[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 162 (2016), Part 1]
[House]
[Pages 294-306]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1600
             NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2016

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill 
(H.R. 757) to improve the enforcement of sanctions against the 
Government of North Korea, and for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                                H.R. 757

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``North 
     Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2016''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Definitions.

       TITLE I--INVESTIGATIONS, PROHIBITED CONDUCT, AND PENALTIES

Sec. 101. Statement of policy.
Sec. 102. Investigations.
Sec. 103. Briefing to Congress.
Sec. 104. Designation of persons for prohibited conduct and mandatory 
              and discretionary designation and sanctions authorities.
Sec. 105. Forfeiture of property.

 TITLE II--SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION, HUMAN RIGHTS 
  ABUSES, ILLICIT ACTIVITIES, AND SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES UNDERMINING 
                             CYBER SECURITY

Sec. 201. Determinations with respect to North Korea as a jurisdiction 
              of primary money laundering concern.
Sec. 202. Ensuring the consistent enforcement of United Nations 
              Security Council resolutions and financial restrictions 
              on North Korea.
Sec. 203. Proliferation prevention sanctions.
Sec. 204. Procurement sanctions.
Sec. 205. Enhanced inspections authorities.
Sec. 206. Travel sanctions.
Sec. 207. Exemptions, waivers, and removals of designation.
Sec. 208. Report on those responsible for knowingly engaging in 
              significant activities undermining cyber security.
Sec. 209. Sense of Congress that trilateral cooperation among the 
              United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea is 
              crucial to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.
Sec. 210. Report on nuclear program cooperation between North Korea and 
              Iran.

                  TITLE III--PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Sec. 301. Information technology.
Sec. 302. Report on North Korean prison camps.
Sec. 303. Report on persons who are responsible for serious human 
              rights abuses or censorship in North Korea.

                     TITLE IV--GENERAL AUTHORITIES

Sec. 401. Suspension of sanctions and other measures.
Sec. 402. Termination of sanctions and other measures.
Sec. 403. Authority to consolidate reports.
Sec. 404. Regulations.
Sec. 405. No additional funds authorized.
Sec. 406. Effective date.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds the following:
       (1) The Government of North Korea has repeatedly violated 
     its commitments to the complete, verifiable, irreversible 
     dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programs, and has 
     willfully violated multiple United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions calling for it to cease its development, testing, 
     and production of weapons of mass destruction.
       (2) North Korea poses a grave risk for the proliferation of 
     nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
       (3) The Government of North Korea has been implicated 
     repeatedly in money laundering and illicit activities, 
     including prohibited arms sales, narcotics trafficking, the 
     counterfeiting of United States currency, and the 
     counterfeiting of intellectual property of United States 
     persons.
       (4) The Government of North Korea has, both historically 
     and recently, repeatedly sponsored acts of international 
     terrorism, including attempts to assassinate defectors and 
     human rights activists, repeated threats of violence against 
     foreign persons, leaders, newspapers, and cities, and the 
     shipment of weapons to terrorists and state sponsors of 
     terrorism.
       (5) North Korea has unilaterally withdrawn from the 1953 
     Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War, and committed 
     provocations against South Korea in 2010 by sinking the 
     warship Cheonan and killing 46 of her crew, and by shelling 
     Yeonpyeong Island, killing four South Koreans.
       (6) North Korea maintains a system of brutal political 
     prison camps that contain as many as 120,000 men, women, and 
     children, who live in atrocious living conditions with 
     insufficient food, clothing, and medical care, and under 
     constant fear of torture or arbitrary execution.
       (7) The Congress reaffirms the purposes of the North Korean 
     Human Rights Act of 2004 contained in section 4 of such Act 
     (22 U.S.C. 7802).
       (8) North Korea has prioritized weapons programs and the 
     procurement of luxury goods, in defiance of United Nations 
     Security Council resolutions, and in gross disregard of the 
     needs of its people.
       (9) The President has determined that the Government of 
     North Korea is responsible for knowingly engaging in 
     significant activities undermining cyber security with 
     respect to United States persons and interests, and for 
     threats of violence against the civilian population of the 
     United States.
       (10) Persons, including financial institutions, who engage 
     in transactions with, or provide financial services to, the 
     Government of North Korea and its financial institutions 
     without establishing sufficient financial safeguards against 
     North Korea's use of these transactions to promote 
     proliferation, weapons trafficking, human rights violations, 
     illicit activity, and the purchase of luxury goods, aid and 
     abet North Korea's misuse of the international financial 
     system, and also violate the intent of relevant United 
     Nations Security Council resolutions.
       (11) The Government of North Korea's conduct poses an 
     imminent threat to the security of the United States and its 
     allies, to the global economy, to the safety of members of 
     the United States Armed Forces, to the integrity of the 
     global financial system, to the integrity of global 
     nonproliferation programs, and to the people of North Korea.
       (12) The Congress seeks, through this legislation, to use 
     nonmilitary means to address this crisis, to provide 
     diplomatic leverage to negotiate necessary changes in North 
     Korea's conduct, and to ease the suffering of the people of 
     North Korea.

[[Page 295]]



     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Applicable executive order.--The term ``applicable 
     Executive order'' means--
       (A) Executive Order No. 13382 (2005), 13466 (2008), 13551 
     (2010), 13570 (2011), or 13687 (2015) to the extent that such 
     Executive order authorizes the imposition of sanctions on 
     persons for conduct, or prohibits transactions or activities, 
     involving the Government of North Korea; or
       (B) any Executive order adopted on or after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, to the extent that such Executive 
     order authorizes the imposition of sanctions on persons for 
     conduct, or prohibits transactions or activities, involving 
     the Government of North Korea.
       (2) Applicable united nations security council 
     resolution.--The term ``applicable United Nations Security 
     Council resolution'' means--
       (A) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695 (2006), 
     1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or 2094 (2013); or
       (B) any United Nations Security Council resolution adopted 
     on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, to the 
     extent that such resolution authorizes the imposition of 
     sanctions on persons for conduct, or prohibits transactions 
     or activities, involving the Government of North Korea.
       (3) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways 
     and Means, and the Committee on Financial Services of the 
     House of Representatives; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
       (4) Designated person.--The term ``designated person'' 
     means a person designated under subsection (a) or (b) of 
     section 104 for purposes of applying one or more of the 
     sanctions described in title I or II of this Act with respect 
     to the person.
       (5) Government of north korea.--The term ``Government of 
     North Korea'' means--
       (A) the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of 
     Korea or any political subdivision, agency, or 
     instrumentality thereof; and
       (B) any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or on 
     behalf of, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic 
     of Korea.
       (6) International terrorism.--The term ``international 
     terrorism'' has the meaning given such term in section 140(d) 
     of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 
     and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)), and includes the conduct 
     described in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)), to the extent 
     such conduct involves the citizens of more than one country.
       (7) Luxury goods.--The term ``luxury goods'' has the 
     meaning given such term in subpart 746.4 of title 15, Code of 
     Federal Regulations, and includes the items listed in 
     Supplement No. 1 to such regulation, and any similar items.
       (8) Monetary instrument.--The term ``monetary instrument'' 
     has the meaning given such term under section 5312 of title 
     31, United States Code.
       (9) North korean financial institution.--The term ``North 
     Korean financial institution'' means--
       (A) a financial institution organized under the laws of 
     North Korea or any jurisdiction within North Korea (including 
     a foreign branch of such institution);
       (B) any financial institution located in North Korea, 
     except as may be excluded from such definition by the 
     President in accordance with section 207(d);
       (C) any financial institution, wherever located, owned or 
     controlled by the Government of North Korea; and
       (D) any financial institution, wherever located, owned or 
     controlled by a financial institution described in 
     subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
       (10) Other stores of value.--The term ``other stores of 
     value'' means--
       (A) prepaid access devices, tangible or intangible prepaid 
     access devices, or other instruments or devices for the 
     storage or transmission of value, as defined in part 1010 of 
     title 31, Code of Federal Regulations; and
       (B) any covered goods, as defined in section 1027.100 of 
     title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, and any instrument or 
     tangible or intangible access device used for the storage and 
     transmission of a representation of covered goods, or other 
     device, as defined in section 1027.100 of title 31, Code of 
     Federal Regulations.
       (11) Person.--The term ``person'' has the meaning given 
     such term in section 510.306 of title 31, Code of Federal 
     Regulations.
       (12) Significant activities undermining cyber security.--
     The term ``significant activities undermining cyber 
     security'' means--
       (A) significant efforts to--
       (i) deny access to or degrade, disrupt, or destroy an 
     information and communications technology system or network; 
     or
       (ii) exfiltrate information from such a system or network 
     without authorization;
       (B) significant destructive malware attacks;
       (C) significant denial of service activities; or
       (D) such other significant activities as may be described 
     in regulations promulgated to implement section 104.
       (13) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' has the meaning given such term in section 510.311 
     of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.

       TITLE I--INVESTIGATIONS, PROHIBITED CONDUCT, AND PENALTIES

     SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       In order to achieve the peaceful disarmament of North 
     Korea, Congress finds that it is necessary--
       (1) to encourage all states to fully and promptly implement 
     United Nations Security Council Resolution 2094 (2013);
       (2) to sanction--
       (A) persons that facilitate proliferation of weapons of 
     mass destruction, illicit activities, arms trafficking, 
     imports of luxury goods, cash smuggling, censorship, and 
     knowingly engage in significant activities undermining cyber 
     security by the Government of North Korea; and
       (B) persons that fail to exercise due diligence to ensure 
     that financial institutions do not facilitate any of the 
     activities described in subparagraph (A) by the Government of 
     North Korea;
       (3) to deny the Government of North Korea access to the 
     funds it uses to obtain nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, 
     offensive cyber capabilities, and luxury goods instead of 
     providing for the needs of its people; and
       (4) to enforce sanctions in a manner that avoids any 
     adverse humanitarian impact on the people of North Korea to 
     the extent possible and in a manner that does not unduly 
     constrain the enforcement of such sanctions.

     SEC. 102. INVESTIGATIONS.

       The President shall initiate an investigation into the 
     possible designation of a person under section 104(a) upon 
     receipt by the President of credible information indicating 
     that such person has engaged in conduct described in section 
     104(a).

     SEC. 103. BRIEFING TO CONGRESS.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, and periodically thereafter, the President shall 
     provide to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     briefing on efforts to implement this Act, to include the 
     following, to the extent the information is available:
       (1) The principal foreign assets and sources of foreign 
     income of the Government of North Korea.
       (2) A list of the persons designated under subsections (a) 
     and (b) of section 104.
       (3) A list of the persons with respect to which sanctions 
     were waived or removed under section 207.
       (4) A summary of any diplomatic efforts made in accordance 
     with section 202(b) and of the progress realized from such 
     efforts, including efforts to encourage the European Union 
     and other states and jurisdictions to sanction and block the 
     assets of the Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea and Daedong 
     Credit Bank.

