russia, Iran, and North Korean Sanctions 
Act.
  Mr. Speaker, I particularly want to highlight the provisions that are 
the product of the hard work of the Financial Services Committee's 
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Illicit Finance. The inclusion of these 
provisions will undoubtedly assist our government's anti-money 
laundering and counterterrorist financing efforts.
  For instance, this bill includes language directing the President, 
acting through the Secretary of the Treasury, to develop and maintain a 
national strategy for combating the financing of terrorism and related 
forms of illicit financing.
  The opportunistic nature of terrorist groups, combined with the 
emergence of financial technology, creates new challenges for our law 
enforcement community and their efforts to disrupt terror finance.
  The national strategy should also seek to enhance partnerships with 
the private sector that prevent and detect illicit financing, and 
increase efforts to facilitate compliance with our anti-money 
laundering and counterterrorist financing laws.
  I would like to commend Congressman Ted Budd for introducing the 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorists, Underground, and Other 
Illicit Financing Act, which is almost entirely incorporated in section 
2 of the underlying legislation.
  I would also like to recognize Congressman Pearce and Congressman 
Pittenger, the chairman and vice chairman of the Terrorism and Illicit 
Finance Subcommittee of our committee, whose leadership on these issues 
has been instrumental to achieve the legislation that is before us 
today.
  Mr. Speaker, we know that Thomas Jefferson once famously said: ``The 
price of liberty is eternal vigilance.'' And that is indeed true.
  Thanks, in no small part, to the hard work of the Subcommittee on 
Terrorism and Illicit Finance, the bill before us today ensures that we 
remain vigilant to address the evolving threats to our financial 
system. I am proud to support it and I encourage all Members to support 
it.
  Again, I thank Chairman Royce for his leadership today on this bill 
and in our committee.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), who was instrumental in putting this bill 
forward, who has been with us every step of the way and so invaluable 
to this finished product, the distinguished Democratic whip.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank Ranking Member Engel for yielding. 
And I thank Mr. Royce for his hard work on this bill.
  I have said this before and I will say it again: Mr. Royce, as 
chairman, and Mr. Engel, as ranking member, are an example for, 
frankly, all of us on how to work together productively in a bipartisan 
fashion to reach a result that is good for our country, for our people, 
and indeed for international security.
  I also want to thank Senators Cardin and Corker for their leadership 
and their involvement.
  This legislation is the product of very careful and sometimes 
difficult negotiations on a bipartisan basis. It is a strong, tough, 
and appropriate response to Russia's attempts to meddle in our election 
process, its support for violent separatists in Ukraine, its illegal 
occupation of Crimea, and, yes, its unhelpful activity in Syria.
  It also imposes new sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile program, 
which threatens the United States, our Gulf allies, and Israel.
  Russia's power comes from its ability to coerce other nations by its 
energy distribution, in many instances. This bill seeks to make it 
harder for Russia to use that type of coercion, and empower other 
nations to join us in standing up against Russian aggression. These 
sanctions will only be successful, however, if they are truly 
bipartisan and if Congress continues to play its important and 
necessary oversight role.
  Democrats and Republicans are coming together on this bill, Mr. 
Speaker, to ensure that the President cannot alter sanctions toward 
Russia without congressional review. This is critical at a moment when 
our allies are uncertain about where this administration stands with 
respect to Russian aggression.
  I remain open to additional sanctions on Russia's energy sector at a 
later date if the Russian leader and his associates fail to heed the 
message of this bill that their business as usual cannot and must not 
continue.
  Once this bill passes the Senate, as I believe it will, Russia will 
know that sanctions levied because of its malevolent acts will be 
lifted only with the concurrence, either tacitly or expressly, of the 
Congress of the United States. There will be no side deals or turning a 
blind eye to its actions.
  This legislation, Mr. Speaker, will also make it clear that Russia's 
interference in Ukraine comes with consequences, and it puts pressure 
on Iran to end its ballistic missile program.
  In addition, it deters, hopefully, North Korea from pursuing its 
dangerous development of nuclear weapons and vehicles to deliver those 
weapons as close as the western part of this country.
  I urge my colleagues to support this legislation and to send it to 
the Senate as quickly as possible.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to recognize the good 
work of the Democratic whip, Mr. Steny Hoyer, and also the Republican 
leader, Kevin McCarthy, on this legislation and to thank them.
  Mr. HOYER. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROYCE of California. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
  Mr. HOYER. Frankly, all four of us--yourself and your leadership, Mr. 
Engel, the majority leader, and I--were privileged to work together in 
a way that, as I said at the beginning,

