[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 9]
[House]
[Pages 13227-13231]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF HURRICANE KATRINA

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 6, 2015, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. 
Richmond) for 30 minutes.
  Mr. RICHMOND. Mr. Speaker, I want to just thank my colleagues from 
Louisiana for also talking about the devastation that we received in 
hurricanes, both Katrina and Rita, which we call the ``sister 
hurricanes'' because they were only separated by a couple of days and 
what damage that Hurricane Katrina caused. Just a few days later, 
Hurricane Rita came right behind it and exacerbated that damage.
  Let me just hit on a few of the misperceptions of Katrina. Well, 
actually, since I have had a little time and

[[Page 13228]]

I want to make sure that everyone involved has a chance to have time to 
speak on this, I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. 
Thompson), my good friend, who at the time was chair of the Homeland 
Security Committee, who made sure that some of the deficiencies in FEMA 
and some of the other places that caused us undue headaches during the 
rebuilding, that those headaches were relieved a little bit or eased a 
little bit because of the hard work of Bennie Thompson, whose State 
also incurred some damage.

                              {time}  1915

  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. I appreciate the gentleman from New 
Orleans for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise for two reasons--one, to talk about what it is to 
be in the eye of a hurricane and to be without basic necessities for 
over 10 days because of a hurricane and, two, what it is that our 
government should do when those situations occur at the Federal, State, 
and local levels.
  In my comments, initially, I will talk a little bit about what 
happened in August of 2005--how, in fact, so many people were impacted 
as well as what we have done as a government, what we didn't do, and 
what we should do in going forward.
  As the gentleman from Louisiana has said, for the most part, both 
Hurricanes Rita and Katrina ravaged Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama, and a little bit of Florida, but I will limit my comments to 
Katrina. In Hurricane Katrina, there were over 1,800 people--from 
Florida to Texas--who died.
  In my home State of Mississippi, 238 individuals died. Basically, 
what we had after that is over 1.2 million housing units damaged, and 
in my home State, almost 120,000 were completely destroyed. In southern 
Mississippi, that meant that over 60 percent of the single family 
dwellings were either destroyed or rendered uninhabitable, and the 
statistics were worse for rental units. Along the Gulf Coast--the 
beautiful Gulf Coast where we have the largest manmade beach in the 
United States--there were over 1 million people displaced. One month 
after the storm, 600,000 families were still homeless, and, ultimately, 
114,000 were housed in FEMA trailers.
  Mr. Speaker, I don't have to tell you what happened with the FEMA 
trailers. It was a mess. The government's response to the temporary 
housing situation could only be characterized as a mess. We fixed it, 
but during that time, we put people in trailers that had basically been 
pieced together and shipped to the good people of the Gulf Coast. Many 
of them had Chinese drywall in those trailers that let off 
formaldehyde, which, ultimately, impacted the health of everybody we 
put in the trailers, ostensibly, for temporary housing. We created a 
bigger health problem.
  Obviously, we passed legislation to address some of it in terms of 
the health costs and other things. Ultimately, a lawsuit provided some 
relief to the families. What we have done in correcting that temporary 
housing situation is to direct FEMA to not just be the response and 
recovery agency. We want you to also understand that, when people are 
in trouble, not only do you come, but you come with the right resources 
to make sure that you don't create and make life worse for them. After 
our Katrina experience, we have a more nimble operation, and we have 
far better individuals who are trained so that, when disasters come, we 
can respond.
  The problem that I have goes back, Mr. Speaker, to the comments that 
a speaker on the other side made.
  When you are in a disaster, whether it is a hurricane or a flood or a 
tornado, the last thing you want is for somebody to ask, ``Well, who is 
going to pay for it?'' These are citizens of the United States of 