     SEC. 104. DESIGNATION OF PERSONS FOR PROHIBITED CONDUCT AND 
                   MANDATORY AND DISCRETIONARY DESIGNATION AND 
                   SANCTIONS AUTHORITIES.

       (a) Prohibited Conduct and Mandatory Designation and 
     Sanctions Authority.--
       (1) Conduct described.--Except as provided in section 207, 
     the President shall designate under this subsection any 
     person the President determines to--
       (A) have knowingly engaged in significant activities or 
     transactions with the Government of North Korea that have 
     materially contributed to the proliferation of weapons of 
     mass destruction or their means of delivery (including 
     missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any 
     efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, 
     transfer, or use such items;
       (B) have knowingly imported, exported, or reexported to, 
     into, or from North Korea any significant arms or related 
     materiel, whether directly or indirectly;
       (C) have knowingly provided significant training, advice, 
     or other services or assistance, or engaged in significant 
     transactions, related to the manufacture, maintenance, or use 
     of any arms or related materiel to be imported, exported, or 
     reexported to, into, or from North Korea, or following their 
     importation, exportation, or reexportation to, into, or from 
     North Korea, whether directly or indirectly;
       (D) have knowingly, directly or indirectly, imported, 
     exported, or reexported significant luxury goods to or into 
     North Korea;
       (E) have knowingly engaged in or been responsible for 
     censorship by the Government of North Korea, including 
     prohibiting, limiting, or penalizing the exercise of freedom 
     of expression or assembly, limiting access to print, radio or 
     other broadcast media, Internet or other electronic 
     communications, or the facilitation or support of intentional 
     frequency manipulation that would jam or restrict an 
     international signal;
       (F) have knowingly engaged in or been responsible for 
     serious human rights abuses by the Government of North Korea, 
     including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
     or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, 
     forced labor

[[Page 296]]

     or trafficking in persons, causing the disappearance of 
     persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those 
     persons, and other denial of the right to life, liberty, or 
     the security of a person;
       (G) have knowingly, directly or indirectly, engaged in acts 
     of money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods or currency, 
     bulk cash smuggling, narcotics trafficking, or other illicit 
     activity that involves or supports the Government of North 
     Korea or any senior official thereof, whether directly or 
     indirectly; or
       (H) have knowingly attempted to engage in any of the 
     conduct described in subparagraphs (A) through (G) of this 
     paragraph.
       (2) Effect of designation.--With respect to any person 
     designated under this subsection, the President--
       (A) shall exercise the authorities of the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705 et seq.) to 
     block all property and interests in property of any person 
     designated under this subsection that are in the United 
     States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that 
     are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any 
     United States person, including any foreign branch; and
       (B) may apply any of the sanctions described in sections 
     204, 205(c), and 206.
       (3) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in section 206 
     of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1705) shall apply to a person who violates, attempts to 
     violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of any 
     prohibition provided for in this subsection, or of an order 
     or regulation prescribed under this Act, to the same extent 
     that such penalties apply to a person that commits an 
     unlawful act described in section 206(a) of that Act (50 
     U.S.C. 1705(a)).
       (4) Definition.--In paragraph (1)(F), the term 
     ``trafficking in persons'' has the meaning given the term in 
     section 103(9) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 
     2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102(9)).
       (b) Discretionary Designation and Sanctions Authority.--
       (1) Conduct described.--Except as provided in section 207 
     and paragraph (3) of this subsection, the President may 
     designate under this subsection any person that the President 
     determines to--
       (A) have knowingly engaged in, contributed to, assisted, 
     sponsored, or provided financial, material or technological 
     support for, or goods and services in support of, any 
     violation of, or evasion of, an applicable United Nations 
     Security Council resolution;
       (B) have knowingly facilitated the transfer of any funds, 
     financial assets, or economic resources of, or property or 
     interests in property of a person designated under an 
     applicable Executive order, or by the United Nations Security 
     Council pursuant to an applicable United Nations Security 
     Council resolution;
       (C) have knowingly facilitated the transfer of any funds, 
     financial assets, or economic resources, or any property or 
     interests in property derived from, involved in, or that has 
     materially contributed to conduct prohibited by subsection 
     (a) or an applicable United Nations Security Council 
     resolution;
       (D) have knowingly facilitated any transaction, including 
     any transaction in bulk cash or other stores of value, 
     without applying enhanced monitoring to ensure that such 
     transaction does not contribute materially to conduct 
     described in subsection (a) an applicable Executive order, or 
     an applicable United Nations Security Council resolution;
       (E) have knowingly facilitated any transactions in cash or 
     monetary instruments or other stores of value, including 
     through cash couriers transiting to or from North Korea, used 
     to facilitate any conduct prohibited by an applicable United 
     Nations Security Council resolution;
       (F) have knowingly, directly or indirectly, engaged in 
     significant activities undermining cyber security for, in 
     support of on behalf of, the Government of North Korea or any 
     senior official thereof, or have knowingly contributed to the 
     bribery of an official of the Government of North Korea, the 
     misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public funds by, 
     or for the benefit of, an official of the Government of North 
     Korea, or the use of any proceeds of any such conduct; or
       (G) have knowingly and materially assisted, sponsored, or 
     provided significant financial, material, or technological 
     support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the 
     conduct described in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this 
     paragraph or the conduct described in subparagraphs (A) 
     through (G) of subsection (a)(1).
       (2) Effect of designation.--With respect to any person 
     designated under this subsection, the President--
       (A) may apply the sanctions described in section 204;
       (B) may apply any of the special measures described in 
     section 5318A of title 31, United States Code;
       (C) may prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that 
     are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in 
     which such person has any interest;
       (D) may prohibit any transfers of credit or payments 
     between financial institutions or by, through, or to any 
     financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or 
     payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
     and involve any interest of the person; and
       (E) may exercise the authorities of the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705 et seq.) 
     without regard to section 202 of such Act to block any 
     property and interests in property of any person designated 
     under this subsection that are in the United States, that 
     hereafter come within the United States, or that are or 
     hereafter come within the possession or control of any United 
     States person, including any foreign branch.
       (3) Limitation.--If the President determines that a person 
     has engaged in any conduct described in subparagraphs (A) 
     through (F) of paragraph (1) that may also be construed to 
     constitute conduct described in subparagraphs (A) through (H) 
     of subsection (a)(1), the President may not designate the 
     person under this subsection but rather shall designate the 
     person under subsection (a).
       (c) Blocking of All Property and Interests in Property of 
     the Government of North Korea and the Worker's Party of 
     Korea.--Except as provided in section 207, the President 
     shall exercise the authorities of the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705 et seq.) to block all 
     property and interests in property of the Government of North 
     Korea or the Worker's Party of Korea that on or after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act come within the United 
     States, or that come within the possession or control of any 
     United States person, including any foreign branch.
       (d) Application.--The designation of a person under 
     subsection (a) or (b) and the blocking of property and 
     interests in property under subsection (c) shall also apply 
     with respect to a person who is determined to be owned or 
     controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on 
     behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property 
     and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this 
     section.
       (e) Licensing.--
       (1) License required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the President shall promulgate 
     regulations prohibiting United States persons from engaging 
     in any transaction involving any property or services--
       (A) in which the Government of North Korea has an interest;
       (B) located in North Korea;
       (C) of North Korean origin; or
       (D) knowingly transferred, directly or indirectly, to the 
     Government of North Korea.
       (2) Transaction licensing.--The President shall deny or 
     revoke any license for any transaction that, in the 
     determination of the President, lacks sufficient financial 
     controls to ensure that such transaction will not facilitate 
     any of the conduct described in subsection (a) or subsection 
     (b).
       (3) Licensing authorization.--The President may issue 
     regulations to authorize--
       (A) transactions for the purposes described in section 207; 
     and
       (B) transactions and activities authorized under North 
     Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7801 et seq.).

     SEC. 105. FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY.

       (a) Amendment to Property Subject to Forfeiture.--Section 
     981(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(I) Any property, real or personal, that is involved in a 
     violation or attempted violation, or which constitutes or is 
     derived from proceeds traceable to a violation, of section 
     104(a) of the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 
     2016.''.
       (b) Amendment to Definition of Civil Forfeiture Statute.--
     Section 983(i)(2)(D) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``or the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act'' and inserting ``, the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act''; and
       (2) by adding at the end before the semicolon the 
     following: ``, or the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act 
     of 2016''.
       (c) Amendment to Definition of Specified Unlawful 
     Activity.--Section 1956(c)(7)(D) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``or section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954'' and inserting ``section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following: ``, or section 
     104(a) of the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 
     2016;''.

 TITLE II--SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION, HUMAN RIGHTS 
  ABUSES, ILLICIT ACTIVITIES, AND SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES UNDERMINING 
                             CYBER SECURITY

     SEC. 201. DETERMINATIONS WITH RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA AS A 
                   JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING 
                   CONCERN.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and 
     Financial Intelligence, who is responsible for safeguarding 
     the financial system against illicit use, money laundering, 
     terrorist financing, and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction, has repeatedly expressed concern about North 
     Korea's misuse of the international financial system as 
     follows:
       (A) In 2006, the Undersecretary stated that, given North 
     Korea's ``counterfeiting of U.S.

