[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 163 (2017), Part 14]
[House]
[Pages 20195-20205]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




           SYSTEMIC RISK DESIGNATION IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2017

  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 667, I call 
up the bill (H.R. 3312) to amend the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act to specify when bank holding companies may be 
subject to certain enhanced supervision, and for other purposes, and 
ask for its immediate consideration in the House.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, in lieu of 
the amendment recommended by the Committee on Financial Services 
printed in the bill, an amendment in the nature of a substitute 
consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 115-49, modified by the 
amendment printed in House Report 115-474, is adopted, and the bill, as 
amended, is considered read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 3312

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Systemic Risk Designation 
     Improvement Act of 2017''.

     SEC. 2. REVISIONS TO COUNCIL AUTHORITY.

       (a) Purposes and Duties.--Section 112 of the Dodd-Frank 
     Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 
     5322) is amended in subsection (a)(2)(I) by inserting before 
     the semicolon ``, which have been identified as global 
     systemically important bank holding companies pursuant to 
     section 217.402 of title 12, Code of Federal Regulations, or 
     subjected to a determination under subsection (l) of section 
     165''.
       (b) Enhanced Supervision.--Section 115 of the Dodd-Frank 
     Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 
     5325) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``large, 
     interconnected bank holding companies'' and inserting ``bank 
     holding companies which have been identified as global 
     systemically important bank holding companies pursuant to 
     section 217.402 of title 12, Code of Federal Regulations, or 
     subjected to a determination under subsection (l) of section 
     165''; and
       (2) in subsection (a)(2)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``; or'' at the end 
     and inserting a period;
       (B) by striking ``the Council may'' and all that follows 
     through ``differentiate'' and inserting ``the Council may 
     differentiate''; and
       (C) by striking subparagraph (B).
       (c) Reports.--Section 116(a) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
     Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5326(a)) is 
     amended by striking ``with total consolidated assets of 
     $50,000,000,000 or greater'' and inserting ``which has been 
     identified as a global systemically important bank holding 
     company pursuant to section 217.402 of title 12, Code of 
     Federal Regulations, or subjected to a determination under 
     subsection (l) of section 165''.
       (d) Mitigation.--Section 121(a) of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
     Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5331) is 
     amended by striking ``with total consolidated assets of 
     $50,000,000,000 or more'' and inserting ``which has been 
     identified as a global systemically important bank holding 
     company pursuant to section 217.402 of title 12, Code of 
     Federal Regulations, or subjected to a determination under 
     subsection (l) of section 165''.
       (e) Office of Financial Research.--Section 155 of the Dodd-
     Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12 
     U.S.C. 5345) is amended in subsection (d) by striking ``with 
     total consolidated assets of 50,000,000,000 or greater'' and 
     inserting ``which have been identified as global systemically 
     important bank holding companies pursuant to section 217.402 
     of title 12, Code of Federal Regulations, or subjected to a 
     determination under subsection (l) of section 165''.

     SEC. 3. REVISIONS TO BOARD AUTHORITY.

       (a) Acquisitions.--Section 163 of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
     Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5363) is 
     amended by striking ``with total consolidated assets equal to 
     or greater than $50,000,000,000'' each place such term 
     appears and inserting ``which has been identified as a global 
     systemically important bank holding company pursuant to 
     section 217.402 of title 12, Code of Federal Regulations, or 
     subjected to a determination under subsection (l) of section 
     165''.
       (b) Management Interlocks.--Section 164 of the Dodd-Frank 
     Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 
     5364) is amended by striking ``with total consolidated assets 
     equal to or greater than $50,000,000,000'' and inserting 
     ``which has been identified as a global systemically 
     important bank holding company pursuant to section 217.402 of 
     title 12, Code of Federal Regulations, or subjected to a 
     determination under subsection (l) of section 165''.
       (c) Enhanced Supervision and Prudential Standards.--Section 
     165 of the Dodd-Frank

[[Page 20196]]

     Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 
     5365) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``with total 
     consolidated assets equal to or greater than 
     $50,000,000,000'' and inserting ``which have been identified 
     as global systemically important bank holding companies 
     pursuant to section 217.402 of title 12, Code of Federal 
     Regulations, or subjected to a determination under subsection 
     (l)'';
       (2) in subsection (a)(2)--
       (A) by striking ``(A) In general.--'';
       (B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``may'' and inserting 
     ``shall''; and
       (C) by striking subparagraph (B);
       (3) in subsection (j), by striking ``with total 
     consolidated assets equal to or greater than 
     $50,000,000,000'' and inserting ``which has been identified 
     as a global systemically important bank holding company 
     pursuant to section 217.402 of title 12, Code of Federal 
     Regulations, or subjected to a determination under subsection 
     (l)''.
       (d) Advanced Tailoring.--Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
     Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5365) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(l) Additional Bank Holding Companies Subject to Enhanced 
     Supervision and Prudential Standards by Tailored 
     Regulation.--
       ``(1) Determination.--The Board of Governors may, within 
     the limits of its existing resources--
       ``(A) determine that a bank holding company that has not 
     been identified as a global systemically important bank 
     holding company pursuant to section 217.402 of title 12, Code 
     of Federal Regulations, shall be subject to certain enhanced 
     supervision or prudential standards under this section, 
     tailored to the risks presented, based on the considerations 
     in paragraph (3), where material financial distress at the 
     bank holding company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, 
     concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities 
     of the individual bank holding company, could pose a threat 
     to the financial stability of the United States; or
       ``(B) by regulation determine that a category of bank 
     holding companies that have not been identified as global 
     systemically important bank holding companies pursuant to 
     section 217.402 of title 12, Code of Federal Regulations, 
     shall be subject to certain enhanced supervision or 
     prudential standards under this section, tailored to the risk 
     presented by the category of bank holding companies, based on 
     the considerations in paragraph (3), where material financial 
     distress at the category of bank holding companies, or the 
     nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, 
     interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the category 
     of bank holding companies, could pose a threat to the 
     financial stability of the United States.
       ``(2) Council approval of regulations with respect to 
     categories.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(B), a regulation 
     issued by the Board of Governors to make a determination 
     under such paragraph (1)(B) shall not take effect unless the 
     Council, by a vote of not fewer than \2/3\ of the voting 
     members then serving, including an affirmative vote by the 
     Chairperson, approves the metrics used by the Board of 
     Governors in establishing such regulation.
       ``(3) Considerations.--In making any determination under 
     paragraph (1), the Board of Governors shall consider the 
     following factors:
       ``(A) The size of the bank holding company.
       ``(B) The interconnectedness of the bank holding company.
       ``(C) The extent of readily available substitutes or 
     financial institution infrastructure for the services of the 
     bank holding company.
       ``(D) The global cross-jurisdictional activity of the bank 
     holding company.
       ``(E) The complexity of the bank holding company.
       ``(4) Consistent application of considerations.--In making 
     a determination under paragraph (1), the Board of Governors 
     shall ensure that bank holding companies that are similarly 
     situated with respect to the factors described under 
     paragraph (3), are treated similarly for purposes of any 
     enhanced supervision or prudential standards applied under 
     this section.
       ``(5) Use of currently reported data to avoid unnecessary 
     burden.--For purposes of making a determination under 
     paragraph (1), the Board of Governors shall make use of data 
     already being reported to the Board of Governors, including 
     from calculating a bank holding company's systemic indicator 
     score, in order to avoid placing an unnecessary burden on 
     bank holding companies.''.
       (e) Systemic Identification.--Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank 
     Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 
     5365), as amended by subsection (d), is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(m) Systemic Identification.--With respect to the 
     identification of bank holding companies as global 
     systemically important bank holding companies pursuant to 
     section 217.402 of title 12, Code of Federal Regulations, or 
     subjected to a determination under subsection (l), the Board 
     of Governors shall--
       ``(1) publish, including on the Board of Governors's 
     website, a list of all bank holding companies that have been 
     so identified, and keep such list current; and
       ``(2) solicit feedback from the Council on the 
     identification process and on the application of such process 
     to specific bank holding companies.''.