America. The only thing we should say is, ``In your darkest hour, in 
your time of need, your government will not let you down.'' I would 
hope that people understand that we are a great nation because we take 
care of all of our people, especially when the chips are down and when 
they have no other place to turn. So I would hope that we would not 
talk about issues of deficit spending when people are being plucked off 
the roofs of their homes or when they are being dislocated hundreds of 
miles from their residences simply because they can't get back into 
their neighborhoods.
  What I also want to talk about is the fact that, since Katrina, we 
have made sure that first responders can communicate with each other. 
There were a number of stories about individuals who wanted to help but 
who couldn't talk to each other. Hopefully, we have started fixing that 
interoperability issue so that those individuals can communicate with 
each other, whether they are paid firemen, volunteer firepersons, or 
whether they are law enforcement at the State, county, or local level, 
because, when we are involved in any natural disaster that is federally 
declared, the constituents who need our help don't want us to get 
bogged down in the territories. They just want the help. Part of the 
help is making sure that these individuals can communicate with each 
other.
  We had nonprofit organizations. The Red Cross, most specifically, was 
severely criticized because of its response to Katrina. A substantial 
number of citizens who were impacted were in low-income, minority 
communities, and we started getting responses such as: ``We don't know 
what to do in those areas''; ``We are afraid to go in those areas.'' 
Yet, if you are part of the national preparedness system, you go and 
help; you don't try to qualify that help. Part of that agreement we 
have with an organization like the Red Cross is that you will do 
better, that you will respond when other organizations don't have the 
capacity.
  We are continuing to work on the Red Cross' response to natural 
disasters in this country. Sometimes they do a good job, and sometimes 
they don't. What we have to do is make sure that, every time they 
respond, they respond in a manner that is helping someone. Regardless 
of people's socioeconomic statuses in life, they are still American 
citizens. I look forward to continuing to work on that.
  The other thing we have to work on, Mr. Speaker, is in making sure 
that the moneys that are sent to the devastated areas don't get 
diverted to other areas.
  In my home State of Mississippi, our Governor at the time diverted 
over $600 million, which was directed to low- and middle-income housing 
problems, to a port expansion, which had nothing to do with housing, 
but the flexibility to do it was there. We had a number of people who 
lost everything they had, and they didn't have any means to come back. 
The moneys that we sent from Washington to attempt to make those 
individuals whole and to reintroduce them to the communities from which 
they had been displaced had been sent to the Port of Gulfport. It is a 
worthy project, but you shouldn't have to take moneys to do that which 
were intended by Congress to go for low- and middle-income housing.
  As of this date, the requirements for that money still have not met 
the satisfaction of not only the HUD officials, but also of members of 
the communities. We should not take moneys in times of emergency and 
fund pet projects. If those projects are worthy to be funded, then 
let's fund them out of traditional sources and not out of emergency 
sources. I am concerned that we do that.
  I want to pay a special tribute to the Mississippi Center for 
Justice, which has done a wonderful job in pursuing the expenditure of 
these funds consistent with the intent of those funds. I want to pay a 
special tribute as well to the Mississippi Conference of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. They have provided 
witnesses and testimony at hearing after hearing as well as 
documentation about the questionable expenditures around Hurricane 
Katrina.
  As I said in the beginning, as one of those individuals who 
experienced Katrina firsthand, our government has to step up and help 
these people in their time of need. What we have done in the last 10 
years is to attempt to fix everything that we have identified that 
didn't work. We have solved our interoperability problem. We have 
provided training for first responders. We have provided evacuation 
routes for individuals so that they know how to leave as

