[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 163 (2017), Part 6]
[Senate]
[Pages 7630-7633]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                          U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

  Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. President, in addition to the Ministerial of the 
Arctic Council, as I mentioned, the eyes of the world are on this--
clearly on the important issue of U.S.-China relations.
  We had the recent President Trump and President Xi meeting in Mar-a-
Lago, and this week Madam Fu Ying, who is one of the top Chinese 
Foreign Minister officials, is going to be in Washington to meet with a 
number of us. It is something I believe this body needs to focus on 
more, this important issue of U.S.-China relations.
  Our country faces a lot of significant national security challenges 
around the world. In my view, however, the most significant long-term, 
geostrategic challenge we face is not ISIS, not al-Qaida, not Iran, 
Russia, or even North Korea. Those are very serious and immediate 
concerns, but the most significant long-term challenge we face as a 
country is the rise of China and the threat it poses to the post-World 
War II international order, led by the United States.
  This has been made clear in a series of writings by the well-known 
and respected Harvard professor, Graham Allison, beginning 2 years ago 
in 2015. In an article in The Atlantic magazine, he started to write 
about what he called the Thucydides Trap. Professor Allison is set to 
publish a book this month on the same topic. In the book, he writes 
that the defining question of global order for this generation is 
whether China and the United States can escape the Thucydides Trap.
  I have had the privilege over the last few weeks to review the book, 
and I believe it will be a ``must read'' for those who care about the 
long-term security and economic interests of the United States.
  What is he talking about? What is this issue, the Thucydides Trap? 
Why has Professor Allison been so focused on writing about it and 
addressing it?
  Thucydides is the famed Greek historian. Many actually view him as 
the father of all history, who wrote an epic historical work about the 
Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. In that 30-year war, which 
devastated both of those Greek city states, the rising power, Athens, 
challenged the established order of the ruling power, Sparta.
  The ``Thucydides Trap'' is the term Professor Allison describes when 
he talks about the strategic dilemma and danger that occurs when a 
rising power threatens a ruling power in the international system. As 
his new book explores, in the last 500 years when this has happened--
because it does happen a lot in history, and he reviews the last 500 
years--of the 16 times this has happened in the last 500 years, 12 of 
those times ended up having extensive war between the two countries. 
That is not good. Those are not great odds. Indeed, in his Atlantic 
article just 2 years ago, he concludes by saying that because of the 
seismic shifts and friction that is occurring between China and the 
United States, war between these two countries is more likely than is 
recognized at the moment. That is not good news.
  There is some good news on this because it is not just Harvard 
professors who are talking about this, such as Professor Allison, who 
is talking about the Thucydides Trap; so, too, are the Chinese.
  I, with a number of Senators, had the opportunity a few years ago, 
when President Xi Jinping visited the Senate, to meet with him. I went 
down to the Senate floor to talk about some of the issues, some of the 
ways in which we need to think about the long-term challenges with 
regard to the United States and China. The article in the Atlantic had 
just come out, so I talked about it, the Thucydides Trap, and how we 
need to avoid it. Then I literally walked into a meeting with the 
President of China and some other U.S. Senators. In his opening 
remarks, he talked about the Thucydides Trap and how China and the 
United States need to avoid it. So that is the good news. At least on 
that issue, we are on the same sheet of paper.
  There is other good news, and that is that this body--the U.S. 
Senate--in many ways, is the ideal place where we should be discussing, 
debating, developing, and, yes, implementing the kind of long-term 
strategic policies we need to address as a country and develop with 
regard to the rise of China.
  In ``The Federalist Papers,'' Madison talks about one of the 
important roles of the Senate, with its Members having 6-year terms and 
having significant powers in foreign policy, is to be able to ensure 
stable and lasting relations between the United States and other 
nations. Indeed, perhaps more than any other part of the Federal 
Government, this institution--the U.S. Senate--has the opportunity to 
act and think and debate and implement policies--strategic policies--
for the long-term interests of our Nation.
