[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 162 (2016), Part 10]
[House]
[Pages 13586-13600]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




     COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2016

  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 5978) to amend title 14, United States Code, to clarify the 
functions of the Chief Acquisition Officer of the Coast Guard, and for 
other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 5978

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Coast 
     Guard and Maritime Transportation Amendments Act of 2016''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

             TITLE I--COAST GUARD, NAVIGATION, AND SHIPPING

Sec. 101. Coast Guard major acquisition programs.
Sec. 102. Prospective payment of funds necessary to provide medical 
              care for the Coast Guard.
Sec. 103. Oil spill disbursements auditing and report.
Sec. 104. Deadline for compliance with alternate safety compliance 
              program.
Sec. 105. Coast Guard pier in Wilmington, North Carolina.
Sec. 106. Backup global positioning system.
Sec. 107. Arctic alternative planning criteria.

                        TITLE II--OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 201. Vessel ``Apollonia''.
Sec. 202. Reimbursement for non-Federal construction costs of certain 
              aids to navigation.
Sec. 203. Corrections to provisions enacted by Coast Guard 
              Authorization Acts.

             TITLE I--COAST GUARD, NAVIGATION, AND SHIPPING

     SEC. 101. COAST GUARD MAJOR ACQUISITION PROGRAMS.

       (a) Functions of Chief Acquisition Officer.--Section 56(c) 
     of title 14, United States Code, is amended by striking 
     ``and'' after the semicolon at the end of paragraph (8), 
     striking the period at the end of paragraph (9) and inserting 
     ``; and'', and adding at the end the following:
       ``(10)(A) keeping the Commandant informed of the progress 
     of major acquisition programs (as that term is defined in 
     section 581);
       ``(B) informing the Commandant on a continuing basis of any 
     developments on such programs that may require new or 
     revisited trade-offs among cost, schedule, technical 
     feasibility, and performance, including--
       ``(i) significant cost growth or schedule slippage; and
       ``(ii) requirements creep (as that term is defined in 
     section 2547(c)(1) of title 10); and
       ``(C) ensuring that the views of the Commandant regarding 
     such programs on cost, schedule, technical feasibility, and 
     performance trade-offs are strongly considered by program 
     managers and program executive officers in all phases of the 
     acquisition process.''.
       (b) Customer Service Mission of Directorate.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 15 of title 14, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (A) in section 561(b)--
       (i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting 
     ``; and''; and
       (iii) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) to meet the needs of customers of major acquisition 
     programs in the most cost-effective manner practicable.'';
       (B) in section 562, by repealing subsection (b) and 
     redesignating subsections (c) through (g) as subsections (b) 
     through (e), respectively;
       (C) in section 563, by striking ``Not later than 180 days 
     after the date of enactment of the Coast Guard Authorization 
     Act of 2010, the Commandant shall commence implementation 
     of'' and inserting ``The Commandant shall maintain'';
       (D) by adding at the end of section 564 the following:
       ``(c) Acquisition of Unmanned Aerial Systems.--
       ``(1) In general.--During any fiscal year for which funds 
     are appropriated for the design or construction of the 
     Offshore Patrol Cutter, the Commandant--
       ``(A) may not award a contract for design of an unmanned 
     aerial system for use by the Coast Guard; and
       ``(B) may acquire an unmanned aerial system only--
       ``(i) if such a system has been acquired by, or has been 
     used by, the Department of Defense or the department in which 
     the Coast Guard is operating, or a component thereof, before 
     the date on which the Commandant acquires the system; and
       ``(ii) through an agreement with such a department or 
     component, unless the unmanned aerial system can be obtained 
     at less cost through independent contract action.
       ``(2) Limitations on application.--
       ``(A) Small unmanned aerial systems.--The limitations in 
     paragraph (1)(B) do not apply to any small unmanned aerial 
     system that consists of--
       ``(i) an unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds on 
     takeoff, including all components and equipment on board or 
     otherwise attached to the aircraft; and
       ``(ii) associated elements (including communication links 
     and the components that control such aircraft) that are 
     required for the safe and efficient operation of such 
     aircraft.
       ``(B) Previously funded systems.--The limitations in 
     paragraph (1) do not apply to the design or acquisition of an 
     unmanned aerial system for which funds for research, 
     development, test, and evaluation have been received from the 
     Department of Defense or the department in which the Coast 
     Guard is operating.'';
       (E) in subchapter II, by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 578. Role of Vice Commandant in major acquisition 
       programs

       ``The Vice Commandant--
       ``(1) shall represent the customer of a major acquisition 
     program with regard to trade-offs made among cost, schedule, 
     technical feasibility, and performance with respect to such 
     program; and
       ``(2) shall advise the Commandant in decisions regarding 
     the balancing of resources against priorities, and associated 
     trade-offs referred to in paragraph (1), on behalf of the 
     customer of a major acquisition program.

     ``Sec. 579. Extension of major acquisition program contracts

       ``(a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 564(a)(2) of 
     this title and section 2304 of title 10, and subject to 
     subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the Secretary may 
     acquire additional units procured under a Coast Guard major 
     acquisition program contract, by extension of such contract 
     without competition, if the Director of the Cost Analysis 
     Division of the Department of Homeland Security determines 
     that the costs that would be saved through award of a new 
     contract in accordance with such sections would not exceed 
     the costs of such an award.
       ``(b) Limitation on Number of Additional Units.--The number 
     of additional units acquired under a contract extension under 
     this section may not exceed the number of additional units 
     for which such determination is made.
       ``(c) Determination of Costs Upon Request.--The Director of 
     the Cost Analysis Division of the Department of Homeland 
     Security shall, at the request of the Secretary, determine 
     for purposes of this section--
       ``(1) the costs that would be saved through award of a new 
     major acquisition program contract in accordance with section 
     564(a)(2) for the acquisition of a number of additional units 
     specified by the Secretary; and

[[Page 13587]]

       ``(2) the costs of such award, including the costs that 
     would be incurred due to acquisition schedule delays and 
     asset design changes associated with such award.
       ``(d) Number of Extensions.--A contract may be extended 
     under this section more than once.''; and
       (F) in section 581--
       (i) by redesignating paragraphs (7) through (10) as 
     paragraphs (9) through (12), respectively, and by 
     redesignating paragraphs (3) through (6) as paragraphs (4) 
     through (7), respectively;
       (ii) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
       ``(3) Customer of a major acquisition program.--The term 
     `customer of a major acquisition program' means the operating 
     field unit of the Coast Guard that will field the system or 
     systems acquired under a major acquisition program.''; and
       (iii) by inserting after paragraph (7), as so redesignated, 
     the following:
       ``(8) Major acquisition program.--The term `major 
     acquisition program' means an ongoing acquisition undertaken 
     by the Coast Guard with a life-cycle cost estimate greater 
     than or equal to $300,000,000.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The analysis at the beginning of 
     such chapter is amended by adding at the end of the items 
     relating to subchapter II the following:

``578. Role of Vice Commandant in major acquisition programs.
``579. Extension of major acquisition program contracts.''.
       (c) Review Required.--
       (1) Requirement.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard shall 
     conduct a review of--
       (A) the authorities provided to the Commandant in chapter 
     15 of title 14, United States Code, and other relevant 
     statutes and regulations related to Coast Guard acquisitions, 
     including developing recommendations to ensure that the 
     Commandant plays an appropriate role in the development of 
     requirements, acquisition processes, and the associated 
     budget practices;
       (B) implementation of the strategy prepared in accordance 
     with section 562(b)(2) of title 14, United States Code, as in 
     effect before the enactment of this Act; and
       (C) acquisition policies, directives, and regulations of 
     the Coast Guard to ensure such policies, directives, and 
     regulations establish a customer-oriented acquisition system.
       (2) Report.--Not later than March 1, 2017, the Commandant 
     shall submit to the Committee on Transportation and 
     Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 
     Senate a report containing, at a minimum, the following:
       (A) The recommendations developed by the Commandant under 
     paragraph (1) and other results of the review conducted under 
     such paragraph.
       (B) The actions the Commandant is taking, if any, within 
     the Commandant's existing authority to implement such 
     recommendations.
       (3) Modification of policies, directives, and 
     regulations.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Commandant of the Coast Guard 
     shall modify the acquisition policies, directives, and 
     regulations of the Coast Guard as necessary to ensure the 
     development and implementation of a customer-oriented 
     acquisition system, pursuant to the review under paragraph 
     (1)(C).
       (d) Analysis of Using Multiyear Contracting.--
       (1) In general.--No later than one year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the department in 
     which the Coast Guard is operating shall submit to the 
     Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House 
     of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, 
     and Transportation of the Senate an analysis of the use of 
     multiyear contracting, including procurement authority 
     provided under section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, 
     authority similar to that granted to the Navy under section 
     121(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1648) and section 150 
     of the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (Public Law 111-
     242; 124 Stat. 3519), and block buy authority to acquire Fast 
     Response Cutters, Offshore Patrol Cutters, heavy polar 
     icebreakers, and medium polar icebreakers.
       (2) Vessels to be analyzed.--Under paragraph (1) the 
     Secretary shall analyze--
       (A) the acquisition of at least 5 Fast Response Cutters, 
     beginning with Hull 43;
       (B) the acquisition of at least 5 Offshore Patrol Cutters, 
     beginning with Hull 5;
       (C) the acquisition of at least 3 heavy polar icebreakers; 
     and
       (D) the acquisition of at least 3 medium polar icebreakers.
       (3) Contents.--The analysis under paragraph (1) shall 
     include the costs and benefits of using multiyear 
     contracting, the impact of multiyear contracting on delivery 
     timelines, and whether the acquisitions examined would meet 
     the tests for the use of multiyear procurement authorities.

     SEC. 102. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT OF FUNDS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE 
                   MEDICAL CARE FOR THE COAST GUARD.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 13 of title 14, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 520. Prospective payment of funds necessary to provide 
       medical care

       ``(a) Prospective Payment Required.--In lieu of the 
     reimbursement required under section 1085 of title 10, for 
     periods when the Coast Guard is not operating as a service in 
     the Navy the Secretary of the department in which the Coast 
     Guard is operating shall make a prospective payment to the 
     Secretary of Defense of an amount that represents the 
     actuarial valuation of treatment or care--
       ``(1) that the Department of Defense provides to members of 
     the Coast Guard, former members of the Coast Guard, and 
     dependents of such members and former members (other than 
     former members and dependents of former members who are a 
     Medicare-eligible beneficiary or for whom the payment for 
     treatment or care is made from the Medicare-Eligible Retiree 
     Health Care Fund) at facilities under the jurisdiction of the 
     Department of Defense or a military department; and
       ``(2) for which a reimbursement would otherwise be made 
     under such section 1085.
       ``(b) Amount.--The amount of the prospective payment under 
     subsection (a) shall be--
       ``(1) in the case of treatment or care to be provided to 
     members of the Coast Guard and their dependents, derived from 
     amounts appropriated for the operating expenses of the Coast 
     Guard;
       ``(2) in the case of treatment or care to be provided 
     former members of the Coast Guard and their dependents, 
     derived from amounts appropriated for retired pay;
       ``(3) determined under procedures established by the 
     Secretary of Defense;
       ``(4) paid during the fiscal year in which treatment or 
     care is provided; and
       ``(5) subject to adjustment or reconciliation as the 
     Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is 
     operating when it is not operating as a service in the Navy 
     and the Secretary of Defense determine appropriate during or 
     promptly after such fiscal year in cases in which the 
     prospective payment is determined excessive or insufficient 
     based on the services actually provided.
       ``(c) No Prospective Payment When Service in Navy.--No 
     prospective payment shall be made under this section for any 
     period during which the Coast Guard operates as a service in 
     the Navy.
       ``(d) Relationship to TRICARE.--This section shall not be 
     construed to require a payment for, or the prospective 
     payment of an amount that represents the value of, treatment 
     or care provided under any TRICARE program.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 13 of 
     title 14, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:

``520. Prospective payment of funds necessary to provide medical 
              care.''.
       (c) Repeal.--Section 217 of the Coast Guard Authorization 
     Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-120), and the item relating to 
     that section in the table of contents in section 2 of such 
     Act, are repealed.

     SEC. 103. OIL SPILL DISBURSEMENTS AUDITING AND REPORT.

       Section 1012 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (33 U.S.C. 
     2712) is amended--
       (1) by repealing subsection (g);
       (2) in subsection (l)(1), by striking ``Within one year 
     after the date of enactment of the Coast Guard Authorization 
     Act of 2010, and annually thereafter,'' and inserting ``Each 
     year, on the date on which the President submits to Congress 
     a budget under section 1105 of title 31, United States 
     Code,''; and
       (3) by amending subsection (l)(2) to read as follows:
       ``(2) Contents.--The report shall include--
       ``(A) a list of each disbursement of $500,000 or more from 
     the Fund in the preceding fiscal year, including 
     disbursements to Federal agencies;
       ``(B) a list of each disbursement of $500,000 or more from 
     the Fund in the fiscal year preceding the preceding fiscal 
     year that has not been reimbursed by a responsible party; and
       ``(C) a description of how each use of the Fund described 
     in subparagraph (A) or (B) meets the requirements of 
     subsection (a).''.

     SEC. 104. DEADLINE FOR COMPLIANCE WITH ALTERNATE SAFETY 
                   COMPLIANCE PROGRAM.

       Section 4503(d)(1) of title 46, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``After January 1, 2020,'' and all that 
     follows through ``the Secretary,'' and inserting ``For each 
     of fishing vessels, fish processing vessels, and fish tender 
     vessels, after the later of January 1, 2020, or the end of 
     the 3-year period beginning on the date on which the 
     Secretary prescribes an alternate safety compliance program 
     developed in cooperation with the commercial fishing industry 
     for such a vessel, such a vessel shall comply with the 
     applicable alternate safety compliance program''.