[[Page 13229]]

well as routes for vulnerable populations or whether they are 
handicapped in some form. We have even created opportunities so that 
pets won't be left alone when evacuations occur. All of those things 
are very important because it goes to who we are as a people. So how we 
treat the least of them in their most desperate hours goes to the 
character of who we are as a nation.
  As we mark this 10-year anniversary of Katrina, Mr. Speaker, I want 
us to understand that it is still a work in progress and that it 
doesn't matter whether you live in a house on a hill or if you live in 
a house around the corner that is at a dead end--you are still an 
American citizen. When things like a Hurricane Katrina happen, you 
should rest assured that your government will be Johnny on the spot.
  As I step back from my microphone, I want to compliment the gentleman 
from Louisiana for leading this Special Order, because we should really 
understand how difficult Katrina has been for those individuals who 
were in the brunt.
  Let me also take a point of personal privilege to talk about the good 
job that the men and women of the United States Coast Guard did in 
response to Katrina. They really did a tremendous job in working and in 
managing a lot of the recovery and response to Katrina.
  In August 2005, nearly ten years ago, Hurricane Katrina made landfall 
in Mississippi and ravaged the Gulf Coast.
  The storm pummeled everything in its path.
  Over 1,800 people from Florida to Texas died, including 238 from my 
home State of Mississippi.
  After what felt like an eternity, the storm died down.
  We inventoried our losses, and the painfully slow recovery process 
began.
  1.2 million housing units were damaged, and 120,000 were completely 
destroyed.
  In Southern Mississippi, more than 60 percent of single-family 
dwellings were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable--and the statistics 
were worse for rental units.
  Along the Gulf Coast, over 1 million people were displaced.
  One month after the storm, about 600,000 families were still 
homeless, and ultimately 114,000 were housed in FEMA trailers.
  The recovery process was slow and wrought with mistakes at the 
Federal, State, and local level.
  At the Federal level, chain-of-command and coordination failures 
complicated the quick and efficient delivery of Federal resources, 
undermining both response and recovery efforts.
  Opportunities to pre-stage important resources were missed.
  Interoperable emergency communications challenges and lack of 
qualified, well-trained, and well-funded emergency response personnel--
capability gaps first identified during the response to the September 
11th attacks--persisted.
  Ineffective and underdeveloped disaster housing and disaster 
procurement policies dragged out recovery efforts and drove up costs.
  States appeared to lack capacity to drawdown Federal recovery funds 
quickly or effectively.
  For example, my home state of Mississippi was awarded $3 billion in 
Katrina related infrastructure grants, but by January 2009, it had only 
drawn down a little over half of those funds ($1.7 million).
  FEMA allocated $156 million in hazard mitigation grant funds to 
Mississippi, but the State had only drawn down $40 million two-and-a-
half years after the storm struck.
  My governor at the time diverted $600 million in CDBG funds initially 
intended for the construction of low and middle income housing to a 
port expansion project.
  Parts of southern Mississippi are still feeling the impact of that 
ill-advised decision to this day.
  In the aftermath of the storm, Congress overhauled the national 
emergency management infrastructure by enacting The Post Katrina 
Emergency Management Reform Act, or PKEMRA.
  The legislation sought to address preparedness, response and recovery 
gaps identified through oversight activities carried out by this 
Committee, including:
  (1) apparent uncertainty regarding who had authority to coordinate 
and direct response and recovery efforts under the National Response 
Plan;
  (2) ineffective coordination of Federal, state, local, private sector 
response and recovery efforts;