     SEC. 4. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act 
     shall be construed to prohibit the Board of Governors of the 
     Federal Reserve System from prescribing enhanced prudential 
     standards for any bank holding company which the Board of 
     Governors determines, based upon the bank holding company's 
     size, interconnectedness, substitutability, global cross-
     jurisdictional activity, and complexity, could pose a safety 
     and soundness risk to the stability of the United States 
     banking or financial system but has not been designated as a 
     global systemically important bank holding company.

     SEC. 5. EXISTING ASSESSMENT TERMINATION SCHEDULE.

       (a) Temporary Extension of Existing Assessment.--
       (1) In general.--Each bank holding company that, on the day 
     that is 24 months following the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, has total consolidated assets equal to or greater than 
     $50,000,000,000, has not been identified as a global 
     systemically important bank holding company pursuant to 
     section 217.402 of title 12, Code of Federal Regulations, and 
     has not been subjected to a determination under subsection 
     (l) of section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
     Consumer Protection Act, shall be subject to assessments by 
     the Secretary of the Treasury to the same extent as a bank 
     holding company that has been so identified or subjected.
       (2) Considerations.--In making assessments pursuant to 
     paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Treasury shall take into 
     account differences among the bank holding companies subject 
     to such assessment, based on the considerations for 
     establishing the prudential standards under section 115 of 
     the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
     (12 U.S.C. 5325).
       (3) Limitation on amount of assessments.--The aggregate 
     amount collected pursuant to paragraph (1) from all bank 
     holding companies assessed under such paragraph shall be 
     $58,000,000.
       (4) Payment period options.--The Secretary of the Treasury 
     shall offer the option of payments spread out before the end 
     of the 48-month period following the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, or shorter periods including the option of a one-
     time payment, at the discretion of each bank holding company 
     paying assessments pursuant to paragraph (1).
       (5) Assessments to be made in addition to any other 
     assessments.--The assessments collected pursuant to paragraph 
     (1) shall be in addition to, and not as a replacement of, any 
     assessments required under any other law.
       (b) Treatment Upon Determination.--A bank holding company 
     assessed under this section shall no longer be subject to 
     such assessments in the event it is identified as a global 
     systemically important bank holding company pursuant to 
     section 217.402 of title 12, Code of Federal Regulations, or 
     subjected to a determination under subsection (l) of section 
     165 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
     Protection Act. Any prior payments made by such a banking 
     holding company pursuant to an assessment under this section 
     shall be nonrefundable.

     SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       The amendments made by this Act shall take effect after the 
     end of the 18-month period following the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for 
1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority 
member of the Committee on Financial Services.
  The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hensarling) and the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Al Green) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hensarling).


                             General Leave

  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks 
and submit extraneous material on the bill under consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, today I rise in strong support of H.R. 3312, the 
Systemic Risk Designation Improvement Act of 2017.
  This very important piece of legislation was introduced by my friend, 
Mr. Luetkemeyer, who serves as chairman of the Financial Institutions 
and Consumer Credit Subcommittee of the Financial Services Committee, 
and is cosponsored by a bipartisan group of Members of the House. In 
fact, Mr. Speaker, the bill was approved in October by the Financial 
Services Committee with a very strong bipartisan vote of 47-12, so 
strong, Mr. Speaker, that even a majority of Democrats on the committee 
voted to support the bill.
  This bill reforms what Republicans and now many Democrats acknowledge

[[Page 20197]]

is a flawed and arbitrary framework under the Dodd-Frank Act to 
designate so-called systemically important financial institutions, also 
known as SIFIs. In fact, one of those Democrats who acknowledges that 
it is a flawed and arbitrary framework is none other than former 
chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, Barney Frank, the 
very Frank of Dodd-Frank, the coauthor of the Dodd-Frank Act. He, 
himself, has said that this provision in the Dodd-Frank Act that many 
of us are trying to reform today is ``arbitrary'' and ``a mistake.'' 
Those are his words, Mr. Speaker, not mine.
  That arbitrary and mistaken provision is Dodd-Frank's one-size-fits-
all standard that subjects banks with $50 billion or more in assets to 
the same costly and cumbersome SIFI regulatory standards as trillion-
dollar global systemically important institutions.
  We should take note that this flawed standard has now been criticized 
by Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen, former Federal Reserve Board 
Governor Dan Tarullo, former Comptroller of the Currency Thomas Curry, 
and many other Obama appointees. In other words, Mr. Speaker, it is 
that bad.
  Mr. Luetkemeyer's bipartisan bill--again, very strong bipartisan 
bill--replaces this inflexible, flawed, $50 billion threshold that has 
been criticized by so many with a series of well-established, critical 
standards that more accurately measure systemic importance.

                              {time}  1515

  Specifically, his legislation requires the Federal Reserve to review 
a financial institution's size, interconnectedness, global cross-
jurisdictional activity, and complexity, before determining whether the 
institution should be subject to heightened SIFI regulatory standards.
  In other words, this bipartisan bill tailors regulations based on a 
bank's actual level of risk, instead of Dodd-Frank's one-size-fits-all 
system that ensnares smaller regional and midsize banks that, 
essentially, have simple community bank lending models. These banks are 
not globally complex Wall Street banks and shouldn't be treated the 
same.
  It simply doesn't make sense to subject small regional and midsize 
banks with only $50 billion in assets to the same expensive and 
cumbersome SIFI regulatory regime as a bank like JPMorgan Chase, which 
has $2.5 trillion in assets. Based on size alone, the $50 billion bank 
is just 2 percent, 2 percent of JPMorgan Chase's size.
  What does make sense, Mr. Speaker, is to base the regulation of these 
financial institutions on their actual risk profile rather than their 
asset size alone, which is exactly what Mr. Luetkemeyer's strongly 
bipartisan bill will do.
  Now, while I personally do not support the SIFI architecture at all 
and do not believe any financial institution in America should be 
designated too big to fail, it is important that we always continue to 
work to find bipartisan reforms where we can find them and improve 
current law, and the legislation before us today represents a good 
faith effort to do exactly that.
  Let's keep in mind, Mr. Speaker, this is simply not a debate over an 
arcane definition in law. It is about the real world effect these 
regulations have on the U.S. economy and the working men and women whom 
we represent.
  Let me share with my colleagues what the Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship Council has to say about the importance of the bill 
that we are debating today: ``Access to working and growth capital 
remains a challenge for many entrepreneurs and small businesses. H.R. 
3312 would improve the lending environment and unleash capital by 
alleviating inappropriate requirements imposed on regional and midsize 
banks under Dodd-Frank. Midsize and regional banks, which many startups 
and small businesses have counted on for lending, have been negatively 
affected by this Dodd-Frank arbitrary trigger.''
  Mr. Speaker, the American people deserve better. They deserve a 
healthy economy with growing paychecks, better jobs, and a brighter 
future. It is time to restore economic growth fueled by capital flowing 
from America's banks to American communities across our Nation.
  So I urge my colleagues to correct this widely acknowledged mistake 
in Dodd-Frank, even acknowledged by former Congressman Barney Frank 
himself, and put into place real, discernible, critical standards, and 
help our struggling small businesses on Main Street. Let's pass H.R. 
3312.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. David Scott).
  Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, as the Democratic lead on 
this bill, it is very important for me to point out that I worked very 
closely with Chairman Barney Frank and the Obama administration, both 
of which admitted at the time that it was a mistake, a blunt 
instrument, to be able to just put an arbitrary figure of $50 billion 
and say they are a threat to our financial stability.
  No. Our banking system deserves better than that. The American people 
deserve better than that. It is not the amount of money that you have 
got in your assets that caused the problem; it was what they were doing 
that caused the exposure.
  So we want to substitute the $50 billion to make sure that we have a 
five-point test that the Feds will give that will be able to determine 
if they are a threat to our security and then tailor a program of 
advanced supervision that would prevent them from causing us this 
problem.
  It is a great bill. It is time we corrected it, and I ask all of my 
colleagues, both Democrats and Republicans, to do the right thing for 
the American people, and let's have a resounding ``yes'' vote for this 
SIFI bill.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Missouri (Mr. Luetkemeyer), who is the Republican sponsor of the 
legislation and the chairman of our Financial Services Subcommittee on 
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit.
  Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Mr. Speaker, I want to start by thanking Chairman 
Hensarling for his support of this legislation and his dedication to a 
more reasonable regulatory regime.
  I would also like to thank my good friend, Representative David Scott 
from Georgia, for being a cosponsor on the Democrat side and for all 
the hard work and support he has given us throughout this labor of love 
here on trying to get this thing done. He has been a champion for us, 
and we thank him sincerely.
  Today, the House will consider H.R. 3312, the Systemic Risk 
Designation Improvement Act of 2017, a bipartisan piece of legislation 
to address an inefficient regulatory structure by accounting for actual 
risk, rather than the size alone in the designation of systemically 
important financial institutions, or SIFIs.
  Under the current regulatory framework for SIFI designations, any 
bank holding company with more than $50 billion in assets is subject to 
enhanced regulatory supervision and special assessments. This approach 
fails to take into account differences in business models or risks 
posed to the financial system. It has real world implications, too, 
stunting economic growth and limiting access to credit.
  The risk of a traditional bank is not the same as an internationally 
active complex firm. In fact, the Fed has produced data showing the 
risk of every single midsize and regional bank which pales in 
comparison to risks posed by many and almost all global systemically 
important banks.
  H.R. 3312 will remove the completely arbitrary approach taken today 
and replace it with analysis of actual risk posed to the financial 
system. The bill would require regulators to examine not just size, but 
also interconnectedness, the extent of readily available substitutes, 
global cross-jurisdictional activity, and the complexity of each bank 
holding company.
  Today's method isn't a reasonable basis for supervision, a fact that 
has been recognized by Fed Chair Yellen, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin, 
and former Treasury Secretary Lew, and