     SEC. 105. COAST GUARD PIER IN WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of the department in which 
     the Coast Guard is operating shall submit to the Committee on 
     Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
     Transportation of the Senate by not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act a report on--
       (1) short-term plans for berthing the USCGC Diligence in 
     Wilmington, North

[[Page 13588]]

     Carolina, while the Coast Guard pier in Wilmington is being 
     repaired; and
       (2) long-term plans for repairing and maintaining such pier 
     so that it can be used to berth such vessel and any future 
     Coast Guard cutter stationed in Wilmington.
       (b) Cost Estimates.--The report shall include cost 
     estimates and timeframes for such short- and long-term plans.

     SEC. 106. BACKUP GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the 
     ``National Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Resilience and 
     Security Act of 2016''.
       (b) In General.--Subtitle VIII of title 46, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

            ``CHAPTER 807--POSITION, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING

``Sec.
``80701. Land-based complementary and backup system.

     ``Sec. 80701. Land-based complementary and backup system

       ``(a) In General.--Subject to the availability of 
     appropriations, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall 
     provide for the establishment, sustainment, and operation of 
     a reliable land-based enhanced LORAN, or eLORAN, positioning, 
     navigation, and timing system to provide a complement to and 
     backup for the Global Positioning System (in this section 
     referred to as `GPS') to ensure the availability of 
     uncorrupted and nondegraded positioning, navigation, and 
     timing signals for military and civilian users in the event 
     that GPS signals are corrupted, degraded, unreliable, or 
     otherwise unavailable.
       ``(b) Requirements.--The system established under 
     subsection (a) shall--
       ``(1) be wireless;
       ``(2) be terrestrial;
       ``(3) provide wide-area coverage;
       ``(4) deliver a precise, high-power 100 kilohertz signal;
       ``(5) be synchronized with coordinated universal time;
       ``(6) be resilient and extremely difficult to disrupt or 
     degrade;
       ``(7) be able to penetrate underground and inside 
     buildings;
       ``(8) be capable of ready deployment to remote locations;
       ``(9) take full advantage of the infrastructure of the 
     existing, unused Government long-range navigation system 
     (commonly known as `LORAN');
       ``(10) incorporate the expertise of the private sector with 
     respect to development, building, and operation;
       ``(11) work in concert with and complement any other 
     similar positioning, navigation, and timing systems;
       ``(12) be available for use by Federal and non-Federal 
     government agencies for public purposes at no cost; and
       ``(13) incorporate such other requirements determined 
     necessary by the Commandant.
       ``(c) Request for Proposals.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than three months after the 
     date of enactment of this section, the Commandant, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall 
     publish a request for proposals to solicit options for--
       ``(A) eLORAN system architecture; and
       ``(B) business models for the design, installation, 
     operation, and maintenance of an eLORAN system in accordance 
     with this section for a period of no less than 20 years.
       ``(2) Contracting options.--The request for proposals shall 
     request options that--
       ``(A) incorporate the expertise of the private sector; and
       ``(B) allow for the expeditious installation, daily 
     operation, and routine maintenance of an eLORAN system 
     architecture.
       ``(d) Implementation Date.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of enactment of this section, the Commandant of the 
     Coast Guard, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Transportation, shall provide to the Committee on 
     Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
     Transportation of the Senate a plan to ensure that the system 
     required under this section is fully operational not later 
     than 3 years after such date of enactment.''.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The analysis for subtitle VIII of 
     title 46, United States Code, is amended by adding after the 
     item relating to chapter 805 the following:

``807. Position, Navigation, and Timing....................80701''.....

     SEC. 107. ARCTIC ALTERNATIVE PLANNING CRITERIA.

       (a) General.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard may approve 
     alternative planning criteria for an area of lesser 
     geographic extent than the area covered by the Captain of the 
     Port Zone that includes the Arctic for purposes of complying 
     with sections 155.1035(i) and 155.5035(i) of title 33, Code 
     of Federal Regulations, only if the Commandant--
       (1) publishes the proposed alternative planning criteria in 
     the Federal Register for notice and comment in accordance 
     with section 553 of title 5, United States Code;
       (2) completes a study of the economic impacts on the Arctic 
     of such criteria; and
       (3) submits a report on such study to the Committee on 
     Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
     Transportation of the Senate.
       (b) Definition.--For the purposes of this section 
     ``Arctic'' has the meaning that term has under section 112 of 
     the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (15 U.S.C. 4111).

                        TITLE II--OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 201. VESSEL ``APOLLONIA''.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary 
     of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating shall 
     issue a certificate of documentation with a coastwise 
     endorsement for the vessel Apollonia (United States official 
     number 1266527).

     SEC. 202. REIMBURSEMENT FOR NON-FEDERAL CONSTRUCTION COSTS OF 
                   CERTAIN AIDS TO NAVIGATION.

       (a) In General.--Subject to the availability of amounts 
     specifically provided in advance in subsequent appropriations 
     Acts and in accordance with this section, the Commandant of 
     the Coast Guard may reimburse a non-Federal entity for costs 
     incurred by the entity for a covered project.
       (b) Conditions.--The Commandant may not provide 
     reimbursement under subsection (a) with respect to a covered 
     project unless--
       (1) the need for the project is a result of the completion 
     of construction with respect to a federally authorized 
     navigation channel;
       (2) the Commandant determines, through an appropriate 
     navigation safety analysis, that the project is necessary to 
     ensure safe marine transportation;
       (3) the Commandant approves the design of the project to 
     ensure that it meets all applicable Coast Guard aid to 
     navigation standards and requirements;
       (4) the non-Federal entity agrees to transfer the project 
     upon completion to the Coast Guard to be operated and 
     maintained by the Coast Guard as a Federal aid to navigation;
       (5) the non-Federal entity carries out the project in 
     accordance with the same laws and regulations that would 
     apply to the Coast Guard if the Coast Guard carried out the 
     project, including obtaining all permits required for the 
     project under Federal and State law; and
       (6) the Commandant determines that the project satisfies 
     such additional requirements as may be established by the 
     Commandant.
       (c) Limitations.--Reimbursements under subsection (a) may 
     not exceed the following:
       (1) For a single covered project, $5,000,000.
       (2) For all covered projects in a single fiscal year, 
     $5,000,000.
       (d) Expiration.--The authority granted under this section 
     shall expire on the date that is 4 years after the date of 
     enactment of this section.
       (e) Covered Project Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``covered project'' means a project carried out by a non-
     Federal entity to construct and establish an aid to 
     navigation that facilitates safe and efficient marine 
     transportation on a federally authorized navigation channel.

     SEC. 203. CORRECTIONS TO PROVISIONS ENACTED BY COAST GUARD 
                   AUTHORIZATION ACTS.

       (a) Short Title Correction.--The Coast Guard Authorization 
     Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-120) is amended by striking 
     ``Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015'' each place it 
     appears (including in quoted material) and inserting ``Coast 
     Guard Authorization Act of 2016''.
       (b) Title 46, United States Code.--
       (1) Section 7510 of title 46, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (A) in subsection (c)(1)(D), by striking ``engine'' and 
     inserting ``engineer''; and
       (B) in subsection (c)(9), by inserting a period after 
     ``App''.
       (2) Section 4503(f)(2) of title 46, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``, that'' and inserting ``, then''.
       (c) Provisions Relating to the Pribilof Islands.--
       (1) Short title correction.--Section 521 of the Coast Guard 
     Authorization Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-120), as amended by 
     subsection (a), is further amended by striking ``2015'' and 
     inserting ``2016''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--Section 105(e)(1) of the 
     Pribilof Islands Transition Act (16 U.S.C. 1161 note; Public 
     Law 106-562) is amended by striking ``2015'' and inserting 
     ``2016''.
       (3) Technical correction.--Section 522(b)(2) of the Coast 
     Guard Authorization Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-120), as 
     amended by subsection (a), is further amended by striking 
     ``subsection (a)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1)''.
       (d) Title 14, United States Code.--
       (1) Redistribution of authorizations of appropriations.--
     Section 2702 of title 14, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``$6,981,036,000'' and 
     inserting ``$6,986,815,000''; and
       (B) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``$140,016,000'' and 
     inserting ``$134,237,000''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The analysis at the beginning of 
     part III of title 14, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking the period at the end of the item relating to 
     chapter 29.
       (e) National Academy of Sciences Cost Assessment.--Section 
     604(a) of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015 (Public 
     Law

[[Page 13589]]

     114-120) is amended in the first sentence by striking ``365 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act,'' and 
     inserting ``July 15, 2017,''.
       (f) Continuation on Active Duty: Board.--Section 290(a) of 
     title 14, United States Code, is amended by striking ``five 
     officers serving in the grade of vice admiral'' and inserting 
     ``5 officers (other than the Commandant) serving in the grade 
     of admiral or vice admiral''.
       (g) Certificate of Documentation.--Section 604(b) of the 
     Howard Coble Coast Guard and Maritime Authorization Act of 
     2014 (Public Law 113-281) is amended by inserting ``and 
     fisheries endorsement'' after ``endorsement''.
       (h) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall take effect as if included in the enactment of Public 
     Law 114-120.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Hunter) and the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Garamendi) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter).


                             General Leave

  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and 
include extraneous material on H.R. 5978.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, before we talk about H.R. 5978, I would like to talk 
about what is not in this bill, which is probably one of the most 
important things that is my duty, Mr. Garamendi's duty, and the Coast 
Guard's duty to get done--and that is build a polar icebreaker.
  Let me tell you why there is no polar icebreaker in this bill: the 
CBO couldn't get their act together in time to score this one way or 
another. So, again, this body is held ransom by the Congressional 
Budget Office not scoring something one way or another, whether it is 
good to go or not.
  The reason it is so important that we have more polar icebreakers and 
that we included the language that passed the Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee last week is this: we do not have 24/7, 365-
day polar icebreaking ability for the Arctic. The Russians have over 40 
polar icebreakers. That is over 40, some of which are even nuclear. 
China has got more than 20 now. The United States only has one that is 
capable of crushing heavy ice, and even that is not available 24/7, 
365.
  The High Latitude Region Mission Analysis revealed the following 
Coast Guard missions--defense readiness; ice operations; marine 
environmental protection; and ports, waterways, and coastal security in 
the Arctic--were significantly impacted by the gap in this mission 
performance. It is these gaps and the knowledge that, when the Polar 
Star reaches the end of its extended service life, we will have a 
period where the Coast Guard doesn't have a heavy icebreaker at all, 
let alone what it has now, which is limited capability in the Arctic.
  Progress is being made on the acquisition front. Mr. Garamendi and I 
and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee granted the Coast 
Guard the capability to do block buys, which is what the Navy has, 
where you can purchase more than one vessel at a time, which saves 
billions of dollars.
  We also gave them the ability to have lead-time materials, which 
means they could buy the materials way in advance, which would save 
tens of millions of dollars. The Coast Guard now has this ability for 
the FRC and the OPC. We want them to have it for the icebreaker as 
well, but because of the CBO not scoring this, we weren't able to get 
the language in.
  Here is the specific language that is missing from H.R. 5978:
  ``The Commandant of the Coast Guard, subject to the availability of 
amounts specifically provided in advance in subsequent appropriations 
acts may enter into a contract for the acquisition of no less than 
three heavy polar icebreakers; and may enter into a contract for 
acquisition of additional polar icebreakers, except that the total 
number of icebreakers acquired under this subsection may not exceed 
six.''
  We are talking about three. Right now we have one.
  ``Such acquisitions may be made through block buy contracts; may be 
incrementally funded; may include combined purchases, also known as 
economic order quantity purchases, of materials and components; and 
long lead time materials; and may include advance construction 
funding.''
  This is what the Navy has for every ship that they make. This is one 
reason we created a joint program office between the Coast Guard and 
the Navy, so that the Navy can push the Coast Guard to do the right 
thing.
  The Coast Guard, let it be said, at the best, has been dragging their 
feet on acquiring these icebreakers. In fact, they have been pushing 
back against Congress every inch of the way on this.
  In my point of view, this is just like UAVs, or the unmanned aerial 
vehicles that we have now, Predators and the like. Congress earmarked 
those because the Air Force did not want pilotless airplanes. Then you 
would have to get rid of pilots. So the Air Force pushed back day and 
night in the late nineties and this Congress earmarked Predator drones. 
That is why we have Predator drones.
  The military pushed back against Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected 
vehicles, also known as MRAP vehicles, which have saved thousands of 
lives in Iraq and Afghanistan, also pushed by Congress, not the U.S. 
military. In things like this, Congress is able to see things outside 
the box, which the Coast Guard cannot in this case.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) has been an 
extraordinary leader on trying to address a critical need that the 
United States has.
  The Arctic Ocean is opening. There is not only a Northwest Passage, 
but there is a Northeast Passage. And this year, just a couple of weeks 
ago--less than 2 weeks ago--a cruise ship passed through the Northwest 
Passage without the aid of an icebreaker.
  We absolutely have to have a polar icebreaker. As the chairman said, 
we have one icebreaker today, and it is going to go in for overhaul. 
When it does, we have no heavy icebreaker either for the North Pole or 
the South Pole.
  We are in trouble. We have to have this. The U.S. Navy has to have 
it. U.S. security has to have it. And certainly for the commerce in the 
Arctic, we have to have it. It is a reality. The Arctic Ocean is 
opening. Commerce will take place. And it will also need military 
availability in that area.
  The legislation that is before us today does not have the proper 
language in it because of CBO sitting on their duff and doodling 
numbers when we know we need this language.
  The Senate appropriations bill has a billion dollars for icebreakers, 
but there is no authorization. Unfortunately, because of our rules 
here, we had to strip the language out. Later, we hope to put the 
language back in, but it is not available today.
  We have to have this. We go back meeting after meeting, hearing after 
hearing, year after year, 4 or 5 years that we have been working on 
this, and then, at the very last moment, CBO can't get its act 
together. Well, I am sorry, CBO. We ought to waive the rules and get on 
with what we need to do here, which is to provide the authorization.
  The language that the chairman has worked out with me and others 
would not only provide the authorization, but would do it in such a way 
as to give us the very best possible financial deal on the construction 
of icebreakers--that is a block buy--and also authorizing, should the 
money be available in the future, an additional three lighter 
icebreakers beyond the three heavy icebreakers.
  Not to say we are going to build it all at once, but the 
authorization is in the law. That then allows the Coast Guard to 
properly line it up for the very best deal that we can get, maybe one 
at a