  (3) inadequate Federal coordination of preparedness planning, 
including lack of effective evacuation and temporary housing plans to 
meet the needs of all of those in a community;
  (4) lack of operable and interoperable communications to support 
response and recovery efforts; and,
  (5) lack of effective emergency alert and warning systems to notify 
the public of potential threats to health and safety.
  Nationally, we have made progress on addressing these gaps.
  For example, we have saved lives by getting people out of danger's 
path with the Integrated Public Alerts and Warnings System.
  Our planning and exercise programs have improved relationships among 
Federal, State, and local responders to facilitate quicker, more 
effective response and recovery efforts.
  And we have honed the national doctrine on preventing, protecting 
against, mitigating the effects of, responding to, and recovering from 
natural and manmade disasters.
  But significant challenges with long term recovery efforts remain.
  For example, the Federal government's failure to have adequate 
disaster housing plans in place before the storm struck resulted in 
last-minute scrambling to find long-term recovery housing for the 
displaced.
  We ended up with botched FEMA trailer contracts that cost taxpayers 
millions of dollars, and ultimately provided Hurricane survivors with 
formaldehyde-laced dwellings.
  A class action lawsuit from 55,000 Gulf Coast Residents against over 
two dozen mobile home manufacturers was finally settled for over $42.5 
million in 2012.
  Despite this difficult lesson, as we saw in 2012 after Hurricane 
Sandy, developing viable disaster housing options for regions across 
the United States continues to be an elusive goal.
  Although we have made progress on achieving interoperability, gaps 
continue to hinder effective responses.
  Despite the horrific loss, survivors demonstrated inspiring 
resilience.
  And the American people proved once again their commitment to helping 
those affected by disaster by sending resources and flocking affected 
areas to aid recovery.
  Over the past decade, Gulf Coast residents, with Federal support and 
the help of volunteers from across the country, have rebuilt much of 
what was lost.
  I would be remiss if I did not mention the important work of the 
Mississippi Conference of the NAACP and the Mississippi Center for 
Justice.
  Both of those organizations traveled to and opened offices on the 
Coast to offer legal services to the thousands of Gulf Coast area 
residents who needed an advocate to help make them whole.
  Notably, they filed a lawsuit on behalf of community groups and 
individuals against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development resulting in a landmark settlement of $132 million dollars 
for low-income households in nine Mississippi counties.
  The Mississippi Center for Justice has continued to spearhead 
numerous Federal and state policy battles to demand and restore safe 
and affordable housing to Hurricane Katrina's most vulnerable 
survivors, including thousands of children.
  The Hurricane Katrina recovery, in many respects, has become a story 
of American perseverance and generosity--and I am glad we are here to 
commemorate and honor it this evening.
  Mr. RICHMOND. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, let me inquire as to how much time I have remaining.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hardy). The gentleman has 17 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. RICHMOND. Mr. Speaker, before I get into some of the 
misconceptions and perceptions that still remain from Katrina, let me 
just finish where the gentleman from Mississippi left off.
  In its aftermath and the rescue and recovery, one of the shining 
stars during Hurricane Katrina was the United States Coast Guard. They 
did a phenomenal job, both day and night, in rescuing people with 
helicopters and boats and everything at their disposal. They didn't 
care if they were tired, and they didn't care if they were hungry. They 
just did the job that they should have done just like most of our 
servicemen. They were the shining stars.