  Contrary to some conventional wisdom, where we only hear about 
American ``short-termism,'' in terms of long-term foreign policy 
issues, our country actually has a history of developing long-term 
strategic frameworks that address significant challenges to America's 
security and economic interests. Just think of the Monroe Doctrine in 
the 19th century or George Kennan's strategy of containment in the 20th 
century, dealing with the threat posed by the rise of the Soviet

[[Page 7631]]

Union and global communism. These were long-term, successful strategies 
for the United States in response to significant challenges facing our 
Nation, in part developed here in the U.S. Senate and implemented here, 
and we can do it with regard to the challenges we are facing now with 
China.
  So as we work with the executive branch on developing an American 
strategy to address the rise of China and to avoid the Thucydides Trap, 
how should we be thinking about it? What principles should we be 
focused on? Let me suggest four that we should be focused on as a 
nation.
  First, we must recognize and emphasize that the United States is an 
Asia-Pacific power; second, we must strengthen, deepen, and expand our 
comprehensive alliances with the Asia-Pacific region; third, we must 
engage with, not try to contain, China; and fourth--and perhaps most 
importantly--we must renew America's strength, particularly the 
economic power and vitality of this great Nation.
  I will turn to each of these principles in a bit more detail. As I 
mentioned first, America is an Asia-Pacific power, and we must push 
back on narratives or counterstrategies being developed in the region 
that talk about Asia for Asians, which are veiled attempts to try to 
exclude the United States from this dynamic region in the future, in 
the orders being developed in the Asia-Pacific.
  Just look at this map. Geographically, we clearly are an Asia-Pacific 
nation. A few of us, about a month and a half ago, had the opportunity, 
when Prime Minister Abe was visiting, to have breakfast with him, and I 
reminded the Prime Minister at the breakfast that not only are they a 
key ally of ours in the Asia-Pacific, but for me, as an Alaskan, they 
are also a neighbor. Just look at this map. I reminded the Prime 
Minister that my hometown of Anchorage is actually closer to Tokyo than 
it is to Washington, DC, and having just gotten off the plane from 
Anchorage, I can tell you it is a lot closer.
  When we think of our forces, whether in Alaska or Guam or Hawaii, we 
look at this map, and on U.S. territory, Alaska forces, based in my 
great State, are, for the most part, closer to the Korean Peninsula 
than forces based in Australia. So, clearly, geographically, we are an 
Asia-Pacific country.
  Of course, American history has been embedded in the Asia-Pacific for 
centuries. During World War II, the United States led the effort to win 
the war in the Pacific after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the 
bombing of Alaska, which was bombed, invaded, and occupied by the 
forces of Imperial Japan. Many Americans are not familiar with that 
history of the war.
  It is not just geographic proximity and the battles we fought to win 
World War II in the Asia-Pacific, just as important, in terms of our 
heritage as an Asia-Pacific nation, are the policies we implemented 
after World War II because it is now clear the United States has 
underwritten the peace, prosperity, and security of this entire region 
through our continued military presence, our alliances, and our 
economic engagement and power in the region.
  No country has done more than the United States to make the Asia-
Pacific the world's most dynamic and economically vibrant region, and 
it has been the policies of our great Nation over 70 years that have 
led to that. By the way, no country has benefited more from the 
established order that we put forward and established in this region 
than China, with the rise of China, in many ways, helped, encouraged, 
and moved forward by the peace and prosperity we brought to the region.
  Let me provide just one example of how the U.S. military forces in 
the region have played the key role in helping keep the relative peace. 
Our enduring naval presence has helped to keep the sealanes, where all 
of this transportation and commerce and economic growth has occurred, 
in the Asia-Pacific. That has been the U.S. Navy, for decades, doing 
that. As I mentioned, all nations of the region--ours included--have 
benefited from this order, and from our policies, and our commitment 
and our sacrifice. All nations--including and particularly true, China 
has.
  So we must flatly and completely reject policies being developed in 
the region or in Washington that forget our geography and our history. 
The United States is an Asia-Pacific power. The United States is the 
preeminent Asia-Pacific power, but many of America's core national 
interests are at stake in the region, and we will be an enduring 
presence in this part of the world for decades and centuries to come.