[[Page 20198]]

many Members of this body. Even Barney Frank, as Chairman Hensarling 
just noted, the former Democratic chairman of the Financial Services 
Committee and author of the Dodd-Frank Act, has said the $50 billion 
threshold is completely arbitrary and has had negative implications on 
our economy.
  It is important to note that this bill will not impact the authority 
of the Federal Reserve to oversee institutions. The focused standards 
set forth in the bill don't guarantee that any institution will be 
permanently freed from the rigors that are associated with SIFI 
designation. If the Fed so feels that a bank needs to have continuous 
oversight, they will do so.
  I want to take a moment to discuss the score issued by the 
Congressional Budget Office. CBO opined that this bill would result in 
direct spending. I disagree with the CBO interpretation of what this 
legislation will do, and I believe that my bill will actually create a 
safer financial system.
  At the same time, it is important to me and my colleagues that the 
bill comes to the taxpayers at no cost. The offset included in the 
Rules Committee Print will more than cover any potential hit to the 
Deposit Insurance Fund and makes this legislation budget-neutral.
  The bottom line is this: an inefficient regulatory structure that 
does not reflect the reality of the U.S. banking system can have real 
economic consequences. We should no longer let the SIFI process lead to 
marketplace disruption or penalize companies for size alone.
  I have worked on this legislation surrounding the SIFI designation 
process for the last 4 years, but I have not done it alone. H.R. 3312 
was drafted in good faith with--and with considerable input from--many 
of my friends on the other side of the aisle as well.
  Because we worked together, this legislation received broad 
bipartisan support when it was reported by the Financial Services 
Committee with a vote of 47-12. That means nearly 80 percent of the 
committee members voted in favor of this legislation.
  I want to thank my colleagues for their help in this effort, namely, 
Mr. Scott, Ms. Sinema, Mr. Hill, Mr. Williams, Mr. Stivers, Mrs. 
Beatty, Mr. Budd, Mr. Meeks, and Mr. Gottheimer. This is an important 
issue, and I hope our colleagues will join us in supporting this 
bipartisan, commonsense measure.
  Mr. Speaker, at the end of the day, this is a bill about being able 
to allow these banks that are caught in a ``California Hotel'' 
situation here to be able to get out of this with a good analysis of 
their risk profile, their business model, because, at the end of the 
day, this is what this is all about. Their business model is not a risk 
to this country or the economic system that we have. It is not like the 
international connected banks, and, therefore, they shouldn't be 
treated as such.
  As a result, this is important for not only the midsize banks, but 
for the banks below them because the regulators have been also allowing 
these sorts of requirements and rules to roll downhill on community 
banks as well. So it is time we put a stop to this.
  It is important that we take a pragmatic approach to this designation 
process, to manage actual risk, and limit the real threats to our 
financial system.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Missouri (Mrs. Wagner), the chairwoman of the Financial Services 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.
  Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman Hensarling for his support 
and for yielding me this time.
  I am proud to rise today in support of my colleague, Chairman Blaine 
Luetkemeyer, and urge immediate passage of his bill, the Systemic Risk 
Designation Improvement Act of 2017.
  H.R. 3312 uses a commonsense approach which would allow regulators 
the opportunity to weigh multiple factors before deeming a financial 
institution systemically important.
  More importantly, the bill would allow the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council, FSOC, to more precisely identify systemic risk by 
differentiating between stable activities and those that would truly 
threaten the financial stability of the United States.
  Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal Reserve was given never-before-
seen regulatory power to supervise those that were deemed systemically 
important. Unfortunately, the Fed has chosen to ignore tailoring their 
regulatory standards and continues to base them on asset size alone.
  If an institution, indeed, is a minimal risk, then it is vital to 
make sure those standards reflect that lower risk.
  Finally, it is important to note that an arbitrary threshold does 
matter to those caught in the SIFI web. These financial institutions 
often face significant compliance costs under a SIFI designation, 
redirecting resources that otherwise would provide consumers with 
affordable financial products.
  Chairman Luetkemeyer's bill creates a framework that promotes 
responsible regulations and enforces market discipline, all while 
protecting taxpayers from unnecessary bailouts.
  Mr. Speaker, again, I want to applaud my friend, the gentleman from 
Missouri, Chairman Luetkemeyer, for his leadership on this issue. H.R. 
3312 is about smarter regulation. I urge all my colleagues to support 
Chairman Luetkemeyer's bill.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance 
of my time.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Kentucky (Mr. Barr), the chairman of the Financial Services 
Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade.
  Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of a bipartisan bill, 
the Systemic Risk Designation Improvement Act of 2017, introduced by my 
good friend and colleague, Congressman Blaine Luetkemeyer from 
Missouri.
  I also want to thank Chairman Hensarling for his leadership and, for 
my friends on the other side of the aisle, particularly Mr. David Scott 
from Georgia, for his leadership in support of this legislation.
  Among the least transparent and most mysterious black holes of the 
United States Government is the process under the Dodd-Frank financial 
control law, by which U.S. financial firms are designated too big to 
fail.
  Formally called systemically important financial institutions, or 
SIFIs, these firms are considered by all-knowing Washington bureaucrats 
as businesses so critical to the Nation's economy that they need to be 
burdened with additional regulations, supervised more strictly to 
further the cause of bureaucrats, and designated as a SIFI to send a 
clear signal to investors that it is a firm which is most likely to be 
bailed out by taxpayers during the next crisis.
  For bank SIFIs, there is a one-size-fits-all designation model that 
says that any bank with more than $50 billion in assets is 
automatically a SIFI. Bureaucrats do little to nothing to account for 
the unique nature of each institution that may indicate it is more risk 
adverse or better positioned to handle a turbulent economy.
  Bank SIFIs suffer from the same plight, in that they are not told by 
the U.S. Government what they need to do to rid themselves of the 
shackles of this SIFI designation. Instead, these firms are left in the 
dark to guess what they can do to de-risk by Federal regulators. And 
even if firms try to make reforms, they have no idea if the changes 
they are making will help them shed themselves of this arbitrary 
designation.