[[Page 297]]

     currency, narcotics trafficking and use of accounts worldwide 
     to conduct proliferation-related transactions, the line 
     between illicit and licit North Korean money is nearly 
     invisible'' and urged financial institutions worldwide to 
     ``think carefully about the risks of doing any North Korea-
     related business.''.
       (B) In 2011, the Undersecretary stated that ``North Korea 
     remains intent on engaging in proliferation, selling arms as 
     well as bringing in material,'' and was ``aggressively 
     pursuing the effort to establish front companies.''.
       (C) In 2013, the Undersecretary stated, in reference to 
     North Korea's distribution of high-quality counterfeit United 
     States currency, that ``North Korea is continuing to try to 
     pass a supernote into the international financial system,'' 
     and that the Department of the Treasury would soon introduce 
     new currency with improved security features to protect 
     against counterfeiting by the Government of North Korea.
       (2) The Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental 
     body whose purpose is to develop and promote national and 
     international policies to combat money laundering and 
     terrorist financing, has repeatedly--
       (A) expressed concern at deficiencies in North Korea's 
     regimes to combat money laundering and terrorist financing;
       (B) urged North Korea to adopt a plan of action to address 
     significant deficiencies in these regimes and the serious 
     threat they pose to the integrity of the international 
     financial system;
       (C) urged all jurisdictions to apply countermeasures to 
     protect the international financial system from ongoing and 
     substantial money laundering and terrorist financing risks 
     emanating from North Korea;
       (D) urged all jurisdictions to advise their financial 
     institutions to give special attention to business 
     relationships and transactions with North Korea, including 
     North Korean companies and financial institutions; and
       (E) called on all jurisdictions to protect against 
     correspondent relationships being used to bypass or evade 
     countermeasures and risk mitigation practices, and take into 
     account money laundering and terrorist financing risks when 
     considering requests by North Korean financial institutions 
     to open branches and subsidiaries in their jurisdiction.
       (3) On March 7, 2013, the United Nations Security Council 
     unanimously adopted Resolution 2094, which--
       (A) welcomed the Financial Action Task Force's 
     recommendation on financial sanctions related to 
     proliferation, and its guidance on the implementation of 
     sanctions;
       (B) decided that Member States should apply enhanced 
     monitoring and other legal measures to prevent the provision 
     of financial services or the transfer of property that could 
     contribute to activities prohibited by applicable United 
     Nations Security Council resolutions; and
       (C) called on Member States to prohibit North Korean banks 
     from establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships 
     with banks in their jurisdictions, to prevent the provision 
     of financial services, if they have information that provides 
     reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could 
     contribute to activities prohibited by an applicable United 
     Nations Security Council resolution, or to the evasion of 
     such prohibitions.
       (b) Sense of Congress Regarding the Designation of North 
     Korea as a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering 
     Concern.--Congress--
       (1) acknowledges the efforts of the United Nations Security 
     Council to impose limitations on, and require enhanced 
     monitoring of, transactions involving North Korean financial 
     institutions that could contribute to sanctioned activities;
       (2) urges the President, in the strongest terms, to 
     immediately designate North Korea as a jurisdiction of 
     primary money laundering concern, and to adopt stringent 
     special measures to safeguard the financial system against 
     the risks posed by North Korea's willful evasion of sanctions 
     and its illicit activities; and
       (3) urges the President to seek the prompt implementation 
     by other states of enhanced monitoring and due diligence to 
     prevent North Korea's misuse of the international financial 
     system, including by sharing information about activities, 
     transactions, and property that could contribute to 
     activities sanctioned by applicable United Nations Security 
     Council resolutions, or to the evasion of sanctions.
       (c) Determinations Regarding North Korea.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall, not 
     later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, determine, in consultation with the Secretary of State 
     and Attorney General, and in accordance with section 5318A of 
     title 31, United States Code, whether reasonable grounds 
     exist for concluding that North Korea is a jurisdiction of 
     primary money laundering concern.
       (2) Special measures.--If the Secretary of the Treasury 
     determines under this subsection that reasonable grounds 
     exist for finding that North Korea is a jurisdiction of 
     primary money laundering concern, the Secretary of the 
     Treasury, in consultation with the Federal functional 
     regulators, shall impose one or more of the special measures 
     described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 5318A(b) 
     of title 31, United States Code, with respect to the 
     jurisdiction of North Korea.
       (3) Report required.--
       (A) In general.--If the Secretary of the Treasury 
     determines that North Korea is a jurisdiction of primary 
     money laundering concern, the Secretary of the Treasury 
     shall, not later than 90 days after the date on which the 
     Secretary makes such determination, submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report on the determination made 
     under paragraph (1) together with the reasons for that 
     determination.
       (B) Form.--A report or copy of any report submitted under 
     this paragraph shall be submitted in unclassified form but 
     may contain a classified annex.

     SEC. 202. ENSURING THE CONSISTENT ENFORCEMENT OF UNITED 
                   NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND 
                   FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) all states and jurisdictions are obligated to implement 
     and enforce applicable United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions fully and promptly, including by--
       (A) blocking the property of, and ensuring that any 
     property is prevented from being made available to, persons 
     designated by the Security Council under applicable United 
     Nations Security Council resolutions;
       (B) blocking any property associated with an activity 
     prohibited by applicable United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions; and
       (C) preventing any transfer of property and any provision 
     of financial services that could contribute to an activity 
     prohibited by applicable United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions, or to the evasion of sanctions under such 
     resolutions;
       (2) all states and jurisdictions share a common interest in 
     protecting the international financial system from the risks 
     of money laundering and illicit transactions emanating from 
     North Korea;
       (3) the United States Dollar and the Euro are the world's 
     principal reserve currencies, and the United States and the 
     European Union are primarily responsible for the protection 
     of the international financial system from these risks;
       (4) the cooperation of the People's Republic of China, as 
     North Korea's principal trading partner, is essential to the 
     enforcement of applicable United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions and to the protection of the international 
     financial system;
       (5) the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant 
     to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, dated 
     June 11, 2013, expressed concern about the ability of banks 
     in states with less effective regulators and those unable to 
     afford effective compliance to detect and prevent illicit 
     transfers involving North Korea;
       (6) North Korea has historically exploited inconsistencies 
     between jurisdictions in the interpretation and enforcement 
     of financial regulations and applicable United Nations 
     Security Council resolutions to circumvent sanctions and 
     launder the proceeds of illicit activities;
       (7) Amroggang Development Bank, Bank of East Land, and 
     Tanchon Commercial Bank have been designated by the Secretary 
     of the Treasury, the United Nations Security Council, and the 
     European Union;
       (8) Korea Daesong Bank and Korea Kwangson Banking 
     Corporation have been designated by the Secretary of the 
     Treasury and the European Union;
       (9) the Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea has been 
     designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for facilitating 
     transactions on behalf of persons linked to its proliferation 
     network, and for serving as ``a key financial node''; and
       (10) Daedong Credit Bank has been designated by the 
     Secretary of the Treasury for activities prohibited by 
     applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions, 
     including the use of deceptive financial practices to 
     facilitate transactions on behalf of persons linked to North 
     Korea's proliferation network.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President should intensify diplomatic efforts, both in 
     appropriate international fora such as the United Nations and 
     bilaterally, to develop and implement a coordinated, 
     consistent, multilateral strategy for protecting the global 
     financial system against risks emanating from North Korea, 
     including--
       (1) the cessation of any financial services whose 
     continuation is inconsistent with applicable United Nations 
     Security Council resolutions;
       (2) the cessation of any financial services to persons, 
     including financial institutions, that present unacceptable 
     risks of facilitating money laundering and illicit activity 
     by the Government of North Korea;
       (3) the blocking by all states and jurisdictions, in 
     accordance with the legal process of the state or 
     jurisdiction in which the property is held, of any property 
     required to be blocked under applicable United Nations 
     Security Council resolutions;

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       (4) the blocking of any property derived from illicit 
     activity, from significant activities undermining cyber 
     security, from the misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement 
     of public funds by, or for the benefit of, officials of the 
     Government of North Korea;
       (5) the blocking of any property involved in significant 
     activities undermining cyber security by the Government of 
     North Korea, directly or indirectly, against United States 
     persons, or the theft of intellectual property by the 
     Government of North Korea, directly or indirectly from United 
     States persons; and
       (6) the blocking of any property of persons directly or 
     indirectly involved in censorship or human rights abuses by 
     the Government of North Korea.

     SEC. 203. PROLIFERATION PREVENTION SANCTIONS.

       (a) Export of Certain Goods or Technology.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to section 207(a)(2)(C) of this 
     Act, a license shall be required for the export to North 
     Korea of any goods or technology subject to the Export 
     Administration Regulations (part 730 of title 15, Code of 
     Federal Regulations) without regard to whether the Secretary 
     of State has designated North Korea as a country the 
     government of which has provided support for acts of 
     international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of 
     State under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 
     1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2045), as continued in effect under the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
       (2) Presumption of denial.--A license for the export to 
     North Korea of any goods or technology as described in 
     paragraph (1) shall be subject to a presumption of denial.
       (b) Transactions With Countries Supporting Acts of 
     International Terrorism.--
       (1) Arms export control act prohibitions.--The prohibitions 
     and restrictions described in section 40 of the Arms Export 
     Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), and other provisions provided 
     for in that Act, shall also apply to exporting or otherwise 
     providing (by sale, lease or loan, grant, or other means), 
     directly or indirectly, any munitions item to the Government 
     of North Korea without regard to whether or not North Korea 
     is a country with respect to which subsection (d) of such 
     section (relating to designation of state sponsors of 
     terrorism) applies.
       (2) Financial transactions.--Except as provided in section 
     207 of this Act and the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 
     (22 U.S.C. 7801 et seq.), the penalties provided for in 
     section 2332d of title 18, United States Code, shall apply to 
     a United States person that engages in a financial 
     transaction with the Government of North Korea on or after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act to the same extent that 
     such penalties apply to a United States citizen that commits 
     an unlawful act described in section 2332d of title 18, 
     United States Code.
       (c) Transactions in Lethal Military Equipment.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall withhold assistance 
     under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et 
     seq.) to any country that provides lethal military equipment 
     to, or receives lethal military equipment from, the 
     Government of North Korea.
       (2) Applicability.--The prohibition under this subsection 
     with respect to a country shall terminate on the date that is 
     1 year after the date on which such country ceases to provide 
     lethal military equipment to the Government of North Korea.
       (3) Waiver.--The President may, on a case-by-case basis, 
     waive the prohibition under this subsection with respect to a 
     country for a period of not more than 180 days, and may renew 
     the waiver for additional periods of not more than 180 days, 
     if the President determines and so reports to the appropriate 
     congressional committees that it is vital to the national 
     security interests of the United States to exercise such 
     waiver authority.

     SEC. 204. PROCUREMENT SANCTIONS.