  Second, with regard to how to address the rise of China and the 
principles we need to think about, we must continue to strengthen, 
deepen, and expand our comprehensive set of alliances in the Asia-
Pacific region that have been built over decades. Now, the United 
States faces many global challenges, but one of the most critical 
strategic advantages that we have as a nation, in terms of security, is 
that we are an ally-rich nation and our adversaries and potential 
adversaries and competitors are ally-poor. Just think about it. Look at 
this map. Look through and think through all of the countries that are 
either treaty allies of the United States or wanting to get closer, and 
then think of other countries, including China, Russia, North Korea, 
Iran--all ally-poor. This is particularly the case in Europe and the 
Asia-Pacific. As I mentioned, these alliance systems have been built 
over decades by Democratic and Republican administrations, and what we 
need to emphasize now is we should not squander them.
  It is also the case--and we are seeing and hearing about it literally 
almost every day, whether it is countries like Russia or, yes, China 
that are constantly looking for opportunities to create schisms and 
tensions between the United States and its longstanding allies. We need 
to resist that, we need to be aware of that, and we need to focus on 
our allies. As Winston Churchill famously said, the only thing worse 
than going to war with allies is doing so without them. With regard to 
the Asia-Pacific, we have an opportunity to not just deepen existing 
alliances with critical countries like Japan and Korea, Australia, New 
Zealand, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand, we also have a unique 
opportunity to expand our alliances in the region of the Asia-Pacific 
with countries like Vietnam and India.
  In my first couple of years in the Senate, I have had the opportunity 
to travel in the region several times--in fact, every time I go home, I 
travel in the region--and meet with many of the leaders in the Asia-
Pacific when they come to Washington or when we are in the region. It 
is clear to me there is a deep interest in many countries to strengthen 
their economic and security relationships with the United States. This 
is driven, in part, by the role we have played over decades as the 
force in the region that has kept the peace and promoted prosperity, 
but this is also driven by concerns of almost every country in the 
region about China's increasingly aggressive actions, particularly in 
the South China Sea, where, despite pledges from senior Chinese leaders 
not to militarize that part of the world--not to militarize that 
critical crossroads of commerce for the entire world--they clearly are 
doing it. For a country that in many ways is renowned for taking the 
long view--for having the ability to see around the corners of 
history--China's actions are having the effect of driving more and more 
countries into the American sphere. We should seize this opportunity, 
while recognizing that the productive work, the hard work of 
maintaining our alliances in the region takes time, takes patience, 
perseverance, respect, and consistency.
  To be honest, I was a bit concerned--and I gave some speeches last 
year about this--that given some of last year's campaign rhetoric, the 
Trump administration would not emphasize the importance of our allies 
and not undertake the hard but necessary work of deepening and 
expanding key strategic relationships, but I think, to the contrary, 
they are off to a very good start. The Secretary of Defense, General 
Mattis, in his first trip overseas as the new Secretary of Defense, 
could have gone anywhere, including NATO, the Middle East, where we 
have critical

[[Page 7632]]

strategic interests, but he chose to go to Japan and Korea to cement 
these critical alliances. The Vice President just got back from a 10-
day trip to Japan, to Korea, to Australia, and to Indonesia, with stops 
in the States representing the Asia-Pacific, including my home State of 
Alaska and Hawaii, along the way.
  I had a good discussion with the Vice President recently over dinner. 
We talked mostly about this and how focused he and the administration 
were on maintaining and deepening our alliances in the region, but 
still we can always improve, especially in terms of making sure we are 
coordinating closely with all of our allies on critical decisions and 
that we keep surprises, especially on sensitive strategic issues, to a 
minimum with regard to our allies. In this regard, President Trump's 
recent statement that South Korea would have to pay for the THAAD 
missile system that we are deploying in South Korea, after the U.S. had 
previously stated we would pay, was an unforced error that I hope the 
administration will be learning from.
  Of course, this body, the U.S. Senate, also has an important role to 
play, not only in emphasizing and helping maintain our alliances by 
meeting with leaders around the world and working with them but also in 
bolstering the capabilities of our partners in the region, economically 
and militarily.