                              {time}  1530

  In the end, the entire SIFI process does little to make our economy 
stronger and more resilient. Instead, designated U.S. firms and their 
workers are harmed and disadvantaged relative to their international 
competition, undermining credit availability, causing weaker jobs and 
economic growth in America.
  For these reasons, I support the Systemic Risk Designation 
Improvement Act, which will give much-needed transparency to the SIFI 
designation

[[Page 20199]]

process and eliminate the arbitrary automatic SIFI designation of banks 
with $50 billion or more in assets.
  Under this legislation, banks will be judged by their merits, such as 
interconnectedness, size, cross-jurisdictional activity, complexity, 
and substitutability, and the justifications for a designation will be 
clearly communicated to them. The end result will be greater credit 
availability for small businesses, more capital formation, more help 
for consumers, greater consumer choice, greater economic growth, and 
greater competition.
  Mr. Speaker, again, I want to thank Mr. Luetkemeyer and Mr. 
Hensarling for their leadership on this critical issue, and I urge my 
colleagues to vote for this legislation.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have 
remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlemen from Texas (Mr. Al Green) has 
29 minutes remaining. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hensarling) has 
14\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, in order to better balance the time on 
each side, may I inquire if my colleague anticipates having speakers on 
the bill.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I do anticipate additional 
speakers, and I will be making comments myself.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Hultgren), the vice chairman of the Financial Services 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, and Investments.
  Mr. HULTGREN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank Chairman Hensarling for 
his continued work on this, and I also want to thank my colleague and 
friend from Missouri, Blaine Luetkemeyer, for his important work on 
this issue.
  Mr. Speaker, I am proud to be a cosponsor on this legislation because 
it is an important bill for regional banks in Illinois, but also around 
the country.
  The Financial Services Committee has spent a significant amount of 
time debating which banks should qualify as so-called community banks 
and regional banks when determining how to legislate regulatory relief.
  I have to agree that, as a bank starts getting larger, it starts 
looking less and less like a community bank. But both Republicans and 
Democrats have agreed that asset size should not be the sole 
characteristic for determining a bank's riskiness to the financial 
system.
  There are a number of banks that have successfully made use of the 
traditional community bank business model of deposit taking and lending 
that have grown in size. Some have grown substantially, and now they 
are able to serve more than one community.
  Congress should not punish these financial institutions with an asset 
threshold that even Congressman Barney Frank described as arbitrary. 
Our policies should encourage low-risk relationship lending so 
communities can benefit from institutions of different sizes. At a 
minimum, we should provide the banking regulators some flexibility to 
determine which institutions with assets over $50 billion pose higher 
risk to the financial system.
  In addition to the outstanding community banks in my district, my 
constituents also look to regional banks like BMO and Discover when 
they are trying to find best rates on mortgages, car loans, credit 
cards, or their student loans.
  Discover Financial Services, which has its headquarters just outside 
my district in Riverwoods, Illinois, has a simple business model that 
includes credit cards, student loans, home equity lending, and a number 
of deposit products that you would expect from a Main Street financial 
institution. This is the only business Discover is in. Nothing they do 
is comparable to what you might see in one of the big money center 
banks.
  So why did Congress mandate that this bank be automatically 
designated as systemically important? The current law is arbitrary and 
subjects banks to the same standards as trillion-dollar global 
systemically important institutions.
  Automatically designating these institutions as systemically 
important unnecessarily increases the cost of lending and makes it more 
difficult for my constituents to achieve their financial goals.
  Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support the Systemic Risk 
Designation Improvement Act of 2017.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, because I believe in truth in labeling, truth in 
titling, truth in the style of legislation, Mr. Speaker, I believe that 
this bill should be appropriately styled the Big Bank Bonus Bill.
  As a matter of fact, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this 
bill be styled the Big Bank Bonus Bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair cannot entertain the gentleman's 
request.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I am sorry?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair cannot entertain that request as 
the majority manager has not yielded for that purpose.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. A UC request.
  Mr. Speaker, my friends on the other side have said much about Barney 
Frank.
  Chairman Frank was a dear friend of mine. I knew him well. I still do 
know him well. Mr. Speaker, Chairman Frank has not endorsed this bill. 
The language that they have used would lead an unsuspecting person to 
conclude that Chairman Frank supports this piece of legislation. He 
does not.
  I have in my hand a letter from Chairman Frank. I will read a portion 
of it. He indicates:

       H.R. 3312 significantly increases the need for subjective 
     judgment by the regulators and very much weakens the ability 
     of financial institutions to rely on clear rules to guide 
     their decisionmaking.

  Mr. Speaker, without question, Chairman Frank does not support this 
legislation.
  My friends have made much to-do about the term ``arbitrary and 
capricious,'' a threshold that is arbitrary. What is more arbitrary 
than reducing the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent, 
which you just did? What is more arbitrary than reducing the individual 
tax rate from 39.6 percent to 37 percent, which you just did?
  You are the masters of arbitrary and capricious numbers. That bill 
that you just passed is flush with arbitrary and capricious numbers.
  Mr. Speaker, I would suggest that they examine their thoughts about 
arbitrary and capricious before we continue, because I have more to say 
about arbitrary and capricious numbers.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. 
Sarbanes), my colleague.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague for yielding 
time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to H.R. 3312. I 
appreciate my colleague's redesignation, renaming of the bill. I think 
it is much more appropriate.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a completely unwarranted piece of legislation. 
If you look at it, it is just another gift to the wealthy and the well 
connected on Wall Street.
  We keep saying that over here because it is true. It is crazy. In 
2008, the economy was brought to its knees. Reckless behavior out there 
by a lot of these huge institutions. The Nation's largest financial 
institutions crashed the economy. Everybody knows it.
  So what did we do? We took steps, smart steps. We put in place the 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protect Act of 2010. I think most 
Americans were comforted by that. They felt, okay. There are guardrails 
in place now so this kind of thing can't happen again.
  But the fact of the matter is that, as soon as the ink was dry on 
that law, lobbyists moved in, the special interests moved in, and they 
started to unwind the core provisions, and the guardrails are starting 
to come down.
  This is crazy. This is a case of amnesia at best or cynical 
capitulation to Wall Street at worst.

[[Page 20200]]

