[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 163 (2017), Part 11]
[House]
[Pages 16525-16536]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




SUNSHINE FOR REGULATIONS AND REGULATORY DECREES AND SETTLEMENTS ACT OF 
                                  2017


                             General Leave

  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks 
and to include extraneous material on H.R. 469.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Norman). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from Georgia?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 577 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 469.
  The Chair appoints the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Duncan) to 
preside over the Committee of the Whole.

                              {time}  1621


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 469) to impose certain limitations on consent decrees and 
settlement agreements by agencies that require the agencies to take 
regulatory action in accordance with the terms thereof, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Duncan from Tennessee in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Collins) and the gentleman from Rhode 
Island (Mr. Cicilline) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I am glad to be here on H.R. 469. We have had the 
opportunity, through rule debate yesterday, to discuss this.

[[Page 16526]]

  What we are coming forward with today is a bill that I have 
introduced that basically breaks down to what we know is a sue and 
settlement ban on this part of my bill. There are other parts that we 
are going to get to as we go forward in this.
  But I think I want to start off this debate today by simply stating 
some of the foundational issues--things that we come here and talk 
about many times on the floor of the House have to do with bills and 
discussions. But one of the things I think that has been very 
disturbing for me--and I know many of our colleagues as we have come up 
here--is the disturbing trend of moving away from Congress relieving 
its powers and taking ownership of its Article I authority, and doing 
the oversight, doing the planning, doing the budgeting, and then sort 
of moving that more toward the executive branch or letting the judicial 
system take responsibility.
  And I think one of the things that we are starting out with today in 
these bills, that we have taken up over the past 2 days, is a general 
discussion to move back toward Article I authority, which Congress is 
doing the legislating and the oversight that it is supposed to be, and 
the executive branch is following through in their role of actually 
executing the laws that are made, judicial, of course, being the 
interpretive branch.
  What we are seeing in this bill--and one of the reasons for our sue 
and settlement legislation, which is my part of this bill, and I want 
to start here, and we will continue as we go through this through the 
other parts as we go--is really a fairness issue. And this is not 
specific to one party in the executive branch. I stated this yesterday. 
Sometimes it gets mixed up. But hear me clearly: I don't care the party 
of the resident at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. I do not care who they may 
be in the sense of what they do in that job. What I want to know is: 
Are they fulfilling the executive branch role and not overstepping 
Congress' role?
  What we have seen over previous administrations, including the last 
one and the previous administration, especially under this area of sue 
and settlement that increased greatly during the last administration, 
was this idea of taking a law that we have passed, having the 
regulatory agency's job to execute that law; but, at the same point in 
time, being sued by a friendly party, or another party, on a deadline 
of the bill, or something that they want to, they go into, say, with 
EPA or another agency, and they discuss this lawsuit. They come to an 
agreement, and they file the suit. Many times the suit and the consent 
were filed on the same day.
  The consent decree--now, look, consent decrees are good judicial 
tools. They have been used, and will continue to be used, even under 
this bill. But what we don't want to have happen is when the consent 
decree basically comes at the time of the suit, or just shortly 
thereafter, where the party that wants to see a specific agenda pushed, 
along with a willing agency, goes to a judge, is able to get that 
consent decree, and then turn around and give it to somebody else and 
say: You now have to live under this without any emphasis or any input 
from the other party.
  So we are simply saying: Let's make this a little fair. You are going 
to have to publicize notice, you are going to have to actually include 
others who may have a problem with this consent decree, and you are 
going to have to do it a little more transparently.
  So we are going to start here today, Mr. Chairman. We are going to 
talk about these issues and coming forward. We can talk about many 
other things as the day progresses, but, at the end of the day, it is 
about Congress itself taking control of its Article I authority and 
saying, ``We are going to be the legislative branch that we are called 
to be,'' and the executive taking their role and judiciary taking 
theirs.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 469, an unwarranted and 
costly intrusion into Congress' powers under Article I of the 
Constitution that will undermine the enforcement of statutory 
deadlines.
  When passing laws, Congress routinely establishes mandatory deadlines 
for agency action. These statutory deadlines serve several purposes. 
They establish congressional priorities, attempt to reduce undue delay 
in an agency's compliance with the law, and communicate the importance 
of a legal requirement to the public. But because agency resources are 
limited, there is widespread noncompliance with statutory deadlines, as 
the Administrative Conference of the United States has long observed.
  Accordingly, a plaintiff with standing may file a lawsuit to complete 
a schedule for an agency to complete an action required by Congress, 
often referred to as a ``deadline suit.'' As the nonpartisan Government 
Accountability Office, the GAO, reported earlier this year, ``Most 
deadline suits are resolved through a negotiated settlement agreement 
because, in the majority of them, it is undisputed that a statutory 
deadline was missed,'' and there was no legal defense to the lawsuit.
  But proponents of H.R. 469 assert that these settlements undercut 
applicable administrative law and short-circuit review of new 
regulations. This premise is based on a report by the Chamber of 
Commerce that the so-called sue and settle process is increasingly 
being used as a technique to shape agencies' regulatory agendas. This 
concern, however, is unsupported by any independent evidence and has 
been debunked by the GAO.
  In two reports on deadline suits, the GAO has found that, ``the 
settlement agreements did not affect the substantive basis or 
procedural rulemaking requirements,'' of the agencies it studied.
  In its December 2014 report on deadline lawsuits involving the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the GAO determined that none of the 
settlements finalized under the Obama administration ``included terms 
that finalized the substantive outcome of a rule.'' The GAO underscored 
this point in the title of its report: ``Impact of Deadline Suits on 
EPA's Rulemaking is Limited.''
  In its February 2017 report on deadline suits involving the 
Endangered Species Act, the GAO found that ``the settlement agreements 
did not affect the substantive basis or procedural rulemaking 
requirements the agencies were to follow in completing the actions, 
such as providing opportunities for public notice and comment on 
proposed listing rules.''
  Leading experts have also debunked the Chamber's sue and settle 
narrative. John Cruden, a senior career official at the Justice 
Department for more than two decades during two Republican and two 
Democratic administrations, testified on a substantially identical bill 
that he was ``not aware of any instance of a settlement that could 
remotely be described as collusive, but that the Justice Department 
vigorously represented the Federal agency, defending the agency's legal 
position, and obtaining in any settlement the best possible terms that 
were consistent with the controlling law.''
  Other administrative law experts, such as Robert Weissman, the 
president of Public Citizen, have similarly testified that sue and 
settlement allegations are patently false.
  This bill is also unnecessary because current law and agency practice 
already restrict the use of settlement policy to shape regulatory 
priorities. During its exhaustive review of deadline litigation, the 
GAO found that the Justice Department is guided by the Meese memo of 
1986, when litigating deadline suits. This policy, as the GAO noted 
earlier this year, limits the settlement of a deadline suit to ``only 
include a commitment to perform a mandatory action by an agreed upon 
schedule and would not otherwise predetermine or prescribe a specific 
substantive outcome for the actions to be completed by the agencies.''
  The Meese memo was codified in 1991, in the Code of Federal 
Regulations, and applies to settlement policy today. The Meese policy 
primarily restricts agencies from using settlement policy to

[[Page 16527]]

contravene the law or congressional intent.