  Right now, there are initiatives that are doing just that, coming out 
of the Armed Services Committee on which I sit. One is the Asia-Pacific 
Stability Initiative, led by Senator McCain, which would do that--
increase our capabilities with our partners in the region to deepen our 
alliances.
  Our alliances clearly matter. They matter in our long-term strategy 
to address the rise of China. But, of course, so does our relationship 
with China. That is the third principle I would like to discuss.
  We must continue to engage with China, not seek to contain it, as 
some have argued. In fact, when we look at the U.S. relationship with 
China, ever since Secretary of State Kissinger and President Nixon in 
the early 1970s began having discussions with China's leadership, 
America's policy toward China has always been about engaging. It has 
never been about containing, as our strategy was with regard to the 
Soviet Union.
  Of course, it has taken different forms. We had the One China policy, 
which we are still focused on, and the Taiwan Relations Act, which was 
developed by this body in the U.S. Senate in the late 1970s. We had 
recently initiated by President Bush and continued by President Obama 
the strategic economic dialogue where senior leaders in the United 
States and China met every 6 months. I had the opportunity to 
participate in that as an Assistant Secretary of State under Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice.
  There are all kinds of different approaches to our engagement. In my 
view, the most strategic concept since the One China policy was the 
policy developed during the Bush administration by former Deputy 
Secretary of State Bob Zoellick, who went on to be the president of the 
World Bank. What he called the responsible stakeholder model was very 
well-received initially in 2006. He laid it out in a big speech, then 
went to China and focused on this.
  Essentially, the essence of that strategy was that China has greatly 
benefited from the U.S.-led international order, from the U.S.-led 
international system; therefore, it is in China's interest to become a 
responsible stakeholder in that system, to strengthen the international 
system that has so greatly enabled its own economic success.
  In the early days of the strategy, when it was launched, there was a 
lot of promise. I remember having the opportunity to go to China with 
Secretary Paulson when he was leading the strategic economic dialogue 
in the Bush administration. We would meet with all the leadership of 
China, from the President on down. At that time, every leader in these 
meetings used the term ``responsible stakeholder.'' They talked about 
it; they talked about this American concept as a framework for our 
relationship.
  Unfortunately, it doesn't seem to be working out so well now. Chinese 
officials no longer talk about being a responsible stakeholder. In 
fact, on many military and economic issues, they seem focused on 
undermining the US-led international order. Professor Allison's book 
mentions this specifically, where he says an increasingly powerful 
China is unraveling the American-led order, throwing into question the 
peace that generations in the region have taken for granted.
  When we look at the long arch of history with regard to China, this 
notion that maybe they wouldn't accept this idea of becoming a 
responsible stakeholder in our system that we created--that might not 
happen. Indeed, this was foretold by one of the wisest men in Asia, Lee 
Kuan Yew, who was the father of Singapore. Decade after decade as he 
built that country into an economic powerhouse, American leaders--
military leaders, political leaders, Presidents, Democrats, 
Republicans--would meet with Lee Kuan Yew to get his advice and wisdom.
  I had the opportunity as a young National Security Council staffer to 
be invited to a meeting with Lee Kuan Yew when I was in Singapore--one 
of the most interesting meetings of my career--with Deputy Secretary 
Bob Zoellick and our Ambassador. Lee Kuan Yew talked about Asia and 
about America's role for 2 hours.
  But in another book about Lee Kuan Yew by Professor Allison, he was 
asked about whether China would accept this idea of being a responsible 
stakeholder in the American-led international order. His answer was: Of 
course not.
  Why not? How could they aspire not to be No. 1 in Asia and in time 
No. 1 in the world?
  When asked about this concept of being a responsible stakeholder in 
this system which has benefited them, Lee Kuan Yew was complimentary of 
the concept that the Americans were trying to lay out, but he said: 
China wants to be China and, as such, not an honorary member of the 
West and their international system.
  So even though it is clear that the responsible stakeholder framework 
is not working with China, we still need to stay engaged at all 
levels--senior leaders, economic officials, military leaders. I want to 
compliment the President on how he started the relationship with 
President Xi Jinping. They seem to be off to a good start.