  Proponents of the legislation say this is about helping the mom-and-
pop banks on Main Street--Main Street. Were institutions like 
Countrywide and Washington Mutual and Wachovia and IndyMac--these are 
the names that haunt a lot of Americans. A lot of American households 
suffered because of the behavior of those institutions. Were they Main 
Street banks?
  The fact is, under the bill before us, some of the Nation's largest 
banks whose failure led to the carnage of 2008 would be exempt from 
heightened oversight. Exactly the kind of institutions that the public 
wants us to keep an eye on would no longer have that oversight in 
place. Of those still standing, 30 of the Nation's 38 largest financial 
institutions would escape sensible oversight imposed by Dodd-Frank.
  Even more than that, this legislation is based on the false premise 
that the reforms of Dodd-Frank were one size fits all. That is the 
phrase we always hear to justify letting go of the reins: Oh, it is one 
size fits all. People can't fit into this. We have got to do something.
  But, no, the agency was given the maneuvering room, the flexibility, 
to actually customize things and have been in a position to do that.
  There was a premium put on regulatory flexibility, explicitly 
instructing the Federal Reserve to tailor its prudential regulatory 
regime based on size and risk profile of financial institutions.
  Ironically, the changes to asset thresholds will increase the 
likelihood of consolidation as large financial institutions and banks 
can now grow, that is, buy out small players beyond the $50 billion 
threshold. The banks are going to start growing bigger again. The 
financial institutions are going to get heavier again. It makes it 
easier for them to crash through whatever guardrails we can build.
  The public doesn't want this, and that means true community banks 
very well might be absorbed by super-regional banks, which would 
decrease consumer credit access and worsen pricing.
  Mr. Speaker, Americans are tired of watching this Congress forget the 
lessons of the 2008 financial crash. They are tired of a Congress that 
routinely favors Wall Street over the interests of Main Street, and 
they are tired of the same worn-out talking points that are used to 
justify deregulation of Wall Street.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Minnesota (Mr. Emmer), a hardworking member of the Financial 
Services Committee.
  Mr. EMMER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, 10 years ago, some of America's largest financial 
institutions failed, resulting in near collapse of our entire financial 
system. The experience destroyed businesses, ruined lives across the 
country, and left fear and uncertainty in its wake.
  Congress set out to prevent a future crisis by requiring enhanced 
supervision and regulation of some of the biggest financial 
institutions in the country by passing the Dodd-Frank Act. In Dodd-
Frank, Congress defined the largest financial institutions as 
``systematically important financial institutions,'' more commonly 
referred to as SIFIs, those with more than $50 billion in assets.
  The goal of preventing our Nation's largest financial institutions 
from failing and bringing down our entire financial system is laudable. 
The problem, however, is Dodd-Frank's definition of what constitutes a 
SIFI: the $50 billion asset threshold. In fact, the creator of the 
threshold and former chair of the Financial Services Committee, Barney 
Frank, admits the threshold is arbitrary, and he supports changing the 
threshold.
  H.R. 3312, the Systemic Risk Designation Improvement Act, removes the 
arbitrary asset threshold and, instead, will classify the largest 
financial institutions by their activities. Differentiating between 
stable activities and those that could potentially threaten the 
financial stability of the United States is a more accurate way to 
identify and monitor risk.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask all my colleagues to support this important and 
appropriate policy change to ensure the continued stability of our 
financial system by passing H.R. 3312.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I would like to engage my friend from Minnesota, if I may, before he 
leaves. Would the gentleman please not leave?
  Would Mr. Hensarling ask the gentleman not to leave? I want to engage 
him.
  I would like to engage Mr. Emmer, if he will come back, please. I 
would like to engage with the gentleman for just a moment if I may.
  The gentleman declines.
  Is there anyone on the other side that I can talk to?
  I ask Mr. Hensarling, is 39.6 arbitrary, reducing the taxes on 
individuals from 39.6 to 37? What is 37? Why is it not arbitrary?
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, is the gentleman prepared to yield me 
time?
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Pardon?
  Mr. HENSARLING. Is the gentleman prepared to yield me time?
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. I yield time. Yes, of course.
  Mr. HENSARLING. How much time does the gentleman yield me?
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. I yield.
  Mr. HENSARLING. I inquire of the gentleman how much time is he 
yielding? I don't wish to be cut off.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. I yield you such time as I may deem necessary, 
if you will take time.
  Well, you may use your own time.
  Mr. HENSARLING. I am going to respectfully decline the opportunity.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the arbitrary numbers that they 
have they don't care to defend.
  Let's talk about the one-size-fits-all accusation, if you will.
  Mr. Speaker, I have a source, and it is the Department of the 
Treasury, which indicates that we have a tiered system, and we actually 
have five different tiers. These tiers will allow banks to be 
classified as small, midsize, regional, international active, and G-
SIBs.

                              {time}  1545

  There is a tiering system, but within the tiering system, we have 
given the regulators the authority to tailor rules to fit banks within 
the system.
  Mr. Speaker, my colleague mentioned institution failure. I was here. 
I know what happened in 2008. I understand why we have Dodd-Frank. We 
don't have Dodd-Frank because Mr. Dodd and Mr. Frank woke up one 
morning and decided that they would like to regulate banks to the 
extent that they were regulated.
  We have Dodd-Frank because we had a crisis. We had Dodd-Frank 
developed because of exotic products, the 327s and the 228s, which had 
teaser rates that would allow persons to get into loans that had fixed 
rates for 3 years or 2 years, and then they would have 27 years of 
variable rates or 28 years of variable rates.
  This was the exotic product that a good many people had and could not 
get out of because, quite frankly, they also had a prepayment penalty 
that would coincide with these teaser rates.
  It was a time of great crisis for banking.
  We also had the so-called credit default swaps, which were just 
another way of laying off bets. Banks found clever ways to lay off 
their bets that they thought were risky.
  We had no-doc loans, negative amortization. You could pay as much as 
you wanted and would add to the principal what you didn't pay, which 
means that you would end up paying a lot more for your loan than you 
initially started out owing.
  We had interest-only loans: just pay the interest, let the loan 
continue to increase in value.
  There was no firewall between commercial banking and investment 
banking. They finally got Glass-Steagall. Took them decades to do it, 
but they did.
  Then we had the dastardly yield spread premium, which would allow the

[[Page 20201]]

person who was servicing you, the loan originator, to qualify you for a 
loan at 5 percent, come out and shake your hand and say: Good news, you 
now have a loan for 10 percent.
  That was all lawful, but Dodd-Frank ended all of this.
  We have Dodd-Frank because we had a deregulation era, very much 
comparable to what we are about to go through now. Banks were regulated 
to the extent that they couldn't do all of these things, but we 
deregulated, just as we are about to do it now, and we will get back to 
the future, where banks will not have the liquidity necessary, where 
the credit risk that they take will be unreasonable.
  This is a bill that belongs on the trash heap of history. I adamantly 
oppose the bill. I believe that it is time for us to take the stand 
that the American people want us to take, not the stand that the big 
banks would have us take.
  This is a big bank bonus. The big banks love this bill. Thirty banks 
are going to be relieved of their obligation to let us know how to put 
them out of their misery in the event that they are about to bring the 
banking system down. Thirty banks. These are big banks, $500 billion 
max. Big banks.
  These banks will continue to give us their stress test so that we can 
know what their liquidity is and understand their credit worthiness by 
virtue of the loans that they make.
  This bill is what the big banks want, but not the American people.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Maxine Waters), the ranking member.
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, first I would like to 
thank Congressman Green for his leadership. He is a member of the 
Financial Services Committee, who is dedicated to the proposition that 
we can and should work very hard to implement Dodd-Frank.
  He has done a wonderful job in representing all of the people of this 
country when it comes to this issue of whether or not we are going to 
allow the biggest banks in this country to revert back to the practices 
that they have been involved in historically, where it caused us to be 
into a situation that caused the recession in 2008 or whether or not we 
are going to honor the work of Dodd-Frank and the reforms that were 
instituted and be about the business of fairness and justice.
  I want to thank Mr. Green for his work, for his leadership, and for 
managing this most important legislation today.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 3312, the Systemic 
Risk Designation Improvement Act.
  At a time when big banks are doing very well and the industry made 
record profits--more than $171 billion last year--and business lending 
has increased 75 percent since Dodd-Frank was signed into law, now is 
not the time to eliminate critical safeguards and reduce oversight of 
many of our largest banks.
  H.R. 3312 will roll back the enhanced prudential standards that 
currently apply to the 30 of the largest banks with more than $50 
billion in assets. These are some of the most important rules in Dodd-
Frank, like enhanced capital and stress testing that are critical to 
maintaining a safe and sound banking system that supports the broader 
economy.
  Proponents of this bill argue that Dodd-Frank imposed a one-size-
fits-all approach to any bank over $50 billion. But the law makes clear 
that the Fed should tier and tailor its rules to differentiate between 
even these large banks ``on an individual basis or by category, taking 
into consideration their capital structure, riskiness, complexity, 
financial activities (including the financial activities of their 
subsidiaries), size, and any other risk-related factors that the Board 
of Governors deems appropriate.''
  There is no one-size-fits-all mandate and the Fed has indeed tailored 
these rules. For example, the prudential rules for a trillion-dollar 
bank are much tougher compared to those that apply to a $250 billion 
bank and considerably more so compared to a $50 billion bank.
  Yet, after 18 months, this bill would exempt 30 of our largest banks 
from enhanced oversight, and it replaces the $50 billion threshold with 
a cumbersome, discretionary process led by the Federal Reserve along 
with the FSOC. We have a similar process for designating non-bank 
financial bank companies, like AIG, which have posed a systemic risk. 
So it is strange that Republicans are now pushing a similar approach 
after they repeatedly blasted the same FSOC designation process for 
being arbitrary, opaque, unfair, and unworkable.
  Those designations were heavily litigated, if not blocked in court, 
as these new designations by the Federal Reserve and the FSOC would 
likely be. Currently, there is only one non-bank designated by the FSOC 
through this process, so we should expect there would be hardly any 
designations through H.R. 3312.
  Who are these 30 massive banks that stand to benefit?
  These banks collectively hold more than $5 trillion in assets or one-
fourth of all banking assets in the United States. Of the 30 banks, 12 
of them are foreign banks, including Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Credit 
Suisse, and UBS. These banks have violated a wide range of U.S. laws, 
including anti-money laundering and unlawful trading practices, so I 
have no clue why Congress should even consider doing those banks any 
favors.
  For all the talk about helping out small community banks that serve 
our customers well in our rural and underserved neighborhoods, there is 
not a single provision that helps out these thousands of community 
banks and their customers. While some characterize this bill as helping 
``medium-sized'' banks, the medium-sized bank has only about $200 
million in assets or roughly 250 times less than the massive banks that 
benefit by this bill.
  More troubling, instead of helping community banks, the bill would 
make it easier for the largest banks to acquire smaller ones, 
accelerating a 30-year consolidation trend.
  Reasonable people can disagree on how best to dial up or down some of 
these enhanced standards and tier them more effectively--and I know my 
colleagues have good intentions--but this proposal goes way, way too 
far in reversing strong oversight of the Nation's largest banks. Even a 
Senate bill that resembles Chairman Hensarling's ``Wrong Choice Act'' 
is far less aggressive, raising the $50 billion threshold to $250 
billion, although even that proposal would be damaging.
  Let me close by emphasizing that H.R. 3312 represents one of the 
largest rollbacks of sensible rules for many of our largest banks, 
including a dozen foreign banks, at a time when the industry is making 
record profits, and such a bill would hurt and make it harder for 
community banks to compete.
  For these reasons, I strongly urge Members to oppose this bill, H.R. 
3312.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, what is the amount of time 
remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Al Green) has 
10\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hensarling) 
has 11 minutes remaining.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I am now pleased to yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Hill), a member of the Financial 
Services Committee and our Republican whip.
  Mr. HILL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for the time.
  I rise in strong support of H.R. 3312, a bipartisan bill. A majority 
of the majority party and a majority of the minority party on our 
committee reported this bill to the House floor. It is sponsored by my 
friend, Chairman Blaine Luetkemeyer, who has spent years studying Dodd-
Frank, seven long years of studying the impact of Dodd-Frank, and how 
to improve it.
  This bill removes a requirement that uses $50 billion as an asset 
test to designate whether a banking company in this country is 
systemically important and, if they are, subject them to higher 
regulatory standards.