[[Page 13590]]

time, maybe two or three over a 5- or 10-year period of time. 
Unfortunately, that language had to be stripped out.
  So when the chairman started his explanation of this bill, he did so 
to call all of our attention to what is not in the bill that should 
have been in the bill, but for CBO and the rules that we have that 
require us to have CBO's accounting before we move an authorization.
  That is where we are today. Unfortunately, it is where we are. So we 
are going to move this bill along. We will probably--hopefully--come 
back before this session is over in the lameduck session and write this 
thing properly. Unfortunately, today we are not there. There is more to 
be said about the rest of the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, now we are going to get back to H.R. 5978, which is a 
very good bill in and of itself that, once again, doesn't have the 
language that we tried to get in.
  H.R. 5978, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Amendments Act 
of 2016, is a catch-all bill that addresses a number of different Coast 
Guard and maritime transportation issues.
  The bill involves improvements to the Coast Guard acquisition 
authorities to ensure the acquisition program keeps in mind the needs 
of Coast Guard operating units when acquiring assets. This provision 
also requires an analysis on the use of multiyear procurement and block 
buy authorities related to the purchase of Fast Response Cutters, 
Offshore Patrol Cutters, and polar icebreakers, but just a report.
  We already know from watching the Navy do business for the last few 
decades that block buys save hundreds of millions of dollars.
  At the request of the GAO, the bill repeals a GAO report regarding 
disbursements from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. The information 
that was collected by GAO will be incorporated into an existing Coast 
Guard report.
  Due to certain recent weather events impacting a Coast Guard pier in 
Wilmington, North Carolina, the Coast Guard is required to issue a one-
time report detailing short- and long-term plans to replace and 
maintain the pier. Certain fishing industries will be assisted by the 
bill, including those that would be affected by a prescribed 
Alternative Safety Compliance Program to be issued by the Coast Guard 
by January 1, 2017.
  If the service does not issue the program by January 1, 2017, which 
is hopefully the case, the bill would provide a 3-year window for 
industry compliance from the date the Coast Guard issues the program.
  It has been a long-term interest for many, including Ranking Member 
Garamendi, who has been instrumental--and I would say more instrumental 
than myself--in preparing the language included in this legislation 
that there be a reliable land-based positioning, navigation, and timing 
system to complement, supplement, and back up the Global Positioning 
System that we now use, the GPS.
  We have all seen what the Chinese can do now in knocking down 
satellites. If our GPS goes out, there is no other way for us to 
navigate the oceans or to navigate land. The eLoran system does this to 
ensure the continuous availability of uncorrupted or non-degraded 
signals for military and civilian users. The bill directed the Coast 
Guard to establish and maintain such a backup system.

                              {time}  1915

  Aids to navigation are important tools that allow vessels to safely 
navigate waterways. The bill would allow the Commandant, subject to 
appropriations, to reimburse a non-Federal entity for costs incurred by 
that entity to construct and establish an aid to navigation that would 
otherwise be constructed by the Coast Guard.
  Aids to navigation facilitate safe and efficient maritime 
transportation on federally authorized navigation channels. Specific 
conditions for reimbursement are outlined. Reimbursements for a single 
project are limited to $5 million, and the authority expires 4 years 
after the date of enactment of the bill.
  There are concerns with the Coast Guard's Western Alaska Captain of 
the Port Zone approving alternate planning criteria for areas covering 
only a portion of the zone. This action would create two adjacent areas 
with different levels of prevention and response preparedness. This 
bill requires public notice, an economic study, and a report to 
Congress on the study before approval of any criteria not covering the 
full Western Alaska zone.
  Lastly, the bill makes a variety of technical changes to provisions 
in enacted Coast Guard Authorization Acts.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I join Chairman Hunter in strong support for the 
legislation and to advance this new policy initiative to improve the 
oversight of the Coast Guard and the major acquisition programs, and 
also to advance the safety and security of the U.S. maritime industry.
  H.R. 5978, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Amendments 
Act, is bipartisan legislation. We have talked about some of the 
provisions that are not in the bill. I will try to talk about those 
that are in the bill. It deserves the robust support from Members on 
both sides of the aisle, and I urge its quick passage, probably as 
early as today.
  I thank the gentleman, Mr. Hunter, for his unwavering support of the 
Coast Guard and the work that we are able to do together with the 
members of the committee.
  Of great significance, this legislation will address an overlooked 
and underappreciated threat to our national and economic security: the 
fact that GPS, Global Positioning System, it has been identified for 
nearly 20 years as the single point of failure, with serious 
implications for our national security and economy.
  I know we are not able to use these little machines called cell 
phones on the floor, but if we could, they are totally reliant on GPS. 
You go down to the ATM, it will not work without GPS. Our systems of 
navigation, including such things as positive train control, totally 
dependent upon GPS. In fact, Wall Street, totally dependent on GPS. It 
is timing, navigation, and positioning. That is GPS.
  We have no backup; other countries do. You might ask, why is China, 
why is Russia, why are they building a GLAN-based backup to GPS? Well, 
they know that if there is trouble, the first thing that is going to 
disappear is GPS.
  Right now, GPS can be knocked out by somebody driving down the 
freeway with their 18-wheeler and using an antiradar device. You might 
ask what happened at the Newark airport. That is exactly what happened. 
GPS was knocked out by somebody on Interstate 95 with a radar device.
  It is a very weak signal, but it is an extraordinarily important 
signal. So this bill provides for a backup system which has been 
discussed for nearly 20 years, and we have gone round and round the 
Bush--I guess that is the right thing--and the Clinton, in between, 
without any action.
  So this bill would actually push this forward to give us an 
opportunity to establish a backup system, which is actually very old 
but will be updated with the enhanced LORAN system, dating back to the 
1940s, which was the first navigational system that we built in the 
United States.
  Much of the system is already available; the towers, the locations, 
much of that is in place. This would authorize a public-private 
partnership to put that in place.
  I won't go into it anymore, but it is high time that we get on with 
this. The chairman laid out how it is going to be done in his talk and, 
hopefully, we can finally get this underway.
  There are many, many other pieces that are in this legislation. We 
have talked a little bit about the Coast Guard icebreakers. We do have 
a study--oh, my goodness, another study. It is the best we could do at 
the moment. The chairman and I talked about

[[Page 13591]]

what we would like to accomplish with more than that with his actual 
authorization. The block buy, we have got to do it, and, hopefully, we 
will.
  There are other things that are in the bill that the chairman has 
described. I won't go into them today in any more detail but to say 
that, in my written statement, it will be covered.
  One more thing, to back up the GPS, I include in the Record about 15 
years of studies by Federal Government agencies that all say we have 
got to have a backup system, and the eLORAN is the best.
  Mr. Chairman, shall we continue on and beat this for a while longer 
or shall we say let's pass the bill and get on with it?
  I am pleased to rise and join Chairman Hunter in strong support of 
this legislation to advance new policy initiatives to improve the 
oversight of the Coast Guard's major acquisition programs and to 
advance the safety and security of the U.S. maritime industry.
  H.R. 5978, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Amendments Act 
of 2016, is bipartisan legislation that was developed to address issues 
that have arisen since the Congress passed a two-year comprehensive 
Coast Guard authorization bill earlier this year.
  This legislation is deserving of robust support from members on both 
sides of the aisle and I urge its quick passage by the House today so 
it can be sent to the other body for its consideration and passage 
before the 114th Congress adjourns sine die.
  I want to thank Chairman Hunter for his unwavering leadership and for 
the cooperative spirit of this excellent staff in working with me and 
other Democratic members to address our interests and concerns in this 
legislation.
  Of greatest significance, this legislation will address an overlooked 
need and under-appreciated threat to our national and economic 
security--the fact that the Global Positioning System, or GPS, has been 
identified as a single point of failure with serious implications for 
our national security and economy.
  GPS has revolutionized how we live, work, and play. Signals provided 
by GPS satellites ensure that literally everything that we routinely 
depend on not only runs, but runs with unprecedented reliability and 
precision.
  We have all benefitted from GPS: whether through the distribution of 
power from our electric grid; the coordination of timing signals for 
trains and traffic signals; or, to improve the efficiency of maritime 
search and rescue missions launched by the Coast Guard.
  There is no denying that GPS has been a tremendous technological 
asset. But the reality is that GPS signals are relatively weak and 
fairly easy to degrade, disrupt or jam. This is not a hypothetical 
matter; this threat is real, and it is happening now.
  Just last week, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Paul 
Zukunft, while speaking at a National Harbor Safety Conference in 
Portland, Oregon, cited over 100 instances in which vessels experienced 
disruption to their GPS reception.
  There is nothing we can do to change the underlying physics of the 
GPS signal. We can, however, take necessary and appropriate actions now 
to ensure that a reliable land-based back-up system for positioning, 
navigation and timing signals is available when needed.
  Moreover, if the Russians, the Chinese, the EU, and other nations are 
developing land-based GPS back-up systems, the United States should 
have its own system as well.
  Since 2001 the Federal Government, notably the PNT Executive 
Committee, has been evaluating options. The Executive Committee 
concluded in December, 2014 that an enhanced LORAN, or eLORAN system, 
would be the most cost-effective and reliable back-up for GPS signals.
  What this legislation will do is force the Federal Government to 
finally take action on its own recommendation.
  The Coast Guard, which for decades operated the LORAN-C navigation 
system (the predecessor of GPS), would be directed to publish a request 
for proposals, complete a plan for the architecture of an eLORAN 
system, and get a system built and fully operational within three 
years.
  Make no mistake, this is a significant undertaking. But the stakes of 
doing nothing is a risky roll of the dice we would be well-advised to 
avoid. I strongly urge members on both sides to support this important 
provision.
  I am also very pleased that this legislation continues to move 
forward in our efforts to recapitalize the Coast Guard's legacy fleet 
of polar class heavy icebreakers.
  It is clear that we are witnessing the opening of the Arctic to 
maritime commerce, and with it, the creation of a whole new ocean of 
operational responsibility for the Coast Guard. In this most 
challenging of maritime environments, it is vital that the Service has 
the icebreaking capabilities it will need to operate safely and 
effectively.
  I must express my disappointment that we were unable to retain the 
``block buy'' provision that was reported out of the Transportation 
Committee.
  Nevertheless, the analysis of multi-year procurement and block buy 
contracting called for in this legislation would be helpful to have on 
hand when the Congress ultimately does appropriate funds for the 
construction of these vital new national security assets.
  I also want to express my support for other provisions in the bill, 
notably language that will ensure commercial fishermen a full three 
years to comply with new alternative safety compliance program 
requirements from the date the Coast Guard publishes these 
requirements.
  Additionally, I want to express my support for the provision that 
would grant to the Coast Guard authority to reimburse private entities 
for their costs to construct a Federal navigation aid. The additional 
sideboards that were added have clarified the scope and intent of this 
new authority. I want to thank Congressman Blake Farenthold for his 
willingness to work to improve this provision.
  Mr. Speaker, I again want to express my appreciation to Chairman 
Hunter and his staff for their support for the Coast Guard and the U.S. 
Maritime industry, and for their collaboration in developing this 
legislation.
  I also want to thank the Chairman of the full Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee, Congressman Bill Shuster, and the Ranking 
Member on the full Committee, Congressman Peter DeFazio, for their 
leadership and support for the Committee's maritime agenda.
  In closing, this legislation is bipartisan and non-controversial. It 
deserves the full support of the House.

  NSPD-39: U.S. Space-Based Position, Navigation, and Timing Policy, 
                           December 15, 2004


                               FACT SHEET

       The President authorized a new national policy on December 
     8, 2004 that establishes guidance and implementation actions 
     for space-based positioning, navigation, and timing programs, 
     augmentations, and activities for U.S. national and homeland 
     security, civil, scientific, and commercial purposes. This 
     policy supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/National 
     Science and Technology Council-6, U.S. Global Positioning 
     System Policy, dated March 28, 1996.
     I. Scope and Definitions
       This policy provides guidance for: (1) development, 
     acquisition, operation, sustainment, and modernization of the 
     Global Positioning System and U.S.-developed, owned and/or 
     operated systems used to augment or otherwise improve the 
     Global Positioning System and/or other space-based 
     positioning, navigation, and timing signals; (2) development, 
     deployment, sustainment, and modernization of capabilities to 
     protect U.S. and allied access to and use of the Global 
     Positioning System for national, homeland, and economic 
     security, and to deny adversaries access to any space-based 
     positioning, navigation, and timing services; and (3) foreign 
     access to the Global Positioning System and United States 
     Government augmentations, and international cooperation with 
     foreign space-based positioning, navigation, and timing 
     services, including augmentations.
       For purposes of this document:
       ``Interoperable'' refers to the ability of civil U.S. and 
     foreign space-based positioning, navigation, and timing 
     services to be used together to provide better capabilities 
     at the user level than would be achieved by relying solely on 
     one service or signal;
       ``Compatible'' refers to the ability of U.S. and foreign 
     space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services to 
     be used separately or together without interfering with each 
     individual service or signal, and without adversely affecting 
     navigation warfare; and
       ``Augmentation'' refers to space and/or ground-based 
     systems that provide users of space-based positioning, 
     navigation, and timing signals with additional information 
     that enables users to obtain enhanced performance when 
     compared to the un-augmented space-based signals alone. These 
     improvements include better accuracy, availability, 
     integrity, and reliability, with independent integrity 
     monitoring and alerting capabilities for critical 
     applications.
     II. Background
       Over the past decade, the Global Positioning System has 
     grown into a global utility whose multiuse services are 
     integral to U.S. national security, economic growth, 
     transportation safety, and homeland security, and are an 
     essential element of the worldwide economic infrastructure. 
     In the year 2000, the United States recognized the increasing 
     importance of the Global Positioning System to civil and 
     commercial users by discontinuing the deliberate degradation 
     of accuracy for non-military signals, known as Selective 
     Availability. Since that time, commercial and civil 
     applications

