[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 163 (2017), Part 7]
[Senate]
[Pages 8881-8887]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                           TEXT OF AMENDMENTS

  SA 223. Mr. SASSE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by 
him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in 
relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of 
international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other 
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       On page 31, between lines 12 and 13, insert the following:
       (7) An assessment of Iran's cyber capabilities, cyber force 
     structure, and hostile cyber activities targeting the United 
     States, United States interests, the interests of allies and 
     partners of the United States, and interests of Iran's 
     regional neighbors, including an assessment of the 
     acquisition, development, and deployment by Iran of cyber 
     personnel and capabilities.
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 224. Mr. SASSE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by 
him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in 
relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of 
international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other 
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       On page 28, line 18, strike ``AND NORTH AFRICA'' and insert 
     ``NORTH AFRICA, AND SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA''.
       On page 29, line 2, strike ``and beyond'' and insert 
     ``South and Central Asia, and beyond''.
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 225. Mr. VAN HOLLEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed 
by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in 
relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of 
international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other 
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of the bill, add the following:

     SEC. 13. CONDITIONS FOR RETURN OF RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC 
                   FACILITIES.

       Section 205 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act 
     of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4305) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(e) Access to the Russian diplomatic facilities in 
     Maryland and New York, which were closed by President Obama 
     in December 2016, in accordance with subsection (b)(3), in 
     response to efforts by the Government of Russia, or its 
     surrogates, to interfere in the 2016 United States 
     presidential campaign, shall be denied to all representatives 
     of the Government of Russia until the Secretary of State, 
     after consultation with Secretary of Treasury and the 
     Attorney General, certifies to Congress that the Government 
     of Russia is no longer conducting cyber-enabled activities 
     that--
       ``(1) are reasonably likely to result in, or have 
     materially contributed to, a significant threat to the 
     national security, foreign policy, or economic health or 
     financial stability of the United States; or
       ``(2) have the purpose or effect of--
       ``(A) harming, or otherwise significantly compromising the 
     provision of services by, a computer or network of computers 
     that support 1 or more entities in the United States in a 
     critical infrastructure sector;
       ``(B) significantly compromising the provision of services 
     by 1 or more entities in the United States in a critical 
     infrastructure sector;
       ``(C) causing a significant disruption to the availability 
     of a computer or network of computers in the United States;
       ``(D) causing a significant misappropriation of funds or 
     economic resources, trade secrets, personal identifiers, or 
     financial information in the United States for commercial or 
     competitive advantage or private financial gain; or
       ``(E) tampering with, altering, or causing a 
     misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of 
     interfering with or undermining United States election 
     processes or institutions.''.
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 226. Mr. VAN HOLLEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed 
by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in 
relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of 
international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other 
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of the bill, add the following:

     SEC. 13. STRENGTHENING ALLIED CYBERSECURITY.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the 
     ``Strengthening Allied Cybersecurity Act of 2017''.
       (b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) In January 2017, the Director of National Intelligence 
     (referred to in this Act as the ``DNI''), in coordination 
     with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation (referred to in this Act as the ``FBI''), and 
     the National Security Agency, judged with high confidence 
     that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence 
     campaign aimed at the 2016 United States presidential 
     election.
       (2) The DNI report stated, ``[The Department of Homeland 
     Security] assesses that the types of systems Russian actors 
     targeted or compromised were not involved in vote 
     tallying.''.
       (3) On January 10, 2017, the DNI stated, in testimony 
     before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, 
     ``We can say that we did not see evidence of the Russians 
     altering vote tallies.''.
       (4) On March 20, 2017, FBI Director James Comey stated, in 
     testimony before the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives, ``We also, as a 
     government, supplied information to all the states so they 
     could equip themselves to make sure there was no successful 
     effort to affect the vote and there was none, as we said 
     earlier.''.

[[Page 8882]]