                              {time}  1630

  As the majority noted in its report on a substantially identical 
version of the bill considered last Congress, this policy is grounded 
in separation of powers concerns. There is no evidence that agencies do 
not follow this policy, and the majority's witnesses in prior hearings 
on this proposal have been unable to provide examples of settlements 
that violate the Meese policies.
  H.R. 469 is also wasteful and undermines Congress' powers under 
Article I of the Constitution. Congress, not agencies, establish 
regulatory priorities through statutes. Agencies do not have discretion 
to pick and choose regulatory priorities where Congress has expressly 
instructed that certain actions be undertaken by a specific date. By 
imposing a series of onerous procedures that will constrain the use of 
settlements to resolve a Federal agency's noncompliance with the law, 
H.R. 469 erodes the constitutional function of the legislative branch.
  Finally, the bill is also costly. The Congressional Budget Office 
notes that this bill greatly lengthens the settlement process, costing 
millions of dollars and straining the Treasury's Judgment Fund through 
increased attorney's fees.
  In closing, I strongly oppose this measure.
  I now yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Conyers), our ranking member, to control.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, our system of government is a tripartite one, with each 
branch having certain defined functions delegated to it. The Congress 
is charged with writing the laws, the President with executing the 
laws, and the judiciary with interpreting them.
  The Constitution divides powers between the branches in this manner 
in order to guard against the abuse of power by any one branch. The 
separation of powers is at the core of the fundamental premise of our 
constitutional design that a limited government, divided into three 
branches exercising enumerated powers, is necessary to protect 
individual liberty and the rule of law.
  Unfortunately, over the last several decades, Congress has allowed 
its powers to gradually be chipped away at by the other branches. By 
allowing its powers to be diminished, Congress, especially this House, 
effectively is permitting the people to be deprived of their most 
responsive voice in the Federal Government. Through the legislation 
before us today and other legislation that the House has actively 
pursued in recent years, we can begin to reestablish and enforce the 
limits on the authority of the other two branches.
  Although no package of bills by itself can rebuild Congress' 
institutional strength and restore the Constitution's integrity, it is 
absolutely necessary that Congress begin reasserting the powers that it 
has ceded to the other branches. This package of bills promotes the 
restoration of Congress' Article I powers.
  The first bill in the package addresses executive branch negotiated 
regulatory decrees and settlements. Over the past several decades, 
consent decrees and settlement agreements increasingly have been used 
in Federal litigation to allow the executive branch to write new law in 
ways that give short shrift to the requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, Regulatory Flexibility Act, and other laws by which 
Congress has prescribed how agencies must conduct rulemaking.
  While the executive does have some regulatory authority, these 
settlements and consent decrees have been used to aggrandize that 
authority and shift regulatory priorities under the cloak of judicial 
authority. This subverts the boundaries both the Constitution and 
Congress have placed on administrative authority.
  The Sunshine for Regulations and Regulatory Decrees and Settlements 
Act limits the ability of the executive branch to collude with 
plaintiffs to abuse consent decrees and settlement agreements in a 
manner that allows the executive to thwart laws written by Congress and 
increases the power of the judiciary beyond its constitutional limits.
  The second bill in the package, the Judgment Fund Transparency Act, 
increases transparency over Federal spending by requiring the Treasury 
Department to publish data on settlements and court-offered judgments 
entered against the Federal Government.
  One of Congress' core powers is the authority to authorize and 
appropriate money from the Treasury. In order to properly exercise this 
power, Congress needs to know how the bill it has appropriated is being 
spent.
  This bill will allow Congress to better scrutinize and understand 
where Federal taxpayer dollars are going. Only through the transparency 
this bill provides can Congress make the executive and the judiciary 
more accountable for the money that comes out of the Judgment Fund.
  The final bill in the package, the Article I Amicus and Intervention 
Act, makes clear Congress' ability to defend and assert its 
institutional interests in litigation that puts the powers and 
responsibilities of Congress into question.
  Currently, when the executive branch declines to pursue litigation in 
defense of an act of Congress, it is not required to give Congress 
notice sufficient to allow the House or Senate to defend the lawsuit 
before court filing deadlines have expired. In addition, the House of 
Representatives, unlike the Senate, does not have a statutory right to 
intervene or file amicus briefs in cases questioning congressional 
authority. This legislation ensures that both Houses of Congress have 
adequate time and a right to intervene in litigation that questions 
congressional authority.
  We cannot continue to abdicate our powers and responsibilities to the 
other branches of government, weakening the separation of powers 
enshrined in our Constitution and threatening the very liberty divide 
powers were designed to protect.
  Mr. Chair, I ask my colleagues to support this legislation, and I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to be here to support--well, I don't 
think it is going to be support. It is really more in opposition to 
this so-called Sunshine for Regulations and Regulatory Decrees and 
Settlements Act.
  Well, why? Well, because it is anticonsumer.
  Well, why? Because it is antienvironment.
  Well, why? Because it is antiprivacy.
  Not surprisingly, a broad consortium of more than 150 organizations 
strenuously oppose this bill, including some of our best nonprofits: 
the National Resources Defense Council, for example; the Sierra Club, 
for another example; Public Citizen; and a lot of labor organizations 
and other groups.
  Title I of this bill, for example, has one goal: it is to discourage 
the use of settlement agreements and consent decrees that compel 
agencies to follow the law.
  When enacting new statutes, Congress routinely establishes deadlines 
for agency action, particularly when it involves urgent public health 
and safety concerns. When agencies fail to meet these deadlines, a 
party with standing may file a lawsuit under section 7 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act to ensure that the agency performs this 
mandatory, nondiscretionary duty. By delaying the enforcement of 
statutory deadlines, the bill, however, jeopardizes public health and 
safety, which explains why the previous Obama administration issued a 
veto threat to similar legislation considered only last Congress.
  Title I imposes nearly impossible hurdles for agencies seeking to 
resolve the deadline lawsuits and gives opponents of regulation 
multiple opportunities to stifle agency regulatory actions.
  With respect to consent decrees concerning a rulemaking, an agency 
would

[[Page 16528]]

be forced to go through two public comment periods--one for the consent 
decree, and one for the rulemaking that results from the consent 
decree--doubling the agency's effort. In addition, it would allow any 
affected party to intervene in opposition to a proposed settlement 
agreement or consent decree.
  Contrary to the claims of those who support this measure, the 
Government Accountability Office has found no evidence that these 
deadline lawsuits are collusive. As the Justice Department, which 
represents most Federal agencies, acknowledged earlier this year, these 
agencies are left with few defenses, if any, to these lawsuits.
  I am also concerned that H.R. 469 will inevitably generate more 
litigation that will result in millions of dollars of additional 
transactional costs, all of which will be borne by you know who--the 
American taxpayer.
  For example, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, in its 
analysis of the bill's predecessor from the last Congress, concluded:

       The measure would impose millions of dollars in additional 
     costs, most of which would be incurred because the litigation 
     involving consent decrees and settlement agreements would 
     probably take longer under the bill, and agencies would face 
     additional administrative requirements.

  That is a quotation. In other words, Title I of this bill is a costly 
solution, again, in search of a problem.
  Now, Title II of the bill isn't much better. For instance, Title II 
overrides the Privacy Act to require publication of sensitive personal 
information of victims of government abuse or unlawful conduct, which 
raises serious privacy concerns.
  Although proponents of this measure argue it will increase government 
transparency, its real effect will be to force the Treasury Department 
to publish, on the Internet, the names of individual victims of 
government misconduct compensated for their claims by the Judgment 
Fund, including victims of race and sex discrimination, and so, in 
effect, revictimizing victims harmed by the Federal Government.
  Finally, Title III would facilitate the ability of the House majority 
to intervene in pending cases where the Justice Department has already 
determined that it will not defend the constitutionality of a Federal 
law.
  Not only do these provisions raise possible separation of powers 
concerns, it is unclear why they are even needed.
  This measure has not ever been the subject of a single hearing or 
markup by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives. As a 
result, there has not been any opportunity to consider these critical 
issues and to analyze the ramifications presented by Title III.
  For all of these reasons, I must, accordingly, urge my colleagues to 
oppose H.R. 469.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comments, 
especially of my friend from Rhode Island. I would agree in principle 
with the Meese amendment as well. The problem is that, through the 
Clinton administration and through preceding administrations, it has 
been watered down. I would actually go back to that. The problem is 
lack of transparency and the lack of a coherent voice here as we go 
further, but I do appreciate the comments.
  Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina 
(Mr. Norman).
  Mr. NORMAN. Mr. Chair, I rise today in overwhelming and adamant 
support of H.R. 469, the Sunshine for Regulations and Regulatory 
Decrees and Settlements Act, which will strengthen Article I powers for 
Congress.
  Let me begin by briefly quoting Article I, Section 8 of our 
Constitution, the Necessary and Proper Clause: ``The Congress shall 
have the power . . . to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers . . . in the 
government,'' meaning, Congress must continue to respect and reinforce 
the idea of the separation of powers in our government, but, at the 
same time, Congress can ultimately decide when, whether, and how to 
legislate the powers and authority of another branch of government.