[[Page 13592]]

     of the Global Positioning System have continued to multiply 
     and their importance has increased significantly. Services 
     dependent on Global Positioning System information are now an 
     engine for economic growth, enhancing economic development, 
     and improving safety of life, and the system is a key 
     component of multiple sectors of U.S. critical 
     infrastructure.
       While the growth in civil and commercial applications 
     continues, the positioning, navigation, and timing 
     information provided by the Global Positioning System remains 
     critical to U.S. national security, and its applications are 
     integrated into virtually every facet of U.S. military 
     operations. United States and allied military forces will 
     continue to rely on the Global Positioning System military 
     services for positioning, navigation, and timing services.
       The continuing growth of services based on the Global 
     Positioning System presents opportunities, risks, and threats 
     to U.S. national, homeland, and economic security. The 
     widespread and growing dependence on the Global Positioning 
     System of military, civil, and commercial systems and 
     infrastructures has made many of these systems inherently 
     vulnerable to an unexpected interruption in positioning, 
     navigation, and/or timing services. In addition, whether 
     designed for military capabilities or not, all positioning, 
     navigation, and timing signals from space and their 
     augmentations provide inherent capabilities that can be used 
     by adversaries, including enemy military forces and terrorist 
     groups. Finally, emerging foreign space-based positioning, 
     navigation, and timing services could enhance or undermine 
     the future utility of the Global Positioning System.
       The United States must continue to improve and maintain the 
     Global Positioning System, augmentations, and backup 
     capabilities to meet growing national, homeland, and economic 
     security requirements, for civil requirements, and to meet 
     commercial and scientific demands. In parallel, we must 
     continue to improve capabilities to deny adversary access to 
     all space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services, 
     particularly including services that are openly available and 
     can be readily used by adversaries and/or terrorists to 
     threaten the security of the United States. In addition, the 
     diverse requirements for and multiple applications of space-
     based positioning, navigation, and timing services require 
     stable yet adaptable policies and management mechanisms. The 
     existing management mechanisms for the Global Positioning 
     System and its augmentations must be modified to accommodate 
     a multi-use approach to program planning, resource 
     allocation, system development, and operations. Therefore, 
     the United States Government must improve the policy and 
     management framework governing the Global Positioning System 
     and its augmentations to support their continued ability to 
     meet increasing and varied domestic and global requirements.
     III. Goals and Objectives
       The fundamental goal of this policy is to ensure that the 
     United States maintains space-based positioning, navigation, 
     and timing services, augmentation, back-up, and service 
     denial capabilities that: (1) provide uninterrupted 
     availability of positioning, navigation, and timing services; 
     (2) meet growing national, homeland, economic security, and 
     civil requirements, and scientific and commercial demands; 
     (3) remain the pre-eminent military space-based positioning, 
     navigation, and timing service; (4) continue to provide civil 
     services that exceed or are competitive with foreign civil 
     space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services and 
     augmentation systems; (5) remain essential components of 
     internationally accepted positioning, navigation, and timing 
     services; and (6) promote U.S. technological leadership in 
     applications involving space-based positioning, navigation, 
     and timing services. To achieve this goal, the United States 
     Government shall:
       Provide uninterrupted access to U.S. space-based global, 
     precise positioning, navigation, and timing services for U.S. 
     and allied national security systems and capabilities through 
     the Global Positioning System, without being dependent on 
     foreign positioning, navigation, and timing services;
       Provide on a continuous, worldwide basis civil space-based, 
     positioning, navigation, and timing services free of direct 
     user fees for civil, commercial, and scientific uses, and for 
     homeland security through the Global Positioning System and 
     its augmentations, and provide open, free access to 
     information necessary to develop and build equipment to use 
     these services;
       Improve capabilities to deny hostile use of any space-based 
     positioning, navigation, and timing services, without unduly 
     disrupting civil and commercial access to civil positioning, 
     navigation, and timing services outside an area of military 
     operations, or for homeland security purposes;
       Improve the performance of space-based positioning, 
     navigation, and timing services, including more robust 
     resistance to interference for, and consistent with, U.S. and 
     allied national security purposes, homeland security, and 
     civil, commercial, and scientific users worldwide;
       Maintain the Global Positioning System as a component of 
     multiple sectors of the U.S. Critical Infrastructure, 
     consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7, 
     Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
     Protection, dated December 17, 2003;
       Encourage foreign development of positioning, navigation, 
     and timing services and systems based on the Global 
     Positioning System. Seek to ensure that foreign space-based 
     positioning, navigation, and timing systems are interoperable 
     with the civil services of the Global Positioning System and 
     its augmentations in order to benefit civil, commercial, and 
     scientific users worldwide. At a minimum, seek to ensure that 
     foreign systems are compatible with the Global Positioning 
     System and its augmentations and address mutual security 
     concerns with foreign providers to prevent hostile use of 
     space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services; and
       Promote the use of U.S. space-based positioning, 
     navigation, and timing services and capabilities for 
     applications at the Federal, State, and local level, to the 
     maximum practical extent.
     IV. Management of Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and 
         Timing Services
       This policy establishes a permanent National Space-Based 
     Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Executive Committee. The 
     Executive Committee will be co-chaired by the Deputy 
     Secretaries of the Department of Defense and the Department 
     of Transportation or by their designated representatives. Its 
     members will include representatives at the equivalent level 
     from the Departments of State, Commerce, and Homeland 
     Security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Aeronautics 
     and Space Administration, and from other Departments and 
     Agencies as required. Components of the Executive Office of 
     the President, including the Office of Management and Budget, 
     the National Security Council staff, the Homeland Security 
     Council staff, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, 
     and the National Economic Council staff, shall participate as 
     observers to the Executive Committee. The Chairman of the 
     Federal Communications Commission shall be invited to 
     participate on the Executive Committee as a Liaison. The 
     Executive Committee shall meet at least twice each year. The 
     Secretaries of Defense and Transportation shall develop the 
     procedures by which the Committee shall operate.
       The Executive Committee shall make recommendations to its 
     member Departments and Agencies, and to the President through 
     the representatives of the Executive Office of the President. 
     In addition, the Executive Committee will advise and 
     coordinate with and among the Departments and Agencies 
     responsible for the strategic decisions regarding policies, 
     architectures, requirements, and resource allocation for 
     maintaining and improving U.S. space-based positioning, 
     navigation, and timing infrastructures, including the Global 
     Positioning System, its augmentations, security for these 
     services, and relationships with foreign positioning, 
     navigation, and timing services. Specifically, the Executive 
     Committee shall:
       Ensure that national security, homeland security, and civil 
     requirements receive full and appropriate consideration in 
     the decision-making process and facilitate the integration 
     and de-confliction of these requirements for space-based 
     positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities, as 
     required;
       Coordinate individual Departments' and Agencies' 
     positioning, navigation, and timing program plans, 
     requirements, budgets, and policies, and assess the adequacy 
     of funding and schedules to meet validated requirements in a 
     timely manner;
       Ensure that the utility of civil services exceeds, or is at 
     least equivalent to, those routinely provided by foreign 
     space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services;
       Promote plans to modernize the U.S. space-based 
     positioning, navigation, and timing infrastructure, 
     including: (1) development, deployment, and operation of new 
     and/or improved national security and public safety services 
     when required and to the maximum practical extent; and (2) 
     determining the apportionment of requirements between the 
     Global Positioning System and its augmentations, including 
     consideration of user equipment;
       Review proposals and provide recommendations to the 
     Departments and Agencies for international cooperation, as 
     well as spectrum management and protection issues; and
       Establish a space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing 
     Advisory Board. The board shall be comprised of experts from 
     outside the United States Government, and shall be chartered 
     as a Federal Advisory Committee.
       The Executive Committee shall establish the National Space-
     Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Coordination 
     Office. This office shall provide the staff functions for the 
     Executive Committee. It shall be led by a full-time Director 
     chosen by, and reporting to the Executive Committee, and 
     shall include a cadre of full-time staff provided by 
     Departments and Agencies represented on the Executive 
     Committee. The Executive Committee shall determine the 
     resources for

[[Page 13593]]

     the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing 
     Coordination Office, including funding, location, staffing, 
     and composition, consistent with the direction of this 
     policy.
       The National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and 
     Timing Coordination Office shall serve as the Secretariat for 
     the Executive Committee and shall perform those functions 
     delegated by the Executive Committee. Departments and 
     Agencies shall provide appropriate information to the 
     National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing 
     Coordination Office to ensure interagency transparency about 
     positioning, navigation, and timing programs, policies, 
     budgets, and activities that might affect mutual interests or 
     interagency dependencies. The Interagency Global Positioning 
     System Executive Board is hereby disestablished, and the 
     Executive Committee or the National Space-Based Positioning, 
     Navigation, and Timing Coordination Office, as appropriate, 
     shall assume its functions as defined in the Positioning, 
     Navigation, and Timing Executive Committee Charter, 
     consistent with the direction provided in this policy.
       The Executive Committee shall advise and coordinate the 
     interdepartmental resource allocation for the Global 
     Positioning System and it augmentations on an annual basis. 
     The Secretary of Defense shall have primary responsibility 
     for providing resources for development, acquisition, 
     operation, sustainment, and modernization of the Global 
     Positioning System. The Secretary of Transportation shall 
     provide resources to the Secretary of Defense for assessment, 
     development, acquisition, implementation, operation, and 
     sustainment of additional designated Global Positioning 
     System civil capabilities beyond the second and third civil 
     signals already contained in the current Global Positioning 
     System program Global Positioning System civil signal 
     performance monitoring, augmentations, and other unique 
     positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities will be 
     funded by the agency or agencies requiring those services or 
     capabilities, including out-year procurement and operations 
     costs. Any new technical features proposed and funded by the 
     civil agencies shall not degrade or displace existing or 
     planned national security functions of the system. If the 
     Executive Committee recommends that the availability of 
     Global Positioning System capabilities should be accelerated, 
     the Executive Committee will make recommendations regarding 
     the resources required to accelerate those capabilities. 
     Resource issues will be resolved during the regular budget 
     process.
       The details of the cost sharing between: (1) the Department 
     of Defense and the Department of Transportation, for the 
     Global Positioning System; and (2) Departments and Agencies 
     sponsoring augmentations, and/or unique or accelerated 
     capabilities, shall be outlined in a Five-Year National 
     Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Plan, 
     consistent with the guidance provided in this policy.
     V. Foreign Access to U.S. Space-based Positioning, 
         Navigation, and Timing Capabilities
       Any exports of U.S. positioning, navigation, and timing 
     capabilities covered by the United States Munitions List or 
     the Commerce Control List will continue to be licensed 
     pursuant to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations or 
     the Export Administration Regulations, as appropriate, and in 
     accordance with all existing laws and regulations.
       As a general guideline, export of civil or other non-United 
     States Munitions List space-based positioning, navigation and 
     timing capabilities that are currently available or are 
     planned to be available in the global marketplace will 
     continue to be considered favorably. Exports of sensitive or 
     advanced positioning, navigation, and timing information, 
     systems, technologies, and components will be considered on a 
     case-by-case basis in accordance with existing laws and 
     regulations, as well as relevant national security and 
     foreign policy goals and considerations. In support of such 
     reviews, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
     Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and Energy, the 
     Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration, and the Director of Central Intelligence, 
     shall modify and maintain the Sensitive Technology List 
     directed in U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Space Policy, 
     dated April 25, 2003, including those technology items or 
     areas deemed sensitive for positioning, navigation and timing 
     applications. The Secretaries of State and Commerce shall use 
     the list in the evaluation of requests for exports.
     VI. Agency Roles and Responsibilities
       Departments and Agencies shall allocate the resources 
     required to fulfill the objectives of this policy. Nothing in 
     this policy shall diminish the operational and budgetary 
     authorities of the Departments and Agencies.
       The Secretary of Defense shall:
       Have responsibility for development, acquisition, 
     operation, security, and continued modernization of the 
     Global Positioning System, while facilitating appropriate 
     civil and homeland security Department and Agency 
     representation and participation in these activities, and any 
     decisions that affect civil and homeland security equities;
       Develop, acquire, operate, realistically test, evaluate, 
     and maintain navigation warfare capabilities and other 
     capabilities required to:
       Effectively utilize the Global Positioning System services 
     in the event of adversary jamming or other interference;
       Deny to adversaries position, navigation, and timing 
     services from the Global Positioning System, its 
     augmentations, and/or any other space-based position, 
     navigation, and timing systems without unduly disrupting 
     civil, commercial, and scientific uses of these services 
     outside an area of military operations, or for homeland 
     security purposes; and
       Identify, locate and mitigate, in coordination with 
     Departments and Agencies, as appropriate, any interference on 
     a global basis that adversely affects use of the Global 
     Positioning System for military operations;
       Ensure the earliest operational availability for modernized 
     military and navigation warfare capabilities;
       Train, equip, test, and exercise U.S. military forces and 
     national security capabilities in operationally realistic 
     conditions that include denial of the Global Positioning 
     System. In cooperation with the Secretaries of Transportation 
     and Homeland Security, and as appropriate, with the Secretary 
     of State, develop guidelines that facilitate these activities 
     and Navigation Warfare training, testing, demonstrations, and 
     exercises without unduly disrupting or degrading homeland 
     security and civil services and operations, either 
     internationally or domestically;
       Promote use of Global Positioning System national security 
     services to allied military forces to facilitate 
     interoperability between U.S. and allied forces and 
     capabilities, and to maintain their use as the pre-eminent 
     military space-based positioning, navigation, and timing 
     capability;
       Consistent with the guidance in Section V of this policy, 
     make Global Positioning System national security services, 
     user equipment, information, and technology available for use 
     by allied military forces; and
       Work with allies to monitor access to national security 
     services and user equipment, in order to limit the potential 
     for adversaries to use these capabilities against U.S. and 
     allied military forces;
       Maintain the commitment to discontinue the use of the 
     feature known as Selective Availability designed to degrade 
     globally the Standard Positioning Service of the Global 
     Positioning System;
       Facilitate access to appropriate levels of national 
     security services and user equipment at the Federal level to 
     meet critical requirements for emergency response and other 
     homeland security purposes, and, on an exceptional basis, for 
     civil purposes, including state or local emergency response;
       Develop improved, dedicated national security positioning, 
     navigation, and timing capabilities, including but not 
     limited to more diverse, flexible, and capable signals and 
     services;
       Maintain lead responsibility for negotiating with foreign 
     defense organizations any cooperation regarding access to or 
     information about Global Positioning System military 
     services; and
       In cooperation with other Departments and Agencies, assess 
     the utility and feasibility of hosting secondary payloads on 
     Global Positioning System satellites, including, but not 
     limited to those intended to enhance global search and rescue 
     capabilities for all users. No secondary payload may 
     adversely affect the performance, schedule, or cost of the 
     Global Positioning System, its signals or services. Resources 
     required for the assessment, development, acquisition, 
     integration, and operation of secondary payloads shall be the 
     responsibility of the sponsoring agency or agencies.
       The Secretary of Transportation shall:
       Have lead responsibility for the development of 
     requirements for civil applications from all United States 
     Government civil Departments and Agencies;
       Ensure, in cooperation with the Secretary of Defense and 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, the performance 
     monitoring of U.S. civil space-based positioning, navigation, 
     and timing services;
       Consistent with the guidance in Section V of this policy, 
     and in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the 
     Secretary of State, facilitate: (1) foreign development of 
     civil positioning, navigation, and timing services and 
     systems based on the Global Positioning System; and (2) 
     international participation in the development of civil 
     applications for U.S. space-based positioning, navigation, 
     and timing services;
       Ensure, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, that 
     space-based positioning, navigation, and timing public safety 
     services meet or exceed international performance standards, 
     including but not limited to those used for these services in 
     aviation and/or maritime applications;
       In cooperation with other Departments and Agencies, promote 
     the use of U.S. civil space-based positioning, navigation, 
     and timing services and capabilities for transportation 
     safety;
       Represent the civil Departments and Agencies in the 
     development, acquisition, management, and operations of the 
     Global Positioning System;