[[Page 11541]]

was constructive and that, I think, has resulted in a very good 
product.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may 
consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions), the chairman of the 
Rules Committee, for the purpose of a colloquy.

                              {time}  1500

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the chairman for yielding 
me this time, and I rise to applaud him for the hard work and the 
responsible actions that the chairman has taken, not only to ensure 
this piece of legislation is prepared, but bettered and ready to go 
back to the Senate.
  I think we have a forceful sanctions bill that is before the House 
today, and one that targets not only Iran and Russia, but also the 
North Korean regime.
  As you know, the bill that was passed by the Senate risked giving 
Russian energy firms a competitive advantage across the globe by 
inadvertently denying American companies access to neutral third-party 
energy markets where there would simply be a small or de minimis 
Russian presence.
  The bill before us today prevents Russia from being able to weaponize 
these sanctions against U.S. energy firms. I want to thank Chairman 
Royce for his hard work on this issue.
  I also want to ensure that we have an understanding of the definition 
of the word ``controlling'' in section 223(d) of H.R. 3364. For 
purposes of clarification and legislative intent, the term 
``controlling'' means the power to direct, determine, or resolve 
fundamental, operational, and financial decisions of an oil project 
through the ownership of a majority of the voting interests of the oil 
project.
  Mr. Speaker, I would ask the gentleman, the young chairman, if he 
agrees with that definition.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SESSIONS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Yes. Yes, that is my understanding.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I want to thank the gentleman for not only this 
clarification, but making sure that we are most specific in what we are 
undertaking.
  Mr. Speaker, I would also like to note that the Shah Deniz Pipeline 
and the Southern Gas Corridor projects will continue to be able to 
bring gas from the Caspian Sea, which is a huge find, to our European 
allies, reducing their dependency on Russian energy.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. That is my understanding.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman, and I would 
thank him for his time on this colloquy.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I now yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Sherman), one of my senior colleagues on the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, the ranking member of the Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this bill, which is really a 
combination of three bills. First, as to North Korea, it embodies a 
bill passed on this floor in May introduced by Chairman Royce, Ranking 
Member Engel, Mr. Yoho, and myself from the Asia and the Pacific 
Subcommittee. We will expand our sanctions on North Korea's precious 
metals, minerals, jet fuel, coal, and across the board, and especially 
banking sanctions.
  But keep in mind, ultimately, we have got to force China to decide 
whether they are going to support North Korea or whether they are going 
to have access to American markets. We can't let them have both.
  As to Iran, this bill designates the entire Iran Revolutionary Guard 
Corps, as the Quds Force has already been designated, as subject to 
terrorism sanctions, and provides an arms embargo. Let us remember that 
the real face of this regime in Tehran is not their dapper foreign 
minister, but rather it is the hundreds of thousands who have died in 
Syria as a result of Iranian action.
  Speaking of countries that have supported Assad, finally and perhaps 
most importantly, this bill provides sanctions against Russia necessary 
because of its action in the Ukraine and its interference in our 
elections.
  We hit Russia in a very important way by dealing with the technology 
they would need to explore oil. Unfortunately, even under this very 
strong bill, it would take a two-thirds vote for us to block a 
sanctions waiver should our resolution be vetoed.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe), chairman of the Foreign Affairs' 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.
  Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman, and I also thank 
the ranking member for their work on this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I have spoken to our military leaders, and they said 
that the biggest threat to the United States is North Korea. Strategic 
patience is over. It is time for strategic sanctions. This bill will go 
a long way to tighten the screws on little Kim and bring the dictator 
to his knees. We can no longer stand by meekly while North Korea 
terrorizes the world.
  This bill includes my bill that has already passed the House that 
calls on the State Department to reassess if North Korea should be on 
the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. Let us not forget that North 
Korea helped supply Syria with chemical weapons. It has given Iran 
ballistic missiles and advice on how to develop its own nukes.
  North Korea and Iran's evil cooperation is even going on as we speak 
today. They are now working together to develop an intercontinental 
ballistic missile that can reach American shores.
  This bill also puts China in the crosshairs. Chinese banks have 
enabled the Korean regime to avoid sanctions and build its illegal 
weapons programs. China even provided the vehicle used to launch North 
Korea's new ICBM.
  China also uses slave labor from North Korea to help North Korea 
avoid sanctions already in place. China needs to understand how its 
support for Kim will not only endanger the United States and South 
Korea, but it also endangers its own security.
  Mr. Speaker, by targeting these rogue nations, we show we will not go 
away quietly in the darkness of silence.
  And that is just the way it is.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Connolly), one of our senior members on the Foreign 
Affairs Committee.
  Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend, the distinguished 
ranking member, Mr. Engel.
  Mr. Speaker, today, this House comes together on a bipartisan basis 
to address sanctions and the rules on the girding sanctions for North 
Korea, Iran, and, most importantly perhaps, Russia. Importantly, 
because there has been a lot of doubt about whether this Congress would 
ever again speak eloquently and forcefully about Russian behavior.
  Today, we answer that question. Overwhelmingly, we say Russia's 
behavior is unacceptable in many ways, not least of which is the 
incursion of sovereign territory of its neighbors, specifically 
Georgia, Ukraine, including Crimea.
  I vote easily and enthusiastically for the resolution today, but it 
must not be construed, because it references the Minsk agreement, that 
that means that we don't mean to continue sanctions on the Crimean 
invasion. We do.
  Mr. Chabot and I, and I know the chairman and the ranking member of 
our committee, will continue to be vigilant on that until that illegal 
annexation is ended.
  Mr. Speaker, I commend the leadership for bringing this resolution to 
the floor, and I am proud today to be a Member of this body and 
speaking with one voice about Russian behavior and the need for 
sanctioning it.
  Mr. Speaker, this Congress does not trust the President of the United 
States to manage U.S.-Russia relations.
  Case in point--the first major legislative accomplishment of the 
Republican-led Congress in the Trump era will be a sanctions package 
that limits, in every imaginable way, the president's ability to 
appease Putin.
  President Trump and his administration have given the American public 
little reason to trust them on all things Russia.

