[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 162 (2016), Part 11]
[Senate]
[Pages 14743-14746]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                   UNANIMOUS CONSENT REQUEST--S. 3485

  Mr. WYDEN. Senator Cornyn has now objected to passage of the two 
bills relating to rule 41, and he is certainly within his right to do 
so. I wish to offer the theory--not exactly a radical one, in my view--
that if we can't pass bills with respect to mass surveillance or have 
hearings, we at least ought to have a vote so that the American people 
can actually determine if their Senators support authorizing 
unprecedented, sweeping government hacking without a single hearing. 
There is a lot more debate in this body over the tax treatment of race 
horses than massive expansion of surveillance authority.
  In a moment, I will ask unanimous consent that the body move to an 
immediate rollcall vote on the Stalling Mass Damaging Hacking Act which 
would delay rule 41 changes until March 31. I don't condone Congress 
kicking cans down the road. This is one example of where, with a short 
delay, it would be possible to have at least one hearing in both bodies 
so that Congress would have a chance to debate a very significant 
change in our hacking policy.
  Congress has not weighed, considered, amended, or acted like anything 
resembling an elected legislature on this issue. There have been some 
who have looked into the issue, but--I call it Senate 101--we should at 
least have a hearing on a topic with enormous potential consequences 
for millions of Americans. That had not been done, despite a bipartisan 
bill being introduced in the House and the Senate, days after the 
changes were approved. Lawmakers and the public ought to know more 
about a novel, complicated, and controversial topic, and they would be 
in a position to have that information if there was a hearing and 
Members of both sides of the aisle could ask important questions.
  Since the Senate has not had a hearing on this issue, lawmakers have 
still been trying to get answers to important questions. Twenty-three 
elected representatives from the House and Senate, Democrats and 
Republicans spanning the philosophical spectrum, have asked substantive 
questions that the Department of Justice has failed to answer, and they 
barely went through the motions. They spectacularly failed to respond 
to both concerns of Democrats and Republicans in both the Senate and in 
the House.
  I ask unanimous consent that the letter that was sent to the DOJ, 
signed by myself and 22 bipartisan colleagues from the House and 
Senate, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                Congress of the United States,

                                 Washington, DC, October 27, 2016.
     Hon. Loretta Lynch,
     U.S. Attorney General,
     Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
       Dear Attorney General Lynch: We write to request 
     information regarding the Department of Justice's proposed 
     amendments to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
     Procedure. These amendments were approved by the Supreme 
     Court and transmitted to Congress pursuant to the Rules 
     Enabling Act on April 30, 2016. Absent congressional action 
     the amendments will take effect on December 1, 2016.
       The proposed amendments to Rule 41 have the potential to 
     significantly expand the Department's ability to obtain a 
     warrant to engage in ``remote access,'' or hacking of 
     computers and other electronic devices. We are concerned 
     about the full scope of the new authority that would be 
     provided to the Department of Justice. We believe that 
     Congress--and the American public--must better understand the 
     Department's need for the proposed amendments, how the 
     Department intends to use its proposed new powers, and the 
     potential consequences to our digital security before these 
     rules go into effect. In light of the limited time for 
     congressional consideration of the proposed amendments, we 
     request that you provide us with the following information 
     two weeks after your receipt of this letter.
       1. How would the government prevent ``forum shopping'' 
     under the proposed amendments? The proposed amendments would 
     allow prosecutors to seek a warrant in any district ``where 
     activities related to a crime may have occurred.'' Will the 
     Department issue guidance to prosecutors on how this should 
     be interpreted?
       2. We are concerned that the deployment of software to 
     search for and possibly disable a botnet may have unintended 
     consequences on internet-connected devices, from smartphones 
     to medical devices. Please describe the testing that is 
     conducted on the viability of `network investigative 
     techniques' (``NITs'') to safely search devices such as 
     phones, tablets, hospital information systems, and internet-
     connected video monitoring systems.