       (5) The DNI, in coordination with the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, the FBI, and the National Security Agency, judged 
     that Russia's intelligence services conducted cyber 
     operations against targets associated with the 2016 United 
     States presidential election.
       (6) The DNI assessed that the Russian Government's campaign 
     aimed at the United States election featured--
       (A) disclosures of data obtained through Russian cyber 
     operations;
       (B) intrusions into United States state and local election 
     boards; and
       (C) overt propaganda.
       (7) Russia's use of public disclosures of Russian-collected 
     data during the United States election was unprecedented.
       (8) The DNI, in coordination with the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, the FBI, and the National Security Agency, assessed 
     that Russia will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered 
     campaign aimed at the United States presidential election to 
     influence future elections worldwide, including against 
     United States allies and their election processes.
       (9) In May 2016, Germany's domestic intelligence agency 
     assessed that hackers linked to the Russian Government had 
     targeted Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic 
     Union party and German state computers.
       (10) The head of Germany's foreign intelligence service, 
     Bruno Kahl, later asserted that Germany had ``evidence that 
     cyber-attacks are taking place that have no other purpose 
     than to elicit political uncertainty. The perpetrators are 
     interested in delegitimizing the democratic process as such, 
     regardless of who that ends of helping. We have indications 
     that [the attacks] come from the Russian region.'' In 
     November 2016, German Chancellor Merkel, said, ``such cyber-
     attacks, or hybrid conflicts as they are known in Russian 
     doctrine, are now part of daily life and we must learn to 
     cope with them''.
       (11) On May 9, 2017, Admiral Michael Rogers, United States 
     Cyber Command commander and Director of the National Security 
     Agency, testified before the Committee on Armed Services of 
     the Senate that the United States surveilled Russian hackers 
     attack French computer systems as the French election 
     approached. In his testimony, Rogers said, ``We had talked to 
     our French counterparts prior to the public announcements of 
     the events that were publicly attributed this past weekend, 
     and gave them a heads up, `Look we're watching the Russians, 
     we're seeing them penetrate some of your infrastructure.'.''.
       (12) In February 2017, the United Kingdom's Defence 
     Secretary Fallon stated that--
       (A) all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries 
     must support reform ``to make NATO more agile, resilient, and 
     better configured to operate in the contemporary environment 
     including against hybrid and cyber-attacks''; and
       (B) ``NATO must defend itself as effectively in the cyber 
     sphere as it does in the air, on land, and at sea.''.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate federal agencies.--The term ``appropriate 
     Federal agencies'' means--
       (A) the Department of Defense;
       (B) the Department of Homeland Security;
       (C) the Department of Justice;
       (D) the Department of the Treasury;
       (E) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 
     and
       (F) the Department of Commerce
       (2) Hybrid warfare.--The term ``hybrid warfare'' means a 
     military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular 
     warfare, informational warfare, and cyber warfare.
       (3) Relevant congressional committees.--The term ``relevant 
     congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (C) the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and 
     Related Programs of the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     Senate;
       (D) the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and 
     Related Programs of the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     House of Representatives;
       (E) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
       (F) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives;
       (G) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate;
       (H) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (I) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
       (J) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (K) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
       (L) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (d) Trans-Atlantic Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
     coordination with the heads of the appropriate Federal 
     agencies, shall develop, and submit to the relevant 
     congressional committees, a trans-Atlantic cybersecurity 
     strategy, with a classified annex, if necessary, that 
     includes--
       (A) a plan of action to guide United States cooperation 
     with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to 
     respond to Russia's hybrid warfare against NATO allies;
       (B) a plan of action to guide United States cooperation 
     with European partners, including non-NATO nations, to 
     counter Russia's cyber efforts to undermine democratic 
     elections in the United States and Europe;
       (C) an assessment of nonmilitary tools and tactics, 
     including sanctions, indictments, or other actions that the 
     United States can use, unilaterally or in cooperation with 
     like-minded nations, to counter Russia's malicious cyber 
     activity in the United States and Europe; and
       (D) a review of resources required by the Department of 
     State and appropriate Federal agencies to conduct activities 
     to build cooperation with NATO allies and European partners 
     on countering Russia's hybrid warfare and disinformation 
     efforts.
       (2) Civil liberties and privacy.--The Secretary of State 
     shall ensure that the implementation of the strategy 
     described in paragraph (1) is consistent with United States 
     standards for civil liberties and privacy protections.
       (e) Federal Cybersecurity Liaison to United States 
     Presidential Campaigns and Major National Political Party 
     Committees.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall appoint, at the rank of Executive 
     Assistant Director, a cybersecurity liaison for presidential 
     campaigns and major national political party committees, who, 
     at the request of presidential campaigns and major national 
     political party committees, shall--
       (1) regularly share cybersecurity best practices and 
     protocols with each presidential campaign, the Democratic 
     National Committee, the Republican National Committee, the 
     Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, the National 
     Republican Senatorial Committee, the Democratic Congressional 
     Campaign Committee, and the National Republican Congressional 
     Committee; and
       (2) provide the timely sharing of cybersecurity threats to 
     such campaigns and committees to prevent or mitigate adverse 
     effects from such cybersecurity threats.
       (f) Reporting Requirement.--The Secretary of State, in 
     coordination with the heads of the appropriate Federal 
     agencies, shall submit an annual report to the relevant 
     congressional committees on the implementation of the trans-
     Atlantic cybersecurity cooperation strategy developed under 
     subsection (d).
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 227. Mr. McCONNELL (for Mr. Moran (for himself and Mr. Roberts)) 
proposed an amendment to the resolution S. Res. 115, commemorating the 
100th anniversary of the 1st Infantry Division; as follows:

       Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the 
     following:
       That the Senate--
       (1) commemorates ``A Century of Service'', the 100th 
     anniversary of the 1st Infantry Division on June 8, 2017;
       (2) commends the 1st Infantry Division for continuing to 
     exemplify the motto of the 1st Infantry Division, ``No 
     Mission Too Difficult. No Sacrifice Too Great. Duty First!'';
       (3) honors the memory of the more than 13,000 soldiers of 
     the 1st Infantry Division who lost their lives in battle;
       (4) expresses gratitude and support for all 1st Infantry 
     Division soldiers, veterans, and their families, including 
     1st Infantry Division soldiers and their families of the past 
     and future and those who are serving as of May 2017; and
       (5) recognizes that the 1st Infantry Division holds an 
     honored place in United States history.
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 228. Mr. McCONNELL (for Mr. Moran (for himself and Mr. Roberts)) 
proposed an amendment to the resolution S. Res. 115, commemorating the 
100th anniversary of the 1st Infantry Division; as follows:

       Strike the preamble and insert the following:
       Whereas June 8, 2017, is the 100th anniversary of the 
     organization of the 1st Infantry Division;
       Whereas the First Infantry Division was established in 1917 
     as the first permanent combined arms division in the Regular 
     Army and has been on continuous active duty since 1917;
       Whereas, from the heroic start of the 1st Infantry 
     Division, the 1st Infantry Division has played an integral 
     part in United States history by serving in--
       (1) World War I;
       (2) World War II;
       (3) the Cold War;
       (4) the Vietnam War;
       (5) Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm;
       (6) the Balkans peacekeeping missions;
       (7) the War on Terror; and
       (8) as of May 2017, multiple operations around the globe;
       Whereas, immediately after its establishment, the 1st 
     Division started to build a

