[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 163 (2017), Part 8]
[House]
[Pages 11449-11458]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018

  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill 
(H.R. 3180) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2018 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 3180

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central 
              Intelligence Agency.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 303. Congressional oversight of intelligence community 
              contractors.
Sec. 304. Enhanced personnel security programs.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of 
              the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing 
              environment.
Sec. 403. Technical correction to the executive schedule.

                       Subtitle B--Other Elements

Sec. 411. Requirements relating to appointment of General Counsel of 
              National Security Agency.
Sec. 412. Transfer or elimination of certain components and functions 
              of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 413. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.

             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Sec. 501. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns 
              directed at foreign elections and referenda.
Sec. 502. Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to 
              Federal election campaigns.
Sec. 503. Assessment of threat finance relating to the Russian 
              Federation.

                  TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 601. Period of overseas assignments for certain foreign service 
              officers.
Sec. 602. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized public 
              disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 603. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
Sec. 604. Report on expansion of Security Protective Services 
              jurisdiction.
Sec. 605. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with 
              respect to certain foreign investments.
Sec. 606. Report on Cyber Exchange Program.
Sec. 607. Review of intelligence community participation in 
              vulnerabilities equities process.
Sec. 608. Review of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 609. Sense of Congress on notifications of certain disclosures of 
              classified information.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2018 for the conduct of

[[Page 11450]]

     the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
     following elements of the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to 
     be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 
     103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 
     2018, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the 
     elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 
     101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--
       (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made 
     available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, and to the President.
       (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, 
     within the executive branch.
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
     disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
     portion of such Schedule except--
       (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
     Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
     3306(a));
       (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
       (C) as otherwise required by law.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel 
     in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2018 by 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines that such action is necessary to the performance 
     of important intelligence functions, except that the number 
     of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized 
     under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such 
     element.
       (b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, 
     for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment 
     under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), 
     including any exemption from such personnel levels, of 
     employment or assignment in--
       (1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
       (2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
       (3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.
       (c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The 
     Director of National Intelligence shall notify the 
     congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 
     days prior to each exercise of an authority described in 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2018 the sum of $526,900,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2019.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 804 positions as of 
     September 30, 2018. Personnel serving in such elements may be 
     permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the 
     United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account for fiscal year 2018 such additional 
     amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional 
     amounts made available for advanced research and development 
     shall remain available until September 30, 2019.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2018, there are authorized such additional personnel for the 
     Community Management Account as of that date as are specified 
     in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2018 the sum of $514,000,000.

     SEC. 202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Computation of Annuities.--
       (1) In general.--Section 221 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period at the 
     end and inserting ``, as determined by using the annual rate 
     of basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in 
     that position.'';
       (B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking ``12-month'' 
     and inserting ``2-year'';
       (C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ``one year'' and 
     inserting ``two years'';
       (D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking ``one year'' both 
     places it appears and inserting ``two years'';
       (E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), and 
     (l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), respectively; 
     and
       (F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
       ``(h) Conditional Election of Insurable Interest Survivor 
     Annuity by Participants Married at the Time of Retirement.--
       ``(1)  Authority to make designation.--Subject to the 
     rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and section 
     222, at the time of retirement a married participant found by 
     the Director to be in good health may elect to receive an 
     annuity reduced in accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and 
     designate in writing an individual having an insurable 
     interest in the participant to receive an annuity under the 
     system after the participant's death, except that any such 
     election to provide an insurable interest survivor annuity to 
     the participant's spouse shall only be effective if the 
     participant's spouse waives the spousal right to a survivor 
     annuity under this Act. The amount of the annuity shall be 
     equal to 55 percent of the participant's reduced annuity.
       ``(2) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The annuity 
     payable to the participant making such election shall be 
     reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection 
     (a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the 
     designated individual is younger than the participant. The 
     total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40 
     percent.
       ``(3) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The annuity 
     payable to the designated individual shall begin on the day 
     after the retired participant dies and terminate on the last 
     day of the month before the designated individual dies.
       ``(4) Recomputation of participant's annuity on death of 
     designated individual.--An annuity which is reduced under 
     this subsection shall, effective the first day of the month 
     following the death of the designated individual, be 
     recomputed and paid as if the annuity had not been so 
     reduced.''.
       (2) Conforming amendments.--
       (A) Central intelligence agency retirement act.--The 
     Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 et 
     seq.) is amended--
       (i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(1)), by 
     striking ``221(h),'' and inserting ``221(i),''; and
       (ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2082(h)(4)), by 
     striking ``221(k)'' and inserting ``221(l)''.
       (B) Central intelligence agency act of 1949.--Subsection 
     (a) of section 14 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is amended by striking ``221(h)(2), 
     221(i), 221(l),'' and inserting ``221(i)(2), 221(j), 
     221(m),''.
       (b) Annuities for Former Spouses.--Subparagraph (B) of 
     section 222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by 
     striking ``one year'' and inserting ``two years''.
       (c) Prior Service Credit.--Subparagraph (A) of section 
     252(b)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking ``October 1, 
     1990'' both places that term appears and inserting ``March 
     31, 1991''.
       (d) Reemployment Compensation.--Section 273 of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is 
     amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections 
     (c) and (d), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

[[Page 11451]]

       ``(b) Part-time Reemployed Annuitants.--The Director shall 
     have the authority to reemploy an annuitant in a part-time 
     basis in accordance with section 8344(l) of title 5, United 
     States Code.''.
       (e) Effective Date and Application.--The amendments made by 
     subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as 
     if enacted on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to 
     computations or participants, respectively, as of such date.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

     SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 303. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   CONTRACTORS.

       (a) Oversight by Congress.--
       (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 506J the following new section:

     ``SEC. 506K. OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.