       3. Will law enforcement use authority under the proposed 
     amendments to disable or otherwise render inoperable software 
     that is damaging or has damaged a protected device? In other 
     words, will network investigative techniques be used to 
     ``clean'' infected devices, including devices that belong to 
     innocent Americans? Has the Department ever attempted to 
     ``clean'' infected computers in the past? If so, under what 
     legal authority?
       4. What methods will the Department use to notify users and 
     owners of devices that have been searched, particularly in 
     potential cases where tens of thousands of devices are 
     searched?
       5. How will the Department maintain proper chain of custody 
     when analyzing or removing evidence from a suspect's device? 
     Please describe how the Department intends to address 
     technical issues such as fluctuations of internet speed and 
     limitations on the ability to securely transfer data.
       6. Please describe any differences in legal requirements 
     between obtaining a warrant for a physical search versus 
     obtaining a warrant for a remote electronic search. In 
     particular, and if applicable, please describe how the 
     principle of probable cause may be used to justify the remote 
     search of tens of thousands of devices. Is it sufficient 
     probable cause for a search that a device merely be 
     ``damaged'' and connected to a crime?

[[Page 14744]]


       7. If the Department were to search devices belonging to 
     innocent Americans to combat a complicated computer crime, 
     please describe what procedures the Department would use to 
     protect the private information of victims and prevent 
     further damage to accessed devices.
           Sincerely,
         Ron Wyden; Patrick Leahy; Tammy Baldwin; Christopher A. 
           Coons; Ted Poe; John Conyers, Jr.; Justin Amash; Jason 
           Chaffetz; Steve Daines; Al Franken; Mazie K. Hirono; 
           Mike Lee; Jon Tester; Elizabeth Warren; Martin 
           Heinrich; Judy Chu; Steve Cohen; Suzan DelBene; Louie 
           Gohmert; Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson; Ted W. Lieu; Zoe 
           Lofgren; Jerrold Nadler.

  Mr. WYDEN. I also ask unanimous consent that the response from the 
Department of Justice, which I have characterized as extraordinarily 
unresponsive to what legislators have said, be printed in the Record as 
well.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                       U.S. Department of Justice,


                                Office of Legislative Affairs,

                                Washington, DC, November 18, 2016.
     Hon. Ron Wyden,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Wyden: This responds to your letter to the 
     Attorney General, dated October 27, 2016, regarding proposed 
     amendments to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
     Procedure, recently approved by the Supreme Court. We are 
     sending identical responses to the Senators and Members who 
     joined in your letter.
       The amendments to Rule 41, which are scheduled to take 
     effect on December 1, 2016, mark the end of a three-year 
     deliberation process, which included extensive written 
     comments and public testimony. After hearing the public's 
     views, the federal judiciary's Advisory Committee on the 
     Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which includes federal 
     and state judges, law professors, attorneys in private 
     practice, and others in the legal community, approved the 
     amendments and rejected criticisms of the proposal. The 
     amendments were then considered and unanimously approved by 
     the Standing Committee on Rules and the Judicial Conference, 
     and adopted by the United States Supreme Court.
       It is important to note that the amendments do not change 
     any of the traditional protections and procedures under the 
     Fourth Amendment, such as the requirement that the government 
     establish probable cause. Rather, the amendments would merely 
     ensure that venue exists so that at least one court is 
     available to consider whether a particular warrant 
     application comports with the Fourth Amendment.
       Further, the amendments would not authorize the government 
     to undertake any search or seizure or use any remote search 
     technique, whether inside or outside the United States, that 
     is not already permitted under current law. The use of remote 
     searches is not new, and warrants for remote searches are 
     currently issued under Rule 41. In addition, courts already 
     permit the search of multiple computers pursuant to a single 
     warrant, so long as the necessary legal requirements are met 
     with respect to each computer. Nothing in the amendments 
     changes the existing legal requirements.