  At the same time, we need to continue to look at different concepts, 
different frameworks of how we continue to engage with China. Let me 
suggest one idea that I have termed ``true reciprocity.''
  As China has rejected the responsible stakeholder model, it is also 
clear they are increasingly rejecting the idea of a reciprocal 
relationship with the United States across a number of sectors. Let me 
give a couple examples.
  We look at issues like intellectual property theft. The United States 
has been raising this issue for decades. As a matter of fact, I had the 
opportunity to sit in a meeting with former President Bush, Condoleezza 
Rice, and senior Chinese officials in the Oval Office. We talked about 
this issue. The President pounded the table on this issue. The Chinese 
committed not to steal our intellectual property. Yet that continues 
unabated, now often through cyber attacks.
  We look at foreign direct investment, how Chinese companies invest in 
Europe and the United States, how they are buying companies such as 
advanced robotics, biotech, media, high-tech companies, internet 
companies. But if an American company or a Western European company 
wanted to do the same in China, we know what the answer would be. It 
would be no.
  This lack of economic reciprocity extends beyond the trading 
relationship. I attended a briefing a few weeks ago in the Senate by 
the Asia Society, which is putting out an important strategy document 
with regard to China--ideas for the Trump administration, a very 
thoughtful policy recommendation piece.
  One thing they noted in terms of diplomacy: Right now in Beijing, our 
U.S. Ambassador is typically getting only deputy minister-level access, 
deputy minister-level meetings, while

[[Page 7633]]

back here we give much higher access to ministers to the Secretary of 
State. This was essentially confirmed by former President Obama's own 
Ambassador, former Senator Max Baucus, who, in a remarkable exit 
interview about his time as Ambassador to China--a job he loved--talked 
about how, in many ways, in terms of reciprocity, we were too weak, not 
firm enough, pushed around. These are his quotes. It was an interview 
that actually didn't make a lot of news but was quite remarkable--how 
we had no strategy to deal with this, how we needed to draw our own 
redlines.
  As we develop a long-term strategy toward China to avoid the 
Thucydides Trap, we need to institute an engagement policy which looks 
at true reciprocity. I will be speaking about this more in the coming 
weeks, and I am going to be offering legislation with regard to 
reciprocity in the economic and trade relationship. But I will say, 
diplomatically speaking, this should be a no-brainer. If our Ambassador 
in Beijing gets only deputy minister-level access to Chinese officials 
in China's capital, then that is what we should provide China's 
Ambassador here. It is simple, easy.
  The final principle we need to focus on in developing our long-term 
strategy to address the rise of China is the imperative to renew 
America's strength, particularly the economic power and vitality of the 
United States. We have to be strong at home again, and we haven't been.
  I have a chart here that says it all. Over the last, really, 10 to 15 
years, we have a lost decade of economic growth. We have not been able 
to hit 3 percent GDP growth in almost 15 years. Some have called this 
the new normal; this is what we should expect. But in many ways, when 
we look at this chart--Republican, Democratic administrations--the 3-
percent line here is not a great number. It is an OK number. The 
traditional numbers of economic growth are closer to 4 percent for our 
country. But literally, in almost 15 years, we haven't hit it--not 
once. President Obama was the first President who never hit 3 percent 
GDP growth in a year, ever.
  This is not a healthy economy, and in many ways people are starting 
to question the American dream, the idea that each generation will be 
better. We have to get back to a strong economy. I certainly hope the 
Trump administration will be focusing on this. I know that many Members 
of this body are focused on this issue.
  Last quarter we didn't have a good start with the new 
administration--0.7 percent GDP growth, less than 1 percent growth. 
Economic growth, even more than military might, in many ways is the 
coin of the realm in Asia. We must get back to a robust economy.
  Many experts at home and abroad say we can't do it. They say our 
demographic challenges are too great, but I disagree. If we look at 
U.S. history, every time we are dismissed, every time someone talks 
about the decline of the great American engine of growth, whether in 
the 1930s or in the 1970s or beginning in the 1980s when Japan was 
going to overtake us--every time that has happened and the naysayers 
are out there, the U.S. economy comes roaring back. It is critical that 
we do this now.