                              {time}  1645

  Mr. Chairman, this piece of legislation will go a long way in 
fortifying the balance of powers and reestablishing Congress' authority 
set forth by James Madison and our Founding Fathers and Article I of 
the United States Constitution.
  Furthermore, we must be sure to use our constitutional authority to 
effectively guarantee and ensure that government is more efficient, 
transparent, and accountable to all American citizens of our great 
Nation, and this bill will do just that.
  It is time for Congress to establish procedures for honest 
regulations, transparency within the Treasury Department, and judicial 
intervention in unconstitutional court cases.
  Mr. Chairman, again, I rise in full support of H.R. 469, and I urge 
all of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and in both Chambers to 
make sure this is a government not only of the people, but for the 
people.
  Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 469, 
the newly renamed Congressional Article I Power Strengthening Act.
  This bill stitches together three unrelated bills, each one 
problematic in its own way.
  Title III of the bill, the Article I Amicus and Intervention Act, 
would permit as a right the House to intervene as a party where an 
amicus in a lawsuit with the Department of Justice declines to defend 
the constitutionality of a law or regulation.
  While this proposal may have some merit, it was introduced only last 
week. It was the subject of no hearing. It has had no markup. We simply 
do not know the full implications of the measure. If it is a worthy 
proposal, we should take the time to consider it in committee before 
moving forward.
  Title II of the legislation, the Judgment Fund Transparency Act, 
would require additional reporting about the funds paid out of the 
Treasury Department's Judgment Fund by the United States Government to 
resolve legal claims against it. This legislation raises significant 
privacy concerns. It would require publishing sensitive, personally 
identifying information about individual claimants who are the victims 
of government misconduct, such as medical malpractice, racial 
discrimination, or sexual harassment.
  Our laws should carefully balance the need for public disclosure of 
government spending with the need to protect the personal privacy of 
individual citizens. This bill upsets that balance.
  By far, the most concerning aspect of this legislation is Title I, 
the Sunshine for Regulations and Regulatory Decrees and Settlements 
Act.
  This provision also poses as a transparency measure, but its real aim 
is to disrupt and delay the process for issuing rules that protect 
public health and safety.
  Congress frequently sets a statutory deadline for an agency to 
complete a rulemaking, but the agency sometimes misses that deadline. 
Under current law, private parties can sue the agency to meet its 
statutory obligations. Since there is little dispute that the agency 
has failed to do its duty, these lawsuits often end up settling, with 
the agency agreeing to a new schedule in which to complete the required 
rulemaking. That is perfectly reasonable.
  However, the Republican majority and the businesses that are the 
subject of such regulation believe these lawsuits have some nefarious 
purpose. They have concocted an imagined vast conspiracy by which 
private parties collude with the government to file a lawsuit, and the 
government happily either settles or enters into a consent decree, 
supposedly allowing it to impose obligations or rules beyond what it 
could otherwise do.
  Unfortunately for supporters of this bill, there is no evidence of 
such a conspiracy and no evidence, in fact, of any problem. To solve 
this nonexistent problem, this bill adds numerous procedural 
requirements before a settlement or consent degree can be entered into.
  The effect of these requirements would be to make any settlements or

[[Page 16529]]

consent decrees more difficult and more time-consuming to enter into, 
with the predictable result that agencies will not even bother to enter 
into them at all.
  Most troubling, the bill would create a special and more permissive 
rule for virtually any party to involve itself in the case as an 
intervener. These interveners would do their best to ruin, block, or 
delay any settlement, including during what should be private 
negotiations.
  That, of course, is the true purpose of this bill. They seek to tie 
government agencies up in years of litigation so that they are unable 
to issue rules protecting public health and safety. The real conspiracy 
here is the Republican plot to destroy the regulatory state. With one 
hand, we defund the agencies; and with the other hand, we build all 
sorts of hurdles in the regulatory process so that the agencies have no 
ability to complete their work.
  It is a shameful effort that may save big businesses some money and 
regulatory compliance, but it will cost our citizens their health, 
their safety, and possibly their lives.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to oppose this terrible 
legislation.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I don't believe, as was just 
stated, that there is a nefarious plot here. It is to get government 
doing the regulation it should with transparency--and that is what 
needs to be done--and have Congress do what it should be doing, and 
that is writing laws and having the regulatory process start from here. 
That is simply what we are looking at. If that is too much, I 
understand.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. 
Stewart).
  Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Mr. Collins and 
Chairman Goodlatte for their work.
  Mr. Chairman, I have to say, in listening to this debate, I can't 
imagine why anyone would oppose this legislation that is entirely 
designed to create transparency. This is good work that Chairman 
Goodlatte and Mr. Collins have worked on.
  Last week we heard a number of shocking stories about government 
malfeasance, such as Chairman Goodlatte's investigation that the 
government had settled and revealed that the Obama Justice Department 
had funneled money to politically allied groups. We are grateful for 
that.
  Today we are taking up H.R. 469, and I am thrilled that this 
legislation includes the text of my bill, the Judgment Fund 
Transparency Act.
  As I said, the purpose of this act is really very simple. Actually, 
contrary to what has been said, it is to bring simplicity, it is to 
bring transparency. This bill would go a long way to providing our 
constituents and taxpayers a better idea of how their tax dollars are 
spent.
  Heaven knows, and for heaven's sake, those of us here certainly know 
that sometimes the Federal Government makes mistakes. It is not 
perfect. It is prone to errors and it can cause harm to individuals. 
And when that happens, especially when these errors are particularly 
egregious, the government is sued and damages can be awarded.
  Early on, in fact, this Congress spent a lot of its time doing 
nothing but that, sorting through claims and making appropriations to 
pay those claims. In fact, not even 100 years ago, much of this body's 
work was consumed only by this topic. It wasn't until 1956 that 
Congress established the Judgment Fund and gave authority to the 
Treasury Department to resolve these claims in ``a permanent and 
indefinite appropriation.'' That has simply been abused.
  In keeping with the law, the Treasury Department files a yearly 
report with Congress and maintains a web page that supposedly can be 
searched. That sounds good, but it doesn't work that way. It is cryptic 
and has otherwise limited information related to each payout that has 
made the data almost entirely worthless. There is no information on 
what the government did. There is no information on the claimant. We 
are all familiar with, for example, when the previous administration 
took $1.3 billion out of the fund and converted it to cash and 
delivered it to Iran.
  Four years ago, The New York Times reported what was likely an 
illegal billion-dollar payout to farmers who had never even sued the 
government. This isn't just unacceptable, it is crazy. It is horrible 
government. It is what leads people to distrust the Federal Government.
  It would require the Treasury to make payment out of this fund 
public, and it would include very simple things that common sense would 
simply demand.
  This bill would name the agency. It would name the name of the 
plaintiff and the amount that they were paid, then a brief description 
of the facts around that claim.
  Mr. Chairman, I will conclude by just saying the Judgment Fund 
Transparency Act may not prevent bad decisions by all government 
employees, but it will shine a light on decisions to the American 
people. It is about helping to increase trust between the American 
people and government, a government that we have given them reason not 
to trust. Let's bring in accountability and transparency to that.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this bill and the 
language found within this bill.
  Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I just want to again remind folks that, during the course of this 
argument, we have heard this narrative about the problems with the sue 
and settle, as Mr. Nadler described it, an imagined, concocted vast 
conspiracy, but without any evidence that it actually exists, a 
solution in search of a problem.
  Just to remind folks, there were two reports done by the GAO--I have 
them in my hand; they are thick--that, in fact, undermine the 
suggestion that there is any such problem.
  In response to requests from the Republican committee chairs, the 
Government Accountability Office has twice concluded that agencies 
cannot and do not circumvent the rulemaking system through settlements 
relating to statutory deadlines.
  Finally, we received testimony earlier this year from Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions' Justice Department that current agency policy, 
which was codified in 1991, prohibits circumventing the rulemaking 
process through deadline lawsuits. We have heard similar testimony from 
career Justice Department officials in prior administrations.
  I ask the question: How is H.R. 469 necessary in light of this 
complete lack of support for this so-called sue and settle phenomenon 
and the presence of controls against this from happening in the first 
instance?
  Mr. Chair, again, there is just no evidence to support the necessity 
for this. I think it has been articulated very well by my colleagues 
what the dangers are of moving forward with this legislation.
  Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the 
gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Johnson), a member of the Judiciary 
Committee.
  Mr. JOHNSON of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to speak in 
favor of H.R. 469, the Sunshine for Regulations and Regulatory Decrees 
and Settlements Act.
  This is an important piece of legislation because, as has been noted 
here, it seeks to increase accountability on the regulatory process by 
providing greater scrutiny of sue and settle cases. Yes, they do exist.
  It requires the Department of Justice to release details of payments 
made through the Judgment Fund, and it strengthens Congress' ability to 
intervene on litigation regarding the constitutionality of 
congressional statutes.
  This legislation also includes H.R. 1096, the Judgment Fund 
Transparency Act, which I am proud to cosponsor. That piece of 
legislation includes an amendment I offered, which would require the 
Secretary of the Treasury to clearly display the total expenditures, 
including the attorney's fees, interest, and all other payments made 
from the Judgment Fund on an annual basis.
  Hardworking taxpayers deserve to know where their tax dollars are 
being