[[Page 8883]]

     prestigious reputation for its service in World War I;
       Whereas, in May 1918, the victory of the 1st Division at 
     the Battle of Cantigny, France, was the first United States 
     victory of World War I, and despite suffering more than 1,000 
     casualties in that battle, the 1st Division seized the 
     village from German forces, defended the village against 
     repeated counterattacks, and bolstered the morale of the 
     Allies;
       Whereas, after the Battle of Cantigny, the 1st Division 
     played a central role in other monumental battles of World 
     War I, such as--
       (1) the Battle of Soissons;
       (2) the Battle of Saint-Mihiel; and
       (3) the Meuse-Argonne Offensive;
       Whereas 5 soldiers of the 1st Division received the 
     Congressional Medal of Honor during World War I;
       Whereas the 1st Division--
       (1) remained on occupation duty in Germany to enforce the 
     Armistice; and
       (2) in September 1919, was the last combat division to 
     return home after World War I;
       Whereas, following World War I, the 1st Division was 1 of 
     only 3 United States Army divisions to remain on active duty, 
     which is a strong testament to its accomplishments;
       Whereas, in November 1939, the 1st Infantry Division was 
     called to action again and, in August 1942, became 1 of the 
     first United States divisions sent to the European theater 
     during World War II;
       Whereas, during World War II, the 1st Infantry Division 
     fought bravely in Algeria, Tunisia, and Sicily in 1942 and 
     1943 before the courage and resolve of the 1st Infantry 
     Division was tested on Omaha Beach in Normandy, France;
       Whereas the 1st Infantry Division, reinforced by units of 
     the 29th Infantry Division, made the assault landing on Omaha 
     Beach on D-Day, June 6, 1944, which began the liberation of 
     Western Europe from Nazi control;
       Whereas the 1st Infantry Division continued its invaluable 
     service throughout World War II, including in--
       (1) the liberation of France and Belgium;
       (2) the seizing of Aachen, the first city of Nazi Germany 
     to fall to the Allies;
       (3) the Battle of the Huertgen Forest;
       (4) the Battle of the Bulge, in which the 1st Infantry 
     Division held the critical northern shoulder at Butgenbach, 
     Belgium;
       (5) the crossing of the Rhine River at Remagen;
       (6) the battles around the Ruhr Pocket in Germany; and
       (7) the offensive into Czechoslovakia, where the 1st 
     Infantry Division liberated Nazi labor camps at Falkenau and 
     Zwodau;
       Whereas 17 members of the 1st Infantry Division received 
     the Congressional Medal of Honor for their service during 
     World War II;
       Whereas, in recognition of exemplary service during World 
     War II, the 1st Infantry Division was the recipient of--
       (1) 2 French Croix de Guerre with Palm, and Streamers 
     embroidered with ``Kasserine'' and ``Normandy'';
       (2) the World War II French Fourragere;
       (3) the Belgian Fourragere; and
       (4) the subordinate units of the 1st Infantry Division 
     earned numerous Presidential Unit Citations;
       Whereas the 1st Infantry Division guarded the Nuremburg 
     Trials and remained on occupation duty in Germany before 
     returning home to Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1955;
       Whereas, in 1965, the 1st Infantry Division was 1 of the 
     first 2 divisions sent to the Vietnam War, and the 1st 
     Infantry Division remained in Vietnam for 5 years, during 
     which the 1st Infantry Division--
       (1) protected the capital, Saigon, from attack by the North 
     Vietnamese Army;
       (2) conducted hundreds of--
       (A) offensive operations between Saigon and Cambodia 
     against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units; and
       (B) civil action and pacification operations to protect and 
     assist the Vietnamese people; and
       (3) responded to the 1968 Tet Offensive by clearing Tan Son 
     Nhut Air Force Base of enemy forces, securing Saigon and 
     counterattacking vigorously;
       Whereas 12 soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division earned the 
     Congressional Medal of Honor during the Vietnam War;
       Whereas, in recognition of exemplary service during the 
     Vietnam War--
       (1) the 1st Infantry Division was the recipient of--
       (A) the United States Army Meritorious Unit Commendation;
       (B) the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm 
     for the period of 1965 to 1968; and
       (C) the Republic of Vietnam civic Action Honor Medal, First 
     Class; and
       (2) the subordinate units of the 1st Infantry Division 
     earned numerous Presidential unit citations and other Army 
     awards;
       Whereas, from 1970 to 1990 the 1st Infantry Division--
       (1) was a key component of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization deterrent strategy;
       (2) maintained a forward-stationed brigade in Germany and 
     deployed additional elements annually to Germany on major 
     exercises that demonstrated United States resolve to friend 
     and foe alike; and
       (3) contributed directly to the peaceful end of the Cold 
     War;
       Whereas, in November 1990, the 1st Infantry Division 
     deployed to Saudi Arabia and played a key role in the famous 
     ``left hook'' attack of the US VII Corps through the deserts 
     of western Iraq to destroy the Tawakalna Division of the 
     vaunted Republican Guard of Saddam Hussein, among many other 
     enemy forces;
       Whereas the 1st Infantry Division deployed to Bosnia for 31 
     months between 1996 and 2000, to Macedonia for 4 months in 
     1999, and to Kosovo for 22 months between 1999 and 2003--
       (1) to enforce international peace agreements;
       (2) to halt the worst ethnic violence in Europe since the 
     Holocaust; and
       (3) to bring peace and stability to the Balkans;
       Whereas, in 2004, the 1st Infantry Division deployed to 
     Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom as Task Force Danger and 
     conducted sophisticated counterinsurgency operations that led 
     to the first free and fair elections in Iraqi history in 
     2005;
       Whereas, between 2005 and 2014, the brigade combat teams 
     and other major headquarters and units of the 1st Infantry 
     Division have deployed repeatedly to Iraq and Afghanistan in 
     Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and 
     Operation New Dawn;
       Whereas Specialist Ross A. McGinnis, a 1st Infantry 
     Division soldier, is 1 of the very few people of the United 
     States to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor in the War 
     on Terror;
       Whereas, in the defense of United States interests, the 1st 
     Infantry Division deployed its units and soldiers to Africa 
     in 2015 and Kuwait in 2016;
       Whereas, since November 2016, the headquarters of the 1st 
     Infantry Division has been in Iraq, where the 1st Infantry 
     Division is--
       (1) engaged in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq 
     and Syria (ISIS); and
       (2) providing the leadership structure for the Combined 
     Joint Forces Land Component Command-Operation Inherent 
     Resolve;
       Whereas, as of May 2017--
       (1) the Combat Aviation Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, is 
     deployed to Afghanistan and is conducting combat aviation 
     operations in support of the Afghan and international 
     security forces battling the Taliban;
       (2) the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, is 
     deployed to South Korea, where it bolsters United States 
     deterrence against North Korea; and
       (3) the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, is 
     at Fort Riley, Kansas, where it is honing its combat-
     readiness in preparation for deployment; and
       Whereas, since the establishment of the 1st Infantry 
     Division in 1917--
       (1) the 1st Infantry Division has been present all over the 
     world, assisting in combat and noncombat missions for 100 
     years;
       (2) more than 13,000 soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division 
     have sacrificed their lives in combat; and
       (3) 35 soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division have received 
     the Medal of Honor: Now, therefore, be it
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 229. Mr. GRAHAM (for himself, Mr. Brown, Mr. McCain, and Mr. 
Casey) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the 
bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to 
Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international 
terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes; 
which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end, add the following:

     SEC. 13. SENSE OF SENATE ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF 
                   ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY TO THE 
                   MEMBER NATIONS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
                   ORGANIZATION.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (1) The principle of collective defense of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is immortalized in 
     Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in which members 
     pledge that ``an armed attack against one or more of them in 
     Europe or North America shall be shall be considered an 
     attack against them all''.
       (2) For almost 7 decades, the principle of collective 
     defense has effectively served as a strategic deterrent for 
     the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     and provided stability throughout the world, strengthening 
     the security of the United States and all 28 other member 
     nations.
       (3) Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in 
     New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, the Alliance agreed 
     to invoke Article 5 for the first time, affirming its 
     commitment to collective defense.
       (4) The recent attacks in the United Kingdom underscore the 
     importance of an international alliance to combat hostile 
     nation states and terrorist groups.
       (5) Collective defense unites the 29 members of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization, each committing to protecting 
     and supporting one another from external adversaries, which 
     bolsters the North Atlantic Alliance.

[[Page 8884]]

       (b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate--
       (1) to express the vital importance of Article 5 of the 
     North Atlantic Treaty, the charter of the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization (NATO), as it continues to serve as a 
     critical deterrent to potential hostile nations and terrorist 
     organizations;
       (2) to remember the first and only invocation of Article 5 
     by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in support of the 
     United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
     2001; and
       (3) to affirm that the United States remains fully 
     committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and will 
     honor its obligations enshrined in Article 5.
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 230. Mr. HELLER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by 
him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in 
relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of 
international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other 
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       Beginning on page 31, strike line 16 and all that follows 
     through page 35, line 25.
       At the end, add the following:

 TITLE II--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN

     SEC. 200. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Iran Ballistic Missile 
     Sanctions Act''.

