[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 162 (2016), Part 10]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page 13615]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                          OVERLOOKING AL-QAEDA

                                 ______
                                 

                              HON. TED POE

                                of texas

                    in the house of representatives

                       Monday, September 26, 2016

  Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, back in 2012, the President told the 
American people that al-Qaeda was ``decimated.'' Two years later, the 
President touted U.S. success in ``taking out terrorists who threaten 
us'' in places like Somalia and Yemen, both countries with strong and 
active al-Qaeda branches. Look at those countries now: Somalia's al-
Shabaab continues its terror campaign against Somali and AMISOM troops, 
and Yemen's rebel conflict has breathed new life into al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
  The problem with this Administration's assertions of success is that 
they fundamentally misunderstood al-Qaeda's strategy in light of the 
loud-mouthed tactics of its terrorist spinoff, ISIS. The two terrorist 
organizations seek the same end goal: the establishment of an Islamic 
state where only their strict interpretation of Islamic law is 
tolerated. However, ISIS and al-Qaeda disagree on the means to reach 
that end. Al-Qaeda's leaders and ideologues, including Osama bin Laden, 
have always advocated playing the long game: embedding itself in local 
populations, building relationships, and even allying with enemies and 
rivals in order to achieve their goals. Winning over the hearts and 
minds of local Muslim populations has always been the priority for al-
Qaeda. ISIS, on the other hand, believes that the establishment of the 
caliphate is the supreme priority, judging that force--instead of 
persuasion--can garner the loyalty of local communities.
  While ISIS was busy conquering vast swaths of land in Syria and Iraq, 
al-Qaeda was not simply sitting back and watching dejectedly. It was 
entrenching itself throughout the Middle East, in Yemen, Syria, Libya 
and Tunisia. Al-Qaeda leaders, while fundamentally disagreeing with 
ISIS' establishment of a caliphate on Islamic legal grounds, also 
criticized what they saw as ISIS overstretching its resources. They 
were busy readying the grounds for ISIS' inevitable collapse and al-
Qaeda's return to the spotlight. Unfortunately, the Administration 
misunderstands this. While focusing all of our attention on ISIS, we 
have overlooked al-Qaeda and dismissed it as defeated. This is exactly 
what al-Qaeda wants: the breathing room to grow stronger along with the 
optics of appearing more moderate to its extremist Muslim base than 
ISIS. Once ISIS loses all its territory in Iraq and Syria, as well as 
its fast shrinking base in Libya, it will be left with nothing but a 
band of sympathizers and a radical ideology. Al-Qaeda however will have 
developed deep ties to local communities throughout the region, 
strengthened its operational capabilities, and emerge more dangerous 
than ever.
  Success against ISIS should only be judged in the context of the 
global war on terror. Partial success in one battlefield and total 
failure in another will not be enough to ensure the security of our 
homeland. We must go after al-Qaeda now more than ever before it is too 
late.
  And that's just the way it is.

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