  We have so many strategic advantages, even relative to China, with 
regard to our economy. So many of our challenges, in my view, are self-
inflicted problems that we can solve.
  Strong economic growth--at least about 3 percent--will more closely 
bind our allies to the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.
  Strong economic growth will help us rebuild our military, which has 
been drastically cut over the last 8 years. Strong economic growth will 
be critical to tackling our challenges at home, such as skyrocketing 
deficits and debt levels and crumbling infrastructure. Perhaps, most 
importantly, strong economic growth will enable us to view the future, 
including the rise of China, with confidence and not fear.
  Our great Nation succeeds when we look to the future with 
opportunity, not with trepidation. In Professor Allison's upcoming 
book, currently titled ``Destined for War: Can America and China Escape 
Thucydides's Trap,'' he notes that fear was the driving force that 
propelled Athens and Sparta into the Peloponnesian War. ``What made war 
inevitable,'' Thucydides tells us, was the rise of Athens and the fear 
this instilled in Sparta.
  In the 12 of 16 cases he reviews in his book where a rising power 
challenged an established power leading to war, fear was a key driving 
force that often precipitated war. The more our policies at home can 
renew America's strength, vitality, and confidence, the more likely in 
my view it is that we will develop clear, long-term foreign policies 
that can help us avoid the Thucydides Trap.
  I have had the opportunity in my career to view the U.S.-China 
relationship over the past two decades from a variety of different 
lenses and perspectives. Over 20 years ago, I was deployed as a young 
marine infantry officer as part of an amphibious task force to what 
later became known as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, defending U.S. 
interests in the region and those of our ally Taiwan.
  Later, I was an NSC staffer and an Assistant Secretary of State under 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and I spent a lot of time in China 
working on these issues. I became a State of Alaska official, traveling 
for my State as the commissioner of natural resources and energy. I 
have traveled to China to pursue the promise of better economic 
relations. China is now the No. 1 market for my very export-oriented 
State, for Alaska exports. Now, as a U.S. Senator, I am focused on this 
issue and cochairing the U.S.-China working group with my good friend 
Senator Daines and getting out to the region as often as possible.
  I have seen the promise, opportunity, and challenges of the U.S.-
China relationship as it has matured over the last 20 years, and I have 
deep respect for China, its history, and all that it has recently 
accomplished. I know some of the leaders there and consider them 
colleagues.
  This body, the Senate, and our country need to do more to focus on 
how to make sure that the rise of China is compatible with U.S. 
economic and national security interests and, most importantly, with 
the interests of the people we represent.
  I have laid out some core principles this evening on how we might 
begin to develop a coherent, long-term strategy and address the 
challenges and opportunities of China's rise. I hope my colleagues--
Democrats and Republicans--will work together over the years on this 
incredibly important issue. There is so much at stake and a lot of work 
to do by many in the governments, the private sector, and the 
military--both in the United States and in China and in the countries 
of the region.
  The gravitational pull of history might be working against us. There 
is a lot riding on how we address this preeminent geostrategic issue.
  Let me conclude by reading how Professor Allison, in his book, sums 
up the challenge. He states:

       The return to prominence of a 5,000-year-old civilization 
     with 1.4 billion people is not a problem to be fixed. It is a 
     condition--a chronic condition that will have to be managed 
     over a generation. Success will require not just a new 
     slogan, more frequent presidential summits, or additional 
     meetings of departmental working groups. Managing this 
     relationship without war will demand sustained attention, 
     week by week, at the highest levels in both governments. It 
     will require a depth of mutual understanding not seen since 
     the Henry Kissinger-Zhou Enlai conversations that 
     reestablished US-China relations in the 1970s. Most 
     significant, it will mean more radical changes in attitudes 
     and actions by leaders and the public alike than anyone yet 
     has undertaken. To escape Thucydides's Trap, we must be 
     willing to think the unthinkable--and imagine the 
     unimaginable. Avoiding Thucydides's Trap in this case will 
     require nothing less than bending the arc of history.

  I yield the floor.

                          ____________________