       (a) In General.--Except as provided in this section, the 
     United States Government may not procure, or enter into any 
     contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from 
     any designated person.
       (b) FAR.--The Federal Acquisition Regulation issued 
     pursuant to section 1303 of title 41, United States Code, 
     shall be revised to require a certification from each person 
     that is a prospective contractor that such person does not 
     engage in any of the conduct described in subsection (a) or 
     (b) of section 104. Such revision shall apply with respect to 
     contracts in an amount greater than the simplified 
     acquisition threshold (as defined in section 134 of title 41, 
     United States Code) for which solicitations are issued on or 
     after the date that is 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (c) Termination of Contracts and Initiation of Suspension 
     and Debarment Proceeding.--
       (1) Termination of contracts.--Except as provided in 
     paragraph (2), the head of an executive agency shall 
     terminate a contract with a person who has provided a false 
     certification under subsection (b).
       (2) Waiver.--The head of an executive agency may waive the 
     requirement under paragraph (1) with respect to a person 
     based upon a written finding of urgent and compelling 
     circumstances significantly affecting the interests of the 
     United States. If the head of an executive agency waives the 
     requirement under paragraph (1) for a person, the head of the 
     agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees, within 30 days after the waiver is made, a report 
     containing the rationale for the waiver and relevant 
     information supporting the waiver decision.
       (3) Initiation of suspension and debarment proceeding.--The 
     head of an executive agency shall initiate a suspension and 
     debarment proceeding against a person who has provided a 
     false certification under subsection (b). Upon determination 
     of suspension, debarment, or proposed debarment, the agency 
     shall ensure that such person is entered into the 
     Governmentwide database containing the list of all excluded 
     parties ineligible for Federal programs pursuant to Executive 
     Order No. 12549 (31 U.S.C. 6101 note; relating to debarment 
     and suspension) and Executive Order No. 12689 (31 U.S.C. 6101 
     note; relating to debarment and suspension).
       (d) Clarification Regarding Certain Products.--The remedies 
     specified in subsections (a) through (c) shall not apply with 
     respect to the procurement of eligible products, as defined 
     in section 308(4) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (19 
     U.S.C. 2518(4)), of any foreign country or instrumentality 
     designated under section 301(b) of such Act (19 U.S.C. 
     2511(b)).
       (e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this subsection may 
     be construed to limit the use of other remedies available to 
     the head of an executive agency or any other official of the 
     Federal Government on the basis of a determination of a false 
     certification under subsection (b).
       (f) Executive Agency Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``executive agency'' has the meaning given such term in 
     section 133 of title 41, United States Code.

     SEC. 205. ENHANCED INSPECTIONS AUTHORITIES.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 
     thereafter, the President, acting through the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security, shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees, the Committee on Homeland Security 
     of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, a 
     report identifying foreign sea ports and airports whose 
     inspections of ships, aircraft, and conveyances originating 
     in North Korea, carrying North Korean property, or operated 
     by the Government of North Korea are deficient to effectively 
     prevent the facilitation of any of the activities described 
     in section 104(a).
       (b) Enhanced Security Targeting Requirements.--Not later 
     than 180 days after the identification of any sea port or 
     airport pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall, utilizing the Automated Targeting System 
     operated by the National Targeting Center in U.S. Customs and 
     Border Protection, require enhanced screening procedures to 
     determine if physical inspections are warranted of any cargo 
     bound for or landed in the United States that has been 
     transported through such sea port or airport if there are 
     reasonable grounds to believe that such cargo contains goods 
     prohibited under this Act.
       (c) Seizure and Forfeiture.--A vessel, aircraft, or 
     conveyance used to facilitate any of the activities described 
     in section 104(a) that comes within the jurisdiction of the 
     United States may be seized and forfeited under chapter 46 of 
     title 18, United States Code, or under the Tariff Act of 
     1930.

     SEC. 206. TRAVEL SANCTIONS.

       (a) Aliens Ineligible for Visas, Admission, or Parole.--
       (1) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien (or an alien who 
     is a corporate officer of a person) who the Secretary of 
     State or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or a designee of 
     one of such Secretaries) knows, or has reasonable grounds to 
     believe, is described in subsection (a)(1) or (b)(1) of 
     section 104 is--
       (A) inadmissible to the United States;
       (B) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to 
     enter the United States; and
       (C) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the 
     United States or to receive any other benefit under the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
       (2) Current visas revoked.--
       (A) In general.--The issuing consular officer, the 
     Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or 
     a designee of one of such Secretaries) shall revoke any visa 
     or other entry documentation issued to an alien who is 
     described in subsection (a)(1) or (b)(1) of section 104 
     regardless of when issued.
       (B) Effect of revocation.--A revocation under subparagraph 
     (A)--
       (i) shall take effect immediately; and
       (ii) shall automatically cancel any other valid visa or 
     entry documentation that is in the alien's possession.
       (b) Exception To Comply With United Nations Headquarters 
     Agreement.--Sanctions under subsection (a)(1)(B) shall not 
     apply to an alien if admitting the alien into the United 
     States is necessary to permit the United States to comply 
     with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United 
     Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered 
     into force November 21,

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     1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or 
     other applicable international obligations.

     SEC. 207. EXEMPTIONS, WAIVERS, AND REMOVALS OF DESIGNATION.

       (a) Exemptions.--
       (1) Mandatory exemptions.--The following activities shall 
     be exempt from sanctions under section 104:
       (A) Activities subject to the reporting requirements of 
     title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 
     et seq.), or to any authorized intelligence activities of the 
     United States.
       (B) Any transaction necessary to comply with United States 
     obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations 
     and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters 
     of the United Nations, signed June 26, 1947, and entered into 
     force on November 21, 1947, or under the Vienna Convention on 
     Consular Relations, signed April 24, 1963, and entered into 
     force on March 19, 1967, or under other international 
     agreements.
       (2) Discretionary exemptions.--The following activities may 
     be exempt from sanctions under section 104 as determined by 
     the President:
       (A) Any financial transaction the exclusive purpose for 
     which is to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of 
     North Korea.
       (B) Any financial transaction the exclusive purpose for 
     which is to import food products into North Korea, if such 
     food items are not defined as luxury goods.
       (C) Any transaction the exclusive purpose for which is to 
     import agricultural products, medicine, or medical devices 
     into North Korea, provided that such supplies or equipment 
     are classified as designated ``EAR 99'' under the Export 
     Administration Regulations (part 730 of title 15, Code of 
     Federal Regulations) and not controlled under--
       (i) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
     2401 et seq.), as continued in effect under the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.);
       (ii) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);
       (iii) part B of title VIII of the Nuclear Proliferation 
     Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6301 et seq.); or
       (iv) the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and 
     Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.).
       (b) Waiver.--The President may waive, on a case-by-case 
     basis, the imposition of sanctions for a period of not more 
     than one year, and may renew that waiver for additional 
     periods of not more than one year, any sanction or other 
     measure under section 104, 204, 205, 206, or 303 if the 
     President submits to the appropriate congressional committees 
     a written determination that the waiver meets one or more of 
     the following requirements:
       (1) The waiver is important to the economic or national 
     security interests of the United States.
       (2) The waiver will further the enforcement of this Act or 
     is for an important law enforcement purpose.
       (3) The waiver is for an important humanitarian purpose, 
     including any of the purposes described in section 4 of the 
     North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7802).
       (c) Removals of Sanctions.--The President may prescribe 
     rules and regulations for the removal of sanctions on a 
     person that is designated under subsection (a) or (b) of 
     section 104 and the removal of designations of a person with 
     respect to such sanctions if the President determines that 
     the designated person has verifiably ceased its participation 
     in any of the conduct described in subsection (a) or (b) of 
     section 104, as the case may be, and has given assurances 
     that it will abide by the requirements of this Act.
       (d) Financial Services for Certain Activities.--The 
     President may promulgate regulations, rules, and policies as 
     may be necessary to facilitate the provision of financial 
     services by a foreign financial institution that is not 
     controlled by the Government of North Korea in support of the 
     activities subject to exemption under this section.

     SEC. 208. REPORT ON THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR KNOWINGLY ENGAGING 
                   IN SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES UNDERMINING CYBER 
                   SECURITY.

       (a) In General.--The President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report on significant 
     activities undermining cyber security conducted, or otherwise 
     ordered or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the 
     Government of North Korea, including--
       (1) the identity and nationality of persons that have 
     knowingly engaged in, directed, or provided material support 
     to significant activities undermining cyber security by the 
     Government of North Korea;
       (2) the conduct engaged in by each person identified;
       (3) the extent to which a foreign government has provided 
     material support to significant activities undermining cyber 
     security conducted, or otherwise ordered or controlled by, 
     the Government of North Korea; and
       (4) the efforts made by the United States to engage foreign 
     governments to halt the capability of North Korea to conduct 
     significant activities undermining cyber security.
       (b) Submission and Form.--
       (1) Submission.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for a 
     period not to exceed 3 years.
       (2) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 209. SENSE OF CONGRESS THAT TRILATERAL COOPERATION AMONG 
                   THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND THE REPUBLIC OF 
                   KOREA IS CRUCIAL TO THE STABILITY OF THE ASIA-
                   PACIFIC REGION.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea 
     (South Korea) share the values of democracy, free and open 
     markets, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.
       (2) The alliance relationship between the United States, 
     Japan, and South Korea are critical to peace and security in 
     the Asia-Pacific region.
       (3) The United States, Japan, and South Korea are committed 
     to continuing diplomatic efforts to ensure continued peace 
     and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
       (4) On December 28, 2014, the United States, Japan, and 
     South Korea finalized a trilateral military intelligence-
     sharing arrangement concerning the nuclear and missile 
     threats posed by North Korea.
       (5) The trilateral military intelligence-sharing 
     arrangement reinforces and strengthens the commitment between 
     the United States, Japan, and South Korea toward a Korean 
     Peninsula free of nuclear weapons.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs are of 
     mutual concern to the United States, Japan, and South Korea 
     and a trilateral military intelligence-sharing arrangement is 
     essential to the security of each nation and the Asia-Pacific 
     region.

     SEC. 210. REPORT ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTH 
                   KOREA AND IRAN.

       (a) In General.--The President shall submit to the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
     and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report 
     on cooperation between North Korea and Iran on their nuclear 
     programs, including the identity of Iranian and North Korean 
     persons that have knowingly engaged in or directed the 
     provision of material support or the exchange of information 
     between North Korea and Iran on their respective nuclear 
     programs.
       (b) Submission and Form.--
       (1) Submission.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.
       (2) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex.

                  TITLE III--PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

     SEC. 301. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.

       Section 104 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 
     (22 U.S.C. 7814) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``radios capable of 
     receiving broadcasting'' and inserting ``radio, Internet, and 
     electronic mass communications capable of receiving 
     content''; and
       (2) by adding after subsection (c) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(d) Information Technology Study.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this subsection, the President shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     setting forth a detailed plan for making unrestricted, 
     unmonitored, and inexpensive, radio, Internet, and electronic 
     mass communications available to the people of North Korea.
       ``(2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
     annex.''.