[[Page 13594]]

       Develop, acquire, operate, and maintain Global Positioning 
     System space or terrestrial augmentations for civil 
     transportation applications;
       Ensure the earliest operational availability for modernized 
     civil signals and services on the Global Positioning System 
     and its augmentations, in coordination with the Secretary of 
     Defense;
       In coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
     develop, acquire, operate, and maintain backup position, 
     navigation, and timing capabilities that can support critical 
     transportation, homeland security, and other critical civil 
     and commercial infrastructure applications within the United 
     States, in the event of a disruption of the Global 
     Positioning System or other space-based positioning, 
     navigation, and timing services, consistent with Homeland 
     Security Presidential Directive-7, Critical Infrastructure 
     Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, dated 
     December 17, 2003; and
       In cooperation with the Secretary of Defense, assess and 
     assist, as appropriate, in the international acceptance for 
     using the military positioning, navigation, and timing 
     services of the Global Positioning System for operations in 
     civil airspace.
       The Secretary of Commerce shall:
       Represent U.S. commercial interests with other Departments 
     and Agencies in the requirements review of the Global 
     Positioning System and related space-based augmentations;
       In coordination with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and 
     Transportation and the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration, seek to protect the radio frequency spectrum 
     used by the Global Positioning System and its augmentations 
     through appropriate domestic and international spectrum 
     management and regulatory practices;
       In coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and 
     Transportation, and the Administrator of the National 
     Aeronautics and Space Administration, facilitate cooperation 
     between the United States Government and U.S. industry as 
     appropriate to identify mutually acceptable solutions that 
     will preserve existing and evolving uses of space-based 
     positioning, navigation, and timing services, while allowing 
     for the development of other technologies and services that 
     depend on use of the radio frequency spectrum;
       In cooperation with the Administrator of the National 
     Aeronautics and Space Administration, develop and provide to 
     the Secretary of Transportation requirements for use of the 
     Global Positioning System and its augmentations to support 
     civil space systems; and
       In cooperation with other Departments and Agencies, promote 
     the use of U.S. civil space-based positioning, navigation, 
     and timing services and capabilities for applications at the 
     Federal, State, and local level, to the maximum practical 
     extent.
       The Secretary of State shall:
       In cooperation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
     of Transportation, and other Departments and Agencies promote 
     the use of civil aspects of the Global Positioning System and 
     its augmentation services and standards with foreign 
     governments and other international organizations;
       Take the lead for negotiating with foreign governments and 
     international organizations regarding civil and, as 
     appropriate and in coordination with the Secretary of 
     Defense, military positioning, navigation, and timing 
     matters, including but not limited to coordinating 
     interagency review of:
       Instructions to U.S. delegations for bilateral and 
     multilateral consultations relating to the planning, 
     management, and use of the Global Positioning System and 
     related augmentation systems; and
       International agreements with foreign governments and 
     international organizations regarding the planning, 
     operation, management, and/or use of the Global Positioning 
     System and its augmentations; and
       Modify and maintain, in coordination with the Secretaries 
     of Defense, Commerce, and Energy, the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, and the Administrator of the National 
     Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Sensitive 
     Technology List created by U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing 
     Space Policy, dated April 25, 2003. In particular, include 
     sensitive technology items and/or information related to 
     positioning, navigation, and timing applications.
       The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:
       Identify space-based positioning, navigation, and timing 
     requirements for homeland security purposes to the Secretary 
     of Transportation, and coordinate the use of positioning, 
     navigation, and timing capabilities and backup systems for 
     homeland security purposes by Federal, State, and local 
     governments and authorities;
       In coordination with the Secretary of Transportation, and 
     with other Departments and Agencies, promote the use of the 
     Global Positioning System positioning and timing standards 
     for use by Federal agencies, and by State and local 
     authorities responsible for public safety and emergency 
     response;
       In coordination with the Secretary of Defense, and in 
     cooperation with the Secretaries of Transportation and 
     Commerce, ensure:
       Mechanisms are in place to identify, understand, and 
     disseminate timely information regarding threats associated 
     with the potential hostile use of space-based positioning, 
     navigation, and timing services within the United States; and
       Procedures are developed, implemented, and routinely 
     exercised to request assistance from the Secretary of Defense 
     should it become necessary to deny hostile use of space-based 
     position, navigation and timing services within the United 
     States;
       In coordination with the Secretaries of Defense, 
     Transportation, and Commerce, develop and maintain 
     capabilities, procedures, and techniques, and routinely 
     exercise civil contingency responses to ensure continuity of 
     operations in the event that access to the Global Positioning 
     System is disrupted or denied;
       In coordination with the Secretaries of Transportation and 
     Defense, and in cooperation with other Departments and 
     Agencies, coordinate the use of existing and planned Federal 
     capabilities to identify, locate, and attribute any 
     interference within the United States that adversely affects 
     use of the Global Positioning System and its augmentations 
     for homeland security, civil, commercial, and scientific 
     purposes; and
       In coordination with the Secretaries of Transportation and 
     Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, and in 
     cooperation with other Departments and Agencies: (1) develop 
     a central repository and database for reports of domestic and 
     international interference to the civil services of the 
     Global Positioning System and its augmentations for homeland 
     security, civil, commercial, and scientific purposes; and (2) 
     notify promptly the Administrator, National 
     Telecommunications and Information Administration, the 
     Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, 
     and other Departments and Agencies in cases of domestic or 
     international interference with space-based positioning, 
     navigation, and timing services to enable appropriate 
     investigation, notification, and/or enforcement action.
       The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration, in cooperation with the Secretary of 
     Commerce, shall develop and provide to the Secretary of 
     Transportation requirements for the use of the Global 
     Positioning System and its augmentations to support civil 
     space systems.
       The Director of Central Intelligence shall identify, 
     monitor, and assess the development of foreign threats to the 
     use of the Global Positioning System positioning, navigation, 
     and timing architectures and related services; provide 
     information to assist the Secretary of Defense in development 
     of countermeasures;
       Departments and Agencies detecting interference, or 
     receiving reports of domestic or international interference 
     adversely affecting the performance of U.S. space-based 
     positioning, navigation, and timing services shall provide 
     timely reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
     Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central 
     Intelligence. Upon notification by the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security:
       The Secretary of Commerce, in cooperation with other 
     Departments and Agencies, and with the Chairman of the 
     Federal Communications Commission shall take appropriate and 
     legally permissible actions required to mitigate interference 
     to U.S. space-based positioning, navigation, and timing 
     services within the United States; and
       The Secretary of State shall, as appropriate, notify and/or 
     coordinate the notification of foreign governments and 
     international organizations in cases of interference with 
     U.S. space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services 
     caused by foreign government or commercial activities.

  Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Farenthold).
  Mr. FARENTHOLD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bill. There 
are a lot of good things in it for the Nation.
  As a former computer technician, I know there is nothing worse than a 
single point of failure in the network. GPS is a single point of 
failure for a lot of things; eLORAN is absolutely must-have.
  We can talk about what is not in the bill as well, but I do want to 
talk about a section that is specifically important to the district I 
represent.
  Section 202 grants the authority for the Coast Guard to reimburse 
non-Federal entities for the cost of construction to certain aids to 
navigation. This authority ensures these types of safety-related 
navigation projects can move forward in a timely fashion.
  We are all too aware of how slow the government can be, especially 
when it comes to funding projects, so we have come up with a way here 
where we can work with non-Federal partners to improve the safety of 
our navigation system. It doesn't cost the government

[[Page 13595]]

anything. The non-Federal partners go ahead and put in the equipment up 
to Coast Guard standards with Coast Guard approval and get it done now; 
and then, when the Coast Guard gets the money, when the red tape and 
government machine moves through its procedure, they can get 
reimbursed, while our mariners can enjoin the enhanced safety and our 
ports can enjoy the enhanced economic activity as a result of being 
able to, for instance, traverse channels in low-light conditions.
  It is safety. It is good for the economy. In fact, one of the 
problems that brought this to my attention was when there was a project 
in Corpus Christi, the La Quinta Channel. Somehow, the aids to 
navigation never got built, even though this channel has been dredged 
and is in use. The pilots say it is unsafe to use in low-light 
conditions, and it looks like it could be years before the Coast Guard 
gets around to funding it.
  Well, the Port of Corpus Christi is willing to pony up the money 
today. The Coast Guard says: All right; when we get it, we will give it 
back. This piece of legislation allows that to happen. It is good 
government, along with lots of other pieces of this legislation, 
something we need to pass, and I urge my colleagues to git-r-done.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  We need polar icebreakers. This body is going to push; Mr. Garamendi 
and I are going to push and push until we have polar icebreakers and we 
have at least \1/140\ the capability of Russia. That is a pretty low 
bar that we are setting for ourselves, but we are going to set it right 
here, right now, in this body. Let's at least have \1/140\ of the 
capability or Russia, build those polar icebreakers.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to support H.R. 5978.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the following 
materials:

Exelis, UrsaNav, the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Coast 
 Guard Enter Agreement to Trial Ground-Based Position, Navigation and 
                             Timing Signal

       Herndon, VA, May 22, 2015.--Exelis (NYSE: XLS), UrsaNav, 
     Inc., the Department of Homeland Security's Science and 
     Technology Directorate (DHS S&T), and the U.S. Coast Guard 
     have entered into a cooperative research and development 
     agreement (CRADA) for testing and demonstration at former 
     LORAN-C sites. These sites are the legacy ground-based radio 
     navigation infrastructure of the decommissioned LORAN-C 
     service that could be retained and upgraded to provide eLORAN 
     low frequency service.
       The team will evaluate eLORAN as a potential complementary 
     system to the current Global Positioning System (GPS) 
     currently in wide use throughout the United States. The 
     capabilities and potential utilization methods of eLORAN will 
     be explored in depth to identify all strengths, capacities, 
     and potential vulnerabilities of the technology.
       Under the CRADA, Exelis will use the former LORAN-C assets 
     to put eLORAN signals in space for research, test and 
     demonstration of the ability of eLORAN to meet precise 
     positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) requirements of 
     government and privately-owned critical infrastructure. The 
     first station Exelis will broadcast from is located in 
     Wildwood, NJ. The broadcast will provide a usable signal at a 
     range up to 1000 miles.
       ``eLORAN is an ideal technology to complement GPS for 
     critical, resilient and assured PNT,'' said Ed Sayadian, vice 
     president of Civil & Aerospace Systems for Exelis. ``eLORAN 
     is a difficult to disrupt technology that offers PNT and wide 
     area broadcast data capabilities indoors, in underground 
     locations and other GPS-denied environments.''
       ``A preponderance of government, academic, and industry 
     reports have concluded that eLORAN is the best independent, 
     multi-modal solution to provide assured PNT as a complement 
     to GPS,'' said Chuck Schue, president and CEO of UrsaNay.
       Exelis and UrsaNav have entered into this CRADA because 
     they believe that low frequency signals, such as eLORAN, 
     operate independently of GPS signals and can provide 
     alternative timing, either standalone, or as a component of a 
     PNT service. Exelis also believes that as a result of its 
     wealth of experience in its PNT portfolio, that there are 
     many civil and defense applications that require precise time 
     and/or position in GPS-denied environments. Examples include 
     radio frequency interference, both intentional and 
     unintentional; signal attenuation from heavy forest canopy, 
     terrain or buildings; and indoor and underground locations.
       About UsaNav: UrsaNav, Inc. is a Veteran-Owned and Service-
     Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business focused on delivering 
     innovative engineering and information solutions, and 
     associated professional services to government and commercial 
     clients worldwide. UrsaNav is the World's leading supplier of 
     eLORAN technology, equipment, and services with deep 
     experience in the design, development, and deployment of PNT 
     systems. For more information, visit our website at 
     www.ursanay.com.
       About Exelis: Exelis is a diversified, top-tier global 
     aerospace, defense, information and services company that 
     leverages a greater than 50-year legacy of deep customer 
     knowledge and technical expertise to deliver affordable, 
     mission-critical solutions for global customers. Exelis is a 
     leader in positioning and navigation, sensors, air traffic 
     management solutions, image processing and distribution, 
     communications and information systems; and focused on 
     strategic growth in the areas of critical networks, ISR and 
     analytics, electronic warfare and composite aerostructures. 
     Headquartered in McLean, Virginia, Exelis employs 
     approximately 10,000 people and generated 2014 sales of 
     approximately $3.3 billion. For more information, visit our 
     website at www.exelisinc.com.
                                  ____