       The amendments apply in two narrow circumstances. First, 
     where a criminal suspect has hidden the location of his 
     computer using technological means, the changes to Rule 41 
     would ensure that federal agents know which magistrate judge 
     to go to in order to apply for a warrant. For example, if 
     agents are investigating criminals who are sexually 
     exploiting children and uploading videos of that exploitation 
     for others to see--but concealing their locations through 
     anonymizing technology--agents will be able to apply for a 
     search warrant to discover where they are located.
       An investigation of the Playpen website--a Tor site used by 
     more than 100,000 pedophiles to encourage sexual abuse and 
     exploitation of children and to trade sexually explicit 
     images of the abuse--illustrates the importance of this 
     change. During the investigation, authorities were able to 
     wrest control of the site from its administrators, and then 
     obtained approval from a federal court to use a remote search 
     tool to undo the anonymity promised by Tor. The search would 
     occur only if a Playpen user accessed child pornography on 
     the site (a federal crime), in which case the tool would 
     cause the user's computer to transmit to investigators a 
     limited amount of information, including the user's true IP 
     address, to help locate and identify the user and his 
     computer. Based on that information, investigators could then 
     conduct a traditional, real-world investigation, such as by 
     running a criminal records check, interviewing neighbors, or 
     applying for an additional warrant to search a suspect's 
     house for incriminating evidence. Those court-authorized 
     remote searches in the Playpen case have led to more than 200 
     active prosecutions--including the prosecution of at least 48 
     alleged abusers--and the identification or rescue of at least 
     49 American children who were subject to sexual abuse. 
     Nonetheless, despite the success of the Playpen 
     investigation, Federal courts have ordered the suppression of 
     evidence in some of the resulting prosecutions because of the 
     lack of clear venue in the current version of Rule 41. In 
     other cases, courts have declined to suppress evidence 
     because the law was not clear, but have suggested that they 
     would do so in future cases.
       Second, where the crime involves criminals hacking 
     computers located in five or more different judicial 
     districts, the changes to Rule 41 would ensure that federal 
     agents may identify one judge to review an application for a 
     search warrant rather than be required to submit separate 
     warrant applications in each district--up to 94--where a 
     computer is affected. For example, agents may seek a search 
     warrant to assist in the investigation of a ransomware scheme 
     facilitated by a botnet that enables criminals abroad to 
     extort thousands of Americans. Such botnets, which range in 
     size from hundreds to millions of infected computers and may 
     be used for a variety of criminal purposes, represent one of 
     the fastest-growing species of computer crime and are among 
     the key cybersecurity threats facing American citizens and 
     businesses. Absent the amendments to Rule 41, however, the 
     requirement to obtain up to 94 simultaneous search warrants 
     may prevent cyber investigators from taking needed action to 
     liberate computers infected with such malware. This change 
     would not permit indiscriminate surveillance of thousands of 
     victim computers--that is not permissible now and will 
     continue to be prohibited when the amendment goes into 
     effect. This is because other than identifying a court to 
     consider the warrant application, the amendment makes no 
     change to the substantive law governing when a warrant 
     application should be granted or denied.
       The amended rule limits forum shopping by restricting the 
     venue in which a magistrate judge may issue a warrant for a 
     remote search to ``any district where activities related to a 
     crime may have occurred.'' Often, this language will leave 
     only a single district in which investigators can seek a 
     warrant. For example, where a victim has received death 
     threats, extortion demands, or ransomware demands from a 
     criminal hiding behind Internet anonymizing technologies, the 
     victim's district would likely be the only district in which 
     a warrant could be issued for a remote search to identify the 
     perpetrator.