[[Page 16530]]

spent, and Congress must ensure that programs like the Judgment Fund 
are following the law. The American people must be allowed every 
available tool to keep their government accountable, and this will be 
an important tool.
  Also, it would ensure a terrorist organization is prohibited from 
receiving any taxpayer funds from the Judgment Fund by prohibiting any 
foreign terrorist organization, as defined in section 219 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.
  That statute clearly classifies a terrorist organization as those who 
``engage in terrorist activity or terrorism, and the organization 
threatens the security of the United States nationals or the national 
security of the United States.''
  These terrorist organizations only seek to commit serious harm or 
potential targets, of course, including Americans, and I believe this 
prohibition is warranted to be included in this important legislation.
  Let me be clear. We should all agree that not a cent of taxpayer 
dollars should ever go to a state sponsor of terrorism or foreign 
terrorist organizations. A recent illustration of the need for this ban 
on funding to state sponsors of terrorism is what we now know about the 
previous administration. They paid $1.3 billion from the Judgment Fund 
to the nation of Iran in a settlement dating back over 30 years. 
Although all the information surrounding this payment was never made 
clear to the public, Iran still remains a state sponsor of terrorism, 
the most notorious one.
  Mr. Chair, again, I strongly support H.R. 469. We must never allow 
taxpayer dollars to be given to violent rogue nations that support 
terrorists or, obviously, terrorist organizations, and this will ensure 
a constitutional check on the Judgment Fund. This is about Article I, 
the authority of this body. For that reason, Mr. Chairman, I strongly 
support it, and I encourage our colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, I just want to say I am baffled by the gentleman from 
Louisiana's assertion that this legislation improves accountability. It 
is very hard to imagine how undermining the enforcement of duly enacted 
legislation by Congress of the United States improves accountability.
  This is like the upsidedown world. How does that improve 
accountability, making it more difficult to enforce the laws passed by 
Congress of the United States?
  Mr. Chairman, I just want to say in closing that it is very important 
to note that my opposition to H.R. 469 is joined by a very broad 
spectrum of organizations, including the American Federation of Labor 
and Congress of Industrial Organizations, or AFL-CIO; the American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees; Public Citizen; 
Consumer Federation of America; the National Consumer Law Center; the 
Natural Resources Defense Council; the Sierra Club; Earthjustice; and 
People for the American Way; among many others.
  Mr. Chairman, I think that is company, which should suggest to my 
colleagues that this legislation does not benefit the American people, 
it will undermine the actions of Congress.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge everyone to vote ``no,'' and I yield back the 
balance of my time.

                              {time}  1700

  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  In closing, I just want to say that this is not just something that 
has been dreamed up, as far as from a bill perspective. And they can 
point to studies that say this may or may not be a part, but even the 
outside organization, the Environmental Council of the States, sent a 
letter and basically did a resolution that said there is a need to 
reform State participation in EPA consent decrees which settled through 
citizen lawsuits. I mean, this is an issue because there is not the 
transparency that is needed. That is why these bills are here.
  I would just like to remind everyone why we are considering this bill 
today, going back to where we first started, and why the House passed 
the Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act and the Congressional Subpoena 
Compliance and Enforcement Act earlier this week: to help restore and 
reinforce the powers the people gave Congress in Article I of the 
Constitution.
  Restoring and reinforcing these powers is not some academic issue; 
this is something that we practice every day. It goes back to as early 
as our elementary school days dealing with our simple civics, saying 
this is the way our government is set up.
  I have said this before, Mr. Chairman, from this podium, and I will 
say it again. If the people in agencies down the street would like to 
make law, then I encourage them to leave their job, run for Congress, 
and come up here and make law. This is not their job to do it from a 
cubicle down the street through a lawsuit. We need to do it up here, as 
it should be properly done.
  So, for far too long, Congress has been giving away its power. We 
want to see that change. We are going to see that. That is why this 
bill is here. And although this bill alone is certainly not a silver 
bullet for restoring the power the Congress has ceded, just as powers 
are gradually lost over time, they will be regained by Congress 
gradually reasserting itself.
  I ask my colleagues to join me in support of this legislation to 
reassert congressional authority and to ensure that individual liberty 
protected by the powers of separation of powers between the branches is 
maintained.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express my strong opposition 
to H.R. 469 the ``Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act'' 
of 2017.
  H.R. 469 is yet another attempt to undermine the ability of Federal 
regulators to protect the health and safety of Americans.
  This ill-conceived bill imposes numerous new procedural burdens on 
agencies and courts intended to dissuade them from using consent 
decrees and settlement agreements to resolve enforcement actions filed 
to address agency noncompliance with the law.
  H.R. 469 targets consent decrees and settlement agreements involving 
congressionally mandated federal agency actions.
  These agency actions in many instances have the purpose of protecting 
civil rights, health, safety, and the environment.
  H.R. 469 prescribes a host of burdensome--and, in some cases, 
ambiguous--steps for courts and parties relating to such consent 
decrees and settlements that would favor continued litigation over 
settlement.
  H.R. 469 establishes a prolonged process of publication, 
intervention, and court-supervised mediation for these types of 
settlements.
  This prolonged process would waste judicial, individuals, and local 
governments' resources, while wealthy corporations are empowered to 
perpetuate violations of federal rules.
  Such hurdles to settlements conflict directly with the expressly 
stated and longstanding policy of the federal judiciary system to favor 
compromise and the settlement of disputes in order to make the best use 
of limited resources.
  Proponents of this legislation argue that agencies and interest 
groups collude to ``sue and settle'' to avoid compliance with the 
procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.
  These allegations are unfounded in fact.
  The consent decrees and settlement agreements at issue do not 
determine the substance of agency rules.
  Rather, such agreements simply seek to enforce mandatory statutory 
and procedural duties (such as deadlines enacted by Congress).
  In fact, a December 2014 Government Accountability Office report 
surveyed settlements over deadlines for major U.S. Environmental 
Protection Act rulemakings and found that the settlements did not 
influence the substantive results.
  Furthermore, all public notice and comment requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the individual laws at issue still 
apply when an agency undertakes the substantive action for which a 
deadline was missed.
  Parties and non-parties alike are provided with numerous 
opportunities to provide input in advance of the rules being finalized.
  H.R. 469 undermines protections for the American people, masqueraded 
as a measure to prevent undocumented and unfounded allegations of ``sue 
and settle'' collusion between public interest plaintiffs and 
sympathetic federal agencies entering into consent decrees and 
settlements.

[[Page 16531]]

  In fact, H.R. 469 favors industry interests at taxpayer expense and 
promotes regulatory uncertainty by making it virtually impossible to 
actually enter into consent decrees and settlements that avoid the 
costly and time consuming alternative of litigation.
  But its most serious flaw is that H.R. 469 is really a back door way 
to derail the rulemaking process and undermine federal law, shifting 
limited agency resources away from the implementation of health and 
safety protections for the very people that we are supposed to be 
representing.
  What this bill truly targets are the legal rights of citizens to hold 
government accountable by enforcing laws designed to protect health, 
safety, and the environment, obligations that the supporters of this 
bill would prefer to remain unenforced.
  A broad coalition of more than 150 civil rights, environmental, 
consumer protection and other public interest groups opposed the bill 
in the last Congress.
  On Monday, October 23, 2017, I received a letter signed by 86 
environmental protection and civil rights groups urging me to oppose 
this bill.
  A bill that attempts to give third parties the power to obstruct and 
delay the enforcement of federal law; which will harm plaintiff 
corporations, state and local governments, nonprofit groups, and 
individuals alike, when their interests have been harmed by illegal 
federal agency actions or inactions.
  Consent decrees and settlement agreements are simple, streamlined 
ways to hold federal agencies accountable when they ignore Congress by 
failing to commit congressionally mandated actions by a date 
established in statute.
  H.R. 469 is a sad attempt to eliminate vital and broadly supported 
protections that have improved and saved millions of American lives.
  By providing opportunities for industry to subvert or delay the 
process of redressing injured groups, H.R. 469 effectively makes it 
more expensive for agencies to do what Congress has mandated, that is 
to protect the American people and redress any harm to their 
livelihood.
  Some of the unwholesomeness of this bill could have been mitigated 
had the Jackson Lee amendment to H.R. 469 been made in order.
  The Jackson Lee amendment would have excepted consent decrees or 
settlement agreements that pertain to a reduction in illness or death 
from exposure to toxic substances in communities that are protected by 
Executive Order 12898.
  Executive Order 12898 directs federal agencies to identify and 
address the disproportionately high and adverse human health and 
environmental effects of agency action on minority and low-income 
populations.
  It is impossible to understand why even conservative Republicans 
would back legislation that hinders enforcement of the law, requires 
agencies to waste money in court on cases they believe they cannot win, 
and would stymie industry and state settlements along with all others.
  I urge all members to vote against H.R. 469 and reject this harmful 
legislation.
  The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Mitchell). All time for general debate has 
expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment 
under the 5-minute rule.
  It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose 
of amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 115-34. That 
amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

                                H.R. 469

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Congressional Article I Powers Strengthening Act''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

     TITLE I--SUNSHINE FOR REGULATIONS AND REGULATORY DECREES AND 
                              SETTLEMENTS

Sec. 101. Short title.
Sec. 102. Definitions.
Sec. 103. Consent decree and settlement reform.
Sec. 104. Motions to modify consent decrees.
Sec. 105. Effective date.