                                                 December 8, 2015.
     Hon. Peter A. DeFazio,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman DeFazio: Thank you for your August 31, 
     2015, letter regarding the importance of the Global 
     Positioning System (GPS) and the need for a complementary 
     positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) capability for the 
     nation.
       We share your concerns regarding the importance of GPS to 
     our critical infrastructure and security requirements. 
     Seeking to implement the guidance from National Security 
     Presidential Directive 39, the Department of Defense, the 
     Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of 
     Transportation established an interagency process in 2014 to 
     assess those information sources that are complementary to 
     GPS and that could be used to ensure the continuity of PNT 
     services to critical infrastructure. Through this interagency 
     process, the National Space-Based PNT Executive Committee 
     (EXCOM) reviewed several potential solutions and assessed 
     that an enhanced Loran (eLoran) network could be a viable 
     nationwide complementary capability for GPS applications in 
     U.S. critical infrastructure. The EXCOM also assessed that a 
     timing-focused network could be implemented in the near term 
     with properly scoped specifications, costs, and cost sharing 
     arrangements. As you stated, there may be opportunities to 
     work with private and commercial entities to initiate these 
     complementary capabilities.
       The EXCOM met on September 3, 2015, and agreed to a two-
     fold strategy for activities to explore a national 
     complementary capability to GPS: pursue potential near-term 
     opportunities to leverage public and private sector 
     capabilities and resources to support a timing-focused eLoran 
     network, while also documenting the requirements for a more 
     comprehensive complementary PNT capability for the nation's 
     critical infrastructure.
       The EXCOM acknowledges the challenges associated with this 
     undertaking, especially given the fact that no government-
     wide set of requirements has been established for such a 
     complementary capability. However, sufficient data exists 
     from previous studies to produce initial cost estimates and 
     basic system specifications to determine the appropriate 
     scope of the effort. We are building on these data and 
     estimates to develop a more detailed approach for an initial 
     timing-focused eLoran capability. This initial timing network 
     could provide a near-term solution while we continue our 
     efforts to prescribe a complete set of requirements necessary 
     to support a full complementary PNT capability for the 
     nation.
       We look forward to working with you as we continue our 
     efforts to provide a complementary PNT capability for U.S. 
     critical infrastructure.
       We have sent a similar response to each cosigner of your 
     letter.
           Sincerely,
     Victor M. Mendez,
       Deputy Secretary of Transportation, Co-Chair, National 
     Executive Committee for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, 
     and Timing.
     Robert O. Work,
       Deputy Secretary of Defense, Co-Chair, National Executive 
     Committee for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and 
     Timing.
                                  ____


    [From the DHS Science & Technology Press Office, Apr. 20, 2016]

DHS S&T Demonstrates Precision Timing Technology at the New York Stock 
                                Exchange

       Washington.--The Department of Homeland security, Science 
     and Technology Directorate (S&T) announced today the 
     successful

[[Page 13596]]

     demonstration of the Enhanced Loren (eLoran), a precision-
     timing technology for financial transactions at the New York 
     Stock Exchange (NYSE).
       eLoran is a low-frequency, high-power radio navigation 
     signal that is broadcasted by ground-based transmission 
     stations, allowing the signal to penetrate through buildings 
     and provide precision timing indoors and throughout urban 
     environments.
       ``Accurate position, navigation, and timing is necessary 
     for the function and integrity of many critical 
     infrastructure sectors, such as the electric grid, 
     communication networks, and financial institutions,'' said 
     DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology Dr. Reginald 
     Brothers. ``Ensuring the continuous and uninterrupted 
     availability of critical information ensures our national 
     security.''
       DHS S&T, U.S. Coast Guard, UrsaNav, Inc., and Harris 
     Corporation study eLoran through a Cooperative Research and 
     Development Agreement for applicability to provide timing 
     information for critical infrastructure applications. The 
     demonstration at the NYSE was hosted by Juniper Networks on 
     April 19 and presented to technical representatives from the 
     financial services, energy, and communication sectors.
       We are constantly working with critical infrastructure 
     partners like the financial sector to help build their 
     capabilities and resilience to a variety of hazards, 
     including space weather and other cyber or physical threats 
     to the system's continuity,'' stated DHS Assistant Secretary 
     for Infrastructure Protection Caitlin Durkovich.
       Precise and synchronized timing of financial transactions 
     is critical to markets worldwide and is mandated by 
     regulation in the European Union and is increasingly required 
     in the United States. Today, precision timing capabilities 
     are provided primarily by satellite-based Global Positioning 
     System (GPS). However, GPS's space-based signals are low-
     power and susceptible to possible disruptions. GPS signals 
     are also difficult to receive indoors and in urban canyons.
       ``During the technology demonstration inside the NYSE 
     building, we were able to not only provide signals indoors 
     but also provide timing information to within 30 nanoseconds 
     of our UTC reference,'' said Sarah Mahmood, S&T program 
     manager for the eLoran cooperation agreement.
       Recognizing the challenges of space-based signals and the 
     importance of having multiple timing-sources, eLoran is one 
     technology being considered to provide a complementary timing 
     solution to existing GPS technology.
                                  ____


                   [From the Atlantic, June 13, 2016]

                       What Happens If GPS Fails?

                             (By Dan Glass)

       It only took thirteen millionths of a second to cause a 
     whole lot of problems.
       Last January, as the U.S. Air Force was taking one 
     satellite in the country's constellation of GPS satellites 
     offline, an incorrect time was accidentally uploaded to 
     several others, making them out of sync by less time than it 
     takes for the sound of a gunshot to leave the chamber.
       The minute error disrupted GPS-dependent timing equipment 
     around the world for more than 12 hours. While the problem 
     went unnoticed by many people thanks to short-term backup 
     systems, panicked engineers in Europe called equipment makers 
     to help resolve things before global telecommunications 
     networks began to fail. In parts of the U.S. and Canada, 
     police, fire, and EMS radio equipment stopped functioning. 
     BBC digital radio was out for two days in many areas, and the 
     anomaly was even detected in electrical power grids.
       Despite its name, the Global Positioning System is not 
     about maps; it's about time. Each satellite in the 
     constellation (24 are needed, plus the U.S. has several 
     spares) has multiple atomic clocks on board, synchronized 
     with each other and to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)--the 
     time standard used across the world--down to the nanosecond. 
     The satellites continually broadcast their time and position 
     information down to Earth, where GPS receivers in equipment 
     from iPhones to automated tractors acquire signals and use 
     the minuscule differences in their arrival time to determine 
     an exact position.
       While GPS was initially conceived to aid navigation, 
     globally synchronized time is now a much more critical 
     function of the system. Telecom networks rely on GPS clocks 
     to keep cell towers synchronized so calls can be passed 
     between them. Many electrical power grids use the clocks in 
     equipment that fine-tunes current flow in overloaded 
     networks. The finance sector uses GPS-derived timing systems 
     to timestamp ATM, credit card, and high-speed market 
     transactions. Computer network synchronization, digital 
     television and radio, Doppler radar weather reporting, 
     seismic monitoring, even multi-camera sequencing for film 
     production--GPS clocks have a hand in all.
       But last January's system failure brings up an often-
     ignored question: What if all these flying clock radios were 
     wiped out, and everything on the ground started blinking 
     12:00? According to Mike Lombardi, a metrologist at the 
     National Institute for Standards and Technology, ``Nobody 
     knows exactly what would happen.'' Since so many of these 
     technologies were designed specifically with GPS in mind, the 
     unsettling truth, he says, is ``there's no backup.''
       This isn't a secret. Concern for the consequences of the 
     country's reliance on this invisible utility has been growing 
     among industry and government workers for more than 15 years, 
     after the Department of Transportation issued a report on the 
     need for a backup navigation system, in 2001. But while the 
     means to create one has existed since, a winding bureaucratic 
     path has kept it from actually being implemented. And that 
     leaves many of the everyday tools society depends on 
     vulnerable until one is.
       There are plenty of reasons GPS could fail.
       Intentional attack is one, as emphasized by a declassified 
     2012 risk estimate by the Department of Homeland Security. 
     One of the system's most basic problems is its signals are 
     weak enough to be easily obstructed. Truckers with cheap 
     jamming devices designed to elude employer tracking have 
     unintentionally interfered with airport systems; criminals 
     thwarting GPS tags on stolen goods in shipping containers 
     have accidentally shut down port operations. On a grander 
     scale, North Korea has tormented South Korea with waves of 
     jamming attacks. (jamming devices are now illegal in the 
     U.S., but not difficult to obtain illicitly.)
       A few steps up from jamming devices in both complexity and 
     damage are spoofers: systems that get GPS receivers to lock 
     on to mimicked signal. Spoofers don't trigger equipment 
     alarms, and deliver altered time and position information to 
     unaware users. It's been suggested that Iran used this tactic 
     to lead astray two U.S. Navy patrol boats captured in the 
     Gulf last January.
       A plausible worst-case attack scenario would look something 
     like this: Spoofers feed erroneous data to electrical 
     substation equipment in a metro area, which could overheat 
     power lines and transformers, causing widespread outages. 
     Meanwhile, multiple hidden jammers could cripple cellphone 
     service, and also force fire, police, and emergency medicine 
     departments to revert to old, single-frequency channels. 
     Supplies in this scenario could only be bought in many places 
     with cash, which would be limited without ATM service. 
     According to the DHS report, it could take 30 days or more 
     before the malicious devices are located and disabled. The 
     longer it took, the more systems that would be compromised.
       As for unintentional threats to GPS, the DHS risk estimate 
     lists space debris, space weather, defective software, and 
     good old-fashioned human mistakes, among other things. Of 
     these threats, space weather is the most potentially 
     catastrophic, according to Norwegian geophysicist Pal Brekke, 
     whose country was hardest hit by the January outage. 
     Eruptions of high energy radiation from the sun (known as 
     solar flares) and ejections of electrically charged gases 
     have disabled satellites in the past.
       With satellites and the chips inside them getting smaller 
     as technology progresses, ``one particle from the sun that 
     penetrates a satellite can ruin things,'' Brekke says. ``It 
     wouldn't take that large of an event to take out all GPS.''
       So far, mitigating the loss of GPS signals has involved two 
     approaches. One is interoperability with other global 
     navigation satellite systems like Russia's GLONASS (which 
     also failed due to a ground control error in 2014) or the 
     European and Chinese systems, both of which are expected to 
     be up by 2020. The other is better clocks, says Lombardi, the 
     NIST metrologist, who's published numerous articles on the 
     topic. ``The typical cell tower clock has an oscillator 
     similar to that of a wristwatch,'' he says, ``and can drift 
     out of tolerance in minutes without a signal.'' How long a 
     clock can maintain time on its own, called ``holdover,'' also 
     affects electrical grids, many of which rely on GPS-dependent 
     devices called synchrophasors used to precisely regulate 
     current flow, as well as help locate faults in the network. A 
     lack of such timing technology was the reason it took some 
     Canadian technicians three months to locate failures after 
     the infamous blackout of 2003.
       Chip-scale atomic clocks the size of a penny are a 
     promising new technology that can hold time for about a day, 
     but are currently too expensive to deploy widely. Moreover, 
     hedging and holdover still aren't backups for when space-
     based signals are simply unavailable.
       The bulk of a more promising, comprehensive backup system 
     already exists, right here on the ground. After the sextant 
     but before GPS, navigators around the world used Long Range 
     Aids to Navigation, or ``LORAN,'' a terrestrial system of 
     transmitters and receiving equipment first developed during 
     WWII. By the mid-1990s, Loran ``tower chains'' provided 
     coverage for North America, Europe, and other regions in the 
     Northern Hemisphere. Its use declined in favor of the much 
     finer accuracy of GPS after it became available for civil use 
     in 1995, but the U.S. Coast Guard continued working on an 
     improved system using the existing infrastructure. If 
     adopted, ``Enhanced'' LORAN, or eLoran, could provide 
     positioning accuracy comparable to GPS. Broadcast at hundreds 
     of thousands of watts, the signal is virtually un-jammable, 
     and unlike GPS, can even be received indoors, underwater, and 
     in