[[Page 11542]]

  The President obstructed justice by firing FBI Director James Comey, 
the law enforcement officer tasked with investigating illegal collusion 
between the Trump campaign and Russia.
  Attorney General Jeff Sessions potentially perjured himself by 
failing to disclose secret meetings with the Russian Ambassador.
  Donald Trump, Jr. obscured a meeting he had with the Trump campaign's 
chairman, the president's son-in-law, and Russian operatives until the 
New York Times forced his hand and he had to publish emails that 
confirmed his collusion with individuals associated with Russian 
intelligence operations.
  And now the president is attempting to intimidate his own Attorney 
General into prosecuting political opponents and upending the Russia 
investigation.
  Today, we will pass this sanctions package, the strongest ever, and 
send a clear message to President Putin that there are consequences to 
invading peaceful neighbors and attacking American democratic 
institutions.
  I reserve an important objection to the fact that this bill allows a 
waiver of Crimea-related sanctions on the condition that the Minsk 
agreement is being implemented.
  Minsk does not mention Crimea, and therefore its implementation 
should have no bearing on the U.S.-led effort to combat the illegal and 
forcible annexation of Crimea sovereign Ukrainian territory.
  However, I will vote for this bill because it sends a powerful and 
unified message to Russia, Iran, and North Korea at time when the 
foreign policy emanating from the White House is unsteady and confused.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Lance), a member of the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce.
  Mr. LANCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of this 
sanctions bill. The governments of Iran, North Korea, and Russia do not 
share American values or interests and are active threats to our 
national security. These regimes will see a united message from the 
Congress of the United States with an overwhelming vote in favor of 
strong sanctions.
  Iran is the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism. North Korea, 
the most dangerous and isolated place on Earth, has tested long-range 
missiles demonstrating a frightening potential to target our West 
Coast. Russia has intolerably involved itself in our Nation's 
democratic electoral process. Its invasion of Crimea and actions in 
Ukraine are totally unacceptable.
  Mr. Speaker, let us act decisively today and put these states on 
notice: violate international law by threatening the United States and 
thereby face the consequences.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``yes'' vote.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I now yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Maxine Waters), the ranking member of the Financial 
Services Committee.
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank Ranking Member 
Engel for his leadership and for yielding me time. I thank Chairman 
Royce for his leadership and the way that he has worked with our side 
of the aisle.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Russia, Iran, and North Korea 
Sanctions Act, legislation that is desperately needed to prevent this 
administration from rolling back sanctions tied to Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine and interference in our election.
  This bill's enhanced sanctions on Russia are important in light of 
the actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin, not to mention the 
many ties between the Trump administration and the Kremlin.
  In a recent development, the Treasury Department confirmed that 
ExxonMobil violated existing Russian sanctions while under the 
leadership of Rex Tillerson, who is now Donald Trump's Secretary of 
State. Indeed, in 2014, Exxon signed documents related to oil and gas 
projects in Russia with Igor Sechin, president of Rosneft, a Russian 
state-owned oil giant. Sechin was one of the individuals subject to 
sanctions. Exxon was fined a mere $2 million--a slap on the wrist for a 