[[Page 20202]]

  But instead of ending too-big-to-fail, Dodd-Frank's misguided 
designation regime just entrenches it, Mr. Speaker.
  Authorizing the government to designate large financial institutions 
as systemically important creates a new class of firms that markets 
will interpret and assume are too big to fail.
  The SIFI designation, as noted by many Members on this side of the 
aisle, is, in fact, arbitrary, and I respect my friend that other 
numbers in statute may be arbitrary as well. But this one doesn't have 
any economic basis on why the participants in designing Dodd-Frank 
picked $50 billion.
  But over the past 7 years, we have had witness after witness tell us 
that we should look a different direction and not have an arbitrary 
number of $50 billion.
  Several Federal Reserve officials have expressed that similar view. 
Mr. Frank, as noted, has expressed that view. So here comes Mr. 
Luetkemeyer with an excellent idea, an idea of an activities-based 
designation that the Fed has designed itself, Mr. Speaker.
  The Federal Reserve has designed the metric we are using to say that 
an institution is systemically important. It is activities-based so 
that we can distinguish between levels of risk that might be 
systemically important to our country.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from Arkansas.
  Mr. HILL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for the time.
  So activity-based standards have already been found effective by the 
Federal Reserve. They work and they were used in evaluating 
acquisitions on regional banking companies. So Mr. Luetkemeyer is on to 
a good idea. Mr. Speaker, instead of using $50 billion that was plucked 
out of thin air in the dead of night in the conference committee in 
2010, let's reflect on 7 years and operate in a better way.
  So I urge support of this bill, Mr. Speaker. I thank Mr. Luetkemeyer 
for bringing it. I urge our Senators on the other end of this building 
to look at this as a model for how we should reform Dodd-Frank in their 
own bill.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill does not impact 99 percent, approximately, of 
the banks. Most banks in this country have assets--about 89 to 90 
percent of them--of $1 billion or under.

                              {time}  1600

  This bill is for the big banks. The big banks are doing quite well. 
Last year, the banks made record profits of $171 billion. Community 
banks grew at 8.3 percent, and big banks grew at a 4.8 percent rate. 
They are lending to businesses at a record level.
  So the contention cannot be that they are doing this because banks 
are losing money. It has very little to do with how much money they are 
losing. It has a lot to do with the fact that big banks would like to 
be deregulated so that they can get back to the business as usual that 
caused the crisis of 2008.
  Mr. Speaker, there are 30 big banks this bill will impact worth more 
than $5 trillion in assets. This bill is not needed because, if this 
bill is implemented, it will cause the banks to no longer be placed 
under the $50 billion threshold, except by way of regulation from the 
prudential regulator, which won't happen easily.
  MetLife is a pretty good example of what can happen. Currently, 
MetLife is in court. They are tied up in court, probably indefinitely, 
because the big banks have big bucks, and they are going to fight being 
designated as SIFIs.
  MetLife is fighting it. It is an insurance company, of course, but it 
is fighting it. If they are going to fight the designation, you have to 
have some way to put them under the stress test, under the living wills 
test. This has to be done.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Poe of Texas). The time of the gentleman 
has expired.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself an additional 30 
seconds.
  If you don't have a trigger, it is not likely to be done, because the 
banks are going to fight you all the way through the courts and tie you 
up for years.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Maine (Mr. Poliquin), a very hardworking member of our committee.
  Mr. POLIQUIN. Mr. Speaker, all businesses in America, large and 
small, should be fairly and predictably regulated, including those 
companies in the financial services industry.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, when the real estate market collapsed in 2008, 
Washington did what it does often. It overreacted by imposing 
smothering layers of new regulations on small community banks, credit 
unions, and retirement advisers, when it should, Mr. Speaker, have 
focused its attention on eight or nine large, major money center banks 
that have tentacles that run throughout our economy.
  Mr. Speaker, the goal of Dodd-Frank was to increase regulations on 
financial institutions that could bring down the economy if they got in 
trouble.
  Now, the problem, Mr. Speaker, is that this regulatory net was cast 
so wide, it caught our small community banks and credit unions in 
having to deal with costly, unnecessary, and redundant regulations.
  I travel the State of Maine, Mr. Speaker, and meet with our small 
financial institutions. They tell me: Bruce, we are spending so much 
time and money hiring compliance officers to deal with these 
regulations instead of loan officers to make sure we get money out to 
our families and our small businesses can borrow and grow.
  God forbid, Mr. Speaker, that the Bangor Savings Bank or the Maine 
Family Federal Credit Union in Lewiston gets into trouble. If they do, 
they will not bring down this economy.
  Why in the world should they be imposing or have to deal with this 
additional layer of regulations as they are designated as a SIFI?
  Mr. Luetkemeyer's bill is a terrific bill. It is common sense. It is 
bipartisan. It will require the Federal Reserve to finally factor in 
the role and the function of these financial institutions in the 
economy, instead of arbitrarily based on assets.
  This means, Mr. Speaker, that our community banks and our pension 
advisers, our retirement advisers and credit unions will be able to 
focus on growing the economy and extending credit so our families can 
get a home mortgage, maybe buy another automobile, or maybe one of the 
lobstermen can get a new diesel put in their boat for the season.
  The is a good bill, Mr. Speaker. I am grateful that Mr. Luetkemeyer 
introduced H.R. 3312. I encourage everybody on both sides of the aisle 
to help American businesses and families by supporting this bill.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the amount of 
time I have remaining.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Al Green) has 
8 minutes remaining.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Maxine Waters).
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I think it is important 
to talk about what is happening in this country with this 
administration at this time. It is so related to what we are trying to 
explain about what this bill attempts to do.
  First of all, let me just share with you that committee Democrats 
have made repeated attempts to follow the Trump money trail and 
investigate the suspicious financial dealings of the President, his 
immediate family and his associates, including their possible 
involvement in illicit Russian financial schemes.
  Since March, Democrats have written six letters--two to committee 
Chairman Hensarling, one to Deutsche Bank, one to Deutsche Bank CEO 
John Cryan, two to Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin, and another to 
Deutsche Bank's external counsel, requesting their cooperation in 
exposing the