       In cases involving widespread criminal conduct, activities 
     related to the crime may have occurred in multiple districts, 
     and thus there may be multiple districts in which 
     investigators may seek a warrant under the new amendment. For 
     many years, however, existing laws have recognized the need 
     for warrants to be issued in a district connected to criminal 
     activity even when the information sought may not be present 
     in the district. The language of the new Rule 41(6)(6) 
     amendment limiting warrant venue to ``any district where 
     activities related to a crime may have occurred'' was copied 
     verbatim from the existing warrant venue provisions in Rule 
     41(6)(3) and (b)(5), which authorize judges to issue out-of-
     district warrants in cases involving terrorism and searches 
     of U.S. territories and overseas diplomatic premises. Thus, 
     the new venue provision of Rule 41(b)(6) for remote searches 
     is consistent with existing practices in these other 
     contexts. Similarly, warrants for email and other stored 
     electronic communications are sought tens of thousands of 
     times a year in a wide range of investigations. Such warrants 
     may be issued in any district by a court that ``has 
     jurisdiction over the offense being investigated.'' 18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. Sec. 2703 & 2711(3).
       As with law enforcement activities in the physical world, 
     law enforcement actions to prevent or redress online crime 
     can never be completely free of risk. Before we conduct 
     online investigations, the Department of Justice (the 
     Department) carefully considers both the need to prevent harm 
     to the public caused by criminals and the potential risks of 
     taking action. In particular, when conducting complex online 
     operations, we typically work closely with sophisticated 
     computer security researchers both inside and outside the 
     government. As part of operational planning, investigators 
     conduct pre-deployment verification and validation of 
     computer tools. Such testing is designed to ensure that tools 
     work as intended and do not create unintended consequences. 
     That kind of careful consideration of any future technical 
     measures will continue, and we welcome continued 
     collaboration with the private sector and cybersecurity 
     experts in the development and use of botnet mitigation 
     techniques. The Department's antibotnet successes have 
     demonstrated that the Department can disrupt and dismantle 
     botnets while avoiding collateral damage to victims. And of 
     course, choosing to do nothing has its own cost: leaving 
     victims' computers under the control of criminals who will 
     continue to invade their privacy, extort money from them 
     through ransomware, or steal their financial information.
       Law enforcement could obtain identifying information (such 
     as an IP address) from infected computers comprising a botnet 
     in order to make sure owners are warned of the infection 
     (typically, by their Internet service provider). Or law 
     enforcement might engage

[[Page 14745]]

     in an online operation that is designed to disrupt the botnet 
     and restore full control over computers to their legal 
     owners. Both of these techniques, however, could involve 
     conduct that some courts might hold constitutes a search or 
     seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In general, we anticipate 
     that the items to be searched or seized from victim computers 
     pursuant to a botnet warrant will be quite limited. For 
     example, we believe that it may be reasonable in a botnet 
     investigation to take steps to measure the size of the botnet 
     by having each victim computer report a unique identifier; 
     but it would not be lawful in such circumstances to search 
     the victims' unrelated private files. Whether or not a 
     warrant authorizing a remote search is proper is a question 
     of Fourth Amendment law, which is not changed by the 
     amendments to Rule 41. Simply put, the amendments do not 
     authorize the government to undertake any search or seizure 
     or use any remote search technique that is not already 
     permitted under the Fourth Amendment. They merely ensure that 
     searches that are appropriate under the Fourth Amendment and 
     necessary to help free victim computers from criminal control 
     are not, as a practical matter, blocked by outmoded venue 
     rules.
       The amendment's notice requirement mandates that when 
     executing a warrant for a remote search, ``the officer must 
     make reasonable efforts to serve a copy of the warrant on the 
     person whose property was searched or whose information was 
     seized or copied,'' and that ``[s]ervice may be accomplished 
     by any means, including electronic means, reasonably 
     calculated to reach that person.'' What means are reasonably 
     available to notify an individual who has concealed his 
     location and identity will of course vary from case to case. 