     SEC. 201. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds the following:
       (1) On April 2, 2015, President Barack Obama said, ``Other 
     American sanctions on Iran for its support of terrorism, its 
     human rights abuses, its ballistic missile program, will 
     continue to be fully enforced.''.
       (2) On July 7, 2015, General Martin Dempsey, then-Chairman 
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, ``Under no circumstances 
     should we relieve the pressure on Iran relative to ballistic 
     missile capabilities.''.
       (3) On July 29, 2015, in his role as the top military 
     officer in the United States and advisor to the President, 
     General Dempsey confirmed that his military recommendation 
     was that sanctions relating to the ballistic missile program 
     of Iran not be lifted.
       (4) The Government of Iran and Iran's Revolutionary Guard 
     Corps have been responsible for the repeated testing of 
     illegal ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear 
     device, including observed tests in October and November 2015 
     and March 2016, violating United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions.
       (5) On October 14, 2015, Samantha Power, United States 
     Ambassador to the United Nations, said, ``One of the really 
     important features in implementation of the recent Iran deal 
     to dismantle Iran's nuclear program is going to have to be 
     enforcement of the resolutions and the standards that remain 
     on the books.''.
       (6) On December 11, 2015, the United Nations Panel of 
     Experts concluded that the missile launch on October 10, 
     2015, ``was a violation by Iran of paragraph 9 of Security 
     Council resolution 1929 (2010)''.
       (7) On January 17, 2016, Adam Szubin, Acting Under 
     Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, stated, 
     ``Iran's ballistic missile program poses a significant threat 
     to regional and global security, and it will continue to be 
     subject to international sanctions. We have consistently made 
     clear that the United States will vigorously press sanctions 
     against Iranian activities outside of the Joint Comprehensive 
     Plan of Action--including those related to Iran's support for 
     terrorism, regional destabilization, human rights abuses, and 
     ballistic missile program.''.
       (8) On February 9, 2016, James Clapper, Director of 
     National Intelligence, testified that, ``We judge that Tehran 
     would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred method of 
     delivering nuclear weapons, if it builds them. Iran's 
     ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD, 
     and Tehran already has the largest inventory of ballistic 
     missiles in the Middle East. Iran's progress on space launch 
     vehicles--along with its desire to deter the United States 
     and its allies--provides Tehran with the means and motivation 
     to develop longer-range missiles, including ICBMs.''.
       (9) On March 9, 2016, Iran reportedly fired two Qadr 
     ballistic missiles with a range of more than 1,000 miles and 
     according to public reports, the missiles were marked with a 
     statement in Hebrew reading, ``Israel must be wiped off the 
     arena of time.''.
       (10) On March 11, 2016, Ambassador Power called the recent 
     ballistic missile launches by Iran ``provocative and 
     destabilizing'' and called on the international community to 
     ``degrade Iran's missile program''.
       (11) On March 14, 2016, Ambassador Power said that the 
     recent ballistic missile launches by Iran were ``in defiance 
     of provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2231''.
       (12) Iran has demonstrated the ability to launch multiple 
     rockets from fortified underground facilities and mobile 
     launch sites not previously known.
       (13) The ongoing procurement by Iran of technologies needed 
     to boost the range, accuracy, and payloads of its diverse 
     ballistic missile arsenal represents a threat to deployed 
     personnel of the United States and allies of the United 
     States in Europe and the Middle East, including Israel.
       (14) Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, testified in a 
     hearing before the Armed Services Committee of the Senate on 
     July 7, 2015, that, ``[T]he reason that we want to stop Iran 
     from having an ICBM program is that the I in ICBM stands for 
     intercontinental, which means having the capability to fly 
     from Iran to the United States, and we don't want that. 
     That's why we oppose ICBMs.''.
       (15) Through recent ballistic missile launch tests the 
     Government of Iran has shown blatant disregard for 
     international laws and its intention to continue tests of 
     that nature throughout the implementation of the Joint 
     Comprehensive Plan of Action.
       (16) The banking sector of Iran has facilitated the 
     financing of the ballistic missile programs in Iran and 
     evidence has not been provided that entities in that sector 
     have ceased facilitating the financing of those programs.
       (17) Iran has been able to amass a large arsenal of 
     ballistic missiles through its illicit smuggling networks and 
     domestic manufacturing capabilities that have been supported 
     and maintained by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and 
     specific sectors of the economy of Iran.
       (18) Penetration by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps into 
     the economy of Iran is well documented including investments 
     in the construction, automotive, telecommunications, 
     electronics, mining, metallurgy, and petrochemical sectors of 
     the economy of Iran.
       (19) Items procured through sectors of Iran specified in 
     paragraph (18) have dual use applications that are currently 
     being used to create ballistic missiles in Iran and will 
     continue to be a source of materials for the creation of 
     future weapons.
       (20) In order to curb future illicit activity by Iran, the 
     Government of the United States and the international 
     community must take action against persons that facilitate 
     and profit from the illegal acquisition of ballistic missile 
     parts and technology in support of the missile programs of 
     Iran.

     SEC. 202. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the ballistic missile program of Iran represents a 
     serious threat to allies of the United States in the Middle 
     East and Europe, members of the Armed Forces deployed in the 
     those regions, and ultimately the United States;
       (2) the testing and production by Iran of ballistic 
     missiles capable of carrying a nuclear device is a clear 
     violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 
     (2015), which was unanimously adopted by the international 
     community;
       (3) Iran is using its space launch program to develop the 
     capabilities necessary to deploy an intercontinental 
     ballistic missile that could threaten the United States, and 
     the Director of National Intelligence has assessed that Iran 
     would use ballistic missiles as its ``preferred method of 
     delivering nuclear weapons''; and
       (4) the Government of the United States should impose tough 
     primary and secondary sanctions against any sector of the 
     economy of Iran or any Iranian person that directly or 
     indirectly supports the ballistic missile program of Iran as 
     well as any foreign person or financial institution that 
     engages in transactions or trade that support that program.

     SEC. 203. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO EFFORTS BY 
                   IRAN TO ACQUIRE BALLISTIC MISSILE AND RELATED 
                   TECHNOLOGY.

       (a) Certain Persons.--Section 1604(a) of the Iran-Iraq Arms 
     Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note) is amended by inserting ``, to acquire ballistic 
     missile or related technology,'' after ``nuclear weapons''.
       (b) Foreign Countries.--Section 1605(a) of the Iran-Iraq 
     Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50 
     U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended, in the matter preceding 
     paragraph (1), by inserting ``, to acquire ballistic missile 
     or related technology,'' after ``nuclear weapons''.

     SEC. 204. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS THAT 
                   ACQUIRE OR DEVELOP BALLISTIC MISSILES.

       Section 5(b)(1)(B) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 
     (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) in clause (i), by striking ``would likely'' and 
     inserting ``may''; and
       (2) in clause (ii)--
       (A) in subclause (I), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (B) by redesignating subclause (II) as subclause (III); and
       (C) by inserting after subclause (I) the following:

       ``(II) acquire or develop ballistic missiles and the 
     capability to launch ballistic missiles; or''.

     SEC. 205. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC 
                   MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Title II of the Iran Threat Reduction and 
     Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721 et seq.) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:

[[Page 8885]]



  ``Subtitle C--Measures Relating to Ballistic Missile Program of Iran

     ``SEC. 231. DEFINITIONS.