                  TITLE II--JUDGMENT FUND TRANSPARENCY

Sec. 201. Short title.
Sec. 202. Judgment fund transparency.

              TITLE III--ARTICLE I AMICUS AND INTERVENTION

Sec. 301. Short title.
Sec. 302. Congressional intervention as of right.
Sec. 303. Intervention and amicus authority for house of 
              representatives.

     TITLE I--SUNSHINE FOR REGULATIONS AND REGULATORY DECREES AND 
                              SETTLEMENTS

     SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Sunshine for Regulations 
     and Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2017''.

     SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title--
       (1) the terms ``agency'' and ``agency action'' have the 
     meanings given those terms under section 551 of title 5, 
     United States Code;
       (2) the term ``covered civil action'' means a civil 
     action--
       (A) seeking to compel agency action;
       (B) alleging that the agency is unlawfully withholding or 
     unreasonably delaying an agency action relating to a 
     regulatory action that would affect the rights of--
       (i) private persons other than the person bringing the 
     action; or
       (ii) a State, local, or tribal government; and
       (C) brought under--
       (i) chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code; or
       (ii) any other statute authorizing such an action;
       (3) the term ``covered consent decree'' means--
       (A) a consent decree entered into in a covered civil 
     action; and
       (B) any other consent decree that requires agency action 
     relating to a regulatory action that affects the rights of--
       (i) private persons other than the person bringing the 
     action; or
       (ii) a State, local, or tribal government;
       (4) the term ``covered consent decree or settlement 
     agreement'' means a covered consent decree and a covered 
     settlement agreement; and
       (5) the term ``covered settlement agreement'' means--
       (A) a settlement agreement entered into in a covered civil 
     action; and
       (B) any other settlement agreement that requires agency 
     action relating to a regulatory action that affects the 
     rights of--
       (i) private persons other than the person bringing the 
     action; or
       (ii) a State, local, or tribal government.

     SEC. 103. CONSENT DECREE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM.

       (a) Pleadings and Preliminary Matters.--
       (1) In general.--In any covered civil action, the agency 
     against which the covered civil action is brought shall 
     publish the notice of intent to sue and the complaint in a 
     readily accessible manner, including by making the notice of 
     intent to sue and the complaint available online not later 
     than 15 days after receiving service of the notice of intent 
     to sue or complaint, respectively.
       (2) Entry of a covered consent decree or settlement 
     agreement.--A party may not make a motion for entry of a 
     covered consent decree or to dismiss a civil action pursuant 
     to a covered settlement agreement until after the end of 
     proceedings in accordance with paragraph (1) and 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2) of subsection (d) 
     or subsection (d)(3)(A), whichever is later.
       (b) Intervention.--
       (1) Rebuttable presumption.--In considering a motion to 
     intervene in a covered civil action or a civil action in 
     which a covered consent decree or settlement agreement has 
     been proposed that is filed by a person who alleges that the 
     agency action in dispute would affect the person, the court 
     shall presume, subject to rebuttal, that the interests of the 
     person would not be represented adequately by the existing 
     parties to the action.
       (2) State, local, and tribal governments.--In considering a 
     motion to intervene in a covered civil action or a civil 
     action in which a covered consent decree or settlement 
     agreement has been proposed that is filed by a State, local, 
     or tribal government, the court shall take due account of 
     whether the movant--
       (A) administers jointly with an agency that is a defendant 
     in the action the statutory provisions that give rise to the 
     regulatory action to which the action relates; or
       (B) administers an authority under State, local, or tribal 
     law that would be preempted by the regulatory action to which 
     the action relates.
       (c) Settlement Negotiations.--Efforts to settle a covered 
     civil action or otherwise reach an agreement on a covered 
     consent decree or settlement agreement shall--
       (1) be conducted pursuant to the mediation or alternative 
     dispute resolution program of the court or by a district 
     judge other than the presiding judge, magistrate judge, or 
     special master, as determined appropriate by the presiding 
     judge; and
       (2) include any party that intervenes in the action.
       (d) Publication of and Comment on Covered Consent Decrees 
     or Settlement Agreements.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days before the date on 
     which a covered consent decree or settlement agreement is 
     filed with a court, the agency seeking to enter the covered 
     consent decree or settlement agreement shall publish in the 
     Federal Register and online--
       (A) the proposed covered consent decree or settlement 
     agreement; and
       (B) a statement providing--

[[Page 16532]]

       (i) the statutory basis for the covered consent decree or 
     settlement agreement; and
       (ii) a description of the terms of the covered consent 
     decree or settlement agreement, including whether it provides 
     for the award of attorneys' fees or costs and, if so, the 
     basis for including the award.
       (2) Public comment.--
       (A) In general.--An agency seeking to enter a covered 
     consent decree or settlement agreement shall accept public 
     comment during the period described in paragraph (1) on any 
     issue relating to the matters alleged in the complaint in the 
     applicable civil action or addressed or affected by the 
     proposed covered consent decree or settlement agreement.
       (B) Response to comments.--An agency shall respond to any 
     comment received under subparagraph (A).
       (C) Submissions to court.--When moving that the court enter 
     a proposed covered consent decree or settlement agreement or 
     for dismissal pursuant to a proposed covered consent decree 
     or settlement agreement, an agency shall--
       (i) inform the court of the statutory basis for the 
     proposed covered consent decree or settlement agreement and 
     its terms;
       (ii) submit to the court a summary of the comments received 
     under subparagraph (A) and the response of the agency to the 
     comments;
       (iii) submit to the court a certified index of the 
     administrative record of the notice and comment proceeding; 
     and
       (iv) make the administrative record described in clause 
     (iii) fully accessible to the court.
       (D) Inclusion in record.--The court shall include in the 
     court record for a civil action the certified index of the 
     administrative record submitted by an agency under 
     subparagraph (C)(iii) and any documents listed in the index 
     which any party or amicus curiae appearing before the court 
     in the action submits to the court.
       (3) Public hearings permitted.--
       (A) In general.--After providing notice in the Federal 
     Register and online, an agency may hold a public hearing 
     regarding whether to enter into a proposed covered consent 
     decree or settlement agreement.
       (B) Record.--If an agency holds a public hearing under 
     subparagraph (A)--
       (i) the agency shall--

       (I) submit to the court a summary of the proceedings;
       (II) submit to the court a certified index of the hearing 
     record; and
       (III) provide access to the hearing record to the court; 
     and

       (ii) the full hearing record shall be included in the court 
     record.
       (4) Mandatory deadlines.--If a proposed covered consent 
     decree or settlement agreement requires an agency action by a 
     date certain, the agency shall, when moving for entry of the 
     covered consent decree or settlement agreement or dismissal 
     based on the covered consent decree or settlement agreement, 
     inform the court of--
       (A) any required regulatory action the agency has not taken 
     that the covered consent decree or settlement agreement does 
     not address;
       (B) how the covered consent decree or settlement agreement, 
     if approved, would affect the discharge of the duties 
     described in subparagraph (A); and
       (C) why the effects of the covered consent decree or 
     settlement agreement on the manner in which the agency 
     discharges its duties is in the public interest.
       (e) Submission by the Government.--
       (1) In general.--For any proposed covered consent decree or 
     settlement agreement that contains a term described in 
     paragraph (2), the Attorney General or, if the matter is 
     being litigated independently by an agency, the head of the 
     agency shall submit to the court a certification that the 
     Attorney General or head of the agency approves the proposed 
     covered consent decree or settlement agreement. The Attorney 
     General or head of the agency shall personally sign any 
     certification submitted under this paragraph.
       (2) Terms.--A term described in this paragraph is--
       (A) in the case of a covered consent decree, a term that--
       (i) converts into a nondiscretionary duty a discretionary 
     authority of an agency to propose, promulgate, revise, or 
     amend regulations;
       (ii) commits an agency to expend funds that have not been 
     appropriated and that have not been budgeted for the 
     regulatory action in question;
       (iii) commits an agency to seek a particular appropriation 
     or budget authorization;
       (iv) divests an agency of discretion committed to the 
     agency by statute or the Constitution of the United States, 
     without regard to whether the discretion was granted to 
     respond to changing circumstances, to make policy or 
     managerial choices, or to protect the rights of third 
     parties; or
       (v) otherwise affords relief that the court could not enter 
     under its own authority upon a final judgment in the civil 
     action; or
       (B) in the case of a covered settlement agreement, a term--
       (i) that provides a remedy for a failure by the agency to 
     comply with the terms of the covered settlement agreement 
     other than the revival of the civil action resolved by the 
     covered settlement agreement; and
       (ii) that--