     If the remote search is successful in identifying the 
     suspect, then notice can be provided in the traditional 
     manner (following existing rules for delaying notice where 
     appropriate in ongoing investigations). If the search is 
     unsuccessful, then investigators would have to consider other 
     means that may be available, for example through a known 
     email address. In an investigation involving botnet victims, 
     the Department would make reasonable efforts to notify 
     victims of any search conducted pursuant to warrant. For 
     example, if investigators obtained victims' IP addresses at a 
     particular date and time in order to measure the size of the 
     botnet, investigators could ask the victims' Internet service 
     providers to notify the individuals whose computers were 
     identified as being under the control of criminal bot 
     herders. Under such an approach, it would not even be 
     necessary for investigators to learn the identities of 
     specific victims. The Department will, of course, also 
     consider other appropriate mechanisms to provide notice 
     consistent with the amended Rule 41.
       Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the government must 
     establish the authenticity of any item of electronic evidence 
     it moves to admit in evidence. To do so, it must offer 
     evidence ``sufficient to support a finding that the item is'' 
     what the government claims it to be, and a criminal defendant 
     may object to the admission of evidence on the basis that the 
     government has not established its authenticity. The 
     amendments to Rule 41 do not make any change to the law 
     governing the admissibility of lawfully obtained evidence at 
     trial, whether on the basis of authenticity or any other 
     basis, and to our knowledge authenticity objections have not 
     played a substantial role in prior federal criminal trials at 
     which evidence obtained as a result of remote searches was 
     introduced.
       Protecting victims' privacy is one of the Department's top 
     priorities. To the extent that investigators collect any 
     information concerning botnet victims, the Department will 
     take all appropriate steps to safeguard any such information 
     from improper use or disclosure. The Department presently and 
     vigorously protects the private information collected 
     pursuant to search warrants for computers and documents 
     seized from a home or business and the Department will follow 
     the same exacting standards for any warrant executed under 
     the amendments to Rule 41.
       We hope that this information is helpful. Please do not 
     hesitate to contact this office if we may provide additional 
     assistance regarding this or any other matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Peter J. Kadzik,
                                       Assistant Attorney General.

  Mr. WYDEN. Colleagues are going to see that substantive, clear 
questions, posed by Democrats and Republicans in writing, were not 
responded to.
  Because of the lack of genuine answers from the Justice Department to 
this letter, signed by 23 Members of Congress, and the substantial 
nature of these unprecedented changes in surveillance policy, I ask now 
for unanimous consent for a vote on the SMDH Act to give Congress time 
to debate these sweeping changes to government's hacking authority.
  I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate 
consideration of S. 3485, introduced earlier today; that at a time to 
be determined by the majority leader, in consultation with the 
Democratic leader, but no later than 4 p.m. today, the Senate proceed 
to vote in relation to this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  The majority whip.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I know sometimes that when people hear us 
engage in these debates, they think we don't like each other and we 
can't work together; that we are so polarized, we are dysfunctional. 
Actually, these Senators are my friends in addition to being 
colleagues. Let me just explain how I think their concerns are 
misplaced.
  First of all, we all care about, on the spectrum of privacy to 
security, how that is dialed in. As the Presiding Officer knows, as the 
former attorney general of Alaska, we always try to strike the right 
balance between individual privacy and safety and security and law 
enforcement, and sometimes we have differences of opinion as to where 
exactly on that spectrum that ought to be struck, but the fundamental 
problem with the requests that have been made today is, Federal Rule Of 
Criminal Procedure 41 has already been the subject of a lengthy 3-year 
process with a lot of thoughtful input, public hearings, and 
deliberation.
  As the Presiding Officer knows, the courts have the inherent power to 
write their own rules of procedure, and that is what this is, part of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. What happens is a pretty 
challenging process when we want to change a Federal rule of criminal 
procedure. We have to get it approved by the Rules Advisory Committee. 
It is made up of judges, law professors, and practicing lawyers. Then 
it has to be approved by the Judicial Conference. Then, as in this 
case, they have to be endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court, which is 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, which happened on May 1, 2016.