                              {time}  1930

  I mentioned earlier that one of the perceptions that is just 
inaccurate about Katrina was that it was a natural disaster. It is not 
just me who will call it a manmade disaster.
  In 2009, Judge Duval ruled that the Federal Government was liable for 
the

[[Page 13230]]

damage related to MRGO because the canal's original purpose was 
navigation. That decision was affirmed, and then it was overturned by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
  However, on May 1, 2015, a Federal claims judge, Susan Braden, ruled 
that the Army Corps of Engineers is liable for damages resulting from 
flooding during Katrina again and that the damage caused in both St. 
Bernard Parish, which is not in my district, and the lower Ninth Ward 
of New Orleans, which is in my district, was that the Army Corps of 
Engineers was responsible and liable for the damage caused to their 
homes because the Coast Guard was responsible for the increased storm 
surge and flooding during Hurricane Katrina and that the Army Corps 
knew that their failure could have that effect.
  So Judge Braden has ordered that the Federal Government, more 
specifically, the Justice Department, enter into settlement 
negotiations with the attorneys of those residents in both the lower 
Ninth Ward and St. Bernard Parish. I would just continue to urge the 
Federal Government to step up to do that because it is the right thing 
to do.
  Some of the other things that I just want to spend a quick moment in 
correcting are that, after the storm, there was violence in the streets 
and people were shooting at the rescue boats. That was just absolutely 
untrue.
  As I tout the success of the Coast Guard, I have to now question and 
criticize the effort of both the Red Cross and our National Guard.
  In the days after Katrina, there were Red Cross buses on the side of 
the highway that lined from New Orleans all the way to Baton Rouge 
because the buses were scared to go into New Orleans because it was 
dangerous.
  The Red Cross and the National Guard had 18-wheelers and military 
trucks full of water that were designated to go into New Orleans, but 
they were on the side of the interstate opposite the buses because they 
thought it was too dangerous to go into New Orleans.
  Well, Mr. Speaker, I just want to tell you, while the National Guard, 
the Red Cross, and others were scared to go into New Orleans, I myself, 
with another council member, Oliver Thomas at the time, was driving a 
minivan into New Orleans filled with water with no security, no 
protection, and the only thing we encountered were grateful people who 
were looking for some help, some water, some food, and some direction 
as to how and when this recovery would start.
  What I don't want is people to look at New Orleans and remember back 
to those days and just believe the misinformation about all of those 
other things.
  While I am correcting that, let me also touch on why people didn't 
leave. Many people have said people just chose not to leave for various 
reasons, they didn't know better. All of that is absolutely untrue, 
also.
  The biggest reason people didn't leave was that the warnings were 
weak and they were not enough notice. I remember watching the news and 
watching the mayor of New Orleans say: Well, I am sending my family to 
Dallas. If I were you, I would evacuate.
  Well, in moments like this, you need stern warnings and you have to 
be blunt.
  I was on the conference calls where FEMA and Red Cross said that they 
were sending 10,000 body bags. We knew this was the real one. It was 
the time to show leadership and tell people to leave the city in no 
uncertain terms.
  I remember having a conference call with Governor Blanco in which she 
talked about all of these things, along with the Red Cross and FEMA.
  By the time that it was my turn to talk, I said, ``Governor, I 
understand that this is the real deal. However, there are 1,500 people 
across the street from my house playing Little League. They don't get 
the benefit of hearing what you just said on this conference call.''
  It was later that day and the next morning that people pushed, but it 
was only a day out from the storm.
  And then we never talked about the expenses associated with 
evacuating once or twice in the city, packing your family up, driving 
to another city, paying for a hotel, feeding your family, and then 
coming back.
  When that happens over and over again and they were false alarms, if 
you don't give them the stern warning when you know it is the real one, 
you know some people won't leave.
  The last part of it is we came up with a bad idea of using shelters 
that were in harm's way. We had thousands of people in the Louisiana 
Superdome that is located in New Orleans. Well, the Superdome was right 
in harm's way.
  One of the other perceptions--and you actually heard it tonight--was 
that the new New Orleans has a great school system that has turned 
around education in this urban setting, and the truth of the matter is 
it is a work in progress at best.
  The State came in and took over most of our schools, all but maybe 
five or six of them. Out of those 57 schools that they took over, seven 
are B schools, no A schools, 20 are C schools, and 24 are D and F 
schools.
  We still have some work to do in the area of education. We have made 
some improvements, but we have kids now that are being bused and 
staying on the bus almost 2 hours to get to a school in the morning and 
2 hours in the evening. That is not a system that we want.
  Our good schools don't have attendance zones, and it has become a 
maze in order to apply and to get into our better schools.
  Those are things that can be fixed if everybody is willing to come to 
the table and figure out the best way to do it and not look at everyone 
who has suggestions or criticisms of the school system as being an 
enemy.
  Public education: Even if you look at the Brown v. Board of Education 
decision years ago, 50, 75 years ago, that decision came about because 
the Justices talked about how an education is important to being a good 
citizen, thriving, and being a success.
  Because of that, we should spend more time in working to make sure 
that the New Orleans public school system is a system that educates all 
of the kids.
  Whether you are Black or White, whether you are poor or rich, whether 
you live in a great neighborhood or whether you live in a bad 
neighborhood, every kid should have the opportunity to succeed.
  The other thing that people see a lot now, whether we are hosting a 
Super Bowl, the Final Four, or the Sugar Bowl, people assume that the 
city is back because the areas that they cover on TV are the areas that 
are back.
  If you look at Canal Street, Bourbon Street, and all of those areas, 
the Superdome, the New Orleans arena, they are back.
  However, there are still areas that are not back. You still have 
areas where homeowners are still struggling to rebuild.
  You can look at the lower Ninth Ward. You can look at the upper Ninth 
Ward. You can look at Gentilly. You can look at New Orleans East. Those 
areas are still fighting to recover.
  You can look at some of the complaints from homeowners when the Road 
Home process was set up. They complain that they were fingerprinted and 
treated like criminals during the application process in the onset of 
asking for government assistance.
  Remember, we are talking about homeowners, the most responsible 
people in a community, being fingerprinted and treated like criminals 
during the application process.
  Also, the Federal Government prohibited grants exceeding the value of 
a property. So Road Home tied its calculation to a home's prestorm 
value as opposed to the actual cost of rebuilding.
  So when you look at the 36,000 grant recipient collection letters for 
alleged overpayments, duplication of insurance proceeds, or failure to 
comply with the covenants, you see 36,000 people that are being 
unjustly punished by the Federal Government.
  I would just say that we said it very early on in the process, that 
using appraised value was going to harm minority communities because an 
appraisal is subjective, depending on where you