       (I) interferes with the authority of an agency to revise, 
     amend, or issue rules under the procedures set forth in 
     chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code, or any other 
     statute or Executive order prescribing rulemaking procedures 
     for a rulemaking that is the subject of the covered 
     settlement agreement;
       (II) commits the agency to expend funds that have not been 
     appropriated and that have not been budgeted for the 
     regulatory action in question; or
       (III) for such a covered settlement agreement that commits 
     the agency to exercise in a particular way discretion which 
     was committed to the agency by statute or the Constitution of 
     the United States to respond to changing circumstances, to 
     make policy or managerial choices, or to protect the rights 
     of third parties.

       (f) Review by Court.--
       (1) Amicus.--A court considering a proposed covered consent 
     decree or settlement agreement shall presume, subject to 
     rebuttal, that it is proper to allow amicus participation 
     relating to the covered consent decree or settlement 
     agreement by any person who filed public comments or 
     participated in a public hearing on the covered consent 
     decree or settlement agreement under paragraph (2) or (3) of 
     subsection (d).
       (2) Review of deadlines.--
       (A) Proposed covered consent decrees.--For a proposed 
     covered consent decree, a court shall not approve the covered 
     consent decree unless the proposed covered consent decree 
     allows sufficient time and incorporates adequate procedures 
     for the agency to comply with chapter 5 of title 5, United 
     States Code, and other applicable statutes that govern 
     rulemaking and, unless contrary to the public interest, the 
     provisions of any Executive order that governs rulemaking.
       (B) Proposed covered settlement agreements.--For a proposed 
     covered settlement agreement, a court shall ensure that the 
     covered settlement agreement allows sufficient time and 
     incorporates adequate procedures for the agency to comply 
     with chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code, and other 
     applicable statutes that govern rulemaking and, unless 
     contrary to the public interest, the provisions of any 
     Executive order that governs rulemaking.
       (g) Annual Reports.--Each agency shall submit to Congress 
     an annual report that, for the year covered by the report, 
     includes--
       (1) the number, identity, and content of covered civil 
     actions brought against and covered consent decrees or 
     settlement agreements entered against or into by the agency; 
     and
       (2) a description of the statutory basis for--
       (A) each covered consent decree or settlement agreement 
     entered against or into by the agency; and
       (B) any award of attorneys fees or costs in a civil action 
     resolved by a covered consent decree or settlement agreement 
     entered against or into by the agency.

     SEC. 104. MOTIONS TO MODIFY CONSENT DECREES.

       If an agency moves a court to modify a covered consent 
     decree or settlement agreement and the basis of the motion is 
     that the terms of the covered consent decree or settlement 
     agreement are no longer fully in the public interest due to 
     the obligations of the agency to fulfill other duties or due 
     to changed facts and circumstances, the court shall review 
     the motion and the covered consent decree or settlement 
     agreement de novo.

     SEC. 105. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       This title shall apply to--
       (1) any covered civil action filed on or after the date of 
     enactment of this title; and
       (2) any covered consent decree or settlement agreement 
     proposed to a court on or after the date of enactment of this 
     title.

                  TITLE II--JUDGMENT FUND TRANSPARENCY

     SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Judgment Fund Transparency 
     Act of 2017''.

     SEC. 202. JUDGMENT FUND TRANSPARENCY.

       (a) Transparency Requirement.--Section 1304 of title 31, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(d)(1) Unless the disclosure of such information is 
     otherwise prohibited by law or court order, the Secretary of 
     the Treasury shall make available to the public on a website, 
     as soon as practicable, but not later than 30 days after the 
     date on which a payment under this section is tendered on or 
     after January 1, 2016, the following information with regard 
     to that payment:
       ``(A) The name of the specific agency or entity whose 
     actions gave rise to the claim or judgment.
       ``(B) The name of the plaintiff or claimant.
       ``(C) The name of counsel for the plaintiff or claimant.
       ``(D) The amount paid representing principal liability, and 
     any amounts paid representing any ancillary liability, 
     including attorney fees, costs, and interest.
       ``(E) A brief description of the facts that gave rise to 
     the claim.
       ``(F) The name of the agency that submitted the claim.
       ``(G) Any information available on reports generated by the 
     Judgment Fund Payment Search administered by the Treasury 
     Department.
       ``(2) In addition to the information described in paragraph 
     (1), if a payment under this section is made to a foreign 
     state on or after January 1, 2016, the Secretary of the 
     Treasury shall make available to the public in accordance 
     with paragraph (1), the following information with regard to 
     that payment:
       ``(A) A description of the method of payment.
       ``(B) A description of the currency denominations used for 
     the payment.
       ``(C) The name and location of each financial institution 
     owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a foreign 
     state or an agent of a foreign state through which the 
     payment passed or

[[Page 16533]]

     from which the payment was withdrawn, including any financial 
     institution owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a 
     foreign state or an agent of a foreign state that is holding 
     the payment as of the date on which the information is made 
     available.
       ``(3) Not later than January 1, 2018, and annually 
     thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall make 
     available to the public on the website described in paragraph 
     (1)--
       ``(A) the total amount paid under this section during the 
     year preceding the date of the report; and
       ``(B) the amount paid under this section during the year 
     preceding the date of the report--
       ``(i) for attorney fees;
       ``(ii) for interest; and
       ``(iii) for all other payments.
       ``(4) In this subsection, the term `foreign state' has the 
     meaning given the term in section 1603 of title 28.
       ``(e) Except with regard to children under eighteen, the 
     disclosure of information required in this section shall not 
     be considered a `clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
     privacy' for purposes of title 5, United States Code.
       ``(f) No payment may be made under this section to a state 
     sponsor of terrorism, as defined in section 1605A(h) of title 
     28, or to an organization that has been designated as a 
     foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).''.
       (b) Implementation.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
     carry out the amendment made by this section by not later 
     than 60 days after the date of enactment of this title.

              TITLE III--ARTICLE I AMICUS AND INTERVENTION

     SEC. 301. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Article I Amicus and 
     Intervention Act of 2017''.

     SEC. 302. CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION AS OF RIGHT.

       (a) Deadline for Report on Limitation on Enforcement of 
     Laws.--Paragraph (2) of section 530D(b) of title 28, United 
     States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(2) under subsection (a)(1)(B), within such time as will 
     reasonably enable the House of Representatives and the Senate 
     to take action, separately or jointly, to intervene in a 
     timely fashion in the proceeding, but in no event--
       ``(A) later than 30 days after the making of each 
     determination; and
       ``(B) later than 21 days before any applicable deadline for 
     filing any pleading necessary--
       ``(i) to defend or assert the constitutionality of the 
     provision at issue; or
       ``(ii) to request review of any judicial, administrative, 
     or other determination adversely affecting the 
     constitutionality of such provision;''.
       (b) Intervention as of Right.--Section 530D of title 28, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(f) Intervention as of Right.--The Senate or House of 
     Representatives may intervene as of right in any proceeding 
     referenced in subsection (a)(1)(B) in order to defend or 
     assert the constitutionality of any provision of any Federal 
     statute, rule, regulation, program, policy, or other law, or 
     to appeal or request review of any judicial, administrative, 
     or other determination adversely affecting the 
     constitutionality of any such provision. Notwithstanding any 
     otherwise applicable time limits or other provisions of law 
     to the contrary, if such intervention is filed not later than 
     21 days after receipt of the notice required by this section 
     the intervention shall be deemed timely and shall preserve 
     the right of the Senate or House of Representatives to 
     advance any applicable legal arguments in favor of the 
     constitutionality of any such provision.''.