       ``(a) In General.--In this subtitle:
       ``(1) Agricultural commodity.--The term `agricultural 
     commodity' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of 
     the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
       ``(2) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
     `appropriate committees of Congress' means--
       ``(A) the committees specified in section 14(2) of the Iran 
     Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 
     note); and
       ``(B) the congressional defense committees, as defined in 
     section 101 of title 10, United States Code.
       ``(3) Correspondent account; payable-through account.--The 
     terms `correspondent account' and `payable-through account' 
     have the meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title 
     31, United States Code.
       ``(4) Foreign financial institution.--The term `foreign 
     financial institution' has the meaning of that term as 
     determined by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to 
     section 104(i) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
     8513(i)).
       ``(5) Good.--The term `good' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 
     (50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.)).
       ``(6) Government.--The term `Government', with respect to a 
     foreign country, includes any agencies or instrumentalities 
     of that Government and any entities controlled by that 
     Government.
       ``(7) Medical device.--The term `medical device' has the 
     meaning given the term `device' in section 201 of the Federal 
     Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
       ``(8) Medicine.--The term `medicine' has the meaning given 
     the term `drug' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
     Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
       ``(b) Determinations of Significance.--For purposes of this 
     subtitle, in determining if financial transactions or 
     financial services are significant, the President may 
     consider the totality of the facts and circumstances, 
     including factors similar to the factors set forth in section 
     561.404 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any 
     corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

     ``SEC. 232. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS 
                   THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF 
                   IRAN.

       ``(a) Identification of Persons.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, 
     and not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter, 
     the President shall, in coordination with the Secretary of 
     Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary 
     of the Treasury, and the Secretary of State, submit to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress a report identifying 
     persons that have knowingly aided the Government of Iran in 
     the development of the ballistic missile program of Iran.
       ``(2) Elements.--Each report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall include the following:
       ``(A) An identification of persons (disaggregated by 
     Iranian and non-Iranian persons) that have knowingly aided 
     the Government of Iran in the development of the ballistic 
     missile program of Iran, including persons that have--
       ``(i) knowingly engaged in the direct or indirect provision 
     of material support to such program;
       ``(ii) knowingly facilitated, supported, or engaged in 
     activities to further the development of such program;
       ``(iii) knowingly transmitted information relating to 
     ballistic missiles to the Government of Iran; or
       ``(iv) otherwise knowingly aided such program.
       ``(B) A description of the character and significance of 
     the cooperation of each person identified under subparagraph 
     (A) with the Government of Iran with respect to such program.
       ``(C) An assessment of the cooperation of the Government of 
     the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the Government 
     of Iran with respect to such program.
       ``(3) Classified annex.--Each report required by paragraph 
     (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain 
     a classified annex.
       ``(b) Blocking of Property.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 15 days after submitting 
     a report required by subsection (a)(1), the President shall, 
     in accordance with the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all 
     transactions in all property and interests in property of any 
     person specified in such report if such property and 
     interests in property are in the United States, come within 
     the United States, or are or come within the possession or 
     control of a United States person.
       ``(2) Inapplicability of national emergency requirement.--
     The requirements under section 202 of the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not 
     apply for purposes of this subsection.
       ``(c) Exclusion From United States.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any 
     alien subject to blocking of property and interests in 
     property under subsection (b).
       ``(2) Compliance with united nations headquarters 
     agreement.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the head of 
     state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if 
     admission to the United States is necessary to permit the 
     United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the 
     Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success 
     June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, 
     between the United Nations and the United States.
       ``(d) Facilitation of Certain Transactions.--The President 
     shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict 
     conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a 
     correspondent account or a payable-through account by a 
     foreign financial institution that the President determines 
     knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions 
     Act, conducts or facilitates a significant financial 
     transaction for a person subject to blocking of property and 
     interests in property under subsection (b).

     ``SEC. 233. BLOCKING OF PROPERTY OF PERSONS AFFILIATED WITH 
                   CERTAIN IRANIAN ENTITIES.

       ``(a) Blocking of Property.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President shall, in accordance with 
     the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all 
     property and interests in property of any person described in 
     paragraph (3) if such property and interests in property are 
     in the United States, come within the United States, or are 
     or come within the possession or control of a United States 
     person.
       ``(2) Inapplicability of national emergency requirement.--
     The requirements under section 202 of the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not 
     apply for purposes of this subsection.
       ``(3) Persons described.--A person described in this 
     paragraph is--
       ``(A) an entity that is owned, directly or indirectly, by a 
     25 percent or greater interest--
       ``(i) by the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid 
     Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, 
     or any agent or affiliate of such organization or group; or
       ``(ii) collectively by a group of individuals that hold an 
     interest in the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid 
     Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, 
     or any agent or affiliate of such organization or group, even 
     if none of those individuals hold a 25 percent or greater 
     interest in the entity;
       ``(B) a person that controls, manages, or directs an entity 
     described in subparagraph (A); or
       ``(C) an individual who is on the board of directors of an 
     entity described in subparagraph (A).
       ``(b) Facilitation of Certain Transactions.--The President 
     shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict 
     conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a 
     correspondent account or a payable-through account by a 
     foreign financial institution that the President determines 
     knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions 
     Act, conducts or facilitates a significant financial 
     transaction for a person subject to blocking of property and 
     interests in property under subsection (a).
       ``(c) Iran Missile Proliferation Watch List.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, 
     and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the 
     Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress and publish in the Federal Register a 
     list of--
       ``(A) each entity in which the Aerospace Industries 
     Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid 
     Bakeri Industrial Group, or any agent or affiliate of such 
     organization or group has an ownership interest of more than 
     0 percent and less than 25 percent;
       ``(B) each entity in which the Aerospace Industries 
     Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid 
     Bakeri Industrial Group, or any agent or affiliate of such 
     organization or group does not have an ownership interest but 
     maintains a presence on the board of directors of the entity 
     or otherwise influences the actions, policies, or personnel 
     decisions of the entity; and
       ``(C) each person that controls, manages, or directs an 
     entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
       ``(2) Reference.--The list required by paragraph (1) may be 
     referred to as the `Iran Missile Proliferation Watch List'.
       ``(d) Comptroller General Report.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall--