company that earned $7.8 billion in profits in 2016.
  Russia is continuing its aggression in Ukraine. It is supporting the 
murderous regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. It interfered in the 2016 
U.S. election. That is why we must strengthen the sanctions against 
Russia, and we must block Rex Tillerson and Donald Trump from waiving 
or lifting those sanctions without review.
  Before closing, I would also note that the legislation before us also 
includes several measures championed by Democrats on the Financial 
Services Committee. These provisions will focus the government on 
creating a national strategy to combat the financing of terrorism, 
enhance Treasury's tools for combating money laundering vulnerabilities 
such as the well-known risk in high-end real estate, and help address 
the de-risking trend that is driving fund transfers into the shadows.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Budd), a member of the Committee on 
Financial Services.
  Mr. BUDD. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 3364. 
In particular, I am proud of the bipartisan language in the bill which 
would create a national strategy for combating terrorism and illicit 
finance. The financing of terrorism and related forms of illicit 
finance present a direct threat to our national security and financial 
system.
  It is critical for the government to create and maintain a unified 
strategy to fight financial crime, both to accommodate new and 
developing threats and to help Congress develop legislative and funding 
priorities now and in the future.
  Additionally, a national strategy should seek to enhance 
intergovernmental cooperation, to identify illicit financing trends, 
and to encourage Federal agencies to work with the private financial 
sector to do the same.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill does these things and will go a long way in 
making sure we are keeping pace with the ever-changing terror finance 
landscape.
  I would like to thank Chairman Hensarling for his extraordinary 
conservative leadership on the Financial Services Committee and for 
helping to include this language in the overall bill.
  Additionally, I want to thank the chairman of the Terrorism and 
Illicit Finance Subcommittee, Mr. Pearce, and for his support, and for 
my colleague, Ms. Sinema, for her work on this as well.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Arizona (Ms. Sinema), my friend on the Financial Services Committee.
  Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3364. The 
authoritarian regimes in Iran, Russia, and North Korea continue to 
undermine global peace and security and threaten the safety of the 
United States and our allies.
  Russia's coordinated efforts to undermine democracies and free and 
fair elections around the world is particularly troubling and demand a 
strong response.
  I thank Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel for their bipartisan 
legislation that counters these belligerent regimes and ensures strong 
oversight by Congress and the American people.
  The safety and security of our communities and our country must come 
before partisanship.
  I also thank the chair and ranking member for introducing our 
bipartisan legislation introduced with Congressman Budd to establish a 
whole-of-government strategy to combat the financing of terrorism.
  Current U.S. efforts to counter the financing of terrorism lack 
sufficient coordination, and the U.S. has no unified national strategy 
to guide our counterfinancing efforts. Money is the lifeblood of any 
organization. We must establish a comprehensive and effective strategy 
to deny money to terrorists. This strategy will enhance detection, 
deterrence, and prosecution and ultimately strengthen our broader 
national security goals.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the chair and ranking member for advancing this 
important bipartisan national security bill, and I urge my colleagues 
to vote ``yes.''
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my 
time.