  If there was any basis for the claim that this is somehow a hacking 
of personal information without due process of law or without adequate 
consideration, I just--I think the process by which the Supreme Court 
has set up, through the Rules Advisory Committee and through the 
Judicial Conference, dispels any concerns that the objections that were 
raised were not adequately considered.
  I am also told, Senator Graham from South Carolina chaired a 
subcommittee hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee--I believe it 
was last spring--on this very issue. So there has been some effort in 
the Congress to do oversight and to look into this, although perhaps it 
didn't get the sort of attention that it has gotten now.
  The biggest, most important point to me is that for everybody who 
cares about civil liberties and for everybody who cares about the 
personal right of privacy we all have in our homes and the expectation 
of privacy we have against intrusion by the government without due 
process, this still requires the government to come forward and do what 
it always has to do when it seeks a search warrant under the Fourth 
Amendment. You still have to go before a judge--an impartial 
magistrate--you still have to show probable cause that a crime has been 
committed, and the defendant can still challenge the lawfulness of the 
search. The defendant always reserves that right to challenge the 
lawfulness of the search. I believe all of these constitutional 
protections, all of these procedural protections, all the concerns 
about lack of adequate deliberation can be dispelled by the simple 
facts.
  There is a challenge when cyber criminals use the Internet and social 
media to prey on innocent children, to traffic in human beings, to buy 
and sell drugs, and there has to be a way for law enforcement--for the 
Federal Government--to get a search warrant approved by a judge based 
on the showing of probable cause to be able to get that evidence so the 
law can be enforced and these cyber criminals can be prosecuted. That 
is what we are talking about. All this rule 41 does is creates a 
circumstance where if the criminal is

[[Page 14746]]

using an anonymizer, or some way to scramble the IP address--the 
Internet Protocol address of the computer they are operating from--then 
this rule of procedure allows the U.S. attorney, the Justice 
Department, to go to any court that will then require probable cause, 
that will then allow the defendant to challenge that search warrant--
but to provide a means by which you can go to court and get a search 
warrant and investigate the facts and, if a crime has been committed, 
to make sure that person is prosecuted under the letter of the law.
  I appreciate the concerns my colleagues have expressed, that somehow 
we have gotten the balance between security and privacy wrong, but I 
believe that as a result of the process by which the Rules Advisory 
Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court have approved 
this rule after 3 years of deliberation, including public hearings, 
scholarly input by academicians, practicing lawyers, law professors and 
the like, I think that ought to allay their concerns that somehow this 
is an unthought-through or hasty rule that is going to have unintended 
consequences. I think the fundamental protection we all have under the 
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution against unreasonable searches and 
seizures and the requirement that the government come to court in front 
of a judge and show probable cause that a crime has been committed, and 
that even once the search warrant is issued, that the defendant can 
challenge the lawfulness of the search--all of that ought to allay the 
concerns of my colleagues that somehow we have gotten that balance 
between privacy and security right because I think this does strike an 
appropriate balance.
  Those are the reasons I felt compelled to object to the unanimous 
consent requests, and I appreciate the courtesy of each of my 
colleagues.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, before he leaves the floor, I wish to 
engage my friend for a moment with respect to his remarks. He is 
absolutely right that we have been friends since we arrived here, and 
we are working together on a whole host of projects right now. So this 
is debate about differences of opinion with respect to some of the key 
issues. I wish to make a couple of quick points in response to my 
colleague.
  My colleague said there had been an inclusive process for discussing 
this. As far as I can tell, the vast amount of discussion basically 
took place between the judges and the government. My guess is, if you 
and I walked into a coffee shop in Houston or Dallas, or in my home 
State, in Coos Bay or Eugene, people wouldn't have any idea what was 
going to happen tonight at midnight. Tonight at midnight is going to be 
a significant moment in this discussion.