       ``Notwithstanding the terms of any contract awarded by the 
     head of an element of the intelligence community, the head 
     may not--
       ``(1) prohibit a contractor of such element from contacting 
     or meeting with either of the congressional intelligence 
     committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to 
     discuss matters relating to a contract;
       ``(2) take any adverse action against a contractor of such 
     element, including by suspending or debarring the contractor 
     or terminating a contract, based on the contractor contacting 
     or meeting with either of the congressional intelligence 
     committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to 
     discuss matters relating to a contract; or
       ``(3) require the approval of the head before a contractor 
     of such element contacts or meets with either of the 
     congressional intelligence committees (including a member or 
     an employee thereof) to discuss matters relating to a 
     contract.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 506J the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 506K. Oversight of intelligence community contractors.''.
       (b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a)(1) 
     shall apply with respect to a contract awarded by the head of 
     an element of the intelligence community on or after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 304. ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS.

       Section 11001(d) of title 5, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Audit'' and 
     inserting ``Review'';
       (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``audit'' and inserting 
     ``review''; and
       (3) in paragraph (2), by striking ``audit'' and inserting 
     ``review''.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     SEC. 401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER 
                   EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking ``such 
     personnel of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may 
     designate;'' and inserting ``current and former personnel of 
     the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their 
     immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence 
     may designate;''.

     SEC. 402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER-INFORMATION 
                   SHARING ENVIRONMENT.

       (a) Information Sharing Environment.--Section 1016(b) of 
     the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
     (6 U.S.C. 485(b)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``President'' and 
     inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``President'' both places 
     that term appears and inserting ``Director of National 
     Intelligence''.
       (b) Program Manager.--Section 1016(f) of the Intelligence 
     Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(f)) 
     is amended by striking ``The individual designated as the 
     program manager shall serve as program manager until removed 
     from service or replaced by the President (at the President's 
     sole discretion).'' and inserting ``Beginning on the date of 
     the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2018, each individual designated as the program 
     manager shall be appointed by the Director of National 
     Intelligence.''.

     SEC. 403. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

       Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``Director of the National Counterintelligence and 
     Security.''.

                       Subtitle B--Other Elements

     SEC. 411. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL 
                   COUNSEL OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

       (a) In General.--Section 2 of the National Security Agency 
     Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50 U.S.C. 3602) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(c)(1) There is a General Counsel of the National 
     Security Agency.
       ``(2) The General Counsel of the National Security Agency 
     shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
     and consent of the Senate.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--Subsection (c) of section 2 of the 
     National Security Agency Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50 
     U.S.C. 3602) shall apply with respect to any person who is 
     appointed to serve as General Counsel of the National 
     Security Agency on or after January 21, 2021.

     SEC. 412. TRANSFER OR ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN COMPONENTS AND 
                   FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Information Review Task Force.--
       (1) Transfer required.--Effective on the date that is 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is 
     transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all 
     functions performed by the Information Review Task Force and 
     all assigned responsibilities performed by the Information 
     Review Task Force. Upon such transfer, such Task Force shall 
     be designated as a chairman's controlled activity.
       (2) Transition plan.--
       (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff shall jointly brief the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required 
     under paragraph (1).
       (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees a formal plan for the transfer required under 
     paragraph (1).
       (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any 
     funds authorized to be appropriated for the Information 
     Review Task Force for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 
     180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any 
     such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date 
     shall be transferred to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff.
       (b) Identity Intelligence Project Office.--
       (1) Elimination.--Effective on the date that is 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     the Defense Intelligence Agency shall eliminate the Identity 
     Intelligence Project Office, including all functions and 
     assigned responsibilities performed by the Identity 
     Intelligence Project Office. All personnel and assets 
     pertaining to such Office shall be transferred to other 
     elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by 
     the Director.
       (2) Transition plan.--
       (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees on the plan to carry out the elimination required 
     under paragraph (1).
       (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees a formal plan for the elimination required under 
     paragraph (1).
       (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any 
     funds authorized to be appropriated for the Identity 
     Intelligence Project Office for fiscal year 2018 after the 
     date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of 
     such date shall be transferred to other elements of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.
       (c) Watchlisting Branch.--
       (1) Transfer required.--Effective on the date that is 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is 
     transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency to the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff 
     all functions and all assigned

[[Page 11452]]