[[Page 20203]]

scope of Russian influence on the Trump administration.
  I have also written two letters on my own--one to Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions, another to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, 
regarding the Department of Justice's investigation into Deutsche 
Bank's Russian mirror trading scheme.
  On March 10, 2017, committee Democrats called on Chairman Hensarling 
to use the full range of the committee's investigative powers to 
examine Deutsche Bank's Russian money laundering operation and assess 
the integrity of the U.S. Department of Justice's ongoing investigation 
into the scheme, given the Trump administration's conflicts of interest 
in the matter and the revelations of Attorney General Sessions' 
communications with the Russian Ambassador. Chairman Hensarling failed 
to respond. We have heard nothing from our chairman.
  On May 23, 2017, committee Democrats sent a letter to Deutsche Bank's 
chief executive officer, John Cryan, requesting information on two 
internal reviews the bank reportedly conducted, the first on its mirror 
trading scandal and the second on whether the accounts of President 
Donald Trump and his family members held at the bank had any ties to 
Russia.
  Deutsche Bank's external counsel responded, stating that Deutsche 
Bank was unable to cooperate with the request, citing privacy concerns.
  On May 23, 2017, committee Democrats all sent a letter to Treasury 
Secretary Steven Mnuchin requesting that FinCEN provide any records to 
the committee that detail President Trump's financial ties to Russia as 
well as those of his family, his family members, and associates. 
Secretary Mnuchin failed to respond.
  It goes on and on and on. Letters were sent on June 21. We sent a 
follow-up letter to Deutsche Bank. On and on and on.
  What is important about all of this is Deutsche Bank is known and has 
been fined for many things, including money laundering. So, knowing 
that, what we are doing here is lifting oversight on Deutsche Bank, one 
of the fallen banks that would be covered by this bill.
  I think this is outrageous. I think people should know what this bill 
is all about and how it is going to put us at greater risk. We are 
dealing with limiting the oversight of banks like Deutsche Bank.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, how much time does the other 
gentleman from Texas have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Al Green) has 
4\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hensarling) has 
6 minutes remaining.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I might point out to the ranking member 
that she should read her mail, since I responded to her letter.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Davidson), a hardworking member of the Financial Services Committee.
  Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Speaker, I am so pleased to join Mr. Luetkemeyer in 
supporting his bill. I am so encouraged that this is a bipartisan bill.
  Listening to the Members opposed, I am concerned that the bill is 
being highly mischaracterized. It occurred to me that when the Member 
opposed mentioned that 97 percent of banks would not be affected by 
this, that it automatically excludes 97 percent of banks from being 
affected by this.
  Mr. Luetkemeyer doesn't pick a number and say big is bad. He says: 
Let's judge the bank by its behavior, not by the size of its balance 
sheet.
  This is a rational, measured approach, and that is why it has drawn 
bipartisan support. It is focused on solving the problem, not driving 
regulatory burdens.
  Let me explain that the SIFI designation is an arbitrary number, and 
it subjects banks with $50 billion or more in assets to the same 
standards as trillion-dollar globally important financial banks.
  So a bank with $51 billion would be regulated the same way as 
JPMorgan Chase, for example.
  Even former Chair Barney Frank, as has been mentioned, seized the 
problem. Janet Yellen seized the problem.
  People look at it and say: What can be a solution?
  The Federal Reserve has seen a possible solution as judging the 
character of the business activity. Mr. Luetkemeyer's bill firmly 
addresses that.
  A simple asset threshold captures numerous banks that are widely 
perceived to be no threat to financial stability. It also distorts 
growth decisions.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentlewoman from Wisconsin (Ms. Moore).
  Ms. MOORE. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Luetkemeyer might have had a good idea, 
but what we have really seen is an arbitrary FSOC and a Republican-
controlled Federal Reserve Board that operates without quorums. This 
may be a good idea, but until we have a financial regulatory framework 
where we can trust the people in charge, I think that we should not 
support this bill.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Indiana (Mr. Hollingsworth), a member of the Financial Services 
Committee.
  Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of 
H.R. 3312.
  This bill is really important to Hoosiers back home. Hoosiers back 
home aren't checking the financial statements of banks around the 
country. What they are checking are their own financial statements.
  According to the FDIC, the total balance of commercial and industrial 
loans smaller than $1 million has increased by only 0.18 percent since 
2018, when the U.S. GDP has grown by 26 percent.
  The total balance of nonfarm residential loans has declined by almost 
25 percent during the same time period. This is adversely impacting 
Hoosiers back home and their ability to get capital and loans to be 
able to start businesses.
  Frequently, I get the opportunity to stand up here and talk about 
one-size-fits-all regulation. But in this particular instance, we are 
truly talking about one-size-restricting-all regulation.
  Chairman Luetkemeyer uses a very strong approach. Instead of, as the 
architects of section 165 in Dodd-Frank, using size as a proxy for 
risk, he simply said: Let's use their underlying risk as an indicator 
of their actual risk. He does this by using a system already put in 
place by the Federal Reserve in actually tracking the variables that 
indicate risk of an institution.
  I strongly support the measure. I continue to strongly support the 
removal of arbitrary lines in regulation.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Maxine Waters).
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise to correct my 
chairman--I do not like to do this--however, I did check my mail, and I 
have discovered that when he responded to the August 11 letter, he let 
me know that he would not use his subpoena power to help us out. He did 
not respond at all to the March 10 letter.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I happen to have the letter in my hand. 
I would be happy to share it with the ranking member if she has 
misfiled it.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
GOTTHEIMER), a Democratic colleague.

                              {time}  1615

  Mr. GOTTHEIMER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support this bipartisan 
legislation and to thank my friend, Mr. Luetkemeyer, for working across 
the aisle with me on this commonsense measure.
  This bill is a smart, thoughtful effort to perfect and improve our 
financial safeguards, cut burdensome regulation, and spur economic 
growth. Developed with Democrats and Republicans on the committee, it 
addresses our systematic risk in the financial sector.
  With these changes, we can free up resources at smaller banks to get 
loans into the hands of New Jersey small businesses, families, and 
consumers, ultimately growing our American economy. It does so by 
making practical changes to protect New Jersey.

[[Page 20204]]