     SEC. 302. REPORT ON NORTH KOREAN PRISON CAMPS.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report describing, 
     with respect to each political prison camp in North Korea to 
     the extent information is available--
       (1) the camp's estimated prisoner population;
       (2) the camp's geographical coordinates;
       (3) the reasons for confinement of the prisoners;
       (4) the camp's primary industries and products, and the end 
     users of any goods produced in such camp;
       (5) the natural persons and agencies responsible for 
     conditions in the camp;
       (6) the conditions under which prisoners are confined, with 
     respect to the adequacy of food, shelter, medical care, 
     working conditions, and reports of ill-treatment of 
     prisoners; and
       (7) imagery, to include satellite imagery of each such 
     camp, in a format that, if published, would not compromise 
     the sources and methods used by the intelligence agencies of 
     the United States to capture geospatial imagery.
       (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) may be 
     included in the first report required to be submitted to 
     Congress

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     after the date of the enactment of this Act under sections 
     116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2151n(d) and 2304(b)) (relating to the annual human 
     rights report).

     SEC. 303. REPORT ON PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS 
                   HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OR CENSORSHIP IN NORTH 
                   KOREA.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that contains 
     an identification of each person the Secretary determines to 
     be responsible for serious human rights abuses or censorship 
     in North Korea and a description of such abuses or censorship 
     engaged in by such person. The report shall include a 
     description of actions taken by the Department of State to 
     implement or support the recommendations of the Commission of 
     Inquiry's Report on Human Rights in the Democratic People's 
     Republic of North Korea, including efforts to press China and 
     other countries to implement Commission recommendations.
       (b) Consideration.--In preparing the report required under 
     subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall give due 
     consideration to the findings of the United Nations 
     Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, and 
     shall make specific findings with respect to the 
     responsibility of Kim Jong Un, and of each natural person who 
     is a member of the National Defense Commission of North 
     Korea, or the Organization and Guidance Department of the 
     Workers' Party of Korea, for serious human rights abuses and 
     censorship.
       (c) Designation of Persons.--The President shall designate 
     under section 104(a) any person listed in the report required 
     under subsection (a) as responsible for serious human rights 
     abuses or censorship in North Korea.
       (d) Submission and Form.--
       (1) Submission.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for 
     a period not to exceed 3 years, shall be included in each 
     report required under sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n(d) and 
     2304(b)) (relating to the annual human rights report).
       (2) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex. The Secretary of State shall also publish 
     the unclassified part of the report on the Department of 
     State's Web site.

                     TITLE IV--GENERAL AUTHORITIES

     SEC. 401. SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS AND OTHER MEASURES.

       (a) In General.--Any sanction or other measure provided for 
     in title I (or any amendment made by title I) or title II may 
     be suspended for up to 365 days upon certification by the 
     President to the appropriate congressional committees that 
     the Government of North Korea has--
       (1) verifiably ceased its counterfeiting of United States 
     currency, including the surrender or destruction of 
     specialized materials and equipment used for or particularly 
     suitable for counterfeiting;
       (2) taken significant steps toward financial transparency 
     to comply with generally accepted protocols to cease and 
     prevent the laundering of monetary instruments;
       (3) taken significant steps toward verification of its 
     compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
     1695, 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2094;
       (4) taken significant steps toward accounting for and 
     repatriating the citizens of other countries abducted or 
     unlawfully held captive by the Government of North Korea or 
     detained in violation of the 1953 Armistice Agreement;
       (5) accepted and begun to abide by internationally 
     recognized standards for the distribution and monitoring of 
     humanitarian aid;
       (6) provided credible assurances that it will not support 
     further acts of international terrorism;
       (7) taken significant and verified steps to improve living 
     conditions in its political prison camps; and
       (8) made significant progress in planning for unrestricted 
     family reunification meetings, including for those 
     individuals among the two million strong Korean-American 
     community who maintain family ties with relatives in North 
     Korea.
       (b) Renewal of Suspension.--The suspension described in 
     subsection (a) may be renewed for additional consecutive 
     periods of 180 days upon certification by the President to 
     the appropriate congressional committees that the Government 
     of North Korea has continued to comply with the conditions 
     described in subsection (a) during the previous year.

     SEC. 402. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS AND OTHER MEASURES.

       Any sanction or other measure provided for in title I (or 
     any amendment made by title I) or title II shall terminate on 
     the date on which the President determines and certifies to 
     the appropriate congressional committees that the Government 
     of North Korea has met the requirements of section 401, and 
     has also--
       (1) completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantled all 
     of its nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological 
     weapons programs, including all programs for the development 
     of systems designed in whole or in part for the delivery of 
     such weapons;
       (2) released all political prisoners, including the 
     citizens of North Korea detained in North Korea's political 
     prison camps;
       (3) ceased its censorship of peaceful political activity;
       (4) taken significant steps toward the establishment of an 
     open, transparent, and representative society;
       (5) fully accounted for and repatriated all citizens of all 
     nations abducted or unlawfully held captive by the Government 
     of North Korea or detained in violation of the 1953 Armistice 
     Agreement; and
       (6) agreed with the Financial Action Task Force on a plan 
     of action to address deficiencies in its anti-money 
     laundering regime and begun to implement this plan of action.

     SEC. 403. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.

       Any or all reports required to be submitted to appropriate 
     congressional committees under this Act or any amendment made 
     by this Act that are subject to a deadline for submission 
     consisting of the same unit of time may be consolidated into 
     a single report that is submitted to appropriate 
     congressional committees pursuant to such deadline.

     SEC. 404. REGULATIONS.

       (a) In General.--The President is authorized to promulgate 
     such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out 
     the provisions of this Act (which may include regulatory 
     exceptions), including under sections 203 and 205 of the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 
     and 1704).
       (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act or any 
     amendment made by this Act shall be construed to limit the 
     authority of the President pursuant to an applicable 
     Executive order or otherwise pursuant to the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

     SEC. 405. NO ADDITIONAL FUNDS AUTHORIZED.

       No additional funds are authorized to carry out the 
     requirements of this Act and the amendments made by this Act.

     SEC. 406. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Except as otherwise provided in this Act, this Act and the 
     amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Royce) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel) each 
will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.


                             General Leave

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to 
include extraneous materials on this resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROYCE. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I appreciate Leader McCarthy working with myself, 
working with Ranking Member Eliot Engel of New York to schedule this 
legislation for floor consideration.
  Last week, North Korea conducted its fourth known nuclear test. The 
Kim regime has developed increasingly destructive weapons.
  What we are concerned about here is the miniaturization of nuclear 
warheads that fit onto its most reliable missiles. We are also 
concerned about the submarine tests for firing from a sub these 
missiles that would be capable of launching those devices. We are 
concerned about the ongoing efforts to make certain that they have got 
the range now on a three-stage rocket, ICBM, to hit the United States. 
This threat is unacceptable, and it has to be aggressively challenged.
  The legislation that we are considering here is the most 
comprehensive North Korea sanctions legislation to come before this 
body. Importantly, what this bill does is use targeted financial and 
economic pressure to isolate Kim Jong-un and his top officials from the 
assets that they maintain in foreign banks and from the hard currency 
that sustains their rule.
  These assets are derived primarily from illicit activities, such as 
counterfeiting U.S. currency, something that North Korea has been 
caught doing with hundred-dollar bank notes, such as selling their 
missile systems around the world, contraband in cigarettes, drugs, and 
other illicit activities. And all of that is used to advance North 
Korea's nuclear program.
  They also pay for the luxurious lifestyle of the ruling elites, as we 
have

[[Page 301]]

seen in some of the exposes that come out of North Korea, and it is 
used to repress the people. In other words, the money from that hard 
currency pays for the generals, pays for the secret police, pays for 
the missile program and the nuclear weapons program.
  A strategy of financial pressure is the approach we took a decade ago 
when the previous administration targeted Banco Delta Asia. That was a 
Macao-based bank. This was in 2005. They were targeted for their role 
in laundering money for North Korea, and this cut it off from the 
financial system, really. This led other banks in the region to shun 
North Korean business, because when the option is out there between 
whether or not you are going to bank with North Korea or bank with the 
U.S. and the rest of the world, it is a fairly easy choice for these 
banks to make. At that point, they freeze the accounts, and that, 
obviously, isolates the regime.
  At that time, according to one former top U.S. official who was 
speaking to the issue of what the North Koreans would say when they 
would come into the meetings with the State Department, at every 
conversation we had with the North Koreans, he said, every one of them 
began and ended with the same question: ``When do we get our money 
back?''
  Now, the part that got my interest at the time was not only the 
report that, because he couldn't pay his generals, there were problems 
for the regime--it is not a good position for a dictator to be in--but 
also that missile production lines had come to a halt because they 
couldn't buy on the black market; they didn't have the hard currency 
anymore to do it, the parts that they needed for their programs.
  Unfortunately, the pressure at the time was lifted. I think it was 
lifted prematurely for certain because the representation was made that 
Kim Jong Il was going to make concessions on his nuclear program, 
concessions that ultimately were never made. From my standpoint, what a 
mistake. From the standpoint of the people I talk to over at Treasury, 
what a mistake. They had a different vision on how those sanctions 
should be maintained.
  Today, the Obama administration has let its North Korea policy drift. 
A year ago, it promised a proportional response to the massive cyber 
terrorist attack against the United States. But to date, the 
administration's response has been dangerously weak. A mere 18 low-
level arms dealers have been sanctioned. That has been it. Failing to 
respond to North Korea's belligerence, I think, only emboldens their 
leader.
  Disrupting North Korea's illicit activities will place tremendous 
strain on that country's ruling elite who have so brutalized the people 
of North Korea. I spoke to the defector who used to run their 
propaganda machinery about this. He defected through China. And he 
discussed this issue. He said: Look, that hard currency goes, not to 
the people; it goes for the military apparatus and the political 
apparatus of the regime. So we have got to go after those illicit 
activities like we went after organized crime in the United States: 
identify the network, interdict shipments, disrupt the flow of money.
  North Korea, after all, has been called a ``gangster regime.'' You 
have seen that term in the press. Well, it is pretty apt. This regime 
is a critical threat, frankly, to our national security. Under this 
bill's framework, anyone laundering money, counterfeiting goods, 
smuggling, or trafficking narcotics will be subject to significant 
sanctions.
  It is also important to remember the deplorable state of human rights 
in North Korea. Two years ago, a U.N. Commission of Inquiry released 
the most comprehensive report on North Korea to date, finding that the 
Kim regime ``has for decades,'' in their words, ``pursued policies 
involving crimes that shock the conscience of humanity.'' So this bill 
requires the State Department to use this report's findings to identify 
the individuals responsible for these abuses and to press for more ways 
in which to get information into North Korea so as to move the 
attitudes of the population inside the country.
  Mr. Speaker, a return to the strategy of effective financial pressure 
on North Korea is our best bet to end North Korea's threat to its own 
people, to our South Korean allies, and ultimately to us.
  I reserve the balance of my time.