[[Page 8886]]

       ``(A) conduct a review of each list required by subsection 
     (c)(1); and
       ``(B) not later than 60 days after each such list is 
     submitted to the appropriate committees of Congress under 
     that subsection, submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress a report on the review conducted under subparagraph 
     (A) that includes a list of persons not included in that list 
     that qualify for inclusion in that list, as determined by the 
     Comptroller General.
       ``(2) Consultations.--In preparing the report required by 
     paragraph (1)(B), the Comptroller General shall consult with 
     nongovernmental organizations.

     ``SEC. 234. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN 
                   PERSONS INVOLVED IN BALLISTIC MISSILE 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       ``(a) Certification.--Not later than 120 days after the 
     date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions 
     Act, and not less frequently than once every 180 days 
     thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress a certification that each person 
     listed in an annex of United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), or 1929 (2010) is not 
     directly or indirectly facilitating, supporting, or involved 
     with the development of or transfer to Iran of ballistic 
     missiles or technology, parts, components, or technology 
     information relating to ballistic missiles.
       ``(b) Blocking of Property.--
       ``(1) In general.--If the President is unable to make a 
     certification under subsection (a) with respect to a person 
     and the person is not currently subject to sanctions with 
     respect to Iran under any other provision of law, the 
     President shall, not later than 15 days after that 
     certification would have been required under that 
     subsection--
       ``(A) in accordance with the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and 
     prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in 
     property of that person if such property and interests in 
     property are in the United States, come within the United 
     States, or are or come within the possession or control of a 
     United States person; and
       ``(B) publish in the Federal Register a report describing 
     the reason why the President was unable to make a 
     certification with respect to that person.
       ``(2) Inapplicability of national emergency requirement.--
     The requirements under section 202 of the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not 
     apply for purposes of this subsection.
       ``(c) Exclusion From United States.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any 
     alien subject to blocking of property and interests in 
     property under subsection (b).
       ``(2) Compliance with united nations headquarters 
     agreement.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the head of 
     state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if 
     admission to the United States is necessary to permit the 
     United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the 
     Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success 
     June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, 
     between the United Nations and the United States.
       ``(d) Facilitation of Certain Transactions.--The President 
     shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict 
     conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a 
     correspondent account or a payable-through account by a 
     foreign financial institution that the President determines 
     knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions 
     Act, conducts or facilitates a significant financial 
     transaction for a person subject to blocking of property and 
     interests in property under subsection (b).

     ``SEC. 235. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN 
                   SECTORS OF IRAN THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC 
                   MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN.

       ``(a) List of Sectors.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, 
     and not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter, 
     the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress and publish in the Federal Register a list of the 
     sectors of the economy of Iran that are directly or 
     indirectly facilitating, supporting, or involved with the 
     development of or transfer to Iran of ballistic missiles or 
     technology, parts, components, or technology information 
     relating to ballistic missiles.
       ``(2) Certain sectors.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress a determination as to whether each of the 
     automotive, chemical, computer science, construction, 
     electronic, energy, metallurgy, mining, petrochemical, 
     research (including universities and research institutions), 
     and telecommunications sectors of Iran meet the criteria 
     specified in paragraph (1).
       ``(B) Inclusion in initial list.--If the President 
     determines under subparagraph (A) that the sectors of the 
     economy of Iran specified in such subparagraph meet the 
     criteria specified in paragraph (1), that sector shall be 
     included in the initial list submitted and published under 
     that paragraph.
       ``(b) Sanctions With Respect to Specified Sectors of 
     Iran.--
       ``(1) Blocking of property.--
       ``(A) In general.--The President shall, in accordance with 
     the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all 
     property and interests in property of any person described in 
     paragraph (4) if such property and interests in property are 
     in the United States, come within the United States, or are 
     or come within the possession or control of a United States 
     person.
       ``(B) Inapplicability of national emergency requirement.--
     The requirements under section 202 of the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not 
     apply for purposes of this paragraph.
       ``(2) Exclusion from united states.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United 
     States, any alien that is a person described in paragraph 
     (4).
       ``(B) Compliance with united nations headquarters 
     agreement.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the head of 
     state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if 
     admission to the United States is necessary to permit the 
     United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the 
     Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success 
     June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, 
     between the United Nations and the United States.
       ``(3) Facilitation of certain transactions.--Except as 
     provided in this section, the President shall prohibit the 
     opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the 
     maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account 
     or a payable-through account by a foreign financial 
     institution that the President determines knowingly, on or 
     after the date that is 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, 
     conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction 
     for a person described in paragraph (4).
       ``(4) Persons described.--A person is described in this 
     paragraph if the President determines that the person, on or 
     after the date that is 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act--
       ``(A) operates in a sector of the economy of Iran included 
     in the most recent list published by the President under 
     subsection (a);
       ``(B) knowingly provides significant financial, material, 
     technological, or other support to, or goods or services in 
     support of, any activity or transaction on behalf of or for 
     the benefit of a person described in subparagraph (A); or
       ``(C) is owned or controlled by a person described in 
     subparagraph (A).
       ``(c) Humanitarian Exception.--The President may not impose 
     sanctions under this section with respect to any person for 
     conducting or facilitating a transaction for the sale of 
     agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices 
     to Iran or for the provision of humanitarian assistance to 
     the people of Iran.