                              {time}  1515

  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio

[[Page 11543]]

(Mr. Ryan), my friend on the Appropriations Committee.
  Mr. RYAN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the chairman and the 
ranking member for their leadership on this.
  This clearly is a big issue pressing the country, and I just wanted 
to rise in support of what is happening here today; of taking a firmer 
stance on Russia, Iran, and North Korea; trying to stabilize the 
peninsula; trying to take care of the funding that is coming out of 
Iran to all of these terrorist groups across the country and across the 
world.
  What is happening with these sanctions here in the targeting of 
Russian gas pipelines--their number one export--I think is entirely 
appropriate. The Nord Stream 2, which carries gas from Russia through 
the Baltics to Germany--and I know Germany isn't happy about it, but 
this is something that we have to do.
  The point I want to make is that we have to address this issue in a 
comprehensive way. We must continue to focus on how we get our gas here 
in the United States, our natural gas to Europe, to our allies, so they 
are not so dependent on Russia. We have got to have the sanctions, but 
we also have got to be shipping liquid natural gas to some of these 
allies of ours so they are not so dependent on the Russians, which is 
part and parcel of this entire approach.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 1 minute to 
the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky), a respected member of 
the Energy and Commerce Committee.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I rise in support of today's sanction legislation, which I am so 
happy to find has complied with the Iran nuclear agreement, something I 
worked very hard on, as did many here.
  Experts, the international community, and even some of President 
Trump's own advisers agree that the Iran nuclear agreement is working. 
In June, the International Atomic Energy Agency certified that Iran is 
within the limits set by this historic deal. There are serious issues 
left to be addressed with Iran, especially in regards to human rights 
violations and ballistic missiles, which this bill covers.
  The Iran deal took Iran's nuclear weapons off the table and allowed 
us to deal with these remaining challenges. Withdrawing or violating 
the agreement would be an enormous mistake. This bill upholds our 
agreement with Iran while also holding Russia and North Korea 
accountable for their actions.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North 
Carolina (Mr. Price).
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise to stress two 
critical aspects of this legislation.
  First, it would impose tough sanctions on Russia for its serious 
international violations, the seizure of Crimea, its violent incursion 
into Ukraine, its cyber interference in the 2016 U.S. election. Perhaps 
most importantly, in the present context, it would prevent President 
Trump from removing or softening existing sanctions without 
congressional approval.
  Second, the bill addresses Iran's unacceptable behavior in the non-
nuclear realm, such as ballistic missile development, human rights 
violations, financing of terrorism, without violating the nuclear deal 
with Iran.
  The JCPOA celebrated its second anniversary 2 weeks ago. It has given 
the international community 24/7 access to Iran's nuclear sites, 
provided an enforcement mechanism to ensure that Iran's nuclear-related 
activity is solely peaceful, and elongated Iran's breakout time to over 
a year. It has made the world a safer place.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from North Carolina.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, as the United States 
continues to monitor the JCPOA and Iran's behavior, it is important 
that Congress continue to refrain from actions that would violate the 
deal, threaten the deal, or impose careless sanctions that--under the 
guise of being tough on Iran--would make the United States less safe.
  This legislation meets that test, and I urge its adoption.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  On Vladimir Putin's orders, Russia attacked American democracy last 
year. That makes Russia a threat to this country, just like Iran, just 
like North Korea.
  When the United States faces a real threat, we have an obligation to 
respond. So far, a response to Russia has fallen far short. That ends 
with this legislation.
  Along with Pyongyang and Tehran, Moscow needs to understand that if 
you violate international law, you threaten the security of the United 
States and our allies, there will be consequences.
  Now, I wish we were going to pass this incentive to the President's 
desk today. So after we vote today, leaders in both houses have an 
obligation to clear away any remaining issues and get this bill signed 
into law as soon as possible.
  So long as Russia remains a threat, so long as Iran and North Korea 
defy global norms with their destructive agendas, none of us are off 
the hook.
  I want to also thank the Democratic leader, Ms. Pelosi, for her 
advice and counsel on this bill. Let's pass this bill and keep pressing 
this bill forward.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, in closing, I would like to again thank my colleagues; 
the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Engel; our 
counterparts, Senators Corker and Cardin; the majority leader, Mr. 
McCarthy; the minority whip, Mr. Hoyer; as well as the leadership on 
both sides of the aisle in the other body. They deserve credit for 
their efforts.
  Let me also say it is critically important that we stand shoulder to 
shoulder with our European allies encountering Russian aggression. That 
is why, in the bipartisan House-Senate negotiations, we secured 
important changes to improve transatlantic cooperation. So I am 
confident that, under the text of this House bill that we will pass 
today, these concerns have been addressed.
  Let me also say that every time North Korea tests a ballistic missile 
or a nuclear device, it gets closer to having the ability to strike the 
U.S. mainland with a nuclear weapon.
  For years, the policies of successive administrations have failed to 
get North Korea to change.
  Why?
  Because diplomatic pressure has been applied only in spurts. It has 
been lifted prematurely for North Korean promises that have never 
materialized.
  So we need leverage, and leverage comes from real sustained pressure. 
That is why I have authored tough new sanctions to crack down on the 
regime, to shut off the regime's access to the hard currency it needs 
to fund its nuclear program, and we have included that in this bill.
  These sanctions passed in this House in May by a vote of 419-1, and 
it is time for the other body to pick them up. By including these North 
Korean sanctions in the legislation, we ensure that our colleagues do 
so.
  We cannot afford any more delay, and that is why I worked with the 
other body to make small changes to the North Korean sanctions in this 
bill, to ensure swift passage in both Houses. I am confident this bill, 
including the North Korean sanctions bill, will soon become law.
  Let me say that congressional engagement in foreign affairs is 
strongest when we all speak with one voice. I urge my colleagues to 
vote in favor of the bill and join us in sending a clear message to 
Vladimir Putin, to Kim Jong-un, and to the radical regime in