  My colleague made the point with respect to security and privacy. I 
definitely feel those two are not mutually exclusive; we can have both, 
but it is going to take smart policies. My colleague has done a lot of 
important work on the Freedom of Information Act issues. These are 
complicated, important issues, and nobody up here has had a chance to 
weigh in. There has been a process with some judges, and I guess some 
folks got a chance to submit a brief. Maybe there was a notice in the 
Federal Register; that is the way it usually works, but nobody at home 
knows anything about that. My guess is, none of our hospitals know 
anything about something like this, and it has real implications for 
them because our medical facilities--something we all agree on that 
have been major sources of cyber hackings--they have been major kinds 
of targets.
  Again, this is not the kind of thing where somebody is saying 
something derogatory about somebody personally; we just have a 
difference of opinion with respect to the process. To me, at home, when 
people hear about a government process, they say: Hey, I guess that 
means I get a chance to weigh in. That is why I have townhall meetings 
in every county every year because that is what the people think the 
process is, not judges talking among themselves.
  The second point my friend touched on was essentially the warrant 
policies and that he supports the Fourth Amendment and this is about 
the Fourth Amendment. I think that is worth debating. To me, at a 
minimum, this is an awful novel approach to the Fourth Amendment. One 
judge, one warrant for thousands and potentially millions of computers 
which could result in more damage to the citizen after the citizen has 
already been hit once with the hack. So my colleague said this is what 
the fourth Amendment is about. I think that is a fair point for debate. 
I would argue this is an awful novel approach to the Fourth Amendment. 
This is not what I think most people think the Fourth Amendment is. 
Hey, this is about me and somebody is going to have to get a warrant 
about me. It is about individuals. To me, the Senate has now--and we 
still have officially 12 hours to do something about it--but as of now, 
the Senate has given consent to an expansion of government hacking and 
surveillance. In effect, the Senate, by not acting, has put a stamp of 
approval on a major policy change that has not had a single hearing, no 
oversight, no discussion. In effect, the Senate--this is not even 
Senate 101. That is what everybody thinks Senators are supposed to be 
about. When we are talking about search and seizure, that is an issue 
for Congress to debate, and the Justice Department shouldn't have the 
ability to, at a minimum, as I indicated in my conversation with my 
colleague from Texas, come up with a very novel approach to the Fourth 
Amendment without elected officials being able to weigh in.
  Now I will close by way of saying that when Americans find out that 
the Congress is allowing the Justice Department to just wave its arms 
in the air and grant itself new powers under the Fourth Amendment 
without the Senate even being a part of a single hearing, I think law 
abiding Americans are going to ask: So what were you people in the 
Senate thinking about? What are you thinking about when the FBI starts 
hacking the victims of a botnet attack or when a mass attack breaks 
their device or an entire hospital system, in effect, has great damage 
done, faces great damage, and possibly puts lives at risk?
  My hope is that Congress would add protections for Americans 
surrounding the whole issue of government hacking. I have said again 
and again and again that the smart technology policy, the smart 
surveillance policy from the get-go is built around the idea that 
security and liberty are not mutually exclusive, that a smart policy 
will do both, but increasingly, policies coming out of here aren't 
doing a whole lot of either. In this case, I think the Senate is 
abdicating its obligations. Certainly, in the digital era, Americans do 
not throw their Fourth Amendment rights out the window because they use 
a device that connects to the Internet.
  So I am going to close by way of saying that I think this debate 
about government hacking is far from over. My guess is that Senators 
are going to hear from their constituents about this policy sooner 
rather than later, and we will be back on the floor then, looking to do 
what should have been done prior to midnight tonight, which is to have 
hearings, to involve the public--not just Justices and maybe a few 
people who can figure out how to find that section of the Federal 
Register so they can weigh in.
  Americans are going to continue to demand from all of us in the 
Senate policies that protect their security and their liberty. They are 
right to do so. That cause will be harmed if the Senate doesn't take 
steps between now and midnight.
  With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. WARREN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________