     responsibilities performed by the Watchlisting Branch.
       (2) Transition plan.--
       (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director for Intelligence 
     of the Joint Staff shall jointly brief the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required 
     under paragraph (1).
       (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director for Intelligence 
     of the Joint Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees a formal plan for the transfer required under 
     paragraph (1).
       (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any 
     funds authorized to be appropriated for the Watchlisting 
     Branch for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds 
     that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be 
     transferred to the Director for Intelligence of the Joint 
     Staff.
       (d) Counter-Threat Finance.--
       (1) Elimination.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency shall eliminate the Counter-Threat 
     Finance analysis function of the Defense Intelligence Agency. 
     All personnel and assets pertaining to such function shall be 
     transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency, as determined by the Director.
       (2) Transition plan.--
       (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees on the plan to eliminate the Counter-Threat 
     Finance analysis function under paragraph (1).
       (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees a formal plan to eliminate such function under 
     paragraph (1).
       (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any 
     funds authorized to be appropriated for the Counter-Threat 
     Finance analysis function for fiscal year 2018 after the date 
     that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
     Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such 
     date shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.
       (e) National Intelligence University.--
       (1) Transfer required.--Effective on October 1, 2020, there 
     is transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency to the Director of National Intelligence all functions 
     and all assigned responsibilities performed by the National 
     Intelligence University.
       (2) Transition plan.--
       (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than October 1, 
     2018, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall jointly brief the 
     congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 
     defense committees on the plan to carry out the transfer 
     required under paragraph (1).
       (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than April 1, 
     2019, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall jointly submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 
     defense committees a formal plan for the transfer required 
     under paragraph (1).
       (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any 
     funds authorized to be appropriated for the National 
     Intelligence University after October 1, 2020. Any such funds 
     that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be 
     transferred to the Director of National Intelligence.
       (f) Congressional Notice for Reprogramming.--Not later than 
     30 days before transferring any funds relating to 
     transferring or eliminating any function under this section, 
     the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
     congressional defense committees notice in writing of such 
     transfer.
       (g) Treatment of Certain Functions and Responsibilities.--
       (1) In general.--In the case of any function or executive 
     agent responsibility that is transferred to the Director of 
     National Intelligence pursuant to this section, the Director 
     of National Intelligence may not delegate such function or 
     responsibility to another element of the intelligence 
     community.
       (2) Executive agent responsibility.--In this subsection, 
     the term ``executive agent responsibility'' means the 
     specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities 
     assigned by the Director of National Intelligence to the head 
     of an intelligence community element to provide defined 
     levels of support for intelligence operations, or 
     administrative or other designated activities.
       (h) Deadline for Policy Updates.--Not later than October 1, 
     2020, the Director of National Intelligence, the Under 
     Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Chairman of 
     the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall ensure that all relevant 
     policies of the intelligence community and Department of 
     Defense are updated to reflect the transfers required to be 
     made pursuant to this section.
       (i) Treatment of Transferred Functions.--No transferred 
     functions or assigned responsibility referred to in 
     subsection (a), (c), or (e) shall be considered a new start 
     by the receiving element, including in the case of any lapse 
     of appropriation for such transferred function or assigned 
     responsibility.
       (j) Reports on Other Elements of Defense Intelligence 
     Agency.--
       (1) National center for credibility assessment.--
       (A) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (i) the assignment of executive agency for the National 
     Center for Credibility Assessment to the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency may be limiting the ability of 
     the Center to effectively serve the Federal customer base of 
     the Center;
       (ii) the failure of the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in the role of the Director as security executive for the 
     Federal Government, to define in policy the term ``Executive 
     Agent'' may be further limiting the ability of the Center to 
     receive sufficient resources to carry out the critical 
     Federal mission of the Center; and
       (iii) the evolution of the Center from an organization of 
     the Army to an organization serving 27 departments and 
     agencies and responsible for all Federal credibility 
     assessment training, oversight, and research and development, 
     has resulted in a convoluted oversight structure based on 
     legacy reporting requirements.
       (B) Report.--Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director 
     of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
     congressional defense committees a report on--
       (i) the current and projected missions and functions of the 
     National Center for Credibility Assessment;
       (ii) the effectiveness of the current organizational 
     assignment of the Center to the Director of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency;
       (iii) the effectiveness of the current oversight structure 
     between the Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
     Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director 
     of National Intelligence; and
       (iv) the resources and authorities necessary to most 
     effectively execute the missions and functions of the Center.
       (2) Underground facilities analysis center.--
       (A) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (i) the assignment of executive agency for the Underground 
     Facilities Analysis Center to the Director of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency may be limiting the ability of the Center 
     to effectively serve the broader intelligence community 
     customer base of the Center;
       (ii) the failure of the Director of National Intelligence 
     to define in policy the term ``Executive Agent'' may be 
     further limiting the ability of the Center to receive 
     sufficient resources to carry out the critical mission of the 
     Center; and
       (iii) the requirements of the intelligence community and 
     Department of Defense with respect to underground facilities 
     are not adequately being met given the scale and complexity 
     of the problem set and the relatively small amount of funding 
     currently received by the Center.
       (B) Report.--Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director 
     of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
     shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees and the congressional defense committees a report 
     on--
       (i) the missions and functions of the Underground 
     Facilities Analysis Center;
       (ii) the state of the requirements of the intelligence 
     community and Department of Defense with respect to 
     underground facilities and the ability of the Center to meet 
     such requirements;
       (iii) the effectiveness of the current organizational 
     assignment of the Center to the Director of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency;
       (iv) the effectiveness of the current oversight structure 
     between the Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
     Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National 
     Intelligence; and
       (v) the resources and authorities necessary to most 
     effectively execute the missions and functions of the Center.
       (k) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``congressional defense committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and 
     House of Representatives; and
       (2) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and 
     House of Representatives.

[[Page 11453]]



     SEC. 413. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                   ENERGY.

       (a) Atomic Energy Defense Act.--Section 4524(b)(2) of the 
     Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended 
     by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``The Director of''.
       (b) National Security Act of 1947.--Paragraph (2) of 
     section 106(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ``and 
     Counterintelligence'' after ``Office of Intelligence'';
       (2) by striking subparagraph (F);
       (3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as 
     subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively; and
       (4) in subparagraph (H), as redesignated by paragraph (3), 
     by realigning the margin of such subparagraph two ems to the 
     left.

             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

     SEC. 501. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE 
                   CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND 
                   REFERENDA.

       (a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report containing an analytical assessment of 
     the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any, 
     conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant 
     current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any. 
     Such assessment shall include--
       (1) a summary of such significant Russian influence 
     campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by 
     which such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or 
     likely will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific 
     goal of each such campaign;
       (2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such 
     Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the 
     elections or referenda;
       (3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the 
     intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of 
     assisting the government of such foreign state in defending 
     against or responding to such Russian influence campaigns; 
     and
       (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and 
     responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).
       (b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) may be 
     submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall 
     contain an unclassified summary.
       (c) Russian Influence Campaign Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``Russian influence campaign'' means any effort, 
     covert or overt, and by any means, attributable to the 
     Russian Federation directed at an election, referendum, or 
     similar process in a country other than the Russian 
     Federation or the United States.

     SEC. 502. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND CYBERSECURITY 
                   THREATS TO FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.

       (a) Reports Required.--
       (1) In general.--As provided in paragraph (2), for each 
     Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
     for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an 
     internet website an advisory report on foreign 
     counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election 
     campaigns for Federal offices. Each such report shall 
     include, consistent with the protection of sources and 
     methods, each of the following:
       (A) A description of foreign counterintelligence and 
     cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal 
     offices.
       (B) A summary of best practices that election campaigns for 
     Federal offices can employ in seeking to counter such 
     threats.
       (C) An identification of any publicly available resources, 
     including United States Government resources, for countering 
     such threats.
       (2) Schedule for submittal.--A report under this subsection 
     shall be made available as follows:
       (A) In the case of a report regarding an election held for 
     the office of Senator or Member of the House of 
     Representatives during 2018, not later than the date that is 
     60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (B) In the case of a report regarding an election for a 
     Federal office during any subsequent year, not later than the 
     date that is one year before the date of the election.
       (3) Information to be included.--A report under this 
     subsection shall reflect the most current information 
     available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding 
     foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.
       (b) Treatment of Campaigns Subject to Heightened Threats.--
     If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
     the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and 
     Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for 
     Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign 
     counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and 
     the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of 
     sources and methods, may make available additional 
     information to the appropriate representatives of such 
     campaign.