[[Page 13231]]

live. So homes in the more affluent areas of New Orleans appraised a 
lot higher.
  I can just tell you, doing electrical work when I was small, doing 
construction work, to rebuild a 1,500-square-foot house, whether it is 
in Lakeview or whether it is in the lower Ninth Ward, Sheetrock, 
plywood, screws, and nails are all going to cost the same. Instead of 
using appraised value, we should have used rebuilding cost. That is 
just not my opinion.
  I will tell you that the Federal court ruled that the Road Home's 
method of calculating grants discriminated against African American 
homeowners. That was back in 2010.
  The problem with that ruling was that, in order for the State to stop 
using prestorm value to calculate Road Home grants, it was only for the 
future grants. By that time, a majority of the grants had already been 
given out.
  So I will just tell you that that $62 million in additional grants 
helped about 1,500 homeowners. Remember, we had over 100,000 properties 
that were damaged in the storm. So you can see the abundance of people 
that did not get assistance.
  Some of the other remaining issues with Road Home was that we still 
have people who need money to get back into their homes because they 
have an unmet need.
  HUD could have done something very simple to figure out where we are 
now, and that is to figure out what people received from their 
insurance company, what people received from FEMA, and what people 
received from Road Home.
  You add those up and then you figure out the cost to rebuild. If the 
rebuilding cost exceeds those, that is the unmet need that we need help 
from the government because there is money that is still available.
  I would say we need the Federal Government to actually take some 
time, investigate, and figure out how we can use the unused money to 
make people whole that were not made whole in the beginning.
  Also, let me bring up just one other thing so you can get a full idea 
of the picture of New Orleans. If you just look at rent, in the 9 years 
since Katrina, the share of people paying 50 percent of their income 
for rent is now 37 percent.
  So what you are really saying is that secure housing cost burdens 50 
percent of household income, and that indicates a serious problem in 
housing affordability.
  In 2004, just to give you a reference, the share of severely cost-
burdened renters in New Orleans was 24 percent. Now it is 37 percent in 
New Orleans. It is 26 percent nationally.
  That is a problem and we really need to work on it because, if you 
can't live in the city, you can't work in the city. This government is 
better than that.
  So the other thing I would just say is that people think we are back 
and we are rebuilt, and that is not the case. The other thing is that 
people think that we received everything we need to rebuild.
  I would say that Congress, the government, and the President did a 
great job in immediately sending down $14 billion to New Orleans and 
putting it in a fund, which is unheard of in Congress, to take money 
and just put it in a fund and say: Corps of Engineers, as you rebuild 
the levee, spend this money, protect New Orleans. They did it, and they 
did a good job of doing it.
  We still have outlying areas that need flood control. If you look at 
the cost of Katrina--and I will give you a few figures--you will see 
that we still have a gap.
  You had $150 billion in damages. Most of the Federal spending went 
for relief, not rebuilding. $120.5 billion in total spending. Emergency 
relief was 75 billion. Rebuilding funds was 45 billion.
  So if you look at the Federal funding, private insurance claims, and 
charitable giving, it still leaves a gap of about $60 billion. When you 
talk about a gap of $60 billion, I just want you to understand what 
that means.
  That means, in every community, every neighborhood, including mine, 
you will see five houses where people have come back, saved up money, 
and rebuilt using both insurance, savings, retirement, FEMA, government 
money. Then you will see a house or two that is not rebuilt at all.
  Then if you go down to the lower Ninth Ward, you will see one house 
that is rebuilt. Then you will see six or seven houses that are not 
rebuilt where the grass is just as high as the trees and it looks like 
a forest.
  If you are that one homeowner that took the time to come home and 
rebuild and you have to pass that every night, it is just not a safe 
situation. We, as a country, can do better than that.
  So what I would hope is that, as we continue the process of helping 
New Orleans and Louisiana recover from Katrina, that we look at the 
lessons learned and we find the people who still have unmet needs, we 
find the people that are still not back in their homes who want to be 
in their homes, and we figure out a way to help them.

                              {time}  1945

  That is what HUD is for. We still have the money, and in fact, 
citizens and community groups--and I can think of a bunch of them, A 
Community Voice, Justice and Beyond--all of those groups have been 
asking Congress and the inspector general to do an audit and an 
investigation of how much funds we received, where did they go, what is 
left, how do we move forward and make sure that everyone who wants to 
come home has the ability to come home.
  Now, all of those things and, I think, lessons learned and 
misperceptions of Katrina, I think we have to take those same things 
and look at Sandy and all other hurricanes.
  What I wanted to do before we went home for a break and celebrate the 
10th anniversary of Katrina is to let people know that we still have 
needs; we still have things we have to do to complete the recovery, but 
also thank Congress for what they did do.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

                          ____________________