[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 163 (2017), Part 7]
[Senate]
[Pages 9156-9157]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                           TEXT OF AMENDMENTS

  SA 234. Mr. PERDUE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by 
him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in 
relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of 
international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other 
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. ___. SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON IRAN AND NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR 
                   AND BALLISTIC MISSILE COOPERATION.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:

[[Page 9157]]

       (1) Iran developed a close working relationship with North 
     Korea on many ballistic missile programs, dating back to an 
     acquisition of Scud missiles from North Korea in the mid-
     1980s.
       (2) By the mid-1980s North Korea reverse-engineered Scud B 
     missiles originally received from Egypt, and developed the 
     500-kilometer range Scud C missile in 1991, and sold both the 
     Scud B and Scud C, as well as missile production technology, 
     to Iran.
       (3) In 1992, then-Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Robert Gates, in testimony to Congress, identified Iran as a 
     recipient of North Korean Scud missiles.
       (4) In 1993, then-Director of Central Intelligence James 
     Woolsey provided more detail, stating that North Korea had 
     sold Iran extended range Scud C missiles and agreed to sell 
     other forms of missile technology.
       (5) Annual threat assessments from the intelligence 
     community during the 1990s showed that North Korea's ongoing 
     export of ballistic missiles provided a qualitative increase 
     in capabilities to countries such as Iran.
       (6) The same threat assessments noted that Iran was using 
     North Korean ballistic missile goods and services to achieve 
     its goal of self-sufficiency in the production of medium-
     range ballistic missiles.
       (7) The intelligence community assessed in the 1990s that 
     Iran's acquisition of missile systems or key missile-related 
     components could improve Iran's ability to produce an 
     intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
       (8) Throughout the 2000s, the intelligence community 
     continued to assess that North Korean cooperation with Iran's 
     ballistic missile program was ongoing and significant.
       (9) In 2007 a failed missile test in Syria caused the death 
     of Syrian, Iranian, and North Korean experts.
       (10) North Korea built the nuclear reactor in Syria that 
     was bombed in 2007. Syria failed to report the construction 
     of the reactor to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     (IAEA), which was Syria's obligation under its safeguards 
     agreement with the agency.
       (11) Official sources confirm that Iran and North Korea 
     have engaged in various forms of clandestine nuclear 
     cooperation.
       (12) North Korea and Iran obtained designs and materials 
     related to uranium enrichment from a clandestine procurement 
     network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan.
       (13) In the early 2000s, North Korea exported, with the 
     assistance of Abdul Qadeer Khan, uranium hexafluoride (UF6) 
     gas to Libya, which was intended to be used in Libya's 
     clandestine nuclear weapons program.
       (14) On January 6, 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth 
     nuclear weapons test.
       (15) On September 9, 2016, North Korea conducted its fifth 
     nuclear weapons test.
       (16) Iranian officials reportedly traveled to North Korea 
     to witness its three previous nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 
     and 2013.
       (17) Before North Korea's 2013 test, a senior American 
     official was quoted as saying ``it's very possible that North 
     Koreans are testing for two countries''.
       (18) In September 2012, Iran and North Korea signed an 
     agreement for technological and scientific cooperation.
       (19) In an April 2015 interview with CNN, then-Secretary of 
     Defense Ashton Carter said that North Korea and Iran ``could 
     be'' cooperating to develop a nuclear weapon.
       (20) On March 11, 2017, Director of National Intelligence 
     Dan Coats provided written testimony to Congress that stated 
     that Pyongyang's ``export of ballistic missiles and 
     associated materials to several countries, including Iran and 
     Syria, and its assistance to Syria's construction of a 
     nuclear reactor . . . illustrate its willingness to 
     proliferate dangerous technologies''.
       (21) A 2016 Congressional Research Service report confirmed 
     that ``ballistic missile technology cooperation between the 
     two [Iran and North Korea] is significant and meaningful''.
       (22) Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander of United States 
     Northern Command, testified to Congress on April 14, 2016, 
     that ``Iran's continuing pursuit of long-range missile 
     capabilities and ballistic missile and space launch programs, 
     in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions, 
     remains a serious concern''.
       (23) Iran has engaged in nuclear technology cooperation 
     with North Korea.
       (24) It has been suspected for over a decade that Iran and 
     North Korea are working together on nuclear weapons 
     development.
       (25) Since the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2013 (Public Law 112-277) repealed requirements for the 
     intelligence community to provide unclassified annual report 
     to Congress on the ``Acquisition of Technology Relating to 
     Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional 
     Munitions'', the number of unclassified reports to Congress 
     on nuclear-weapons issues decreased considerably.
       (26) North Korea's cooperation with Iran on nuclear weapon 
     development is widely suspected, but has yet to be detailed 
     by the President to Congress.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the ballistic missile programs of Iran and North Korea 
     represent a serious threat to allies of the United States in 
     the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, members of the Armed 
     Forces deployed in those regions, and ultimately the United 
     States;
       (2) further cooperation between Iran and North Korea on 
     nuclear weapons or ballistic missile technology is not in the 
     security interests of the United States or our allies;
       (3) the testing and production by Iran of ballistic 
     missiles capable of carrying a nuclear device is a clear 
     violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 
     (2015), which was unanimously adopted by the United Nations 
     Security Council and supported by the international 
     community; and
       (4) Iran is using its space launch program to develop the 
     capabilities necessary to deploy an intercontinental 
     ballistic missile that could threaten the United States, and 
     the Director of National Intelligence has assessed that Iran 
     would use ballistic missiles as its ``preferred method of 
     delivering nuclear weapons''.
       (c) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     President, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the 
     Secretary of State, and the heads of other relevant agencies, 
     shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
     report on nuclear and ballistic missile cooperation between 
     the Government of Iran and the Government of the Democratic 
     People's Republic of North Korea, including the identity of 
     Iranian and North Korean persons that have knowingly engaged 
     in or directed the provision of material support or the 
     exchange of information between the Government of Iran and 
     the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of North 
     Korea on their respective nuclear programs.
       (2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
     annex.
       (3) Appropriate committees of congress defined.--In this 
     subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

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