                                         House of Representatives,


                 Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,

                                Washington, DC, February 26, 2015.
     Hon. Ed Royce,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I write concerning H.R. 757, the North 
     Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015. As you know, the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs received an original referral 
     and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform a 
     secondary referral when the bill was introduced on February 
     5, 2015. I recognize and appreciate your desire to bring this 
     legislation before the House of Representatives in an 
     expeditious manner, and accordingly, the Committee on 
     Oversight and Government Reform will forego action on the 
     bill.
       The Committee takes this action with our mutual 
     understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 757 at 
     this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over the subject 
     matter contained in this or similar legislation. Further, I 
     request your support for the appointment of conferees from 
     the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform during any 
     House-Senate conference convened on this or related 
     legislation.
       Finally, I would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters 
     on this matter be included in the bill report filed by the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as in the Congressional 
     Record during floor consideration, to memorialize our 
     understanding.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Jason Chaffetz,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                  Washington, DC, January 8, 2016.
     Hon. Jason Chaffetz,
     Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 757, the North Korea 
     Sanctions Enforcement Act, and for agreeing to be discharged 
     from further consideration of that bill.
       I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure 
     does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of the 
     Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, or prejudice 
     its jurisdictional prerogatives on this bill or similar 
     legislation in the future. I would support your effort to 
     seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any 
     House-Senate conference involving this legislation.
       I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 757 into the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. 
     I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and 
     look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as 
     this measure moves through the legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                  Committee on Ways and Means,

                                     Washington, DC, May 29, 2015.
     Hon. Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Royce: I am writing with respect to H.R. 757, 
     the ``North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015.'' As a 
     result of your having consulted with us on provisions in H.R. 
     757 that fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee 
     on Ways and Means, I agree to waive consideration of this 
     bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.
       The Committee on Ways and Means takes this action with the 
     mutual understanding that by forgoing consideration of H.R. 
     757 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over the 
     subject matter contained in this or similar legislation, and 
     the Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as 
     the bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may 
     address any remaining issues that fall within our Rule X 
     jurisdiction. The Committee also reserves the right to seek 
     appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any 
     House-Senate conference involving this or similar 
     legislation, and requests your support for such request.
       Finally, I would appreciate your response to this letter 
     confirming this understanding, and would ask that a copy of 
     our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration thereof.
           Sincerely,
                                                        Paul Ryan,
                                                         Chairman.

[[Page 302]]

     
                                  ____
                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                     Washington, DC, June 4, 2015.
     Hon. Paul Ryan,
     Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 757, the North Korea 
     Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015, and for agreeing to be 
     discharged from further consideration of that bill.
       I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure 
     does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of the 
     Committee on Ways and Means, or prejudice its jurisdictional 
     prerogatives on this bill or similar legislation in the 
     future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an 
     appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate 
     conference involving this legislation.
       I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 757 into the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. 
     I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and 
     look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as 
     this measure moves through the legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                   Committee on the Judiciary,

                                  Washington, DC, January 7, 2016.
     Hon. Ed Royce,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
     Washington, D.C.
       Dear Chairman Royce: I am writing with respect to H.R. 757, 
     the ``North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015,'' which 
     was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and in 
     addition to the Committee on the Judiciary. As a result of 
     your having consulted with us on provisions in H.R. 757 that 
     fall within the rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on the 
     Judiciary, I agree to discharge our Committee from further 
     consideration of this bill so that it may proceed 
     expeditiously to the House floor for consideration.
       The Judiciary Committee takes this action with our mutual 
     understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 757 at 
     this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over subject 
     matter contained in this or similar legislation, and that our 
     Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as 
     this bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may 
     address any remaining issues in our jurisdiction. Our 
     Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of an 
     appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate 
     conference involving this or similar legislation, and asks 
     that you support any such request.
       I would appreciate a response to this letter confirming 
     this understanding with respect to H.R. 757, and would ask 
     that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be 
     included in the Congressional Record during Floor 
     consideration of H.R. 757.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Bob Goodlatte,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                     Washington, DC, June 4, 2015.
     Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
     Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 757, the North Korea 
     Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015, and for agreeing to be 
     discharged from further consideration of that bill.
       I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure 
     does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of the 
     Committee on the Judiciary, or prejudice its jurisdictional 
     prerogatives on this bill or similar legislation in the 
     future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an 
     appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate 
     conference involving this legislation.
       I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 757 into the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. 
     I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and 
     look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as 
     this measure moves through the legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                              Committee on Financial Services,

                                  Washington, DC, January 8, 2016.
     Hon. Ed Royce,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Royce: I am writing concerning H.R. 757, the 
     North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015, and H.R. 3662, 
     the Iran Terror Finance Transparency Act, both of which were 
     referred to the Committee on Financial Services in addition 
     to your Committee.
       As a result of your having consulted with the Committee on 
     Financial Services concerning provisions of the bills that 
     fall within our Rule X jurisdiction, I agree to discharge our 
     Committee from further consideration of the bills so that 
     they may proceed expeditiously to the House Floor. The 
     Committee on Financial Services takes this action with our 
     mutual understanding that, by foregoing consideration of H.R. 
     757 and H.R. 3662 at this time, we do not waive any 
     jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this or 
     similar legislation, and that our Committee will be 
     appropriately consulted and involved as this or similar 
     legislation moves forward so that we may address any 
     remaining issues that fall within our Rule X jurisdiction. 
     Our Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of 
     an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate 
     conference involving this or similar legislation, and 
     requests your support for any such request.
       Finally, I would appreciate your response to this letter 
     confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 757 and 
     H.R. 3662 and would ask that a copy of our exchange of 
     letters on this matter be included in your Committee's report 
     to accompany the legislation and in the Congressional Record 
     during floor consideration thereof.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Jeb Hensarling,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                  Washington, DC, January 8, 2016.
     Hon. Jeb Hensarling,
     Chairman, House Committee on Financial Services, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 757, the North Korea 
     Sanctions Enforcement Act, and for agreeing to be discharged 
     from further consideration of that bill.
       I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure 
     does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of the 
     Committee on Financial Services, or prejudice its 
     jurisdictional prerogatives on this bill or similar 
     legislation in the future. I would support your effort to 
     seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any 
     House-Senate conference involving this legislation.
       I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 757 into the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. 
     I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and 
     look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as 
     this measure moves through the legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Edward R. Royce,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise in support of this measure.
  I want to first thank our chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Ed Royce, for authoring this very good, bipartisan bill. I am very 
pleased to be the lead Democratic cosponsor. I think this is an 
important bill, and it ties in with what we have tried to do for these 
past years on the Foreign Affairs Committee, being bipartisan and 
letting politics stop at the water's edge when we are talking about 
international affairs.
  Mr. Speaker, last week's nuclear test in North Korea was a stark 
reminder of just how dangerous the Kim regime is. A nuclear weapon in 
the hands of a rogue power is a threat to peace and stability around 
the world. North Korea continues to have a destabilizing influence on 
the peninsula and across the region, and the potential for nuclear fuel 
from North Korea to end up on the black market in the hands of violent 
extremists only compounds the threat.
  Yet, despite the burden of some of the toughest sanctions imaginable, 
despite constant pressure from the global community, despite the 
increasing isolation of North Korea from the rest of the world, leaders 
in Pyongyang persist on this dangerous and destabilizing course.
  The latest test demands a response. We need to work with our allies, 
particularly South Korea and Japan. We need to make sure this issue is 
at the top of the agenda in our engagement with China. China can have a 
lot of influence and does have a lot of influence over North Korea. We 
need to act unilaterally to make clear to the North Koreans that their 
actions have consequences.
  This bill would broaden our sanctions and strengthen enforcement. Let 
me say I am very proud, again, in a bipartisan way, this bill passed 
unanimously out of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
  North Korea has become more and more savvy at evading sanctions, and 
that is why this bill broadens our sanctions. The country's elites do 
business with shell companies and cover up the

[[Page 303]]

money trail. This allows hard currency to flow into North Korea. This 
bill would crack down on this practice and go after anyone helping prop 
up the Kim regime through these illegal activities.
  I must say that I have been to North Korea twice, to Pyongyang twice. 
We watched in the morning when people were going to work. The elites do 
very well there. It is just the rest of the country that is starving.
  This bill would include the important exceptions for the humanitarian 
aid that benefits the North Korean people. We help them with food aid. 
We are the most generous country with feeding North Korea. It is 
important to point this out because our quarrel is not with the North 
Korean people. It is with the despot and his aides that run North 
Korea.
  We know that the people of North Korea endure deplorable treatment at 
the hands of a corrupt regime. I can tell you the country's citizens 
deserve much, much better. That is why we will keep up the pressure on 
North Korea's leaders and that is why we need to pass this legislation.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Smith), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International 
Organizations.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished 
chairman for yielding.
  I rise in strong support of H.R. 757, the North Korea Sanctions 
Enforcement Act of 2016.
  Mr. Speaker, there is a compelling need to pass tough and effective 
legislation to freeze the assets of the Kim Jong-un regime.
  I want to commend Chairman Royce for his long and hard work on North 
Korea and his determination to bring this bill to the floor. I again 
thank Ranking Member Eliot Engel for his good, strong sense of 
bipartisanship. This is a one-two punch against a cruel dictatorship, 
and this legislation has to get to the President as soon as possible.
  Mr. Speaker, whether it be North Korea or Iran, when will we learn 
the hard lesson that totalitarian states do not negotiate in good 
faith, cannot be trusted to hold up their end of the bargain, and use 
our goodwill and our foreign capital to keep on proliferating? They 
will not allow intrusive inspections because they cheat and because it 
weakens their status at home. They use nuclear weapons negotiations to 
enhance their own diplomatic status and to gain concessions.
  In the end, nuclear negotiations earn rogue nations like Iran and 
North Korea foreign capital and other investments from the West. They 
use that to fund additional missile technology, to fund criminal and 
terrorist activities, and to continue with clandestine nuclear 
programs.
  During the Bush administration, the most effective tools in bringing 
the North Korea dictatorship to heel were the freezing of its assets in 
the Banco Delta Asia in Macao and the building of an international 
coalition to interdict suspect North Korea shipping. These should be 
our priorities now, especially in the shadow of North Korea's nuclear 
tests, by imposing mandatory sanctions on the perpetrators of human 
rights abuses, censorship, arms and human trafficking, money 
laundering, as well proliferation.
  Nearly 2 years ago, the U.N. Commission of Inquiry reported that the 
ongoing crimes against humanity in North Korea have no ``parallel in 
the contemporary world.'' These crimes include ``extermination, murder, 
enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other 
sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, and racial, and 
grounds, the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced 
disappearance of persons, and the inhumane act of knowingly causing 
prolonged starvation.''