[[Page 11544]]

Tehran that efforts to threaten the United States and to destabilize 
our allies will be met with a united American response.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3364 or 
the bill entitled ``Russia, Iran, and North Korea Sanctions Act.''
  As a senior member of the Committee on Homeland Security and its 
Subcommittees on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, and Cybersecurity, 
Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, I am reminded 
daily that there are actors and nation-states that threaten the 
security of our nation.
  Within the past year, the United States has experienced a series of 
aggressions that threaten not only our nation's security, but also the 
very democratic principles that are the foundation upon which our 
country was built.
  These hostile acts have been orchestrated and perpetrated by our 
long-time adversaries--Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
  Within that short time span, their actions have been so egregious 
that it is inexcusable that this administration has failed to respond 
to these acts of aggression with strength and resolve.
  Mr. Speaker, U.S. intelligence agencies have confirmed that Russian 
hackers launched cyberattacks during one of the most sacred processes 
in our republic--the U.S. presidential election.
  Specifically, we know that Russia was behind the cyber theft of DNC 
documents and that Russian hackers intentionally targeted 21 U.S. state 
election systems during the 2016 presidential campaign.
  This administration refused to acknowledge Russia's tampering in last 
year's election until it became impossible to deny what everyone knows 
to be true.
  Further, Iran's support of groups who actively operate against U.S. 
interests is disturbing even in the face of the implementation of the 
JCPOA in January 2016.
  North Korea is growing increasingly belligerent, launching 17 
missiles since the beginning of this year as it attempts to improve its 
missile capabilities with each launch.
  Although North Korea has launched missiles in the past, never have 
they occurred in such a rapid, unpredictable succession.
  In a show of bipartisanship, our counterparts in the Senate led the 
charge in adopting legislation that would stop Russia, Iran, and North 
Korea from operating with such impunity.
  On June 15, 2017, the Senate passed an amended version of S. 722, the 
``Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017'' that not 
only penalizes Iran but also punishes Russia for its interference in 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
  The fact that that legislation was passed 98-2 demonstrated 
congressional willingness to set clear boundaries for what is and is 
not acceptable behavior especially for our adversaries.
  The House must act just as decisively by passing H.R. 3364.
  H.R. 3364 will work to avert and penalize any threat posed by 
adversaries in several ways.
  One of the most important provisions of this act is that it will 
prevent the Trump Administration from repealing existing Obama-era 
Russian sanctions tied to Ukraine and election interference.
  H.R. 3364 will also impose new sanctions on Russia while 
strengthening other sanctions.
  Furthermore, it will require congressional oversight for altering 
sanctions related to Russia.
  With respect to Iran, H.R. 3364 will mandate new sanctions on those 
who support the development of Iran's ballistic missile program.
  H.R. 3364 requires the imposition of sanctions on Iran for human 
rights violations as well as sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps.
  Finally, H.R. 3364 clamps down on North Korea by updating and 
expanding sanctions in direct response to its repeated aggression.
  In addition, H.R. 3364 also makes it more difficult for North Korea 
to secure the funding for its illegal weapon program.
  Mr. Speaker, it is time that this body acts to show that the United 
States will not tolerate and will respond to threats to our homeland, 
our national security.
  That is why I urge all Members to join me in voting for H.R. 3364.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, today I voted for H.R. 3364, the 
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Roll No. 413). 
This legislation is an important step forward in punishing Russia for 
its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and for the country's alleged 
interference in the 2016 United States presidential election.
  The bill also updates and expands sanctions on North Korea at a time 
when the country continues to pursue dangerous weapons programs.