     SEC. 503. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO THE 
                   RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
     acting through the National Intelligence Manager for Threat 
     Finance, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report containing an assessment of the financing 
     of threat activity by the Russian Federation.
       (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) 
     shall include, at a minimum, the following:
       (1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period 
     prior to the date of the report of any threat finance 
     activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at the behest 
     of officials of the Government of Russia, persons subject to 
     sanctions under any provision of law imposing sanctions with 
     respect to Russia, or Russian nationals subject to sanctions 
     under any other provision of law.
       (2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in 
     threat finance activities relating to Russia, including 
     common methods of conducting such activities.
       (3) A summary of engagement and coordination with 
     international partners on threat finance relating to Russia, 
     especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement 
     and coordination.
       (4) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.
       (c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) may be 
     submitted in classified form.
       (d) Threat Finance Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``threat finance'' means--
       (1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence 
     campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation, 
     terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;
       (2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move, 
     raise, or conceal money or value on behalf of threat actors;
       (3) sanctions evasion; or
       (4) other forms of threat financing domestically or 
     internationally, as defined by the President.

                  TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 601. PERIOD OF OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS FOR CERTAIN FOREIGN 
                   SERVICE OFFICERS.

       (a) Length of Period of Assignment.--Subsection (a) of 
     section 502 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 
     3982) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(3) In making assignments under paragraph (1), and in 
     accordance with section 903, and, if applicable, section 503, 
     the Secretary shall assure that a member of the Service may 
     serve at a post for a period of not more than six consecutive 
     years.''.
       (b) Foreign Language Deployment Requirements.--Section 702 
     of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4022) is 
     amended by--
       (1) redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(c) Foreign Language Deployment Requirements.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, with the 
     assistance of other relevant officials, shall require all 
     members of the Service who receive foreign language training 
     in Arabic, Farsi, Chinese (Mandarin or Cantonese), Turkish, 
     Korean, and Japanese by the institution or otherwise in 
     accordance with subsection (b) to serve three successive 
     tours in positions in which the acquired language is both 
     relevant and determined to be a benefit to the Department.
       ``(2) Overseas deployments.--In carrying out paragraph (1), 
     at least one of the three successive tours referred to in 
     such paragraph shall be an overseas deployment.
       ``(3) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the 
     application of paragraph (1) for medical or family hardship 
     or in the interest of national security.
       ``(4) Congressional notification.--The Secretary of State 
     shall notify the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives and Committees on 
     Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate at the end 
     of each fiscal year of any instances during the prior twelve 
     months in which the waiver authority described in paragraph 
     (3) was invoked.''.

     SEC. 602. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF 
                   UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:

     ``SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF 
                   UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED 
                   INFORMATION.

       ``(a) In General.--On a semiannual basis, each covered 
     official shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report that includes, with respect to the 
     preceding 6-month period--
       ``(1) the number of investigations opened by the covered 
     official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of 
     classified information;

[[Page 11454]]

       ``(2) the number of investigations completed by the covered 
     official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of 
     classified information; and
       ``(3) of the number of such completed investigations 
     identified under paragraph (2), the number referred to the 
     Attorney General for criminal investigation.
       ``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The term `covered official' means--
       ``(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence 
     community; and
       ``(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility 
     for an element of the intelligence community.
       ``(2) The term `investigation' means any inquiry, whether 
     formal or informal, into the existence of an unauthorized 
     public disclosure of classified information.
       ``(3) The term `unauthorized public disclosure of 
     classified information' means the unauthorized disclosure of 
     classified information to a journalist or media 
     organization.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 1104 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized 
              public disclosures of classified information.''.

     SEC. 603. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY 
                   CLEARANCES.

       Section 506H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting ``and'' after the 
     semicolon;
       (B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a period; and
       (C) by striking subparagraph (C);
       (2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
       (3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
     subsection (b):
       ``(b) Intelligence Community Reports.--(1) Not later than 
     March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on the security clearances processed by each element 
     of the intelligence community during the preceding calendar 
     year. Each such report shall separately identify security 
     clearances processed by each such element and shall cover 
     Federal employees and contractor employees.
       ``(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
     include each of the following for each element of the 
     intelligence community for the year covered by the report:
       ``(A) The total number of initial security clearance 
     background investigations opened for new applicants.
       ``(B) The total number of security clearance periodic re-
     investigations opened for existing employees.
       ``(C) The total number of initial security clearance 
     background investigations for new applicants that were 
     finalized and adjudicated with notice of a determination 
     provided to the prospective applicant, including--
       ``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably and 
     granted access to classified information; and
       ``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably 
     and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security 
     clearance.
       ``(D) The total number of security clearance periodic 
     background investigations that were finalized and adjudicated 
     with notice of a determination provided to the existing 
     employee, including--
       ``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably; and
       ``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably 
     and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security 
     clearance.
       ``(E) The total number of pending security clearance 
     background investigations, including initial applicant 
     investigations and periodic re-investigations, that were not 
     finalized and adjudicated as of the last day of such year and 
     that remained pending as follows:
       ``(i) For 180 days or less.
       ``(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 months.
       ``(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 months.
       ``(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 months.
       ``(v) For 24 months or longer.
       ``(F) In the case of security clearance determinations 
     completed or pending during the year preceding the year for 
     which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12 
     months to complete--
       ``(i) the cause of the delay for such determinations; and
       ``(ii) the number of such determinations for which 
     polygraph examinations were required.
       ``(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations, 
     including initial and periodic re-investigations, that 
     resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
       ``(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations 
     that resulted in incomplete information.
       ``(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations 
     that did not result in enough information to make a decision 
     on potentially adverse information.
       ``(3) The report required under this subsection shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.''; and
       (4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
     inserting ``and (b)'' after ``subsection (a)(1)''.