[[Page 13597]]

     urban or natural canyons. It also turns out that eLoran can 
     provide a UTC time signal with sub-microsecond time 
     resolution across a large geographical area.
       The technology is available--the Coast Guard demonstrated a 
     working prototype last year--so why isn't America using it? 
     John Garamendi, a California congressman, asked this question 
     at a July 2015 congressional hearing on the Federal 
     Radionavigation Plan, the nation's primary planning document 
     for position, navigation, and timing (PNT). ``There are two 
     kinds of time,'' he opened, ``real time . . . and then 
     federal time, which seems to be the forever time. The e-Loran 
     system was identified as a backup 15 years ago, and here we 
     are, federal time, not yet done.''
       Cost doesn't seem to be a problem. A complete alternate PNT 
     system is estimated at $350 million to $400 million; it costs 
     $1 billion yearly to maintain GPS. And science and industry 
     appears to share a consensus that eLoran is the solution. 
     Even the Air Force Colonel and engineer who created GPS, Brad 
     Parkinson, had been on record for years saying ``eLoran is 
     the only cost-effective backup for national needs.''
       In a 2004, a presidential directive tasked DHS and DOT with 
     creating a backup to the GPS system. In 2008, the DHS issued 
     a press release that it was committing to the system and 
     transferred control from the Coast Guard to its National 
     Protection and Programs Directorate. But push and pull 
     between DHS and the Coast Guard appears to have slowed 
     progress.
       After this year's satellite error, many European officials 
     who had previously followed America's reluctance to adopt 
     eLoran stepped up development. Meanwhile, pressure from 
     Garamendi, who argued in his address that ``without an eLoran 
     system in place ASAP, this country is in serious, serious 
     jeopardy,'' prompted a letter to him from the Deputy 
     Secretaries of Defense and Transportation informing that the 
     PNT Executive Committee has agreed that an eLoran-based 
     timing network ``could provide a near term solution'' (if 
     private entities bore some of the cost) while they ``continue 
     [their] efforts to prescribe a complete set of requirements 
     necessary to support a full complementary PNT capability for 
     the nation.'' In other words, it seems: federal time.
       Why is the sense of urgency among decision-makers so out of 
     sync? Could some of it be similar to why people delay backing 
     up our computers even though they've been telling themselves 
     to for weeks? How do we decide, when presented a risk with 
     unknown odds, when it's time to sacrifice time and resources 
     to prevent it?
       Now is a critically important time to answer that question, 
     as the world actually been given odds on another, even more 
     catastrophic risk than GPS failure: destruction of the 
     electrical power infrastructure itself. On July 23, 2012, a 
     billion-ton cloud of electrified gases blasted off the far 
     side of the sun at over six million miles per hour. According 
     to professor Daniel Baker at University of Colorado, this 
     coronal mass ejection (CME) ``was in all respects at least as 
     strong as the 1859 Carrington Event,'' referring to the 
     strongest solar storm ever recorded, which set fire to 
     telegraph stations and caused auroras down to Cuba. As was 
     widely reported two years ago, if the 2012 CME had occurred 
     one week later, it would have hit Earth.
       Space Katrina would be biblically catastrophic. Power could 
     be out for years while electrical transformers were repaired, 
     if the resources are even available to do so. ``Collateral 
     effects of a longer-term outage would likely include 
     disruption of the transportation, communication, banking, and 
     finance systems, and government services; the breakdown of 
     the distribution of potable water owing to pump failure; and 
     the loss of perishable foods and medications because of lack 
     of refrigeration,'' reads a 2008 National Academy of Sciences 
     report.
       In 2014, physicist from San Diego calculated the likelihood 
     of a Carrington-level event in the next decade. The odds he 
     came up with were 12 percent.
       The predicament of events like this is not that they're 
     occurring more frequently, but that the rapid development of 
     technology is opening the tools on which humanity depends to 
     an increasingly wide variety of rare but potentially 
     destructive cosmic threats. In the span of a century, we've 
     transferred much of the weight of modern society to global 
     infrastructures with wobbly legs. If they collapse, time will 
     very quickly appear to move backward.

  Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the following 
materials:


 statement from dhs press secretary laura keehhner on the adoption of 
                     national backup system to gps

                           (February 7, 2008)

       Today the U.S. Department of Homeland Security will begin 
     implementing an independent national positioning, navigation 
     and timing system that complements the Global Positioning 
     System (GPS) in the event of an outage or disruption in 
     service.
       The enhanced Loran, or eLoran, system will be a land-based, 
     independent system and will mitigate any safety, security, or 
     economic effects of a GPS outage or disruption. GPS is a 
     satellite-based system widely used for positioning, 
     navigation, and timing. The eLoran system will be an enhanced 
     and modernized version of Loran-C, long used by mariners and 
     aviators and originally developed for civil marine use in 
     coastal areas.
       In addition to providing backup coverage, the signal 
     strength and penetration capability of eLoran will provide 
     support to first responders and other operators in 
     environments that GPS cannot support, such as under heavy 
     foliage, in some underground areas, and in dense high-rise 
     structures. The system will use modernized transmitting 
     stations and an upgraded network.
                                  ____



national pnt advisory board comments on jamming the global positioning 
 system--a national security threat: recent events and potential cures

                           (November 4, 2010)

       Summary: The United States is now critically dependent on 
     GPS. For example, cell phone towers, power grid 
     synchronization, new aircraft landing systems, and the future 
     FAA Air Traffic Control System (NEXGEN) cannot function 
     without it. Yet we find increasing incidents of deliberate or 
     inadvertent interference that render GPS inoperable for 
     critical infrastructure operations.
       Most alarming, the very recent web availability of small 
     GPS-Jammers suggests the problem will get worse. These so-
     called personal protection devices (PPDs) as well as other, 
     readily available, more powerful devices can deliberately jam 
     the Global Positioning System (GPS) signal over tens of 
     square miles. They also can be devastating to the other, new 
     foreign satellite navigation systems being deployed 
     worldwide.
       PPDs are illegal to operate, but many versions are 
     available (for as little as $30) from foreign manufacturers 
     over the Internet. The simplest models plug in to a cigarette 
     lighter and prevent all GPS reception within a line of sight 
     range of 5 to 10 miles. Current penalty for operation is 
     simply that the device is confiscated.
       We currently lack sufficient capabilities to locate and 
     mitigate GPS jamming. It literally took months to locate such 
     a device that was interfering with a new GPS-based landing 
     system being installed at Newark Airport, NJ.
       This paper provides background on satellite navigation and 
     describes the impact of these dangerous PPDs and other 
     disruptive radio frequency interference (Jamming). It also 
     suggests needed action and discusses technical measures 
     needed to harden GPS receivers against PPDs. The PNT Advisory 
     Board believes that countermeasures and actions must be 
     urgently developed.
       We strongly believe that the Executive Branch should 
     formally declare GPS a ``Critical Infrastructure.'' But that 
     is clearly only the first action and is by no means 
     sufficient. A multiple agency approach must be urgently 
     developed and executed.
       We must quickly develop and field systems that will rapidly 
     locate, mitigate and shutdown the interference. In addition, 
     laws are needed with the power to arrest and prosecute 
     deliberate offenders. [This would be similar to legal action 
     in response to the recent spate of laser attacks on pilots in 
     flight].
       Finally, we discuss the need for alternate navigation 
     systems such as eLoran or a backup system currently being 
     configured by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 
     While the foreign GPS-equivalent systems may offer some help 
     against accidental interference, web sites are already 
     offering devices that will effectively shut down all 
     satellite-based radio navigation signals.
       Note that all of these actions and jamming countermeasures 
     tend to deter those who would deliberately interfere with the 
     signals.
       Specific Recommendations:
       1. National Focus.
       GPS should be formally declared critical infrastructure by 
     Executive Branch and managed as such by DHS.
       2. National Alerting and Pinpointing Interference 
     Locations.
       The National Executive Committee should establish and 
     sponsor a National GPS Interference Locating, Reporting, and 
     Elimination System; coordinating and expanding on the 
     resources of several Departments.
       3. Shutting Down and Prosecuting Interferers--
       Legal and Law Enforcement actions. The National Executive 
     Committee should examine whether or not they should sponsor 
     Legislation in Congress that addresses interference to GPS 
     that provides substantial fines and jail time for both 
     possession and use of GPS jammers.
       4. Hardening GPS Receivers and Antennas.
       Government should foster and help to stimulate 
     Manufacturers to speed up the development and offering of 
     interference resistant GPS receivers, especially for safety-
     of-life applications such as commercial air and maritime.
       5. Fund a National back-up capability to insure continuity 
     of PNT Operations.
       We strongly recommend that the previously announced 
     decision (to deploy eLoran as the primary Alternate PNT) 
     should be reconfirmed and quickly implemented.
       We support the FAA's efforts to provide Alternate PNT 
     options that can provide a robust backup to GPS and deter 
     malicious interference.

[[Page 13598]]




                      justification and rationale

     Background
       The utility of GPS continues to increase with an ever-
     broadening set of applications including military use, 
     aircraft guidance, harbor navigation, car navigation, 
     emergency response and personal navigation. It is now 
     estimated there are close to one billion users.
       GPS is a one-way system; it broadcasts line-of-sight 
     signals from a set of satellites in medium earth orbit (MEO) 
     to the earth-bound users carrying GPS receivers. The 
     satellites are approximately 12,000 miles above the 
     receivers. These satellites are placed at this altitude, so 
     that the coverage of an individual satellite is over one 
     third of the Earth's surface. With 30 satellites carefully 
     arranged in MEO, all earthbound users of GPS (with a clear 
     view of the sky) can see at least the prerequisite four 
     satellites to determine user location instantaneously. MEO is 
     used so that a reasonably sized constellation can aid 
     navigation worldwide. Lower orbits would require much larger 
     constellations for worldwide instantaneous coverage.
       For the reason described above, all GNSS satellites are 
     placed in medium earth orbit (MEO). However, because the 
     journey from MEO to the surface of the earth is 12,000 miles 
     long, the GNSS signals are weak. They have a received power 
     of only 10-16 Watts (equivalent to a Los Angeles 
     user receiving the light from 60 watt lightbulb in New York), 
     and can be easily overwhelmed by earth-sourced interfering 
     transmissions at the GPS frequency. As described below, this 
     radio frequency interference (RFI) can be: scheduled, 
     accidental, or malevolent.
     Critical Dependency on GPS
       Much of our infrastructure is critically dependent on 
     Positioning and Time from GPS. Two such dependencies 
     illustrate this.
       First, most telephone cell towers require GPS time to 
     insure they are synchronized and cooperate. Recent instances 
     of jamming in New York have rendered whole neighborhoods 
     without cell service including Emergency Service Providers.
       A Second example is the use of GPS for Aircraft Approach to 
     Landing Fields. These GPS-based systems are being deployed 
     and are particularly useful at airports where good 
     alternatives are not available such as at Aspen, CO and 
     Juneau, AK. There are now more FAA-sanctioned GPS approaches 
     than the older beam-steering type. (Over 2000 GPS 
     approaches). The value of these systems is enormous but the 
     vulnerability is not universally appreciated: it took over a 
     month to locate the deliberate small Jammer that was 
     periodically driven by Newark airport. This example is 
     particularly pertinent because the FAA's NextGen Air Traffic 
     Control System is critically dependent on GPS. Proliferated 
     Jammers would cripple the new system which is expected to 
     greatly reduce aircraft delays.
       Other Applications: GPS as a ``Stealth'' Utility. GPS has 
     been aptly called the Stealth Utility. There are literally 
     100s of additional application examples. Some are safety-of-
     life (e.g., air and marine), some are startling productivity 
     improvements (e.g., agriculture) and some are simply 
     convenience or recreation (e.g., car navigation). It is now 
     estimated that there are close to 1 Billion GPS receivers 
     worldwide.
     The GPS Jamming Threat
       Scheduled RFI is probably the largest cause of GPS outages 
     today. The military testing of GPS jamming causes these 
     outages. The events are localized (usually in the 
     Southwestern US), scheduled (during periods of light air 
     traffic), and approved/coordinated by the Federal Aviation 
     Administration. The FAA announces all upcoming events in 
     Notices to Airmen. Because of the ever-greater Airway-
     Dependency on GPS, the FAA is increasingly reluctant to grant 
     permission for these tests.
       Accidental RFI has certainly interfered with GPS countless 
     times, both domestically and internationally. Most events are 
     probably not reported. The user who is denied service may not 
     even know to whom it should be reported. These disruptive 
     events include unintentional interference due to harmonics 
     from broadcast television, and improperly designed wireless 
     data communication systems.
       Deliberate interference, called jamming, is the looming 
     threat. Many of the billion GPS users have become extremely 
     dependent on GPS accuracy, 24 hour availability, and 
     outstanding integrity. This dependency makes GPS a very 
     appealing target for sabotage or malicious mischief.
       This white paper is a plea that the National Decision 
     Makers address this situation.
     Deliberate Jamming: the so-called ``Personal Privacy 
         Devices''
       In the past year, so-called personal privacy devices (PPDs) 
     have become widely available on the Internet. A simple 
     example of such products is shown in Figure 1. The most 
     inexpensive PPDs are single antenna devices that jam the one 
     GPS signal frequency (L1) that is used by most users. More 
     expensive units have multiple antennas and attack all three 
     GPS signal frequencies (L1, L2 and L5). As such, these 
     attackers anticipate the next generation of GPS user 
     equipment that would continue to function if only one or two 
     of the three frequencies were jammed. Others PPDs jam cell 
     phone frequencies at the same time, shutting down all calls. 
     They are preferred by car thieves that wish to prevent an on-
     car warning systems to report the location of a stolen car to 
     the authorities using a GPS receiver connected to a cell 
     phone link.
       As shown in Figure 2 (Eldredge, 2010), PPDs range in price 
     from $30 to over $300 based on the number of frequencies 
     under attack and the transmitted power. Some radiate only a 
     few milli-watts and other broadcast several watts. The former 
     knock out GPS receivers for hundreds of yards, and the latter 
     can have dangerous effects for many miles.
       As their name suggests, PPDs are marketed to individuals 
     that fear for their privacy. This sales strategy seems to be 
     effective. An investigation recently initiated by the FAA 
     revealed that trucks traveling on the New Jersey Turnpike 
     were carrying these devices. Perhaps, these drivers worry 
     that the company dispatcher was monitoring their locations. 
     Ironically, the attention of the dispatcher must be drawn to 
     the truck that never provides location reports.
     Jamming Examples--the threat is real and getting worse.
       Newark Airport. In any event, a PPD can cause collateral 
     damage much greater than any privacy protection the user may 
     possible enjoy. The above-mentioned FAA investigation was 
     sparked while the FAA was installing a new GPS-based landing 
     system for aircraft at Newark International Airport. This new 
     system uses GPS receivers on the ground to aid GPS receivers 
     in the approaching aircraft. This technique allows the use of 
     all runways during restricted visibility conditions. The 
     antennas for the FAA's ground receivers are shown in Figure 3 
     (Eldredge, 2010), which also shows the proximity to the New 
     Jersey Turnpike. During system test, the FAA noticed that the 
     GPS ground receivers suffered one or two breaks in reception 
     on many days. PDDs were identified as the cause of the 
     continuity breaks after an investigation that lasted several 
     months. If PPDs gain notoriety, they could gain the interest 
     of hackers. These people may not be particularly worried 
     about their location privacy, but may simply enjoy the notion 
     of jamming GPS over wide areas.
       Military--North Korean Incident. Malevolent RFI is known as 
     jamming. Enemy Jammers were deployed in Iraq to interfere 
     with US weapons systems during Operation Desert Storm. Most 
     recently, military analysts have expressed concern about 
     recent GPS jammers tested by the North Koreans. (Telematics, 
     2010). On August 23 and 25 of this year, jamming signals 
     emanating from the North Korean city of Kaesong. These 
     attacks interfered with South Korean GPS military and 
     civilian receivers on land and at sea. Officials say the 
     jammers were repeatedly switched on for 10-minute periods 
     over a number of hours during the three days. South Korea's 
     defense minister, Kim Tae-young, voiced concern to members of 
     the National Assembly. He correctly observed that the North 
     Koreans can mount transmitters on vehicles that can jam GPS 
     signals within a 50 to 100 kilometer radius. Professor Park 
     Young-wook, with Kwangwoon University's Defense Industry 
     Research Institute, states that such jamming must be 
     considered a serious threat if it reoccurs because GPS is an 
     integral part of the infrastructure, not only for the 
     military but for many other industries.
       We certainly share the concerns voiced by Minister Tae-
     young and Professor Young-wook. However, we feel that the 
     greater danger is posed by the propagation of GPS jamming 
     technology to the wider public through devices sold on the 
     Internet. These threats were described earlier.
       Maritime Controlled-Jamming Experiments. Until recently, 
     GPS receivers for non-aviation purposes have not enjoyed the 
     scrutiny or extensive testing used by the aviation community. 
     Because of their designs and clear line-of sight exposure, 
     Maritime receivers can certainly be more vulnerable then 
     aviation receivers. The following figures (Last, 2010) depict 
     some disquieting results from recent trials conducted by the 
     General Lighthouse Authorities (GLA) of the United Kingdom 
     and Ireland.
       During these trials, a jammer was deployed shown in Figure 
     4. As shown in Figure 5, this jammer had a devastating effect 
     on the shipborne GPS receiver carried through the jamming 
     zone. The receiver reports a faithful position track (in 
     light blue) when the ship is far to the Northwest or far to 
     the Southeast of the jamming wedge.
       Within the wedge, the receiver is overwhelmed and reports 
     no position fix--the jammer breaks GPS continuity. GPS shows 
     no solution. As the receiver approaches or has just departed 
     the wedge, an extremely hazardous result occurs. The receiver 
     suffers large position errors without an accompanying 
     warning--integrity is broken. This is shown as the string of 
     dots to the south and to the southeast of the actual blue 
     track. These last results are most troubling, because the 
     bridge personnel would not be warned that the navigation 
     system was degraded.
       In another set of trials, the GLA placed a low power jammer 
     on board the Trinity