  Mr. Speaker, I urge support for this bipartisan legislation to help 
constituents in New Jersey's Fifth District.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I think that we have to reemphasize that Chairman Frank 
is not supporting this bill. I thought that the initial comment would 
be sufficient, but, again, I will read what Chairman Frank has 
delivered to us. He indicates that H.R. 3312 significantly increases 
the need for subjective judgments by the regulators and very much 
weakens the ability of financial institutions to rely on clear rules to 
guide their decisionmaking. Chairman Frank does not support this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill is not before the House because banks are 
losing money. Banks are making record profits: $171 billion last year. 
The big banks, a 4.8 percent growth rate; and community banks, an 8.3 
percent growth rate.
  This bill is before the House because the big banks want to again get 
back to business as usual, which will allow them to do many of the 
things that brought this economy to its knees.
  Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Al Green) has 
1\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, we have 30 banks with assets in 
excess of $5 trillion. These banks have been designated as SIFIs for a 
reason. They ought to have to let the regulators know how they can be 
wound down in the event there is a crisis in the economy. They ought to 
undergo stress tests.
  If a consumer wants a loan, the consumer has to demonstrate 
creditworthiness. If banks of this size are going to remain in 
business, they ought to let us know what their liquidity is and be 
required to have a certain amount of liquidity that will cause them to 
stay in business, even when we are faced with a crisis. They ought to 
be tested for their creditworthiness. That is what we currently have.
  If the $50 billion threshold is released, then they will be placed 
under the designation of SIFI only by regulators; and MetLife is proof 
positive that it is difficult, if not impossible, to do.
  AIG went under simply because it was already known to be a 
systemically important institution.
  Mr. Speaker, we must defeat this bill. I call on my colleagues to 
vote against it. It is a big-bank-bonus bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  First, I want to thank my colleague, the gentleman from Texas, for 
coming to the floor. I know how busy he is with his impeachment 
activities, so we are glad he has had an opportunity to come and share 
his views on this particular bill.
  He spent a lot of time telling us who wasn't for the bill, but he 
didn't tell us who was for it. And I would, once again, inform my 
friend, my colleague from Texas, that not only is every single 
Republican member of the House Financial Services Committee for this 
bill, but a majority of the Democrats on the committee are for this 
bill. Perhaps that is why he could find so few Democrats to speak out 
against it.
  So what we have heard, Mr. Speaker, is my colleague and the ranking 
member vociferously defend the whole idea that there should be 
institutions that are too big to fail. As they defend the Dodd-Frank 
Act, Mr. Speaker, I would like to point out that, yet again, the big 
banks have gotten bigger. Under their regulatory scheme, the big banks 
have gotten bigger and the communities banks have become fewer.
  And now what they are telling us is: Oh, no, we have got to protect 
this regime.
  Well, I don't believe in it. But what I do believe in, Mr. Speaker, 
and what Mr. Luetkemeyer believes in, is that we need to try to find 
some bipartisan solutions, some common ground, to try to make some 
common sense out of some of these regulations.
  What is fascinating to me is so many of the Obama-era regulators have 
said this $50 billion threshold makes no sense. Usually, my Democratic 
colleagues will quote Mr. Tarullo, they will quote Janet Yellen, or 
they will quote Mr. Curry. Well, all of them have said that the $50 
billion threshold is essentially arbitrary and does not work.
  So, at the end of the day, what it is doing, Mr. Speaker, is putting 
in an additional regulatory burden on banks that pose no systemic risk 
to our economy, making it more difficult to extend credit to 
hardworking Americans who need it. But for people who just voted 
against tax relief for hardworking Americans, I guess that is what I 
would expect.
  Now they want to make sure that they don't have tax relief, they 
don't have mortgages, and they don't have credit cards. That is what 
they are defending, Mr. Speaker, and it is wrong.
  On a bipartisan basis, today, I believe we are going to vote for H.R. 
3312 and make some sense out of this SIFI rule, and we will have a 
better America tomorrow.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the previous question is ordered on 
the bill, as amended.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. For what purpose does the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Al Green) seek recognition?
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise to remind my colleague 
that he will have another chance to vote on impeachment and to ask for 
a recorded vote.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is not recognized for debate.
  The question now is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, this 15-
minute vote on passage of H.R. 3312 will be followed by 5-minute votes 
on:
  The motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, S. 1536, by the 
yeas and nays; and
  Agreeing to the Speaker's approval of the Journal, if ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 288, 
nays 130, not voting 13, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 694]

                               YEAS--288

     Abraham
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Amash
     Amodei
     Arrington
     Babin
     Bacon
     Banks (IN)
     Barletta
     Barr
     Barton
     Beatty
     Bera
     Bergman
     Beyer
     Biggs
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (MI)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Blum
     Blunt Rochester
     Bost
     Brady (TX)
     Brat
     Brooks (IN)
     Brown (MD)
     Brownley (CA)
     Buchanan
     Buck
     Bucshon
     Budd
     Burgess
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Cardenas
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (TX)
     Chabot
     Cheney
     Clay
     Coffman
     Cole
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (NY)
     Comer
     Comstock
     Conaway
     Connolly
     Cook
     Cooper
     Correa
     Costa
     Costello (PA)
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crawford
     Crist
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Curbelo (FL)
     Curtis
     Davidson
     Davis, Rodney
     Delaney
     Demings
     Denham
     Dent
     DeSantis
     DesJarlais
     Diaz-Balart
     Donovan
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Dunn
     Emmer
     Estes (KS)
     Esty (CT)
     Farenthold
     Faso
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Flores
     Fortenberry
     Foster
     Foxx
     Frelinghuysen
     Gaetz
     Gallagher
     Garrett
     Gianforte
     Gibbs
     Gohmert
     Gonzalez (TX)
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gottheimer
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (LA)
     Graves (MO)
     Green, Gene
     Griffith
     Grothman
     Guthrie
     Handel
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Heck
     Hensarling
     Herrera Beutler
     Hice, Jody B.
     Higgins (LA)
     Higgins (NY)
     Hill
     Himes
     Holding
     Hollingsworth
     Hudson
     Huizenga
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurd
     Issa
     Jenkins (KS)
     Jenkins (WV)
     Johnson (LA)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     Joyce (OH)
     Katko
     Kelly (IL)
     Kelly (MS)
     Kelly (PA)
     Kihuen
     Kilmer
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)

[[Page 20205]]


     Kinzinger
     Knight
     Krishnamoorthi
     Kustoff (TN)
     Labrador
     LaHood
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Larsen (WA)
     Latta
     Lawson (FL)
     Lewis (MN)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Long
     Love
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     MacArthur
     Maloney, Sean
     Marchant
     Marino
     Marshall
     Massie
     Mast
     McCarthy
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McEachin
     McHenry
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McSally
     Meadows
     Meehan
     Meeks
     Mitchell
     Moolenaar
     Mooney (WV)
     Mullin
     Murphy (FL)
     Newhouse
     Noem
     Norman
     Nunes
     O'Halleran
     Olson
     Palazzo
     Palmer
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Perry
     Peters
     Peterson
     Pittenger
     Poe (TX)
     Poliquin
     Posey
     Ratcliffe
     Reed
     Reichert
     Rice (NY)
     Rice (SC)
     Richmond
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney, Francis
     Rooney, Thomas J.
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rosen
     Roskam
     Ross
     Rothfus
     Rouzer
     Royce (CA)
     Ruiz
     Russell
     Rutherford
     Sanford
     Schneider
     Schrader
     Schweikert
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Sewell (AL)
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sinema
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smucker
     Soto
     Stefanik
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Suozzi
     Taylor
     Tenney
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Torres
     Trott
     Turner
     Upton
     Valadao
     Veasey
     Vela
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walker
     Walorski
     Walters, Mimi
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Wenstrup
     Westerman
     Williams
     Wilson (FL)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yoder
     Yoho
     Young (AK)
     Young (IA)
     Zeldin

                               NAYS--130

     Adams
     Aguilar
     Barragan
     Bass
     Blumenauer
     Bonamici
     Boyle, Brendan F.
     Brady (PA)
     Bustos
     Butterfield
     Capuano
     Carbajal
     Carson (IN)
     Cartwright
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Chu, Judy
     Cicilline
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Crowley
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Danny
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     DelBene
     DeSaulnier
     Deutch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle, Michael F.
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellison
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Espaillat
     Evans
     Frankel (FL)
     Fudge
     Gabbard
     Gallego
     Garamendi
     Gomez
     Green, Al
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hanabusa
     Hastings
     Hoyer
     Huffman
     Jackson Lee
     Jayapal
     Johnson (GA)
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Khanna
     Kildee
     Kuster (NH)
     Langevin
     Larson (CT)
     Lawrence
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lieu, Ted
     Lofgren
     Lowenthal
     Lowey
     Lujan Grisham, M.
     Lujan, Ben Ray
     Maloney, Carolyn B.
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McGovern
     McNerney
     Meng
     Moore
     Moulton
     Nadler
     Neal
     Nolan
     Norcross
     O'Rourke
     Pallone
     Panetta
     Pascrell
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Pingree
     Polis
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Raskin
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Shea-Porter
     Sires
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Speier
     Swalwell (CA)
     Takano
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Titus
     Tonko
     Tsongas
     Vargas
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters, Maxine
     Watson Coleman
     Welch
     Yarmuth

                             NOT VOTING--13

     Bridenstine
     Brooks (AL)
     Cummings
     Jeffries
     Kennedy
     Loudermilk
     Lynch
     Messer
     Napolitano
     Pocan
     Renacci
     Scalise
     Smith (TX)

                              {time}  1649

  Ms. JACKSON LEE changed her vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Mr. CARDENAS, Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas, and Mr. RICHMOND 
changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated against:
  Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Speaker, I inadvernty missed the vote for final 
passage of H.R. 3312, the Systemic Risk Designation Improvement Act of 
2017. Had I been present, I would have voted ``Nay'' on rollcall 694.

                          ____________________