     SEC. 604. REPORT ON EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICES 
                   JURISDICTION.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report on the feasibility, 
     justification, costs, and benefits of expanding the 
     jurisdiction of the protective services of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency under section 15(a)(1) of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)). The 
     report shall include--
       (1) an explanation of the need for expanding such 
     jurisdiction beyond the 500-feet limit specified in such 
     section 15(a)(1); and
       (2) an identification of any comparable departments or 
     agencies of the Federal Government in the Washington 
     metropolitan region (as defined in section 8301 of title 40, 
     United States Code) whose protective services jurisdictions 
     exceed 500 feet.
       (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted 
     in classified form.

     SEC. 605. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the heads of the elements of the 
     intelligence community determined appropriate by the 
     Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on the role of the Director in preparing 
     analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the 
     Federal Government of national security risks associated with 
     potential foreign investments into the United States.
       (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) 
     shall--
       (1) describe the current process for the provision of the 
     analytic materials described in subsection (a);
       (2) identify the most significant benefits and drawbacks of 
     such process with respect to the role of the Director, 
     including any benefits or drawbacks relating to the time 
     allotted to the Director to prepare such materials; and
       (3) include recommendations to improve such process.

     SEC. 606. REPORT ON CYBER EXCHANGE PROGRAM.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on the potential establishment of a fully voluntary 
     exchange program between elements of the intelligence 
     community and private technology companies under which--
       (1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community 
     with demonstrated expertise and work experience in 
     cybersecurity or related disciplines may elect to be 
     temporarily detailed to a private technology company that has 
     elected to receive the detailee; and
       (2) an employee of a private technology company with 
     demonstrated expertise and work experience in cybersecurity 
     or related disciplines may elect to be temporarily detailed 
     to an element of the intelligence community that has elected 
     to receive the detailee.
       (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) 
     shall include the following:
       (1) The feasibility of establishing the exchange program 
     described in such subsection.
       (2) Identification of any challenges in establishing the 
     exchange program.
       (3) An evaluation of the benefits to the intelligence 
     community that would result from the exchange program.

     SEC. 607. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN 
                   VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS.

       (a) Review.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall review, with respect to the 3-
     year period preceding the date of the review, the roles and 
     responsibilities of the elements of the intelligence 
     community in the process of the Federal Government for 
     determining whether, when, how, and to whom information about 
     a vulnerability that is not publicly known will be shared 
     with or released to a non-Federal entity or the public.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) Submission.--Not later than 240 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
     results of the review under subsection (a).
       (2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include 
     the following:
       (A) A description of the roles and responsibilities of the 
     elements of the intelligence community in the process of 
     determining whether, when, how, and to whom information about 
     a vulnerability that is not publicly known will be shared or 
     released to a non-Federal entity or the public.

[[Page 11455]]

       (B) The criteria used by the Federal Government, including 
     elements of the intelligence community, in making such 
     determination.
       (C) With respect to the period covered by the review--
       (i) a summary of vulnerabilities known to elements of the 
     intelligence community that were reviewed by the Federal 
     Government pursuant to such process, including--

       (I) the number of vulnerabilities known to the intelligence 
     community that were reviewed; and
       (II) of such number of reviewed vulnerabilities, the number 
     for which information was shared with or released to a non-
     Federal entity or the public;

       (ii) an assessment of whether there were any 
     vulnerabilities known to elements of the intelligence 
     community that were not reviewed pursuant to such process, 
     and if so, the basis and rationale for not conducting such a 
     review; and
       (iii) a summary of the most significant incidents in which 
     a vulnerability known to the intelligence community, but not 
     shared with or released to a non-Federal entity or the 
     public, was exploited by an individual, an entity, or a 
     foreign country in the course of carrying out a cyber 
     intrusion.
       (D) A description of any current mechanisms for overseeing 
     such process.
       (E) Recommendations to improve the efficiency, 
     effectiveness, accountability, and, consistent with national 
     security, transparency of such process.
       (F) Any other matters the Inspector General determines 
     appropriate.
       (3) Form.--The report may be submitted in classified form.
       (c) Vulnerability Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``vulnerability'' means, with respect to information 
     technology, a design, configuration, or implementation 
     weakness in a technology, product, system, service, or 
     application that can be exploited or triggered to cause 
     unexpected or unintended behavior.

     SEC. 608. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER 
                   MATTERS.

       (a) Review of Whistleblower Matters.--The Inspector General 
     of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the 
     inspectors general for the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
     National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
     Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the 
     National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review of the 
     authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other 
     practices and procedures relating to intelligence community 
     whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors 
     general.
       (b) Objective of Review.--The objective of the review 
     required under subsection (a) is to identify any 
     discrepancies, inconsistencies, or other issues, which 
     frustrate the timely and effective reporting of intelligence 
     community whistleblower matters to appropriate inspectors 
     general and to the congressional intelligence committees, and 
     the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such 
     matters.
       (c) Conduct of Review.--The Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall take such measures as the 
     Inspector General determines necessary in order to ensure 
     that the review required by subsection (a) is conducted in an 
     independent and objective fashion.
       (d) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a written report containing the 
     results of the review required under subsection (a), along 
     with recommendations to improve the timely and effective 
     reporting of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters to 
     inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence 
     committees and the fair and expeditious investigation and 
     resolution of such matters.