     SEC. 303. INTERVENTION AND AMICUS AUTHORITY FOR HOUSE OF 
                   REPRESENTATIVES.

        Section 101 of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 
     2000 (2 U.S.C. 5571), is amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (d); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following (and 
     redesignating succeeding subsections accordingly):
       ``(c) House of Representatives Intervention and Amicus 
     Authority.--
       ``(1) Actions or proceedings.--When directed to do so in 
     accordance with the Rules of the House of Representatives, 
     the General Counsel of the House of Representatives shall 
     intervene or appear as amicus curiae in the name of the 
     House, or in the name of an officer, committee, subcommittee, 
     or chair of a committee or subcommittee of the House, or 
     other entity of the House, in any legal action or proceeding 
     pending in any court of the United States or of a State or 
     political subdivision thereof.
       ``(2) Intervention or appearance as of right.--Intervention 
     as a party or appearance as amicus curiae shall be of right 
     and may be denied by a court only upon an express finding 
     that such intervention or appearance is untimely and would 
     significantly delay the pending action or, in the case of 
     intervention, that standing to intervene is required and has 
     not been established under section 2 of article III of the 
     Constitution of the United States.
       ``(3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed to confer standing on any party seeking to 
     bring, or jurisdiction on any court with respect to, any 
     civil or criminal action against Congress, either House of 
     Congress, a Member of Congress, a committee or subcommittee 
     of a House of Congress, any office or agency of Congress, or 
     any officer or employee of a House of Congress or any office 
     or agency of Congress.''.

  The Acting CHAIR. No amendment to that amendment in the nature of a 
substitute shall be in order except those printed in part A of House 
Report 115-363 and the amendment designated in the order of the House 
of October 24, 2017. Each such amendment may be offered only in the 
order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, 
shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified 
in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an 
opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject 
to a demand for division of the question.


           Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Collins of Georgia

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 
printed in part A of House Report 115-363.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I rise as the designee of 
Chairman Goodlatte, and I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 16, line 2, insert after ``otherwise prohibited by 
     law'' the following: ``(other than section 552a of title 5, 
     United States Code)''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 577, the gentleman 
from Georgia (Mr. Collins) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, the Department of the 
Treasury's interpretation of current law prohibits it from making 
public the names of plaintiffs. My amendment clarifies that these 
names, which this bill requires to be disclosed, will, in fact, be 
disclosed.
  In January 2016, it was reported that the United States agreed to pay 
$1.7 billion to Iran in a settlement arising from an agreement to sell 
military equipment to Iran prior to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. At the 
time, it was known that $400 million in cash had been transferred to 
Iran, but it was unclear, even after public inquiry, how the remaining 
$1.3 billion had been paid.
  On August 22, 2016, the New York Sun reported that, while conducting 
an ongoing but fruitless search of ``Iran'' as a claimant in the 
Treasury database, it found 13 payments totaling 13 cents less than 
$1.3 billion, as well as an additional payment of just over $10 
million. Without further context, however, the New York Sun could not 
confirm whether these payments were, in fact, part of the settlement.
  It was only after months of increased public scrutiny, long after the 
money had been disbursed, that the previous administration acknowledges 
that these payments were indeed part of the Iran settlement.
  My amendment will ensure that the public knows about the conduct of 
its government and the laws that are being faithfully executed and that 
justice is being served. The information that this bill requires to be 
disclosed, which, in many cases is already publicly available in court 
documents, informs Congress and the public in new ways, particularly 
with regard to systemic government abuse.
  Furthermore, any concerns about the disclosure of the plaintiffs' 
names are mitigated by the fact that this amendment does not foreclose 
a court's ability to protect private information. Indeed, the 
information required to be made public in title II will not be 
disclosed if such disclosure is prohibited by a court order. Moreover, 
Federal judges have ample discretion to allow a plaintiff to proceed 
under the pseudonym as a ``Doe plaintiff'' or to seal and redact 
intimate records.
  My amendment is necessary to prevent future government abuse by 
increasing the overall transparency of the Judgment Fund and, in turn, 
increasing government accountability.
  I urge my colleagues to support this important clarification, and I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Chairman, I seek time in opposition to the 
amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Rhode Island is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important to say at 
the

[[Page 16534]]

outset this is not about clarifying anything. This is about a major 
change in policy.
  This amendment will permit the publication of a victim's sensitive 
information, such as the individual's name and case history, on the 
internet. This overrides the Privacy Act.
  So let's be clear about what this is. This is not a clarification. 
This is a major change in policy.
  This amendment will make a bad bill even worse. It specifies that the 
Privacy Act does not prohibit the publication of a victim's sensitive 
information, such as his or her name and case history.
  Under current law, the Treasury Department cannot, for the purposes 
of the Judgment Fund, publish the sensitive information of individuals 
who are victims of government abuse or misconduct, such as a name or 
case history. This is because the Privacy Act requires an individual's 
consent prior to publishing their name or other sensitive information.
  Although proponents of this amendment may claim that this information 
is, in some instances, already publicly available, the Supreme Court 
has recognized that a person's privacy interests and their personal 
information collected in government records does not automatically 
dissolve because such information may be available to the public 
already in some other format. Individuals have the right to control the 
dissemination of their own personal information. This amendment makes 
it clear that the bill will infringe on an individual's personal 
privacy if he or she is compensated from the Judgment Fund.
  Moreover, this amendment does not further the public interest in 
government transparency. Publishing an individual person's name on the 
internet sheds no significant light on the inner workings of government 
and has no value; and so, to the contrary, it will result in 
potentially grave harassment or even intimidation.
  Revealing this information is an unwarranted intrusion on personal 
privacy of individuals harmed by government misconduct, which could 
include victims of medical malpractice as well as racial and sexual 
discrimination. In effect, it revictimizes the victims of government 
misconduct or abuse--a terrible result.
  So, therefore, I oppose this amendment which does not do anything to 
improve the bill and, in fact, makes it considerably worse.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this amendment. 
And if you vote for it, recognize that you will have to go home and 
tell your constituents that you have agreed to a serious invasion of 
their personal privacy and that it will allow individuals who are 
victims of government misconduct to have that personal information put 
on the internet and shared with millions of people all over the world.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, you can also go home and tell 
them, if they filed a suit, that it is already currently in the PACER 
system, probably with more information than just that, or they could 
have filed it under a pseudonym or had their lawyers have this 
suppressed. This is an issue that is already out there; and as we look 
at this, this is moving forward. So I would just ask that this 
amendment be reported favorably.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Collins).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Conyers

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 made 
in order by the order of the House of October 24, 2017.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

 An Amendment Offered in Lieu of Amendment No. 2 Printed in Part A of 
      House Report No. 115-363 Offered by Mr. Conyers of Michigan

       Page 3, line 17, strike ``; and'' and insert ``, other than 
     an excepted consent decree or settlement agreement;''.
       Page 4, line 4, strike the period and insert ``; and''.
       Page 4, insert after line 4 the following:
       (6) the term ``excepted consent decree or settlement 
     agreement'' means a covered consent decree or covered 
     settlement agreement that prevents or is intended to prevent 
     discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, or 
     any other protected category.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 577, the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, my amendment would exempt from H.R. 469 
settlement agreements and consent decrees intended to prevent 
discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, or other 
protected category.
  Given the often systemic nature of discriminatory conduct, settlement 
agreements and consent decrees provide an invaluable means to provide 
for general relief for non-identifiable victims and to prevent future 
discriminatory acts.
  In particular, they are instrumental in enforcing critical civil 
rights protections in a wide variety of cases, including voting rights 
violations and predatory lending practices based on race. Other 
examples include the use of consent decrees by the Justice Department 
to address unconstitutional police pattern or practice activities.
  For example, in 2003, the City of Detroit entered into a consent 
decree with the Justice Department concerning the inappropriate use of 
force and arrest practices by the city's police department. As a result 
of this decree, the police department implemented vastly improved 
practices that have substantially reduced the incidence of fatalities 
caused by law enforcement activities, a goal that the Judiciary 
Committee Chairman Goodlatte and I very much endorse.
  According to the department's civil rights division, these decrees 
facilitate institutional reforms, such as improving systems for 
supervising officers and holding them accountable for misconduct, as 
well as ensuring officers have the policy guidance, training, 
equipment, and other resources necessary for constitutional and 
effective policing.
  Unfortunately, H.R. 469 would make the use of such remedies 
exceedingly difficult by subjecting them to numerous procedural and 
potentially meritless court challenges.
  A particularly concerning provision of this bill is its broad and 
ill-defined authorization allowing virtually anyone to intervene with 
respect to a proposed settlement agreement or consent decree.
  For example, imagine a proposed settlement agreement intended to 
restrict a city's school district from discriminating against Muslims. 
Under the bill, any anti-Muslim or neo-Nazi organization could petition 
the court to intervene for the purpose of opposing such agreement on 
the ground that it ``would affect'' such person.
  This is just one of the many fundamental problems presented by this 
thoroughly flawed and, I think, harmful measure, and, so, accordingly, 
I ask my colleagues here to join me in opposing H.R. 469.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, with much respect for my 
ranking member on my committee--we have served together; we have worked 
on a lot of issues together, namely, the Police Working Group, and 
other things, and his work has been very helpful in that regard--I do 
have to oppose this amendment because, really, what this amendment does 
is seek less transparency, public participation, and judicial review 
for consent decrees and settlement agreements for regulations that 
allegedly will help to protect civil rights.
  With all due respect, I believe this has matters backwards. More 
transparency, public input, and judicial scrutiny will only help to 
produce regulations that better protect civil rights.