  Further, I commend leadership and committee members in the House and 
Senate for ensuring that the Iran sanctions portion of this legislation 
does not violate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached 
between Iran, the United States, and five major world powers, including 
Russia and China. While the Iranian ballistic missile program is deeply 
concerning and must be addressed, undermining the nuclear agreement, 
which has forced Iran to remove thousands of centrifuges from service 
and halt all uranium enrichment, would be a mistake of tragic 
proportions.
  The bipartisan support for the bill should be a signal to the 
administration to refrain from taking action that would encourage Iran 
to change course.
  To be sure, Iran has some unsavory hardline people in key positions 
of leadership, but these hardliners just suffered a major defeat in the 
Iranian elections. President Hassan Rouhani has been a voice of and a 
force for moderation--and people voted for him.
  We must proceed with the utmost caution and develop a thoughtful 
approach to ensure we continue to keep Iran away from the nuclear 
threshold, while also countering the regime's nefarious activities.
  Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3364--but with 
reservations.
  I strongly support the section of this bill that provides a role for 
the Congress before any president may waive sanctions or provide relief 
from sanctions against Russia. Russia sought to undermine America's 
2016 election. It attempted to subvert our democracy. It did so 
deliberately, methodically, and ruthlessly, spreading lies and 
misinformation and exploiting weaknesses in computer systems and 
records to steal private information and release it in sensationalistic 
fashion.
  These attacks against our democracy were and are totally unacceptable 
and must be condemned. I remain bewildered that the current president 
of the United States still fails to acknowledge that these actions 
happened and that the Russian government, at the very highest level, is 
responsible--even though there is a consensus among all U.S. domestic 
and international intelligence and law enforcement agencies that this 
is the case.
  Sanctions imposed by the Obama Administration in response to this 
multifaceted operation were lifted by President Trump. This legislation 
rectifies that situation by re-imposing those sanctions and ensuring 
that they cannot be removed without congressional consultation and 
consent.
  In addition, Russia continues to threaten its neighbors, especially 
Ukraine, for which economic and military sanctions are now in place.
  But I am somewhat reluctant in my support for this legislation 
because of the provisions included on Iran. Like all my colleagues, I 
am worried about Iran's continued testing and development of ballistic 
missile technology. It is threatening and provocative to Iran's 
neighbors and the region. I also oppose Iran's support for regional 
militant and terrorist organizations, and for choosing to side with the 
brutal regime of Bashir al-Assad in the Syrian conflict, as did Russia.
  I do support, however, Iran's continuing compliance with the terms of 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)--or the Iran nuclear 
deal. I worry that the sanctions against Iran included in this bill 
will be used and manipulated to undermine the JCPOA. I am worried that 
we now have a president and an Administration actively seeking to 
abrogate this international nuclear agreement. And I strongly oppose 
any action that would violate, let alone abandon, the JCPOA.
  The Trump Administration--and the White House in particular--seem 
hell-bent on putting us on a path that leads to yet another costly war 
in the Middle East and to a nuclear-armed Iran. This would be a 
calamity of the greatest order, one that would place our friends and 
allies in the region in even greater danger than what they now face. We 
must not go there.
  While I will vote in favor of H.R. 3364, I do so with grave 
misgivings about how President Trump will seek to exploit the sanctions 
against Iran provided in this bill to violate U.S. obligations under 
the JCPOA, which will, in turn, give permission to Iran to develop a 
nuclear weapon, and bring us all to the brink of war in the Middle 
East.
  Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 
3364.
  I rise in support of the Countering America's Adversaries through 
Sanctions Act, to strengthen sanctions against Russia, North Korea, and 
Iran. These sanctions have been a long time coming.
  Russian aggression towards the United States and our allies is at a 
level not seen