     SEC. 609. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF CERTAIN 
                   DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that section 502 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires 
     elements of the intelligence community to keep the 
     congressional intelligence committees ``fully and currently 
     informed'' about all ``intelligence activities'' of the 
     United States, and to ``furnish to the congressional 
     intelligence committees any information or material 
     concerning intelligence activities . . . which is requested 
     by either of the congressional intelligence committees in 
     order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.''.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the authorities described in subsection (a), together 
     with other intelligence community authorities, obligate an 
     element of the intelligence community to submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees written notification, 
     by not later than 7 days after becoming aware, that an 
     individual in the executive branch has disclosed covered 
     classified information to an official of an adversary foreign 
     government using methods other than established intelligence 
     channels; and
       (2) each such notification should include--
       (A) the date and place of the disclosure of classified 
     information covered by the notification;
       (B) a description of such classified information;
       (C) identification of the individual who made such 
     disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure was 
     made; and
       (D) a summary of the circumstances of such disclosure.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``adversary foreign government'' means the 
     government of any of the following foreign countries:
       (A) North Korea.
       (B) Iran.
       (C) China.
       (D) Russia.
       (E) Cuba.
       (2) The term ``covered classified information'' means 
     classified information that was--
       (A) collected by an element of the intelligence community; 
     or
       (B) provided by the intelligence service or military of a 
     foreign country to an element of the intelligence community.
       (3) The term ``established intelligence channels'' means 
     methods to exchange intelligence to coordinate foreign 
     intelligence relationships, as established pursuant to law by 
     the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National 
     Security Agency, or other head of an element of the 
     intelligence community.
       (4) The term ``individual in the executive branch'' means 
     any officer or employee of the executive branch, including 
     individuals--
       (A) occupying a position specified in article II of the 
     Constitution;
       (B) appointed to a position by an individual described in 
     subparagraph (A); or
       (C) serving in the civil service or the senior executive 
     service (or similar service for senior executives of 
     particular departments or agencies).

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Nunes) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes).


                             General Leave

  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 
5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include 
extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 3180.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.

                              {time}  1730

  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, passing an annual intelligence authorization bill is the 
most important tool Congress has to conduct effective oversight of the 
intelligence activities of the U.S. Government. The Intelligence 
Committee has brought a bill to the floor every year since fiscal year 
2010. Once again, the bill is a bipartisan product that reflects 
contributions from all committee members. It was reported out of 
committee by a unanimous voice vote.
  Because most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified 
programs, the bulk of the Committee's schedule of authorizations and 
direction are found in the classified annex to the bill. This 
classified annex has been made available to Members since markup in the 
House Intelligence Committee spaces.
  At the unclassified level, I can report that the overall funding 
authorized by this bill is slightly below the President's budget 
request. Furthermore, the bill funds the Military Intelligence Program 
in line with the levels of the House-passed National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018.
  The bill implements the first stage of a committee initiative to 
streamline and optimize defense intelligence beginning with the Defense 
Intelligence Agency; provides guidelines to guarantee that intelligence 
community contractors can meet with Congress unhindered; and enhances 
oversight of intelligence activities by mandating intelligence 
community reports on threats to Federal elections, leaks of classified 
information, security clearance processing, and other vital activities.
  Mr. Speaker, America faces an international threat matrix more 
complicated than anything we have endured in the past. The recent, 
impressive progress made by the U.S. military and its allies against 
ISIS in Iraq and Syria has not ended the ISIS terror threat. In fact, 
based on the group's ability to inspire terror attacks

[[Page 11456]]

through social media and other means, ISIS could remain a significant 
threat to the West even after it loses all the territory it controls. 
Additionally, al-Qaida remains active in Afghanistan and has retained 
its close links to the resurgent Taliban. Meanwhile, other threats from 
belligerent regimes like Iran and North Korea continue to intensify, 
while instability in failed states like Libya presents pressing 
security challenges to the U.S. and our European allies, including 
through the facilitation of waves of mass migration that provide cover 
for the movement of jihadists to the West.
  This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our 
intelligence community have the funding, authorities, and support they 
need to carry out their mission and to keep us safe, while providing 
Congress with the tools it needs to provide robust oversight over their 
actions.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