                              {time}  1615

  Kim Jong-un cares not at all about the welfare of his own people. We 
should expect that he cares even less about the welfare of the people 
of Japan, South Korea, or even U.S. citizens who face the threat of 
North Korean nuclear weapons.
  The U.N. Commission recommended that the U.N. impose targeted 
sanctions on the North Korean leaders responsible for its human rights 
crimes. However, China blocks U.N. action.
  Without U.N. action, the U.S. must act, using our position as the 
steward of the global financial system. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
North Korea welcomes such action, supporting targeted sanctions of 
those most responsible for these heinous crimes against humanity.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Connolly), my friend and colleague and a valued member of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my dear friend from New York, the 
distinguished ranking member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  I rise today in support of the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act 
of 2016. I want to thank the chairman and ranking member for their 
leadership in bringing this legislation before us.
  I especially appreciate the inclusion of two of my amendments, one to 
provide for the reunification of Korean families separated by the 38th 
parallel, and another to ensure that U.S. policy toward North Korea is 
informed by the recommendations made in the landmark Commission of 
Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea conducted by the United Nations.
  Amidst the tense geopolitical standoffs and irresponsible actions of 
the North Korean regime, we must always remember the human cost of this 
enduring conflict. I believe this bill, through these amendments and 
important exceptions to sanctions for humanitarian relief 
organizations, does just that. This is timely, if not overdue, 
legislation.
  North Korea is a reckless, paranoid state devoid of virtually all 
aspects of human autonomy, now armed with a nuclear umbrella. That 
makes the Korean peninsula one of the most dangerous flash points on 
the globe.
  There have been recent developments in North Korea that are 
profoundly troubling and deserve an immediate response from this 
Congress. Reports that North Korea has conducted its fourth nuclear 
weapons test confirm that the regime in Pyongyang is committed to 
defying international norms and risks destabilizing the entire Asia-
Pacific region.
  As co-chairman of the Congressional Caucus on Korea, I remain deeply 
concerned with the volatility and the ever-present potential of 
conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
  It is a specter that looms over 75 million Koreans and, for their 
sake and that of the region, the U.S., the Republic of Korea, China, 
and other regional stakeholders must demonstrate commitment to 
addressing this threat.
  By targeting the individuals and entities that support the Kim regime 
through illicit activities, this bill will hopefully weaken the resolve 
and capability of Pyongyang to endanger regional stability.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of the bill.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Poe), chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, 
and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. He is also an original 
cosponsor with me on this legislation.
  Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman and the ranking 
member for bringing this piece of legislation up to the House floor.
  Mr. Speaker, North Korea is a world threat, a nuclear world threat. 
Its leaders are outlaws with no redeeming social character in their 
souls, and we need to operate with them knowing this.
  Last week, North Korea tested another nuclear weapon. As chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, I held a 
hearing in October and predicted that this test would happen again.
  With Iran about to receive hundreds of billions of dollars for its 
illegal nuclear program, we shouldn't be surprised that North Korea 
wants a piece

[[Page 304]]

of the pie, too. Illegal nuclear programs and material can bring a lot 
of money to a regime.
  In the hearing that we had in October, we learned of deep connections 
between Iran and North Korea. Both nations, among other things, sponsor 
worldwide terror. They have a history of working together on missile 
development. There is mounting evidence that they have worked together 
on their nuclear weapons programs as well. We should expect Iran to 
keep working with North Korea to advance its own nuclear weapons 
program.
  We have sanctions on North Korea, but all those sanctions have not 
been fully implemented. The administration's policy of strategic 
patience is not working because this barbaric regime continues to 
develop nuclear weapons and ICBMs. I say our patience has run out in 
dealing with them.
  This bill is Congress showing North Korea that there are consequences 
for their testing of nuclear weapons. We cannot let North Korea develop 
its nuclear program even more.
  North Korea already has submarines with missiles on them that can 
reach the United States, over 10 nuclear bombs, and for some reason has 
Austin on its hit list. I take that personally, Mr. Speaker, that 
Austin is their number one target in the United States.
  North Korea is a state that imprisons Christians for their faith, 
starves its citizens, controls the Internet and the media, tortures 
anyone in its domain who dares to disagree with the regime, and is 
engaged in cyberterrorism.
  Dangerous actions by a ruthless dictator must be met by forceful 
responses. I am glad to be an original cosponsor of this bill. I urge 
its passage. It is time for them to pay the price for going rogue.
  And that is just the way it is.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Hawaii (Ms. Gabbard), our colleague on the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, a rising star in our committee.
  Ms. GABBARD. Mr. Speaker, I am rising today in strong support of H.R. 
757, the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act, which I am proud to be 
a cosponsor of.
  North Korea continues to pose a serious and dangerous threat to my 
constituents in Hawaii, the Pacific, and the West Coast of the United 
States. Our communities and our families lie within range of North 
Korea's intercontinental ballistic missiles.
  North Korea's nuclear tests just a week ago and their continued 
pursuit of developing more nuclear weapons and miniaturizing those 
weapons serve as a reminder of the threat that North Korea poses to our 
country, which my constituents in Hawaii know all too well.
  There are some necessary steps that the United States must take to 
deal with this threat: We need to increase the strength and 
capabilities of our Pacific fleet and forces. We need to stop the 
downward trend in investment of ballistic missile defense development 
and capabilities, and strengthen our ballistic missile defense 
capabilities, specifically in Hawaii and the Pacific, to counter this 
threat. We need to completely reexamine our strategy of so-called 
strategic patience with North Korea, recognizing that North Korea has 
continued to grow in their nuclear and missile capabilities, telling us 
that the status quo is not working.
  This bill, however, deals with another important area where we need 
to act, and that is sanctions. It gives us the tools to respond to 
North Korea's provocations. One provision would apply sanctions that 
prohibit the export of munitions to North Korea and severely restrict 
export licenses for controlled goods and technologies. It would 
prohibit financial transactions between U.S. persons and the Government 
of North Korea and sanction those who send or receive lethal military 
equipment to or from North Korea.
  The bill will also give us the tools to reapply some of the most 
effective sanctions that we have ever had against hard currency for 
those who do business with North Korea. We saw how these sanctions were 
effective before.
  Following U.S. action against the Banco Delta Asia based in Macao in 
2005, the assets of North Korean banks and leaders were frozen and 
completely blocked from the international financial system. This 
directly affected the money being used to develop these nuclear and 
ballistic missile capabilities, and the money also supported the 
regime's leadership and its elites and their lifestyle.
  This severely increased the pressure in North Korea, causing them to 
engage with the international community, coming to an agreement to lift 
the sanctions in 2007--prematurely, in my view--made in exchange for 
shutting down and sealing the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and 
discussing a list of its nuclear-related activities with the U.S. and 
other parties in the region.
  The agreement was violated by North Korea in 2009 when they tested a 
missile, and the sanctions on Banco Delta showed us earlier a way to 
impact North Korean leadership and business directly. Those sanctions 
should have been immediately reinstated upon North Korea breaking that 
agreement, but that is why we are here today--to act.
  While sanctions alone are not enough, this bill could provide some 
very important tools to countering North Korea's aggression and 
ultimately achieving our objective of a denuclearized North Korea.
  Lastly, this bill recognizes the terrible human rights abuses 
inflicted on the people of North Korea. For many years, State 
Department human rights reports, as well as private organizations' 
reports, have depicted a pattern of extreme human rights abuses by the 
tyrannical North Korean regime, including the denial of basic human 
freedoms: withheld access to food and deplorable prison camps where 
extrajudicial killings, enslavement, torture, and sexual abuse are 
widespread.
  I would like to thank our Chairman Royce and our Ranking Member Engel 
for their steadfast, bipartisan dedication and leadership to taking 
action on this global and domestic security issue. This bill provides a 
critical step forward.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), chairman emeritus of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and author of multiple North Korea human rights and 
sanctions laws. She is also a cosponsor of this bill.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am so proud and pleased to be here 
speaking on behalf of this bill, H.R. 757, the North Korea Sanctions 
Enforcement Act. I thank Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel for 
introducing this important bill which, once again, is presented in 
their usual bipartisan manner.
  While initial reports, Mr. Speaker, cast doubt on North Korea's 
claims that it carried out a hydrogen bomb test, any enhancement of the 
regime's nuclear capability should be--must be--a cause for concern. 
Both U.S. and South Korean intelligence assessments indicate that North 
Korea already possesses the capability to install a nuclear warhead on 
a missile that can reach United States territory or that of our allies.
  Despite some doubt about that capability's effectiveness, it is just 
a matter of time before North Korea finishes developing this dangerous 
technology that it is seeking or, worse, shares this technology with 
Iran, as these two rogue regimes are bosom buddies and have long been 
known to collaborate on their ballistic missile programs.
  What is clear is that our current policy toward North Korea is not 
working. Administrations from both parties, Mr. Speaker, have made 
mistakes with North Korea over the years. They have failed to respond 
to North Korea's violation of its nuclear deal and have failed to hold 
the regime accountable for its illicit activity. Administration after 
administration have removed North Korea off the State Sponsors of 
Terrorism list and continue to keep the regime off that list despite 
mounting evidence that would support its inclusion back on the 
terrorism list. Various administrations have utterly failed to enforce 
the North Korea sanctions that we already have on the books.

[[Page 305]]

  The Obama administration's so-called strategic patience policy with 
North Korea has proven to be a disaster, and it is time that we fully 
and vigorously enforce the existing sanctions and expand upon those to 
implement new sanctions on Pyongyang until its nuclear program is 
dismantled.
  By some estimates, North Korea might already have 10 to 15 nuclear 
weapons, and Kim Jong-un has shown that he will stop at nothing to get 
the weapons and the technology that he desires. This bill would help 
ensure that our sanctions on North Korea are finally being enforced the 
way they always should have been, but we can't forget that North Korea 
cannot make progress on its nuclear program alone.
  North Korea has a long history of collaborating with other rogue 
regimes, and we must ensure that we are enforcing sanctions on all of 
its collaborators. Any government entity or individual that has sold or 
transferred weapons or technology to North Korea in violation of U.S. 
law or U.N. Security Council resolution should also be targeted for 
sanctions.
  Mr. Speaker, I will end with this note: North Korea has been writing 
the playbook for rogue regimes to follow, and unless this 
administration gets serious about confronting Pyongyang's aggressions, 
I worry that it will continue to allow Iran to take advantage of us, 
that we won't enforce sanctions on Tehran, just like we are not 
enforcing them on North Korea.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the 
gentlewoman.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. In a few years' time, we will be back here debating 
what to do after another nuclear device test by North Korea, by Iran, 
or by other rogue actors.
  North Korea poses an imminent threat now to our security as well as 
that of our allies. We cannot afford to ignore it nor look the other 
way.
  I urge all of my colleagues to vote for this important bill and urge 
its passage.
  I thank the chairman and the ranking member for this bill.