[[Page 11545]]

since the Cold War. Although you wouldn't know it from the conduct of 
our president, Russia is unparalleled in its willingness to use illicit 
``active measures'' to try to weaken the rules-based international 
order that has benefited the world for decades. Although the techniques 
in many ways aren't new--we saw similar tactics during the Cold War--
the power of social media and the Internet have only amplified Russia's 
capabilities.
  It's thought that Russia has been behind the hacking of the attempted 
hacking of campaigns, infrastructure systems, and government entities 
in many of our European allies, including Denmark, France, Georgia, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Ukraine, and Estonia. In Ukraine, Russia is 
thought to be behind a power blackout in 2015.
  Many of Russia's attempts have failed, but in Russia's influence 
campaign in the 2016 presidential election, it was partially 
successful. Russia and its government-backed hackers have undermined 
the integrity of our democratic processes and our system of 
representative government, the foundation of our country, since its 
inception. It may not have succeeded in changing the outcome of the 
election, but it has accomplished one of its goals, to sow discord and 
mistrust in an already-divided country. We must not let it accomplish 
its other aims.
  President Trump has often seemed more admiring of Vladimir Putin and 
Russian officials than he has of his own country. In many cases, he's 
been friendlier to the Russian government than to his own advisors. As 
president, astonishingly, he's talked about a joint cyber-security task 
force with our biggest cyber adversary.
  This bill is a crucial step in ensuring that we make clear to Russia 
that we will not accept the meddling of foreign governments in our 
democratic processes or the endangerment or intimidation of our allies 
and our people. We must make sure that Russia is not emboldened by our 
president's apparent determination to improve relations with Russia at 
any cost, and that it does not continue to endanger our democracy, our 
infrastructure, or our allies.
  Make no mistake--Russia poses a huge threat to the United States. If 
the U.S. government fails to respond, Ukraine's power blackout should 
serve as a warning of what is to come, to ignore at our peril. Russia's 
appetite for cyber and information warfare and its willingness to 
employ criminals and malicious hackers forsworn by other countries make 
it especially dangerous. We must protect our people and our 
infrastructure, and this bill makes sure that Congress has the ability 
to do that.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 3364.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and 
nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

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