                                         House of Representatives,


                               Committee on Homeland Security,

                                    Washington, DC, July 24, 2017.
     Hon. Devin Nunes,
     Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Nunes: I am writing to you concerning the 
     jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Homeland Security 
     in H.R. 3180, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2018.'' The bill includes provisions that fall within 
     the jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security.
       I recognize and appreciate the desire to bring this 
     legislation before the House of Representatives in an 
     expeditious manner, and accordingly, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security will forego seeking a sequential referral 
     on this bill. However, this is conditional based on our 
     mutual understanding that foregoing action on H.R. 3180 at 
     this time does not prejudice this Committee with respect to 
     any future jurisdictional claim over the subject matter 
     contained in this bill or similar legislation.
       This waiver is also given with the understanding that the 
     Committee on Homeland Security expressly reserves its 
     authority to seek conferees on any provision within its 
     jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference that may be 
     convened on this or any similar legislation, and requests 
     your support for such a request.
       I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming 
     this understanding with respect to H.R. 3180, and ask that a 
     copy of this letter and your response be included in the 
     Congressional Record during consideration of this bill on the 
     House floor.
           Sincerely,
                                                Michael T. McCaul,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
           Intelligence,
                                    Washington, DC, July 24, 2017.
     Hon. Michael McCaul,
     Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman McCaul: I received your letter regarding H.R. 
     3180, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2018.'' You have asserted that Section 502 of the Act falls 
     within your jurisdiction because it requests that the 
     Director of National Intelligence coordinate with the 
     National Intelligence Program (NIP) funded Department of 
     Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS 
     I&A) to produce a publicly available advisory report on 
     foreign counterintelligence and cyber threats.
       Consistent with our January 11, 2017 exchange of letters, 
     HPSCI has exclusive jurisdiction over NIP funded DHS I&A 
     intelligence activities. However, I acknowledge that your 
     letter in no way diminishes or alters the jurisdiction of the 
     Committee on Homeland Security with respect to any future 
     jurisdictional claim over the subject matter contained in the 
     bill or any similar legislation.
       I will include a copy of your letter and this response in 
     the Congressional Record during consideration of the 
     legislation on the House Floor. Thank you for your assistance 
     with this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Devin Nunes,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to taking up the Intelligence 
Authorization Act on suspension at a time when issues concerning the 
intelligence community have taken on an even greater significance and 
urgency, and taking up the bill this way will deprive Members of the 
opportunity to offer important amendments.
  The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 is a good and 
bipartisan bill, but even a good bill can be made better. And although 
we have taken up the IAA on suspension on occasion in the past, it has 
only been on the basis of mutual agreement, which is not the case this 
year.
  On its merits, I believe the IAA should and will become law, and I 
look forward to its ultimate approval by both the House and Senate, and 
enactment.
  Nevertheless, I share Leader Pelosi and Whip Hoyer's view that 
tonight's suspension vote should be opposed. This IAA should go through 
regular order so that Members may offer amendments. I will vote ``no'' 
today because I disagree with the expedited procedure used to bring 
this to the floor.
  The Intelligence Committee has a unique role in this House and a 
special obligation to the American people.
  It is our job to oversee the activities of the 17 agencies that 
comprise the intelligence community, ensuring that we strike an 
appropriate balance between protecting our country's national security 
and the civil liberties of everyone who calls America home.
  On behalf of the House--by and through our oversight tools, including 
the IAA--our committee helps ensure that the activities of the U.S. 
intelligence community do the following: that they adhere to the 
Constitution and to the law; that they advance the national security 
interests of the United States; that they wisely expend taxpayer 
dollars; and that they steadfastly protect Americans' civil liberties 
and privacy rights.
  The legislation before us today, like its predecessors, continues to 
fund, equip, and give policy direction to the intelligence community 
and military intelligence elements of the Department of Defense. It 
provides funding levels slightly below the President's 2018 budget 
request and sustains intelligence priorities provided for in previous 
authorizations.
  In addition to the unclassified legislative text and accompanying 
House report, the IAA includes a classified annex, which directs the 
resources and spending for the IC's activities and programs. This 
includes a correlating schedule of authorizations that lays out funding 
for the IC and the DOD.
  This year's IAA, once again, incorporates a number of Democratic 
Member oversight priorities: it improves our efforts to stamp out 
waste, fraud, and abuse by requiring an Inspector General-level review 
of existing whistleblower procedures and by permitting IC contractors 
to come directly to Congress without requiring permission from the IC 
elements that employ them.
  A provision accompanying the report mandates that the ODNI notify and 
provide justification to Congress if the executive branch alters the 
existing Presidential Policy Guidance, or PPG, relating to U.S. 
counterterrorism actions located outside of designated areas of active 
hostilities. The PPG, first promulgated under the previous 
administration, is an important element of U.S. policymaking that seeks 
to ensure direct action against lawful terrorist targets is undertaken 
only when necessary and consistent with U.S. national security and 
foreign policy interests. This is the result of rigorous legal and 
policy deliberation and coordination within the U.S. Government. 
Reporting to Congress on any changes to it ensures proper oversight.
  The bill also furthers our committee's belief that the future of the 
IC workforce depends on diversity; as such, this year's IAA enhances 
the ODNI's Centers of Academic Excellence program.
  Finally, this bill reflects a clear-eyed assessment of the threat we 
face from a resurgent Russia determined to undermine our democratic 
institutions and our faith in the American political process.
  As the intelligence community has determined, Moscow initiated as 
early as mid-2015 an active measures campaign to assault our 2016 
election. The Kremlin's influence campaign consisted of cyber 
espionage, hacking and weaponizing stolen documents, and a propaganda 
machine that was used to great effect to amplify every element of their 
appalling campaign, and perhaps more.
  This year's IAA acts on that unanimous IC judgment by directing 
assessments on Moscow's influence campaigns against foreign elections 
and

[[Page 11457]]