                              {time}  1630

  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Colleagues, a nuclear weapon in the hands of North Korea, a rogue, 
destabilizing country on the peninsula and across the region, is simply 
a nonstarter. It is unthinkable. Despite our tough sanctions and 
increasing isolation from the global community, Pyongyang continues 
down a dangerous and destabilizing course.
  Last week's nuclear test in North Korea is a jarring reminder of just 
how dangerous the Kim regime is and demands a response from the United 
States and our allies as well. We must work with South Korea and Japan 
to make sure this issue is at the top of our agenda in our engagement 
with China. We must act unilaterally to make sure to North Koreans that 
their leadership's actions have consequences.
  H.R. 757 would broaden our sanctions and strengthen enforcement. The 
bill would crack down on North Korean elite who do business through 
shell companies to evade detection and go after anyone helping to prop 
up the Kim regime through illegal activities. This bill would include 
important exceptions for the humanitarian aid that benefits the North 
Korean people.
  North Koreans deserve much more than what its leaders are providing, 
which is why we need to pass this legislation. We cannot allow North 
Korea to continue to be dangerous and frivolous. We have to stand up 
and say no. They have to understand that we mean business. They have to 
understand that what they have done is unacceptable and will not stand.
  I urge my colleagues to support this measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  We have the opportunity today to show Americans and the world that 
Congress is willing to lead on this vital national security issue. This 
is an issue that Congress has been focused on, obviously, for some 
time.
  I have spent much of my time on the Foreign Affairs Committee focused 
on the North Korean threat. Ranking Member Eliot Engel and I, in one of 
our first trips together as chairman and ranking member of the 
committee, traveled to visit our South Korean ally and toured the 
wreckage of the Cheonan.
  This was a corvette ship that was hit and split right in half by a 
torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine, costing the lives of 46 
sailors. It is a reminder of the attitude that North Korea has in terms 
of its provocative action.
  Both Eliot Engel and I have been to North Korea on separate trips, 
and we can tell you it is a totalitarian state with an ever-present 
cult of personalities. If you have ever read Orwell's book, ``Nineteen 
Eighty-Four,'' the society in that book seemed almost more rational 
than this police state.
  I was talking to the former Minister of Propaganda. In the no-go 
areas, 1.9 million were starved to death in North Korea. You ask why. 
Well, with the paranoia of the police state, they are not considered 
particularly loyal out there.
  Besides, the food can be sold on the food exchange in the capital for 
hard currency. Donated food often is used in this way to support what 
he calls ``juche,'' to support this philosophy which leads them forward 
with this desire to have a nuclear weapon and the capability to deliver 
it.
  This bipartisan bill, which I authored with Eliot Engel as our 
principal coauthor, is based on legislation that unanimously passed the 
House last Congress. Its implementation will help sever a key subsidy 
for North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program, for only when 
the North Korean leadership realizes that its criminal activities are 
untenable do prospects for peace and security in Northeast Asia 
improve.
  This bill will return us to the one strategy that has worked to 
pressure North Korea at a time when Kim Jong-un is trying to blackmail 
his way to consolidating power.
  Congress must send the message to the Kim regime that they can either 
reform and disarm or the system can implode. Without hard currency, 
without being able to pay the generals, that system would implode. By 
cutting off Kim Jong-un's access to the hard currency he needs for his 
army and his weapons, this bill, H.R. 757, will squarely present the 
North Korean regime with that choice.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, recent news of North Korea's claim that 
it successfully conducted an H-bomb test for the first time, in 
defiance of United Nations' resolutions ups the ante on why we must 
remain steadfast in expediently addressing insecurity in our nation and 
across the globe, as anticipated in this bill by Representative Royce 
of California, entitled the North Korean Sanctions Enforcement Act of 
2,315 which has enjoyed bi-partisan support.
  Our world today is faced with resurgent and evolving threats from 
weapons of mass destruction to destructive nuclear ambitions.
  Indeed, news events inform us of the far-ranging spectrum we must 
contend with, ranging from persistent nation state-based dangerous 
nuclear ambitions in North Korea, to continued chemical weapons used in 
Syria, to terrorist organizations such as Daesh ramping up their 
destructive capabilities through vitriolic recruitment strategies, that 
pose an existential threat beyond the borders from which ISIS is 
operating.
  I am confident that these are issues that President Obama will be 
addressing and proposing durable solutions to during his last state of 
the Union Address as our nation's Commander In Chief.
  Under his leadership, our nation has achieved foreign policy feats 
that have worked to maintain our security, promote our geopolitical 
objectives and advance our diplomatic relationships with key allies.
  Let's just take a quick look back at some of the President's foreign 
policy achievements:
  The capture and neutralization of Osama Bin Laden which brought an 
end to a nearly decade long manhunt.
  The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq which helped to bring an end 
to a costly war,

[[Page 306]]

helping our country save billions of dollars in U.S. taxpayer funds.
  The current Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which has been 
instrumental in deterring and stemming Iran's nuclear ambitions and 
enabling security in the global society.
  The repealing of Don't Ask, Don't Tell, an aspersion on the personal 
private matters of those who have dedicated their lives to protect our 
nation.
  Signing into law the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), an 
important treaty that showcases how the U.S. leads by example by 
signing a treaty that requires both the United States and Russia to 
reduce their nuclear warhead arsenals to 1,550 each, a 30 percent 
reduction from the 2002 Treaty of Moscow and a 74 percent reduction 
from the 1991 START treaty.
  Neutralization of al Qaeda propagandist and foreign fighter recruiter 
Anwar Al Awlaki, one of the main leaders in the Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP).
  Indeed, under President Obama's leadership, our country's military 
aid to Israel has increased remarkably with the eye towards deepening 
and expanding U.S./Israeli relations-an important aspect of our 
nation's foreign policy and geopolitical efforts to promote peace in 
the region.
  This president's foreign policy achievements in promoting the 
security of our nation are irrefutable and this is why I support the 
North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015 because it will empower 
him to continue his impressive work in this arena.
  Much like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) championed 
by this Administration, this bill encourages our President to 
investigate any credible information of sanctionable activities 
involving North Korea.
  Furthermore, this bill will designate and implement sanctions against 
persons and entities who knowingly engage in or contribute to 
activities in North Korea whether it is through their exporting or 
importing of weapons of mass destruction, significant arms, significant 
luxury goods, money laundering, censorship, or engage in human rights 
abuses.
  Pursuant to the bill, the President is empowered to exercise 
authorities under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(IEEPA) as it relates to persons, entities and the government of North 
Korea.
  This bill empowers our President with discretionary authority to 
designate and apply sanctions to persons involved in certain other 
kinds of conduct.
  This bill will facilitate civil forfeiture of assets, real or 
personal, if said properties inure from any attempted or actual 
violation of this Act, or which constitutes or is derived from proceeds 
traceable to such a violation.
  Other core provisions of the bill is the empowerment of our Treasury 
Secretary to:
  determine whether reasonable grounds exist for concluding that North 
Korea is a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern; and
  In the event our Treasury Secretary makes this determination, he is 
empowered to impose one or more special measures with respect to the 
jurisdiction of North Korea.
  Finally, our sense of Congress in this bill is in comity with and 
ensures the consistent enforcement of United Nations Security Council 
resolutions and financial restrictions on North Korea.
  Through this bill, our president will be empowered to withhold 
assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to any country that 
provides lethal military equipment to, or receives it from the 
government of North Korea.
  This bill is also important because it will put into place an 
enhanced screening procedure whereby our Secretary of Homeland Security 
(DHS) will be able to determine if physical inspections are warranted 
of any cargo bound for or landed in the United States that has been 
transported through a foreign seaport or airport whose inspections are 
deficient if there are reasonable grounds to believe that such cargo 
contains goods prohibited under this Act.
  This will facilitate expedient seizure of vessels or aircraft used to 
facilitate sanctionable activities.
  The President will also be supported in his efforts to produce 
progress reports on significant activities undermining cyber security 
conflicted, or otherwise ordered or controlled, directly or indirectly, 
by the government of North Korea.
  Our Secretary of State will be supported in his human rights efforts 
of reporting on each political prison camp in North Korea, which will 
include a detailed description of those abuses or censorship.
  Again, I thank Chairman Royce for championing this bill and look 
forward to working with him and other members of this House in 
promoting our national security and supporting our President's 
objective of establishing us as a credible and trusted leader in the 
global landscape.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following exchange of letters 
between myself and the Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security 
regarding H.R. 757, the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act.

                                                 January 12, 2016.
     Hon. Michael McCaul,
     Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman McCaul: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 757, the North Korea 
     Sanctions Enforcement Act, and for agreeing to forgo a 
     sequential referral request so that the bill may proceed 
     expeditiously to the Floor.
       I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure 
     does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of the 
     Committee on Homeland Security, or prejudice its 
     jurisdictional prerogatives on this bill or similar 
     legislation in the future.
       I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 757 into the 
     Congressional Record. I appreciate your cooperation regarding 
     this legislation and look forward to continuing to work with 
     your Committee as this measure moves through the legislative 
     process.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                                 January 12, 2016.
     Hon. Ed Royce,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Royce: I am writing to you concerning the 
     jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Homeland Security 
     in H.R 757, the ``North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 
     2015.'' The bill contains provisions that fall within the 
     jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security.
       I recognize and appreciate the desire to bring this 
     legislation before the House of Representatives in an 
     expeditious manner, and accordingly, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security will not assert its jurisdictional claim 
     over this bill by seeking a sequential referral. The 
     Committee takes this action with the mutual understanding 
     that by foregoing action at this time we do not waive any 
     jurisdiction over subject matter contained in this or similar 
     legislation.
       This waiver is also given with the understanding that the 
     Committee on Homeland Security expressly reserves its 
     authority to seek conferees on any provision within its 
     jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference on this or 
     any similar legislation, and requests your support for such a 
     request.
       I ask that a copy of this letter and your response be 
     included in the Congressional Record during consideration of 
     this bill on the House floor.
           Sincerely,

                                            Michael T. McCaul,

                                                         Chairman,
                                   Committee on Homeland Security.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 757, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

                          ____________________