[[Page 13599]]

     House Vessel Galatea. As shown in Figure 6, this jammer 
     induced position reports that skipped across Scandinavia and 
     Ireland while the ship sat steadfastly in the English Channel 
     (the yellow track). Among the systems affected by the 
     interference were the ship's radar and gyrocompass, key 
     reversionary systems when GPS fails.
       The worrisome results shown in Figures 5 and 6 would not 
     affect an aviation receiver, because aviation standards 
     insist on an internal set of tests (algorithms) for RFI. We 
     later recommend that these algorithms or equivalents become 
     part of the standards for receivers used in any safety-of-
     life applications.
     Recommended Actions to Counter the Threat of GPS Interference
       There is not any practical way to completely eliminate GPS 
     interference. But steps can be taken to greatly reduce the 
     frequency and impacts of such interference. Further, actions 
     can be taken to insure that GPS receivers do not give false 
     indications of position or time. Our recommendations are:.
       1. National Focus. GPS is absolutely critical US National 
     Infrastructure. This has not been formally recognized. GPS 
     should be formally declared critical infrastructure by 
     Executive Branch and managed as such by DHS. This is 
     necessary to elevate the importance of GPS to our critical 
     infrastructure and bring the needed attention to the 
     interference problem. The various existing national 
     interference programs must be coordinated and gaps must be 
     filled with additional funded efforts (see later 
     recommendations). Senior leadership must recognize the 
     vulnerabilities of the current critical infrastructure and 
     give high priority to budgets and solutions.
       2. National Alerting and Pinpointing Interference 
     Locations. The NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE should establish 
     and sponsor a National GPS Interference Locating, Reporting, 
     and Elimination System; coordinating and expanding on the 
     resources of several Departments. It took several months to 
     locate the PPD that shut down the Newark landing system. 
     Technology exists to locate such sources much more quickly. 
     To rapidly alert and pinpoint interference, two elements are 
     required: 1. sensing of the interference and 2. a 
     communications channel to report the problem in real-time. 
     For example, every cell phone tower could be configured to 
     expand the functionality of their GPS timing receiver by 
     promptly recognizing and reporting interference, including 
     pertinent characteristics. The incremental cost would be 
     extremely small. Another example: many toll booths routinely 
     videotape vehicles including license plates. A properly 
     configured GPS receiver at the booth could identify vehicles 
     that are broadcasting interference. There are many more 
     national reference receivers that could be so configured. 
     Cell phones that include GPS receivers can be configured to 
     sense and automatically report suspected interference. This 
     would constitute a near instantaneous reporting channel, 
     worldwide. Of course a central data-gathering location is 
     needed; it could be collocated with preexisting civil/
     military resources such as WAAS, NGPS or the Air Force's 
     2SOPS. In turn, the located sources must be reported for 
     appropriate action. No such National (or International) Real-
     Time System exists today or is even currently planned.
       3. Shutting Down and Prosecuting Interferers--Legal and Law 
     Enforcement actions. When the mobile jammer was finally 
     located at Newark, the only punitive action for the 
     deliberate interference was to confiscate the Jammer. The 
     coordination of FAA, FCC, FBI, and DOD was commendable, but 
     ad hoc and very tardy. The PNT Executive Board should sponsor 
     Legislation in Congress that addresses interference to GPS 
     with laws that provide substantial fines and jail time for 
     both possession and use of GPS jammers. Precedents have 
     already been established with the laws enacted to prevent and 
     deter lasers being aimed at Pilots as they attempt to land 
     airplanes. Australia, which is also very reliant on GPS for 
     Air Traffic control, has a law that fines the possessor of a 
     GPS jammer $100,000. In addition, operational procedures for 
     rapid interdepartmental reaction and mitigation of 
     interference must be established. A reasonable goal is to 
     locate and shut down any jammer in a matter of hours.
       4. Hardening GPS Receivers and Antennas. In addition to 
     legal action, we wish to galvanize a technical effort to 
     strengthen all GPS receivers. GPS receivers should never give 
     the Hazardous and Misleading Information (HMI) that is shown 
     in figure 6. The techniques to avoid this are well known and 
     specified for all FAA certified equipment. All GPS safety-of-
     life receivers should include the integrity algorithms 
     specified by the FAA. There are also well-known design 
     techniques to greatly reduce outages of GPS receivers due to 
     interference. Examples include: special antennas that null 
     interference, coasting thorough interference by using 
     inertial components and/or small atomic clocks, as well as 
     physical shielding in the direction of presumed jamming. Some 
     would add significant cost but may be warranted for safety-of 
     life and other critical applications. New supplementary 
     devices can make GPS receivers more robust and are becoming 
     more affordable. (e.g. miniature accelerometers, chip scale 
     atomic clocks etc.)
       Some actions are being taken. For example, the FAA is 
     already hardening the GPS receivers and antennas placed on 
     the ground at Newark International Airport. Changes include: 
     GPS antennas that are less vulnerable to radio frequency 
     interference; improved practices for placement of GPS 
     antennas on the airport (farther from public roadways); and 
     receiver algorithms that more quickly recover when the PPD 
     moves away from the GPS antenna. Manufacturers should speed 
     up the offering of interference resistant GPS receivers, 
     especially for safety-of-life applications such as commercial 
     maritime. These receivers should use FAA techniques to insure 
     they do not display Hazardous and Misleading Information 
     during periods of interference.
       5. Establishing GPS Backups to insure continuity of PNT 
     Operations. As described above, GPS receivers should 
     certainly be made more robust against jamming. In addition, 
     we feel that the nation should vigorously support efforts to 
     provide Alternate Position, Navigation and Time (APNT). In 
     this final section, we first describe the role of planned 
     foreign satellite systems (GNSS) that are similar to GPS. 
     Unfortunately they have the same susceptibility to 
     interference as GPS. Next we describe two alternate 
     techniques to determine PNT (APNT) that are more jam-
     resistant and could be readily made operational.
       GNSS. GPS is now recognized worldwide, and other nations 
     are responding with satellite navigation systems of their 
     own. The Russians are reinvigorating their satellite 
     navigation system called GLONASS, and new systems are being 
     developed in China, Europe, Japan and India. Taken together, 
     GPS and these other systems are called Global Navigation 
     Satellite Systems (GNSS).
       These other systems are valuable for improved accuracy and 
     integrity. In addition they will offer frequency diversity. 
     Therefore they will be helpful in countering unintentional 
     interference at a single frequency. The new PFD (Jammers) 
     being sold on the web will also prevent use of these foreign 
     GPS-like systems as well as cell phones. Thus these new 
     foreign systems will not be helpful in operating during 
     deliberate jamming radiated by the better devices currently 
     available.
       While a number of backup PNT systems have been considered, 
     there are two major alternatives for APNT that have emerged 
     as being particularly useful:
       1. e-Loran: Loran is a ground-based radio-navigation system 
     that preceded satellite navigation. It finds its origins in 
     World War II, and enjoyed wide spread adoption after the 
     grounding of the Argo Merchant on Georges Bank. At that time, 
     the U.S. Coast Guard began to require Loran carriage by ships 
     over a certain tonnage in the Coastal Confluence Zone of the 
     United States. Importantly, Loran is based on the broadcast 
     of extremely high power signals in the low frequency portion 
     of the radio spectrum. The frequency of transmission is 
     10,000 lower than the GPS frequencies in the microwave band, 
     and the power of the transmission is 1000 times greater than 
     the GPS transmission power. An updated version of called 
     eLoran has now been developed and tested. It is very robust, 
     resistant to interference and has two dimensional accuracies 
     of about 20 meters in critical areas. It is not nearly as 
     accurate as the best GPS, and the lack of the vertical 
     dimension reduces eLoran's effectiveness, yet it is a very 
     robust APNT system.
       In December 2006, an Independent Assessment Team was 
     appointed, reporting to DOT and DHS. It was under the 
     administration of the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). 
     After careful review over many weeks, they unanimously 
     recommended that the eLoran deployment be completed as a 
     backup for GPS. Yearly cost to maintain this in the US was 
     about 20 $M. This is about 1/10th the cost of a single GPS 
     satellite. The DHS then made an announcement that eLoran was 
     the official APNT system for the US. The Schlesinger-chaired 
     PNT Advisory Board has also unanimously recommended that 
     eLoran be deployed and maintained as a GPS backup.
       For these reasons, the international navigation community 
     has also strongly supported the upgrade and sustainment of 
     the Loran system in any number of forums. This recommendation 
     has been heeded in Europe. Indeed, Figure 7 shows the 
     faithful position track provided by enhanced Loran (e-Loran) 
     as the ship traverses the jamming wedge generated by the 
     General Lighthouse Authorities from Flamborough. Figure 7 
     provides a stark contrast to the GPS-based results in Figure 
     5. Unfortunately, DHS has not followed through with their 
     announcement: the Loran system in the United States has been 
     turned off.
       We strongly recommend that the previously announced 
     decision (to deploy eLoran as the primary APNT) should be 
     reconfirmed and quickly implemented. The reasons for this are 
     clearly stated in the IDA white paper. It is the most viable 
     and robust backup to GPS and can be implemented in a way that 
     is virtually seamless to the user.

[[Page 13600]]


       2. Alternate Navigation for the Next Generation Air 
     Transportation System: Today, the FAA uses an extensive 
     network of terrestrial navigation aides to mitigate GPS 
     outages. This backup navigation capability is based on 
     ground-based navigation aids that precede GPS. All of these 
     extant systems support point-to-point navigation. Even though 
     these transmissions are reasonably robust against RFI, this 
     point-to-point capability may not be suitable for the Next 
     Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). NextGen 
     anticipates an increase in air operations by a factor of two 
     or more by 2025, and will enable a host of operational 
     improvements needed to smoothly support this traffic 
     increase. NextGen is based on GPS, satellite-based 
     augmentation systems (SBAS), and ground-based augmentation 
     systems (GBAS). All of these systems provide so-called area 
     navigation (RNAV). In other words, they provide guidance over 
     a volume, and the alternate navigation system of 2025 also 
     needs to provide a volumetric aid to navigation.
       Thus, the FAA is actively exploring alternate position, 
     navigation time (APNT) as part of their NextGen effort, 
     because the airspace should not revert to inefficient point-
     to-point navigation should RFI interrupt GPS-based operations 
     in the 2025 timeframe. This APNT capability would be based on 
     a reconfiguration of existing or planned FAA ground 
     facilities (Eldredge, 2010), and Figure 8 shows part of the 
     ground infrastructure that can be utilized to provide this 
     APNT area navigation capability.
       Time Synchronization: As part of their APNT effort, the FAA 
     has identified three architectures that may be suitable for 
     alternate area navigation in 2025. These straw men are based 
     on the sites shown in Figure 8, but two of these APNT 
     architectures require time synchronization of neighboring 
     ground sites. To this end, the FAA has investigated time 
     transfer based on hardened GPS receivers and low earth 
     orbiting satellites (LEOs). In the former case, jammers are 
     attenuated by so-called controlled radiation pattern 
     antennas. In the latter case, the needed processing gain 
     derives from the proximity of the LEOs. Indeed, the altitude 
     of the LEOs is approximately twenty times less than the GNSS 
     altitude. Thus LEOs have small earth footprints and cannot 
     provide the navigation performance associated with GNSS. 
     However, the signal received from this nearby source is 
     approximately 400 times greater than the power received from 
     GNSS. Thus, LEOs could provide the robust time transfer 
     capability needed to support APNT, because time transfer only 
     requires one satellite to be in the common view of the ground 
     stations to be synchronized.
       We encourage the FAA to continue efforts and to provide an 
     APNT that is a robust backup to GPS and deterrent to 
     malicious interference.
     Summary and Conclusions:
       The interference threats to GPS are very real and promise 
     to get worse. These threats potentially imperil much of the 
     U.S. infrastructure. It will take some time to field a full 
     set of countermeasures and systems. Failure to act will be a 
     serious abdication of our national responsibility.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 5978, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the 
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________