the threat posed by Russian finance activities globally. It also 
requires ODNI to publish a report on the foreign cybersecurity and 
counterintelligence threats to future U.S. Federal election campaigns.
  As with any product of a good-faith attempt at compromise, I do not 
pretend this bill is perfect. There are provisions I wish were 
modified, and some provisions that I would have liked to have seen 
included. Many of my colleagues feel the same way, and they should have 
been permitted to offer amendments, something I hope they will be 
permitted to do by voting ``no'' on this bill under suspension.
  For example, we wish this bill had done more to codify in law some of 
the previous administration's counterterrorism reforms, including 
giving the status of law to an executive order requiring the Director 
of National Intelligence to continue the practice of releasing publicly 
available data on the total number of combatants and noncombatants 
killed or injured due to counterterrorism action.
  I look forward to the fiscal year '18 Intelligence Authorization Act 
being enacted into law--not through the vehicle of the suspension 
calendar, but through consideration under regular order. For that 
reason, I urge a ``no'' vote here so that all Members will have a 
chance to be heard.
  Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Alabama (Ms. Sewell), who is one of our superb members of the committee 
and also one of our ranking members.
  Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, today I rise to speak on the 
passage of the fiscal year 2018 Intelligence Authorization Act under 
suspension of the rules.
  Unfortunately, I strongly oppose its passage today, not because it is 
a bad bill. On the contrary, I voted for it out of committee. But today 
I disagree on how this bill is presented on the floor. The Intelligence 
Authorization Act should be on regular order and rule and not on 
suspension.
  This critically important piece of legislation is the most 
substantial oversight mechanism that Congress has over the intelligence 
community, and it deserves full consideration and robust debate. The 
American public and our intelligence community deserve nothing less.
  Before authorizing tens of billions of dollars for the United States 
intelligence community, our lawmakers should carefully consider and 
debate the issues our intelligence community faces, many of which 
directly impact our national security. Instead, today's consideration 
of the IAA has been fast-tracked, and debate has been cut short.
  Most of the work of the intelligence community and our committee 
happens behind closed doors, which means that debate on the House floor 
over the Intelligence Authorization Act is one of the few times the 
public can engage with the issues facing our intelligence community. By 
limiting debate on this bill, we cut public engagement off as well.
  Mr. Speaker, I am proud of the bipartisan way in which our committee 
worked to craft this year's Intelligence Authorization Act. I am 
excited that this year's IAA includes a provision that I drafted that 
provides our lawmakers, election officials, campaigns, and the public 
with additional information and resources to defend our democracy 
against emerging cyber threats. Additionally, we will continue to be 
able to provide a summer internship program to students from the 
existing Centers of Academic Excellence in intelligence. This year's 
IAA will also hold the IC accountable for creating a more diverse and 
inclusive working environment.
  Nevertheless, I will oppose today's bill not because I don't support 
the underlying bill, but because I believe that national security 
issues raised by this legislation are too important to be fast-tracked.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose today's vote under 
suspension of the rules and to stand with us in demanding full debate 
and consideration under regular order.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers, and I reserve the 
balance of my time to close.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  The Intelligence Authorization Act is a critical oversight tool, one 
component of the legal architecture that governs the authorities and 
boundaries of our civilian and military intelligence professionals.
  The bipartisan legislation before us today is sound, and I endorse 
its substance on the merits. But I agree with our leadership that the 
suspension process is not the appropriate venue for its adoption.
  For this reason, I will vote ``no'' on the measure tonight, but I 
remain optimistic about this legislation's ultimate passage into law 
after we complete its consideration under regular order.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, first, I thank Mr. Phil Tubesing, who has been a 
congressional fellow with our committee for the last 2 years. This will 
be his last bill. He will be leaving us at the end of the month, so I 
wanted to recognize him for all his fine work on the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this bill. This 
is typically how the bill has come to the floor from the Intelligence 
Committee. As nearly all the Members know, for the last several years 
that is how it has occurred. Unfortunately, we are beginning to 
deteriorate into political theater at the Intelligence Committee. As 
long as I am chairman, I am going to continue to try to stop that from 
happening.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``yes'' vote, and I yield back the balance of 
my time.
  Mr. CARSON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the House 
Intelligence Committee, I am proud of the bipartisanship that allowed 
us to put this bill together.
  Our committee, which normally operates quietly, has gotten more 
attention than normal this year as we conduct the critical business of 
investigating Russian intervention in our elections.
  But we still do our day job--overseeing intelligence programs and 
providing support to the men and women of our intelligence community 
who fight to keep our country safe.
  This bill is the culmination of this cooperation.
  Our country is facing a wide array of pervasive and complex threats.
  Our near-peer adversaries, Russia and China, are rapidly growing 
their military capabilities and regularly, unashamedly violating 
international law.
  A nuclear weapons stockpile and functioning ICBM program now sit in 
the hands of an unpredictable North Korean dictator.
  And the so-called caliphate started by ISIS is losing ground, only to 
increase homegrown attacks against the United States and its allies.
  My constituents, like all Americans, are rightly concerned.
  But they can feel confident that we are working with the intelligence 
community on ways to address them.
  As the Ranking Member of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee, I am 
particularly interested in supporting our intelligence professionals 
who assess and prevent terrorist threats to our homeland--while 
protecting the civil rights and liberties of innocent Americans.
  I'm working to ensure they use their expertise, as well as that in 
the private sector, to find and remove online propaganda used to 
recruit would-be attackers.
  I'm also proud to include language that will enable the IC and 
private sector to temporarily exchange IT talent in order to better 
tackle some of the toughest cybersecurity challenges.
  Mr. Speaker, Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff have led this 
process with bipartisan professionalism.
  This bill is stronger because it reflects the input of all of our 
members.
  The full House should have this same opportunity--not be forced to 
vote up or down under suspension.
  Republican leadership owes it to our members to return to regular 
order so our bill can benefit from the input of the full House.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Homeland 
Security Committee and vigilant defender of our national security, I 
rise in support of H.R. 3180, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2018,'' which will provide the Intelligence Community (IC) 
with the necessary resources and authorities to ensure they remain 
capable of protecting and defending the United States.

[[Page 11458]]

  This bill authorizes appropriations for Fiscal Year 2018 for vital 
intelligence activities of the U.S. government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
  H.R. 3180 comes at a critical time in the status of our national 
security and the IC's ability to protect it.
  As we continue to face a diverse and growing array of threats from 
terrorist groups, hostile nation states, and questionable or 
incompetent figures in the Trump administration, it is crucial that the 
IC receive all the resources it needs to do its job while Congress has 
the necessary tools to carry out rigorous oversight of its work.
  This bill seeks to meet these challenges by supporting critical 
national security programs, particularly those focused on countering 
terrorism and cyberattacks.
  Under H.R. 3180, the Director of National Intelligence will be 
required to electronically publish an unclassified advisory report on 
foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to federal 
elections.
  It also bolsters intelligence oversight by ensuring that IC 
contractors can meet freely with Congress.
  Lastly, this bill improves IC accountability to Congress by requiring 
the IC to provide reports on:
  Investigations of leaks of classified information;
  Security clearance processing timelines;
  The process for reviewing information about computer vulnerabilities 
for retention or potential release;
  And Russian influence campaigns directed at foreign elections and 
threat finance activities.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 3180 is a necessary response to the overwhelming 
evidence pointing to a carefully planned and executed infiltration of 
our 2016 Presidential Election by the Russian government and its 
operatives.
  The issue of cybersecurity, particularly with regards to our federal 
election computer system infrastructure, has been of great concern to 
me and the American public as more and more reports of Russian hacking 
efforts have come to light.
  In addition, the provision requiring reports on security clearance 
processing timelines should shed light on the highly dubious and 
inscrutable security clearances of Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner.
  Donald Trump's blatant and irresponsible nepotism towards his 
daughter and son-in-law have made us all vulnerable to Russian and 
other foreign influence at the highest levels of our federal 
government.
  H.R. 3180 will give the American people what they crave and deserve: 
clarity and transparency to pierce through the haze of cover-ups and 
distractions surrounding the Trump Administration.
  This bill also takes significant, much-needed steps to improve 
benefits for members of the IC, such as increasing employee 
compensation and authorizing $514 million in appropriations for the 
CIA's Retirement and Disability System.
  Congress must do its part to adequately recompense the patriotic 
Americans who serve our nation through their work in the IC, especially 
employees with disabilities, who make up 9 percent of the intelligence 
workforce.
  At the same lime, we must continue to ensure that Congress can 
exercise oversight over and maintain transparency for the 17 agencies 
that comprise the IC.
  I am heartened that my Republican colleagues in the Intelligence 
Committee are starting to see the light in recognizing the sinister 
threat of Russian infiltration and White House collusion, both of which 
endanger our nation's ability to practice and protect its core 
democratic values.
  I look forward to working with all Members of Congress to strengthen 
our IC, and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this 
important legislation.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 3180, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

                          ____________________