     ``SEC. 236. IDENTIFICATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS THAT SUPPORT 
                   THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN IN 
                   CERTAIN SECTORS OF IRAN.

       ``(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act, 
     and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress and publish in the Federal Register a list of all 
     foreign persons that have, based on credible information, 
     directly or indirectly facilitated, supported, or been 
     involved with the development of ballistic missiles or 
     technology, parts, components, or technology information 
     related to ballistic missiles in the following sectors of the 
     economy of Iran during the period specified in subsection 
     (b):
       ``(1) Automotive.
       ``(2) Chemical.
       ``(3) Computer Science.
       ``(4) Construction.
       ``(5) Electronic.
       ``(6) Energy.
       ``(7) Metallurgy.
       ``(8) Mining.
       ``(9) Petrochemical.
       ``(10) Research (including universities and research 
     institutions).
       ``(11) Telecommunications.
       ``(12) Any other sector of the economy of Iran identified 
     under section 235(a).
       ``(b) Period Specified.--The period specified in this 
     subsection is--
       ``(1) with respect to the first list submitted under 
     subsection (a), the period beginning on the date of the 
     enactment of the Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act and 
     ending on the date that is 120 days after such date of 
     enactment; and
       ``(2) with respect to each subsequent list submitted under 
     such subsection, the one-year period preceding the submission 
     of the list.
       ``(c) Comptroller General Report.--

[[Page 8887]]

       ``(1) In general.--With respect to each list submitted 
     under subsection (a), not later than 120 days after the list 
     is submitted under that subsection, the Comptroller General 
     of the United States shall submit to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress--
       ``(A) an assessment of the processes followed by the 
     President in preparing the list;
       ``(B) an assessment of the foreign persons included in the 
     list; and
       ``(C) a list of persons not included in the list that 
     qualify for inclusion in the list, as determined by the 
     Comptroller General.
       ``(2) Consultations.--In preparing the report required by 
     paragraph (1), the Comptroller General shall consult with 
     nongovernmental organizations.
       ``(d) Credible Information Defined.--In this section, the 
     term `credible information' has the meaning given that term 
     in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 
     104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 224 
     the following:

  ``Subtitle C--Measures Relating to Ballistic Missile Program of Iran

``Sec. 231. Definitions.
``Sec. 232. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons that 
              support the ballistic missile program of Iran.
``Sec. 233. Blocking of property of persons affiliated with certain 
              Iranian entities.
``Sec. 234. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain persons 
              involved in ballistic missile activities.
``Sec. 235. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain sectors of 
              Iran that support the ballistic missile program of Iran.
``Sec. 236. Identification of foreign persons that support the 
              ballistic missile program of Iran in certain sectors of 
              Iran.''.

     SEC. 206. EXPANSION OF MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN 
                   TRANSACTIONS RELATING TO BALLISTIC MISSILE 
                   CAPABILITIES OF IRAN.

       Section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513) 
     is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)(2)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)--
       (i) in clause (i), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (ii) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and
       (iii) by inserting after clause (i) the following:
       ``(ii) to acquire or develop ballistic missiles and 
     capabilities and launch technology relating to ballistic 
     missiles; or''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (E)(ii)--
       (i) in subclause (I), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (ii) by redesignating subclause (II) as subclause (III); 
     and
       (iii) by inserting after subclause (I) the following:

       ``(II) Iran's development of ballistic missiles and 
     capabilities and launch technology relating to ballistic 
     missiles; or''; and

       (2) in subsection (f)--
       (A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and moving those 
     subparagraphs, as so redesignated, two ems to the right;
       (B) by striking ``Waiver.--The'' and inserting ``Waiver.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     the''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Exception.--The Secretary of the Treasury may not 
     waive under paragraph (1) the application of a prohibition or 
     condition imposed with respect to an activity described in 
     subparagraph (A)(ii) or (E)(ii)(II) of subsection (c)(2).''.

     SEC. 207. DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
                   COMMISSION OF ACTIVITIES WITH CERTAIN SECTORS 
                   OF IRAN THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC MISSILE 
                   PROGRAM OF IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Section 13(r)(1) of the Securities 
     Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(r)(1)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``; or'' and inserting 
     a semicolon;
       (2) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E); 
     and
       (3) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following:
       ``(D) knowingly engaged in any activity for which sanctions 
     may be imposed under section 235 of the Iran Threat Reduction 
     and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012; or''.
       (b) Investigations.--Section 13(r)(5)(A) of the Securities 
     Exchange Act of 1934 is amended by striking ``an Executive 
     order specified in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(D)'' 
     and inserting ``section 235 of the Iran Threat Reduction and 
     Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, an Executive order specified 
     in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(E)''.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 13(r)(5) of the 
     Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended, in the matter 
     preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``subparagraph 
     (D)(iii)'' and inserting ``subparagraph (E)(iii)''.
       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall take effect with respect to reports required to be 
     filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the 
     date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.

     SEC. 208. REGULATIONS.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the President shall prescribe regulations to carry 
     out this title and the amendments made by this title.

                          ____________________