[[Page 16535]]

  Further, since the bill promotes the participation of regulated 
entities and State, local, and Tribal entities that may be affected by 
or help to enforce the regulations, it will promote buy-in from these 
groups. That will help the regulation to be better and more promptly 
implemented and not held for years in litigation challenging the rules.
  I would urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1715

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, although H.R. 469 has many flaws, I am 
particularly concerned that the bill's broad and ill-defined 
requirements would effectively delay and possibly deter civil 
enforcement agencies from providing general relief in discrimination 
cases, discourage courts from enforcing these settlements, and also 
invite costly and needless litigation.
  In response to this problem, my amendment would simply exclude from 
the bill's burdensome requirements settlement agreements and consent 
decrees intended to remediate generalized harms in civil rights cases.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a commonsense amendment, and I urge my 
colleagues here to support it.
  Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).
  The amendment was rejected.


           Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Johnson of Georgia

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 
printed in part A of House Report 115-363.
  Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 3, line 17, strike ``; and'' and insert ``, other than 
     an excepted consent decree or settlement agreement;''.
       Page 4, line 4, strike the period and insert ``; and''.
       Page 4, insert after line 4 the following:
       (6) the term ``excepted consent decree or settlement 
     agreement'' means a covered consent decree or covered 
     settlement agreement pertaining to a deadline established by 
     Congress through the enactment of a Federal statute to--
       (A) significantly improve access to affordable, high-speed 
     broadband internet in under-served markets, such as low-
     income and rural communities; and
       (B) facilitate economic development in locations without 
     sufficient access to such service.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 577, the gentleman 
from Georgia (Mr. Johnson) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia.
  Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support my amendment 
to H.R. 469, and to advocate for rural Georgians and Americans across 
the country who don't have dependable access to broadband internet 
services.
  We are here today debating H.R. 469, a bill that would require 
burdensome and unnecessary processes that would delay the enforcement 
of Federal regulations. H.R. 469 undermines the ability of government 
agencies to protect public health and safety by prohibiting them from 
using consent decrees and settlements to enforce the law that we pass 
by allowing private industry to intervene in opposition to regulations 
that they deem unfavorable to them. It requires the publishing of the 
personal data of those who bring complaints against the government, 
thus deterring complaints.
  My amendment would ensure that future actions taken by Congress to 
increase broadband access in rural areas are not stymied by these 
excessive regulatory burdens. My amendment would exempt any future 
legislation, or any future rules that may be enacted to bring this 
technology to underserved areas from the requirements put in place by 
H.R. 469.
  It shouldn't be groundbreaking news that, in many of our districts, a 
gap exists between urban and rural communities insofar as broadband 
connectivity is concerned. The Fourth District of Georgia has some 
rural pockets that are facing this challenge today.
  According to a study done by the Pew Research Center in 2016, rural 
Americans are still 10 percentage points less likely than average 
citizens to have broadband access at home. Although we have seen 
improvements since the 16-point gap in 2007, we have much work to do to 
ensure that all families have access to what is now a modern necessity.
  My home State of Georgia ranks 21st in the Nation in terms of access 
to 25 megabit per second broadband, according to a report put together 
by the Georgia House and Senate Study Committee on High Speed Broadband 
Communications Access for all Georgians. In rural counties where this 
problem persists, we have seen local development stall without access 
to telehealth services, educational materials, and other digital 
resources.
  Broadband connectivity brings with it countless learning 
opportunities and exchanges of information that are not possible in 
isolated communities without broadband. The issue of broadband access 
is inextricably linked to the vitality of these rural areas, and it is 
in our best interest as a Congress to give rural communities all of the 
modern tools they need to succeed.
  The FCC's 2016 Broadband Progress Report identified 24 million rural 
Americans throughout the country who don't have a broadband 
connection--24 million Americans whose access would be delayed even 
further by the implementation of H.R. 469's elimination of consent 
decrees.
  I hope Congress can agree on the importance of achieving full 
broadband access, and I hope that this amendment will begin removing 
this hurdle that is being put in place by my friends on the other side 
of the aisle who support business as opposed to people.
  Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this 
commonsense amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. I was just sitting here, Mr. Chairman, and I 
am excited and welcome my friend from Georgia to the fight for 
broadband. I have been leading on this fight now for several years, 
especially in my district, which is rural, which has a company called 
Windstream that does not provide for its citizens. I am excited to have 
the acknowledgment that rural broadband is something that we need to be 
fighting for.
  My district has areas in which Windstream was supposed to use its 
Connect America funds to widen its footprint on rural broadband. 
Instead, they have shrunk it, only to compete in areas where they are 
competing against other companies, and only widening it in areas where 
they already had technology which they could have widened years before.
  I think it is really interesting, and I am so glad about this because 
it also gives me the opportunity to talk about the GO Act, the Gigabyte 
Opportunity Act, which actually will provide real solutions into these 
districts for broadband opportunity.
  I would encourage my friends from Georgia and from Michigan, and 
anybody else, to sign on to this bill. It is a good bill that has 
support across the way in the Senate, and also working with the 
administration to provide the way for States to actually look at their 
own States and provide gigabyte opportunity zones so that they can 
actually make ways and get these companies that are monopolizing the 
areas and not serving their constituents.
  By the way, Mr. Chairman, it is sad because, in some of my districts 
right now, it has been over really about 6 weeks or so since Irma came 
through northeast Georgia and knocked out power and delayed broadband, 
and I still have customers in my district who do not have phone service 
or broadband this long after that fact.
  This is just unacceptable, so I appreciate the concern here. The only 
problem is, this amendment doesn't help. This amendment is not one that 
does--again, it just is another amendment,

[[Page 16536]]

unfortunately, like the last amendment, that seeks less transparency 
and public participation. It does not do anything to discourage people 
from working to find rural broadband solutions.
  What this actually does, it just, again, tries to seek less 
transparency instead of more. But I think there is a positive here. I 
choose to look at the positive. I disagree with this amendment and 
would ask that it be voted ``no.'' But I look at the positive to say, 
as someone from Georgia, we have got a fight we can connect on, and 
that is rural broadband, because there is no longer a digital divide. 
There is a hope and dream divide. It is not a digital divide. It is a 
hope and dream for those students, and those moms, and those dads, and 
those families in those areas who cannot access the internet.
  For me, it was a radio and a book. It took me all over the world. 
Nowadays, it is the internet and a phone where our students can 
actually get what they want. Unfortunately, this amendment doesn't do 
it. I have to oppose this amendment, but I am glad to welcome to the 
fight another friend against the evils of not being able to expand 
broadband.
  Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia. Mr. Chair, I just enjoyed the contrast 
between our different styles. The Congressman, my friend from Georgia, 
is very upbeat and passionate. I am more laid back and kind of 
reserved. But we both agree on the fact that we want more broadband to 
be accessible to rural customers. We both agree on that.
  We just simply disagree on whether or not we should allow a process 
whereby a third-party corporation can come in and gum up the regulatory 
scheme that has been laid out in the rulings that have been made and, 
thus, delay the availability of broadband to rural customers.
  Mr. Chair, I would ask respectfully that my colleagues support my 
amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Johnson).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia will 
be postponed.
  The Committee will rise informally.
  The Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Johnson of Louisiana) assumed the chair.

                          ____________________